FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

1050 FIRST STREET, N.E.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20463

BEFORE THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

In the Matter of ) 

 ) 

True the Vote, Inc. ) MUR 7894

Catherine Engelbrecht ) 

Georgia Republican Party, Inc. and ) 

Joseph Brannan in his official ) 

capacity as treasurer ) 

David Shafer ) 

 

STATEMENT OF REASONS OF CHAIRMAN ALLEN J. DICKERSON

AND COMMISSIONER JAMES E. “TREY” TRAINOR, III

This Matter arose from a Complaint alleging that True the Vote (“TTV”), TTV’s 

executive director Catherine Engelbrecht, the Georgia Republican Party and Joseph 

Brannan in his official capacity as treasurer (“Georgia GOP”), and Georgia GOP

chairman David Shafer violated the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (“FECA” 

or the “Act”). Specifically, the Complaint alleges that as a result of TTV’s election

integrity initiatives during the 2021 Georgia Senate runoff election, TTV made, and 

the Georgia GOP accepted, illegal corporate contributions.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

TTV is a nonprofit organized under Internal Revenue Code § 501(c)(3) and 

describes itself as “the country’s largest voters’ rights organization and well known 

for our ability to lead unified national plans to protect election integrity.”1 According 

to Engelbrecht’s declaration in this matter, TTV works “with other organizations to 

implement targeted election integrity initiatives to expose and deter election fraud.”2

“TTV does not have an interest in which candidates are elected, nor do they advocate 

for particular candidates. Instead, TTV focuses its efforts on free and fair elections 

for Republicans, Democrats, and everyone in between.”3 

1 First General Counsel’s Report (“FGCR”) at 4. 2 Engelbrecht Decl. ⁋ 4.

3 Id. at ⁋ 5.

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TTV pursued a suite of election integrity initiatives during the 2020 general 

election in various states and during the 2021 Georgia Senate runoff election.4 “In 

support of these election integrity efforts in Georgia and across the nation, TTV 

engaged in a number of activities”—namely, it “ran a statewide election integrity 

hotline to support voters and election workers,” “hosted election worker training and 

signature verification courses,” and “provided the data and research to preemptively 

challenge potentially ineligible voters.”5 Engelbrecht states that “[a]ll of these 

activities were pursued in a non-partisan manner.”6

The Georgia GOP is a state party committee of the Republican Party.7 In 

December 2020, Engelbrecht met with the Georgia GOP, who “were also interested 

in election integrity.”8 The meeting attendees “discussed TTV’s efforts promoting 

election integrity,” and Engelbrecht “explained that TTV was already engaging in 

numerous election integrity efforts and that all of [TTV’s] trainings and information 

were publicly available online.”9 After the meeting, TTV discussed its efforts in 

Georgia in a “Weekly Update” email, stating, “[w]e’ve met with voters and state 

leaders, leading ultimately to a request from the Georgia Republican Party to provide 

publicly available nonpartisan signature verification training, a 24x7 voter hotline, 

ballot-curing support, and more.”10 

TTV also issued a press release discussing a “partnership with the Georgia 

Republican Party to assist with the Senate runoff election process, including publicly 

available signature verification training, a statewide voter hotline, monitoring 

absentee ballot drop boxes, and other election integrity initiatives.”11 The press 

release quoted Engelbrecht as stating “we are thrilled to partner with the Georgia 

Republican Party, Chairman Shafer, and his team to ensure the law is upheld and 

law-abiding voters have their voices heard. True the Vote is already on the ground 

and proud to be serving Georgia voters with a laser focus on the effort to ensure a 

free, fair, and secure election for all Georgia voters irrespective of political party.”12

4 Id. at ⁋⁋ 6–7. 

5 Id. at ⁋ 8.

6 Id. 7 Georgia Republican Party Inc., Statement of Organization, FEC Form 1 (Jul. 14, 2020),

https://docquery.fec.gov/pdf/003/202007149244564003/202007149244564003.pdf (visited Aug. 15, 

2022). 8 Engelbrecht Decl. ⁋ 9.

9 Id. at ⁋ 10.

10 True the Vote, Weekly Update | Validate the Vote GA | 12.13.20 (Dec. 14, 2020, 12:26am), available 

at https://politicalemails.org/messages/318884 (visited Aug. 12, 2022); see also Engelbrecht Decl. ⁋ 12. 11 Press Release, True the Vote, True the Vote Partners With Georgia GOP to Ensure Transparent, 

Secure Ballot Effort for Senate Runoff Elections (Dec. 14, 2020), https://www.truethevote.org/true-thevote-partners-with-georgia-gop-to-ensure-transparent-secure-ballot-effort-for-senate-runoff-elections/

(visited Aug. 12, 2022).

12 Id.

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The press release also quoted Georgia GOP Chairman Shafer as stating, “the 

resources of [TTV] will help us organize and implement the most comprehensive 

ballot security initiative in Georgia history.”13

TTV also contacted the Democratic Party of Georgia “to offer [its] assistance to 

the Democratic Party of Georgia for the Senate runoff, including publicly available 

signature verification training, a statewide voter hotline, monitoring absentee ballot 

drop boxes, and other election integrity initiatives,”14 but received no response.15 TTV

updated its press release to reflect that it had “reached out to both parties to offer 

assistance with critical election training and resources.”16

Though not mentioned in the Complaint, OGC consulted Engelbrecht’s 

declaration in a lawsuit filed against TTV in Texas federal court by a donor seeking 

a refund of his donation.17 That declaration discusses TTV’s work in states including

Texas, Georgia, Pennsylvania, Nevada, Arizona, Michigan, and Wisconsin,18 which 

included “help[ing] voter challenges of over 364,000 people in Georgia whose 

residence made them potentially ineligible to vote in the runoff election.”19

Based on the foregoing, OGC recommended that the Commission find reason to 

believe that TTV made, Engelbrecht consented to the making of, and the Georgia 

GOP knowingly accepted prohibited in-kind corporate contributions.20 OGC also

recommended finding reason to believe that the Georgia GOP failed to report receipts 

and disbursements in connection with the alleged prohibited in-kind contributions.21

II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Under FECA, a “contribution” includes “any gift, subscription, loan, advance, or 

deposit of money or anything of value made by any person for the purpose of 

influencing any election for Federal office.”22 FECA defines “expenditure” in similar 

terms, as “any purchase, payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of 

money or anything of value, made by any person for the purpose of influencing any 

13 Id. 14 Engelbrecht Decl. ⁋ 22. 15 Id. at ⁋ 25.

16 Compare https://web.archive.org/web/20201214222722/https:/truethevote.org/true-the-votepartners-with-georgia-gop-to-ensure-transparent-secure-ballot-effort-for-senate-runoff-elections/ with

https://web.archive.org/web/20210107214913/https:/truethevote.org/true-the-vote-partners-withgeorgia-gop-to-ensure-transparent-secure-ballot-effort-for-senate-runoff-elections/. 17 See, e.g., FGCR at 7–8.

18 Decl. of Catherine Engelbrecht, Eshelman v. True the Vote, No. 4:20-cv-0434, Dkt. 47-1 (S.D. Tex.). 19 Id. at ⁋ 24. 20 FGCR at 22. 21 Id. 22 52 U.S.C. § 30101(8)(A)(i). 

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election for Federal office.”23 “[E]xpenditures made by any person (other than a 

candidate or candidate’s authorized committee) in cooperation, consultation, or 

concert with, or at the request or suggestion of, a national, State, or local committee 

of a political party, shall be considered to be contributions made to such party 

committee.”24 Expenditures made in this way are called “coordinated expenditures.”25

Commission regulations provide that “the term anything of value includes all inkind contributions,” which include “the provision of any goods or services without 

charge or at a charge that is less than the usual and normal charge,”26 and, as 

relevant here, coordinated expenditures.27 FECA generally prohibits corporations 

from making contributions to federal political committees28 except independentexpenditure-only and hybrid committees.29 This corporate-contribution ban extends 

to coordinated expenditures.30 Relatedly, committees and other persons may not 

knowingly accept,31 and corporate officers and directors may not consent to,32 such 

prohibited contributions.

III. ANALYSIS

The Commission is “[u]nique among federal administrative agencies” given its 

especially sensitive mission: its “sole purpose [is] the regulation of core 

constitutionally protected activity.”33 Accordingly, our authority is cabined both by 

the Act—which limits our jurisdiction to “contributions” and “expenditures”34—and 

by decades of jurisprudence narrowing that legislative grant. As we have often 

recognized, Buckley v. Valeo35 dramatically limited FECA by imposing constitutional 

limits on our ability to enforce the Act’s expenditure caps, independent-expenditure 

23 Id. § 30101(9)(A)(i). 24 Id. § 30116(a)(7)(B)(ii). 

25 11 C.F.R. § 109.20(a) (defining “coordinated” as “made in cooperation, consultation or concert with, 

or at the request or suggestion of . . . a political party committee.”). 

26 Id. § 100.52(d)(1). 27 See id. § 109.20(b) (providing that an expenditure that is coordinated but not made for a coordinated

or party-coordinated communication “is either an in-kind contribution to, or a coordinated party 

expenditure with respect to, the candidate or political party committee with whom or with which it 

was coordinated”).

28 52 U.S.C. § 30118(a); 11 C.F.R. § 114.2(b).

29 See, e.g., SpeechNow.org v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc); Carey v. 

Fed. Election Comm’n, 791 F. Supp. 2d 121 (D.D.C. 2011).

30 11 C.F.R. § 114.10(a) (“Corporations . . . are prohibited from making coordinated expenditures as 

defined in 11 C.F.R. § 109.20”).

31 52 U.S.C. § 30118(a); 11 C.F.R. § 114.2(b), (d). 32 52 U.S.C. § 30118(a); 11 C.F.R. § 114.2(e). 

33 Am. Fed’n of Labor & Cong. of Indus. Orgs. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 333 F.3d 168, 170 (D.C. Cir. 

2003).

34 52 U.S.C. § 30101, et seq.

35 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).

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limits, and PAC-registration requirements, and landmark cases since have further 

restricted our discretion.36

Despite this limited authority, “as has been noted before, ‘there is a tendency to 

recast political disputes as campaign finance violations and enlist the Commission as 

a party to larger conflicts.’”37 However well-intentioned such efforts may be, federal 

courts have carefully limited our jurisdiction as a matter of constitutional imperative. 

To respect those limits is to remain mindful that, to put it plainly, not everything that 

could impact an election is a potential FECA violation.

With this in mind, we turn to the question presented: whether TTV made 

coordinated expenditures resulting in prohibited in-kind contributions to the Georgia 

GOP. We first assess whether TTV’s activities were undertaken “for the purpose of 

influencing any election for Federal office” such that they may be “expenditures” 

under the Act.38 Second, we consider “coordination,” i.e., whether TTV’s activities

were “made in cooperation, consultation or concert with, or at the request of 

suggestion of”39 the Georgia GOP. We answer both questions in the negative.

a. For the Purpose of Influencing an Election

TTV’s activities during the 2021 Georgia Senate runoff election—offering publicly 

available signature verification training, operating a voter hotline, providing ballotcuring support, monitoring ballot drop boxes, and helping with voter challenges of 

people who were potentially ineligible to vote—were not “for the purpose of 

influencing an election,” as defined by the Act, for at least two reasons. 

First, state law compliance is categorically excluded from the Commission’s

enforcement jurisdiction. Our regulations are explicit that “[t]he Act does not 

36 See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm’n v. Nat’l Conservative Pol. Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480 (1985) 

(invalidating expenditure limits for independent PACs); Fed. Election Comm’n v. Mass. Citizens for 

Life, 479 U.S. 238 (1986) (invalidating corporate-expenditure prohibition for qualified nonprofits); 

Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (invalidating prohibition on corporate 

electioneering communications); McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 572 U.S. 185 (2014) 

(invalidating aggregate contribution limits). Many lower court orders also limit us. See, e.g.,

SpeechNow.org, 599 F.3d at 696 (invalidating contribution limits for independent-expenditure-only 

groups); Fed. Election Comm’n v. Swallow, 304 F.Supp.3d 1113, 1118 (D. Utah 2018) (invalidating 

Commission regulation on aiding or abetting contributions as “exceeding [our] authority to write 

regulations and improperly intruding into the realm of law-making that is the exclusive province of 

Congress”); Fed. Election Comm’n v. Christian Coal., 52 F. Supp.2d 45, 92–97 (D.D.C. 1999) (rescinding

Commission enforcement action predicated on overly aggressive reading of FECA’s coordination rules).

37 Supp. Statement of Reasons of Vice Chair Dickerson at 2, MURs 7207/7268/7274/7623 (Russian 

Fed’n) (quoting Supp. Statement of Reasons of Vice Chair Dickerson & Commissioner Trainor at 2, 

MURs 7821/7827/7868 (Twitter, Inc.)).

38 52 U.S.C. § 30101(9)(A)(i).

39 11 C.F.R. § 109.20(a).

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supersede State laws which provide for,” among other things, “[v]oter registration” 

and the “[p]rohibition of false registration, voting fraud, theft of ballots, and similar 

offenses.”40 Because TTV’s activities targeted compliance with valid Georgia laws 

governing signature-verification, ballot-curing, ballot drop boxes, and residence 

requirements, they fall squarely within this exemption. Accordingly, TTV’s activities 

fall outside of the ambit of FECA. In other words, because Congress has declined to 

preempt the Georgia laws at the heart of TTV’s activities, the Commission has no 

authority to police those activities.41

Second, under the Act and Supreme Court precedent, trying to influence how 

elections are administered, as a policy matter, is different from acting “for the purpose 

of influencing” a federal election. TTV’s activities amount to the former and, 

therefore, fall outside our jurisdiction. 

This foundational distinction goes back to Buckley, where the Court found the 

language “for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office,” in the 

“expenditure” definition unconstitutionally vague,42 as it has the “potential for 

encompassing both issue discussion and advocacy of a political result.”43 Buckley also 

recognized that courts had given this same language “a narrow meaning” in the 

context of FECA’s “contribution” definition in order “to alleviate various problems.”44

The Court noted, however, that the phrase “present[ed] fewer problems in connection 

with the definition of a contribution because of the limiting connotation created by 

the general understanding of what constitutes a political contribution,” i.e., “[f]unds 

provided to a candidate or political party or campaign committee either directly or 

40 Id. § 108.7(c)(3), (4). 41 See generally U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 4, cl. 1; compare, e.g., Weber v. Heaney, 995 F.2d 872, 873–76 (8th 

Cir. 1993) (FECA preempts state law targeted specifically to campaign expenditures by candidates for 

federal office) with Priorities USA v. Nessel, 978 F.3d 976, 983 (6th Cir. 2020) (Noting that a 

Commission regulation “specifies three kinds of state laws that are preempted” by FECA, all of which

are “about campaign finance: the sources of funding and reporting on its collection and distribution. 

By ejusdem generis, the kind of state regulations contemplated as preempted likely do not include” 

other types of state laws governing the conduct of elections.) (emphasis original). 42 424 U.S. at 78 (“Congress . . . wished to promote full disclosure of campaign-oriented spending to 

insure both the reality and the appearance of the purity and openness of the federal election process. 

Our task is to construe ‘for the purpose of . . . influencing,’ incorporated . . . through the definitions of 

‘contributions’ and ‘expenditures,’ in a manner that precisely furthers this goal.”) (emphasis added).

See also, e.g., Statement of Reasons of Chairman Dickerson & Commissioners Cooksey & Trainor at 

5–6, MURs 7645/7663/7705 (Donald J. Trump, et al.) (discussing Buckley’s narrowing construction of 

the phrase “for the purpose of influencing”).

43 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 79. 44 Id. at 23, n.24 (citations omitted)

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indirectly through an intermediary,” or “dollars given to another person or 

organization that are earmarked for political purposes.”45 

TTV’s activities reflect the sort of issue advocacy that is fundamental in our free 

society and is not subject to regulation under the Act. To be sure, there is broad and 

spirited debate about how elections are conducted in the United States. Advocacy in 

this area—like advocacy about guns, abortion, the environment, health care, national 

security, and countless other provocative issues—goes hand-in-hand with related 

activism. Under Buckley’s narrowing construction of the phrase “for the purpose of 

influencing,” TTV’s engagement around election integrity issues can be no less

protected than any other organization’s engagement around any other policy issue. 

To illustrate, consider the ACLU, the League of Women Voters, the Institute for 

Justice, or the NAACP—just a few of the many organizations that advocate for 

various ideas, policies, or constituencies. These entities’ core programmatic activities 

could, in practice, impact a federal election. For example, advocacy groups often seek 

policy change through strategic litigation, and in recent years, have sued to challenge 

mail-in ballot requirements,46 congressional redistricting plans,47 buffer zones 

around polling places,48 and numerous other election-related laws and practices. 

Buckley itself, where the ACLU served as counsel, is an obvious example, and its 

result continues to impact federal elections to this day. FECA does not extend to this 

activity—and legal costs and institutional resources that issue organizations dedicate 

to it are not “expenditures” or “contributions” under the Act—even though successful 

litigation in this context unquestionably could influence a federal election.49 

45 Id. We further note that TTV’s activities can only arguably be regarded as in-kind “contributions” if 

they were “coordinated” with the Georgia GOP. 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(7)(B)(ii). As explained infra, Part 

III(b), this is not satisfied here.

46 See, e.g., Richardson v. Flores, 28 F.4th 649 (5th Cir. 2022) (challenge to mail-in ballot signatureverification requirement where four advocacy organizations were plaintiffs and the nonprofit Texas 

Civil Rights Project was counsel); Mi Familia Vota v. Abbott, 977 F.3d 461 (5th Cir. 2020) (challenge 

to Covid-19 voting procedures where two advocacy groups were plaintiffs and nonprofit Free Speech 

for People was counsel). 

47 See, e.g., Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305 (2018) (challenge to redistricting plans by voters, legislators, 

and voting-rights organizations).

48 League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Lee, No. 4:21-cv-186-MW/MAF, 2022 WL 969538, at *108 (N.D. 

Fla. Mar. 31, 2022) (finding that state law prohibiting “engaging in any activity with the intent to 

influence or effect of influencing a voter” in or within 150 feet of a polling place or ballot drop box 

violated League of Women Voters’ First and Fourteenth Amendment rights), stay granted sub nom., 

League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Fla. Sec’y of State, 32 F.4th 1363 (11th Cir. 2022).

49 See, e.g., Advisory Op. 2010-03 at 4 (Nat’l Democratic Redistricting Trust); Advisory Op. 1990-23 

(Frost) (money raised and spent by entity other than political committee to pay legal expenses related 

to redistricting not contribution or expenditure); Advisory Op. 1983-37 (Mass. Democratic State 

Comm.) (money raised and spent by legal expense fund to pay for legal challenge to party ballot-access 

rules not contribution or expenditure); Advisory Op. 1983-30 (Joyner) (same, for costs of challenging 

state constitutional provision); Advisory Op. 1982-37 (Edwards) (same, for legal expenses in connection 

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The Commission discussed this principle in MUR 7024 (Van Hollen for Senate, 

et al.), which involved a Congressman and Senate candidate who made campaign

finance “a centerpiece” of his “campaign rhetoric.”50 Van Hollen sued to challenge a 

Commission regulation, claiming an “interest in participating in elections untainted 

by expenditures from undisclosed sources,” and also petitioned the Commission for a 

rulemaking.51 Van Hollen received pro bono legal services in the lawsuit and 

rulemaking from Democracy 21 and Campaign Legal Center, and in the lawsuit from 

Wilmer Hale LLP.

To determine whether the services were contributions, the Commission stated

that the “question under the Act is whether the legal services were provided for the 

purpose of influencing a federal election, not whether they provided a benefit to Van 

Hollen’s campaign,” and found no contribution given the absence of any indication

that Democracy 21, Campaign Legal Center, or Wilmer Hale LLP acted for the 

purpose of influencing an election.52 It also emphasized that, although the lawsuit or 

rulemaking petition could impact a federal election, “the effect on any particular 

candidate’s election would be too indirect and attenuated to constitute a 

contribution.”53 

So too here. TTV’s activities reflect core issue advocacy, and any impact on an 

election would, indeed, be too indirect and attenuated to fall within FECA’s ambit. 

To conclude otherwise would establish a rule with no logical endpoint, 

unconstitutionally subjecting a broad swath of protected advocacy and civic 

participation to the specter of Commission enforcement action. 

This is also consistent with the fact that “[t]he Commission has long considered 

activity engaged in for bona fide commercial reasons not to be ‘for the purpose of 

influencing an election,’ and thus, not a contribution or expenditure under section 

30118(a). This is true even if a candidate benefitted from the commercial activity.”54

For example, in Advisory Opinion 2018-11 (Microsoft Corp.), the Commission 

concluded that Microsoft’s proposal to offer a free account-security product to its 

“election-sensitive” customers for reasons including “to protect [Microsoft’s] brand 

reputation” would not result in an in-kind contribution.55 Similarly, in MUR 7832 

(Twitter, Inc.), five Commissioners concluded that Twitter did not make an in-kind 

with reapportionment); Advisory Op. 1982-35 (Hopfman) (same, for challenge to party ballot-access 

rule); Advisory Op. 1981-35 (Thomas) (same, for expenses related to reapportionment).

50 Factual & Legal Analysis at 2, MUR 7024 (Van Hollen for Senate, et al.) (citation omitted).

51 Id. 

52 Id. at 6.

53 Id. at 5.

54 Factual & Legal Analysis at 7, MUR 7870 (Google LLC, et al.) (citations omitted).

55 Advisory Op. 2018-11 (Microsoft Corp.) at 4–5.

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contribution to the primary and general election opponents of a congressional 

candidate by declining to “verify” that candidate’s account but “verifying” the 

accounts of the candidate’s opponents, since Twitter was acting for a commercial 

purpose, and not for the purpose of influencing an election.56

Because the record does not reflect that TTV acted for such purpose, and because 

state law compliance is outside our jurisdiction, we found no reason to believe that 

an expenditure occurred. 

b. Coordination

We also found that TTV’s alleged activity was not undertaken “in cooperation, 

consultation, or concert with, or at the request or suggestion of” the Georgia GOP. 

Consequently, no coordination occurred, foreclosing a finding of a coordinated 

expenditure resulting in an in-kind contribution to the Georgia GOP.57

The Commission will not presume coordination. Rather, it has consistently

required a concrete and plausible factual basis for finding reason to believe that 

coordination has occurred. For example, the Commission made such a finding when 

an entity provided free campaign-strategy consulting services to congressional 

campaigns.58 More recently, the Commission found reason to believe that AMI, a 

media company, made a coordinated expenditure when it purchased a potentially 

damaging story about then-candidate Donald J. Trump “‘in cooperation, consultation 

or concert with, or at the request or suggestion’ of [Michael] Cohen, whom AMI 

believed was an agent for the Trump Committee.”59 AMI specified that it purchased 

the story “to ensure that a woman did not publicize damaging allegations about [then-

]candidate [Trump] before the 2016 presidential election and thereby influence that 

election.”60

 Two primary facts distinguish this case from those where we have found reason 

to believe that there has been a coordinated expenditure. First, TTV’s election 

integrity initiatives were equally available to all comers—it not only met with the 

Georgia GOP and contacted the Democratic Party of Georgia to provide information 

about its initiatives, it also offered these services to the public, for free. Even more 

importantly, the record reflects that TTV was pursuing these initiatives—and would 

have continued to do so—regardless of Engelbrecht’s meeting with the Georgia GOP. 

56 Statement of Reasons of Chair Broussard, Vice Chair Dickerson, & Commissioners Trainor, Walther, 

& Weintraub, MUR 7832 (Twitter, Inc.).

57 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(7)(B)(ii); 11 C.F.R. § 109.20(b).

58 Factual & Legal Analysis at 32–33, MURs 4568/4633/4634 (Triad Mgmt. Servs., Inc.). 59 Factual & Legal Analysis at 11, MURs 7324/7332/7366 (A360 Media, LLC f/k/a American Media, 

Inc., et al.) (citations omitted).

60 Id. (quoting AMI’s Non-Prosecution Agreement with the Department of Justice).

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The reference to a “partnership” between TTV and the Georgia GOP—the 

linchpin of OGC’s analysis on this point—does not change this result. That is because 

the record shows that the term “partnership”, as used here, had a colloquial and not 

a legal significance. Moreover, nothing in the record indicates that TTV, in fact,

undertook any of its activities “in cooperation, consultation, or concert with, or at the 

request or suggestion of” the Georgia GOP. 

This situation is more akin to MUR 7119 (Donald J. Trump, et al.), where the 

Commission declined to find reason to believe that the Trump Committee coordinated 

with an independent-expenditure-only committee, ALFE, when “a person associated 

with the Trump Committee . . . attended and spoke at an ALFE event.”61 The 

Commission concluded that this “does not demonstrate impermissible ‘coordination’ 

between ALFE and the Trump Committee . . . for purposes of the Act.”62 After all, 

there is a difference between communicating with a regulated committee and 

coordinating within the meaning of the Act—a principle the Commission has also 

recognized in the coordinated-communication context.63 

TTV undoubtedly communicated with the Georgia GOP about its election

integrity initiatives. But, absent a credible indication that TTV acted for the purpose 

of influencing a federal election or coordinated with the Georgia GOP within the 

meaning of the Act, we found no reason to believe that (1) TTV and Engelbrecht 

violated 52 U.S.C. § 30118(a) and 11 C.F.R. § 114.2(b) and (e) by making and 

consenting to make prohibited corporate in-kind contributions; (2) the Georgia GOP 

violated 52 U.S.C. § 30118(a) and 11 C.F.R. § 114.2(d) by knowingly accepting 

prohibited corporate in-kind contributions; or (3) the Georgia GOP failed to report 

receiving contributions in violation of 52 U.S.C. § 30104(b) and 11 C.F.R. § 104.3. 

61 Factual & Legal Analysis at 5, MUR 7119 (Donald J. Trump, et al.).

62 Id. (citing 11 C.F.R. § 109.20(a)). 63 See, e.g., Factual & Legal Analysis, MUR 7797 (Sara Gideon for Maine, et al.) (Finding no 

coordination when campaign staff of Sara Gideon, Senator Susan Collins’ 2020 general-election 

challenger, tweeted “Voters across Maine should see and hear how Collins has taken money from drug 

and insurance companies and then voted their way instead of for Maine people. In Portland they 

should also see and hear how Collins has stood with Trump and McConnell instead of Maine people,” 

and, shortly thereafter, an independent-expenditure-only PAC uploaded communications to YouTube 

and aired ads matching those themes); Statement of Reasons of Chairman Dickerson & Commissioners 

Cooksey, Trainor, & Weintraub, MUR 7700 (VoteVets, et al.) (declining to find reason to believe that 

a presidential campaign and a multicandidate hybrid PAC engaged in “coordination” under similar 

circumstances). See also, e.g., 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(f) (establishing safe harbor, in the coordinatedcommunication context, for candidates’ and political parties’ responses to inquiries about their position 

on legislative or policy issues); Statement of Reasons of Chairman Dickerson & Commissioner Trainor, 

MUR 7510 (Katie Arrington for Congress, et al.) (discussing same.).

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September 13, 2022

Date

___________________________ 

Allen Dickerson

Chairman

September 13, 2022

Date

___________________________ 

James E. “Trey” Trainor, III

Commissioner 

MUR789400128