NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

CHARLES RUSSELL WILLIAMS, Petitioner/Appellant,

v.

KARIMA HADDAD, Respondent/Appellee.

__________________________________

No. 1 CA-CV 18-0746 FC

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. FC2018-091883

The Honorable Laura M. Reckart, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Schill Law Group, PLLC, Scottsdale

By John Schill

Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant

FILED 9-12-2019
WILLIAMS v. HADDAD

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Maria Elena Cruz delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Kenton D. Jones and Judge Paul J. McMurdie joined.

C R U Z, Judge:

¶1 Petitioner/Appellant Charles Russell Williams (“Father”) 

appeals the superior court’s order dismissing his petition to establish legal 

decision making and parenting time and his petition to enforce a physical 

child custody order. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Father and Respondent/Appellee Karima Haddad 

(“Mother”), who never married, are the parents of two minor children. 

Mother is a Dutch citizen and both children were born in the Netherlands

and lived there with Mother. Father is an American citizen who resides in 

Arizona.

¶3 At the end of June 2018, Mother and the children came to 

Arizona and stayed with Father at his home. Father asserts that Mother 

planned to move with the children to Arizona at that time, but Mother 

denied that she or the children ever lived or intended to live in Arizona.

¶4 On July 2, 2019, Father obtained an order of protection against 

Mother in favor of himself and the children, claiming that Mother had 

attacked him with a knife in front of the children and had previously 

abused the children. Father also initiated the underlying action with a 

petition to establish legal decision making and parenting time. The 

superior court granted Father’s ex parte request for temporary emergency 

legal decision making and physical custody of the children. The following 

day, the court entered an order directing Mother to produce the children to 

Father or a law enforcement agency. Mother immediately left Arizona with 

the children and ultimately returned to the Netherlands.

¶5 Although it is unclear from the record whether Mother was 

served with the order of protection and petition for temporary legal 

decision making and physical custody, she appeared and testified 

telephonically at the court’s return hearing on the temporary orders. After 
WILLIAMS v. HADDAD

Decision of the Court

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the hearing, the court entered an order establishing Father’s paternity and 

extended the temporary orders.

¶6 Mother then moved to dismiss Father’s petition to establish 

legal decision making and parenting time and the court’s temporary orders,

claiming that because the children were born and raised in the Netherlands 

and had spent less than one month in Arizona, the court lacked jurisdiction 

to enter custody orders under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and 

Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”), codified in Arizona Revised Statutes 

(“A.R.S.”) sections 25-1001 to -1067.

¶7 Father argued that Mother had waived service and entered a 

general appearance by participating telephonically in the return hearing

and therefore could not contest the court’s jurisdiction. He also asserted 

that the superior court had jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 25-1031(A)(2) or 25-

1031(A)(3) because no other court would take jurisdiction of the case and 

the children have significant contacts with Arizona. He further maintained

jurisdiction was proper because Arizona was the children’s “habitual 

residence,” and Arizona had an interest in protecting the children of an 

Arizona citizen who are of tender years and unable to protect themselves

from Mother’s alleged abuse.

¶8 The superior court ruled it lacked jurisdiction and granted the 

motion to dismiss. Father timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant 

to A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).

ISSUES

¶9 Father argues the superior court erred in dismissing his 

petition to establish legal decision making and parenting time because 

Mother subjected herself and the children to Arizona’s jurisdiction and 

Arizona statutory law grants the court jurisdiction. He further contends the 

court abused its discretion by not holding a hearing and making a factual 

determination regarding whether Arizona is the children’s habitual 

residence.

DISCUSSION

¶10 Whether a court has jurisdiction under the UCCJEA is a 

question of law that this court reviews de novo. In re Ramirez v. Barnet, 241 

Ariz. 145, 149, ¶ 12 n.5 (App. 2016).
WILLIAMS v. HADDAD

Decision of the Court

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I. Personal Jurisdiction Over Mother

¶11 Father argues that Mother’s telephonic appearance at the 

superior court’s return hearing had the same effect as if she had been 

properly served with his petition to establish legal decision making and 

parenting time, see Arizona Rule of Family Law Procedure 40(f)(3), and,

therefore, the court had jurisdiction over Mother and the children.

1 

However, even assuming the superior court gained personal jurisdiction 

over Mother, her telephonic appearance alone would not have conferred

jurisdiction on the court to consider Father’s petition for legal decision

making and parenting time. “Physical presence of or personal jurisdiction 

over a party or a child is not necessary or sufficient to make a child custody 

determination.” A.R.S. § 25-1031(C). Instead, the court must conduct a 

separate jurisdictional analysis under the UCCJEA.

II. Jurisdiction Under the UCCJEA

¶12 The UCCJEA provides that a court “has jurisdiction to make 

an initial child custody determination” if any of the following are true:

1. This state is the home state of the child on the date of the 

commencement of the proceeding, or was the home state of

the child within six months before the commencement of the 

proceeding and the child is absent from this state but a parent 

or person acting as a parent continues to live in this state.

2. A court of another state does not have jurisdiction under 

paragraph 1 or a court of the home state of the child has 

declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this state 

is the more appropriate forum under § 25-1037 or 25-1038 and 

both of the following are true:

 

1 Father also asserts that because Mother’s appearance had the same 

effect as proper service of the petition, her removal of the children from the 

United States was wrongful under the Hague Convention on the Civil 

Aspects of International Child Abduction (“Hague Convention”), which 

the United States Congress implemented through the International Child 

Abduction Remedies Act, 22 U.S.C. § 9001 (formerly 42 U.S.C. § 11601). We 

discuss the Hague Convention infra.
WILLIAMS v. HADDAD

Decision of the Court

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(a) The child and the child’s parents, or the child and at least 

one parent or a person acting as a parent, have a significant 

connection with this state other than mere physical presence.

(b) Substantial evidence is available in this state concerning 

the child’s care, protection, training and personal 

relationships.

3. All courts having jurisdiction under paragraph 1 or 2 have 

declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that a court of 

this state is the more appropriate forum to determine the 

custody of the child under § 25-1037 or 25-1038.

A.R.S. § 25-1031(A).2

¶13 A “home state” is defined as “[t]he state in which a child lived 

with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive 

months immediately before the commencement of a child custody 

proceeding, including any period during which that person is temporarily 

absent from that state.” A.R.S. § 25-1002(7)(a). The evidence shows that the 

Netherlands has jurisdiction as the children’s home state under § 25-

1031(A)(1) because the children had lived there since birth.

¶14 Father does not dispute that the Netherlands is the children’s 

home state but argues that Arizona has jurisdiction to make a custody 

determination under § 25-1031(A)(2) or 25-1031(A)(3) because the 

Netherlands will not consider a custody request from an unwed father 

unless the mother grants the father certain parental rights and the children 

have significant contacts with Arizona. Those subsections, however, do not 

apply simply when a home state’s custody laws may disadvantage a party.

3 

Rather, when Arizona is not a child’s home state, an Arizona court may 

only exercise jurisdiction when the home state has declined jurisdiction on 

the basis that Arizona is the more appropriate forum. A.R.S. § 25-

1031(A)(2), (3).

 

2 Foreign countries are treated as if they are “state[s] of the United 

States” for purposes of resolving jurisdiction. A.R.S. § 25-1005(A).

3 Although an Arizona court may decline to apply the UCCJEA if “the 

child custody law of a foreign country violates fundamental principles of 

human rights,” A.R.S. § 25-1005(C), Father does not argue that this 

provision applies in this case.
WILLIAMS v. HADDAD

Decision of the Court

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¶15 There is no evidence in the record that Father has asked a

Dutch court to exercise jurisdiction over his custody petition or that it has 

declined to do so on the basis that Arizona is the more appropriate forum. 

Accordingly, this court will not consider whether Arizona could exercise 

jurisdiction under § 25-1031(A)(2) or 25-1031(A)(3). See Welch-Doden v. 

Roberts, 202 Ariz. 201, 205-06, ¶ 19 (App. 2002) (stating that when another 

state is a child’s “home state,” that state has initial jurisdiction “regardless 

of any significant connections” to the forum state); see also Ariz. Dep’t of 

Econ. Sec. v. Grant, 232 Ariz. 576, 579-81, ¶¶ 7-12 (App. 2013) (holding 

Arizona court had jurisdiction under § 25-1031(A)(2) over children who did 

not have a “home state” as defined by § 25-1031(A)(1) and had “significant 

connections” to the state).

¶16 We also reject Father’s argument that Arizona became the 

children’s home state under A.R.S. § 25-1034(B). That statute directs that 

when a court has issued temporary emergency orders concerning a child 

who is present in the state, and no custody proceeding is commenced in a 

court of a state that has jurisdiction under § 25-1031, the temporary order 

becomes a final determination “if it so provides and this state becomes the 

home state of the child.” A.R.S. § 25-1034(B).

¶17 Because the children did not remain in Arizona for at least six 

months, Arizona did not become their home state; therefore, the superior 

court’s temporary order did not become a final determination.

4 Father’s 

suggestion—that a state may achieve “home state” status merely by issuing 

temporary emergency orders even if the children do not remain in the 

forum state as long as a custody proceeding is not commenced in another 

state that has jurisdiction—is not consistent with the language of § 25-

1034(B) and would contradict § 25-1031.

III. The Hague Convention

¶18 Finally, Father contends that the superior court erred by not 

holding a hearing to determine if Arizona was the children’s “habitual 

residence.”

¶19 The issue of habitual residence, while not a consideration 

under the UCCJEA, is relevant to a petition under the Hague Convention 

for the return of children who have been wrongfully removed or retained. 

 

4 While the superior court extended the temporary orders “until 

further order of the [c]ourt,” it did not provide that those orders would 

become a final determination.
WILLIAMS v. HADDAD

Decision of the Court

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The Hague Convention’s “focus is not the underlying merits of a custody 

dispute but . . . whether a child should be returned to a country for custody 

proceedings under that country’s domestic law.” Papakosmas v. Papakosmas, 

483 F.3d 617, 621 (9th Cir. 2007). Father first made his request that the 

superior court order the children be returned to Arizona under the Hague 

Convention in his response to Mother’s motion to dismiss. Father’s request

was not brought in the proper forum. As a person seeking to initiate 

judicial proceedings under the Hague Convention for the return of a child, 

he must file a petition for such relief in a court “in the place where the child 

is located at the time the petition is filed.” 22 U.S.C. § 9003(b) (formerly 42 

U.S.C. 

§ 11603). Thus, the superior court did not err by not holding a hearing to 

determine whether Arizona was the children’s habitual residence under the 

Hague Convention.

CONCLUSION

¶20 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.