Present: All the Justices 

TRAVIS EUGENE DANIELS, NO. 304441 

v. Record No. 022195 PER CURIAM 

 October 31, 2003 

WARDEN OF THE RED ONION STATE PRISON 

UPON A PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 

 In this habeas corpus case, Travis Eugene Daniels, the 

petitioner, previously filed a petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus in the trial court in which he was convicted of various 

felony offenses and sentenced to a period of incarceration of 33 

years in prison. Prior to a consideration of the merits of that 

petition, the trial court entered an order of nonsuit at 

Daniels’ request and dismissed that petition.1 On September 23, 

2002, invoking the original jurisdiction of this Court, Daniels 

filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus against the Warden 

of the Red Onion State Prison, challenging the legality of his 

convictions in the trial court. The dispositive issue before us 

is whether this petition is procedurally barred by the provision 

of Code § 8.01-654(B)(2) that “[n]o writ shall be granted on the 

basis of any allegation the facts of which petitioner had 

knowledge at the time of filing any previous petition.” See

 1

 Daniels also filed a habeas petition in the United States 

District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, which 

subsequently was dismissed at his request. The fact of the 

federal court habeas petition does not impinge upon our analysis 

of this case. 
Dorsey v. Angelone, 261 Va. 601, 604, 544 S.E.2d 350, 352 

(2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 924 (2001)(holding that a habeas 

petition that was “withdrawn” by the petitioner barred the 

filing of a subsequent petition). 

 Daniels does not dispute that his initial habeas petition, 

which asserted a generalized claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel, contained inadequate allegations of fact to support the 

specific issues he now raises in his current petition to this 

Court. Rather, Daniels contends that dismissal of his habeas 

petition is not warranted because the nonsuit of his first 

habeas petition did not invoke the bar of Code § 8.01-654(B)(2). 

Daniels notes that unlike the “withdrawal” of the habeas 

petition in Dorsey, the dismissal of his prior habeas petition 

by nonsuit was pursuant to the statutory right provided by Code 

§ 8.01-380. Thus, Daniels contends that, as would be permitted 

in any other civil case, he is entitled to commence a new 

proceeding on the same cause without limitation on the 

introduction of new claims and allegations of fact.2 This is so, 

 2

 Challenging the rationale of Dorsey, Daniels also contends 

that a proper interpretation of Code § 8.01-654(B)(2) would bar 

the filing of a subsequent habeas petition only where there had 

been a decision on the merits of a prior petition, and he urges 

this Court to reconsider the holding in Dorsey and overturn that 

decision. Since the decision in Dorsey was announced, the 

General Assembly has met twice in regular session and has not 

acted to amend Code § 8.01-654 to alter our decision in that 

case. “‘Under these circumstances, the construction given to 

the statute is presumed to be sanctioned by the legislature and 

2
he asserts, because “[a] nonsuit does not involve a decision on 

the merits, rather it ‘simply [puts] an end to the present 

action, but is no bar to a subsequent action for the same 

cause.’ ” Sheets v. Castle, 263 Va. 407, 413, 559 S.E.2d 616, 

620 (2002) (quoting Payne v. Buena Vista Extract Co., 124 Va. 

296, 311, 98 S.E. 34, 39 (1919)). 

The Attorney General, on behalf of the Warden, responds 

that, for purposes of resolving the successive petitions issue 

in this case, the holding of Dorsey controls. The Attorney 

General asserts that there is no significant distinction between 

a habeas petition which is “withdrawn” on the petitioner’s 

motion and one which is the subject of a voluntary nonsuit by 

the petitioner. We agree with the Attorney General. 

 In Dorsey, we held that: 

 The statutory language [of Code § 8.01-654(B)(2)] 

is plain and unambiguous, clearly limiting the right 

of a prisoner to file successive petitions for writs 

of habeas corpus. The key provisions of this 

statutory language focus on “the time of filing” the 

first habeas petition. 

 The statutory language could not be more 

explicit; it means what it says. At the time of 

filing the initial petition, the prisoner must include 

“all” claims the facts of which are known to the 

prisoner. And, no habeas relief will be granted based 

 

therefore becomes obligatory upon the courts.’” Cochran v. 

Commonwealth, 258 Va. 604, 607, 521 S.E.2d 287, 289 (1999), 

cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1075 (2000) (quoting Vansant and Gusler, 

Inc. v. Washington, 245 Va. 356, 361, 429 S.E.2d 31, 33-34 

(1993)). Accordingly, we decline Daniels’ invitation that we 

revisit our decision in Dorsey. 

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upon “any” allegation the facts of which the prisoner 

had knowledge at the time of filing any previous 

petition. 

Dorsey, 261 Va. at 603-04, 544 S.E.2d at 352. 

 Daniels correctly contends that generally the effect of a 

first voluntary nonsuit pursuant to Code § 8.01-380 is to put an 

end to a case without prejudice and without a decision on the 

merits, and the fact of the former suit places no impediment on 

the claims or allegations that may be raised in a timely filed 

subsequent action on the same cause. However, Code § 8.01-380 

is a statute of general application for all civil cases. By 

contrast, Code § 8.01-654 is a specific statute, narrow in 

scope, applying only to petitions for writs of habeas corpus. 

To the extent that these code sections can be said to be 

facially in conflict in the context of the present case, our 

resolution of that conflict is guided by a well established 

rule. “The rule is that ‘when one statute speaks to a subject 

in a general way and another deals with a part of the same 

subject in a more specific manner, the two should be harmonized, 

if possible, and where they conflict, the latter prevails.’” 

Thomas v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 1, 22-23, 419 S.E.2d 606, 618 

(1992) (quoting Virginia National Bank v. Harris, 220 Va. 336, 

340, 257 S.E.2d 867, 870 (1979)). 

 Applying this rule and the rationale of Dorsey that “the 

key provisions of [Code § 8.01-654(B)(2)] focus on ‘the time of 

4
filing’ the first habeas petition” and that at “the time of 

filing the initial petition, the prisoner must include ‘all’ 

claims the facts of which are known to the prisoner,” the 

provisions of Code § 8.01-654(B)(2) and those of Code § 8.01-380 

may be readily harmonized. Simply put, the provisions of Code 

§ 8.01-654(B)(2) require a prisoner to include all claims that 

he intends to bring before the court in his first habeas 

petition. Regardless of the manner in which that habeas 

petition is resolved, he may not thereafter file a subsequent 

habeas petition that seeks relief based upon any allegations of 

fact that were known to him at the time of the initial filing 

and not included therein. Accordingly, Code § 8.01-654(B)(2) 

does not conflict with a prisoner’s right to seek a nonsuit 

under Code § 8.01-380, but having elected to take a nonsuit 

under the latter statute, the former statute bars him from 

raising in a subsequent petition those issues which he knew of 

and could have raised in the first petition, but failed to 

assert. 

 In this case, the allegations of fact that form the basis 

of his claims challenging the legality of his convictions 

unquestionably were known to Daniels at the time he filed his 

first habeas petition in the trial court, but were not raised 

therein. Accordingly, Daniels’ petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus will be dismissed. 

5
Dismissed. 

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