FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

Washington, DC 

BEFORE THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

In the Matter of ) 

 ) 

Freedom Vote, Inc. ) MUR 7465

 ) 

 

STATEMENT OF REASONS OF CHAIRMAN ALLEN DICKERSON AND

COMMISSIONERS SEAN J. COOKSEY AND JAMES E. “TREY” TRAINOR, III

I. INTRODUCTION

This Matter arose from a complaint alleging that Freedom Vote, Inc., (“Freedom Vote”

or “Respondent”) violated the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (“FECA” or “Act”) by 

failing to organize, register, and report as a political committee in connection with Freedom 

Vote’s spending in 2014, 2015, and 2016.1 The Commission issued a reason-to-believe finding, 

and the Commission’s Office of General Counsel (“OGC”) opened an investigation.2 By the 

time this Matter was presented to the Commission for a probable-cause determination, 

however, the five-year statute of limitations had expired on the bulk of Freedom Vote’s 

alleged FECA violations. In an exercise of our prosecutorial discretion, we declined to pursue

the alleged violations that were not time-barred. We further declined to adopt OGC’s theory 

that the Commission has jurisdiction, in perpetuity, to require continued reporting by any 

organization that has ever operated as a political committee. We issue this statement of 

reasons as contemplated by the courts.3 

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In 2010, Freedom Vote organized as a tax-exempt corporation under Internal Revenue 

Code § 501(c)(4), stating that its purpose was “[t]o further the common good and general 

1 See generally Complaint at 1–2, MUR 7465 (Aug. 9, 2018). 

2 General Counsel’s Brief (“GC Br.”) at 1, MUR 7465 (Sept. 20, 2021); Certification ¶ 2.a, MUR 7465 (July 29, 

2019). 

3 See, e.g., Nat’l Republican Senatorial Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 966 F.2d 1471, 1476 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“We 

further held that, to make judicial review a meaningful exercise, the three Commissioners who voted to dismiss 

must provide a statement of their reasons for so voting. Since those Commissioners constitute a controlling group 

for purposes of the decision, their rationale necessarily states the agency’s reasons for acting as it did.”) (citation 

omitted); Campaign Legal Ctr. & Democracy 21 v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 952 F.3d 352, 355 (D.C. Cir. 2020).

MUR746500243
MUR 7465 (Freedom Vote, Inc.) 

Statement of Reasons

Page 2 of 11

welfare of the people of Ohio.”4 In 2014, Freedom Vote made several independent 

expenditures, at least some of which it reported to the Commission.5 It did not, however, 

register as a political committee.

On August 9, 2018, Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (“CREW”) filed 

a complaint with the Commission alleging, inter alia, that Freedom Vote’s spending in 2014, 

2015, and 2016 triggered requirements to organize, register, and report as a political 

committee under the Act.6 On July 29, 2019, the Commission found reason to believe that 

Freedom Vote violated 52 U.S.C. §§ 30102, 30103, and 30104(a), (b), and (g)(2).7 In its 

subsequent investigation, OGC concluded that Freedom Vote: 

• spent at least $239,877.81 on “federal campaign activity”8 in 2014, which was 

82.67% of its total spending for that year;9

• spent at least $217,539.00 on “federal campaign activity” in 2015, which was 

66.28% of its total spending for that year;10 and,

• spent at least $2,987,563.45 on “federal campaign activity” in 2016, which was 

77.35% of its total spending for that year.11

4 GC Br. at 2.

5 Id. at 6–8.

6 See generally Complaint at 1–2, MUR 7465 (Aug. 9, 2018). 

7 Certification ¶ 2.a, MUR 7465 (July 29, 2019). The Commission also found reason to believe that Freedom Vote

violated 52 U.S.C. § 30120(a) and (d) and 11 C.F.R. § 110.11 by failing to include a disclaimer on its “Third Largest” 

advertisement, which aired in June and July of 2016. See id.; GC Br. at 14 & n.63. This alleged violation was 

time-barred once this Matter reached the Commission for a probable-cause finding and therefore provided no

basis for further action against Freedom Vote. See infra, Part III(a) (explaining why the statute of limitations 

barred enforcement action in connection with many of Freedom Vote’s alleged FECA violations); OGC

Memorandum to the Commission, MUR 7465 (Sept. 13, 2021) (acknowledging that statute of limitations had 

expired as to alleged failure to include a disclaimer on “Third Largest” ad). 

8 OGC’s references to “federal campaign activity” include “Freedom Vote’s contributions to political committees, 

its own express advocacy, expenses associated with the ‘Third Largest’ advertisement (to the extent it is not, itself, 

express advocacy), and other expenses described above such as polling done to support Freedom Vote’s express 

advocacy.” GC Br. at 18. As OGC notes, the Commission never found that the “Third Largest” ad is express 

advocacy. Id. at 23, n.103. 

9 Id. at 11, 18.

10 Id. at 12, 18.

11 Id. at 16–17, 18.

MUR746500244
MUR 7465 (Freedom Vote, Inc.) 

Statement of Reasons

Page 3 of 11

Freedom Vote did not spend any funds on “federal campaign activity” after 2016.12 After 

settling an audit with the IRS and going bankrupt, Freedom Vote dissolved in 2019.13

Freedom Vote responded that it did not meet the threshold for political-committee status, 

and that—in recommending a reason-to-believe finding—OGC had misunderstood 

information that Freedom Vote provided about its spending during the investigation.14 It also 

contended that, rather than focus upon spending in an isolated year or years, the Commission 

ought to consider Freedom Vote’s spending over time (which, according to Freedom Vote, 

demonstrated that the organization did not satisfy the major-purpose test for politicalcommittee status).15

On October 27, 2021, OGC recommended that the Commission find probable cause to 

believe that Freedom Vote violated 52 U.S.C. §§ 30102, 30103, and 30104(a), (b), and (g)(2) 

by failing to organize, register, and report as a political committee.16 The Commission 

considered OGC’s recommendation on November 9, 2021, and we voted against finding 

probable cause.17 Commissioner Broussard joined us in voting to close the file on this 

Matter.18

III. AUTHORITY AND ANALYSIS

a. The statute of limitations deprived the Commission of enforcement 

authority in connection with conduct more than five-years old.

Congress gave the Commission “exclusive” jurisdiction over civil enforcement of the Act.19

But exclusive jurisdiction is not perpetual jurisdiction. Because “FECA itself contains no 

12 Id. at 17–18.

13 Id. at 2, 19.

14 Freedom Vote Supp’l Resp.at 1-2, MUR 7465 (July 6, 2021).

15 Id. at 4. While we need not reach the issue in this Matter, previous Commissioners have “rejected OGC’s myopic 

focus on one year of spending,” noting that “[t]he fundamental flaw of OGC’s one-year approach—which is a recent 

creation by OGC—is that it ignores an organization’s history and other activities.” Statement of Reasons of Vice 

Chair Hunter and Comm’r Goodman at 21, n.96, MUR 6872 (Dec. 20, 2017). 

16 OGC Notice to Commission, MUR 7465 (Oct. 27, 2021). 

17 Certification, MUR 7465 (Nov. 14, 2021). The three other Commissioners voted to find probable cause, see id., 

and issued a Statement of Reasons. Statement of Reasons of Chair Broussard and Comm’rs Walther and 

Weintraub at 9, MUR 7465 (Dec. 16, 2021). 

18 Id.

19 52 U.S.C. § 30107(e) (“Except as provided in section 30109(a)(8) of this title [providing for persons aggrieved by 

Commission dismissal of or failure to act on a complaint to pursue litigation under certain circumstances], the 

power of the Commission to initiate civil actions under subsection (a)(6) shall be the exclusive civil remedy for the 

enforcement of the provisions of this Act”); (a)(6) (“The Commission has the power . . . to initiate (through civil 

actions for injunctive, declaratory, or other appropriate relief), defend (in the case of any civil action brought under 

MUR746500245
MUR 7465 (Freedom Vote, Inc.) 

Statement of Reasons

Page 4 of 11

explicit limitations period. . . courts have applied the catch-all five-year limitations period set 

forth in 28 U.S.C § 2462 to FECA enforcement actions brought by the Commission.”20 Under 

28 U.S.C. § 2462, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, an action, suit or 

proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, 

shall not be entertained unless commenced within five years from the date when the claim 

first accrued . . ..”21

Thus, when the Commission voted on OGC’s probable-cause recommendation on 

November 9, 2021,22 the five-year limitations period prevented us from pursuing enforcement 

based on activity before November 9, 2016. Accordingly, we voted against finding probable 

cause in connection with alleged violations before that date. This is consistent with the 

statutes and the caselaw (as well as our votes in previous matters),23 and disposed of the bulk 

of Freedom Vote’s alleged violations. 

Our colleagues who voted to find probable cause minimize the statute of limitations in 

two ways,24 neither of which changes our analysis. First, they state that the Commission’s 

lack of a quorum during parts of 2019 and 2020 and Freedom Vote’s recalcitrance delayed 

progress in this Matter. But courts have repeatedly rejected the notion that uncooperative

section 30109(a)(8) of this title) or appeal any civil action in the name of the Commission to enforce the provisions 

of this Act and chapter 95 and chapter 96 of Title 26, through its general counsel”).

20 CREW v. Am. Action Network, 410 F. Supp. 3d 1, 23 (D.D.C. 2019) (citing CREW v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 236 

F. Supp. 3d 378, 392 (D.D.C. 2017), aff’d, 892 F.3d 434 (D.C. Cir. 2018)), on reconsideration, No. 18-CV-945 (CRC), 

2022 WL 612655 (D.D.C. Mar. 2, 2022). See also, e.g., Fed. Election Comm’n v. Christian Coal., 965 F. Supp. 66, 

69 (D.D.C. 1997) (“FECA does not contain an internal statute of limitations. The applicable statute of limitations 

is provided under 28 U.S.C. § 2462-a point the parties do not, nor could they, reasonably dispute.”) (citations 

omitted); Beam v. Mukasey, No. 07 C 1227, 2008 WL 4614324, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 15, 2008) (collecting cases; 

noting that, “[a]lthough FECA does not contain a statute of limitations for civil liability, courts that have 

considered the question have found that the five-year default statute of limitations provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2462 

applies.”) (citations omitted).

21 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (emphasis added). The statute of limitations applicable to the Commission’s civil enforcement 

of FECA parallels the statute governing the Department of Justice’s authority over criminal enforcement of the 

Act. See 52 U.S.C. § 30145(a) (“No person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any violation of” the Act 

“unless the indictment is found or the information is instituted within 5 years after the date of the violation.”); 

see also Fed. Election Comm'n v. Lance, 617 F.2d 365, 371–72 (5th Cir. 1980), supplemented, 635 F.2d 1132 (5th 

Cir. 1981) (Stating, in context of predecessor to 52 U.S.C. § 30145(a), that “[t]he statute refers to the institution 

of an ‘information’ or an ‘indictment,’ but not to the pursuit of a civil remedy. Thus, the statutory language 

indicates that the period of limitations applies only to the criminal prosecutions for violations of the FECA . . ..”).

22 Certification, MUR 7465 (Nov. 14, 2021). 

23 Statement of Reasons of Vice Chair Dickerson and Comm’rs Cooksey and Trainor at 1–2, MURs 7859, 7860 

(Dec. 17, 2021) (rejecting OGC’s argument that, “the passage of more than five years [since the alleged violations] 

notwithstanding, [the Commission] retain[s] authority over the[] Respondents”) (citing, inter alia, 52 U.S.C. § 

30145(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2462); Statement of Reasons of Vice Chair Dickerson and Comm’rs Cooksey and Trainor at 

2, MUR 7181 (Mar. 18, 2021) (rejecting OGC’s suggestion that the Commission possessed jurisdiction over alleged 

FECA violations that occurred in “the 2010, 2012, and 2014 federal elections.”). 

24 See Statement of Reasons of Chair Broussard and Comm’rs Walther and Weintraub at 6, MUR 7465 (Dec. 16, 

2021). 

MUR746500246
MUR 7465 (Freedom Vote, Inc.) 

Statement of Reasons

Page 5 of 11

respondents or lengthy delays in the administrative process have any impact on our statute 

of limitations.25 To the contrary—“nothing in the language of § 2462 even arguably makes 

the running of the limitations period turn on the degree of difficulty an agency experiences 

in detecting violations.”26

Second, our colleagues argue that the statute of limitations does not preclude the 

Commission from pursuing “equitable remedies [] including requiring Freedom Vote’s 

disclosure of its receipts and disbursements as a political committee.”27 As we have noted in 

the past, courts reject the theory that the statute of limitations prevents the Commission 

from imposing fines but does not bar equitable relief.28 For instance, in Federal Election 

Commission v. Williams, this agency “argue[d] that § 2462 does not apply to actions for 

injunctive relief.”29 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit flatly rejected that 

argument as “directly contrary to the Supreme Court’s holding in Cope v. Anderson, [which]

holds that ‘equity will withhold its relief in such a case where the applicable statute of 

limitations would bar the concurrent legal remedy.’ In other words, because the claim for 

injunctive relief is connected to the claim for legal relief, the statute of limitations applies to 

both.”30 So too here.

Nevertheless, our colleagues contend that this principle does not apply to an enforcement 

action by the United States, citing two opinions from the U.S. District Court for the District 

of Columbia.31 But both of those were “cases where there [wa]s a significant risk of future 

harm,” and in such instances, “the law may allow the FEC to grant equitable relief 

25 See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm’n v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 916 F. Supp. 10, 14 (D.D.C. 1996) (Where “[t]he 

Commission did not get around to voting to find probable cause until May of 1989, a mere four months before the 

fifth anniversary of [the respondent’s] last known transgression,” the court could “discern no reason why the 

administrative process cannot easily be accomplished by the FEC within the five year limitation in § 2462, even 

with discovery and subpoena enforcement delays of many months or even years,” as encountered there) (quoting 

Fed. Election Comm’n v. Nat’l Republican Senatorial Comm., 877 F. Supp. 15, 18–19 (D.D.C. 1995)) (emphasis 

added) (cleaned up). 

26 3M Co. (Minnesota Min. & Mfg.) v. Browner, 17 F.3d 1453, 1461 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Fed. Election Comm'n v. 

Christian Coal., 965 F. Supp. at 70 (quoting and applying 3M Co. in context of Commission enforcement action).

27 Statement of Reasons of Chair Broussard and Comm’rs Walther and Weintraub at 7, MUR 7465 (Dec. 16, 2021). 

28 See Statement of Reasons of Vice Chair Dickerson and Comm’rs Cooksey and Trainor at 3–4, MURs 7859, 7860 

(Dec. 17, 2021). 

29 104 F.3d 237, 240 (9th Cir. 1996).

30 Id. (quoting Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461, 464 (1947)). See also, e.g., Fed. Election Comm’n v. Nat’l Right to 

Work Comm., 916 F. Supp. at 14, 15 (“The FEC’s claim for civil penalties is barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2462. The FEC 

argues that even if § 2462 bars its civil penalty claims, it is nevertheless entitled to its declaratory judgment and 

an injunction. The Court disagrees. . . . Notions of welcome repose for ancient grievances aside, the practical 

concerns alone for problems of missing documents, faded memories, and absent witnesses that inevitably occur 

with the passage of time are no less problematic in adjudicating actions for declaratory and injunctive relief than 

in determining liability for monetary civil penalties.”).

31 Statement of Reasons of Chair Broussard and Comm’rs Walther and Weintraub at 6, n.26, MUR 7465 (Dec. 16, 

2021) (citing Fed. Election Comm’n v. Christian Coal., 965 F. Supp. at 71 and Fed. Election Comm’n v. Nat’l 

Republican Senatorial Comm., 877 F. Supp. at 20–21 for the proposition that “injunctive relief is not a penalty.”). 

MUR746500247
MUR 7465 (Freedom Vote, Inc.) 

Statement of Reasons

Page 6 of 11

notwithstanding the expiration of the statute of limitations.”32 Plainly, this “future harm” 

exception does not apply on these facts: the Respondent is a defunct, bankrupt entity accused 

of prior reporting violations, and there is no basis to believe that the allegedly impermissible 

conduct will recur.33 Indeed, as the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia recognized 

(and the Court of Appeals affirmed), the Commission’s “injunctive remedies would be moot, 

given [a respondent’s] defunct status,” and the “controlling commissioners almost certainly 

could not have found a significant risk of future harm by [the respondent] as required [to 

invoke the ‘future harm’ exception], because [the respondent] was defunct at the time of the 

decision.”34 This reasoning squarely applies here.

Finally, our colleagues suggest that the statute of limitations “does not prevent us from 

making a probable cause to believe finding.”35 Even if true, this would be irrelevant at best. 

Upon finding probable cause, the Commission is empowered to “attempt . . . to correct or 

prevent” an alleged FECA violation “by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and 

persuasion, and to enter into a conciliation agreement with any person involved.”36 The 

Commission must spend no less than 30 (but no more than 90) days attempting conciliation.37

Nothing, however, requires a respondent to reach agreement (or even engage) with the 

Commission in the conciliation process. Instead, the Commission’s sole coercive power is 

derived from the courts of the United States—38 and, as such, ultimately depends upon this 

32 CREW v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 236 F. Supp. 3d at 392–93 (discussing Fed. Election Comm'n v. Christian Coal., 

965 F. Supp. at 71 and Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Right to Work Comm., 916 F. Supp. at 15).

33 See id.

34 Id. at 393.

35 Statement of Reasons of Chair Broussard and Comm’rs Walther and Weintraub at 6, MUR 7465 (Dec. 16, 2021). 

But see Fed. Election Comm’n v. Furgatch, 869 F.2d 1256, 1262 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating, with respect to injunctive 

relief under FECA, “Because the Act implicates First Amendment concerns about political expression, it is 

important that courts avoid granting injunctive relief which is unnecessary to further the purposes of the Act.”).

36 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(4)(A)(i) (“Except as provided in clause[] (ii) [establishing 15-day conciliation period where 

probable-cause determination occurs during the 45 days preceding an election] and subparagraph (C) [setting out 

process Commission may follow to impose scheduled penalties for violations of qualified disclosure requirements], 

if the Commission determines, by an affirmative vote of 4 of its members, that there is probable cause to believe 

that any person has committed, or is about to commit, a violation of this Act . . . the Commission shall attempt, 

for a period of at least 30 days, to correct or prevent such violation by informal methods of conference, conciliation, 

and persuasion, and to enter into a conciliation agreement with any person involved. Such attempt by the 

Commission to correct or prevent such violation may continue for a period of not more than 90 days. The 

Commission may not enter into a conciliation agreement under this clause except pursuant to an affirmative vote 

of 4 of its members. A conciliation agreement, unless violated, is a complete bar to any further action by the 

Commission, including the bringing of a civil proceeding under paragraph (6)(A).”) (emphasis added).

37 Id.

38 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(6)(A) (“If the Commission is unable to correct or prevent any violation of this Act . . . by 

the methods specified in paragraph (4) [providing for conciliation; imposition of scheduled penalties for violations 

of qualified disclosure requirements], the Commission may, upon an affirmative vote of 4 of its members, institute 

a civil action for relief, including a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or any other appropriate 

order . . . in the district court of the United States for the district in which the person against whom such action 

is brought is found, resides, or transacts business.”).

MUR746500248
MUR 7465 (Freedom Vote, Inc.) 

Statement of Reasons

Page 7 of 11

agency’s ability to demonstrate an actionable violation in court. Thus, even if the Commission 

could find probable cause to believe a time-barred violation occurred, doing so would be an 

exercise in futility as the Commission lacks direct enforcement authority over the Act.

The Commission lacked authority to pursue enforcement action against Freedom Vote in 

connection with activity before November 9, 2016. We voted accordingly, thus disposing of all 

but two of Freedom Vote’s alleged FECA violations. 

b. We exercised our prosecutorial discretion and declined to pursue 

enforcement in connection with Freedom Vote’s other alleged FECA 

violations.

OGC argued that two of Freedom Vote’s alleged FECA violations were not yet timebarred: the failure to file “the Post-General Report, due December 8, 2016, and the Year End 

Report, due January 31, 2017.”39 OGC further suggested that the Commission find probable 

cause on the theory that, “as a political committee, Freedom Vote had a continuing obligation 

to file disclosure reports until it terminated.”40

In determining whether to pursue enforcement, the Commission has prosecutorial 

discretion as described in Heckler v. Cheney.41 When exercising that discretion, it is 

incumbent upon us to “not only assess whether a violation has occurred, but whether agency 

resources are best spent on this violation or another, whether the agency is likely to succeed 

if it acts, whether the particular enforcement action requested best fits the agency’s overall 

policies[,]”42 and other factors.

i. The Commission does not have jurisdiction to require 

continuous reporting by Respondent.

OGC’s suggestion that the Commission may find probable cause because “as a political 

committee, Freedom Vote had a continuing obligation to file disclosure reports until it 

terminated”43 defies both logic and black-letter law. Indeed, this theory was rejected in prior 

litigation, as the Commission can “cite to no precedent suggesting that the reporting 

39 GC Br. at 24, n.105; see also Statement of Reasons of Chair Broussard and Comm’rs Walther and Weintraub at 

7, MUR 7465 (Dec. 16, 2021) (conceding that there is “doubt” about the timeliness of enforcement action based on 

anything other than “disclosure reports that were due less than five years before November 9, 2021.”).

40 GC Br. at 24, n.105.

41 470 U.S. 821, 831–32 (1985). See also id. at 831 (“[A]n agency’s decision not to prosecute or enforce ... is a 

decision generally committed to an agency’s absolute discretion ... [and] often involves a complicated balancing of 

a number of factors which are peculiarly within its expertise.”); CREW v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 892 F.3d at 438 

(“The Supreme Court has recognized that federal administrative agencies in general, and the Federal Election 

Commission in particular, have unreviewable prosecutorial discretion to determine whether to bring an 

enforcement action.”) (citing Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 831; Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 25 

(1998); CREW v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 475 F.3d 337, 340 (D.C. Cir. 2007)).

42 Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831.

43 GC Br. at 24, n.105.

MUR746500249
MUR 7465 (Freedom Vote, Inc.) 

Statement of Reasons

Page 8 of 11

requirements are continuous and the text of FECA does not clearly establish that entities 

have a continuous obligation to report information.”44 After all, if FECA did require 

continuous reporting, “the statute of limitations would be largely irrelevant in cases of 

alleged non-disclosure or failure-to-register.”45 This cannot be right. Adopting this line of 

thinking would be tantamount to vesting ourselves with perpetual jurisdiction over such 

violations, which would gut the purpose of 28 U.S.C. § 2462—to “set[] a fixed date when 

exposure to the specified Government enforcement efforts ends, advancing ‘the basic policies 

of all limitations provisions: repose, elimination of stale claims, and certainty about a 

plaintiff’s opportunity for recovery and a defendant’s potential liabilities.’”46 

As the Supreme Court has noted, statutes of limitations including 28 U.S.C. § 2462 “are 

intended to promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have 

been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses 

have disappeared. They provide security and stability to human affairs. We have deemed 

them vital to the welfare of society, and concluded that even wrongdoers are entitled to 

assume that their sins may be forgotten[.]”47 The notion that the Commission may swoop in 

at any moment and pursue enforcement action against any entity that has ever operated as 

a political committee, regardless of how long ago the activity occurred, is at odds with the 

very nature of a statute of limitations, and cannot support enforcement action against 

Respondent. 

ii. Pursuing enforcement on the theory that a reporting violation 

accrues on the report-filing deadline carries litigation risk, 

presents practical challenges, and offers little chance of 

furthering the Commission’s mission.

Next, OGC argue that the Commission should pursue enforcement based upon Freedom 

Vote’s failure to file a 2016 Post-General Report (due December 8, 2016) and a 2016 YearEnd Report (due January 31, 2017)—violations that OGC present as within the statute of

limitations. As an initial matter, we do not find any binding authority for the proposition that 

the statute of limitations on such violation runs from the subject report’s due date. It is 

equally logical that the statute should run from the date of reportable spending.48

44 CREW v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 236 F. Supp. 3d at 392–93.

45 Id.

46 Gabelli v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 568 U.S. 442, 448 (2013) (quoting Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 555 (2000)) 

(declining to read a discovery rule into 28 U.S.C. § 2462 in context of Securities and Exchange Commission’s effort 

to pursue civil penalties).

47 Id. at 448–49 (quoting Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348–349 (1944); 

Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 271 (1985)) (cleaned up).

48 Absent direction from Congress or controlling caselaw, we note that Courts have rejected the application of the 

discovery rule to the running of the limitations period under 28 U.S.C. § 2462. See, e.g., 3M Co. v. Browner, 17 

F.3d at 1462.

MUR746500250
MUR 7465 (Freedom Vote, Inc.) 

Statement of Reasons

Page 9 of 11

And even under OGC’s theory of the statute of limitations, enforcement would be difficult 

or impossible. We consider the following timeline:49

October 20, 2016 First date covered by 2016 Post-General Report

November 8, 2016 2016 General Election

November 28, 2016 Last date covered by 2016 Post-General Report

November 29, 2016 First date covered by 2016 Year-End Report 

December 8, 2016 Due date for 2016 Post-General Report

December 31, 2016 Last date covered by 2016 Year-End Report 

January 31, 2017 Due date for 2016 Year-End Report

July 29, 2019 Commission’s reason-to-believe vote

November 9, 2021 Commission’s probable-cause vote

November 10, 2021 Start of minimum 30-day conciliation period50 

December 10, 2021 End of minimum 30-day conciliation period

As discussed above, when the Commission finds probable cause, it must “attempt, for a 

period of at least 30 days, to correct or prevent [the] violation by informal methods of 

conference, conciliation, and persuasion. . ..”51 Even if we voted to find probable cause on 

November 9, 2021, the Commission would have had to spend 30 days in conciliation before it 

could pursue litigation on December 10, 2021 (at the earliest). By then, the statute of 

limitations on the 2016 Post-General Report would have expired, barring that very lawsuit. 

The Commission would have had—again, at the very most, and under OGC’s expansive 

reading of the statute of limitations—from December 10, 2021, until January 31, 2022, to 

pursue litigation in connection with the Post-General Report. One-and-a-half months is not 

much time to marshal the relevant evidence and information, draft a complaint and a motion 

for injunctive relief, and file suit. This work would have to be done over the winter holidays, 

with much of the staff taking leave, and with a press of other matters vying for their 

attention. Under these circumstances, we acted consistent with Commission practice in 

49 Report due dates and coverage dates are set out in 52 U.S.C. § 30104(a) and 2016 Reporting Dates, Federal 

Election Commission, https://transition.fec.gov/info/report_dates_2016.shtml#quarterly (visited Feb. 22, 2022).

50 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(4)(A)(i).

51 Id.

MUR746500251
MUR 7465 (Freedom Vote, Inc.) 

Statement of Reasons

Page 10 of 11

declining to pursue enforcement where the statute of limitations has not run but is 

“imminent.”52

Moreover, Freedom Vote is apparently defunct and bankrupt, and it is unclear to us that 

there would be anyone to engage in either conciliation or litigation had the Commission

pursued it. For the same reasons, we have no basis to believe that enforcement action would 

deter future violations of the Act. 53

Finally, even if the Commission successfully sued for an injunction compelling Freedom 

Vote to file the reports at issue, and even if somebody was around to comply with that 

injunction, the information would be unhelpful at best and misleading at worst. The PostGeneral Report covered receipts and disbursements from October 20 thru November 28, 

2016—only two weeks of which preceded the 2016 election—and the Year-End Report covered 

activity after the election. The disclosure interest in such information is limited, given the 

likelihood that funds disbursed on election-related activity would have been received before 

then.54 This is confirmed by “Freedom Vote’s own ledgers of expenses produced in the course 

of the investigation,” which OGC used as the basis of its recommendation.55 Based upon 

Freedom Vote’s 2016 ledger, the maximum contributions that it could possibly have received 

during the post-general reporting period—if it were required to report as a political 

committee—would total $45,000.56 This same ledger reflects that Freedom Vote received no 

possible contributions from November 29 thru December 31, the period covered in the Year52 Statement of Reasons of Chair Broussard and Comm’r Weintraub at 2, MUR 7395 (May 7, 2021) (“Under these 

circumstances, and in light of the imminent statute of limitations and other priorities on the Commission’s docket, 

we voted to dismiss the allegations as a matter of prosecutorial discretion.”); Statement of Reasons of Vice Chair 

Dickerson and Comm’rs Cooksey and Trainor at 2, MUR 7265 (May 10, 2021) (concluding that “the Commission 

had no viable course of action but to dismiss [] matters” where “there was no reasonable chance for the Commission 

to bring an enforcement action to fruition in the remaining time.”). See also Statement of Reasons of Vice Chair 

Weintraub and Comm’rs McDonald, Thomas, and Toner at 2, MUR 5089 (Apr. 2, 2004) (exercising prosecutorial 

discretion to dismiss a matter four years and two months after respondents’ alleged violation due, in part, to “the 

age of the case”); Statement of Reasons of Chair Petersen and Comm’rs Hunter and Goodman at 1, MURs 6391, 

6471 (Nov. 6, 2015) (dismissing matters under Heckler because, inter alia, “the statute of limitations [was] 

effectively expired” and the matter “did not warrant the further use of Commission resources”).

53 Of course, a political committee cannot avoid Commission enforcement action by simply dissolving. But see 

CREW v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 236 F. Supp. 3d at 391 (noting that “even if there were not legal issues with 

prosecution, the defunct nature of the [respondent] entity—along with the apparent lack of any officer that could 

conciliate with the FEC—made any remedy, financial or injunctive, extremely difficult.”).

54 Respondent did not engage in any regulable activity after 2016. See supra n.12. 

55 GC Br. at 18, n.78. 

56 Ledger of 2016 Freedom Vote Receipts and Expenses, FV01155-59 (reflecting a $10,000 check dated October 

11, 2016 and deposited on October 21, 2016; a $25,000 check dated October 18, 2016 and deposited on October 21, 

2016; and a $10,000 check dated October 24, 2016 and deposited on November 4, 2016). 

MUR746500252
MUR 7465 (Freedom Vote, Inc.) 

Statement of Reasons

Page 11 of 11

End Report.57 These records also show comparatively minimal disbursements—several of 

which were clearly administrative in nature—during both of these reporting periods.58

IV. CONCLUSION

By the time this matter was before the Commission for a probable-cause finding, the 2016 

election cycle was long over and Freedom Vote was defunct and bankrupt. Most of the alleged 

FECA violations were time-barred, and the Commission may not perpetually extend its own

jurisdiction by requiring continuous reporting. Considering the litigation risk and practical 

obstacles associated with continued action against Freedom Vote, the (at best short) time 

before the statute of limitations would expire, the staleness of the facts, the narrow

information subject to disclosure, and the Commission’s limited resources, we voted against 

finding probable cause and voted to close the file on this Matter.

March 7, 2022 

Date

March 7, 2022

Date

March 7, 2022

Date

___________________________ 

Allen Dickerson

Chairman

____________________________ 

Sean J. Cooksey

Commissioner 

____________________________ 

James E. “Trey” Trainor, III

Commissioner 

57 Id. 

58 Id. (reflecting modest expenses for telephone, accounting, legal, and consulting services).

MUR746500253