### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 18

- 11529

JAIME R. PEREZ,

Plaintiff

- Appellant

v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant

- Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 4:18

- CV

- 65 2

Before OWEN, Chief Judge, and SOUTHWICK and OLDHAM , Circuit Judges

. PER CURIAM: *
Ja i me Perez, a federal prisoner, filed a lawsuit under the Federal Tort Claims Act. He says he received inadequate medical tre atment for an injury sustained at work in a prison electric shop. The district court dismissed for lack of subject

- matter jurisdiction, holding that the Inmate Accident Compensation Act provide s the exclusive remedy for Perez’s claim. We agree.

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED March 31, 2020 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 18-11529 Document: 00515365896 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/31/2020No. 18

- 11529

2 I. Perez is an inmate at the Federal Medical Center (the “Facility”) in Fort Worth, Texas. According to his complaint, Perez fractured his wrist “while at work in the Facility’s electric shop , ” where he wa s employed as an electrician. Perez alleges that the F acility’s medical staff failed to “properly perform the necessary follow ups and treatment , ” causing him “to suffer through numerous surgeries and pain.” So he sued the Government for $1,000,000 under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”)

. The Government mo ved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) , arguing that Perez’s “exclusive remedy lies under the Inmate Accident Compensation Act” (“IACA”), 18 U.S.C. § 4126. That’s because , the Government says, IACA ’s administrative procedure provides the “sole remedy for relie f ” for an injury that occurs while at work in a federal prison. The Government also contested Perez’s version of events. Although the district court credited Perez’s account of the accident, it agreed with the Government that the compensation scheme established in IACA was Perez’s only path to compensation. The court granted the motion to dismiss. Perez timely appealed. Our review is de novo

. S ee Freeman v. United States , 556 F.3d 326, 334 (5th Cir. 2009)

. II. We affirm. The tex t of IACA as well as precedent make it clear that the district court was correct

— for Perez, it’s the IACA compensation scheme or nothing at all. A. Let’s start with the text. IACA “authorize[s]” (but does not require) the G overnment to use certain funds to “pay [ ], under rules and regulations promulgated by the Attorney General, . . . compensation to inmates . . . for injuries suffered in any industry or in any work activity in connection with the Case: 18-11529 Document: 00515365896 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/31/2020No. 18

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3 maintenance or operation of the institution in which the inmates are confined.” 18 U.S.C. § 4126(c)(4). Exercising power delegated by the Attorney General, the Board of Directors of Federal Prison Industries, Inc. (a government entity) promulgated regulations establishing a system for reviewing and administe ring inmates’ claims for compensation. See 28 C.F.R. pt. 30 1

. T he Supreme Court has explained that IACA and its corresponding regulations are a “comprehensive system to award payments for injuries.” United States v. Demko , 385 U.S. 149, 151 (1966). Becaus e “there is a compensation statute that reasonably and fairly covers a particular group of workers”

— here, inmates at work

— IACA “is the exclusive remedy to protect that group.” Id. at 152. That means an inmate covered by IACA may not turn to the FTCA for re lief. I d

. The dispositive question, then, is whether Perez falls within the class of workers covered by IACA . In other words, i s his fractured wrist an “ injur [y] suffered

. . . in any work activity in connection with the maintenance or operation of the institution in which [Perez was] confined” ? 18 U.S.C. § 4126(c)(4). We’ve previously held that “the cause of the injury is irrelevant so long as the injury itself occurred while t he prisoner was on the job.” Aston v. United States , 625 F.2d 1210 , 1211 (5th Cir. Unit B Sept. 1980)

. If the injury occurs “on the job,” a claim related to that injury falls within IACA. Id. IACA applies here. T he district court credited the allegations in Perez’s complaint that he worked as an electrician at the prison’s “electric shop,” and that he fractured his wrist “while at work in the [F] acility’s electric shop.”
Perez was therefore on the job when he was injured

. So Aston tells us that Perez falls within the class of injured prisoners contemplated by IACA. ( Precedent aside, this result i s correct as a matter of common sense. Being at work must be a “work activity”

— it’s the work activity on which all other work activities are predicated. ) Case: 18-11529 Document: 00515365896 Page: 3 Date Filed: 03/31/2020No. 18

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4 That’s the end of the inquiry. Perez was injured in a work activity. He is therefore one of the group of workers whose FTCA claims were replaced by the administrative scheme promulgated under IACA.
B.
Perez counters that he is entitled to bring a n FTCA claim because the IACA regulations preclude him f rom receiving any compensation

. In particular, h e says that he was actually injured while fighting outside of work

— a n assertion at odds with the allegations in his complaint . And because the regulation s only provide for compensation for “work

- related injuries,” 28 C.F.R. § 301.101(b), not for injuries sustained during a fight, see i d. § 301.301(d), he thinks he’d receive no money from the IACA process.
T here is no evidence in the record that Perez ever tried to lodge a claim
th rough the compensation scheme. But e ven if he had, and even if he had been unsuccessful, that would not change today’s result. The regulations promulgated under IACA offer compensation for certain “work

- related injuries.” Id. § 301.101(b)

. That term includes “any injury

. . . proximately caused by the actual performance of the inmate’s work assignment.” Id. § 301.102(a). But it does not extend to “injuries suffered away from the work location (e.g., while the claimant is going to or leaving work, or going to or coming from lunch outside of the work station or area).” Id. § 301.301(c). Nor does it cover “[i]njuries sustained by inmate workers willfully or with intent to injure someone else, or injuries suffered in any activity not related to the actual performance of the work assignment

. . . .” Id. § 301.301(d). In other words, the Attorney General has used his discretionary authority to provide compensation for only a subset of injuries cause d by a “work activity.” An inmate who g ets less money than he wants from the regulations may not turn to the FTCA for relief

— he is covered by IACA , and IACA is exclusive. See Demko , 385 U.S. at 152

– 53 (rejecting the argument that Case: 18-11529 Document: 00515365896 Page: 4 Date Filed: 03/31/2020No. 18

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5 the FTCA remained available to inmates injured at work because IA CA “was not comprehensive enough”); Ellis v. Fed

. Prison Indus

. , 95 F.3d 54, 1996 WL 460035, at *2 (5th Cir. July 30, 1996) (unpublished) (“The matter of awarding compensation

. . . under the IACA is a matter for determination by the prison authorities, su bject to the supervision of the Attorney General of the United States. The decision of the prison authorities, once made, is conclusive

. . . .” ( citation omitted ) ) ; c f. Gill v. United States , 641 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. Unit A Feb. 1981) (per curiam) (federal employee covered by the exclusive provisions of the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act could not bring an FTCA claim for additional damages). If Perez wants compensation , he must proceed through the IACA

process. See Thompson v. U.S. Fed

. Prison Indus

. , 492 F.2d 1082, 1084 (5th Cir. 1974).
III. One issue remains. After the Government filed its motion to dismiss, and again after the motion was granted, Perez asked the district court for permission to amend his complaint to include the alleg ation s that he was injured fighting outside of the electric shop. The district court denied both requests to amend

. Perez says that was in error. The Government contends that Perez has forfeited any argument about the denied requests because those orders are not mentioned in Perez’s notice of appeal. We’re not convinced. Perez’s notice of appeal identifies the dismissal order as a basis for an appea l, and that order contains a justification for the denial of leave to amend. Particularly for a pro se plaintiff, that is sufficient to preserve the argument

. See F ED

. R. A PP

. P. 3(c)(1)(B) (requiring that a notice of appeal “designate the judgment, order, or part thereof being appealed”) ; Smith v. Barry , 502 U.S. 244, 248

– 49 (1992) (“If a document . . . gives the notice required by Rule 3, it is effective as a notice of appeal.”). Case: 18-11529 Document: 00515365896 Page: 5 Date Filed: 03/31/2020No. 18

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6 Still, reviewing the denial of leave to amend for abuse of discretion, see W ord of Faith World Outreach C t r

. Church, Inc. v. Sawyer , 90 F.3d 118, 124 (5th Cir. 1996), we find no reason to reverse. District courts “should freely give leave when justice so requires.” F ED

. R. C IV

. P. 15(a)(2). But h ere, Perez’s complaint, sworn under penalty of perjury to be true and correct , set out one set of facts. And, a s the district court noted, the amended complaint sought “to wholly change th [ose] facts,” with no explanation for th e revision. “ [ J ] ustice” does not “require [ ]” a court to suborn perjury. The district court correctly denied the motions to amend

.

* * * The FTCA is unavailable to Perez. Sovereign immunity therefore bars his suit against the Gover n ment , and the district court lacked subject

- matter j urisdiction over the case

. See Freeman , 556 F.3d at 334

– 35. AFFIRMED. Case: 18-11529 Document: 00515365896 Page: 6 Date Filed: 03/31/2020