J-S09044-21

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

MARQUIS ROBINSON 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 3457 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 20, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0004367-2017, 

CP-51-CR-0011709-2016

BEFORE: OLSON, J., McCAFFERY, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED MAY 12, 2021

Marquis Robinson (“Robinson”) appeals from the judgments of sentence 

entered following his convictions of aggravated assault, simple assault, 

conspiracy, possessing instruments of crime, unlawful restraint, false 

imprisonment, corrupting the morals of a minor, and recklessly endangering 

another person at CP-51-CR-0004367-2017 (“4367-2017”),

1 and third-degree 

murder, aggravated assault, conspiracy, unlawful restraint, possessing 

instruments of crime, false imprisonment, and corrupting the morals of a 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a)(9), 2701(a), 903, 907(a), 2902(b)(1), 2903(b), 

6301(a)(1)(i), 2705. 
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minor at CP-51-CR-0011709-2016 (“11709-2016”).2 We affirm Robinson’s 

judgment of sentence.

The trial court summarized the factual history of the instant appeal as 

follows:

On July 29, 2016, medics arrived at 4633 Greene Street in 

the City and County of Philadelphia[, Pennsylvania,] to discover 

the naked, beaten body of Joyce Quaweay [(“Quaweay”)] laying 

on the floor of the kitchen/dining room, unconscious. After 

numerous attempts to revive [Quaweay] over 20-30 minutes, 

medics pronounced her dead at 11:02 [a.m.]

[Lieutenant John] Pendergast [(“Lt. Pendergast”)] of the 

Philadelphia Fire Department asked Aaron Wright [(“Wright”)], 

[Robinson]’s co-defendant, if [Quaweay] had been using drugs, 

since it is not typical to see a 23-year-old woman unconscious and 

unresponsive. [] Wright stated, “I’m not gonna lie, I was beating 

her and she went unconscious.” At that point, Lt. Pendergast 

excused himself to call the police....

Dr. Albert Chu [(“Dr. Chu”)], the Deputy Chief Medical 

Examiner of the City of Philadelphia[,] testified that he conducted 

a post[-]mortem examination of [] Quaweay. Dr. Chu concluded 

to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty that the cause of [] 

Quaweay’s death was sudden cardiac death during physical 

assault and the manner of death was homicide.

* * *

Eight-year-old A.A.-W[.] witnessed the beating and death of 

[] Quaweay. [] Wright is the father of A.A.-W[.]’s younger sister, 

M.W. [A.A.-W. and Tyreesa Alsop (“Alsop”), her mother,] [] lived 

with [Wright] for many years. [A.A.-W.] knew [Robinson] from 

[Wright] and knew them to be friends. [A.A.-W.] also testified 

that [Robinson] lived with [] Wright and [] Quaweay at the house 

on Greene Street. [] Quaweay and [] Wright had two children 

together, D.W., and L.W., ages 10 months and 2 years, 

____________________________________________

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(c), 2702(a)(1), 903, 2902(a)(1), 907(a), 2903(a), 

6301(a)(1)(i).
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respectively. Although [A.A.-W.] no longer lived with [] Wright, 

she and [M.W.] spent nights at [Wright’s] and [] Quaweay’s house 

frequently because [Alsop] worked overnight shifts. [A.A.-W.] 

spent the night [at the] Greene Street [house] on July 28, 2016.

On July 29, 2016, [] Wright shook [A.A.-W.] awake and 

ordered her to make breakfast for M.W., D.W. and L.W. [A.A.-

W.] immediately heard [] Quaweay screaming. [A.A.-W.] went 

downstairs to the kitchen/dining area to prepare breakfast, and 

saw [Quaweay] in the kitchen area, naked on a weight bench, with 

her hands handcuffed to a chain[,] and her feet zip-tied to the 

weight bench. A.A.-W. noticed that [] Quaweay’s waist was 

secured to the weight bench with a weight belt, to prevent her 

torso from moving while her arms and feet were secured to the 

bench. [Robinson] and [] Wright secured [] Quaweay’s waist to 

the weight bench to prevent her from moving her body. [A.A.-

W.] proceeded to prepare cereal and milk for herself and the 

younger children. While preparing breakfast, [] Wright was 

beating [] Quaweay with a police [] baton on her back and thighs 

while she was tied down. [] Quaweay screamed [] while being 

beaten by [] Wright. A.A.[-]W. [saw] Wright hit [] Quaweay with 

the baton more than twenty times. [Wright] put down the police 

baton and [Robinson] picked it up. While [] Wright yelled at [] 

Quaweay, [Robinson] used the baton to hit [] Quaweay. A.A.-W. 

[saw Robinson] use[] both of his hands on the baton and raise it 

up over his head [before swinging] down on [] Quaweay’s back, 

thighs[,] and buttocks more than [twenty] times.

[After A.A.-W. finished preparing breakfast,] Wright ordered 

her to sit in the kitchen while the beatings [continued]. [] Wright 

used scissors to cut off [] Quaweay’s hair and ordered A.A.-W. to 

put the hair in a plastic bag. [] Quaweay told [Robinson] and 

[Wright] that she could not breathe. [Quaweay’s] eyes were 

half[-]way open. [] Wright poured bottles of water on 

[Quaweay’s] face at least three times[, and Quaweay] stopped 

breathing. [Robinson and Wright] removed [] Quaweay from the 

weight bench and laid her on the floor. [] Wright and [] Robinson 

performed CPR on her to no avail.

[Alsop] arrived [at] the house sometime after A.A.-W. made 

the breakfast, around 9:00 [a.m.] [] Alsop observed [] Quaweay 

on [sic] secured to the weight bench, with her hands and feet 

bound. [Alsop watched as Robinson] and [] Wright would 

occasionally reposition [Quaweay’s] body and they used a heavy, 
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long chain to secure her to the bench. ... [At some point,] Wright 

ask[ed] Quaweay, “Why are you going through with this?” and [] 

Quaweay responded, “Because I don’t listen, I’m wicked.” [] 

Alsop was in the house for more than an hour when she heard [] 

Quaweay say she could not breathe. ... Wright told [] Alsop to call 

911. Once [Alsop] did that, [Robinson] left the house before 

police arrived.

[A.A.-W.] was also a victim of this abuse at the hands of 

[Robinson] and [Wright]. When [A.A.-W. was] told to “get on the 

bench,” she knew that meant, “I was going to get beat.” These 

beatings took place “many times.” One such incident happened 

because her younger sister[, M.W.,] put a tablet into A.A.-W.’s 

book bag. A.A.-W. was restrained face[-]down on the weight 

bench with her hands handcuffed to the bench[,] and her waist 

secured with the weight belt around the weight bench and her 

body. [Robinson] and [Wright] each took turns beating [A.A.-W.] 

with a belt. Each man took turns hitting her with the belt more 

than [twenty] times. One of these beatings left [A.A.-W.] with a 

permanent scar to her thigh. ... A.A.-W. did not immediately report 

these beatings. [] M.W. reported to [] Tina Butler (“Butler”) that 

she had [also] been the victim of these assaults weeks after 

[Robinson] and [Wright had] killed [] Quaweay. The children were 

no longer living with [Alsop at the time] and [they] told [] Butler 

what happened to them.

[At the time of the incident, Robinson]’s weight [] was 225 

pounds and his height was 5’9”. [] Wright was 200 pounds and 

5’11”. [] Wright was a police officer at Temple University Police 

Department and he stopped working there in 2012. [] Robinson 

was a Temple University Police Officer until the time of his arrest 

on the murder case.

Trial Court Opinion, 9/23/19, 2-6 (citations and footnotes omitted).

On January 6, 2017, and on May 30, 2017, Robinson was charged via 

Informations with the above-mentioned offenses, at 11709-2017 and 4367-
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2017, respectively.

3, 4

 On June 22, 2017, the Commonwealth filed Motions to 

Consolidate Robinson’s cases, 4367-2017 and 11709-2016, and Robinson’s 

cases with Wright’s cases for trial. After a hearing, the trial court granted the 

Commonwealth’s Motions. Robinson and Wright were tried together, and on 

May 2, 2018, following a bench trial, Robinson was convicted of the abovementioned offenses.

5 The trial court deferred sentencing for the purposes of 

preparing a pre-sentence investigation report (“PSI”) and a mental health 

evaluation. 

On July 20, 2018, the trial court sentenced Robinson, at 11709-2016,

to consecutive prison terms of 20 to 40 years for his conviction of third-degree 

murder, 5 to 20 years for his conviction of conspiracy, 21⁄2 to 5 years for his 

conviction of unlawful restraint, 21⁄2 to 5 years for his conviction of possessing 

an instrument of crime, and 21⁄2 to 5 years in prison for his conviction of 

corrupting the morals of a minor. Robinson received no further penalty for 

his conviction of false imprisonment at 11709-2016, and his conviction of 

aggravated assault merged with his conviction of third-degree murder. At 

____________________________________________

3 The offenses relating to A.A.-W. are docketed at 4367-2017, and the 

offenses related to Quaweay are docketed at 11709-2016.

4 Wright was similarly charged at Docket Number CP-51-CR-0011708-2016

for the murder of Quaweay, and at Docket Number CP-51-CR-0004368-2017 

for the abuse and beating of A.A.-W.

5 Wright was also convicted of third-degree murder and related offenses. See 

Commonwealth v. Wright, 240 A.3d 964 (Pa. Super. 2020) (unpublished 

memorandum).
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4367-2017, the trial court sentenced Robinson to consecutive prison terms of 

10 to 20 years for his conviction of aggravated assault, 5 to 20 years for his 

conviction of conspiracy, 21⁄2 to 5 years for his conviction of possessing an 

instrument of crime, and 5 to 10 years for his conviction of unlawful restraint. 

Robinson received no further penalty for his convictions of false imprisonment, 

corrupting the morals of a minor, and recklessly endangering another person. 

Robinson’s conviction of simple assault merged with his conviction of 

aggravated assault. Robinson’s sentences at 4367-2017 were imposed 

consecutively to Robinson’s sentence at 11709-2016, resulting in an 

aggregate prison term of 55 to 130 years.

Robinson filed a timely post-sentence Motion listing both 4367-2017 and 

11709-2016, alleging, inter alia, that his conviction of aggravated assault in 

11709-2016 was against the weight of the evidence, and that the trial court 

abused its discretion when it sentenced Robinson in excess of the Standard 

Sentencing Guidelines and failed to consider his character and history. On 

November 26, 2018, the trial court denied Robinson’s Motion by operation of 

law, and entered two separate Orders, one at each docket number.

On November 28, 2018, Robinson filed a single, timely, Notice of Appeal 

listing both 4367-2017 and 11709-2016.

6

 On January 1, 2019, this Court 

issued a Rule to Show Cause why we should not quash the appeal based on 

____________________________________________

6 Additionally, on December 18, 2018, Robinson filed a court-ordered 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise Statement of matters complained of on appeal.
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our Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969, 

971 (Pa. 2018). See Order, 1/17/19. On January 20, 2019, Robinson filed a 

Response in which he conceded that his Notice of Appeal did not comply with 

Walker and Pa.R.A.P. 341(a). Robinson argued, however, that this Court 

should refuse to quash the appeal in the interests of judicial economy and 

justice. Additionally, in his Response, Robinson requested, inter alia, that he 

be allowed to file “two amended Notices of Appeal containing two separate [] 

Docket Numbers.” On March 15, 2019, this Court discharged the Rule to Show 

Cause, and, ultimately,7referred Robinson’s Application for Relief to the 

merit’s panel. See Order, 3/15/19; Order, 8/27/19. 

On December 28, 2019, Robinson filed a Motion to Remand for a 

Grazier8 Hearing and for Suspension of the Briefing Schedule. On January 

17, 2020, this Court granted Robinson’s Motion and remanded the matter to 

the trial court to determine whether Robinson’s waiver of counsel was

knowing, intelligent and voluntary. See Order, 1/17/20, at 1-2. 

Subsequently, the trial court appointed Robinson new appellate counsel. 

Following a continuance, new counsel filed a supplemental Rule 1925(b) 

____________________________________________

7

In the March 15, 2019 Order, this Court directed Robinson to file his “request 

for relief” in a separate filing. See Order, 3/15/19. On July 21, 2019, 

Robinson filed his “Application for Relief” requesting the same relief as detailed 

in his January 20, 2019 “Response.” See Application for Relief, 7/21/19.

8 Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 1 (Pa. 1998).
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Concise Statement, which the trial court addressed in a supplemental Rule 

1925(a) Opinion.

At the outset, prior to addressing Robinson’s substantive claims, we first 

must determine whether Robinson’s Notice of Appeal complies with Pa.R.A.P. 

341 and our Supreme Court’s decision in Walker. The Official Note to 

Pa.R.A.P. 341(a) provides, in relevant part, as follows:

Where ... one or more orders resolves issues arising on more than 

one docket or relating to more than one judgment, separate 

notices of appeal must be filed. ... Commonwealth v. C.M.K., 

932 A.2d 111, 113 & n.3 (Pa. Super. 2007) (quashing appeal 

taken by single notice of appeal from order on remand for 

consideration under Pa.R.Crim.P. 607 of two persons’ judgments 

of sentence).

Pa.R.A.P. 341, Official Note.

In Walker, our Supreme Court held that pursuant to Rule 341, “where 

a single order resolves issues arising on more than one docket, separate 

notices of appeal must be filed for each case.” Walker, 185 A.3d at 971. Our 

Supreme Court concluded that “[t]he Official Note to Rule 341 provides a 

bright-line mandatory instruction to practitioners to file separate notices of 

appeal.... The failure to do so requires the appellate court to quash the appeal.” 

Id. at 976-77. Our Supreme Court applied its holding prospectively to appeals 

filed after June 1, 2018. Thus, where one or more orders resolves issues 

arising on more than one docket or relating to more than one judgment, 

separate notices of appeal must be filed. Commonwealth v. C.M.K., supra.
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Nevertheless, it is well-settled that the failure to file a timely appeal as 

a result of a breakdown in the court system is an exception to that general 

rule. See Commonwealth v. Braykovich, 664 A.2d 133, 136-38 (Pa. 

Super. 1995) (discussing cases and holding failure of clerk of courts to advise 

defendant that his post-sentence motion had been denied by operation of law 

excused late-filed appeal). More recently, this Court has “declined to quash 

an appeal when the defect resulted from an appellant’s acting in accordance 

with misinformation relayed to him by the trial court.” Commonwealth v. 

Larkin, 235 A.3d 350, 353 (Pa. Super. 2020) (en banc) (citing 

Commonwealth v. Stansbury, 219 A.3d 157, 159-60 (Pa. Super. 2019)); 

see also Commonwealth v. Patterson, 940 A.2d 493, 498 (Pa. Super. 

2007) (compiling cases in which “a court breakdown occurred in instances 

where the trial court, ... either failed to advise [a]ppellant of his post-sentence 

and appellate rights[,] or misadvised him.”).

Instantly, at sentencing, the trial court requested that Robinson’s trial 

counsel advise Robinson of his appellate rights on the record. Robinson’s trial 

counsel stated as follows:

[Defense Counsel]: After the denial of the post-sentence motion, 

whether [the trial court] does it expressly or whether it happens 

by operation of law, you have 30 days in which to file an appeal

to the Superior Court. The appeal must be in writing. You have 

an absolute right to have an attorney represent in the filing of the 

appeal.

[] Robinson, I know you want an appeal, and I will take 

care of that. ...
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[Y]ou should not file anything on your own because, for 

example, if you were to file a notice of appeal tomorrow, then 

what that would do is it would take jurisdiction away from [the 

trial court]. ... If you file a notice of appeal before [the trial court] 

decides upon post-sentence motions, you will have waived any 

issue pertaining to the discretionary aspect of your sentencing, or 

any issue with regard to the weight and the credibility of the 

evidence.

N.T. (Sentencing Hearing), 7/20/18, at 67-68 (emphasis added). After the 

above explanation, the trial court did not correct any of trial counsel’s 

statements. Id. at 68-69. Moreover, the trial court, in its Orders denying 

Robinson’s post-sentence Motion, still did not correct the misstatements of 

trial counsel at sentencing, but rather, stated as follows: “You have the right 

to appeal to the appropriate appellate court within 30 days, from the date of 

this Order. Notice of Appeal must be filed at the Appeal Unit[.]” Order at 

Docket Number CP-51-CR-0004367-2017, 11/26/18; see also Order at 

Docket Number CP-51-CR-0011709-2016, 11/26/18. 

We conclude that the misstatements of both trial counsel and the trial 

court constituted a breakdown in court operations such that we may overlook 

the defective nature of Robinson’s timely Notice of Appeal. See Stansbury, 

219 A.3d at 160 (stating that a breakdown in court operations had occurred 

where the trial court advised defendant that he only need file a single notice 

of appeal); see also Larkin, 235 A.3d at 354 (stating that appellant had been 
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misinformed by the trial court where the trial court stated he only need to file 

“an appeal.”). Therefore, we will address the merits of Robinson’s appeal.9

Robinson now raises the following claims for our review:

1. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion when it 

consolidated [11709-2016] and [4367-2017] into one trial[,]

where evidence of one offense would not have been admissible in 

a trial on the other, and where the two offenses were not part of 

a common plan, scheme or design, and a joint trial was highly 

prejudicial to the defense?

2. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion when it 

consolidated [11709-2016] and [4367-2017] into one trial[,]

where evidence of motive had no factual basis because there was 

no evidence that the beating of [] Quaweay grew out of the 

beating of A.A.-W[.,] and there was no specific, logical connection 

between the two incidents that took place over a year apart[,] and 

the joint trial was highly prejudicial to the defense?

3. Was [Robinson’s] conviction for [a]ggravated [a]ssault [] in 

connection with the beating of A.A-W[.] based upon sufficient 

evidence and against the weight and credibility of the evidence 

where the Commonwealth did not sustain its burden of proving 

beyond a reasonable doubt the element of [a]ggravated [sic] that 

[Robinson] caused or had a specific intent to cause serious bodily 

injury to A.A[]-W.[?]

4. Did the [trial] court abuse its discretion when it sentenced

[Robinson] to 55 to 110 [sic] years [in prison,] and all the 

sentences were the statutory maximum and were imposed to run 

consecutively[,] which were manifestly excessive and 

____________________________________________

9 Additionally, we deny Robinson’s Application for Relief because, by the time 

Robinson had requested this relief, time had already expired for him to file 

timely, Walker-compliant notices of appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a) (providing 

that a notice of appeal “shall be filed within 30 days after the entry of the 

order from which the appeal is taken”); see also Pa.R.A.P. 105(b) (providing 

that, generally “[a]n appellate court ... cannot enlarge the time for filing a 

notice of appeal.”); Stansbury, 219 A.3d at 159-60 (stating that this Court 

cannot grant a motion to remand to correct defects in a notice of appeal where 

the 30-day time period to appeal had already expired).
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unreasonable as far outside the Standard Sentencing Guidelines 

without sufficient reasons for the upward deviation[,] and it failed 

to give due consideration to [Robinson’s] character, remorse, 

acceptance of responsibility[,] and other mitigating factors as well 

as individualize his sentence in relation to the conduct of his codefendant?

5. Did the [trial] court err by imposing consecutive sentences on 

two counts of conspiracy constitute an illegal sentence[,] where a 

person who agrees to commit a number of crimes is guilty of only 

one conspiracy so long as such multiple crimes are the object of 

the same agreement[,] and thus[,] in order to be convicted and 

sentenced on two conspiracies there would [sic] have to be two 

separate conspiratorial relationships and under the totality of the 

circumstances a conviction for only one count of conspiracy was 

supported by the facts because the crimes involved the same 

actors, were at the same location, the same method was 

employed[,] and the same object was pursued?

Brief for Appellant at 11-12 (issues renumbered).

We address Robinson’s first two claims together, as they are related, 

and Robinson addressed them together in his brief. Id. at 18-29. Robinson 

argues that the trial court erred in consolidating his cases at 11709-2016 and 

4367-2017 pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 582, because the evidence of one crime 

would not be admissible in a trial for the other under Pa.R.E. 404(b), relating 

to character evidence. Id. at 18-19. In particular, Robinson claims that the 

evidence in both cases could not be used to prove a common plan, scheme or 

design, or motive. Id. at 18-24. In support of this claim, Robinson asserts 

that the beatings of Quaweay and A.A.-W. were too dissimilar, because 

Quaweay and A.A.-W. were part of different age groups; Robinson used 

different items to beat Quaweay and A.A.-W.; and the evidence only 

supported one beating of A.A.-W. compared to several beatings of Quaweay. 
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Id. at 21-24. Robinson concedes that both A.A.-W. and Quaweay are both 

female, both were stripped of their clothing and bound to a weight bench with 

zip-ties and a weight belt, that the items utilized by Robinson and Wright were 

items commonly used by police officers in their occupation, and that other 

children were present in the home during the beatings of both Quaweay and 

A.A.-W. Id. 

Additionally, Robinson claims that the trial court erred in determining 

that the evidence in both of his cases would be admissible in the other 

pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 582, relating to joinder. Id. at 19-21. Robinson 

argues that the trial court conflated the facts of the assault on A.A.-W. Id. at 

25. Further, Robinson claims that he suffered actual prejudice by the trial 

court’s joinder of his cases because “the facts of the numerous beatings by 

[Wright] were attributed to [Robinson].” Id. at 25-29. 

At the outset, we must determine whether Robinson has preserved 

these claims for our review. We observe that Robinson did not file a response 

to the Commonwealth’s Motion to Consolidate, but rather joined Wright’s 

Response. See N.T. (Pre-Trial Motions Hearing), 10/26/17, at 5. Additionally, 

Wright’s Response is not part of the certified record before this Court, and 

therefore, we could find that Robinson has waived these claims. See

Commonwealth v. Preston, 904 A.2d 1, 6-7 (Pa. Super. 2006) (explaining 

that it is the appellant’s responsibility to ensure that the record certified on 

appeal is complete, that matters not of record may not be considered on 
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appeal, and that this Court may not consider any documents which are not 

included in the certified record). Nevertheless, the trial court, in its Opinion,

was able to aptly address Robinson’s claims regarding the joinder of 

Robinson’s cases. See Trial Court Opinion, 9/23/19, at 8-10. Thus, we will 

address the merits of those claims. 

Whether to join or sever offenses for trial is within the trial court’s 

discretion and will not be reversed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of 

discretion, or prejudice and clear injustice to the defendant. Commonwealth 

v. Newman, 598 A.2d 275, 277 (Pa. 1991). 

The Rules of Criminal Procedure, in relevant part, provide:

Rule 582. Joinder--Trial of Separate Indictments of 

Informations

(A) Standards

(1) Offenses charged in separate indictments or 

informations may be tried together if:

(a) the information of each of the offenses would be 

admissible in a separate trial for the other and is capable 

of separation by the jury so that there is no danger of 

confusion; or

(b) the offenses charged are based on the same act or 

transaction

(2) Defendants charged in separate indictments or 

informations may be tried together if they are alleged to 

have participated in the same act or transaction or in the 

same series of acts or transactions constituting an offense 

or offenses.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 582(A)(1)-(2).
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Rule 583. Severance of Offenses or Defendants

The court may order separate trials of offenses or defendants, or 

provide other appropriate relief, if it appears that any party may 

be prejudiced by offenses or defendants being tried together.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 583.

Under Rule 583, the prejudice the defendant suffers due to the joinder 

must be greater than the general prejudice any defendant suffers when the 

Commonwealth’s evidence links him to a crime. Commonwealth v. Lauro, 

819 A.2d 100, 107 (Pa. Super. 2003).

The prejudice of which Rule [583] speaks is, rather, that which 

would occur if the evidence tended to convict [the] appellant only 

by showing his propensity to commit crimes, or because the jury 

was incapable of separating the evidence or could not avoid 

cumulating the evidence. Additionally, the admission of relevant 

evidence connecting a defendant to the crimes charged is a 

natural consequence of a criminal trial, and it is not grounds for 

severance by itself.

Id.

When determining whether a court should join or sever charges, a court 

must apply the following test:

[1] whether the evidence of each of the offenses would be 

admissible in a separate trial for the other; [2] whether such 

evidence is capable of separation by the jury so as to avoid danger 

of confusion; and, if the answers to these questions are in the 

affirmative, [3] whether the defendant will be unduly prejudiced 

by the consolidation of offenses.

Commonwealth v. Collins, 703 A.2d 418, 422 (Pa. 1997). Pursuant to this 

test, “a court must first determine if the evidence of each of the offenses would 

be admissible in a separate trial for the other.” Id. Evidence of other crimes 
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is not admissible solely to show the defendant’s bad character or propensity 

to commit crimes. Commonwealth v. Dozzo, 991 A.2d 898, 902 (Pa. Super. 

2010); see also Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1) (providing that “[e]vidence of other 

crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in 

order to show action in conformity therewith.”).

Evidence of other crimes is admissible to demonstrate:

(1) motive; (2) intent; (3) absence of mistake or accident; (4) a 

common scheme, plan or design embracing the commission 

of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof 

of one tends to prove the others; or (5) to establish the 

identity of the person charged with the commission of the crime 

on trial, in other words, where there is such a logical connection 

between the crimes that proof of one will naturally tend to show 

that the accused is the person who committed the other.

Commonwealth v. Janda, 14 A.3d 147, 156 (Pa. Super. 2011) (emphasis 

added). “Additionally, evidence of other crimes may be admitted where such 

evidence is part of the history of the case and forms part of the natural 

development of the facts.” Dozzo, 991 A.2d at 902 (citation omitted).

In order for evidence of other criminal activity to be admissible to 

establish a common scheme, two conditions must be satisfied: “(1) the 

probative value of the evidence must outweigh its potential prejudice against 

the defendant; and (2) a comparison of the crimes must establish a logical 

connection between them.” Commonwealth v. Arrington, 86 A.3d 831, 

842 (Pa. 2014) (quotations and internal citations omitted).

The trial court addressed Robinson’s claims as follows:
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The evidence of [Robinson]’s beatings of A.A.-W. and [] 

Quaweay establish a common plan, scheme and design, as well as 

the motive and intent of [Robinson] and [Wright] in beating both 

victims. 

* * *

In the instant cases, [Robinson] and [Wright] engaged in 

nearly identical behavior towards the murder victim, [] Quaweay 

and the assault victim, 8-year-old A.A[.]-W. The similarities are:

(1) Both victims are female; (2) both were stripped of their 

clothing after perceived misbehavior; [] Quaweay allegedly 

did not give one of the assailants money for a haircut, she 

allegedly “messed up his car,” “pulled a gun on him,” and 

was forced to say that she was “wicked” and that she 

“didn’t listen” as [Robinson] and [Wright] beat her to death 

and A.A.-W. testified that on one occasion, she was beaten 

after clearing [] Wright’s plate and napkin and putting the 

napkin in the sink and not the trash can; (3) [Robinson] and 

[Wright] forced both victims to get onto a weight bench; (4) 

[t]hey tied both victims’ hands and feet to the weight bench 

with zip-ties that one often sees police officers use in lieu of 

handcuffs; (5) [Robinson] and [Wright] used a weight belt 

to tie each victim to the weight bench to prevent their bodies 

from moving during the beatings; (6) [Robinson] and 

[Wright] used police tools (asps, handcuffs, and zip ties) to 

beat both victims about their bodies; (7) [Quaweay and 

A.A.-W.] were beaten in areas of their bodies that would not 

be seen in public[:] their back, buttocks, legs, not the face 

head or arms; (8) [i]n both cases, [Robinson] and [Wright] 

engaged in these beatings together; (9) [Robinson] and 

[Wright] made other females, including children, watch the 

beatings on the weight bench.

These similarities demonstrate that [Robinson] and [Wright] 

used the same violence, restraint and humiliation technics [sic] to 

punish females who they believed had “misbehaved” .... This 

common scheme of stripping a woman and a young girl naked, 

tying them down to a weight bench, using tools common to their 

training as police officers to both tie [Quaweay and A.A.-W.] down 

and beat them, is their unique[] signature method of punishing 

those who they perceive have “misbehaved.” These similarities 

are more than sufficient to establish a common plan, scheme and 
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design[,] and therefore would be admissible in separate trials. 

Pa.R.Crim.P. []582(A)(1)(a).

[Robinson] and [Wright] elected to have their cases heard 

by a judge, sitting without a jury. Any concern that a fact-finder

would have been unable to separate the offenses is virtually 

mooted by this being a bench trial. There is no basis to conclude 

that the [trial] court could not keep separate the facts of the two 

incidents so as to avoid both confusion and prejudice. No relief is 

due.

Trial Court Opinion, 9/23/19, at 9-10 (citations omitted).

Our review confirms the trial court’s reasoning and analysis. The 

evidence presented at trial revealed that Robinson’s beatings of both Quaweay 

and A.A.-W. were substantially similar and admissible to show a “common 

scheme, plan or design.” See Arrington, supra; see also Newman, 598 

A.2d at 278 (stating that the establishment of a common scheme, plan or 

design “requires only that there are shared similarities in the details of each 

crime.”). Instantly, Robinson and Wright beat both Quaweay and A.A.-W., 

usually in front of the younger children, whenever they “misbehaved” by 

restraining them to a weight bench with a weight belt and zip ties, then taking 

turns beating Quaweay and A.A.-W. on their buttocks, thighs, and back with 

a police baton or belt. See Trial Court Opinion, 9/23/19, at 3-6, 9-10; see 

also N.T. (Bench Trial), 4/30/18, at 46-50, 55-60, 64, 79-80; N.T. (Bench 

Trial), 5/2/18, at 13, 15-16, 39, 88-90, 92-93, 96, 111-12. Thus, evidence 

of Robinson’s crimes would have been admissible as evidence of a common 

scheme, plan or design. See Arrington, supra; Newman, supra.
J-S09044-21

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Additionally, Robinson was convicted following a bench trial, and thus, 

there were no concerns regarding jury confusion, and it is presumed that the 

trial court was capable of separating the evidence to properly consider each 

criminal charge. See Commonwealth v. O’Brien, 836 A.2d 966, 972 (Pa. 

Super. 2003) (explaining that a trial held before a trial court rather than a 

jury “minimizes if not eliminates the potential for prejudice.”). 

Moreover, as the trial court noted in its Opinion, Robinson has not 

established that he was unduly prejudiced by the trial court’s decision to 

consolidate his cases. See Trial Court Opinion, 9/23/19, at 9-10; see also

Newman, 598 A.2d at 278 (stating that in order to establish prejudice, an 

appellant must establish that he was convicted because of his propensity to 

commit crimes, or because the jury was incapable of separating the evidence 

or could not avoid cumulating the evidence). Because evidence of each of 

Robinson’s offenses were admissible in a separate trial for the other, and the 

trial court sat as fact-finder, joinder was appropriate and did not unduly 

prejudice Robinson. See O’Brien, supra; see also Commonwealth v. 

Johnson, 236 A.3d 1141, 1150 (Pa. Super. 2020) (emphasizing this 

Commonwealth’s policy to encourage joinder, especially where “the result will 

be to avoid the expensive and time consuming duplication of evidence.”) 

(citation omitted). Based upon the foregoing, the trial court did not err in

consolidating Robinson’s cases, and we cannot grant Robinson relief on these 

claims.
J-S09044-21

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In his third claim, Robinson raises two distinct challenges, which we will 

address separately. First, Robinson claims that the Commonwealth failed to 

present sufficient evidence that Robinson intended to cause serious bodily 

injury to A.A.-W. Brief for Appellant at 30-31. Robinson directs our attention

to the Reproduced Record of A.A.-W.’s Video Interview,

10 and argues that it 

does not support the trial court’s determination that Robinson caused the 

permanent scarring on A.A.-W.’s thigh. Id. at 31-33. Additionally, Robinson 

claims that he did not pass the belt back and forth with Wright, but rather,

one of them would place the belt down, and the other would pick up the belt 

before resuming A.A.-W.’s beatings. Id. at 32-33.

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in 

the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient 

evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying [the above] test, 

we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for 

a fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and 

circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not 

preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a 

defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the 

evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no 

probability of fact may be drawn from the combined 

circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of 

____________________________________________

10 We note that A.A.-W.’s video interview does not appear in the certified 

record before us, and thus we cannot consider it on appeal. See 

Commonwealth v. Brown, 161 A.3d 960, 968 (Pa. Super. 2017) (stating 

that “our review is limited to those facts which are contained in the certified 

record and what is not contained in the certified record does not exist for 

purposes of our review”) (internal quotations omitted); see also 

Commonwealth v. Holston, 211 A.3d 1264, 1276 (Pa. Super. 2019) (stating 

that it is the appellant’s responsibility to ensure that the certified record on 

appeal is complete). 
J-S09044-21

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proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by 

means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying 

the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all 

evidence received must be considered. Finally, the [trier] of 

fact[,] while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the 

weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none 

of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Smith, 97 A.3d 782, 790 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation 

omitted).

The Crimes Code, in relevant part, provides as follows:

§ 2702. Aggravated Assault

(a) Offense defined.--A person is guilty of aggravated 

assault if he:

* * *

(9) attempts to cause or intentionally, knowingly or 

recklessly causes serious bodily injury to a child less than 

13 years of age, by a person 18 years of age or older.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(9). Additionally, the Crimes Code defines “serious 

bodily injury” as “[b]odily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or 

which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or 

impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 

2301.

In its Opinion, the trial court addressed Robinson’s sufficiency claim as 

follows:

In the present case, there is overwhelming evidence of 

[Robinson]’s intent to cause serious bodily injury to A.A[.]-W. In 

this case, [Robinson] and [Wright] handcuffed A.A.-W[.]’s wrists, 

tied her feet with zip ties and attached her with a belt around her 

waist and to a weight bench, without the protection/padding of 
J-S09044-21

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clothing. She sustained beatings while on the weight bench by 

two grown men (5’9” [and] 225 pounds, 5’11” [and] 200 pounds) 

who took turns beating her with a belt. [Robinson and Wright] 

would passed [sic] the belt back and forth to each other so they 

could each use the belt on her body. [A.A.-W.] recalled being hit 

by [Robinson] and [Wright] with a belt and belt buckle more than 

40 times. A.A.-W. has a permanent mark on her leg from when 

she [was] hit with a weapon by [Robinson] and [Wright]. Each of 

these instances is more than sufficient to prove [Robinson]’s 

intent to inflict serious bodily injury to A.A.-W. The repetitive 

blows with an instrument of crime to the naked, restrained, small 

body of an 8-year-old girl by two adult men, establish that the 

only intent [Robinson] had was to cause serious bodily injury to 

“punish” her for alleged misbehavior. The fact that there is only 

one permanent mark to her body in no way takes away from the 

obvious intent of [Robinson] and [Wright], but rather speaks to 

the resilience of the child and her ability to heal from these 

injuries.

Trial Court Opinion, 9/23/19, at 14-15 (citations omitted).

Our review of the record confirms the trial court’s analysis and 

conclusion, and we affirm on this basis in regards to Robinson’s sufficiency 

claim. See id.; see also Smith, supra. 

Next, Robinson challenges his conviction of aggravated assault of A.A.-

W. as against the weight of the evidence. Brief for Appellant at 34-35. 

Robinson claims that the Commonwealth failed to present enough evidence to 

“prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [Robinson] had the specific intent to 

cause serious bodily injury to A.A.-W.” Id. at 35.

We observe that in his Rule 1925(b) Concise Statement, Robinson 

conflates his sufficiency and weight claims. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise 

Statement, 12/16/18, at 1 (wherein Robinson raises both of these claims 

together and states that his conviction is “based upon insufficient evidence” 
J-S09044-21

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and “the Commonwealth did not sustain its burden of proving beyond a 

reasonable doubt that [Robinson] caused or attempted to cause serious bodily 

injury to [A.A.-W.]”); See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii) (stating that “[t]he 

Statement shall concisely identify each error that the appellant attends to 

assert with sufficient detail to identify the issue to be raised for the judge.”). 

Further, in his brief, Robinson’s claim that there was “a lack of evidence to 

prove beyond a reasonable double that [Robinson] had the specific intent to 

cause serious bodily injury[]” is more properly a sufficiency challenge. Brief 

for Appellant at 35. Indeed, it is the same sufficiency challenge already raised, 

which we addressed above. Accordingly, because Robinson has failed to 

develop his weight claim, this issue is waived. See Commonwealth v. 

Sexton, 222 A.3d 405, 416 (Pa. Super. 2019) (stating that appellant waived 

his challenge to the weight of the evidence where the appellant’s brief 

conflated weight and sufficiency claims and did not otherwise develop his 

weight claim); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (providing that an appellant’s 

argument shall include “such discussion and citation of authorities as are 

deemed pertinent.”).11 

In his fourth claim, Robinson argues that the trial court imposed an 

“excessive sentence based solely on the seriousness of the offense[s],” and 

____________________________________________

11 Even if Robinson had not waived this challenge, we would affirm for the 

same reasons as the trial court in its Opinion. See Trial Court Opinion, 

9/23/19, at 14-15.
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failed to consider all of the relevant sentencing factors under 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 9721(b). Brief for Appellant at 36.

Robinson challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence, from 

which there is no absolute right to appeal. See Commonwealth v. 

Mastromarino, 2 A.3d 581, 585 (Pa. Super. 2010) (stating that a claim that 

an aggregate sentence involving the imposition of consecutive sentences is 

excessive, challenges the discretionary aspects of sentencing). Rather, when 

an appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence, we must 

consider his brief on this issue as a petition for permission to appeal. 

Commonwealth v. Yanoff, 690 A.2d 260, 267 (Pa. Super. 1997); see also 

Commonwealth v. Tuladziecki, 522 A.2d 17, 18 (Pa. 1987). Prior to 

reaching the merits of a discretionary sentencing issue,

[this Court conducts] a four-part analysis to determine: (1) 

whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see

Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly 

preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify 

sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether appellant’s brief 

has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a 

substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not 

appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

* * *

The determination of what constitutes a substantial question 

must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. A substantial 

question exists only when the appellant advance[s] a colorable 

argument that the sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1) 

inconsistent with the specific provisions of the Sentencing Code; 

or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the 

sentencing process
J-S09044-21

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Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010) (quotation 

marks and some citations omitted).

Here, Robinson timely filed his Notice of Appeal, raised his discretionary 

aspects of a sentencing claim in his Post-Sentence Motion, and properly 

included a Rule 2119(f) Statement in his brief. Therefore, we will determine 

whether there is a substantial question requiring us to review the discretionary 

aspects of his sentence.

In his Rule 2119(f) Statement, Robinson argues that the trial court 

abused its discretion in imposing consecutive, statutory maximum sentences. 

See Brief for Appellant at 10. Robinson claims that the trial court failed to 

properly consider his mitigating circumstances and all of the sentencing 

factors pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b), and instead focused on the 

seriousness of the offenses. Brief for Appellant at 10. We conclude that 

Robinson has raised a substantial question for our review. See Moury, 992 

A.2d at 171-72 (stating that “[t]he imposition of consecutive, rather than 

concurrent sentences may raise a substantial question in only the most 

extreme circumstances, such as where the aggregate sentence is unduly 

harsh.”); see also Commonwealth v. Bonner, 135 A.3d 592, 604 (Pa. 

Super. 2016) (concluding that a claim of an excessive sentence, based upon 

the imposition of consecutive, standard range sentences, raises a substantial 

question). Additionally, Robinson’s claim that the trial court failed to consider 

any mitigating evidence when imposing his consecutive statutory maximum 
J-S09044-21

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sentences, raises a substantial question. See Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 

117 A.3d 763, 770 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc) (stating that a claim of an 

excessive sentence, in conjunction with a claim that the trial court failed to 

consider relevant mitigating factors, raises a substantial question). 

Accordingly, we will review the merits of Robinson’s discretionary sentencing 

claim.

We adhere to the following standard of review:

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the 

sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal 

absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse 

of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather, 

the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the 

sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its 

judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or 

arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Robinson, 931 A.2d 15, 26 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation 

omitted). 

“In every case in which the court imposes a sentence for a felony ... the 

court shall make as part of the record, and disclose in open court at the time 

of sentencing, a statement of the reason or reasons for the sentence 

imposed.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b); see also Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 

812 A.2d 617, 620-21 (Pa. 2002) (plurality). The Sentencing Code also 

provides that “the [trial] court shall follow the general principle that the 

sentence imposed should call for confinement that is consistent with the 

protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact 

on the life of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs 
J-S09044-21

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of the defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b); see also Commonwealth v. 

McClendon, 589 A.2d 706, 713 (Pa. Super. 1991) (stating that “the court 

should refer to the defendant’s prior criminal record, age, personal 

characteristics and potential for rehabilitation.”). “A sentencing court may 

consider any legal factor in determining that a sentence in the aggravated 

range should be imposed. ... [T]he sentencing judge’s statement of reasons 

on the record must reflect this consideration....” Commonwealth v. 

Stewart, 867 A.2d 589, 592-93 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation omitted). 

Further, the trial court must consider the Sentencing Guidelines. 

Commonwealth v. Sheller, 961 A.2d 167, 190 (Pa. Super. 2008). 

In its Opinion, the trial court addressed Robinson’s claim as follows:

The required [PSI] and mental health evaluations were 

submitted to and read by th[e c]ourt. The court stated on the 

record[] that [Robinson]’s guidelines were included in the 

Commonwealth’s Sentencing Memorandum, which the court 

indicated it had read. The court then stated on the record that 

[Robinson]’s Prior Record Score was zero. The [Commonwealth] 

provided a chart outlining all of the ranges of sentencing available 

to the court with the “Deadly Weapon Used” as well as the Offense 

Gravity Scores. In addition, the Assistant District Attorney read a 

letter of Victim Impact testimony of A.A.-W[.] and heard the 

testimony from [Quaweay’s family.] The court also heard from 

[Robinson]’s mother[.] [Robinson] spoke on his own behalf, 

apologized, and asked for forgiveness. The court listened to 

arguments from defense counsel concerning the rehabilitation 

needs of [Robinson.]

* * *

Moreover, the court did state its reasoning on the record 

and its reason for going outside the Sentencing Guidelines. Some 

of the reasons that the court went outside the guidelines are based 

upon factors such as the methodical, torturous, brutal 
J-S09044-21

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methods [Robinson] and [Wright] used to assault [] 

Quaweay, beating her so badly it caused her to die. The brutality 

of this crime was made clear in the photographs of the victim’s 

body that were entered into evidence at the trial and subsequently 

at the sentencing hearing. Other factors that take this crime out 

of the guidelines include the fact that [Robinson] and [Wright] 

made a child participate in this horror by requiring A.A.-W. 

to sit in the same room and watch them commit these 

atrocities. They made her clean up the hair they had 

chopped off the dying victim’s head. They made the child 

watch as both [Robinson] and [Wright] each beat her more

than 20 times with a police asp, swinging it with both 

hands over their heads and striking downward, while []

Quaweay was handcuffed, chained[,] and belted to the 

bench. [A.A.-W.] was witness to the fact that [] Quaweay 

said she couldn’t breathe[,] and she watched as the solution 

put forward by [Robinson] and [Wright] was to throw water on 

her face multiple times. All of these actions, in addition to the 

acts mentioned in the Sentencing Hearing, firmly place this case 

well outside the guidelines.

The same can be said for the actions taken by [Robinson] 

regarding A.A.-W.’s beating. The heavy metal chains, metal 

handcuffs, zip ties[,] and leather weight belt used to 

restrain the victim to prevent her from moving while being 

struck repeatedly with weapons exceeded the means 

necessary to accomplish the goal of “punishment.” Because 

of these factors, in addition to the factors mentioned above and 

at the sentencing hearing ... the court went above the guidelines.

* * *

In light of the above facts of these two cases, the total 

sentences of 55-130 [years in prison] is not excessive in light of 

the brutality, torture, and trauma delineated above. There were 

two victims. Each case was treated individually as separate 

crimes. No relief is due.

Trial Court Opinion, 9/23/19, at 18-21 (emphasis added, footnotes and 

citations omitted).
J-S09044-21

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Additionally, at the Sentencing Hearing, the trial court stated that it 

considered the fact that 911 was called, and that Wright and Robinson 

attempted to perform CPR on Quaweay. N.T. (Sentencing Hearing), 7/20/18, 

at 53. Further, the trial court “considered rehabilitation,” but also considered 

that Robinson was a police officer “who [had] sworn to protect the 

community,” and had failed in this oath in regards to Quaweay and A.A.-W. 

Id. at 54-55. Ultimately, the trial court concluded that there was no mitigation 

that could overcome the aggravating factors of the beatings, torture, abuse, 

degradation, humiliation, and ultimately, murder committed by Robinson. Id.

at 49-59.

Our review confirms that the trial court considered all the relevant 

sentencing factors and set forth its reasons for imposing consecutive, 

statutory maximum sentences. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b); see also 

Commonwealth v. Macias, 968 A.2d 773, 778 (Pa. Super. 2009) (stating 

that “[t]he sentencing court merely chose not to give the mitigating factors as 

much weight as [a]ppellant would have liked[.] We cannot re-weigh the 

sentencing factors and impose our judgment in place of the sentencing 

courts.”). Moreover, the trial court had the benefit of a PSI, which the trial 

court expressly stated it had considered. N.T. (Sentencing Hearing), 7/20/18, 

at 6; Trial Court Opinion, 9/23/19, at 18-19; see also Commonwealth v. 

Devers, 546 A.2d 12, 18 (Pa. 1988) (explaining that where a sentencing 

judge considered the PSI, it is presumed that they are “aware of relevant 
J-S09044-21

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information regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those 

considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.”). Therefore, we 

conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Robinson’s 

sentence, and that Robinson’s challenge to the discretionary aspects of his 

sentence is without merit. See Macias, supra; see also Robinson, supra.

In his fifth claim, Robinson claims that his sentence is illegal because 

the trial court imposed consecutive sentences for his two convictions of 

conspiracy. Brief for Appellant at 40. Robinson argues that in order to support 

two conspiracy convictions, “there must be two different separate agreements 

to support each conviction.” Id. at 41. Robinson asserts that the 

Commonwealth argued throughout trial that there was a single conspiracy 

between Robinson and Wright. Id. at 41-43. Robinson contends that 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 903(c) prohibits multiple sentences for a single conspiracy. Id.

at 43-44.

Our standard of review of this claim is well settled: “Issues relating to 

the legality of a sentence are questions of law[.] ... Our standard of review 

over such questions is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” 

Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 106 A.3d 800, 802 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation 

omitted). Pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903(c), “[i]f a person conspires to 

commit a number of crimes, he is guilty of only one conspiracy so long as such 

multiple crimes are the object of the same agreement or continuous 

conspiratorial relationship.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903(c). In determining whether 
J-S09044-21

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a single conspiracy or multiple conspiracies occurred, this Court applies a 

totality of the circumstances test and considers the following factors:

[T]he number of overt acts in common; the overlap of personnel; 

the time period during which the alleged acts took place; the 

similarity in methods of operation; the locations in which the 

alleged acts took place; the extent to which the purported 

conspiracies share a common objective; and, the degree to which 

interdependence is needed for the overall operation to succeed.

Commonwealth v. Rivera, 238 A.3d 482, 504 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation 

omitted).

Applying the above factors to the instant case, the record reflects that 

Robinson was charged with conspiracy at two separate Criminal Informations. 

The first was at 11709-2016, for the beating and murder of Quaweay on July 

29, 2016, in the home on Greene Street. See Criminal Information at Docket 

Number CP-51-CR-0011709-2016, 1/6/17, at 1. At 11709-2016, the 

Commonwealth charged Robinson with conspiracy to commit murder, where 

the overt act was “killed another” and the criminal objective was murder. Id.

The second was at 4367-2017, for the beating and abuse of A.A.-W. in 

a similar manner in the same home on Greene Street. See Criminal 

Information at Docket Number CP-51-CR-0004367-2017, 5/30/17, at 1. At 

4367-2017, the Commonwealth charged Robinson with conspiracy to commit 

aggravated assault, where the overt act was “restrained another, assaulted

another” and the criminal objectives were “assault, unlawful restraint.” Id. 

Because the record reveals that Robinson and Wright had engaged in 

similar, but distinct, conspiracies, with different objectives and overt acts, the 
J-S09044-21

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trial court sentenced Robinson appropriately and we grant him no relief on 

this claim. See Commonwealth v. Andrews, 768 A.2d 309, 316 (Pa. 2001) 

(stating that two distinct conspiracies existed where the defendants 

committed three robberies, of three different individuals, at three different 

buildings, over a two-day period).

Based on the foregoing, we affirm Robinson’s judgment of sentence.

Application for Relief denied. Judgment of Sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/12/2021