Tere sa Bates appears a s t he personal represent ati v e of the esta te of her l ate- 1 husb and , Kevin Bates. NO. 07-08 -007 2-CV IN THE CO UR T OF APPEA LS FO R THE S EVEN TH D ISTRI CT O F TEXAS

AT AM AR ILLO PAN EL C SEPTEM BER25, 2009

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___ TERES A BATES, AS THE PER SON AL R EPR ESEN TATIVE OF TH E ES TAT E OF K EV IN B ATE S, A N D J OE R EY N ER O, A PP EL LA N TS V. RA ND ALL C OU NTY , AP PELLEE

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______ FRO M T HE 18 1 ST DIS T RI CT COU RT OF RA NDA L L COU NT Y; NO. 56, 384 -B; HONORABLE RON ENN S, JUDGE PRESI DING

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____ Before QUINN, C.J., and HANCOCK and PIRT LE, JJ. OPIN ION Appel lan ts, Jo e R e yne ro and Teres a Bat es, appeal the tr ial co urt’ s a w ards of 1 atto rney’s fees in a whistleblower law suit in w hich ap pellan ts prevailed. A ppe llee, Ran dall Cou nty , al so filed noti ce of appeal of the jud g ment. W e rev erse and remand i n par t and aff ir m in par

t.Ev ide nce w as present e d thatappel lan ts made repor ts to t he Tex as Nat ural 2 Resou rce Conversation Com mission thatthe Depa rtme nt w as illegally dum ping mat erials. How ever, the jury

foun d tha t the se repo rts w ere not ma de in good fa ith or w ere no t a cause of app ellant s’ term inatio n. App ellant s did notchallen ge these jury f indings by the ir appea l. Ho w ever, Cranm er a dm itted d uring trial tha t the re had bee n on e insta nce in which 3 an empl oyee had dr iv en a v ehi cl e tha t he w as not p ro per ly l ic ensed to operate a p p ro x i ma t e l y

s i x w e e k s p r i o r

t o H a n s o n ’ s c o n v e rs a t i o n w i t h t h e S h e r i ff.

2 Back g ro und On or ab outDecem ber 13 , 200 4, Ke v in Bat es allegedly repo rted to Stan Cranme r, ass is tant super int endent of the R andal l Cou nty R oad a n d B rid g e D epar tment, that employ ees of the Depar tment w ere v iol ati ng the law byoperati ng road eq uip ment w it hout the proper commerci al dr iv er ’s li cens es. C ra nmer, how ev er , den ies thatBat es ev er made 2 such a repo rt. On Decem ber 23, 2 004 , Reynero called th e Rand all Count y Sherif f to repo rt tha t em ployees of

t he Depa rtme nt w ere op eratin g equipm entw ithou t the prope r li cense s. The S h e r i ff c o n t a c t e d R u s s e l l H a n s o n , s u p e r i n t e n d e n to f t h e D e p a rt me n t , a n d i n q uir ed abo ut th e ma tter. Ha nson a sked Cranm er if t he rep ort w as true a nd Cranm er informe d him th a t n o on e ha d dri ven w it h o u t p ro p e r lic e n sin g. 3
Follow ing his discussion w ith the Sherif f , Hanso n de cided to term inate app ellant s. He c a l l e d b o t h a p p e l l a n t s i n t o a m e e t i n g o n D e c e mb e r 2 9 , 2 0 0 4 , a tw h i c h H a n son immedi atel y

pl aced letters o f ter minat ion in f ro nt of appel lan ts and i nformed t hem thatthey had bee n ter minat ed. Acc ordin g to the t er minat ion l etters, a ppel lan ts w ere bei ng ter minat ed bec ause, Emplo y ee v iol ated the R andal l Cou nty personne l pol icy

by i g nor in g proper g ri ev ance procedu re by by -p ass ing road dep artm e nt s uper v is ors a ndAccording t o the coun ty’ s g riev ance policy , app ellant s shou ld have f irst taken th eir 4 compl ain t t o C ra nmer, then to Han son, then to th e C o u n ty Commi ss ion ers, and t hen, final ly , t o a g ri ev ance commi ttee. Phillips had assum ed Cranm er’s positio n and w ould have been app ellant s’ direct 5 super v is or on M arch 15 i f appell ants had sti ll been employ ed by the Dep artment. 3 dep artm enthea d[ ] and g oing dire c t ly to ano the r depa rtme nt he ad. This 4 c a u s e d a m aj o r

d i s r u p t i o n o f d e p a rt me n t a l w o r kfl o w . I ti s fe l tt h i s att it ude w oul d be too d is ru pti v e i n the future for effect iv e depar tmental functi on. After Han son re ad th e l etters t o appel lan ts, R ey nero att empted t o dis cus s t he matt er w it h Han son, but Han son cut him off by say ing thatthe matter w as not “ up for dis cus si on” and that Bates and Rey nero s houl d l eav e the premis es. R ey nero tes ti fied atthe subs eq uent tr ial thathe c onsi dered hi s a ttempt s t o di sc uss the matter w it h H a n so n t o be a v er bal ini ti ati on of the Cou nty ’s g ri ev ance procedu re . On or aboutM arch 8, 20 05, t he C ounty ’s attor ney m ade a v er bal offer

to re ins tate both Bates and Rey nero w it h full back- pay and benefits . Appel lan ts’ att or ney reje cte d the offer . On M arch 15, a ppel lan ts sent l etters t o Brady Phi ll ips req uest ing rein sta tement,

5 doubl e bac k p ay , and othe r compens ator y damag es to be di sc uss ed i n the future. On Ma rc h 24, the Cou nty

se nt s ettl ement offers to ap pel lan ts th a t would eit her rein sta te appel lan ts w it h bac k- pay or w oul d paythem back -p ay throug h M arch, pl us the a mount of money eac h appel lan t w it hdrew from t hei r re ti re ments, and $5,000. The c ash settl ement offers c ontai ned i n the se letters woul d tot al $23,500 .76 for Bat es and $16, 903.22 for Reynero. On this sam e da te, Ph illips respo nde d to ap pellan ts’ March 15 lette rs by letters sta ti ng , “ I hav e rev iew ed y our g ri ev ance and w il l deny it becau se it w as not filed ti mely and y ou fail ed to foll ow

proper procedu re . . . .” The foll ow ing day , app ell ants se nt l etters t oFurther referen ce to pro v isions of the Texas Governme nt C ode w ill be b y referen ce 6 to “ secti on ___” or

“ § ___. ” 4 Cranmer ex press ing a de si re to cont inu e to pu rs ue th eir g ri ev ances . The record does not include any respo nse to app ellant s’ March 25 lette rs. On A pr il 7, 2005, appel lan ts file d suitagai nstRandal l Cou nty al leg ing v iol ati ons of the Tex as W his tl ebl ow er Ac t. See T EX . G OV ’ T C OD E A NN . §§ 5 54. 001 -.010 (Vernon 200 4). 6 App ellant s sought actual dam ages in the form of lost w ages and men tal an guish dam ages, puni ti v e damag es, and attor ney ’s fees. The C ounty ans w ered. On N ov ember 21, 2006, the Count y

f iled a Plea to the Juris d ict ion alleging that ap pellan ts’ claims w ere jurisdictiona lly

barre d u n d er the T exas W histleb low er Act beca use th e claims were unt ime ly f il e d

. T h e t rial court den ied th e Coun ty’ s Plea on April 16, 20 07. In its Fi rst Amended A nsw er , t he C ounty sp eci fical ly

pl ed th at ap pel lan ts’ cl aims w ere barre d by li mita ti ons u n d er

the Tex as W his tl ebl ow er Ac t. The c ase w as tr ied to a j ur y and, on September

17, 2007, the j ur

y re tur ned a v erdict aw ardin g Bat es $7,713 in back w ag es and $10,736 for

l ostempl oy ee bene fits and aw ardin g R ey nero $7, 203 i n bac k w ag es and $4,523 for l ostempl oy ee bene fits. The Cou nty filed a moti on for jud g ment notw it hst andi ng the v erdict (mo tion for JNOV) allegi ng that th e evide n c e p re s e nte d at trial conclu siv ely esta blished thatapp ellant s’ claims w ere un time ly f iled an d w ere, th erefore, jurisdiction ally bar re d or the Cou nty w as enti tl ed to j udg ment on it s a ff ir mati v e defense of li mita ti ons. The tr ial co urt den ied the Cou nty ’s moti on.5

The is sue of attor ney ’s fees w as not submi tted to the jur y . In af fidav it s s ubmitted t o t h e t r i a l c o u rt , B a t e s ’ s c o u n s e l re q u e s t e d $ 8 9 , 4 6 5 a n d R e y n e ro ’ s c o u n s e l re q uest ed $69,317 .50 a s reason abl e att or ney ’s fees. The Cou nty re spond ed to ap pel lan ts’ req uest s for atto rney’s fees a sserting tha t, und er T exas Local Governm entCode sect ion 89 .00 4(b), app ellant s shou ld be ord ered to pa y the Cou nty’s costs of

suit, includin g atto rney’s fees, and t h a t appel lan t’ s req uest ed attor ney ’s fees w ere unreason abl e under the circumsta nces. On Dec em ber 2, 2 007 , the trial court ente red Final Jud gmen t in accord ance w ith the jury ’s v erdict. T he Fina l Judgmen t also awarded app ellant s atto rney’s fees i n amount s o f $15,000 t o Bat es and $10 ,000 to R ey nero. Appel lan ts mov ed for new tr ial so lel y

on t he i ss ue of the aw ard of atto rn e y’s fees, w hic h appea rs to hav e been ov er ru led by

operati on of l aw . App ellant s timely filed a Joint Notice of Appe al of the award of atto rney’s fees in this matte r. The C ounty

al so ti mely

fil ed N oti ce of Appeal

. In t he order thatthe is sues present ed w il l be address ed, t he C ounty co ntends that( 1) the tr ial co urt er re d i n deny ing the Count y ’s motio n f o r J NOV on th e ba sis that ap pellan ts’ claims w ere jurisdiction ally bar re d or thatthe ev ide nce conc lus iv ely es tabl is hed t he aff ir mati v e defense of li mita ti ons and ( 2) the tr ial cour

t er re d in aw ardin g attor ney ’s fees to appel lan ts and i n notaw ardin g attor ney ’s fees to the Cou nty under Tex as Local Gov er nment C ode s ect ion 89.0 04( b)

. By o n e is s u e , a p p e ll a n t s co n t e n d t h a tt h e t ri a l c o u rte rr e d in a wa rd in g a p p e ll a n t s o n ly a f raction of

their reason able and nece ssaryatto rney’s fees.6 Jur is dicti on and Limi tati ons The Co unty

co ntends thatappel lan ts’ cl aims are jur is dicti onal ly bar re d or that the ev ide nce conc lus iv ely

es tabl is hed t he C ount y’s a f firmat iv e defense of li mita ti ons. The Cou nty so ug ht di smi ss al of appell ants ’ cl aims on the jur is dicti onal grounds byw ay of a pl ea to th e j u risdicti on. After the j ur y reache d i ts v erdict, the C ounty , by i ts moti on for JN OV, again cha llenged th e trial court’s jurisdiction an d cont end ed that the evidence co nclusively esta blished the af

f irmative defense of

limitation s. T he Cou nty’s jurisdictiona l challenge conten ds tha t app ellant s’ suits w ere no t time ly f iled un der the Te x as W histleb low er Act and , beca use tim ely f iling of su it is a statuto ry prereq uis it e to sui t, the t ri al cour t w as w it hout jur is dicti on to hear appel lan ts’ cl aims

. See § 554.00 5 ( s u i t s u n d e r t h e W h i s t l e b l o w e r

A c tm u s tb e fi l e d w i t h i n 9 0 d a y s ) ; § 3 1 1

. 0 34 (s tatut or y prereq uis it es to s uitare j ur is dicti onal r e qui re m e nts i n al l sui ts ag ain st a g ov er nmental enti ty ). Subj ectm atter jur is dicti on is ess enti al to the author ity of a cour t t o d e c id e a c a s e . T e x . A s s ’n o f B u s . v. T e x. A ir

Co n t ro l B d

. , 8 5 2 S

. W

. 2 d 4 4 0 , 4 4 3 (T e x. 1993)

. Subj ectmatte r jur is dicti on i s n ev er presumed and canno t be w aiv ed. Id. at 44 3- 44. W hether the tr ial courthad subj ectm atter jur is dicti on to dec ide a c ase is a l eg al q uest ion subj ectto de n ovo re vie w. Ma yh e w v. T o wn o f S u n n yva le , 9 6 4 S

. W

. 2 d 9 2 2 , 9 2 8 (T e x. 1998)

. Lik ew is e, i ss ues of stat utor y co nst ru cti on are rev iew ed de n ovo . Tex . D ep’ t of T ransp . v . Need ham , 82 S. W .3d 314 , 318 (Tex. 2002 ).The C ounty di d not req uesta j ur

y q uest ion reg ardin g i ts aff ir mati v e defense of 7 li mita ti ons. As a resul t, our anal y si s o f the l imi tati ons defense w il l be l imi ted t o i ts present ati on as a g ro und for jud g ment notw it hst andi ng the v erdict. 7 The Co unty ’s l imi tati ons cont enti on w as present ed as an a ff ir mati v e defense and 7 by w ay of

a mo tion for JNOV. A JNOV mot ion sho uld be g rante d w hen the evidence is c o n c lu s ive a n d o n e p a rt y is e n t it le d t o ju d gm e n t a s a m a t t e r of la w. S e e G a ll a s v. Ca r B iz, Inc ., 914 S.W .2d 592, 593 (Tex .App. –Da ll as 1995, w ri t den ied ). W hen t he par ty se eki ng to di sreg ard the j ur

y ’s findi ng had the b urden of proof on the is sue, w e, first, mustex amine the record for ev ide nce that suppo rts th e j ur y ’s findi ng and ig nore c ontrar y ev ide nce. Ster ner v . M arathon Oi l Co. , 767 S.W .2d 686, 690 (Tex

. 1989)

. If there is no ev ide nce to supp ort the jury ’s fin ding, w e the n mu st rev iew the entire record to dete rmine if th e con trary posi ti on w as est abl is hed as a matter of law

. Id. Both of the County ’s contenti ons are premi sed on the theory that appel lan ts faile d to t imel y fil e the ir l aw sui t i n ac cordance w it h the req uis it es of the Tex as W his tl ebl ow er Ac t. T he T exas W histleb low er Act prote cts a pub lic em ployee w ho ma kes a good faith rep ort of a v iol ati on of l aw

bythe employ ing gov er nmental enti ty from adv erse personne l act ion , suc h as ter minat ion or suspen si on. See § 554. 002( a)

. The Actauth or iz es the repor ti ng employ ee to fil e s uitag ain st the g ov er nmental entity and to s ue for inj unct iv e reli ef, act ual dam ages, cou rt costs, an d reaso nab le atto rney’s fees. See §§ 554 .00 3, .0 035 . How ever, unl ess an a ppl ic abl e g ri ev ance procedu re appl ies to the repor ti ng empl oy ee, t he empl oy ee must file sui t w it hin 90 d ay s o f w hen t he all eg ed adv erse personne l act ion oc cur re d or w as disco v ered bythe em ployee throu gh reasona ble diligence. § 554. 005 . If a gr ievance8

procedu re appl ies to the a dv erse personne l act ion , t he empl oy ee must i nit iat e tha t gr ievance proce dure b efore f iling suit. See § 554 .00 6(a). Once a n ap plicable g riev ance procedu re i s i nit iat ed, t he g ov er nmental entit y is giv en 60 day s i n w hic h to re ach a final decisio n on the g ri ev ance and t his ti me i s e x cl uded fro m the 90 day deadl ine to file sui t. See § 554.006 (b ), ( c)

. In t he presentca se, appel lan ts w ere ter minat ed by the Dep artment on D ecember 29, 200 4. T hey filed suit aga in st the Count y on Ap ril 7, 20 05, 99 da y s af ter the adverse perso nne l action. Appe llants cont end t hatt hey attem pte d to initiat e the Count y ’s g riev ance proce dure during the m eet ing at w hich th ey w ere informe d of their term inatio n. How ever, they w ere prev ented from so doi ng by Han son re fusing to dis cus s the matter

. If the attempt s of an employ ee to compl y w it h the g ri ev ance procedu re are effect iv ely thw arted by the g ov er nmental enti ty ’s refusal to meetor to dis cus s t he matt er , t he pur poses of the W his tl ebl ow er

Ac t w oul d be frust ra ted, espe ci all y if the g ov er nmental entity w ere al low ed to de fend a subs eq uent sui t by cl aimi ng that the e mploy ee’ s c lai m is bar re d bec ause the e m p lo yee did not firs t i nit iat e the g ri ev ance procedu re . See F ort Be nd In dep. Sch. D is t. v . Riv era, 93 S .W .3d 315 , 320 (Tex.App .–Hou ston [14 Dist.] 2002 , no pe t.). Becau se th Bates ’s and Rey nero’s att empts to i nit iat e the g ri ev ance procedu re i n their meeti ng w it h Han son were thw arted, w e c oncl ude t hat a fact i ss ue w as present ed reg ardin g w hether appella nts i nit iat ed th e C ounty ’s g ri ev ance procedu re i n a mann er su ff ic ien t t o tol l the li mita ti ons per iod of secti on 554. 005.9

How ever, the Coun ty cont end s thatthere was no gr ievance proce dure app licable to ap pellan ts’ comp laints an d, th erefore, even if they attem pte d to initiat e the g rie va n ce procedu re i n the ir

D ecember

29 meeti ng w it h Hanso n, thei r sui ts w ere barred bec ause they w ere unt imel y

fil ed. The Cou nty ’s g ri ev ance procedu re ex press ly appl ies to “e mploy ees. ” The Co unty

co ntends that appel lan ts w ere no lon g er employ ees follo w ing thei r ter minat ion on Dece mb er 29, 200 4 and , the refore, the Coun ty’ s gr ievance proce dure w as inap plicable to th e irc o m p la in t s . In supp ort of its conten tion, the Cou nty ci tes th is Court’s opinion in Jordan v . J eff e rs on C ounty , 153 S.W .3d 6 70 ( Tex .App. –Amar il lo 2004, pet. deni ed) , for the p ro posi ti on th a t “Impli ci t i n the duty to compl y

w it h ‘ appl ic abl e’ g ri ev ance pol ic ies conc er nin g the sus pensi on or ter minat ion of employ ment is the need for the e x is tenc e of an appl ic abl e pol icy .” I d. at673. How ever, w hen it is uncle ar w het her an emp loyer has a post-te rmina tion griev ance procedu re , t he te rmi nated employ ee’ s n oti ce to t he emp lo yer th a t he bel iev es that an adv erse personne l act ion w as tak en ag ain st him due t o a g ood fait h repor t of a v iol ati on of law by the g ov er nmental enti ty , i f made w it hin 90 d ay s, is su ff ic ien t t o tol l the l imi tati ons period of section 554 .00 5. See Curbo v . Stat e, 99 8 S.W .2d 337 , 341 (Te x. A p p . –Aust in 1999, no pet.) ; Bei ser v . Tombal l Hos p. A uth., 902 S.W .2d 7 21, 7 24 ( Tex .App. –Ho ust on [1 Dist.] 1995 , w rit denied ). st
Addi ti onal ac ti ons tak en by Bat es and R ey nero w ere treat ed as attempts to ini ti ate the g ri ev ance procedu re bythe Cou nty

. For ex ample, in repl y

to Lette rs of

Gr iev ance sent by appel lan ts on M arch 15, B ra dy Phi ll ips st ated that he had “rev iew ed y our g ri ev ance and10

w il l deny it becaus e it w as not timel y f il ed . . . .” W hil e the ti meli ness of appel lan ts’ fil ing of thei r g ri ev ances w as a fact q uest ion for t he tr ial co urt, w e cons tr ue Phi ll ips ’s st atement as, ata minim um , creating unce rtainty as to w het her the Count y ’s g riev ance proced ure app lied to ap pellan ts’ claims. The Co unty

al ter nati v ely

co ntends that , i f the County ’s gr iev ance procedu re appl ied to ap pel lan ts’ cl aims , app ell ants fail e d t o i n itiat e eac h s tep o f the g ri ev ance procedu re . How ev er , i t i s w ell se ttl ed that the Tex as W his tl ebl ow er Ac t no lon g er

req uires ex haust ion of the governmen tal en tity’s g ri e va nce p roced ure; rath er, it requires tha t the proced ure m e re ly b e in it ia t e d a n d t h e n t h a t t h e go ve rn m e n t a l e n t it y b e a f fo rd e d 6 0 d a ys t o r e s o l ve the g ri e v a n c e b e fo re s u i t i s fi l e d

. S e e § 5 5 4

. 0 0 6 ( a ) ; U n i v . o f Te x . M e d

. B ra nch at Gal v est on v . Ba rre tt , 159 S.W .3d 6 31, 6 32 ( Tex . 200 5) ; F ort Be nd In dep. Sch. D is t., 93 S.W .3d at 319 ; Castleb erry Inde p. Sch . Dist. v . Doe, 35 S.W .3d 777 , 780 (Tex.App .–Fo rt W orth 20 01, pet. dism’d w.o.j.). T here fore, appe llants’ initiatio n of the griev ance proced ure w as suffici ent t o c omply w it h the req uis it es of the Tex as W his tl ebl ow er Ac t. Fi nal ly , t he C ounty cont ends that, ev en i f the C ounty ’s g ri ev ance procedu re appl ied to ap pel lan ts’ cl aims and if appell ants ti mely i nit iat ed th at procedu re , app ell ants st il l faile d to fil e s uitw it hin 90 day s o f the C ounty ’s final resol uti on of thos e g ri ev ances . The in it iat ion of an appl ic abl e g ri ev ance procedu re tol ls the 90 day l imi tati ons p e ri od unde r the Tex as W his tl ebl ow er

Ac t for the p er iod thatthe g ri ev a n ce i s b e in g ac ted u pon by the gov ernm ent al ent ity

o r for 6 0 days. See § 5 54. 006 (c); Curbo , 998 S .W .2d a t 341 ; Beiser, 902 S. W .2d a t 724

. The Co unty ’s co ntent ion i s p re mis ed on re sol uti on of the fact i ss ueAs app ellant s f iled the ir cl aim s on the 99th day aft er the Cou nty took the adverse 8 perso nne l action com plaine d of , a tolling of the limita tions p eriod f o r n in e d ays or mo re w oul d make appel lan ts’ su itti mely fil ed. 11 re g ardin g w hether

H anson ’s refusal to di sc uss appel lan ts’ ter minat ion s a t t he D ecember 29 m eet ing const itute d a “f inal decision ” of the Cou nty regarding appe llants’ gri evances. Cl ear ly , t he tr ial co urt’ s r uli ng s o n the C ounty ’s pl ea to the jur is dicti on and moti on for JN OV giv es rise to an im plied f inding tha t the Co unt y d id notrea ch a f inal decision o n ap pellan ts’ g ri ev ances at any

ti me before the ni nth d ay after the g ri ev ance procedu re w as ini ti ated. 8 S e e L a s s it e r v. B li s s , 5 5 9 S

. W

. 2 d 3 5 3 , 3 5 8 (T e x. 1 9 7 7 ), o ve rr u le d o n o t h e r gr o u n d s b y, Che rn e Ind us. , I nc. v . M ag all anes, 763 S .W .2d 7 68, 7 70 ( Tex . 198 9) ( in the a bsenc e of f indings of

fact relating t o a decision m ade bythe trial court, all fa ctua l fin dings thatw ould supp ort the ruling are presu me d). Further, th e Coun ty’ s action s, specif ically its multiple attempt s t o reach an ag re ement w it h appel lan ts re g ardin g th e ir clai ms, are i ncons is tent w ith the Count y

having reache d a f inal de cision to de ny app ellant s’ g riev ance s. Beca use w e c oncl ude that the County has fail ed to meet i ts burden t o s how thatthe Cou n t y ’ s g r i e v a n c e p ro c e d u re d i d n o t a p p l y t o a p p e l l a n t s ’ c l a i ms a s a ma t t e r o f l awand becau se w e w il l not d is tur b the tr ial co urt’ s resol uti on of the factual q ues ti o n s re lat ed to w hether Bat es and Rey nero ti mely ini ti ated the Cou nty ’s g ri ev ance procedu re and w hen the C ounty

final ly dec ide d tho se g ri ev ances , w e ov er ru le the C ounty ’s first is sue.12 Ran dal l Cou nty ’s Ent it lementto Atto rn ey ’s F ees By i ts sec ond i ss ue, t he C ounty co ntends thatthe tr ial co u rterred i n aw ardin g atto rney’s fees to app ellant s rather tha n a wa rd ing attorne y ’s fe es to th e Coun ty. Th is is sue, as present ed by the Cou nty , appears to be an is sue of first impress ion

. The Co unty cont ends that, b e ca u se appel lan ts did not re cov er more as a resul t of thei r sui t t han t he Cou nty offered th em in settl ement of their clai ms, the t ri al cour

t w as re q uired to as ses s t he Cou nty ’s co sts of sui t ag ain st appel lan ts. Se e T EX . L OC . G OV ’ T C OD E A NN . § 89.004( b) (V er non 200 8)

. Appel lan ts re spond by co ntendi ng that( 1) the C ounty has fail ed to sh ow tha t “costs of

suit” include at torne y ’s fees, (2) the p rev ailing pa rty ’s e ntitlem entto atto rney’s fees under

the W his tl ebl ow er

Ac t c ontrols ov er

the g eneral present ment prov is ion , and ( 3) app ellant s, in fa ct, recovered m ore un der the judgmen t tha n the Count y of fered them in settle me nt of

their claims. W e reje ct appel lan ts’ thi rd co ntent ion

. The o n ly way that the j udg ment c oul d be re ad to hav e aw arded app ell ants a g re ater recov er y than the $23,500 .76 t he C ounty offered to Bat es and t he $16, 903.22 the Co u n ty offered to R ey nero i s i f the aw ard of a t t o r n e y ’ s fe e s o r

p re - a n d p o s t -

j u d g m e n t i n t e re s t a re c o n s i d e re d p a rto f t h e re c o v e r

y . W e conc lud e t h a t a c o n s t r u c t i o n o f s e c t i o n 8 9

. 0 0 4 ( b ) o f t h e Te x a s L o c a l G o v e r n me n tC ode that w oul d i ncl ude attor ney ’s fees and i nterestas par t of the re cov er

y to be c ompared to the s ettl ement offer made by the Cou nty

w oul d defeat t he pur pose of the stat ute. See Id. Cl ear ly , t he pur pose of sect ion 89.0 04( b) i s t o enc ourag e the C oun ty to mak e l eg it imat e efforts to s ettl e clai ms w it hout inc ur ri ng sig nific ant li ti g ati on ex pense s, w hil e al so prov idi ng13

a d is in c e n t ive t o cl a im a n t s reje c t i n g l e gi t im a t e se t t le m e n to f fe rs . Se e I d

. ; E s s e n b e rg v. Dallas Coun ty, 988 S.W .2d 188 , 189 (Tex. 1998 ). If, as app ellant s conte nd, atto rney’s fees a nd int erest are conside red to b e pa rt of a claima nt’s recovery , the claiman tw ould benefit from reje cti ng a l eg it imat e s ettl ement offer. W e will not cons tr ue th e s tatut e i n a m a n n e r t h a two u ld p ro d u c e su c h a n a b s u rd re s u lt

. Se e Fl e m in g F o o d s o f T e x. , I n c . v. Ry land er, 6 S.W .3d 278 , 284 (Tex. 1999 ). T he T exas W histleb low er Act provides thatthe pre v ailing plaintif f und er the Act“is enti tl ed to su e for

. . . re asona ble att or ney fees.” § 554. 003( a) (4 ). Se cti on 89. 004 of the Tex as Local Gov er nment C ode prov ide s t hat, before a p e rso n m a y fil e s uitag ain st a county or an e lected c ounty

off ic ial , t he person mustpresentthe cl aim to t he commi ss ion ers c our

t. T EX . L OC . G OV ’ T C OD E A NN . § 89. 004 (a). If th e com mission ers court of fers to sett le the plaintif f ’s claim fo r mo re tha n the plaint if f ultim ate ly

recovers af

ter trial, the p lai nti ff

sh all pay

the cos ts of the s uit

. Id. § 89.004( b)

. In t he presentca se, i t i s b ey ond leg it imat e di sput e tha t the County offered to se ttl e appel lan ts’ cl aims for a n amountg re ater than appel lan ts ult imat ely recov ered after

tr ial

. As su ch , the tw o s tatut or y prov is ion s discusse d in this pa ragraph w ould app ear to b e in conf lict w hen app lied to th is appe al. How ev er , becaus e the compli ance w it h appl ic abl e g ri ev ance procedu re s p ro v is ion of the Tex as W hist leblow er Ac t prov ide s n oti ce to t he c ounty of the c lai ms as ser

ted b y pla int iffs, our

si ste r cour

ts hav e hel d tha t t he present ment req uirement found i n Tex as Local Gov er nment C ode s ect ion 89.0 04( a) does not appl y to act ion s b ro ug ht un der the Tex as W his tl ebl ow er Act

. See Upt on C ounty v . Brow n, 96 0 S. W .2d 8 08, 8 19 ( Tex .App. –El14

Paso 1997, no p et.) ; G re g g C ounty v . Far ra r, 933 S. W .2d 7 69, 7 72 ( Tex .App. –Aus ti n 1996, w ri t den ied ). Thus, as a neces sar y precond it ion to an aw ard of cos ts of cour t i n fav or of the C ounty

d o e s n o t appl y

to the c lai ms broug ht by appel lan ts, w e c oncl ude t hat t he spec ificremedy

prov ide d by

su bsecti on (b) of

Tex as Local Gov er nment C ode s ect ion 89. 004 doe s not ap ply to ap pellan ts’ w histleb low er claims. In fact, h ad th e legislature int ended t o i ncl ude a cos t s hifti ng prov is ion w it hin the Tex as W h ist leblow er Ac t, the ex is tenc e of suc h a c ostsh ifti ng prov is ion i n s ect ion 89.0 04 of the Tex as Local Gov er nment C ode hi g hli g hts the ease w it h w hic h the l eg is lat ure c oul d hav e done so. Bu t, si nce the o nly

prov is ion i n the Tex as W h istl ebl ow er Ac t t hat a ddress es attor ney ’s fees p ro vid e s t h a tt h e p re va il in g p la in t if f is e n t it le d t o su e fo r r e a s o n a b le a t t o rn e y’s fe e s , we c o n c l u d e t h a tt h e L e g i s l a t u re d i d n o ti n t e n d t o s h i ftco s t s of c o u rtto a pre v a i l i n g p l a i n t i ff, ev en i f t he pla int iff’s re cov er y follo w ing tr ial w as les s t han t he C ounty offered i n s ettl ement of the pl ain ti ff ’s cl aims

. The pur poses of the Tex as W his tl ebl ow er Ac t are to ( 1) protec t pub li c e mploy ees from retal iat ion by

their employ er

w hen, in g ood fait h, t hey repor t a v iol ati on of l aw , and ( 2) sec ure l awful c onduc t by thos e w ho di re ct and c onduc t t he af fairs of g ov er nment. C ity of New Braun fels v

. Allen, 1 32 S.W .3d 157 , 161 (Tex.App .–A ustin 2 004 , no pe t.). Becau se the A ct is remedia l in nature, i t s houl d b e l ibe ra ll y co nst ru ed to effecti ts pur pose. I d. Beca use one pur pose of the Tex as W his tl ebl o wer Acti s t o s ecure l awful c onduc t by g ov er nmental enti ti es, i t i s in furtherance of the Act’ s p ur poses to hol d tha t t he c ostsh ifti ng prov is ion of secti on 89. 004( b) of the Tex as Local Gov er nment C ode doe s n ot ap ply to suc ces sful cl aims as ser ted u nder

the Tex as W his tl ebl ow er Ac t.As our resol uti on of the Cou nty ’s se cond is sue vitiates th e need to de fine th e 9 scope of the ph rase “costs of

suit,” w e express no op inion o n the mat ter.

15 Beca u s e t h e p re s e n t me n tre q u i re me n to f s e c t i o n 8 9

. 0 0 4 o f t h e T e x a s L o cal Governme nt Cod e do es no t app ly to claims asse rted und er t he T exas W histleb low er Act and bec ause appl ic ati on of secti on 89. 004' s c ostsh ifti ng prov is ion w oul d under mine one of the pur poses of the Tex as W his tl ebl ow er Act, w e ov er ru le the C ounty ’s se cond is sue. 9
Aw ard of Att or ney ’s F ees to A ppel lan ts Fi nal ly , app ell ants co ntend that the t ri al cour t ab u se d i ts dis creti on i n aw ardin g appel lan ts onl y

a fra cti on of thei r re asona ble and necessary att or ney ’s fees. Appel lan ts cont end thatthey establishe d tha t, throu gh trial, Bates’s reas o nab le and nece ssary attor ney ’s fees w ere $89, 465 and R ey nero’s reaso nabl e and neces sar y att or ney ’s fees w ere $69, 592.50. How ev er , the tri al cour t aw arded Ba tes $15, 000 and R ey nero $10, 000 in atto rney’s fees. The Count y conte nds th at th e awards of atto rn e y’s f e e s w ere reaso nab le in lig ht of

the reco v eryaw arde d to ap pellan ts. W e rev iew

a t ri al cour

t’ s a w ard o f

a tt o rn e y ’s fees for an abus e of di sc re ti on. Ci ty of Hous ton v . Lev ing sto n, 22 1 S. W .3d 2 04, 2 36 ( Tex .App. –Ho ust on [1 D is t.] 2006, no st pet .). A trial court ab uses its discretio n w hen it ac t s i n an unrea sona ble an d arbitrary manner or w hen i t acts w it hout re ferenc e to any g uid ing r ule s o r pr inc ipl es. I d. In t he presentca se, appel lan ts’ att or ney s e ach submi tted it em ized b illin g s a nd supp orting af

f idavits to the trial c ourt. This evidence indicate d tha t the law f irmThe l odest ar amount is defined as “a reason abl e amountof attor ney ’s fees i n a 10 g iv en c ase, us ual ly

ca lc ula ted b y

mul ti ply ing a reason abl e number of hours wor ked by

the prev ail ing hour ly ra te in the communi ty for si mil ar w or k

. . . .” Id. at 2 3 6 n. 1 8 (q uoti ng B L A CK ’ S L AW D I CTI ONA RY 952 (7 ed. 19 99)). th Th e Coun ty challen ged the hou rly rate cha rg ed b y app ellant s’ attorne y s and all 11 of the fees ch arged for w ork performe d by l egal a ssistant s o f Re y nero ’s co unse l. Howev er, ev en i f the tr ial co urt w ere to acc ept all of the arg uments asser

ted b y the Cou nty

rela ti ng to t h e rates cha rg ed b y app ellant s’ counse l, the lod esta r amo unt s w ould rema in far in ex ces s o f the fees aw arded by the tr ial co urt.

16 re present ing Bat es had s pent 561.7 hours represent ing her in thi s matter

. Bat es’ s a ttor ney s ou g htrei mb urs em en t for h i s t i me a t a rat e of $ 20 0 pe r h ou r and $ 75 pe r

h ou r for t i me spenton t he c ase by

the attor ney ’s l eg al ass is tant. The ev iden ce i n dic ated that the l aw firm re present ing R ey nero had spent520. 75 hours o n the cas e. Rey nero’s att or ney so ug ht re imbursementfor t ime spenton t he cas e at rates of $250 pe r hour for S am Leg ate, $200 per ho ur for Michael W y att, $15 0 pe r hour for Daniela L abin oti, an d $5 0 pe r hour for their leg al ass is tants

. Thus, the l odest ar amount of attor ney ’s fees for Bates w as $89,465 and 10 for R ey nero w as $69,592 .50. 11
As prev ailin g p laint iffs in a w his tl ebl ow er su it , app ell ants w ere ent it led to the re cov er y of thei r re asona ble att or ney ’s fees. See § 554. 003( a) (4 ); Lev ing sto n, 221 S. W .3d at 23 7. To cal cul ate reason abl e att or ney ’s fees, an attor ney sho u ld m u lt iply

the re asona ble number

of hours wor ked by

a re a so n a b le hour ly

rate. See Lev ing sto n, 22 1 S.W .3d a t 237

. After cal cul ati ng the lod est ar amount, a t ri al cour

t c an adj ustt h e fee ca lcu latio n bas ed on factors s uch as thos e i denti fied i n Tex as Di sc ipl ina ry R ule of Professi onal C onduc t 1. 04, repr int ed i n T EX . G OV ’ T C OD E A NN ., tit. 2, su btit. G ap p. (S TA TE B A R R U LES , ar

t. X, § 9)

. One o f these factors i s t he amounti nv olv ed and the resul tsW e no te th at th e tr i al c ou rt di d no t i de nt i fy th e fac to rs th at i t c on s idered in 12 awarding app ellant s atto rney’s fees. How ever, w e agree w it h t he Cou nty that the most log ic al in ferenc e is that the t ri al cour t c onsi dered th e reason abl e rela ti onshi p betw een t he amount recov ered and the a ttor ney ’s fees aw ard. 17 obtai ned. T EX . R. P ROF . C O ND UC T 1.04( b) (4 ). W hile the a mount of damag es re cov ered shou ld be con sidered in calculating an award of atto rney’s fee s , t he co urt shou ld also consid er the d ecision’s ef fect on the la w

a nd the p urpo ses for which an award of atto rney’s fees is allowed. See Jo hnso n v . Geo rg ia Hig hway Ex press, In c., 48 8 F.2d 714 , 717 -19 (5 th Ci r. 1974)

. In th e prese nt case, t he Coun ty cont end s thatapp ellant s’ dam ages w ere esse ntially li q uid ated before t his cas e ev en beg an. The Cou nty arg ues that the mos t t hat a ppel lan ts could have reason ably e xp e c t ed to recover f rom th eir suit w as lost w ages and lost em ployee be nef its. T hese a mo unt s co uld be calculat ed w ith reaso nab le certain ty. As a result, th e Coun ty cont end s thatthe am oun t of atto rney’s fees request ed b y app ellant s is not reason abl y

rela ted t o the resul ts obtai ned and thatthe tri a l co u rtdi d notabus e i ts dis creti on i n dec re asi ng its aw ard of atto rn ey ’s fees t o an amount reason abl y rela ted t o the re sul ts obtai ned. 12
W h il e we u n d e rs t a n d t h e Co u n t y’s co n t e n t io n a n d m a y ge n e ra ll y a gr e e wit h it , we non eth eless con clude thatthe trial court ab used its discretion in awarding app ellant s such a s mall frac ti on of their

reaso nabl e attor ney ’s fees. Fi rs t, there i s n o ev ide nti ar y bas is for the t ri al cour

t’ s a ttor ney ’s fee aw ards of $15,000 to B ates and $10,000 t o R e yne ro . It appears t hat t he tr ial co urt s imply ch o se t h ese numbers a rb it ra ri ly as there i s n o l og ic al18

basi s for thes e aw ards re flect ed i n the record. Fur ther , there is ev ide nce in the record tha t the Count y ’s a t t o rn eys and staf f w orked on this case for 1,06 6.4 5 ho urs resulting in atto rney’s fees of $17 2,2 15. 25. Clearly , app ly ing the Coun ty’ s conte ntion abo v e, th ere is no reason abl e bas is for t he attor ney s represent ing the Cou nty to h a ve inc ur re d a $172,21 5.25 bil l on a cas e tha t c oul d hav e been re asona bly l iq uid ated to en ti tl e appel lan ts to appro x imat ely

$30,000 in damage s. Further , the record reflect s t hat a ppel lan ts inc ur re d cer tai n ex pense s a s a re sul t of a cont inu ance re q uest ed by the Cou nty on the mor nin g that trial w as sche dule d to be gin. Even if app ellant s shou ld have conside red the likely recovery f rom th eir claims in det ermin ing the extent of trial w ork thatshou ld have b een don e in this cas e, s uch unex pect ed happ eni ng s as the g ra nti ng of a cont inu ance on th e mor nin g of tr ial w oul d c ertai nly

throw thos e es ti mates off

and wou ld jus ti fy, i f not nec ess it ate, addi ti onal w or k a nd ex pense s t han w as ini ti all y pl anned. Fi nal ly , and as di sc uss ed more full y abov e, on e of the pur poses of t h e Tex as W histleb low er Act is to secu re lawf ul cond uct by those who direct and cond uct th e af fairs of g overnme nt. Allen , 132 S.W .3d at 161 . To thatend , the purp o s e s o f t h e Act are adv anced i f the w ro ngdo in g go v er nmental enti ty mustpay

a s ucc ess ful w his tl ebl ow er pla int iff’s reason abl e att or ney ’s fees. As su ch, wh ile the resul ts obtai ned by appel lan ts w ere a p ro per

co nsi derati on for the t ri al cour t, the tr ial cour

t shoul d als o bal ance that factor w ith the ef

fect th at its awards of atto rney’s fees would have on th e law . Clearly , an award of attor ney ’s fees to a s ucc ess ful w his tl ebl ow er pl ain ti ff thati s l ess than 17 p ercentof the lode star am oun t of

fees i n c u rr e d bythe pla intif f could ha v e a chilling ef fect on f utu re19

w his tl ebl ow ers’ w il li ng ness to br ing su it , w hic h, in t ur n, w oul d frus trate t he pur poses of the Act

. W hile w e con clude thatthe trial co urt abu sed its discretio n in its aw ard of atto rney’s fees i n thi s cas e, w e nei ther ex press nor impl y any opi nio n as to w hat w e w oul d c onsi der to be an a ppropr iat e aw ard of atto rn ey ’s fees i n thi s c ase. For the foreg oin g reason s, w e s ust ain appel lan ts’ so le is sue. Con cl usi on Ha vin g o ve rr u le d t h e Co u n t y’s two is s u e s a n d su s t a in e d a p p e ll a n t s ’ s o le is s u e , we re v erse the t ri al cour

t’ s a w ard of atto rn ey ’s fees and remand onl y thati ss ue to the tr ial cour t for further p ro ceedi ng s. See Lubboc k C ounty v . St ru be, 9 53 S. W .2d 8 47, 8 58 (Tex .App. –Aus ti n 1997, pet. denied)

. In all other re spects, w e aff ir m the jud g ment of the tr ial co urt.

Mackey K. Hancock Justice

Pi rt le, J. , c oncur ri ng and dis sent ing

.