2024 IL App (1st) 240498-U

No. 1-24-0498B 

Order filed May 15, 2024 

Third Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

 v. 

JAYLEN JOHNSON, 

Defendant-Appellant.

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) 

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Appeal from the

Circuit Court of 

Cook County. 

No. 24 MC 1100487 

Honorable 

Ankur Srivastava, 

Judge, presiding.

JUSTICE VAN TINE delivered the judgment of the court. 

Justices Lampkin and D.B. Walker concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: We affirm the trial court’s order granting the State’s petition for pretrial detention

over defendant’s contentions that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence 

that defendant posed a real and present threat to the safety of the community and that the 

court erred in finding that no conditions would reasonably ensure defendant appeared for 

future hearings or prevent him from being charged with new offenses. 

¶ 2 Defendant Jaylen Johnson appeals the trial court’s February 20, 2024, order granting the 

State’s petition for pretrial detention pursuant to section 110-2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 
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(725 ILCS 5/110-1 et seq. (West 2024)), commonly known as the Pretrial Fairness Act (Act).

1 See

Pub. Act 102-1104, § 70 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023) (amending various provisions of the Act); Rowe v. 

Raoul, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 52 (lifting stay and setting effective date as September 18, 2023). 

¶ 3 Defendant argues that (1) the State did not establish by clear and convincing evidence that 

he posed a real and present threat to the safety of the community, and (2) the trial court erred in 

finding that no conditions of pretrial release would mitigate the risk of flight to avoid prosecution, 

reasonably ensure defendant’s appearance at future court dates, or prevent defendant from being 

charged with new offenses.2 For the following reasons, we affirm. 

¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 5 Police arrested defendant on February 19, 2024, and the State charged him with aggravated 

unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(2) (West 2024)). The charges arose

from an incident in which defendant allegedly fled from officers on patrol and threw to the ground 

a loaded firearm with a laser sight attachment, which the officers recovered after arresting 

defendant. 

¶ 6 The day after defendant’s arrest, the State filed a petition for pretrial detention pursuant to 

sections 110-6.1(a)(1) and (a)(6)(O) of the Pretrial Fairness Act (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1), (6)(O)

(West 2024)), alleging that the proof was evident or the presumption great that defendant 

committed AUUW and that he posed a real and present threat to the community’s safety. 

1The legislation has also been referred to as the Safety, Accountability, Fairness and EquityToday (SAFE-T) Act. Neither commonly known name is official, as neither appears in the Illinois 

Compiled Statutes or the public act. 

2As we discuss in more detail below, none of the factors in the second argument wasthe basis for 

the State’s petition for pretrial detention or the trial court’s pretrial detention ruling.
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¶ 7 At a hearing on the State’s petition, the State proffered that at approximately 6:53 p.m. on 

February 19, 2024, officers on patrol in an unmarked squad car saw defendant walking quickly 

while holding an object under his coat. Defendant quickened his pace as he repeatedly looked back 

toward the officers’ vehicle. As the officers approached defendant, they saw him throw the object

to the ground, jump over a nearby fence, and run away. The officers pursued defendant for 

approximately one block before detaining him. The officers then went back to retrieve the object

defendant threw to the ground and found a loaded firearm with a laser sight attachment. Defendant 

did not have a valid Firearm Owners Identification card (430 ILCS 65/1 et seq. (West 2024)) or a 

concealed carry license (id. § 66/1 et seq.). At the time of his arrest, defendant was on probation 

for a 2023 AUUW conviction. 

¶ 8 Defendant proffered that he was 20 years old, graduated from high school, worked parttime, and regularly attended church. He argued that the State failed to show by clear and 

convincing evidence that he possessed a firearm because the officers did not see him holding a 

firearm and no other evidence connected him to the firearm the officers recovered. Defendant 

suggested that other individuals may have left the firearm where the officers found it. Defendant 

also argued that he was not a threat to the community because, although he was on probation for 

AUUW at the time of this arrest, neither his prior conviction nor this offense involved violence 

against others. Defendant noted that the public safety assessment gave defendant low scores for 

the likelihood of “new criminal activity” and “failure to appear” without a new violence flag, and 

recommended pretrial release with electronic monitoring. Defendant requested pretrial release 

with electronic monitoring. The State responded that defendant likely would not comply with 

electronic monitoring because this AUUW arrest violated his probation in the prior AUUW case. 
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¶ 9 The trial court granted the State’s petition for pretrial detention. The court found that 

AUUW constituted a qualifying offense for pretrial detention and found that the proof was evident 

that defendant committed AUUW. The court explained that defendant throwing the firearm to the 

ground as the officers approached suggested his “consciousness of guilt.” The court was persuaded 

that the firearm was, in fact, the object that defendant threw to the ground because police recovered 

it where they saw defendant throw the object and they detained defendant approximately one block 

away from that location. The court rejected defendant’s arguments regarding the weight of the

evidence as more appropriate for trial. 

¶ 10 As to the second and third elements (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(2-3) (West 2024)), the court 

ruled as follows:

 “The second thing the State has to prove by clear and convincing evidence is that 

your release poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons in the 

community. Again there are two ways to look at this. Your attorney argues that you have 

low pretrial scores which is true. She argues that there is no suggestion that you were using 

the firearm. There is no violence flag. You weren’t pointing the firearm around at anybody 

or anything like that. 

 On the other hand, you are out on the street at 7 p.m. This is a time when or 5 p.m. 

rather -- 7 p.m. sorry 7 p.m. This is a time when people are out and about coming home 

from work, going out to run errands and things like that. And this is a loaded firearm with 

a laser sight that you were carrying around on the streets of Chicago. As to whether or not 

that constitutes a danger to the community for me what matters is the context in which 

this occurred. 
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 You are someone who is on first time gun offender probation. You were placed on 

that probation a year ago. So I acknowledge your attorney’s argument that you weren’t 

using that firearm but for someone in your situation to merely be possessing one based on 

your background, based on the circumstances and the way in which you allegedly 

possessed it I do believe it constitutes a danger. I do find that the State has met the burden 

on the second prong as well. 

I will just say if you’re on gun offender probation to be carrying around a loaded 

firearm with a round in the chamber and a laser sight that represents danger to the 

community in my opinion.

The last thing the State has to prove is that there is no combination of conditions 

which I can impose which would mitigate that threat. I find that the State has met its 

burden on that prong as well. Your attorney is arguing that you could perhaps be placed 

on a curfew or electronic monitoring something like that. In order for any of those 

conditions that I can impose to actually protect the community I have to believe that you 

will actually comply with that. You are on probation for a gun case when this is alleged 

to have occurred. That makes me believe that you are not likely to comply with any of the 

conditions I could impose. For those reasons I find the State’s arguments persuasive as to 

why electronic monitoring or other such lesser conditions would not be sufficient to 

protect the public. I find that the State has met its burden. You are detained.”

The court’s written order was consistent with its oral ruling. 

¶ 11 Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal, using the form approved for Illinois Supreme 

Court Rule 604(h) appeals by defendants. Defendant asked to “strike the order of detention and 
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remand for a new detention hearing.” His entire claim of error consisted of one checked box, with 

an argument attached. Defendant checked the box labeled: “[t]he court erred in its determination 

that no condition or combination of conditions would reasonably ensure the appearance of 

defendant for later hearings or prevent defendant from being charged with a subsequent felony or 

Class A misdemeanor.” Below the checked box, defendant wrote “See attached arguments.” The 

attached argument contended that the trial court erred because defendant received low public safety 

assessment scores, he only had one prior conviction, he was “compliant with the terms of his 

probation for the better part of a year,” and his alleged violation of probation is for a nonviolent 

offense.

¶ 12 Defendant did not check either of the two boxes for contesting that the State “failed to meet 

its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that no condition or combination of 

conditions can mitigate the real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the 

community, based on the specific, articulable facts of the case,” or that it “failed to meet its burden 

of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the proof is evident or the presumption great that 

defendant committed the offense(s) charged.”

¶ 13 Defendant also filed a Rule 604(h)(2) memorandum, which raised two arguments. The first 

argument, not presented in defendant’s notice of appeal, claimed that the State failed to meet its 

burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that defendant posed a real and present threat 

to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific, articulable facts of 

the case. The second argument essentially mirrored the argument attached to his notice of appeal.

¶ 14 II. ANALYSIS
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¶ 15 On appeal, defendant argues that (1) the State failed to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that he posed a real and present threat to the safety of the community and (2) the court 

erred in ruling that no conditions of pretrial release “would reasonably ensure the appearance of 

[defendant] for later hearings or prevent [defendant] from being charged with a subsequent felony 

or Class A misdemeanor.”

¶ 16 The Pretrial Fairness Act presumes that all defendants are eligible for pretrial release. 725 

ILCS 5/110-6.1(e) (West 2024). However, the State may petition the trial court for pretrial 

detention in certain statutorily limited situations. Id. § 110-6.1 (a). Upon filing a timely, verified 

petition, the State has the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the proof is 

evident or the presumption great that the defendant has committed a qualifying offense, (2) the 

defendant’s pretrial release poses a real and present threat to the safety of the community, and (3) 

that less restrictive conditions would not avoid that threat. Id. § 110-6.1(d), (e). The trial court may 

grant release, subject to conditions that the trial court deems appropriate, such as electronic 

monitoring or home supervision. However, if the court determines that the defendant should be 

denied pretrial release, it must make written findings summarizing the reasons for denying pretrial 

release. Id. § 110-6.1(h). 

¶ 17 Defendant has forfeited his first argument regarding the State’s failure to prove that he 

presented a threat to the community because his notice of appeal did not indicate that he would 

raise that argument on appeal. See People v. Martin, 2023 IL App (4th) 230826, ¶ 19 (a defendant 

cannot raise, for the first time in an appellate memorandum, additional grounds for relief that he 

did not raise in the notice of appeal); see also Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(2) (eff. Dec. 7, 2023) (“The 

Notice of Appeal shall describe the relief requested and the grounds for the relief requested.”). 
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Defendant does not acknowledge hisforfeiture of this argument or provide any basis on which we 

could excuse it. See People v. Smith, 228 Ill. 2d 95, 106 (2008) (the two most important tasks of a 

reviewing court are to ascertain its jurisdiction and determine which issues, if any, have been 

forfeited). Although the State did not raise this argument, this court’s power of review “attaches 

only upon compliance with the rules governing appeals.” See People v. Lyles, 217 Ill. 2d 210, 220 

(2005). Accordingly, we limit our review to the sole issue raised in defendant’s notice of appeal. 

¶ 18 Defendant’s second argument regarding conditions of pretrial release mischaracterizes the 

trial court’s ruling, effectively arguing against a finding the court did not make. He contends that 

the court erred in finding no conditions would ensure his appearance at future court dates or would 

prevent him from being charged with new offenses. But that is not what the State alleged, it is not 

what the trial court found, and it is not at issue in this case. The State’s petition for pretrial detention 

alleged only that defendant posed a threat to the safety of others pursuant to section 110-6.1(e)(3)(i)

of the Act, not that he was unlikely to appear for future hearings or charged with new offenses

pursuant to section 110-6(a), which is relevant only to appeals from petitions to revoke pretrial 

release. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6(a) (West 2024). Revocation of pretrial release is not at issue in this 

case.

¶ 19 At the pretrial detention hearing, there was no discussion of defendant missing future court 

dates or being charged with new offenses. None of those issues was the basis for the trial court’s 

ruling. Rather, the court found that no conditions of pretrial release would protect the community

from the threat that defendant posed. Although defendant presented argument on this issue at the 

hearing, he does not contest the ruling on appeal. We decline to review issues that were not argued, 

defended, or ruled on in the trial court. See, e.g., People v. Watkins, 2024 IL App (2d) 230567-U, 
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¶ 12; People v. Hughes, 2024 IL App (1st) 232416-U, ¶ 32; People v. Torres, 2024 IL App (2d) 

230446-U, ¶ 13; People v. Mendoza-Camargo, 2023 IL App (2d) 230330-U, ¶ 22; People v. Ling, 

2023 IL App (4th) 230891-U, ¶ 32; People v. Crowder, 2023 IL App (4th) 230857-U, ¶ 17. 

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order. 

¶ 20 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 21 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County. 

¶ 22 Affirmed.