Report of the Advisory Panel on Streamlining and Codifying Acquisition Regulations

Volume 3 of 3 | January 2019

Budget Volume 3

Recommendation 50: Enact regular appropriations bills on time.

Problem

CRs continue to undermine strategic execution of funds in the defense acquisition system.

Background

Congress is the sole entity with constitutional authority to fund the government:

The Congress shall have Power... to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general 

Welfare of the United States... No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of 

Appropriations made by Law.1

If the DoD acquisition system is to be resourced at all, it is Congress’s fundamental constitutional 

responsibility to manage that resourcing process. Despite efforts by congressional leadership and the 

appropriations committees, Congress does not appear able to reliably pass defense appropriations bills 

on an annual basis prior to the start of the fiscal year.

Discussion

Although there is bipartisan acknowledgement of the problems associated with CRs, Congress 

continues to use CRs as a regular means of funding DoD. This state of affairs points to the intractability 

of the CR issue. Virtually all stakeholders agree that CRs are detrimental to the defense acquisition 

system, but Congress appears to lack the collective action capacity needed to ensure lasting change.

Conclusions

Ideally, the only recommendation for addressing the effect of CRs on defense acquisition would be for 

Congress to pass regular defense appropriations bills via the established process. If the appropriations 

process functioned as intended, CRs would be unnecessary and the Section 809 Panel’s CR-related 

recommendations would be irrelevant. The process appears, however, to be broken. Unless Congress 

can find a way of repairing it, the subsequent recommendations in this section may serve as 

alternatives.

There are no easy solutions. CRs are a product of political gridlock and resulting congressional 

inaction. This problem is particularly intractable because of Congress’s fundamental constitutional 

responsibility for appropriations. The only real solution to the problem of CRs is for the various 

factions of Congress to begin working together to pass appropriations in a timely manner each year

(before October 1).

2 Until timely appropriations occur regularly, however, Congress could consider 

several options for mitigating the harmful effects of CRs on defense acquisition.

 

1 U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8(12) and Section 9(7).

2 Congress has shown a desire to develop a long-term, bipartisan solution to the CR problem. Attached to the fifth CR bill enacted in 

FY 2018, Congress included a provision establishing a Joint Select Committee on Budget and Appropriations Process Reform. The purpose 

of the joint committee is to “provide recommendations and legislative language that will significantly reform the budget and 

appropriations process.” See Title IV, Subtitle B of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-123 (2018). 
Report of the Advisory Panel on Streamlining and Codifying Acquisition Regulations

Volume 3 of 3 | January 2019

Budget Volume 3

One way of avoiding future CRs might be to create a strong disincentive for Congress to rely on them. 

This approach could potentially be implemented without impinging on Congress’s constitutional 

power of the purse.

For example, Congress could pass a law automatically exempting agencies, when operating under a 

CR, from certain oversight and reporting requirements (or loosening those requirements).3 This 

approach would presumably shorten acquisition timetables and free up limited manpower that would 

otherwise be dedicated to meeting reporting requirements. This manpower could then be reallocated to 

addressing the administrative challenges associated with CRs. Another approach would be to loosen 

DoD’s deadlines and budget line-item rules for execution of funds under CRs. This approach is 

outlined in Recommendations 51 through 54 of this report.

Implementation

Legislative Branch

§ Enact defense appropriations and authorization laws prior to the start of the fiscal year on 

October 1.

Executive Branch

§ There are no regulatory changes required for this recommendation.

Implications for Other Agencies

§ There are no cross-agency implications for this 

 

3 As an example, Congress could enact a law exempting DoD, in years without regular appropriations enacted by October 1, from 

completing its inventory of contracted services reporting requirements under 10 U.S.C. § 2330a. This is just one of many defense 

acquisition reporting requirements from which DoD could be exempted in the event of a CR.