NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CHELSEA HAMILTON; ALYSSA 

HERNANDEZ, on behalf of themselves and 

all others similarly situated, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

 v. 

WAL-MART STORES, INC., a corporation; 

WAL-MART ASSOCIATES, INC., a 

corporation; DOES, 1 through 50, inclusive, 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 19-56161 

D.C. Nos. 

5:17-cv-01415-AB-KK 

5:17-cv-01485-AB-KK 

MEMORANDUM*

CHELSEA HAMILTON; ALYSSA 

HERNANDEZ, on behalf of themselves and 

all others similarly situated, 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

 v. 

WAL-MART STORES, INC., a corporation; 

WAL-MART ASSOCIATES, INC., a 

corporation, 

Defendants-Appellants, 

and 

No. 20-55223 

D.C. Nos. 

5:17-cv-01415-AB-KK 

5:17-cv-01485-AB-KK 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

FILED

JUN 30 2022

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

DOES, 1 through 50, inclusive, 

Defendant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Andre Birotte, Jr., District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted May 14, 2021

Pasadena, California

Before: BERZON and BYBEE, Circuit Judges, and CARDONE,** District Judge.

Chelsea Hamilton and Alyssa Hernandez (“Plaintiffs”) appeal, and WalMart Stores, Inc. and Wal-Mart Associates, Inc. (collectively, “Walmart”) crossappeal, the district court’s judgment following a jury trial in a wage-and-hour class 

action. In a concurrently filed opinion, we reverse and remand Hernandez’s 

PAGA claims. In this memorandum disposition, we affirm in part, reverse in part, 

and remand Plaintiffs’ remaining claims raised on appeal.

1. The district court did not err in denying Plaintiffs’ motion for judgment 

as a matter of law with regard to the alternative workweek schedule (“AWS”)

election. Under California law, “[p]rior to [a] secret ballot vote, any employer who 

proposed to institute an alternative workweek schedule shall have made a 

** The Honorable Kathleen Cardone, United States District Judge for the 

Western District of Texas, sitting by designation.
3 

disclosure in writing to the affected employees, including the effects of the 

proposed arrangement on the employees’ wages, hours, and benefits.” Cal. Code 

Regs. tit. 8, § 11070(3)(C)(3). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 

Walmart and drawing all reasonable inferences in Walmart’s favor, see Reeves v. 

Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 149–50 (2000), there was 

sufficient evidence at trial to support the jury’s conclusion that Walmart properly 

implemented the AWS. 

The evidence before the jury included that both before and after 

implementing the AWS, Walmart offered employees 24 hours of paid sick leave. 

Regardless of whether Walmart was required under California Labor Code § 246 

to provide three days of sick time rather than 24 hours when it switched schedules, 

Walmart’s disclosures to employees were accurate. And the change to the AWS 

did not waive the employees’ rights under section 246, as the sick time 

requirements—however they are interpreted—still apply to Walmart. Sufficient 

evidence also supports the jury’s conclusion that Walmart adequately described the 

effects of the AWS as compared to the schedule the employees were currently 

working. Nothing in the statute requires an employer to disclose an alternative

schedule it might offer in the event of a “no” vote.

Finally, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Walmart, the 

jury could reasonably have concluded that Erin Schwartz was properly excluded 
4 

from the election. Walmart’s witnesses testified that Schwartz’s original position 

was not included in the AWS, that she “could have transferred to another 

department,” and that employees at Walmart frequently change positions and 

shifts. The jury had sufficient evidence to conclude that after the vote but before 

implementation of the AWS, Schwartz switched to a position that would be 

covered by the proposed AWS schedule. 

As the district court properly denied Plaintiffs’ motion for judgment as a 

matter of law on the overtime claims, Plaintiffs are not entitled to a new trial on the 

derivative claim for waiting time penalties under California Labor Code § 203.

2. The district court did not abuse its discretion with regard to the AWS 

issue in excluding evidence that some Walmart employees began work after the 

vote but before implementation of the AWS. We reverse evidentiary rulings only 

when we are “convinced firmly that the reviewed decision lies beyond the pale of 

reasonable justification under the circumstances.” Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 

1172, 1175 (9th Cir. 2000).

All the pretrial materials and jury instructions—which Plaintiffs do not 

challenge—focused on Plaintiffs’ theory that Walmart violated the statutory 

requirements for an AWS, not on a theory that Walmart engaged in “subterfuge” in 

scheduling start dates for employees. The district court’s determination that 

evidence regarding the 117 people who started after the election was not relevant 
5 

to Walmart’s statutory obligations to “affected employees” was reasonable. The 

relevant wage orders define “employ” as “to engage, suffer, or permit to work,”

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 8, § 11070, and Martinez v. Combs, 49 Cal. 4th 35 (2010), held 

that “engage” refers only to an ordinary common law employment relationship, 

id. at 64. The district court’s exclusion of evidence concerning people who had not 

begun working at the time of the election was therefore not an abuse of discretion. 

3. The district court abused its discretion in dismissing Plaintiffs’ individual 

unpaid wage claims after decertifying the security checkpoint subclass.

An order denying class certification or decertifying a class is not generally a 

final judgment on the merits of a claim, and ordinarily, “plaintiffs may pursue their 

individual claims on the merits to final judgment.” Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 

137 S. Ct. 1702, 1706 (2017). The challenged decertification was premised 

entirely on Plaintiffs’ lack of a workable method for calculating class-wide 

damages, an issue that does not apply to Plaintiffs’ individual claims. The district 

court nonetheless dismissed the individual claims based on its conclusion that 

Plaintiffs abandoned their individual claims or misled Walmart as to the status of 

those claims. 

“Dismissal under a court’s inherent powers is justified in extreme 

circumstances, in response to abusive litigation practices, and to insure the orderly 

administration of justice and the integrity of the court’s orders.” Halaco Eng’g Co. 
6 

v. Costle, 843 F.2d 376, 380 (9th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). The record does 

not support the factual conclusions meeting this standard. 

Walmart argues otherwise, maintaining that “during meet and confer 

sessions, ‘Plaintiffs’ counsel confirmed that Plaintiffs Hamilton and Hernandez 

would not be pursuing claims for off-the-clock work or unpaid overtime in their 

individual capacities.’” But the meet-and-confer sessions Walmart references 

culminated in “the parties’ March 1, 2019 Final Pretrial Conference Order.” Those 

sessions occurred before the district court decertified the security checkpoint 

subclass on March 4. Prior to that decertification, Plaintiffs had acknowledged 

only that they were not pursuing individual claims as to theories not then certified. 

In contrast, Plaintiffs represented throughout the pretrial process that they were 

pursuing the wage claim on the security checkpoint theory in both their individual 

and representative capacities. Nothing in the record suggests that Plaintiffs 

represented to Walmart during the pre-March 1 meet-and-confer sessions that they 

would abandon individual claims as to subclasses that might later be decertified. 

Plaintiffs’ pursuit of their individual unpaid wage claims after decertification 

was therefore not an “abusive litigation practice[]” nor an “extreme 

circumstance[].” Halaco, 843 F.2d at 380. Dismissal under the court’s inherent 

powers was not supported by the record and so was an abuse of discretion. See 

United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1262 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
7 

4. The district court erred in concluding that Plaintiffs lacked standing to 

bring their wage statement claims under California Labor Code § 226(a). Magadia 

v. Wal-Mart Assocs., Inc., 999 F.3d 668, 679–80 (9th Cir. 2021). We nonetheless 

affirm the dismissal of those claims, as Magadia established that the challenged 

wage statements do not violate section 226(a). Id. at 680–82.

5. The district court did not err in denying Plaintiffs’ Rule 59(e) motion for 

prejudgment interest. “A Rule 59(e) motion may not be used to raise arguments or 

present evidence for the first time when they could reasonably have been raised 

earlier in the litigation.” Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 

(9th Cir. 2000). Here, Plaintiffs had filed an earlier motion for prejudgment 

interest. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Plaintiffs 

could have sought prejudgment interest for meal-break premiums under California

Civil Code § 3287(a) as part of their initial request. 

Plaintiffs contend that they could not have reasonably raised section 3287(a) 

as a basis for prejudgment interest before Naranjo v. Spectrum Security Services, 

Inc., 40 Cal. App. 5th 444 (2019), review granted, 455 P.3d 704 (Jan. 2, 2020), 

held that “unpaid premium wages for meal break violations accrue prejudgment 

interest at 7 percent” under section 3287(a), id. at 452, 476. As an initial matter, 

while review is pending before the California Supreme Court, Naranjo “has no 

binding or precedential effect, and may be cited for potentially persuasive value 
8 

only.” Cal. R. Ct. 8.1115(e)(1). But Plaintiffs still could have pursued interest 

under section 3287(a) in their initial request. California courts had previously 

denied prejudgment interest for meal-break premiums under other sections but 

suggested that § 3287(a) might be a plausible basis for interest. Bernstein v. Virgin 

Am., Inc., 365 F. Supp. 3d 980, 989 n.10 (N.D. Cal. 2019). Like the plaintiffs in 

Naranjo, Plaintiffs here could have sought interest under section 3287(a) before 

the appellate court’s decision. We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of 

Plaintiffs’ Rule 59(e) motion.

6. Finally, the district court did not err in certifying, and subsequently 

denying a motion to decertify, the meal-break class, nor did it err in denying 

Walmart’s motion for judgment as a matter of law as to the same class.

(i) “When reviewing a grant of class certification, we accord the district 

court noticeably more deference than when we review a denial of class 

certification.” Abdullah v. U.S. Sec. Assocs., Inc., 731 F.3d 952, 956 (9th Cir. 

2013) (quoting Wolin v. Jaguar Land Rover N. Am., LLC, 617 F.3d 1168, 1171 

(9th Cir. 2010)). 

California law requires that an employer provide a meal period to employees 

in which the employer “relieves its employees of all duty, relinquishes control over 

their activities and permits them a reasonable opportunity to take an uninterrupted 

30-minute break, and does not impede or discourage them from doing so.” Brinker 
9 

Rest. Corp. v. Superior Ct., 53 Cal. 4th 1004, 1040 (2012). Plaintiffs’ meal-break 

theory is that Walmart’s standard practice—requiring employees who wanted to 

leave the building on their meal breaks to go through a security check after

clocking out—impermissibly impeded or discouraged employees at the Chino 

facility from taking meal breaks.

Class certification under Rule 23(b)(3) requires the court to “find[] that the 

questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions 

affecting only individual members.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). The gravamen of 

Walmart’s arguments in the cross-appeal is that California law requires a 

subjective showing that each employee felt impeded or discouraged—or was 

actually prevented from—taking their lunch break in the way they would have 

wanted. But the Brinker standard focuses on the employer’s obligation to provide 

an uninterrupted meal break free from impediment or discouragement. In the 

analogous context of employer control under the meal-break statute, Ridgeway v. 

Walmart Inc., 946 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2020), concluded that “the question of 

control boils down to whether the employee may use break or non-work time 

however he or she would like,” a “case-specific approach [which] focuses on the 

level of the employer’s control on employees” not on whether every employee 

wants to use their break in an unauthorized way. Id. at 1079. 
10 

Here, all employees in the class were subject to the same security check 

requirements before leaving the building. Plaintiffs’ theory of liability directly

challenged that practice. Plaintiffs’ “theory of liability—that [the employer] has a 

uniform policy, and that that policy, measured against wage order requirements, 

allegedly violates the law—is by its nature a common question eminently suited 

for class treatment.” Brinker, 53 Cal. 4th at 1033. The district court’s certification 

of the meal-break class was therefore not an abuse of discretion.

(ii) The jury determined that Walmart’s security check policy was an 

impediment to employees’ ability to take an uninterrupted meal break outside the 

control of their employer. That conclusion was supported by substantial evidence. 

To leave the building for lunch, employees were required to go through

security after clocking out, which included removing clothing with any metal parts, 

putting any personal items in a clear bin for inspection, and proving that any 

phones they were carrying were not stolen—for instance by showing a 

personalized home screen or entering a passcode. Viewing this evidence in the

light most favorable to Plaintiffs, such security checks to leave the building after 

clocking out could be determined to be unlawful impediments on employees’ meal 

breaks.

As the jury’s special verdict determined that all 452,491 meal breaks 

calculated by Plaintiffs were subject to penalties for violating California’s meal-
11 

break requirements, Walmart’s argument that more than a de minimis number of 

class members were uninjured is unavailing. The jury had sufficient evidence to 

conclude that Walmart provided no meal breaks free from impediments or 

discouragement.

We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of Walmart’s motions for 

decertification and judgment as a matter of law.

The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.