COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judge Benton and 

 Senior Judge Duff 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

NORMA JEAN ARBUCKLE 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 2480-97-4 JUDGE JAMES W. BENTON, JR. 

 JUNE 16, 1998 

GARY R. ARBUCKLE 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 

Thomas S. Kenny, Judge 

 James A. Watson II (Surovell, Jackson, 

Colten & Dugan, P.C., on briefs), for 

appellant. 

 James Ray Cottrell (Gannon, Cottrell & Ward, 

P.C., on brief), for appellee. 

 This appeal arises from a decree granting Norma Jean 

Arbuckle a monetary award as an equitable distribution of the 

parties' property upon divorce. In a prior appeal to this Court, 

we held that the trial judge erred in considering the tax 

consequence of a hypothetical sale when valuing the dental 

practice of Dr. Gary R. Arbuckle, the husband. See Arbuckle v. 

Arbuckle, 22 Va. App. 362, 366, 470 S.E.2d 146, 148 (1996). On 

this appeal, the wife contends the trial judge committed the same 

error following the remand. We disagree and affirm the decree. 

 I. 

 A brief review of the prior proceedings will place the issue 

in proper perspective. This matter was initially before the 

trial judge in 1995 upon a bill of complaint for divorce, 

equitable distribution of property, and spousal support. The 

trial judge entered a decree granting a divorce and reserving 
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jurisdiction to enter further orders as to the parties' property. 

See Code § 20-107.3(A). During the equitable distribution 

proceeding, the trial judge was required to determine the value 

of the parties' property as mandated by Code § 20-107.3(A). In 

valuing the husband's dental practice, the trial judge found that 

the practice was then worth $281,000. However, based upon 

capital gains taxes of 33.7% that would have been imposed if the 

dental practice was sold, the trial judge reduced the valuation 

of the practice to a net value of $186,303. After determining 

the value of all the property, the trial judge applied the 

factors in Code § 20-107.3(E) in fixing the wife's monetary 

award. The wife appealed from that decree. 

 Ruling that the trial judge erred in valuing the dental 

practice when he deducted the estimated capital gains tax on the 

hypothetical sale of the practice, see Arbuckle, 22 Va. App. at 

366, 470 S.E.2d at 148, we reversed the decree. On remand, the 

parties stipulated that the value of the dental practice was 

$281,000. In view of the stipulated value of the dental 

practice, the trial judge reviewed the factors contained in Code 

§ 20-107.3(E) for determining a monetary award, including "[t]he 

tax consequences to each party," see Code § 20-107.3(E)(9), and 

made a monetary award to the wife. The wife appeals from that 

decree. 

 II. 

 Often in our equitable distribution decisions, we have 
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discussed the procedural requirements imposed upon trial judges 

by Code § 20-107.3. See Brinkley v. Brinkley, 5 Va. App. 132, 

135-37, 361 S.E.2d 139, 140-41 (1987); see also Arbuckle, 22 Va. 

App. at 365, 470 S.E.2d at 147. 

 There are three stages to making an equitable 

distribution of property. The court first 

must classify the property as either separate 

or marital. The court then must assign a 

value to the property based upon evidence 

presented by both parties. Finally, the 

court distributes the property to the 

parties, taking into consideration the 

factors presented in Code § 20-107.3(E). 

Marion v. Marion, 11 Va. App. 659, 665, 401 S.E.2d 432, 436 

(1991). The subsections of Code § 20-107.3 identify the stages 

the trial judge must consider in the process. 

 In the prior Arbuckle appeal, the question we decided 

concerned the trial judge's valuation decision under Code 

§ 20-107.3(A) because "[t]he trial [judge] reduced [the] 

valuation of the dental practice by the amount of capital gain 

tax liability that would have accrued had the practice then been 

sold." 22 Va. App. at 364, 470 S.E.2d at 147 (emphasis added). 

"Code § 20-107.3[(A)] requires a trial [judge] to value the 

parties' separate and marital property before making a monetary 

award." Bosserman v. Bosserman, 9 Va. App. 1, 5, 384 S.E.2d 104, 

107 (1989). Thus, when the parties in an equitable distribution 

proceeding request the trial judge to decree as to their 

property, the trial judge must "determine the value of any such 

property as of the date of the evidentiary hearing on the 
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evaluation issue." Code § 20-107.3(A) (emphasis added). We held 

that "[t]he trial [judge] erred in considering the tax 

consequences of a hypothetical sale when valuing the dental 

practice." Arbuckle, 22 Va. App. at 366, 470 S.E.2d at 148 

(emphasis added). We reasoned that "the tax consequences of a 

hypothetical sale were too speculative to be considered by the 

trial [judge] in determining the present value of Dr. Arbuckle's 

dental practice." Id. (emphasis added). 

 The Arbuckle holding is consistent with the well established 

principle that "[t]he trial judge's valuation cannot be based on 

'mere guesswork.'" Bosserman, 9 Va. App. at 5, 384 S.E.2d at 

107. See also Hodges v. Hodges, 2 Va. App. 508, 516, 347 S.E.2d 

134, 139 (1986). After the valuation process is completed, the 

statutory scheme recognizes, however, that a degree of 

imprecision will be inevitable in applying the factors of Code 

§ 20-107.3(E). Thus, under Code § 20-107.3(E), "[t]he amount of 

any division or transfer of jointly owned marital property, and 

the amount of any monetary award, the apportionment of marital 

debts, and the method of payment shall be determined by the court 

after consideration of [ten specified] factors[.]" Those factors 

specifically include "[t]he tax consequences to each party." 

Code § 20-107.3(E)(9). 

 In Arbuckle, we noted that "[w]e perceive[d] no disagreement 

between the holding in Barnes [v. Barnes, 16 Va. App. 98, 428 

S.E.2d 294 (1993),] and our decision . . . [because] Code 
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§ 20-107.3(E)(9) directs consideration of the tax consequences to 

each party in the fashioning of an equitable distribution scheme 

and award." Arbuckle, 22 Va. App. at 366, 470 S.E.2d at 148. 

Simply put, Barnes did not address valuation of property pursuant 

to Code § 20-107.3(A); it involved the review of a trial judge's 

decision that applied the factors of Code § 20-107.3(E) in making 

a monetary award. 

 On remand from Arbuckle, the trial judge accepted the 

stipulated value of the dental practice and reconsidered the 

award based upon the factors specified in Code § 20-107.3(E). 

The judge's consideration included "[t]he tax consequences to 

each party" as proved by evidence in the record. Code 

§ 20-107.3(E)(9). In accordance with our usual standard of 

review, "unless it appears from the record that the trial judge 

has abused his discretion, that he has not considered or has 

misapplied one of the statutory mandates, or that the evidence 

fails to support the findings of fact underlying his resolution 

of the conflict in the equities, the equitable distribution award 

will not be reversed on appeal." Blank v. Blank, 10 Va. App. 1, 

9, 389 S.E.2d 723, 727 (1990). The record establishes no 

reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm the decree. 

 Affirmed.