Report to Congressional Committees

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

November 2001 MILITARY

READINESS

Effects of a U.S.

Military Presence in

Europe on Mobility

Requirements

GAO-02-99
Page 1 GAO-02-99 Military Readiness

November 28, 2001

The Honorable Carl Levin

Chairman

The Honorable John Warner

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Bob Stump

Chairman

The Honorable Ike Skelton

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The United States maintains about 100,000 U.S. military personnel

permanently stationed in Europe. According to the Department of

Defense, these forces and their supporting infrastructure provide rapid

response in the event of a military crisis and help shape the international

environment. These forward-deployed forces and equipment also facilitate

the movement of U.S. forces, or mobility, to an area of operations.

The Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year

2001 required us to assess the benefits and costs of the U. S. military

engagement in Europe.1

 This letter addresses one aspect of that

assessment—the impact of forward-deployed U.S. forces in Europe on

mobility requirements in the event of a regional conflict in Europe or the

Middle East. A separate GAO report will address other aspects of the

mandate.2

 Because of our ongoing work on the Department of Defense’s

Mobility Requirements Study 2005, we agreed with your offices that, for

this report, we would use the study as the basis for a general assessment

of how the U.S. military presence in Europe affects defense mobility

requirements. Specifically, our objective was to provide available

information on how mobility requirements are affected by four elements of

 1

P.L. 106-398, sec. 1223, Oct. 30, 2000.

2 European Security: U.S. and European Contributions to Foster Stability and Security

in Europe (GAO-02-174, Nov. 28, 2001).

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, DC 20548
Page 2 GAO-02-99 Military Readiness

forward presence: (1) the en-route system of airbases,3 (2) prepositioned

weapons and equipment, (3) Air Force personnel and aircraft,4

 and

(4) Army forces.

Because the Mobility Requirements Study 2005 does not specifically

analyze the effects of a reduction in the U.S. forward presence in Europe

on mobility requirements and because Defense officials stated that they

are unaware of any studies or analyses of this specific issue, we relied

primarily on information from and views of commanders and other highranking officials on the relative importance of these four elements on

mobility. We also used prior GAO reports that shed some light on these

issues.

The Department of Defense has not quantified the impact of forward

presence in Europe on mobility requirements. However, Defense officials

believe that, without forward-deployed forces and equipment in Europe, in

some scenarios mobility requirements and mobility costs would be

considerably higher and deployment times would be longer, which would

increase war-fighting risk. The impact can vary for each of the four

elements of forward presence we discuss:

• The U.S. en-route system of airbases is critical to operations in Europe and

Southwest Asia. Without these bases, which provide refueling and other

logistics support to U.S. airlift aircraft, it would be impossible to meet

wartime requirements in Europe and the Middle East/Southwest Asia.

• U.S. prepositioned weapons and equipment in the European theater

provides the ability to execute military operations in nearby areas more

quickly and at a lower cost than by using air and sealift from the United

States.

• Air Force aircraft and personnel deployed in Europe allow forces to move

more quickly to small-scale contingencies in the area and reduce the

burden on airlift and sealift, if units were coming from the U.S.

• As with the Air Force, Army combat and support units stationed in Europe

allow forces to move more quickly and at less cost to small-scale

contingencies in the area. The Army can also move these units by land at

lower mobility costs than for those units coming from the United States.

 3

 A network of overseas airfields that provide logistical support to aircraft on their way to

the war zones.

4

 Fighter/attack, refueling, and transport aircraft.

Results in Brief
Page 3 GAO-02-99 Military Readiness

The Department of Defense defines overseas presence as the right mix of

permanently stationed forces, rotationally deployed forces, temporarily

deployed forces, and infrastructure required to conduct the full range of

military operations. Historically, these forces have been concentrated in

three regions—Asia-Pacific, Europe, and Southwest Asia. Forces in

Europe include the major elements of two Army divisions; six Air Force

wings, which include fighter/attack, refueling, and transport aircraft; one

Navy aircraft carrier battle group; and one Marine Corps amphibious

group.5

 Prepositioned items include Army stockpiles of equipment for

three heavy brigades, equipment and supplies for the lead unit of a Marine

Corps expeditionary unit, and six Air Force air base support sets.

The Mobility Requirements Study 2005, issued in January 2001, determined

the number and mix of mobility systems needed to support the national

defense strategy at the time, which required the military to fight and win

two nearly simultaneous major wars.6

 This mix includes both airplanes

and ships owned by Defense as well as volunteer and chartered civilian

airplanes and ships that participate in the Department’s mobility programs.

The study investigated mobility requirements stateside as well as between

theaters and within individual theaters of war. The analysis determined

requirements for the three components of mobility (airlift, sealift, and

ground transportation) and assumed that most forces and prepositioned

equipment currently stationed overseas, including those in Europe, would

remain at the levels planned, at the time of the study, for fiscal year 2005. 7

The study also modeled the en-route airbases needed to support the

movement of forces and equipment.

The study did not model any scenarios without forward-deployed U.S.

troops and equipment in Europe. The study did conclude, however, that

the mobility force structure planned for fiscal year 2005 was sufficient to

 5

 We do not address Navy forces afloat in this report because they self-deploy and thus

have little impact on mobility requirements. Marine forces often deploy with the Navy, but

in some instances, these forces would require airlift support.

6

 The Quadrennial Defense Review Report, issued on September 30, 2001, stated that a new

defense strategy will require the U.S. military to swiftly defeat aggression in two

overlapping major conflicts, be capable of decisively defeating an adversary in one of those

conflicts, and conduct small-scale contingency operations elsewhere.

7

 Airlift delivers the majority of the initial forces and supplies and would move these items

within the theater. Sealift carries much of the bulk cargo needed to sustain an operation.

Ground transportation moves forces and supplies from their home stations to air and

seaports and within the theater.

Background
Page 4 GAO-02-99 Military Readiness

fight and win one major theater war and that a second nearly simultaneous

war could be won by shifting air and sealift mobility assets from one

theater to the other.

During the time of our study, the Department of Defense was conducting

the Quadrennial Defense Review, a congressionally mandated review of

national defense strategy, which is to analyze, among other things, force

structure and military infrastructure.8 The review’s report, issued on

September 30, 2001, stated that the mix of new threats and missions

requires the Department to reevaluate the Mobility Requirements Study

2005 in detail and adjust the results as necessary. According to a

Department official, this reevaluation includes the en-route basing system,

the use of civilian aircraft, and the mobility requirement for the new

national defense strategy.

A U.S. forward presence in Europe reduces mobility requirements,

mobility costs, war-fighting risk, and time required for deployment to

operations in Europe or Southwest Asia. A reduction in any of the four

elements of forward presence in Europe would have an adverse effect on

mobility requirements, costs, and risk, according to Defense officials.

Central Command officials have told us that the U.S presence in Europe,

particularly the en-route system of airbases and the Air Force assets,

would be critical to the success of their operations in Southwest Asia.9

European Command officials also told us that the U.S. presence allows the

Commander to manage the missions assigned to the Command more

easily, such as the small-scale contingencies in Bosnia and Kosovo.10 Many

officials generally agreed that some elements have a greater relative

impact on mobility requirements than others. DOD officials suggested a

relative ranking of U.S. military presence in Europe starting with the enroute system of airbases as having the greatest impact on mobility,

followed by prepositioned equipment, Air Force aircraft and personnel,

and finally Army combat forces.

 8

 10 U.S.C. 118.

9

 The Central Command oversees the Middle East (excluding Israel, Lebanon, and Syria),

parts of Africa and West Asia, and part of the Indian Ocean.

10 The European Command is responsible for all U.S. military activities in Europe, most of

Africa, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, and the South Atlantic Ocean.

Forward Presence

Components Affect

Mobility

Requirements to

Varying Degrees
Page 5 GAO-02-99 Military Readiness

The Department of Defense maintains a system of en-route airbases in

Europe and the Pacific to support long-range airlift operations. These

bases provide the basic services, such as parking facilities, maintenance

capabilities, equipment to load and unload cargo if needed, and refueling

capabilities for airlift aircraft as they move on to their final destinations.

Six airbases in Europe are part of this en-route system (see fig. 1).11

Figure 1: Location of En-Route Airbases in Europe

Source: Department of Defense.

Officials from the commands agreed that the en-route system is critical to

operations in Europe and Southwest Asia. The en-route airbase system in

Europe gives transport aircraft the ability to fly from the U.S. to Europe

and continue from Europe into Southwest Asia in the early phase of a

 11 Although the United States is currently using facilities at Rhein Main airbase in Frankfurt,

Germany, it has agreed to withdraw by December 31, 2005, in exchange for German

construction of additional facilities at Spangdahlem and Ramstein.

En-Route System of

Airbases
Page 6 GAO-02-99 Military Readiness

conflict, a range of about 3,500 nautical miles, which is about the distance

a C-17 can fly without refueling. Defense officials believe that the system

has a significant impact on their ability to move troops and equipment into

any location around the world. For example, the loss of Howard Air Force

Base in Panama made it more difficult for the United States to move forces

quickly and easily into Central and South America.

According to Defense officials, if the en-route airbase system in Europe

did not exist, it would have to be created before combat forces and

equipment can arrive from the United States and move through on their

way to an operation in Europe or Southwest Asia. This effort would

require using airlift to open airbases along the way, instead of using the

same airlift to carry troops and equipment. Without the system, the

Department would require more air refueling capability, as well as more

airlift.

The Mobility Requirements Study 2005 concluded that en-route system

capacity is significantly less than requirements but that planned

improvements would largely eliminate the shortfall by 2005. Defense

transportation officials attribute the shortfall to the shrinkage in U.S.

overseas presence and increased reliance on the remaining bases. They

believe that the shortfall would cause forces and equipment to arrive in

the war theater later than planned, increasing the risk of operations not

being executed as planned and the risk of higher casualties. We recently

issued a report on the en-route system.12 This report discussed the system’s

shortfall in capacity, the reasons for the shortfall and costs associated with

improvements, and the lack of basic information and a coherent

management structure to ensure that the operations of the system can be

carried out efficiently and effectively. We are continuing to study the

system’s planned modernization.

According to U.S. Transportation Command officials, the en-route system

will continue to be evaluated in the context of the new defense strategy.

They stated that they anticipate airlift requirements will be at least as

demanding, and possibly more demanding in the new strategy.

 12 Military Readiness: Management Focus Needed on Airfields for Overseas Deployments

(GAO-01-566, June 14, 2001).
Page 7 GAO-02-99 Military Readiness

The services have both land-based and sea-based equipment and

munitions prepositioned in Europe. Land-based prepositioned items

consist of equipment and supply sets for three Army brigades, one Army

artillery battalion, and one Marine expeditionary unit, in addition to six Air

Force air base support sets and other Air Force equipment. The Army’s

three brigade sets, two in central Europe and one in Italy, include 348

Abrams tanks and 240 Bradley fighting vehicles. In Norway, the Army has

equipment for an artillery battalion, which includes 18 self-propelled

howitzers, and the Marine Corps stores equipment and 30-day supplies for

a Marine expeditionary brigade. Air Force air base support sets—

temporary shelters for early-arriving air base personnel—are stored at a

site in Luxembourg, with the other equipment stored in sites around

Europe. There are also ships afloat in the Mediterranean Sea, which carry

equipment and munitions for the Marine Corps and the Air Force (see

fig. 2).13

 13 The Army plans to shift its prepositioned equipment in Europe to other locations.

Prepositioned Weapons

and Equipment
Page 8 GAO-02-99 Military Readiness

Figure 2: Locations of Prepositioned Equipment in Europe

Source: Department of Defense.

Prepositioned equipment in Europe greatly reduces the amount of time

needed to deploy to a conflict in Europe than if the same forces and

equipment have to be moved from the United States using air and sealift.

For example, officials stated that the Army has established a brigade set of

equipment in Bosnia for rotating troops to use when they deploy to that

mission instead of bringing their own. Using this prepositioned equipment

saves about $5.5 million in transportation costs if the unit is coming from

the United States and about $2.5 million if the unit is based in Europe.

Furthermore, an earlier mobility study pointed out that prepositioned

equipment is a more attractive option because it might be less expensive

than purchasing more airlift aircraft.14

 14 1995 Mobility Requirements Study Bottom-Up Review, Department of Defense.
Page 9 GAO-02-99 Military Readiness

The Mobility Requirements Study 2005 assumed both afloat and landbased prepositioned equipment would be in place and fully stocked in

2005 and did not model any scenarios without it. Land-based prepositioned

equipment in Europe is not used to support the two major theater war

strategy. However, some prepositioned equipment can be used as reserve

during a major conflict or in small-scale contingencies. In fact, from the

start of the mission in Bosnia in December 1995 to June 1998, the Army

lent over 7,900 pieces of prepositioned equipment to units in Bosnia. The

equipment included, among others, Abrams tanks, Bradley fighting

vehicles, and armored personnel carriers.

Officials did cite some drawbacks to having large quantities of equipment

and weapons prepositioned in specific places. First, it is always difficult to

plan conflicts in advance, and there is always the danger that the

equipment may be in the wrong place or that two conflicts break out at the

same time. Other risks are that prepositioned equipment can be a tempting

target for enemies and that the Department might need more flexibility to

quickly move to other geographical regions than prepositioning allows.

The Air Force has almost 33,000 personnel in Europe assigned to six

wings, which include three fighter wings, a refueling wing, an airlift wing,

and a multi-mission wing (see fig. 3). These forces can accomplish all the

traditional Air Force missions, both conventional and nuclear. The units

include 167 fighter/attack aircraft, 36 transport aircraft, and 15 refueling

aircraft.

Air Force Aircraft and

Personnel
Page 10 GAO-02-99 Military Readiness

Figure 3: Major Locations of U.S. Air Forces in Europe

Source: Department of Defense.

Air Force aircraft deployed in Europe allow forces to move more quickly

to small-scale contingencies and reduce the burden on airlift and sealift.

For example, F-15 pilots from Aviano Airbase in Italy conducted combat

missions during the first day of the air campaign in Kosovo. Also, the

31st Fighter Wing based at Aviano is providing the aircraft to support the

mission to monitor, control, and police air space over Bosnia. Central

Command officials stated that combat and transport aircraft are important

to have in Europe and are critical to ensuring the command’s ability to

execute its operational plan for a major theater war in Southwest Asia.

As stated above, the Mobility Requirements Study 2005 modeled the

forward-deployed forces in Europe as they were planned for fiscal year

2005. The exception is the assumption that those forces currently

enforcing the “no-fly” zones in Northern and Southern Iraq would no

longer be assigned to those missions and therefore would no longer be
Page 11 GAO-02-99 Military Readiness

forward deployed in Europe. This would mean that there would be fewer

Air Force personnel and equipment stationed in Europe and a greater

mobility requirement for U.S. Central Command to execute their

operational plan if a conflict were to arise in Southwest Asia.

There are about 69,400 soldiers based in Europe who are assigned to three

infantry and three armored brigades, an aviation brigade, and numerous

support units (see fig. 4).

Figure 4: Major Locations of Active Army Units in Europe

Source: Department of Defense.

Some officials we spoke with stated that, of the four elements of forward

presence, Army combat and support troops would be the easiest to move,

if they were not forward deployed in Europe. In the event of a conflict in

Europe or Southwest Asia, 95 percent of ground troops would move by

commercial airlift. These troops would then fall in on prepositioned

equipment or meet up with their unit equipment, which would move by

Army Forces
Page 12 GAO-02-99 Military Readiness

sealift. According to the Mobility Requirements Study 2005, there is

sufficient sealift, except for special purpose sealift, which is used to move

watercraft that cannot self-deploy, to handle the requirements of a two

major theater war strategy. This would leave the Defense-owned transport

aircraft to carry other critical items.

But having Army personnel and equipment stationed in Europe allows the

Commander, U.S. European Command, to deploy troops faster and easier

to a conflict in his theater. For example, forward-deployed troops from

Europe were among the first units deployed in both the Bosnia and

Kosovo operations because they had to travel a much shorter distance

from home station to the theater than troops based in the continental

United States. According to a former commander-in-chief of the European

Command, the 1st Armored Division’s deployment to Bosnia from its

bases in Germany reduced the number of days required for full

deployment and cost significantly less than deployment would have by a

similarly equipped unit based stateside using strategic airlift and sealift.

Also, European-based units deploy to Bosnia and Kosovo primarily by rail

and road transportation, and are therefore less costly to move than forces

requiring air transportation.

War fighting risk is another factor to be considered. If personnel, weapons,

and equipment have to be moved to a conflict in Europe or Southwest Asia

from the United States, they would take longer or require more airlift

capacity than the same units coming from Europe, which would increase

risk. For example, the Patriot missile battalion in Europe would need the

airlift capacity of 59 C-17 cargo aircraft to move to the area of operations

under the Central Command. But the same battalion, coming from the

United States, would require twice the airlift capacity to arrive within the

same timeframe, according to Defense officials. If that capacity were not

available, it would take longer to arrive, which would increase the war

fighting risk. Again, the Mobility Requirements Study 2005 modeled the

Army forces in Europe as they were planned, at the time of the study, for

fiscal year 2005.

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally concurred

with the information in our report. DOD’s comments are reprinted in

appendix I. DOD also provided technical comments, which we

incorporated as appropriate.

Agency Comments
Page 13 GAO-02-99 Military Readiness

To determine the impact of U.S. forward presence in Europe on mobility,

we reviewed the Mobility Requirements Study 2005 and other Defense

mobility studies. We obtained briefings, reviewed documents, and

interviewed officials at the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, the military services, the Central Command, the European

Command, the U.S. Transportation Command, the Special Operations

Command, the Joint Forces Command, and the Air Mobility Command. We

also obtained information and held discussions with officials at U.S. Army,

Europe, and U.S. Air Forces, Europe, headquarters.

We conducted our review from May 2001 through August 2001 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional

committees, the Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, and

The Honorable Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr., Director, Office of Management

and Budget. Copies will also be made available to others upon request.

Please contact me at (757) 552-8100 if you or your staffs have any

questions concerning this report. Major contributors to this report are

listed in appendix II.

Neal P. Curtin

Director, Defense Capabilities

 and Management

Scope and

Methodology
Appendix I: Comments From the Department

of Defense

Page 14 GAO-02-99 Military Readiness

Appendix I: Comments From the Department

of Defense
Appendix II: GAO Contacts and

Staff Acknowledgments

Page 15 GAO-02-99 Military Readiness

William C. Meredith (202) 512-4275

Ann Borseth (202) 512-5222

In addition to those named above, Lawrence E. Dixon, Patricia Lentini,

Alan Goldberg, and Stefano Petrucci made key contributions to this

report.

Appendix II: GAO Contacts and Staff

Acknowledgments

GAO Contacts

Acknowledgments

(350047)
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