NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SHALOM M. HARRIS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting 

Commissioner Social Security, 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 16-35585 

D.C. No. 2:15-cv-01387-BAT 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

Brian Tsuchida, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 8, 2017**

Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and TROTT and SILVERMAN, Circuit 

Judges

Shalom Harris appeals the district court’s decision affirming the 

Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of Harris’s application for supplemental 

security income disability benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. We 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

DEC 12 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 16-35585 

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Brown-Hunter v. 

Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 2015), and we affirm.

The ALJ supported his decision to give Dr. Ruddell’s opinion “little weight” 

with specific and legitimate reasons derived from the evidentiary record. Dr. 

Ruddell conducted her examination with a materially incomplete understanding of 

Harris’s mental health and neurological condition. By contrast, Dr. Hendrickson’s 

detailed opinion took Harris’s Asperger’s condition into consideration. The ALJ 

concluded that Dr. Hendrickson’s opinion was “more reliable and accurate” as well 

as consistent with the views of her treating psychiatrist. 

The ALJ properly rejected that part of Dr. Hendrickson’s opinion regarding 

marked limitations in interacting with supervisors based on evidence in the record 

showing that Harris engaged appropriately with medical providers and reported no 

problems interacting with non-family members. See Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004) (concluding that the ALJ may 

properly reject a medical opinion that is contradicted by other medical evidence). 

The Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) assessment properly accounted for the 

remaining limitations in Dr. Hendrickson’s thorough opinion. See StubbsDanielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008) (affirming the ALJ’s 

assessment of specific functional limitations based on substantial evidence in the 

medical record).
3 16-35585 

Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s interpretation of the medical 

opinions from Dr. Weir, Dr. Thuline, Dr. Ignacio, Dr. Nelson, and Dr. Fligstein, 

and the RFC accounts for all relevant limitations in these opinions. See StubbsDanielson, 539 F.3d at 1174 (affirming the ALJ’s RFC assessment based on 

substantial evidence); Batson, 359 F.3d at 1193 (explaining that this court must 

defer to the ALJ when the evidence supports more than one interpretation).

Harris complains that the ALJ erred in failing to acknowledge other 

evidence supporting her case. However, the ALJ indicated that he had given 

careful consideration to “all of the evidence.” We find no error in not mentioning 

some doctors by name.

The ALJ provided several clear and convincing reasons to discredit Harris’s 

testimony regarding the intensity of her symptoms. See Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 

F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009). First, the ALJ properly determined that specific 

testimony regarding Harris’s physical, social, and cognitive limitations was 

inconsistent with specific objective medical evidence. See Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d 

at 494 (requiring the ALJ to link specific medical evidence to the specific 

testimony it discredits). Second, the ALJ properly discredited Harris’s testimony 

based on inconsistencies with her activities. See Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 639 

(9th Cir. 2007) (explaining that an ALJ can properly reject claimant testimony 

based on activities that are inconsistent with the testimony). Third, the ALJ 
4 16-35585 

properly discredited Harris’s statements regarding her inability to lift her niece or 

look for work based on inconsistent statements in the record. See Tommasetti v. 

Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008). Fourth, the ALJ properly relied on a 

lack of objective medical evidence showing anger and anxiety during social 

interactions with non-family members as one factor in discrediting Harris’s 

testimony regarding her functional limitations from anger and anxiety. See Burch 

v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005) (concluding that the ALJ can 

properly rely on a lack of supporting objective medical evidence as one factor in 

discrediting claimant testimony). Even assuming that SSR 16-3p applies 

retroactively, the ALJ properly focused on evaluating Harris’s symptoms and not 

her character for truthfulness. See Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 678 n.5 (9th 

Cir. 2017).

The ALJ properly rejected the lay testimony of Harris’s mother based on 

inconsistencies with Harris’s own testimony and the medical evidence. See Lewis 

v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 511-12 (9th Cir. 2001) (including inconsistencies with 

claimant testimony and with medical evidence as germane reasons to discredit lay 

testimony).

AFFIRMED.