Report to Congressional Committees

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

November 2001 MILITARY

TRANSFORMATION

Army Has a

Comprehensive Plan

for Managing Its

Transformation but

Faces Major

Challenges

GAO-02-96
Page i GAO-02-96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Scope and Methodology 3

Briefing Section I Background 6

Briefing Section II Management of the Transformation 14

Briefing Section III Key Challenges 26

Briefing Section IV Conclusions 42

Appendix I Transformation Campaign Plan’s Lines of Operation,

Missions, and Objectives 44

Appendix II Combat, Aircraft, and Support Systems and

Equipment Planned for Recapitalization or Upgrade

During Army Transformation 46

Appendix III Comments From the Department of Defense 47

Table

Table 1: Roles and Responsibilities in Army’s Transformation

Campaign Plan 15

Contents
Page ii GAO-02-96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

Figures

Figure 1: Army’s Depiction of Its Transformation 8

Figure 2: Army’s Estimated Schedule for Transforming Its Existing

Combat Forces Into the Future Objective Force 10

Abbreviations

CINC Commander in Chief

DOD Department of Defense
Page 1 GAO-02-96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

November 16, 2001

The Honorable Carl Levin

Chairman

The Honorable John W. Warner

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Bob Stump

Chairman

The Honorable Ike Skelton

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Army has begun to transform itself from a Cold War-oriented force

into a more rapidly deployable and responsive force better able to meet

the diverse defense challenges of the future. The far-reaching

organizational and operational changes that the Army plans will affect

virtually every element of the Army and take decades to implement. In

addition, funding the transformation, including developing and acquiring

future combat systems and modernizing aging equipment, will be difficult.

To implement the transformation, the Army has developed a

Transformation Campaign Plan. The Campaign Plan is a mechanism for

integrating transformation efforts within the Army and for achieving the

goal of transforming the Army over 30 years.

Pursuant to our basic legislative responsibilities, we are monitoring the

Army’s transformation efforts. This report is the second of a planned

series of reports related to these efforts.1

 It (1) assesses the Army’s

processes for managing transformation efforts and (2) identifies key

challenges that the Army faces in managing its transformation. We briefed

your offices on the results of our work in July and September 2001. This

report summarizes and updates the major messages of those briefings and

is being provided because of your oversight responsibilities.

 1

 We previously reported on acquisition challenges of the Army’s transformation efforts.

See Defense Acquisition: Army Transformation Faces Weapon Systems Challenges

(GAO-01-311, May 21, 2001).

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, DC 20548
Page 2 GAO-02-96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

The Army has a comprehensive process for managing its transformation

efforts over the next 30 years. Its Transformation Campaign Plan serves as

a common frame of reference for officials throughout the Army. It defines

transformation goals, sets milestones for achieving them, and assigns lines

of responsibilities for each aspect of the plan. The Army has established

several forums at various levels of the organization to discuss evolving

issues and address matters of concern. Because the plan affects every part

of the Army, it is accompanied by an electronic tool that permits

responsible parties in the Army to synchronize their efforts, track

progress, and adjust plans as problems arise. To ensure that

transformation becomes a part of the Army’s normal operations rather

than a separate initiative, the Army’s plans have been integrated into

existing planning, budgeting, and decision-making processes. The key

strategies and concepts of the Army’s plans were developed with the

participation and ongoing input of the Commanders in Chief of the Unified

Combatant Commands and the Army Service Component Commands.

However, the lack of an overall Department of Defense (DOD)

transformation strategy has led the Army to proceed with its

transformation plans solely on the basis of broad departmental guidance

rather than a clear understanding of how its efforts fit into an overall

scheme for military transformation. Although the results of the

Quadrennial Defense Review as well as other events are likely to affect the

Army’s plans, the Transformation Campaign Plan appears to be flexible

enough to permit the Army to adapt its plans to evolving events.

However, the existence of a comprehensive management plan does not

diminish the challenges the Army faces in implementing it. The Army’s

plans are highly dependent on near-term technological advances that are

uncertain and long-term funding commitments. The following are among

the key challenges that we identified:

• Keeping the program on track despite many uncertainties concerning the

maturity and feasibility of new technologies that will be needed to

implement new warfighting concepts.

• Meeting ambitious milestones for forming the first transformational

brigades despite delays in fielding the interim armored vehicles,

designating subsequent brigades, and validating capabilities.

Results in Brief

Technology

Schedule
Page 3 GAO-02-96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

• Achieving highly optimistic goals for equipping the future Objective Force,

given the uncertainty of whether needed technologies can mature quickly

enough.

• Maintaining readiness while simultaneously equipping, training, and

sustaining Legacy, Interim, and Objective Forces—three distinctly

different forces, each with a unique focus.2

• Streamlining logistics to support ambitious rapid deployment goals.

• Maintaining continuity and proficiency in the face of frequent rotations,

training soldiers to the broad range of skills needed to respond to the full

range of military operations, integrating reserve forces into the Army’s

transformation plans, and retaining personnel with advanced technical

skills greatly demanded in the civilian economy.

• Obtaining sustained support of military and civilian leaders as well as the

Congress over a period of 30 years in the face of competing national

security priorities and domestic concerns.

Because the Army is in the early stages of implementing its

transformation, we are not making any recommendations at this time.

In written comments on a draft of this report (see app. III), DOD generally

agreed with the report and said the Department will continue to address

these challenges as it attempts to maintain current timelines. DOD also

provided technical comments that we incorporated where appropriate.

To assess the Army’s management of transformation efforts, we focused

our review on the key strategic document that the Army developed to

guide its transformation efforts—the Army Transformation Campaign

Plan. To gain a clear understanding of transformation plans, we reviewed

documents and interviewed officials involved in transformation planning

in the Offices of the Deputy Chief of Army Staff for Operations and Plans,

Washington, D.C. To gain a clear understanding of roles and

responsibilities, we interviewed officials and received briefings from the

various Army staff offices responsible for key aspects of the

 2

 Legacy Force refers to those selected existing forces that the Army will modernize as it

transforms. Interim Force refers to the first six to eight brigades that will be used as a

bridge to the Army’s future Objective Force, which is scheduled to begin fielding in 2008.

Acquisitions

Operations

Human Capital

Funding

Scope and

Methodology
Page 4 GAO-02-96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

transformation as well as major Army commands, including U.S. Army

Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia, and U.S. Army

Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia. As part of this work, we

discussed how the transformation was being integrated into Army

operations. To determine the organizational structure and operational

capabilities of the Initial Brigade Combat Teams, we obtained documents

and interviewed officials of the Army’s I Corps, the first Interim Brigade

Combat Team, and the Army Training and Doctrine Command’s Brigade

Coordination Cell, all of which are located at Fort Lewis, Washington.

To gain the perspective of commanders in the field on the extent of their

participation in transformation plans and issues of concern to them, we

discussed transformation plans with representatives of the U.S. Central

Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida; U.S. Pacific Command and

U.S. Army, Pacific, Honolulu, Hawaii; U.S. Forces Korea and 8th U.S.

Army, Seoul, Korea; U.S. European Command, Stuttgart, Germany; and

U.S. Army Europe, Heidelberg, Germany. We also discussed with them the

extent of their participation in forums intended to coordinate

transformation.

From these briefings and discussions, we identified key challenges that the

transformation poses to the Army. We conducted our review from

November 2000 through August 2001 in accordance with generally

accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the

Secretary of the Army; the Secretary of the Navy; the Secretary of the Air

Force; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; the Director, Office of

Management and Budget; and other interested parties. We will make

copies available to others on request and through the GAO home page at

www.gao.gov.
Page 5 GAO-02-96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

If you or your staff have any questions, please call me on (202) 512-3958.

Major contributors to this report were Reginald L. Furr, Jr.;

Kenneth F. Daniell; Kevin C. Handley; M. Jane Hunt; and Leo B. Sullivan.

Carol R. Schuster

Director, Defense Capabilities

 and Management
Briefing Section I: Background

Page 6 GAO-02-96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

Briefing Section I: Background
Briefing Section I: Background

Page 7 GAO-02-96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

The Chief of Staff of the Army announced in October 1999 that the Army

was developing plans to transform its current Cold War organization and

equipment to a lighter, more strategically responsive force to fill what it

sees as a strategic gap in current warfighting capabilities. The Army

believes that the transformation is necessary to respond more effectively

to (1) the growing number of peacekeeping operations and small-scale

contingencies and (2) the challenges posed by nontraditional threats such

as weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. According to Army

officials, light infantry forces can deploy rapidly but lack combat power,

tactical mobility, and capability for sustained operations. Conversely, its

heavy forces that rely more on tanks and other armored vehicles have

unmatched combat power, tactical mobility, and capability for sustained

operations but require too much time to deploy and require extensive

materiel support.

Transformation plans call for being able to deploy a combat-capable

brigade anywhere in the world within 96 hours, a division in 120 hours,

and five divisions in 30 days. To do this, the Army plans to develop new

equipment, transform its concepts and doctrine, build unit organizations

that can adapt readily to changes in the intensity of a given military

operation, and change how it trains its soldiers and leaders.
Briefing Section I: Background

Page 8 GAO-02-96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

Figure 1: Army’s Depiction of Its Transformation

Legend:

BCT = Brigade Combat Team

R&D = research and development

S&T = science and technology

Source: Department of the Army.
Briefing Section I: Background

Page 9 GAO-02-96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

The Army plans to transform its forces over 30+ years. Its initial plans are

to form two Interim Brigade Combat Teams at Fort Lewis, Washington.

These forces, along with four to six additional brigades, will comprise the

Army’s Interim Force.1

 According to plans, the brigades will be organized,

trained, and equipped with new light-armored wheeled vehicles (“interim

armored vehicles”) that are significantly lighter and more transportable

than existing tanks and armored vehicles. The initial brigade is to achieve

its initial operating capability in 2003, and all Interim Force brigades are to

be formed and equipped by about 2008. The Army is optimizing these

forces for use in small-scale contingencies but also intends to use them in

the full range of military operations when augmented and employed with

Army divisions. During this interim period, they are to validate new

doctrine and organizational structures, develop insights for subsequent

transformation, and provide a bridge to the Army’s future force—the

Objective Force.

Beginning in 2008 and continuing beyond 2030, the Army plans to

transition to its Objective Force. During this period, all Army forces,

including the Interim Force, are to be transformed into new organizational

structures operating under new warfighting doctrine. Their new combat

systems are to be lighter and more mobile, deployable, lethal, survivable,

and sustainable than current systems. Currently, four competing research

and development teams are working on alternative designs for these future

combat systems. The Army is to select the most promising technologies

from these competing teams by 2003.

As the Army transitions to its Objective Force, it plans to maintain the

organizational designs of a portion of its existing combat force, which it

terms its Legacy Force, and will modernize selected equipment in this

force. This equipment includes such major weapons systems as the M1A1

Abrams tank, Bradley Fighting vehicle, and Black Hawk helicopter. This

selective modernization is intended to enable the Army to maintain

capability and readiness until the future combat systems are delivered to

the Objective Force.

 1

 On July 12, 2001, the Army announced the unit designations and locations of the next four

Interim Brigade Combat Teams. The next four brigades are the 172nd Infantry Brigade

(Separate), Forts Wainwright and Richardson, Alaska; the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment

(Light), Fort Polk, Louisiana; the 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (Light), Schofield

Barracks, Hawaii; and the 56th Brigade of the 28th Infantry Division (Mechanized),

Pennsylvania Army National Guard.
Briefing Section I: Background

Page 10 GAO-02-96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

Figure 2: Army’s Estimated Schedule for Transforming Its Existing Combat Forces Into the Future Objective Force

Legend:

ARNG = Army National Guard

BCT = Brigade Combat Teams

CA = counter attack

FY = fiscal year

Source: Department of the Army.
Briefing Section I: Background

Page 11 GAO-02-96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

The Army’s current combat force is made up of (1) heavy Legacy Forces

that comprise its Counter Attack Corps, (2) other active-duty combat

forces, (3) Army National Guard combat forces, and (4) Army National

Guard-enhanced separate brigades. The six- to eight-brigade Interim Force

is to begin entering the Army’s force in 2003.

As figure 2 shows, the Army plans to transform its entire combat force

over the next 30 years to Objective Force designs while phasing out

Legacy and Interim Forces. For example, through modernization and

recapitalization, Counter Attack Corps brigades are to retain their current

warfighting capabilities until they begin transforming to Objective Force

brigades in about 2020. The plan calls for their transformation to be

completed by 2026. Transformation of the active-duty non-Counter Attack

Corps, National Guard-enhanced separate brigades and other National

Guard divisional forces is to be completed from 2020 to about 2030. The

six to eight Interim Brigade Combat Teams are to be the last to transform

and will not become part of the Objective Force until after 2030.
Briefing Section I: Background

Page 12 GAO-02-96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan
Briefing Section I: Background

Page 13 GAO-02-96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

Under current plans, the Army’s transformation would affect all elements

of the Army, including its operational combat force; the Institutional Army,

which includes the Army’s training centers and schools; and support

forces.

Transforming the Operational Army involves developing new warfighting

concepts and capabilities—the way the Army fights. Transforming the

Institutional Army will involve such things as changing training and

training facilities to support the new operational forces. As part of this

effort, the Army plans to change the way it trains soldiers and leaders and

develop multifunctional soldiers who will be better equipped to handle

complex and varying situations. It plans also to modernize its Combat

Training Centers and schools to keep pace with changes in force structure,

doctrine, and technology.

An important element of transformation will be to streamline support

forces and logistics processes to enable faster deployment, improve

mobility, and more effectively sustain operational forces. Finally, the Army

is considering plans to extend new operational force designs beyond its

brigades by fielding interim divisions and new capabilities at the corps

level. The Army has not yet finalized the details of the structures and

operational concepts at these levels of organization.
Briefing Section II: Management of the

Transformation

Page 14 GAO-02-96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

To manage its transformation, the Army has developed and adopted a

Transformation Campaign Plan, which is intended to integrate and

synchronize all elements of its transformation. This plan establishes a

common framework for guiding transformation activities throughout the

Army and is intended as a living document that will require changes and

refinements as Army efforts evolve.

The plan describes the national security conditions upon which

transformation is based; articulates the mission and goals of the

Briefing Section II: Management of the

Transformation
Briefing Section II: Management of the

Transformation

Page 15 GAO-02-96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

transformation; and describes in detail the objectives of, and activities

associated with, each phase of the transformation. It also establishes

major decision points and the conditions that must be met to proceed to

each successive step in its transformation. For example, the decision to

transition from the Initial Force (first two brigades) to the Interim Force is

to be made when the first battalion of the initial Brigade Combat Team has

fielded its Interim Armored Vehicles and associated initial equipment,

including some substitute items as necessary.

Table 1: Roles and Responsibilities in Army’s Transformation Campaign Plan

Lines of operation Secretary of Army oversight Proponent organization

Strategic Requirements & Planning Manpower & Reserve Affairs Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations

Modernization and Recapitalization Acquisition, Logistics & Technology Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations

Manning the Force/ Investing in Quality

People

Manpower & Reserve Affairs Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

Maintain Unit Readiness & Training Manpower & Reserve Affairs Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations

Training and Leader Development Manpower & Reserve Affairs Training & Doctrine Command

Joint/Army Strategy & Concepts International Affairs Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations

Army Doctrine Manpower & Reserve Affairs Training & Doctrine Command

Operational Force Design Manpower & Reserve Affairs Training & Doctrine Command

Deploying and Sustaining Acquisition, Logistics and Technology Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics

Develop & Acquire Advanced Technology Acquisition, Logistics and Technology Army Materiel Command

Management of Force Programs Manpower & Reserve Affairs Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations

Installations Installations and Environment Assistant Chief of Staff for Installations

Strategic Communications Public Affairs Army Chief of Staff

Resourcing Financial Management & Comptroller Program Analysis & Evaluation

Source: Department of the Army.

As shown in table 1, the Campaign Plan outlines 14 functional areas for the

transformation—“lines of operation” in Campaign Plan parlance. These

lines of operation coincide with such established programmatic and

decision-making areas as doctrine, training, leader development,

organization, materiel, soldier systems, and facilities. The last two—

Strategic Communications and Resourcing—support the overall Campaign

Plan. Strategic Communications seeks to inform and educate others about

the transformation. Resourcing includes integrating transformation

resource requirements into the planning and budgeting process. The

mission and objectives for the 14 lines of operations are listed in

appendix I.

Entities within the Office of the Secretary of the Army and various offices

under the purview of the Army Chief of Staff have been assigned
Briefing Section II: Management of the

Transformation

Page 16 GAO-02-96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

responsibilities for the activities associated with these 14 areas. This

coupling of counterpart civilian and military commands and offices is

intended to foster cooperation in achieving transformation goals across

the Army. The Campaign Plan articulates the specific roles and

responsibilities for these entities and delineates where coordination

among offices is necessary.
Briefing Section II: Management of the

Transformation

Page 17 GAO-02-96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan
Briefing Section II: Management of the

Transformation

Page 18 GAO-02-96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan
Briefing Section II: Management of the

Transformation

Page 19 GAO-02-96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

The Army Chief of Staff directed that the transformation be planned within

existing planning and budgeting systems. Accordingly, the Director, Office

of Program Analysis and Evaluation, is to integrate Army transformation

requirements into the Army’s Planning, Programming, and Budgeting

Execution System to ensure that adequate funding is available to meet

transformation objectives. The Director is to identify and validate resource

requirements; ensure that the transformation timeline is synchronized with

the planning, programming, and budgeting process; and prioritize

requirements for inclusion in the Army’s annual Program Objective

Memorandum and annual budget.

The management of transformation-related force structure changes is to

be accomplished by integrating proposed organizational changes into the

upcoming Total Army Analysis, a process by which the Army determines

its force structure. Personnel requirements and changes are to be reflected

in preparing the Army’s 2003 Program Objective Memorandum. Similarly,

transformation-related modernization and acquisitions are integrated into

the existing Army Modernization Plan.
Briefing Section II: Management of the

Transformation

Page 20 GAO-02-96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan
Briefing Section II: Management of the

Transformation

Page 21 GAO-02-96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

The Army has established several forums at various levels of the

organization to discuss evolving issues and address matters of concern.

These forums coordinate and synchronize decision-making for the

Campaign Plan throughout the Army. General Officers representing the

Campaign Plan’s 14 lines of operation participate in biweekly

synchronization briefings with the Army Vice Chief of Staff. Key decision

points are discussed at these briefings. These briefings are followed by

biweekly meetings where staff officers representing the lines of operation

are provided with feedback on decisions made in the General Officer

briefings, discuss issues, and assign required actions. Another forum for

gaining input from the field is the Commanders in Chief (CINC)

Requirements Task Force, which meets quarterly to address current and

future CINC requirements. According to Army officials in the field, their

participation in this forum has enabled them to raise issues that concern

them. The Army has also established various special task forces that meet

regularly to address specific issues related to the transformation. The

Army Chief of Staff receives regular briefings on the proceedings of these

groups.

To help manage its decision-making process across the lines of operation,

the Army has developed a software program that synchronizes and links

thousands of interrelated tasks, decision points, and milestones.

Representatives of the lines of operation meet regularly to synchronize

and track the progress of ongoing tasks and decision points.
Briefing Section II: Management of the

Transformation

Page 22 GAO-02-96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan
Briefing Section II: Management of the

Transformation

Page 23 GAO-02-96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

The Interim Brigade Combat Teams are intended to meet what the Army

sees as a critical strategic capabilities gap. However, the Army is also

using the Combat Teams as a means for testing and validating the

concepts, doctrine, and training that the Objective Force may ultimately

adopt. As such, the ongoing activities of the initial brigades serve as an

evaluation mechanism for the Campaign Plan.

As the brigades are being formed, the Army War College complements this

evaluation activity by conducting wargaming and analyses of new

concepts and organizational designs. The results of these analyses are fed

back to Army force developers and trainers so that transformation

concepts and plans can be continually refined.

The Army Test and Evaluation Command, Center for Army Lessons

Learned, Army schools, and the initial brigade at Fort Lewis are

cooperating in capturing lessons learned in forming the initial brigade. For

example, the Army is developing an installation template that subsequent

brigades can use to establish the necessary facilities and infrastructure

needed for these new brigades.
Briefing Section II: Management of the

Transformation

Page 24 GAO-02-96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan
Briefing Section II: Management of the

Transformation

Page 25 GAO-02-96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

The Secretary of Defense’s 2001 Annual Report to Congress, issued by the

previous administration, highlighted military transformation as a priority

activity. It highlighted the importance of service and joint concept

development and experimentation and new technologies, concepts, and

capabilities to transformation. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in

Joint Vision 2020, also included transformation goals. The current

administration has indicated that transformation will have a prominent

place in its defense program. Accordingly, there is a general agreement

that transformed U.S. military forces are needed to respond effectively to

the changing security environment of the 21st century.

Beyond these broad documents and statements, the Department of

Defense (DOD) has not put forward an overall DOD strategy for advancing

transformation to guide the services’ efforts. As a result, each of the

services, including the Army, has approached transformation without a

clear indication of how its individual efforts fit into an overall scheme for

transformation. In its September 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review

report, the Department of Defense said it will establish a new office

reporting directly to the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

The Director, Force Transformation will evaluate the transformation

efforts of the Military Departments and recommend steps to integrate their

transformation activities.
Briefing Section III: Key Challenges

Page 26 GAO-02-96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

Briefing Section III: Key Challenges
Briefing Section III: Key Challenges

Page 27 GAO-02-96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

The Army has made substantial progress in implementing its

transformation since it was announced in October 1999. By March 2000,

the Army had completed the requirements and the solicitation to acquire

interim armored vehicles for its Interim Brigade Combat Teams; the

contract was awarded November 17, 2000. The Army has also made

substantial progress in developing new doctrine and organizational and

operational designs for the new Brigade Combat Teams and has begun

forming its initial brigade at Fort Lewis, Washington. In February 2000, the

Army and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency entered into a

6-year collaborative program to explore, design, and test new technologies

vital to the Army’s future Objective Force. These technologies include

robotics, sensors, new fuel and power systems, advanced armor, and

command and control networks. In May 2000, the Army selected four

contractor teams to concurrently work on design concepts for these new

capabilities.

But while progress has been impressive, the Army clearly faces significant,

interrelated challenges in implementing its transformation. The following

charts outline what we see as some key challenges in technology, the

Interim Force schedule, acquisitions,1

 operations, human capital, and

funding.

 1

 We discussed acquisition challenges in more detail in Defense Acquisition: Army

Transformation Faces Weapon Systems Challenges (GAO-01-311, May 21, 2001).
Briefing Section III: Key Challenges

Page 28 GAO-02-96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan
Briefing Section III: Key Challenges

Page 29 GAO-02-96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

The ultimate success of the Army’s transformation strategy, schedule, and

key operational capabilities hinges on achieving anticipated science and

technology advances. The Army believes that science and technology

breakthroughs within the next 2 to 3 years will enable industry to produce

lighter, yet highly lethal and survivable, armored combat systems.

However, such technology breakthroughs are far from certain. The Army

is also counting on advances in digital communications and computer

information systems technology to achieve enhanced situational

awareness on the battlefield.2

 The Army sees this capability as critical to

the warfighting concepts of both the Interim and Objective Forces and to

attaining an adequate level of force protection and survivability.

The Army is also hoping that emerging technology will make it possible to

produce combat systems that are more reliable and fuel efficient, thus

reducing the amount of deployed spare parts and fuel to maintain and

operate them. Reducing the weight of future combat systems and their

sustainment requirements in this manner is critical to the Army’s ability to

meet the rapid deployment goals it has set for itself. Advanced digital

communications and computer capabilities are also critical capabilities in

order to move to sustainment concepts that rely more on quickly moving

supplies and parts to the battlefield rather than taking them all along.

To reduce the weight of armored combat systems while maintaining

survivability, and improve their reliability and fuel efficiency, the Army has

asked the science and technology community to provide a comprehensive

set of technological recommendations by 2003. Much of the technology

that the Army needs for these capabilities is still in the early stages of

concept development, and technology advances to provide the answers

that the Army seeks are not guaranteed. There also are no assurances that

industry can produce affordable future combat systems light enough to

meet the air deployability requirements without sacrificing their lethality

and survivability. Nor are there assurances that advanced digital

technology will provide the situational awareness and the advancements

in logistics operations that the Army will need. Many uncertainties

surround the associated cost and capabilities of these future combat

systems, and the Army will be challenged in estimating both cost and

capabilities until the technologies are fully developed and tested.

 2

 Situational awareness is the ability to see and understand the battlespace before coming

into actual contact with the opponent through the use of advanced command, control,

communications, computer, and intelligence systems.
Briefing Section III: Key Challenges

Page 30 GAO-02-96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

Owing to delays in the acquisition and fielding schedules for interim

armored vehicles, the Army is not likely to meet its original schedule for

forming the planned six to eight Brigade Combat Teams that comprise its

Interim Force. Longer-than-expected development work for three of the

interim armored vehicle variants (the mobile gun system, the fire support

vehicle, and the chemical reconnaissance vehicle) resulted in a 16-month

delay in the original vehicle-fielding schedule. Also, another contractor

making an offer protested the award; and work under the contract was
Briefing Section III: Key Challenges

Page 31 GAO-02-96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

suspended about 4 months, pending the outcome of the protest, which was

denied in April 2001.

Delays in fielding the interim armored vehicles have disrupted the Army’s

original training schedule for the brigade, ultimately setting back the date

the Army planned to have the brigade reach initial operational capability.

The original estimate for achieving this milestone has been extended from

December 2001 to no later than May 2003—a minimum delay of about

16 months. Such delays could jeopardize the scheduled transition to the

Objective Force in 2008, since there may be insufficient time to fully

evaluate and refine the organizational and operational concepts for the

new Interim Brigade Combat Teams.

The Army named its next four Interim Brigade Combat Teams in July

2001—4 months later than expected (Mar. 2001). This delay could pose

challenges to Army planning officials, who say they will need at least 3 to

5 years of lead time to plan and construct maintenance and other

installation facilities that the new brigades will need. Army officials

advised us that officials were working on these issues even before the

locations were officially announced and will incorporate needed funding

in the next programming and budget cycle. They acknowledged, however,

that installation planners face many challenges in forming the initial

brigade as did the planners at Fort Lewis.

Delays in forming these initial brigades and in evaluating their capabilities

have raised questions about what capabilities the regional CINCs can

expect from the Interim Brigade Combat Teams. Planners in the field

believe that they need better information on the projected combat

capabilities of these brigades so that they can assess and mitigate any risks

that might be involved in their employment. Similarly, logistics officials in

the field expressed a need for better information on how these new

brigades are to be supported to adequately plan for their use. The degree

of uncertainty associated with both projected combat capability and

logistical support will continue to pose substantial challenges to planners

in the field.
Briefing Section III: Key Challenges

Page 32 GAO-02-96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan
Briefing Section III: Key Challenges

Page 33 GAO-02-96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

The Army plans to develop the future combat systems concepts, design the

systems, and field them over an 8-year period. The first Objective Force

brigade is to be equipped in fiscal year 2008 and reach its initial operating

capability by fiscal year 2010. However, DOD historically has not been able

to develop high-technology systems within such a relatively short period.

Its average acquisition cycle for all systems has been from 10 to 15 years.

For example, both the Comanche helicopter and Crusader self-propelled

artillery system required significantly more time in development than

originally envisioned. The Comanche will have been in development for

23 years and the Crusader for over 16 years before their planned fielding

dates.

A key question is whether the envisioned technologies will reach maturity

in time to meet projected time lines. Under current plans, the Army

projects that, by 2003, it will need to decide whether the key technologies

required for the future combat systems will be mature enough to enter the

systems development stage in fiscal year 2006. Developing these systems

is likely to require a number of significant advances in science and

technology, and Army officials agree that counting on the maturity of these

systems at the time they are needed is high risk. Army officials advised us

that, if needed technologies were not mature at that time, the Army would

proceed with the most promising technologies available and then modify

the systems later to incrementally improve their capabilities over time.

The Army realizes that it may need to make schedule and other

adjustments as conditions change.

The Army’s plans also call for recapitalizing or upgrading 17 existing

systems in both active and reserve components to provide combat

capability until it transitions to the Objective Force. Recapitalization plans

include such key combat systems as the Abrams tank, Bradley Fighting

Vehicle, and Apache helicopter. (See app. III for a listing.) Concurrently

fielding interim armored vehicles, developing and procuring future combat

systems, and carrying out the recapitalization of existing systems will pose

challenges that may require prioritization and trade-offs.
Briefing Section III: Key Challenges

Page 34 GAO-02-96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

The transformation poses numerous operational challenges related to

maintenance, training, personnel requirements, installations, and logistics,

since it will need to simultaneously support three different forces—

Legacy, Interim, and Objective Forces—beginning in about 2010.

Maintaining and supporting the Legacy Force’s tracked tanks and combat

vehicles, the Interim Force’s interim armored vehicles, and the Objective

Force’s envisioned combat systems will require different types of facilities

and occupational specialties to maintain them and different logistics

operations and support capabilities to deploy and sustain them. Similarly,
Briefing Section III: Key Challenges

Page 35 GAO-02-96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

training three forces is likely to be difficult because officers and soldiers

will need to undergo training on different equipment and in skills geared

toward different doctrine, tactics, and organizational designs.

Furthermore, supporting the different types of training will cause the

Army’s combat training centers and schools to make significant

adjustments.

Creating the Army’s ability to deploy forces and equipment quickly is a

critical aspect of the transformation. Ultimately, the Army hopes to attain

the capability to deploy a combat-capable brigade anywhere in the world

in 96 hours, a division in 120 hours, and five divisions in 30 days. To meet

these capabilities, the Army may need more airlift aircraft than the Air

Force can provide. In 1998, DOD initiated a major study to update its

mobility requirements and programs. The study, Mobility Requirements

Study 2005, found that DOD is currently operating with a significant

strategic airlift shortfall. The study also found that insufficient airlift

assets, low mission-capable rates for the air fleet, insufficient crew-toaircraft ratios, and shortages of spare parts have created shortfalls in

strategic airlift across the services. Given the current airlift shortfalls and

the increased demand on airlift that the Army’s transformed forces will

require, the Army’s goals for rapid air deployability may be difficult to

achieve. Acknowledging this potential shortfall, Army officials are now

examining how the deployment goals might be achieved through a

combination of airlift, fast sealift, and prepositioning of needed equipment

abroad.

One of the principal operational challenges facing the Army is increasing

strategic responsiveness across the spectrum of potential conflicts

anywhere in the world. Success will require the Army to improve and

streamline logistics operations and reduce sustainment requirements. The

Army is currently working on ways to reduce the sustainment

requirements of the Interim and Objective Forces to levels well below

those of its heavy Legacy Forces, which require extensive stockpiled

materiel for support. Again, success depends on the Army’s development

of the technology required to produce future combat systems that are as

lethal and survivable as the current heavy-weapons systems, yet light

enough to be transported in a C-130-type aircraft. Technological

breakthroughs that can reduce sustainment requirements through better

reliability of systems and increased efficiency in power, fuel, and

ammunition consumption will be necessary. Advances in information

technology will also be needed to provide the real-time logistics control

and support capabilities that are a critical part of the Army’s efforts to

streamline its logistics processes. In addition, the Army’s efforts to
Briefing Section III: Key Challenges

Page 36 GAO-02-96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

transform its support forces are of major importance to successfully

reducing the number of people that need to be deployed to support the

combat forces.
Briefing Section III: Key Challenges

Page 37 GAO-02-96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan
Briefing Section III: Key Challenges

Page 38 GAO-02-96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

Maintaining continuity and skill proficiency will be challenging, given the

frequency of personnel rotations and the many skill conversions that will

be required. Significant personnel turbulence could be created as the Army

converts individuals to different military occupational specialties and units

to new organizational and operational designs. For example, Army

officials advised us that the number of military occupational specialties

will be reduced from about 252 to about 170 over the course of the

transformation.
Briefing Section III: Key Challenges

Page 39 GAO-02-96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

Special human capital challenges will arise from the Army’s decision to

include one National Guard brigade as part of its Interim Force.

Converting this brigade will require many personnel to convert to new

skills. Historically, it has taken long periods of time for reserve personnel

to attain full skill qualifications in some specialties because of limitations

on time, training opportunities, and available resources. This is a longstanding problem, and the Army recently noted that qualification rates in

the National Guard have declined over the last 5 years. Recruiting

sufficient personnel to fully staff units that are expected to deploy quickly

could also pose challenges, since personnel with the proper skills must be

recruited within limited geographical areas. Gaining the wide range of new

skills needed and retaining proficiency in these skills could be challenging,

given the limited time that reserve forces have available to train.

The Army is currently dealing with such personnel issues as shortages of

junior officers and problems in recruiting and retaining personnel with

certain skills. The new force designs require increased numbers of some

specialties, such as military intelligence, that have historically been in

short supply throughout the Army. For example, the Interim Brigades

require over 200 military intelligence specialists—about 170 more military

intelligence specialists than a traditional heavy-combat brigade. The Army

has experienced shortages in this specialty for many years, and the

demand for such personnel in ongoing contingency operations abroad has

increased.

The Army’s increased reliance on communications and information

systems technology for tactical warfighting information and real-time

logistics control and personnel support will place extra demands on

military personnel. To maintain, support, and operate future combat

systems and associated technology, both military and civilian personnel

will need to be trained in advanced communications, computing, and

information systems technology. Military personnel will need to

periodically repeat training on digitized systems to retain proficiency while

being trained at the same time to develop a wider range of new skills.

Scheduling all such training and maintaining proficiency will be

challenging to the Army’s trainers, and maintaining proficiency will

challenge individual leaders and soldiers.

Finally, the Army recognizes that in providing its personnel with advanced

technology skills, it will need to provide robust quality-of-life programs

and incentives if it is to retain personnel whose skills are likely to be in

great demand in the civilian economy.
Briefing Section III: Key Challenges

Page 40 GAO-02-96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

Legend:

A/C = Active Component

CTC = Combat Training Centers

IAV = Interim Armored Vehicle

R/C = Reserve Component
Briefing Section III: Key Challenges

Page 41 GAO-02-96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

Trade-offs and budget prioritization will likely be needed to maintain

current readiness and carry out transformation within existing funding

authority. The Army has already made some difficult trade-off decisions.

For example, to help fund the acquisition of interim armored vehicles; the

Army canceled 10 major procurements, restructured four other programs,

and shifted a significant amount of planned spending from fiscal year 2001

through fiscal 2005. Further adjustments may be needed, since the Army

estimates that its planned Legacy Force modernizations alone will require

about $23 billion in fiscal years 2002 through 2007.

In addition, the Army will be faced with having to balance the

transformation-related funding with a full range of other budget priorities

as noted in the Funding briefing chart. The Army says that transformation

starts first with people and that without adequately manning the force,

providing for the well-being of soldiers and their family, and investing in

leader development, the Army cannot achieve its transformation.

Balancing its funding to meet these important competing Army priorities

will be difficult. Similarly, the Army will be competing for resources within

DOD at a time when all the services are facing readiness and

modernization challenges. Other national spending priorities make it

uncertain whether the Department can expect substantial funding

increases over the long period of the transformation.
Briefing Section IV: Conclusions

Page 42 GAO-02-96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

Briefing Section IV: Conclusions
Briefing Section IV: Conclusions

Page 43 GAO-02-96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

The Army’s Transformation Campaign Plan provides a comprehensive,

highly adaptable, results-oriented plan to guide its transformation efforts

over the next 30 years. This management vehicle provides a common

frame of reference for officials throughout the Army, sets clearly defined

transformation goals and milestones, and assigns clear roles and

responsibilities for implementing the transformation. The coordination

forums that the Army has established provide a means to hear and address

concerns in a timely manner; and the electronic tool that accompanies the

Campaign Plan enables the Army to synchronize its activities, track

progress, and adjust plans as problems arise. By using the Interim Brigade

Combat Teams to validate concepts and by capturing lessons learned, the

Army has a means to evaluate its efforts and apply lessons learned to

future brigade formation and ultimately the Objective Force. By

integrating the transformation into its existing planning, budgeting, and

decision-making processes, the Army has greater assurance that

transformation program and funding needs are identified and balanced

against other Army priorities. The results of the Quadrennial Defense

Review as well as other events are likely to affect the Army’s plans. We

believe that the management construct established by the Transformation

Campaign Plan is flexible enough to permit the Army to adapt its plans to

evolving events.

The existence of a comprehensive management plan, however, does not

diminish the challenges the Army faces in implementing it. The Army’s

plans are highly dependent on near-term technological advances and

long-term funding commitments that make attaining some milestones

uncertain. To be successful, the transformation will need a sustained

commitment by Army leadership and support by the Office of the

Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Congress to sustain the

Army’s plans over the long period envisioned for the transformation.
Appendix I: Comments From the Department

of Defense

Page 44 GAO-02-96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation P

Line of operation Mission and objective

Strategic Requirements and Planning Address strategic requirements and planning to ensure that throughout the

transformation process, all critical Commander in Chief (CINC) requirements are

supported; incorporate emerging Army capabilities into CINC requirements for the

future and within joint and services’ strategic documents.

Modernization and Recapitalization Ensure modernization and recapitalization of Army forces. Conduct force development

for Legacy, Interim, and Objective Forces, including the fielding and integration of new

equipment and force designs. Ensure that investment plans support overall force

development.

Manning the Force and Investing in Quality

People

Man the force for full-spectrum operations and invest in quality people to ensure a

trained and ready force. Man the warfighting units at 100 percent; recruit and retain to

meet the Army’s needs; field soldier-usable equipment; manage attrition and

separation; redesign business practices and adapt personnel services and support to

available technology; and enhance the well-being of the Army family.

Maintain Unit Readiness and Training Maintain required levels of unit readiness and training; analyze effects of

transformation on readiness resource levels and provide recommendations to

minimize turbulence, instability, and lowered overall readiness levels; continue to

implement changes to AR 220-1 and the automated readiness system, which will

capture readiness requirements of the future force structure.

Training and Leader Development Ensure training and leader development actions required to maintain trained and

ready Legacy Forces and produce transformed units and leaders capable of joint

warfighting, as well as change. Create a learning environment that is responsive to

emerging technologies and continually improves processes, procedures, and products

that support the force.

Joint/Army Strategy and Concepts Ensure that transformation of the operational Army has a firm strategic and

operational foundation by embedding the requirement for strategically responsive,

fully dominant landpower in key national, Defense Department, joint service, and

Army documents for strategy, concepts, and doctrine.

Army Doctrine Integrate the development of Army doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures to

support the transformation of the Army. Ensure that current doctrine is revised to

support the Legacy Force through transformation and that Interim Force doctrine is

developed and revised to support the Objective Force. Ensure integration with

emerging joint and multinational doctrine throughout transformation to define the

Army’s capabilities and contributions in joint and multinational operations.

Operational Force Design Develop and field operational force designs for combat forces, command and control,

and support elements that are strategically responsive and dominant at every point on

the spectrum of operations.

Deploying and Sustaining Ensure that Army forces are capable of rapidly deploying in support of current and

future operational force deployment goals. Effectively sustain the full spectrum of

Army operations, while synchronizing Army and joint service efforts to (1) reduce the

operational force sustainment requirement and related combat service and combat

service support demand on lift, (2) reduce deployed combat support footprint in the

combat zone, (3) transform the institutional support elements of the Army to be more

strategically responsive (across the full spectrum), and (4) reduce the cost for

logistics/support without reducing warfighting capability.

Develop and Acquire Advanced Technology Develop and acquire advanced technology to provide materiel solutions for the

Legacy, Interim, and Objective Forces.

Management of Force Programs Assess and design the institutional Army throughout transformation; integrate

institutional reengineering initiatives using existing force management processes,

while examining options for more efficient management practices.

Appendix I: Comments From the Department

of Defense

Appendix I: Transformation Campaign Plan’s

Lines of Operation, Missions, and Objectives
Appendix I: Transformation Campaign Plan’s

Lines of Operation, Missions, and Objectives

Page 45 GAO-02-96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation P

Line of operation Mission and objective

Installations Manage, modernize, and refine installations as strategic assets throughout the Army’s

transformation; ensure that necessary real property support and services at

installations are provided during transformation and are provided for the Objective

Force, while providing proper stewardship of the environment.

Strategic Communications Synchronize and coordinate the transformation’s strategic communications efforts to

internal and external audiences to inform, educate, and build consensus; to garner

support; and to acquire the resources for the Army’s transformation.

Resourcing Integrate Army transformation requirements with the Army’s Planning, Programming,

Budgeting, and Execution System and ensure adequate funding for transformation

objectives.

Source: Department of the Army.
Appendix II: Combat, Aircraft,

and Support Systems and

Equipment Planned for

Recapitalization or Upgrade

During Army Transformation

Page 46 GAO-02-96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation P

System Description

Combat systems

M1 A1/A2 Abrams Tank Heavy armor tracked combat vehicle

M2/M3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle Infantry and cavalry tracked combat vehicle

M113 Family of Vehicles Family of tracked vehicles

Patriot Missile System Provides defense against aircraft, cruise missiles, and tactical

 ballistic missiles

Multiple-Launch Rocket System Rocket launcher

M992 Field Artillery Ammunition Supply Vehicle Provides resupply and support of field artillery units

Aviation systems

AH-64 A/D Apache/Longbow Helicopter Attack/reconnaissance helicopter

UH-60 Black Hawk Helicopter Utility and assault helicopter

CH-47 Chinook Helicopter Cargo helicopter

Combat support systems

M48/M60 Armored Vehicle-Launched Bridge Provides assault-bridging capabilities for tank and mechanized

 battalions

M9 Armored Combat Earthmover Multipurpose engineer vehicle

AN/TPQ-36/37 Firefinder Artillery locating radar

Small Emplacement Excavator All-purpose, wheeled engineer vehicle

High-Mobility, Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle Light, tactical vehicle

AN/ASM-190 (includes AN/ASM-146, AN/ASM-147, and

 AN/ASM-189)

Electronic shop shelter

M88 Hercules Equipment recovery, combat utility lift and evacuation system

Heavy Expanded-Mobility Tactical Truck 10-ton, 8-wheel drive family of vehicle systems

Source: Department of the Army.

Appendix II: Combat, Aircraft, and Support

Systems and Equipment Planned for

Recapitalization or Upgrade During Army

Transformation
Appendix III: Comments From the

Department of Defense

Page 47 GAO-02-96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

Appendix III: Comments From the

Department of Defense

(350008)

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