money he was using for tipping. At approximately 4:30 a.m., two female 

dancers began fighting over tip money, giving rise to some sort of melee. 

Although there are several contradictory versions of what exactly 

occurred, these disputed facts are inapplicable to the issues on appeal. In 

the end, after Jones and his entourage had been removed from the club, 

club security officers, Aaron Cudworth and Thomas Urbanski, were both 

shot by Arvin Edwards.' Cudworth and Urbanski survived the shooting. 

Months after the shootings, Cudworth, Urbanski, and 

Urbanski's wife filed separate complaints against Jones and several other 

defendants in district court. Additionally, the Urbanskis filed claims 

against the National Football League (NFL) asserting causes of action for 

negligent hiring, retention and supervision, and respondeat superior. The 

Cudworth and Urbanski cases were consolidated. 

Prior to trial, the district court dismissed the NFL for lack of 

personal jurisdiction, finding that it possessed neither specific nor general 

jurisdiction over the NFL. The Urbanskis now appeal this dismissal. 

During the trial, the district court denied several of Jones' 

proposed jury instructions. These included instructions regarding 

defaulted defendants, three instructions regarding civil conspiracy, 

1The relationship between Edwards and Jones is unclear. It was 

alleged that Edwards was Jones' friend, and that he shot Cudworth as a 

favor to Jones, and later solicited money from Jones for the shooting. 

However, when Jones initially talked to police he did not reference 

Edwards. Jones later cooperated in the investigation against Edwards in 

exchange for a plea deal in his criminal case. Jones maintained that he 

had never met Edwards and that he was a victim of extortion. Ultimately, 

while cooperating with LVMPD, Jones wired money to Edwards through 

intermediaries, allowing LVMPD to arrest Edwards. 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 2 

(0) 1947A .e4) 
intentional infliction of emotional distress (TIED), battery, assault, and 

"[w]ords alone." Accordingly, Jones objected to the jury instructions used 

instead. 

Alter the trial, the jury found Jones liable for all causes of 

action asserted by Cudworth, including (1) assault, (2) battery, (3) false 

imprisonment, and (4) TIED, awarding $1,000,500 in compensatory 

damages and $300,000 in punitive damages. Regarding the Urbanskis, 

the jury found Jones not liable for assault or battery, but found Jones 

liable for TIED. The jury awarded the Urbanskis damages as follows: 

• past medical expenses: $1,728,518.79 

• past care: $1,101,096.65 

• future care: $863,320.09 2 

• past lost income: $142,625.00 

• future lost income: $424,858.00 

• household services: $204,862,00 

• past pain and suffering: $3,000,000.00 

• future pain and suffering: $3,000,000.00. 

Additionally, the jury awarded Kathleen Urbanski $750,000 for loss of 

consortium, but did not award the Urbanskis any punitive damages. 

Following both the initial verdict and the punitive damages verdict, Jones 

polled the jurors. The jury was dismissed on June 15, 2012. 

2The future care amount was added by the district court on a postverdict motion to modify the jury verdict. The district court found that 

Jones had stipulated to the amount of future care, as determined by the 

worker's compensation carrier, and that the amount was inadvertently 

omitted from the verdict form. 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 3 

(0) 1947A 44grefin 
Shortly thereafter, Jones filed a countermotion for remittitur, 

or in the alternative a motion for a new trial, in response to the Urbanskis' 

motion for additur. Then Jones filed a nearly identical motion for 

remittitur, or in the alternative a motion for a new trial. The district court 

denied both Jones' countermotion and motion. Jones now appeals the jury 

verdict. 

The district court did not err in dismissing the NFL for lack of personal 

jurisdiction 

On appeal, the Urbanskis argue that the district court 

possessed both general and specific jurisdiction over the NFL. We 

disagree. 

Standard of review 

"[The plaintiff has the burden of introducing competent 

evidence of essential facts which establish a prima facie showing that 

personal jurisdiction exists." Trump v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 109 

Nev. 687, 692, 857 P.2d 740, 743 (1993) (internal quotations omitted). 

Thus, the district court does not act as a fact finder, but rather "accepts 

properly supported proffers of evidence by a plaintiff as true." Id. at 693, 

857 P.2d at 744 (internal quotations omitted). "Once a prima facie 

showing is made, the plaintiff bears the burden at trial to prove 

jurisdiction by a preponderance of evidence." Viega GmbH v. Eighth 

Judicial Dist. Court, 130 Nev. , 328 P.3d 1152, 1156 (2014). "As a 

question of law, the district court's determination of personal jurisdiction 

is reviewed de novo . . . ." Id. 

"To obtain jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant, a 

plaintiff must show: (1) that the requirements of the state's long-arm 

statute have been satisfied, and (2) that due process is not offended by the 

exercise of jurisdiction." Trump, 109 Nev. at 698, 857 P.2d at 747. 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 4 

(0) 1947A e 
Nevada's long-arm statute, NRS 14.065, extends to the outer reaches of 

due process, therefore this seemingly two,step analysis is collapsed into a 

single inquiry regarding whether a court's exercise of jurisdiction over a 

nonresident defendant would offend due process. Trump, 109 Nev. at 698, 

857 P.2d at 747. 

"Due process requires minimum contacts between the 

defendant and the forum state such that the maintenance of the suit does 

not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Id. 

(internal quotations omitted). "The defendant must have sufficient 

contacts with the forum such that he or she could reasonably anticipate 

being haled into court there." Id. at 699, 857 P.2d at 748 (internal 

quotations omitted). "[P]ersonal jurisdiction occurs in two forms general 

and specific." Dogra v. Liles, 129 Nev. , 314 P.3d 952, 955 (2013). 

The district court did not err in finding that it lacked general 

jurisdiction over the NFL 

"A court may exercise general jurisdiction over a foreign 

company when its contacts with the forum state are so 'continuous and 

systematic as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State." 

Viega, 130 Nev. at , 328 P.3d at 1156-57 (alteration in original) 

(quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. , 

 , 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011)); see also Helicopteros Nacionales de 

Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984); Perkins v. Benguet 

Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445 (1952). 

To determine whether a nonresident defendant's contacts are 

sufficiently substantial, continuous, and systematic, courts generally 

consider their "'[longevity, continuity, volume, economic impact, physical 

presence, and integration into the state's regulatory or economic 

markets." Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1224 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 5 

(0) 1947A 
(9th Cir. 2011) (alteration in original) (quoting Tuazon v. R.J. Reynolds 

Tobacco Co., 433 F.3d 1163, 1172 (9th Cir. 2006)). The standard for 

general jurisdiction "is an exacting standard, as it should be, because a 

finding of general jurisdiction permits a defendant to be haled into court in 

the forum state to answer for any of its activities anywhere in the world." 

Schtvarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 801 (9th Cir. 

2004). 

Here, the Urbanskis argue that the NFL's contacts with 

Nevada are sufficiently continuous and systematic, such that it is 

essentially at home in Nevada. The Urbanskis point to several NFL 

operations, including (1) the NFL's merchandising "stream of commerce" 

activities in Nevada; (2) the NFL's interactive website, including paid-for 

fantasy football; (3) the NFL network and DirecTV "Sunday Ticket" 

television products; (4) the NFL's recruiting of Nevada players; and (5) the 

NFL's "Punt, Pass and Kick" competition. The NFL does not dispute the 

existence of the facts asserted by the Urbanskis; rather, the dispute lies in 

whether such facts constitute a continuous and systematic presence in 

Nevada. 

The seminal general jurisdiction case is Perkins v. Ben guet 

Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952). See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 

131 S. Ct. at 2856. In Perkins, the Supreme Court determined that an 

Ohio court was entitled to exercise general jurisdiction over a Philippine 

corporation when the corporation's president maintained an office in Ohio 

and directly conducted its general business activities on behalf of the 

company from Ohio. 342 U.S. at 447-48. These activities included 

maintaining company files, carrying on correspondence, engaging an Ohio 

bank to act as a transfer agent, distributing salary checks, and holding 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 6 

(0) 19474 
directors' meetings in Ohio. Id. In short, the corporation's president 

"'ha[d] been carrying on in Ohio a continuous and systematic, but limited, 

part of its general business"—which was sufficient to warrant the exercise 

of personal jurisdiction over the Philippine corporation. Id. at 438. 

On the other hand, in Helicopteros, a Colombian corporation, 

which was in the business of providing helicopter transportation 

throughout South America, was sued in a Texas state court for claims 

arising out of a helicopter crash that occurred in Peru. 466 U.S. at 409-11. 

Prior to the crash in Peru, the Colombian corporation had various 

ancillary contacts with Texas prior to the filing of the suit, such as holding 

several contract negotiations in Texas, holding pilot training courses in 

Texas, and purchasing helicopter parts in Texas valued at approximately 

$4 million Id. at 410-11. The Supreme Court concluded that Texas courts 

could not exercise jurisdiction over the foreign helicopter service 

corporation largely because the corporation had never sold products or 

solicited business in Texas, never maintained an office or other 

establishment in Texas, and had never performed any of its primary 

business operations in Texas. Id. at 418 ("[M]ere purchases [made in 

Texas], even if occurring at regular intervals, are not enough to warrant a 

State's assertion of [general] jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation in 

a cause of action not related to those purchase transactions."). Similarly, 

in Goodyear, the Supreme Court concluded that North Carolina courts 

lacked general jurisdiction over a tire manufacturer because "[u]nlike the 

defendant in Perkins, whose sole wartime business activity was conducted 

in Ohio, [Goodyear's foreign subsidiary was] in no sense at home in North 

Carolina." 564 U.S. at , 131 S. Ct. at 2857. 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 7 

(0) 1947A 
NFL's merchandising activities in Nevada 

The Urbanskis argue that the NFL has the exclusive right to 

direct the sale of NFL-related merchandise in any location, including 

Nevada. Thus, the Urbanski's argue that the NFL intentionally directs its 

products into Nevada and directly profits from those sales. 

However, the United States Supreme Court recently clarified 

that the "now of a manufacturer's products into the forum . . . may 

bolster an affiliation germane to specific jurisdiction," but not general 

jurisdiction. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at , 131 S. Ct. at 2855; see also 

Stabilisierungsfonds Fur Wein u. Kaiser Stahl Wine Distribs. Pty. Ltd., 647 

F.2d 200, 203 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (defendants' marketing arrangements, 

although "adequate to permit litigation of claims relating to [their] 

introduction of . . . wine into the United States stream of commerce . . . 

would not be adequate to support general, all purpose adjudicatory 

authority" (internal quotations omitted)). 

Thus, the Urbanskis' use of the term "stream of commerce" is 

misapplied here because (1) they are not arguing for specific jurisdiction, 

and (2) this is not a situation in which a good reached an untargeted 

forum state. See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at , 131 S. Ct. at 2856 ("Under the 

sprawling view of general jurisdiction urged by respondents . . . any 

substantial manufacturer or seller of goods would be amenable to suit, on 

any claim for relief, wherever its products are distributed"). Thus, in light 

of the Supreme Court's recent clarification on this point, we conclude that 

this factor does not support a finding of general jurisdiction. Id. ("A 

corporation's continuous activity of some sorts within a state . . . is not 

enough to support the demand that the corporation be amenable to suits 

unrelated to that activity." (internal quotations omitted)). 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 8 

(0) 1947A 
The NFL's tvebsite 

The Urbanskis argue that the NFL has availed itself of 

jurisdiction via its "interactive" website. See Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, 

Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 418 (9th Cir. 1997). The Urbanskis argue that the 

NFL's website is sufficiently interactive to allow Nevada courts to exercise 

jurisdiction, pointing to a number of the website's interactive and 

commercial features. 

But similar to the "stream of commerce" issue above, the 

Urbanskis' reliance on the NFL's website, regardless of the level of 

interactivity, is misplaced because courts have only considered a 

defendant's website when determining whether it has specific jurisdiction 

over the defendant. See, e.g., Mavrix Photo, 647 F.3d at 1227 (explaining 

that the Zippo sliding-scale approach, the primary test for assessing 

jurisdiction from a website, 'should be of little value in a general 

jurisdiction analysis" (quoting 4A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. 

Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1073.1, at 331 (3d ed. 2002))); 

Revell U. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 471 (5th Cir. 2002) (Zippo test "is not well 

adapted to the general jurisdiction inquiry, because even repeated 

contacts with forum residents by a foreign defendant may not constitute 

the requisite substantial, continuous and systematic contacts required for 

a finding of general jurisdiction"); Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 418. 

Essentially, if we were "[t]o permit the exercise of general 

jurisdiction based on the accessibility in the forum of a non-resident 

interactive website [such a conclusion] would expose most large media 

entities to nationwide general jurisdiction." Mavrix Photo, 647 F.3d at 

1227. This would be entirely "inconsistent with the constitutional 

requirement that the continuous corporate operations within a state be so 

substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against [the nonresident 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 9 

(0) 1947A e 
defendant] on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from 

those activities." Id. (internal quotations omitted). As a result, this factor 

does not support a finding of general jurisdiction. 

The NFL Network and DirecTV Sunday Ticket 

The Urbanskis argue that the NFL's contract negotiations to 

deliver television programming directly into Nevada homes and 

businesses, coupled with the NFL's revenues from such programming is 

sufficient to trigger general jurisdiction. 

In response, the NFL argues that several courts have 

considered similar arguments, and have rejected the idea that a television 

broadcast can establish general jurisdiction. See Sullivan v. Tagliabue, 

785 F. Supp. 1076, 1080 (D.R.I. 1992) ("'[W]here the league itself has no 

continuous and systematic general business contacts with the forum, and 

the asserted cause of action is entirely unrelated to telecasts' or ticket 

sales, these transactions themselves 'form too slippery a foothold' to 

establish [general] personal jurisdiction over the [NFL]." (alterations in 

original) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting DonateIli v. Nat'l Hockey 

League, 893 F.2d 459, 471 (1st Cir. 1990))); Zimmerman v. U.S. Football 

League, 637 F. Supp. 46, 48 (D. Minn. 1986) ("Where a plaintiffs cause of 

action does not arise from television broadcasts into a state, the 

broadcasts do not constitute sufficient contacts for personal jurisdiction."). 

We agree with the NFL. 

Much like with a defendant's website, subjecting a business to 

general jurisdiction solely based on national television broadcasts would 

.

`expose most large media entities to nationwide general jurisdiction." See 

Mavrix Photo, 647 F.3d at 1227. Such a finding would be inconsistent 

with the constitutional requirement that a defendant's operations be so 

"continuous and systematic as to render [it] essentially at home in the 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 10 

(0) 1947A 7rep 
forum State." Goodyear, 564 U.S. at , 131 S. Ct. at 2851 (internal 

quotations omitted). As a result, we conclude that this factor does not 

support a finding of general jurisdiction. 

NFL's recruiting activities and "Punt, Pass and Kick" 

competition 

The Urbanskis argue that scouts from virtually every NFL 

team have traveled and continue to travel to Nevada to recruit future NFL 

players from Nevada's university teams. Additionally, the Urbanskis 

point to the NFL's annual "Punt, Pass and Kick" competition located in 

Mesquite and Las Vegas. 

Here, these activities may help support a finding of general 

jurisdiction, but "engaging in commerce with residents of the forum state 

is not in and of itself the kind of activity that approximates physical 

presence within the state's borders." Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta 

Nat'l Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000). This case is similar to 

Sullivan, 785 F. Supp. 1076, in which an owner of the New England 

Patriots sued the NFL in Rhode Island challenging the NFL's alleged 

block of the sale of a portion of the franchise. Id. at 1077-78. The court 

determined that the NFL's contacts were not sufficiently continuous and 

systematic in Rhode Island, even where the NFL (1) maintained a line of 

credit with a Rhode Island bank, (2) regulated an NFL franchise's training 

camp held in Rhode Island, (3) had players and coaches who traveled 

through Rhode Island, (4) sold radio and television broadcasting rights 

within Rhode Island, (5) sold merchandise within Rhode Island, and (6) 

lobbied the Rhode Island legislature. Id. at 1079-81. 

Thus, we conclude that if the NFL's in-state activities were 

coupled with more substantial contacts, they could support a finding of 

general jurisdiction. But in this case, there are no facts similar to those in 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 11 

(0) 1947A 
Perkins such that the NFL maintained an approximate physical presence 

and would essentially be "at home" in Nevada. See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 

131 S. Ct. at 2857. In light of all of the NFL's contacts with the State 

of Nevada, we hold that the district court did not err in ruling that it did 

not have general jurisdiction over the NFL. 3 

The district court did not err in finding that it lacked specific 

jurisdiction over the NFL 

"Unlike general jurisdiction, specific jurisdiction is proper only 

where 'the cause of action arises from the defendant's contacts with the 

forum." Dogra v. Liles, 129 Nev. „ 314 P.3d 952, 955 (2013) 

(quoting Trump v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 109 Nev. 687, 699, 857 

P.2d 740, 748 (1993)); Goodyear, 564 U.S. at , 131 S. Ct. at 2851 

("[S]pecific jurisdiction is confined to adjudication of issues deriving from, 

or connected with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction." 

(internal quotations omitted)). Nevada courts may exercise specific 

jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if the defendant (1) 

"purposefully avails himself or herself of the protections of Nevada's laws, 

or purposefully directs her conduct towards Nevada"; and (2) "the 

plaintiffs claim actually arises from that purposeful conduct" within 

3Additionally, the NFL's prior unrelated lawsuits in Nevada do not 

create general jurisdiction. See Grynberg v. Ivanhoe Energy, Inc., 666 F. 

Supp. 2d 1218, 1231 (D. Colo. 2009) (finding that a defendant's filing of 

unrelated lawsuits was insufficient to confer general jurisdiction); 

Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Interclaim (Bermuda) Ltd., 304 F. Supp. 2d 

1018, 1025 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (same)). 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 12 

(0) 1947A eir. 
Nevada. Dogra, 129 Nev. at , 314 P.3d at 955 (internal quotations 

omitted). 

Here, even if the NFL purposefully availed itself toward 

Nevada, the Urbanskis' claims do not arise from that purposeful conduct. 

The Urbanskis contend that Jones is an employee of the NFL 100 percent 

of the time; however, there is nothing in the record to indicate any sort of 

"on the clock" employee or agency relationship regarding Jones' late night 

activities in Las Vegas. See Myers v. Bennett Law Offices, 238 F.3d 1068, 

1073 (9th Cir. 2001) (establishing that the acts of an employee with 

authority to act on behalf of the employer can be imputed to the employer 

for the court's specific jurisdiction analysis); see also Dogra, 129 Nev. at 

314 P.3d at 955. Thus, 'Jones' actions cannot be imputed upon the 

NFL, and the Urbanskis have failed to make a prima facie showing of 

jurisdictional facts. Accordingly, the district court did not err in finding 

that it did not have specific jurisdiction over the NFL. 4 

4Additionally, the district court did not err in refusing the 

Urbanskis' request for additional jurisdictional discovery. The Urbanskis 

failed to demonstrate how additional discovery would supplement their 

jurisdictional allegations. See Trintec Indus., Inc. v. Pedre Promotional 

Prods., Inc., 395 F.3d 1275, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ("[D]iscovery is 

appropriate where the existing record is inadequate to support personal 

jurisdiction and a party demonstrates that it can supplement its 

jurisdictional allegations through discovery." (internal quotations 

omitted)). 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 13 

(0) 1947A e 
Jones failed to preserve his argument regarding the jury verdict 

Jones argues on appeal that the jury verdict is inconsistent 

because the damage awards for Cudworth and Urbanski do not properly 

correspond to the jury's findings of liability, both factually and as a matter 

of law. As a result, Jones requests this court to reverse the judgment on 

the verdict and order a new trial with further instruction on how to avoid 

this dilemma in the future. However, we conclude that Jones failed to 

preserve this issue for appeal. 

"This court upholds a jury verdict if there is substantial 

evidence to support it, but will overturn it if it was clearly wrong from all 

the evidence presented." Soper v. Means, 111 Nev. 1290, 1294, 903 P.2d 

222, 224 (1995). However, "[a] point not urged in the trial court, unless it 

goes to the jurisdiction of that court, is deemed to have been waived and 

will not be considered on appeal." Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown, 97 Nev. 

49, 52, 623 P.2d 981, 983 (1981). 

Parties have a duty to object to inconsistent jury verdicts 

before the jury is dismissed. Eberhard Mfg. Co. v. Baldwin, 97 Nev. 271, 

272-73, 628 P.2d 681, 682 (1981); see also Brascia v. Johnson, 105 Nev. 

592, 596 n. 2, 781 P.2d 765, 768 n.2 (1989) (concluding that where 

inconsistent verdicts are returned, a party must challenge the verdicts 

before the jury is discharged and "failure to object while the jury [is] still 

available and able to clarify its verdict constitute[s] a waiver"); cf. Lehrer 

McGovern Bovis, Inc. v. Bullock Insulation, Inc., 124 Nev. 1102, 1111, 197 

P.3d 1032, 1038 (2008) (recognizing that an exception exists to this rule if 

a district court attempts to enter a general verdict which obviously 

contradicts answers to special interrogatories under NRCP 49(b)). In 

Eberhard, a case concerning injuries to a six-year-old boy from contact 

with an open high-voltage electrical fuse box, the jury found the owner of 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 14 

(0) 1947A 
the fuse box liable for negligence, the designer and manufacturer of the 

fuse box locking mechanism liable for strict products liability, but did not 

find liability for the manufacturer's distributor. 97 Nev. at 272, 628 P.2d 

at 681-82. The plaintiff moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, 

and the liable manufacturer motioned for a new trial, however, neither 

took this action prior to the jury being dismissed. Id. at 272, 628 P.2d at 

682. Despite the confusing verdict, post-judgment motions, and plaintiffs 

submission of "alternative verdict forms which, if given, would have 

prevented the claimed inconsistent verdicts," this court still concluded 

that both sides "waived the ground of an inconsistent verdict in support of 

their motions, as a result of their failure to timely object to the filing of the 

verdict or to move that the case be resubmitted to the jury." Id. at 272-73, 

628 P.2d at 682. The fact that the contested jury verdicts might have been 

inconsistent as a matter of law was irrelevant. Id. The "primary objective 

of the promotion and efficient administration of justice," took precedent. 

Id. at 273, 628 P.2d at 682. 

Here, Jones failed to object to the alleged inconsistent jury 

verdicts prior to the jury's dismissal. The district court's denial of Jones' 

proposed jury instructions, Jones' objection to the implemented jury 

instructions, Jones' polling of the jurors following the verdict, Jones' 

countermotion for remittitur or in the alternative for a new trial filed after 

the jury was dismissed, and Jones' motion for remittitur or in the 

alternative for a new trial filed after the jury was dismissed are 

inconsequential. Further, the exception from Lehrer is inapplicable to the 

facts here. Thus, we conclude that Jones' waived his right to appeal on 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 15 

(0) 1947A 7e9A 
, C.J. 

J. 

Parraguirre 

Saitta 

J. 

inconsistent jury verdict grounds, because he failed to object before the 

jury had been discharged. 5 

Accordingly, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 

Gibbons 

A C,A. tift,at. , J. 

Hardesty 

5We have considered the parties' remaining arguments and conclude 

that they are without merit. 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 16 

(0) I947A 
cc: Hon. Jessie Elizabeth Walsh, District Judge 

Hon. Gloria Sturman, District Judge 

Ara H. Shirinian, Settlement Judge 

Kevin Lee Smith 

Law Office of Lisa Rasmussen 

Kolesar & Leatham, Chtd. 

Chesnoff & Schonfeld 

Thorndal Armstrong Delk Balkenbush & Eisinger/Las Vegas 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

SUPREME COURT 

DE 

NEVADA 17 

(0) 1947A