FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20463 

BEFORE THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

In the Matter of ) 

 ) 

Twitter, Inc. ) MUR 7832

 ) 

 

STATEMENT OF REASONS OF VICE CHAIR ALLEN DICKERSON AND 

COMMISSIONER JAMES E. “TREY” TRAINOR III

As a majority of the Commission has explained, there is no reason to believe Twitter, 

Inc. violated federal campaign finance law in this Matter because its decision not to verify 

Complainant’s Twitter account was premised on commercial considerations.1 

But that is not the end of the analysis, and we write separately to note another fatal 

defect in the Complaint’s theory. As explained below, we do not believe Twitter’s decision to 

verify a user’s account, or to decline to do so, represents a “thing of value” under the Act. 

Accordingly, neither granting nor withholding verification of a Twitter account qualifies as a 

“contribution” for our purposes.

As the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended (the “Act”), explains, a

“contribution” includes “any gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money or anything 

of value made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office.”2

And under Commission regulations, “anything of value” includes all in-kind contributions, 

which include “the provision of any goods or services without charge or at a charge that is 

1 MUR 7832 (Twitter, Inc.), Statement of Reasons of Chair Shana M. Broussard, Vice Chair Allen 

Dickerson, and Comm’rs James E. “Trey” Trainor III, Steven T. Walther, and Ellen L. Weintraub 

(Oct. 26, 2021). Our focus on the “thing of value” analysis does not obviate other rationales as to why 

there was no reason to believe a violation occurred in this Matter. Both the Act’s press exemption 

and the Press Clause of the First Amendment itself likely protected the Respondents. See MURs 

7821, 7827, 7868 (Twitter, Inc.), Statement of Reasons of Vice Chair Allen Dickerson and Comm’r 

James E. “Trey” Trainor III ( Sept. 13, 2021); MURs 7443, 7447, 7550 (Twitter, Inc.), Supplemental 

Statement of Reasons of Vice Chair Allen Dickerson and Comm’r James E. “Trey” Trainor III (Oct. 

13, 2021); MUR 7807 (Snap, Inc.), Supplemental Statement of Reasons of Vice Chair Allen Dickerson 

and Comm’r James E. “Trey” Trainor III (Oct. 13, 2021); MURs 7812, 7825, 7869 (Facebook, Inc.), 

Supplemental Statement of Reasons of Vice Chair Allen Dickerson and Comm’r James E. “Trey” 

Trainor III (Oct. 13, 2021); MUR 7742 (Twitter, Inc.), Supplemental Statement of Reasons of Vice 

Chair Allen Dickerson and Comm’r James E. “Trey” Trainor III (Oct. 19, 2021). 

2 52 U.S.C. § 30101(8)(A). 

MUR783200091
MUR 7832 (Twitter, Inc.)

Statement of Reasons

Page 2 of 3 

2 

less than the usual and normal charge for such goods or services.”3 These regulations provide 

a non-exhaustive list of examples of goods and services that qualify as a “thing of value,” 

which includes “[s]ecurities, facilities, equipment, supplies, personnel, advertising services, 

membership lists, and mailing lists.”4 In other words, our regulations clearly govern only 

those products that are freely available for purchase or sale in the stream of commerce.

This approach reinforces the Supreme Court’s observation, in Buckley v. Valeo, that 

the Act should not be interpreted to reach anything of any conceivable value to a campaign, 

but instead should be subject to the “limiting connotation created by the general 

understanding of what constitutes a political contribution.”5 And the Court took care to 

explain what that “general understanding” included: “funds provided to a candidate or 

political party or campaign committee either directly or indirectly through an intermediary” 

and “dollars given to another person or organization that are earmarked for political 

purposes.”6 Consequently, it is clear that an expansive view of the term “thing of value” poses 

clear prudential and constitutional issues.7 

The Complaint contends, and Twitter does not deny, that verification has “numerous 

and significant benefits,” which “can [emphasis added] lead to more followers and a higher 

social media profile.”8 Such benefits may confer a certain level of public relevance, cachet, 

and clout upon the account that has been verified. 

But while it is true that social media followers and account and tweet views can be 

purchased, and therefore reliably valued,9 a so-called “blue check mark”—the public-facing 

indicator showing that a Twitter account is verified—cannot be purchased or transferred 

from account to account. It is not sold by Twitter or on a secondary market. It does not 

guarantee that the verified account will acquire a certain number of followers or views, nor 

does it guarantee that the account can be monetized by the user. In other words, it does not 

have a market price and is not a “contribution” as contemplated by our regulations.10 And 

although social media users commonly leverage clout to make money, Twitter’s decision to 

grant a blue check mark to an account is about signaling identity, newsworthiness, and 

3 11 C.F.R. § 100.52(d).

4 Id. at (d)(1).

5 424 U.S. 1, 23 n.24 (1976).

6 Id. 

7 See, e.g., MUR 7271 (DNC, et al.), Statement of Reasons of Vice Chair Allen Dickerson and 

Comm’rs Sean J. Cooksey and James E. “Trey” Trainor III (concluding that an unpaid statement at a 

press conference was not a “thing of value”); MUR 7265 (Donald J. Trump for President, et al.), 

Statement of Reasons of Vice Chair Allen Dickerson and Comm’rs Sean J. Cooksey and James E. 

“Trey” Trainor III (noting the tenuousness of OGC’s legal theory that a campaign’s solicitation of 

negative information about an opponent is a “thing of value”); MUR 6958 (Senator Claire McCaskill, 

et al.), Statement of Reasons of Vice Chair Caroline C. Hunter and Comm’rs Lee E. Goodman and 

Matthew S. Petersen (concluding that general advice from polling was not a “thing of value”).

8 MUR 7832 (Twitter, Inc.), Compl. at 5.

9 See, e.g., id. at 2 (describing the cost of promoting an account or tweet on Twitter).

10 11 C.F.R. § 100.52(a); see supra n.7 and accompanying text.

MUR783200092
MUR 7832 (Twitter, Inc.)

Statement of Reasons

Page 3 of 3 

3 

legitimacy to other Twitter users—subject to that account’s compliance with Twitter’s terms 

of use. It is not, itself, a revenue-raising Twitter product. 

In light of these considerations, Twitter’s decision to notate (or not notate) a user’s 

account with a “blue check” does not fall within the “general understanding” of what 

constitutes a contribution. Whether newsworthiness and legitimacy have “value,” and what 

that value might be in dollar terms, is a fundamentally subjective determination—especially 

when those definitions and determinations exist within the framework of the terms of use

Twitter has credibly explained are intended to further its own commercial aims and prevent 

misuse of its platform.11 

The Commission is compelled “to avoid the shoals of vagueness,”12 exercise restraint 

when interpreting questions of constitutional import, and interpret the Act precisely, 

objectively, and through the lens of the definitions of “contribution” and “expenditure.”13 And 

we have an obligation to follow our own regulations. To do otherwise risks outstripping our 

expertise and statutory mandate, and would inevitably lead to complicated and protracted 

litigation where, in our view, the Commission would not prevail. 

Accordingly, in addition to the reasons set forth in our other Statement in this matter, 

we voted to find no reason to believe a violation of the Act occurred.

___________________________ 

Date

___________________________ 

Allen Dickerson

Vice Chair

___________________________ 

Date

___________________________ 

James E. “Trey” Trainor III

Commissioner 

11 MUR 7832, Resp. at 4–8 (describing Twitter’s verification process and guidelines).

12 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 78.

13 Id.

October 26, 2021

October 26, 2021

MUR783200093