This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER

contains regulatory documents having general

applicability and legal effect, most of which

are keyed to and codified in the Code of

Federal Regulations, which is published under

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Rules and Regulations Federal Register

41041 

Vol. 77, No. 134 

Thursday, July 12, 2012 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2010–1115; Directorate 

Identifier 2010–NM–221–AD; Amendment 

39–17111; AD 2012–13–09] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing 

Company Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for certain 

The Boeing Company Model 747–100, 

747–100B, 747–100B SUD, 747–200B, 

747–200C, 747–200F, 747–300, 747– 

400, 747–400D, 747–400F, 747SR, and 

747SP series airplanes. This AD was 

prompted by several reports of electrical 

arcs at terminal ‘‘A’’ of the electrically 

heated flight deck window 1. This AD 

requires repetitive inspections for 

damage of the electrical connections at 

terminal ‘‘A’’ of the left and right flight 

deck window 1, and corrective actions 

if necessary. This AD also allows for 

replacing a flight deck window 1 with 

a new improved flight deck window 1 

equipped with different electrical 

connections, which would terminate the 

repetitive inspections for that window. 

We are issuing this AD to prevent smoke 

and fire in the cockpit, which could 

lead to loss of visibility, and injuries to 

or incapacitation of the flight crew. 

DATES: This AD is effective August 16, 

2012. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of a certain publication listed in the AD 

as of August 16, 2012. 

ADDRESSES: For service information 

identified in this AD, contact Boeing 

Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data 

& Services Management, P.O. Box 3707, 

MC 2H–65, Seattle, Washington 98124– 

2207; telephone 206–544–5000, 

extension 1; fax 206–766–5680; Internet 

https://www.myboeingfleet.com. You 

may review copies of the referenced 

service information at the FAA, FAA, 

Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 

Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington. 

For information on the availability of 

this material at the FAA, call 425–227– 

1221. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov; or in person at the 

Docket Management Facility between 

9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD 

docket contains this AD, the regulatory 

evaluation, any comments received, and 

other information. The address for the 

Docket Office (phone: 800–647–5527) is 

Document Management Facility, U.S. 

Department of Transportation, Docket 

Operations, M–30, West Building 

Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 

New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, 

DC 20590. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Louis Natsiopoulos, Aerospace 

Engineer, Systems and Equipment 

Branch, ANM–130S, FAA, Seattle 

Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind 

Avenue SW., Renton, Washington 

98057–3356; phone: 425–917–6478; fax: 

425–917–6590; email: 

elias.natsiopoulos@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

We issued a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 

part 39 to include an AD that would 

apply to the specified products. That 

NPRM published in the Federal 

Register on November 19, 2010 (75 FR 

70868). That NPRM proposed to require 

repetitive inspections for damage of the 

electrical terminal at the left and right 

flightdeck window 1, and corrective 

actions if necessary. That NPRM also 

proposed to allow for replacing the 

flight deck window 1 with a new 

improved flight deck window 1 

equipped with different electrical 

connections, which would terminate the 

repetitive inspections for that flight 

deck window. 

Revised Service Information 

The NPRM (75 FR 70868, November 

19, 2010) referred to Boeing Special 

Attention Service Bulletin 747–30– 

2081, Revision 2, dated March 10, 2010, 

as the appropriate source of service 

information for the proposed actions. 

Boeing has since revised this service 

information to account for certain 

inconsistencies and omissions. Some of 

these discrepancies were reported by 

operators, who commented on these 

inconsistencies and omissions as noted 

below. We have reviewed Boeing 

Service Bulletin 747–30–2081, Revision 

3, dated December 5, 2011, which 

addresses the following commenters’ 

concerns: 

• It extends the repetitive inspection 

intervals for the GKN windshields to 

12,000 flight hours or 48 months, 

whichever occurs later, and provides 

more details for the conditions to look 

for during the investigation and 

corrective actions. 

• It changes the inspection specified 

in Work Packages 1 and 2 to a detailed 

inspection (the type of inspection had 

not been specified). 

• It revises Figures 1 and 2 to provide 

a better illustration of the electrical 

connections, change certain data, and 

add new data to the footnotes. Among 

other things, the new data clarifies the 

conditions to look for when inspecting 

the connectors, clarifies the associated 

corrective actions including replacing a 

connector if it or its cover has melted; 

specifies inspection and corrective 

actions of cross-threaded screws, and 

provides instructions on how to select 

the correct screw for the opted 

windshield. 

Comments 

We gave the public the opportunity to 

participate in developing this AD. The 

following presents the comments 

received on the proposal (75 FR 70868, 

November 19, 2010) and the FAA’s 

response to each comment. 

Support for the NPRM (75 FR 70868, 

November 19, 2010) 

Air Line Pilots Association, 

International (ALPA), supported the 

intent of the NPRM (75 FR 70868, 

November 19, 2010). 

Request To Correct Service Information 

Discrepancies 

United Airlines (UAL) reported a 

number of errors and inconsistencies in 


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the information and procedures 

specified in Boeing Special Attention 

Service Bulletin 747–30–2081, Revision 

2, dated March 10, 2010 (the source of 

service information for the NPRM 

(75 FR 70868, November 19, 2010)). 

As explained above, we reviewed 

Boeing Service Bulletin 747–30–2081, 

Revision 3, dated December 5, 2011, 

which addresses the discrepancies 

noted by UAL. We have revised this 

final rule to refer to Revision 3 of that 

service bulletin. We also removed 

paragraph (j) of the NPRM (75 FR 70868, 

November 19, 2010) (that paragraph had 

explained an exception to the proposed 

service information), and we reidentified subsequent paragraphs 

accordingly. We have, however, 

retained paragraph (i) in this final rule 

to ensure that operators are aware of the 

conditions that require window 

replacement and the compliance time 

for the replacement. We revised the 

NPRM to add credit for actions 

accomplished before the effective date 

of this AD using Boeing Special 

Attention Service Bulletin 747–30– 

2081, Revision 2, dated March 10, 2010. 

Request To Extend Initial Compliance 

Time 

UAL questioned the validity of the 

initial 500-flight-hour compliance time 

for the inspection, and requested that 

this compliance time be extended to 

mitigate the risk of operational 

interruptions. Based on the length of 

time Boeing and the FAA have been 

aware of the issue, UAL felt that 

increasing this time would have no 

adverse effect on flight safety. 

We disagree to extend the compliance 

time. Most of the reported arcing events 

occurred within 500 flight hours after 

incorrect assembly of a screw/connector 

electrical connection during 

maintenance. We have not changed this 

compliance time in the final rule. 

Request To Exclude Certain GKN 

Windshields 

GKN Aerospace (GKN) requested that 

we revise the NPRM (75 FR 70868, 

November 19, 2010) to exclude its 

windshield part numbers 60B10028–17 

and 60B10028–18 (GKN part numbers 

06372 and 06373) from the proposed 

inspections. As an alternative, GKN 

requested that those part numbers be 

given longer compliance times because 

of the superior design of the terminal 

block connections at both the cockpit 

and windshield sides of the terminal 

block. GKN pointed out that the primary 

cause of arcing that leads to high 

temperatures is the melting of the solder 

joint used in the window side of the 

terminal block used by other 

manufacturers. The GKN-designed and 

-manufactured windshields do not use a 

soldered joint to connect the power 

braid to the back of the terminal block. 

Instead, the GKN windshield employs a 

ring tag crimped to a carrier wire, which 

is attached to the terminal insert by a 

screw and secured against vibration by 

a lock washer. The carrier wire is 

mechanically crimped to the braid wire 

from the windshield. The mechanical 

fixing of the power braid to the terminal 

block at the windshield side is superior 

to the soldered joint used in the 

standard alternative windshields. GKN 

also pointed out that material choices 

can reduce the potential for cross 

threading. GKN uses nickel-plated 

bronze terminal inserts, which are 

aligned with industry-accepted 

standards for electrical terminations that 

pass high power and high currents. 

Bronze is also more resistive to cross 

threading than other softer materials 

used in electrical connections by other 

manufacturers. 

We agree to extend the repetitive 

inspection interval of GKNmanufactured windshields with screw/ 

connector electrical heat terminals 

because the material used in the GKN 

747 windshield terminal block has 

significantly better high-temperature 

capability and behaves significantly 

better than PPG’s epoxy terminal blocks, 

and the internal crimped connection 

prevents the sustained arcing that can 

occur with PPG’s internal soldered 

connections. We have revised paragraph 

(g) in this final rule to extend the 

repetitive inspection intervals for GKN 

windshields with screw/connector 

electrical connections to 12,000 flight 

hours or 48 months, whichever occurs 

later. 

We disagree, however, to exclude 

those part numbers from the required 

inspections. Two of five reported Model 

747 windshield arcing events occurred 

on these GKN windshields. The GKN 

windshields using screw/connector type 

electrical terminal connections are 

therefore susceptible to overheat caused 

by a loose screw or an incorrectly 

assembled terminal. An overheated 

terminal could damage adjacent parts 

and become an ignition source for 

combustible material close to the 

overheated terminal. The GKN 

windshields with screw/connector-type 

electrical terminal connections therefore 

are not excluded from the required 

actions of the AD. 

Request To Clarify Note (d) of Figures 

1 and 2 

UAL noted that STEP 2, Note (d), of 

Boeing Special Attention Service 

Bulletin 747–30–2081, Revision 2, dated 

March 10, 2010, considers some 

movement (1–3 degrees) of a tight 

connection to be a normal condition. 

UAL stated that it is not possible to 

distinguish between 3 degrees and, for 

example, 4 degrees, and requested that 

we clarify this condition. 

We agree to provide the requested 

clarification. According to Boeing, the 

referenced Note (d) was added in STEP 

2, Figures 1 and 2, of Boeing Special 

Attention Service Bulletin 747–30– 

2081, Revision 2, dated March 10, 2010 

(which corresponds to Note (e) in 

Boeing Service Bulletin 747–30–2081, 

Revision 3, dated December 5, 2011), in 

response to multiple inquiries from 

airlines regarding the brass terminal 

insert in the PPG windshield terminals. 

The airlines were concerned about the 

lack of information regarding the slight 

movement of the connector with light 

manual pressure while the terminal 

connection is tight (tight screw and not 

crossthreaded). This Note was added to 

describe the small movement— 

‘‘approximately 1–3 degrees’’—of the 

shipside of the connector with light 

manual pressure as being normal and 

not to be perceived as a loose terminal 

connection. The 1- to 3-degree 

movement is an approximation and 

does not require measurement. We have 

determined that this Note is sufficient as 

written and provides the information 

requested by the airlines. We have not 

changed the final rule regarding this 

issue. 

Requests To Allow GKN Windshields as 

Terminating Action for AD 

UAL requested we revise paragraph 

(k) of the NPRM (75 FR 70868, 

November 19, 2010) (paragraph (j) in 

this final rule) to consider installation of 

GKN screw-connector-type windshields 

as terminating action in the NPRM. As 

an alternative, UAL requested that use 

of GKN windshields with pin and 

socket arrangement part numbers 

60B10028–21 and -22 be considered as 

terminating action. UAL also noted that 

the primary cause of the electrical arcs 

is damaged solder joints. UAL pointed 

out that the PPG windshield heat 

terminal contains an internal solder 

joint, but the GKN windshield heat 

terminal does not. The GKN 

windshields do not incorporate the 

design features that cause extreme 

arcing, but use mechanical fasteners 

instead of solder in their terminal 

internal joints. 

We partially agree with the request. 

We agree that damaged solder joints are 

the primary cause for the electrical arcs, 

because the heat caused by a loose 

terminal exceeds the rated melting point 

of the solder, resulting in high voltage 


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Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 134 / Thursday, July 12, 2012 / Rules and Regulations 41043 

arcing that may damage the windshield 

glass. We also agree that the failure rate 

of GKN windshields seems to be 

substantially lower than that of the PPG 

windshields, and the severity of the 

failure conditions of the GKN 

windshields is less than those of the 

PPG windshields. For these reasons, we 

agree to extend the repetitive inspection 

intervals for the GKN windshields. As 

explained previously, we have revised 

the compliance times for these 

windshields in paragraph (g) in this 

final rule. 

We disagree, however, to consider 

installation of GKN windshields with 

screw/connector-type heat terminals as 

terminating action. The primary cause 

of an overheated terminal is a loose 

connection of the screw due to incorrect 

torquing during the installation of the 

screw or incorrect installation of the 

screw. A loose connection increases the 

heat at the terminal, which causes 

damage to the adjacent parts and may 

become an ignition source for any 

combustible material close to the heated 

terminal. A loose or incorrectly installed 

screw is the result of limited access on 

the airplane. The pin-socket connector 

is assembled in a controlled 

environment on a bench. Installation 

with full access is not subject to the 

same assembly errors as the screw/ 

connector terminal, and the robust pin/ 

socket connection can be verified by test 

during the assembly of the terminal. The 

screw/connector design proposed by the 

commenter therefore does not provide 

an acceptable level of safety as a 

terminating action. 

We also disagree to allow GKN 

windshields with pin and socket 

arrangement part numbers 60B10028–21 

and –22 as terminating action because 

those part numbers are not specified in 

Boeing Service Bulletin 747–30–2081, 

Revision 3, dated December 5, 2011, and 

the adequacy of those parts is unknown. 

Under the provisions of paragraph (l) of 

the final rule, however, we will consider 

requests to exclude from the inspection 

pin/socket windshield part numbers not 

specified in that service bulletin if 

sufficient data are submitted to 

substantiate that those part numbers 

would provide an acceptable level of 

safety. 

Request To Clarify Repetitive Interval 

Paragraph (h) of the NPRM (75 FR 

70868, November 19, 2010) specified 

that a windshield replaced for failing an 

inspection must be re-inspected within 

500 flight hours after replacement. UAL 

asked whether this repetitive inspection 

requirement applied to any replaced 

windshield—regardless of the reason for 

the replacement—and questioned why 

the re-inspection would be required 

only when a windshield fails an 

inspection. 

We agree to provide clarification. It is 

not necessary to revise the AD to require 

inspection every time a windshield is 

replaced for any other cause than failure 

of the inspection required by the AD 

because, under those conditions, 

subsequent inspections are done as 

specified in the airplane maintenance 

manual. We have not changed the final 

rule regarding this issue. 

Request To Clarify Intent of AD 

ALPA suggested that we clarify the 

intent of the NPRM (75 FR 70868, 

November 19, 2010) by explaining that 

an investigation showed that the 

electrical arcs are caused by loose 

terminal ‘‘A’’ connections. 

We agree with the request and have 

revised paragraphs (e) and (g) of this 

final rule to add a reference to ‘‘terminal 

‘A’ connections.’’ 

Explanation of Compliance Time 

While Boeing Service Bulletin 747– 

30–2081, Revision 3, dated December 5, 

2011, includes a compliance time of 500 

flight hours or 150 days, whichever 

occurs first, for the detailed inspection 

specified in paragraphs (g), (h) and (i) of 

this AD, we have determined that a 

compliance time of 500 flight hours, as 

specified in the NPRM (75 FR 70868, 

November 19, 2010), represents an 

appropriate interval of time in which 

the required actions can be performed 

and still maintain an adequate level of 

safety. 

Window Heat Power Connection 

Disassembled and Reassembled 

If a window heat power connection, 

on a windshield that uses a screw and 

connector for window heat power 

connection, is disassembled and 

reassembled, Boeing Service Bulletin 

747–30–2081, Revision 3, dated 

December 5, 2011, specifies a detailed 

inspection and corrective actions within 

150 days or 500 flight hours, whichever 

occurs first, after reassembly of the 

windshield heat power connection. This 

action was not included in Boeing 

Special Attention Service Bulletin 747– 

30–2081, Revision 2, dated March 10, 

2010, or in the NPRM. Adding this 

action to the AD actions at this time 

would expand the scope of the NPRM 

and necessitate issuing a supplemental 

NPRM to give the public the 

opportunity to comment on the added 

actions. We do not wish to further delay 

this action but may consider further 

rulemaking in the future to require these 

actions. 

Explanation of Additional Changes to 

NPRM (75 FR 70868, November 19, 

2010) 

We have clarified the replacement 

conditions for paragraph (i)(2) of the 

NPRM (75 FR 70868, November 19, 

2010). That paragraph specified a 500- 

flight-hour compliance time for window 

replacement if the connector is ‘‘tight.’’ 

We have extended this condition to 

connectors that are ‘‘tight or can be 

tightened by applying the correct 

torque.’’ 

References to ‘‘screw/lug’’ have been 

changed to ‘‘screw/connector’’ in this 

final rule to agree with the terminology 

used in Boeing Service Bulletin 747–30– 

2081, Revision 3, dated December 5, 

2011. 

Conclusion 

We reviewed the relevant data, 

considered the comments received, and 

determined that air safety and the 

public interest require adopting the AD 

with the changes described previously 

and minor editorial changes. We have 

determined that these minor changes: 

• Are consistent with the intent that 

was proposed in the NPRM (75 FR 

70868, November 19, 2010) for 

correcting the unsafe condition; and 

• Do not add any additional burden 

upon the public than was already 

proposed in the NPRM (75 FR 70868, 

November 19, 2010). 

We also determined that these 

changes will not increase the economic 

burden on any operator or increase the 

scope of the AD. 

Costs of Compliance 

We estimate that this AD will affect 

251 airplanes of U.S. registry. We 

estimate the following costs to comply 

with this AD: 


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ESTIMATED COSTS

Action Labor cost Parts cost Cost per product Cost on U.S. 

operators 

Inspection ................... 1 work-hour × $85 per hour = $85 per inspection cycle.None .......................... $85 per inspection 

cycle.

$21,335 per inspection cycle. 

We estimate the following costs to do 

any necessary replacements that would 

be required based on the results of the 

inspection. We have no way of 

determining the number of aircraft that 

might need these replacements: 

ON-CONDITION COSTS

Action Labor cost Parts cost Cost per product 

Replacement of windshield Up to 18 work-hours × $85 per hour = $1,530 ............. Up to $47,592 .................... Up to $49,122. 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: 

Aviation Programs, describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

We are issuing this rulemaking under 

the authority described in Subtitle VII, 

Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: 

‘‘General requirements.’’ Under that 

section, Congress charges the FAA with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 

products identified in this rulemaking 

action. 

Regulatory Findings 

This AD will not have federalism 

implications under Executive Order 

13132. This AD will not have a 

substantial direct effect on the States, on 

the relationship between the national 

government and the States, or on the 

distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify that this AD: 

(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866, 

(2) Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979), 

(3) Will not affect intrastate aviation 

in Alaska, and 

(4) Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

Adoption of the Amendment 

Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as 

follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new airworthiness 

directive (AD): 

2012–13–09 The Boeing Company: 

Amendment 39–17111; Docket No. 

FAA–2010–1115; Directorate Identifier 

2010–NM–221–AD. 

(a) Effective Date 

This AD is effective August 16, 2012. 

(b) Affected ADs 

None. 

(c) Applicability 

This AD applies to The Boeing Company 

Model 747–100, 747–100B, 747–100B SUD, 

747–200B, 747–200C, 747–200F, 747–300, 

747–400, 747–400D, 747–400F, 747SR, and 

747SP series airplanes, certificated in any 

category; as identified in Boeing Service 

Bulletin 747–30–2081, Revision 3, dated 

December 5, 2011. 

(d) Subject 

Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC)/ 

Air Transport Association (ATA) of America 

Code 30: Ice and rain protection. 

(e) Unsafe Condition 

This AD was prompted by several reports 

of electrical arcs at the terminal ‘‘A’’ 

connections of the electrically heated flight 

deck window 1. We are issuing this AD to 

prevent smoke and fire in the cockpit, which 

could lead to loss of visibility, and injuries 

to or incapacitation of the flightcrew. 

(f) Compliance 

Comply with this AD within the 

compliance times specified, unless already 

done. 

(g) Detailed Inspection and Corrective 

Actions 

Within 500 flight hours after the effective 

date of this AD, do a detailed inspection for 

damage (including but not limited to a crossthreaded screw, arcing, loose terminal, and 

heat damage) of the electrical terminal ‘‘A’’ 

block, connector, and wiring of the left and 

right flightdeck window 1, and do all 

applicable corrective actions, by 

accomplishing the actions specified in Work 

Packages 1 and 2 of the Accomplishment 

Instructions of Boeing Service Bulletin 747– 

30–2081, Revision 3, dated December 5, 

2011. Except as provided by paragraph (i) of 

this AD, do all applicable corrective actions 

before further flight. Except as required by 

paragraph (h) of this AD, repeat the detailed 

inspection thereafter at the applicable 

intervals specified in paragraph (g)(1) or 

(g)(2) of this AD. Doing the replacement 

specified in paragraph (j) of this AD 

terminates the repetitive inspection 

requirements of this paragraph for the 

replaced flightdeck window 1. 

(1) For flightdeck window 1 manufactured 

by GKN with screw/connector electrical 

connections: Repeat the detailed inspection 

at intervals not to exceed 12,000 flight hours 

or 48 months, whichever occurs later. 

(2) For flightdeck window 1 manufactured 

by PPG with screw/connector electrical 

connections: Repeat the detailed inspection 

at intervals not to exceed 6,000 flight hours 

or 24 months, whichever occurs later. 

(h) Inspection for Replaced Windshield 

For any window 1 that is replaced with a 

window 1 that uses screw and connector for 

the electrical heat connection in accordance 

with Work Package 1 or 2 of the 

Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing 

Service Bulletin 747–30–2081, Revision 3, 

dated December 5, 2011: Within 500 flight 

hours after the corrective action, do a 

detailed inspection, in accordance with Work 

Package 1 or 2, as applicable, of the 


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Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing 

Service Bulletin 747–30–2081, Revision 3, 

dated December 5, 2011, and repeat the 

detailed inspection thereafter at the 

applicable intervals specified in paragraph 

(g)(1) or (g)(2) of this AD. Doing the 

replacement specified in paragraph (j) of this 

AD terminates the repetitive inspection 

requirements of this paragraph for the 

replaced flightdeck window 1. 

(i) Window 1 Conditional Replacement 

If, during the inspection required by 

paragraph (g) or (h) of this AD, a screw is 

found crossthreaded, do the applicable 

corrective actions specified in paragraph 

(i)(1) or (i)(2) of this AD. 

(1) If the connector is loose and cannot be 

tightened by applying the correct torque, 

before further flight, replace that window 1 

in accordance with the Accomplishment 

Instructions of Boeing Service Bulletin 747– 

30–2081, Revision 3, dated December 5, 

2011. 

(2) If the connector is tight or can be 

tightened by applying the correct torque, 

replace that window 1 within 500 flight 

hours after the inspection, in accordance 

with the Accomplishment Instructions of 

Boeing Service Bulletin 747–30–2081, 

Revision 3, dated December 5, 2011. 

(j) Optional Terminating Action 

Replacing a flightdeck window 1 that uses 

screw and connector for the electrical heat 

connection with a flightdeck window 1 that 

uses pin and socket for the electrical 

connection, in accordance with Work 

Package 3 or 4 of the Accomplishment 

Instructions of Boeing Service Bulletin 747– 

30–2081, Revision 3, dated December 5, 

2011, ends the repetitive inspection 

requirements of this AD for that window 1 

only. 

(k) Credit for Previous Actions 

This paragraph provides credit for the 

inspections and corrective actions required 

by this AD, and for the window replacement 

specified in paragraph (j) of this AD for the 

replaced window 1 only, if the corresponding 

actions were performed before the effective 

date of this AD using the service information 

identified in paragraph (k)(1), (k)(2), or (k)(3) 

of this AD. 

(1) Boeing Special Attention Service 

Bulletin 747–30–2081, dated August 8, 2006. 

(2) Boeing Special Attention Service 

Bulletin 747–30–2081, Revision 1, dated 

August 20, 2008. 

(3) Boeing Special Attention Service 

Bulletin 747–30–2081, Revision 2, dated 

March 10, 2010. 

(l) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft 

Certification Office (ACO), FAA, has the 

authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if 

requested using the procedures found in 14 

CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, 

send your request to your principal inspector 

or local Flight Standards District Office, as 

appropriate. If sending information directly 

to the manager of the ACO, send it to the 

attention of the person identified in the 

Related Information section of this AD. 

Information may be emailed to: 9-ANMSeattle-ACO-AMOC-Requests@faa.gov. 

(2) Before using any approved AMOC, 

notify your Principal Maintenance Inspector 

or Principal Avionics Inspector, as 

appropriate, or lacking a principal inspector, 

your local Flight Standards District Office. 

(m) Related Information 

For more information about this AD, 

contact Louis Natsiopoulos, Aerospace 

Engineer, Systems and Equipment Branch, 

ANM–130S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft 

Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., 

Renton, Washington 98057–3356; phone: 

425–917–6478; fax: 425–917–6590; email: 

Elias.Natsiopoulos@faa.gov. 

(n) Material Incorporated by Reference 

(1) The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

(IBR) of the following service information 

under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. 

(2) You must use the following service 

information to do the actions required by this 

AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise. 

(i) Boeing Service Bulletin 747–30–2081, 

Revision 3, dated December 5, 2011. 

(3) For service information identified in 

this AD, contact Boeing Commercial 

Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services 

Management, P.O. Box 3707, MC 2H–65, 

Seattle, Washington 98124–2207; telephone 

206–544–5000, extension 1; fax 206–766– 

5680; Internet https:// 

www.myboeingfleet.com. 

(4) You may review copies of the service 

information at the FAA, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, 

Washington. For information on the 

availability of this material at the FAA, call 

425–227–1221. 

(5) You may also review copies of the 

service information that is incorporated by 

reference at the National Archives and 

Records Administration (NARA). For 

information on the availability of this 

material at NARA, call 202–741–6030, or go 

to: http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/ 

cfr/ibr-locations.html. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on June 27, 

2012. 

Kalene C. Yanamura, 

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2012–16333 Filed 7–11–12; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2012–0104; Directorate 

Identifier 2011–NM–279–AD; Amendment 

39–17107; AD 2012–13–05] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing 

Company Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for certain 

The Boeing Company Model 777–200, 

–200LR, –300, –300ER, and 777F series 

airplanes. This AD was prompted by a 

report indicating that a fire originated 

near the first officer’s area, which 

caused extensive damage to the flight 

deck. This AD requires replacing the 

low-pressure oxygen hoses with nonconductive low-pressure oxygen hoses 

in the flight compartment. We are 

issuing this AD to prevent electrical 

current from passing through the lowpressure oxygen hose internal anticollapse spring, which can cause the 

low-pressure oxygen hose to melt or 

burn, and a consequent oxygen-fed fire 

in the flight compartment. 

DATES: This AD is effective August 16, 

2012. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of certain publications listed in the AD 

as of August 16, 2012. 

ADDRESSES: For service information 

identified in this AD, contact Boeing 

Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data 

& Services Management, P.O. Box 3707, 

MC 2H–65, Seattle, Washington 98124– 

2207; telephone 206–544–5000, 

extension 1; fax 206–766–5680; Internet 

https://www.myboeingfleet.com. You 

may review copies of the referenced 

service information at the FAA, 

Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 

Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057– 

3356. For information on the availability 

of this material at the FAA, call (425) 

227–1221. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov; or in person at the 

Docket Management Facility between 9 

a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD 

docket contains this AD, the regulatory 

evaluation, any comments received, and 

other information. The address for the 

Docket Office (phone: 800–647–5527) is 

Document Management Facility, U.S. 

Department of Transportation, Docket 

Operations, M–30, West Building 

Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 

New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, 

DC 20590. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Susan Monroe, Aerospace Engineer, 

Cabin Safety and Environmental 

Systems Branch, ANM–150S, FAA, 

Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 

1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 

98057–3356; phone: 425–917–6457; fax: 

425–917–6590; email: 

susan.l.monroe@faa.gov. 


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