United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued May 11, 2011

Decided August 30, 2011

Before

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

JOAN HUMPHREY LEFKOW, District Judge*

No. 10-3099

CORY W. GOECKS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

SCOTT E. PEDLEY,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Western District

of Wisconsin.

No. 3:09-cv-00351

William M. Conley, 

Chief Judge.

O R D E R

Plaintiff Cory W. Goecks appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court

forthe Western District of Wisconsin granting defendant Scott Pedley’s motion for summary

judgment. Goecks voluntarily resigned as Deputy Sheriff fromthe Lafayette County Sheriff’s

Department in 2005. He alleges that Lafayette County Sheriff Pedley deprived him of his

occupationallibertywithout dueprocess oflawundertheFourteenthAmendment bymaking

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

The Honorable Joan Humphrey Lefkow of the Northern District of Illinois, sitting *

by designation.
No. 10-3099 Page 2

defamatory and stigmatizing statements to prospective law-enforcement employers and by

discouraging potential employers from hiring Goecks. We incorporate the district court’s

statement of facts by reference. See Goecks v. Pedley, 732 F. Supp. 2d 828, 830-32 (W.D. Wis.

2010). Because Goecks’ claim is foreclosed as a matter of law by Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226

(1991), we affirm.

Defamation is a claim under state tort law, but defamation by a state actor is not, by

itself, a constitutionaldeprivation. Siegert, 500U.S. at 233-34. “[T]oimplicate a libertyinterest,

such charges of defamation must be coupled with the alteration of a legal status, such as the

loss of an employment position.” Townsend v. Vallas, 256 F.3d 661, 669 (7th Cir. 2001), citing

Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 708-10 (1976). Goecks’ claim fails as a matter of law because the

undisputed facts show that Pedley did not make his defamatory statements incident to any

change in Goecks’ legal status. Pedley made his defamatory statements about Goecks and his

efforts to discourage other police departments (notably the Shullsburg Police Department)

from hiring Goecks nearly two years after Goecks voluntarily resigned from the Lafayette

CountySheriff’sDepartment. The statements thereforewerenot “incident to” termination(or

accompanied by a failure to rehire) as required by Siegert. See 500 U.S. at 234; see also Klug v.

Chicago School Reform Bd. of Trustees, 197 F.3d 853, 859 (7th Cir. 1999) (“One must show both a

stigma anda failure torehire. The inflictionof a stigma toreputationaccompaniedbya failure

to rehire (or, a fortiori, by a discharge) states a claim for deprivation of liberty without due

process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.”) (citation and quotation marks

omitted); McMath v. City of Gary, 976 F.2d 1026, 1032 (7th Cir. 1992) (“Siegert . . . emphasized

that the publication [of stigmatizing statements] must occur in the context of termination”);

Wroblewski v. City of Washburn, 965 F.2d 452, 456 (7th Cir. 1992) (observing that Siegert’s

“requirement that the defamatory statement be ‘incident to’ the adverse employment action

is a strict one”).

We find no principled basis on which to distinguish Siegert, a similar case in which the

defendant employer made post-resignation statements that allegedly harmed the plaintiff’s

professional reputation and interfered with new employment prospects. The plaintiff lost in

Siegert because the alleged defamation did not occurincident to his termination. See 500 U.S.

at 234. Thus, as in Siegert, and for the reasons articulated by the district court, Pedley’s

statements about Goecks, do not state a claim for the violation of a liberty interest under the

Fourteenth Amendment.

We also do not believe that Goecks’ allegations about Pedley’s persistent efforts to

encourage the Shullsburg Police Department not to hire Goecks, actions that Goecks

characterizes as “threats”or “inducements”oftheShullsburgMayorortheCityof Shullsburg,

form the basis of any claim for the deprivation of Goecks’ constitutional rights or in any

meaningful way distinguish this case from Siegert.
No. 10-3099 Page 3

We also agree with the district court that stigmatizing statements within Goecks’

personnelfilewiththeSheriff’sDepartment werenot actionablebecause theyhadnot yet been

released, or published. See Franklin v. City of Evanston, 384 F.3d 838, 845 (7th Cir. 2004);

McMath, 976 F.2d at 1035 (noting that information in a personnel file may be a “ticking time

bomb . . . but until the time bomb explodes – i.e., until the information is disseminated – there

is no publication and no constitutional tort.”) (citations and quotation marks omitted). There

is no evidence in the record that Pedley’s memos in Goecks’ personnel file were ever

disseminated.

Goecks’ remaining arguments were not raised before this appeal and are waived.

Goecks argues, for instance, that Pedley’s actions constitute tortious interference with a

contract under Wisconsin law, which amounts to a change in legal status. He also argues that

Pedley’s actions “shock the conscience” and thus constitute a deprivation of Goecks’ right to

substantive due process. We will not consider these arguments for the first time on appeal.

County of McHenry v. Insurance Co. of the West, 438 F.3d 813, 819-20 (7th Cir. 2006).

We address only Goecks’ federal constitutional claim. We express no view on any

possible state lawremedies that might have beenavailable. The judgment ofthedistrict court

is AFFIRMED.