U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

61–318 CC WASHINGTON : 2000

THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: THE

LUSAKA PEACE ACCORDS AND BEYOND

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

SEPTEMBER 28, 1999

Serial No. 106–67

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(
(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman

WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey

DAN BURTON, Indiana

ELTON GALLEGLY, California

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina

DANA ROHRABACHER, California

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California

PETER T. KING, New York

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio

MARSHALL ‘‘MARK’’ SANFORD, South

Carolina

MATT SALMON, Arizona

TOM CAMPBELL, California

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

BILL LUTHER, Minnesota

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina

ROY BLUNT, Missouri

KEVIN BRADY, Texas

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina

PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio

GEORGE P. RADANOVICH, California

JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado

SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut

TOM LANTOS, California

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American

Samoa

MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio

CYNTHIA A. MCKINNEY, Georgia

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida

PAT DANNER, Missouri

EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama

BRAD SHERMAN, California

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey

JIM DAVIS, Florida

EARL POMEROY, North Dakota

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York

BARBARA LEE, California

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania

RICHARD J. GARON, Chief of Staff

KATHLEEN BERTELSEN MOAZED, Democratic Chief of Staff

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman

AMO HOUGHTON, New York

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio

TOM CAMPBELL, California

GEORGE RADANOVICH, California

TOM TANCREDO, Colorado

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York

BARBARA LEE, California

TOM SHEEHY, Subcommittee Staff Director

MALIK M. CHAKA, Professional Staff Member

CHARISSE GLASSMAN, Democratic Professional Staff Member

CHARMAINE V. HOUSEMAN, Staff Associate
(III)

C O N T E N T S

WITNESSES

Page

The Honorable Howard Wolpe, U.S. Department of State ................................... 3

William Zartman, Director of African Studies and Conflict Management,

Johns Hopkins University ................................................................................... 18

Mwabilu Ngoyi, President, Congolese Internatioanl Union ................................. 21

Kanyand Matand, Vice President, Congolese International Union ..................... 21

APPENDIX

The Honorable Howard Wolpe, U.S. Department of State ................................... 36

Dr. William Zartman ............................................................................................... 44

Mwabilu Ngoyi ......................................................................................................... 52

The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman, from the State of New York, Chairman,

Committee on International Relations ............................................................... 63

The Honorable Edward Royce, form the State of California, Chairman, Subcommittee on Africa ............................................................................................. 65

Additional Material Submitted:

Letter from President Frederick Chiluba, Republic of Zambia ............................ 34

Platform of ‘‘Congolese Mothers for Peace’’, Peace Crusade ................................ 66
(1)

THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: THE

LUSAKA PEACE ACCORDS AND BEYOND

Tuesday, September 28, 1999

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA,

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

Washington, D.C.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:45 p.m., in room

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ed Royce (Chairman of

the Subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. ROYCE. This hearing of the Subcommittee on Africa will now

come to order. We will ask the Members to take their chairs.

Since this Subcommittee last heard from the Administration on

the Congo crisis, a peace agreement has been agreed to by most of

the belligerents. Hopefully, the Lusaka Accords is the first step of

what will be probably a long and complex process of bringing peace

and stability to the Democratic Republic of Congo and its neighbors. Today, the Subcommittee will hear about the 2 month-old

peace agreement from the Administration and also from outside observers.

The Administration announced last week that Secretary of State

Madeleine Albright will travel to Africa in mid-October. It is my

hope that the Secretary’s trip will focus on laying the foundation

for a robust American engagement in attempts to resolve this conflict. ‘‘African solutions to African problems’’ should not be a license

for America’s disengagement from this difficult region.

American engagement is expected, considering that in 1997 Secretary Albright said that we must do better because Africa matters

and that no place matters more in Africa than the Great Lakes.

The Secretary went on to say that achieving a lasting peace in this

region will be as difficult as implementing the Camp David agreement and as complex as sustaining the Dayton Accords, yet the rewards were surely as great, and success, the Secretary told us, success no less important to us.

I recall these statements by our Secretary of State in the spirit

of urging the Administration to make good on its commitments to

the region.

Being engaged means using the power we have, including the

World Bank, including the International Monetary Fund, the leverage that we have there. This requires that the United States be

willing to point the finger at uncooperative parties. Being an honest broker does not mean being mute in the face of violations of

this agreement.
2

A year ago at a Subcommittee hearing on this crisis, I raised difficult issues of foreign intervention and territorial integrity that I

wasn’t sure the international community was handling well. I am

still troubled by the military presence of Uganda and Rwanda on

Congo’s sovereign territory. These concerns have been heightened

by the fact that these countries are now plundering Congolese resources. One observer has made the point that this war is now a

triumph for the economic entrepreneur. This development is profoundly troubling for the region and beyond.

The U.S. Institute of Peace has just come out with a study on

the Congo conflict. This report suggests that the current peace

agreement represents, in their words, a last exit on the region’s

highway to hell, unquote. This is strong language but it conveys a

needed sense of urgency. Africa does matter and deserves our attention. Unfortunately, many of the goals that this Subcommittee

and the Administration have sought to help Africa achieve, including the prevention of genocide, are in serious jeopardy in the region.

Now, before we go to our witnesses and our opening statement

by our Ranking Member, I thought I would just introduce in the

audience the Speaker of Nigeria, Speaker of the House, Naaba U.

Ghali, if he would stand at this time. Mr. Speaker, welcome.

We have with him the Majority Leader, Mohammed Wakil, if you

would stand, Mohammed, and with them is a delegation of parliamentarians from Nigeria and cabinet members, and I would ask

them all to stand at this time, if you would.

On behalf of Mr. Payne, Mr. Hastings and myself and the other

Members who have made recent trips to Nigeria, let me say that

the U.S. Congress is closely watching developments in Nigeria, and

I think many of us are encouraged by the progress they have made,

and we want to be supportive. I thank you very much for coming

to our hearing today.

And with that, let me turn to our Ranking Member, Mr. Payne

of New Jersey.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me too welcome

the distinguished delegation from the Republic of Nigeria, and we

are all very pleased about the progress that is being made there

with your new government, or President, Chief Obasanjo, and you

have all of our support and well wishes for continued progress.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for calling this very important meeting today on a hearing of the Lusaka Accords and the

Congo. It is very gratifying to see a person who has spent so much

time, my former colleague Honorable Harold Wolpe, who has done

tremendous, good work in that region and continues to be a person

that has so much to contribute, and we appreciate that.

We held a hearing you will recall last year, and I remember Ambassador Rudasingua of Rwanda testifying at that time, and he

said that the Congo problem is not one of ethnicity. I do believe,

however, the crisis is based on these two fundamental problems, as

he stated: One, the failure to fill the vacuum left by the era of the

dictator Mobutu Sese Seko, in essence, leadership voided at its

highest levels; and second, the use of Congo by various insurgent

groups to destabilize neighboring states. Ostensibly, the imminent

threat of a resurgence of genocide is still there.
3

Let me say that I never thought I would see the day that two

good friends in the Horn, Ethiopia and Eritrea, would go into battle, but I never thought I would also see two friends, Rwanda and

Uganda, also fall on the same path.

I think we need to get tougher on countries that breach the peace

and sovereignty of other countries. In that same light, I think we

need to deal with the real threat to security in the region. I am

concerned by the recent fighting on Congolese soil between insurgents from Burundi with members of the FDD and the Palipehutu,

and I am concerned about what is going on internally in Burundi,

because the parties are not signatories to the Lusaka cease-fire

agreement. This spells disaster for all parties that did sign the document in good faith.

Let me say that this war has wide implications for all of Africa.

As we know, Congo borders nine countries, and since the war in

the Congo, the wars in the region have either started, resumed or

escalated as in Angola, as in the Congo-Brazzaville and as in Burundi. Moreover, many of them are havens for the genocidaiers, as

exemplified in the Central African Republic, and some are just too

weak to sustain this type of massive warfare.

In conclusion, I would like to read excerpts from a letter from

President Chiluba of Zambia. He has been chairing the mediation

efforts on the conflict in the DRC since September 8th, 1998. He

says, ‘‘the people of Congo need peace, and it is the duty of all of

us in the international community to help them achieve it by ensuring that a cease-fire agreement is implemented fully and urgently. The United States has a significant role to play in mobilizing the support and resources required by the United Nations to

send peacekeeping forces to the Democratic Republic of Congo.’’ I

would like to request that the letter from the President of Zambia

be inserted into the record in its entirety.

[The Letter from President of Zambia appears in the appendix.]

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Payne. We will do that. Well, we do

want to welcome and commend Ambassador Wolpe for his commitment and for his hard work. Dr. Howard Wolpe is the President’s

Special Envoy to the Great Lakes Region. Dr. Wolpe, while he was

a Congressman from Michigan, was Chairman of this Committee

for some 10 years, and in addition to his accomplishments in Congress, he is also an author of various articles and books on Africa,

also on American foreign policy and the management of regional

and ethnic conflict.

So we want to welcome him back to this Committee.

Mr. ROYCE. Ambassador.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE HOWARD WOLPE, SPECIAL

ENVOY FOR THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO, U.S.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Ambassador WOLPE. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. It is

very good to be back before the Subcommittee. I will offer an abbreviated opening statement so that there might be maximum time to

entertain your questions. I would ask that the full text of the statement that has been submitted be entered into the record.

Given the recent cease-fire agreement that has been reached at

Lusaka among the various parties at war in the Democratic Repub-
4

lic of Congo and the deployment of the first United Nations officers

to the region, this hearing provides a timely opportunity to take

stock both of recent developments in the Great Lakes crisis and of

American policy toward the region.

It bears repeating that the war in the DRC is the widest interstate war in modern African history and that it has significant consequences, not only for 50 million Congolese, but for the peoples of

all nine countries on the Democratic Republic of Congo’s periphery.

The United States has been deeply engaged in the search for a

diplomatic resolution of the Great Lakes crisis because of our recognition of the enormous dangers posed, for Africa and for American interests, by a widening of the war and of the zone of political

instability. Ethnic violence has been a feature of recent conflicts in

central Africa, and this most recent Congo crisis is no exception.

Thousands of innocent civilians have been killed in the DRC, and

interethnic killings and even the resurgence of genocide in the

Great Lakes region are ever-present dangers.

Much is riding on the successful implementation of the recently

finalized Lusaka cease-fire agreement. This agreement provides the

first regionally authored and internationally sanctioned road map

for the region’s political future, a coherent, principled and comprehensive framework that addresses the principal causes of the

Great Lakes crisis.

Given the complexity of the issues, the multiplicity of actors and

the deep mutual mistrust and suspicion among the principal antagonists, the implementation of the Lusaka Accord will inevitably

be a messy process. Few, if any, deadlines will be met, and every

phase will encounter a number of serious obstacles. Yet, it is hard

to imagine any alternative framework that would stand a better

chance of resolving the underlying fundamental issues. It would be

tragic if the Lusaka signatories were to walk away from their

agreement, or if Lusaka would fail to attract the international political support and concrete economic and technical assistance that

its implementation will require.

The significance of Lusaka lies in its identification of four core

elements that, from our perspective, are key to a sustainable resolution of the Great Lakes crisis.

First, the Lusaka agreement takes as a starting point the affirmation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC and

of all of the surrounding states. All of Lusaka’s signatories accept

that at the end of the day all foreign troops will be withdrawn from

Congolese soil, the authority of the central government will be restored throughout the country, and the belligerent Congolese

armed forces will be combined into a national, restructured and integrated army. There will be no partition of the DRC.

Second, Lusaka recognizes the imperative of a credible, neutrally

facilitated, inclusive political process to resolve the internal Congolese crisis. One of the most important elements of the Lusaka

agreement is the commitment of the Congolese parties themselves

to enter into political negotiations that have as their goal national

reconciliation and a new political dispensation. Most important, the

Lusaka agreements stipulate that these negotiations are to be fully

inclusive, involving not only the government and the rebel groups,
5

but also the unarmed political opposition and civil society. Significantly, too, all of the participants shall enjoy equal status.

Mobutu’s legacy to the DRC is an institutional and political vacuum. There is an urgent need in the DRC to reconstitute a national

political system, and this will be possible only under conditions of

security and an inclusive, democratic, internal dialogue. The principal political formations in the DRC must all be at the table, able

to speak and advocate freely. All efforts at coerced unity, either by

armed rebel movements or by the Kabila government, are doomed

to fail, and will invite only more conflict and violence.

Third, the Lusaka agreement commits its signatories to cooperate in addressing the common security concerns that underlie the

Great Lakes crisis. Specifically, the signatories undertake, and I

am quoting, ‘‘to put an immediate halt to any assistance, collaboration or giving of sanctuary to negative forces bent on destabilizing

neighboring countries.’’ They pledge to take all necessary measures

to secure normalization among their borders, including the control

of illicit trafficking of arms and the infiltration of armed groups.

We welcome this collective commitment because it goes to the

heart of both the war in the DRC and the broader regional crisis.

As long as insurgent groups are able to use Congolese soil for

launching attacks against countries that border the DRC, regional

peace and stability will be unattainable. It is in the interest of all

regional states to make a serious and combined effort to secure

their common borders.

And fourth, the Lusaka cease-fire agreement commits the signatories to work jointly to address the security problems posed by

the continuing activities of forces identified with the 1994 Rwandan genocide.

No Great Lakes conflict has been more intractable and more destabilizing than the bloody confrontation between Tutsi and Hutu

in Burundi and in Rwanda. In 1972 an estimated 150,000 Burundian Hutus were the victims of a genocide executed by Tutsis.

Then, in 1994, well over half a million Rwandans, mostly Tutsi but

also including Hutu moderates, were slaughtered in the genocide

organized by the Hutu Government then in power. It is difficult to

overstate the continuing traumatic impact of that event for Rwanda and for the region. The failure of the international community

to respond at the time of the genocide meant that its survivors

were literally left to their own devices, a conclusion only strengthened by the international community’s subsequent refusal to act

against the genocidal killers who took effective control of the internationally financed refugee camps in the DRC.

In the Lusaka agreement, the signatories go beyond a rhetorical

condemnation of genocide to stipulate that there shall be a mechanism for disarming militias and armed groups, including the genocidal forces. A regional Joint Military Commission made up of belligerent parties themselves is empowered to work out mechanisms

for the tracking, disarming, cantoning and documenting of all

armed groups in the DRC and for putting in place appropriate enforcement measures.

Clearly, the disarmament of the various insurgent forces operating within the DRC is easier said than done. There was no subject more hotly debated in Lusaka, and there remain a great num-
6

ber of unanswered questions about precisely how and by whom this

process will be organized and executed. But one should not discount the political significance of this first collective regional commitment to mount such an effort. All the parties to Lusaka recognized that the ultimate withdrawal of all foreign forces from the

DRC would hinge upon the region’s ability to neutralize the security threat posed by the various insurgencies and, particularly, by

the Rwandan ex-FAR and Interahamwe.

Significantly, the Lusaka agreement combines the threat of coercive measures for those who would refuse to lay down their arms

with incentives for voluntary disarmament and repatriation. Recognizing that lasting stability in the Great Lakes region requires democratization and reconciliation not only in the DRC but also in its

neighboring countries, Lusaka calls upon the countries of origin of

the insurgent fighters to help create conditions that would encourage their voluntary repatriation.

Mr. Chairman, the Lusaka cease-fire agreement is a complex

document, leaving open as many questions as it answers, and it is

clear that implementation will be neither neat nor swift. Nonetheless, the Lusaka accord is a vitally important beginning, embracing

all of the critical elements of a sustainable resolution of the Great

Lakes crisis: respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of

all of the regional states; the establishment of credible and inclusive transitional institutions and processes within the DRC; a commitment on the part of all regional states to work cooperatively to

secure their common borders and to ensure that the DRC is no

longer used as a base for launching insurgent attacks; and a regional determination to join in neutralizing the genocidal threat of

the Rwandan ex-FAR and the Interahamwe.

The region needs a stable DRC, a DRC that has sufficient administrative and military capacity to ensure that insurgent groups will

not operate with impunity on Congolese soil. That stability cannot

be imposed from without. No Congolese rebellion that is clearly understood to be dependent upon its external patrons will acquire political legitimacy among the Congolese people. Continued occupation of Congolese soil will lead to heightened hostility and interethnic conflict, threaten to widen rather than contain cross border

attacks and regional warfare, and invite the animus of a broad

swath of Africa and of the international community. A stable DRC

will emerge only from a credibly inclusive political process, such as

that prescribed by the Lusaka agreement, that will enable the Congolese to claim control of their own destiny and political future.

In Lusaka, the Kinshasa government made a number of difficult

but important concessions. But the Kinshasa government is currently sending very mixed messages. On the one hand, Kinshasa

continues to affirm its interest in moving forward on the internal

dialogue, explicitly welcoming the proposed neutral facilitation of

the national dialogue. On the other hand, continuing arrests and

harassment of party and human rights activists and a new decree

that appears to permit open political activity only within the

framework of the government-sponsored People’s Power Committees, suggest a continued effort to restrict open debate and to manipulate the negotiating framework.
7

The United States will continue to appeal to Kinshasa to abide

by both the spirit and the letter of the Lusaka Accord. Arbitrary

actions by Kinshasa authorities only exacerbate political tensions

and make more difficult the flexibility and compromises that will

be required on all sides.

Let me now say a few words on immediate next steps. Now that

all the belligerent parties have signed the Lusaka agreement, implementation can begin, and among the critical next steps are the

following:

Finalizing the membership of the Joint Military Commission, by

resolving the debate within the RCD as to who will be its representatives on the Joint Military Commission.

Second, identifying a neutral facilitator for the Congolese internal dialogue.

Third, completing the initial United Nations deployment. The

U.N. security council has authorized the deployment of up to 90

military liaison officers to the DRC, to Lusaka and to the capitals

of the warring nations. Their mission will be to determine how the

United Nations might most effectively assist the Lusaka signatories with the implementation of the cease-fire agreement. Now that

all the parties are formally signed on to the cease-fire and the

cease-fire generally appears to be holding, U.N. military liaison officers are being deployed to the belligerent capitals, to Lusaka and

to 15 locations within the DRC itself. Their neutrality and expertise, we believe, will strengthen the peace process and help the

JMC, build its capabilities and confidence for its day-to-day management of the cease-fire.

And fourth, the immediate next step, deciding on how and by

whom both peacekeeping and peace enforcement tasks will be executed. Any firm conclusions on the appropriate size and mandate

of a follow-on peacekeeping presence must await the report of these

liaison officers and of a related assessment mission that SecretaryGeneral Annan intends to send. But it is virtually certain that the

Security Council will reject the Lusaka signatories’ urging that a

U.N. peacekeeping force be empowered not only to monitor the

cease-fire and withdrawal of foreign troops, but also to engage militarily insurgent fighters that refuse to lay down their arms. While

the Security Council may generally support a Secretary General’s

recommendation for deployment of U.N. observers, under Chapter

VI of the U.N. charter, it most probably will insist that the Joint

Military Commission, that is, the belligerent parties themselves,

retain the enforcement responsibility.

The fifth immediate task is securing the appointment of a United

Nations Special Representative. Appropriately, it has been the

Southern African Development Community, SADC, and especially

Zambian President Chiluba, that have taken the lead in facilitating

a cease-fire agreement. But the OAU, United Nations, the European Union, United States and other countries have all been deeply involved in supporting the Lusaka diplomacy, encouraging the

belligerent parties to be flexible, and working to narrow differences

in perception and understanding. Now that a cease-fire agreement

has been reached, sustained international engagement with the

Great Lakes peace process will be more important than ever. The

pending appointment of a United Nations Special Representative
8

for the Congo will provide a means of coordinating both the international diplomatic support and the technical and financial assistance that effective implementation of the Lusaka Accord will require.

Finally, a word about the areas requiring international support

and assistance. There are at least seven distinct areas that are distinguishable. First, continued diplomatic engagement with the parties to the conflict. The deep suspicions and mutual distrust that

characterize interstate relations within the Great Lakes will require continuing third party assistance and encouragement to overcome.

Second, deploying U.N. observers. It is virtually certain that the

Secretary General will recommend the deployment of U.N. observers under Chapter VI of the U.N. charter, and while final decisions

must await the pending United Nations reports and close consultations with the Congress, as the President indicated some months

ago the United States is inclined to support an appropriately sized

and mandated mission.

Third, establishing an enforcement mechanism. The enforcement

responsibility will almost certainly remain with the Joint Military

Commission and a contemplated military task force that will be established under its aegis. This regional multinational force, to be

comprised of troops from belligerent, and possibly non-belligerent,

countries may seek a United Nations mandate. While we would

consider supporting that mandate, any such force would have to be

funded through a mechanism such as voluntary contributions to a

trust fund rather than through expenditure of the U.N. funds. The

Lusaka signatories will be counting on international financial and

logistical support.

Fourth, Congolese internal negotiations. The Congolese participants in this process will require the sustained encouragement and

assistance and, at times, the political pressure of the international

community.

Fifth, the Congolese transition, elections and reconstruction.

Once the negotiations are concluded and the transitional institutions are in place, a massive effort will be required to launch the

DRC on the path to democratization and economic reform. The

DRC’s World Bank trust fund will need to be reactivated as a quick

disbursing mechanism for vitally needed local development assistance; bilateral donors will have to step up to the plate to assist the

DRC in addressing its long term development challenges, and the

international financial institutions will need to be fully engaged in

reconstructing the economy. At the same time, the transitional

DRC government will have to do its part in upholding the rule of

law, in protecting the human rights of its citizens, and in making

clear its commitment to honest, transparent, democratic and accountable government.

Sixth, an international conference on the Great Lakes. Once the

inter-Congolese political negotiation is concluded and reformed

transitional institutions are functioning, the regional states may

welcome new mechanisms, such as an International Conference on

the Great Lakes, that might facilitate greater regional collaboration on issues of common concern.
9

Seventh, the International Coalition Against Genocide. Regional

leaders and President Clinton, at their Entebbe meeting in March

1998, agreed to explore the creation of an International Coalition

Against Genocide, a coalition that would seek to mobilize the resources of concerned states in a systematic effort both to enforce

anti-genocide measures and to prevent a recurrence of genocide in

the region.

The Lusaka agreement gives the concept of an International Coalition Against Genocide immediate relevance. The coalition could

become a forum for more effective coordination of international efforts to support the anti-genocidaire provisions of the Lusaka

agreement.

Mr. Chairman, the regional states at Lusaka were able to transcend the mutual suspicions and antagonisms of the moment to develop a common vision of the way forward, but Lusaka is only the

beginning of a beginning. As difficult as it was to achieve agreement, the effective implementation of the Lusaka Accord will pose

far more formidable challenges. A rocky road lies ahead, and considerable patience, courage and creativity will be required on all

sides.

The United States will also have to remain fully engaged, joining

with others in the international community in providing both diplomatic encouragement and material assistance as the peace process

evolves. Either we are prepared to invest now in Great Lakes conflict resolution, taking advantage of the opportunity provided by

the Lusaka Accord, or we will be required to pay far more later in

responding to much more costly humanitarian, economic and political disasters.

We intend to continue working with our African partners in their

collective undertaking to establish peace in the Great Lakes region.

We see American engagement not only as a moral imperative but

also as in our own national interest, as it is in the interest of the

global community, to support efforts to build stable, democratic and

economically self-reliant nations.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my opening statement, and I

thank you for your attention.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Wolpe appears in the

appendix.]

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Ambassador Wolpe. Let me ask you a

couple of questions if I could at this point. Last September we had

Assistant Secretary of State Susan Rice with the Committee, and

she said that the United States condemns any violation of Congo’s

sovereignty and territorial integrity. In your testimony you mention

that the U.S. policy is to assure the territorial integrity of the

Congo. Yet critics say that the United States has acquiesced to

Uganda and Rwanda’s military intervention in Congo, and now we

have a peace agreement that formalizes their security role in Congolese territory, which is a fairly substantial compromise of sovereignty. Have we publicly condemned Uganda and Rwanda for

their military intervention in Congo, and if we have not publicly

condemned, why have we not done so?

Ambassador WOLPE. Mr. Chairman, we have in fact condemned

the intervention of Rwanda and Uganda in the Congo as a violation

of the fundamental principles of the U.N. charter and of the OAU
10

Charter, and we have expressed both in diplomatic channels and

publicly our determination to see the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Congo restored. The agreement to which you refer,

I would not characterize the Lusaka agreement as somehow constituting an extension of the violation of the principles of sovereignty

and territorial integrity. To the contrary, the Lusaka document

could not be more explicit in affirming those fundamental principles and in making clear that there is a timetable for the total

withdrawal of all foreign forces from the Congo.

There are other issues that need to be addressed if that resolution of the Congolese conflict is, in fact, to be sustainable, and so

the Lusaka Accord also recognizes other issues that underpin the

conflict, most notably the operation of insurgent forces from within

the Congo directing attacks against other nations of the region.

Sovereign countries have an obligation to prevent such attacks that

can jeopardize the security of their neighboring states.

So we have a number of agendas, a number of objectives that we

and the Lusaka signatories together are seeking to achieve: restoration of the sovereignty, territorial integrity of the Congo; prevention of the resumption of any genocide and holding accountable

genocidaires; and finally, securing the borders of the Congo and of

all of the neighboring states.

Mr. ROYCE. Well, I noticed, Ambassador, that we had made comments in generalized terms. I had not noted that we had been specific, but if we are being specific, I think that is a step in the right

direction.

My second question I would ask is, you know, the World Bank

suspended aid for Congo pending a cease-fire, and the World Bank

aid to Ethiopia and Eritrea has been suspended because of their

war. Why was the World Bank aid to Rwanda and Uganda not suspended to get them to the table?

Ambassador WOLPE. I think that the answer to that is Rwanda

has met a number of the World Bank criteria. What the Rwandans

have done with respect to responding to the 1994 genocide is rather

remarkable. I believe that it makes sense that effort be sustained,

and I think that the World Bank has been focused on assisting the

efforts at reintegrating those who had moved out of the country.

The efforts at addressing issues of justice, of moving beyond the

genocide to national reconciliation, are efforts requiring support.

But I cannot speak of course for all of those who were involved in

the World Bank determination and decision. But from an American

perspective, these are among the objectives we seek to advance in

Rwanda.

We also seek to assist the region and encourage the region to collectively begin to work together to address the problem of

insurgencies that have been mounted from within the Congo, to address once and for all time, the lack of full accountability for those

who directly inspired the 1994 genocide. Those objectives, we think,

are meritorious as well.

Mr. ROYCE. I concur, but my point here is in using leverage to

make certain we reach that objective and being prepared to use

that leverage.

Another question I was going to ask about was a report by Reporters without Borders, which is a Paris based media freedom
11

watchdog group, and they stated last week that more than 80 journalists have been locked up for varying lengths of time since President Kabila took power in May 1997. Indeed, our delegation was

there in May 1997, and while we were there, there was a reporter

who was arrested and locked up at that time, and this is only one

example of political oppression by the Kabila government. Is the

U.S. Government weighing in on this and on other government offenses against political freedom in Congo?

Ambassador WOLPE. The answer, Mr. Chairman, is yes. We have

done so diplomatically. We have spoken to our concerns publicly.

We have done so today as you will note from the testimony that

I have presented. We believe that the only hope for the Congo is

to develop the conditions that can permit a fully inclusive and open

debate about the Congolese future that is conducted by the Congolese themselves. Actions that appear to be designed to threaten

those with divergent viewpoints are enormously counterproductive.

We are hoping that the government and all of the parties will work

to create an atmosphere that can ensure that the national debate

can produce the kind of decisions that will be fully accepted by the

Congolese population and become a basis for the kind of inclusive

transition that is the only hope for a stable Congolese future.

Mr. ROYCE. Very good. Another question I wanted to ask you,

Ambassador Wolpe, and this will be my last question, but there

have been press reports that North Koreans are at the Likasi uranium mine in Congo, and let me ask you if that is significant and

if we have a confirmation on those reports about North Korean activity at those uranium mines.

Ambassador WOLPE. We have seen reports of a North Korean

presence of perhaps a few hundred people. Today I cannot give you

any precision the location or the nature of those activities, but we

have seen those reports.

Mr. ROYCE. And my question about the significance of this, given

some of our concerns, for those of us that serve on the Asia Subcommittee as well and are monitoring the situation in North Korea,

our government, I take it, is monitoring this situation with respect

to whether uranium is leaving the country?

Ambassador WOLPE. I assume that is the case, Mr. Chairman,

but that dimension is a bit beyond my own expertise here. It is certainly very much on the radar screen generally.

Mr. ROYCE. OK. Well, thank you, Ambassador Wolpe. I will turn

to our Ranking Member, Mr. Payne, at this time.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. Thank you, Ambassador

Wolpe, for that very comprehensive report. Some of the concern I

have is about the Joint Military Commission, and if you could try

to clarify the Joint Military Commission, and I think in the original

is still a part of the Accord, that a force would be made up of all

of the belligerents, and this force would go to try to disarm the

Interahamwe and ex-FAR, and this would precede a United Nations contingent, because the U.N. would be under Chapter VI and

not Chapter VII as in Kosovo and East Timor and all of that. So

the difference between peacekeeping and peace enforcing of course

is a vast difference. And finally, if this force does not come about

and much of the problem in the region is a security concern of

Rwanda with the cross border infliction from the ex-FAR and the
12

Interahamwe, then would you conclude that if all fails there would

be a continued pursuit of ex-FAR and Interahamwe by the forces

of Rwanda?

Ambassador WOLPE. Thank you, Mr. Payne, for some very important questions. Let me clarify a few of the elements of the Lusaka

agreement as we understand them. First of all, the JMC, the Joint

Military Commission, is led by a political Committee that is comprised of two representatives of all of the belligerent states. It is

contemplated that under the auspices of that JMC there will be

eventually constituted a regional military force comprised not necessarily only of belligerent states; it is conceivable that other nations would become part of that force.

The distinction as between the regional African force and the

United Nations peacekeeping force, is less in terms of sequence and

more in terms of function. The United Nations peacekeepers would

have the functions of observation; of monitoring the cease-fire, the

withdrawal of troops, the separation of forces. If an enforcement action becomes necessary, that would be a function of a different

force, and one of the issues that would have to be addressed in this

two-managed approach would be the integration of the two operations. It is not unprecedented, but that is the way it would work.

The other thing I would say is that it is not just the ex-FAR and

Interahamwe that would be the subject of enforcement if that becomes necessary. In fact, the Lusaka agreement specifically identifies a number of forces that would have to be disarmed under the

terms of this agreement, including some of the Sudanese supported

anti-Ugandan insurgent forces, including UNITA operations in the

Congo if there were any, including the Burundian FDD rebel force

and so on.

The other comment I would make is that the other signatories

are hoping and anticipating that much of the disarmament activity

may occur without the need for a coercive of response. That is why

there is language within the Lusaka Accord calling upon the countries of origin of the insurgent groups to help establish conditions

within their own countries that would encourage voluntary repatriation and reintegration.

The answer to your last question is that clearly the greater the

regional cooperation, and the deeper the regional commitment to

make disarmament of these insurgent forces an achievable objective, the lesser will be the danger that there will be a continuation

of the conflict that has been so destabilizing.

Mr. PAYNE. Well, thank you very much. I will yield the rest of

my time.

Mr. ROYCE. We are going to go to Mr. Hastings of Florida.

Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank

you for holding this hearing. Congressman, Ambassador, friend,

Mr. Wolpe, thank you for the extremely comprehensive report that

you gave us. I would like to ask you to respond to queries put with

reference to whether or not the resources are being extracted from

the land in the Congo by forces who do that kind of mining. The

Chairman put to you the question about Korea, but are Congo and

Rwanda involved at all in exploiting diamond resources, other resources in the Congo at this time, to your knowledge?
13

Ambassador WOLPE. I think there is some evidence that virtually

all of the countries that have entered the Congo have either engaged in some immediate direct exploitation, sometimes as a matter of entrepreneurial activity by local military people, other times

as a matter of government policy. Clearly, a number of the countries that are engaged in the Congolese conflict are contemplating

or anticipating a gain at the end of the day, if not immediately,

through the exploitation of the Congolese resources. There has

been a lot of that kind of free occupation, I think, on the part of

all the states that are involved.

Mr. HASTINGS. All right. Thank you very much. Let me go and

ask you if you would have in hand your page 8 of your statement

and testimony submitted to us and the final three paragraphs

where you deal specifically with the United States and the Great

Lakes. Let me walk through that with just a couple of questions

with you, if you would be so kind, and a final one of dealing with

the suggestion that you made with reference to a trust fund for any

support that may come.

I don’t know personally, and I am not questioning that, whether

precedent exists for that within the framework of the United Nations or the international monetary system, and if so, I would like

to know what it is. But before that, when you say the United

States will also have to remain fully engaged, my question is what

are our intentions regarding engagement beyond your personal jurisdiction and that of the Under Secretary and others who have

demonstrated commitment in this Great Lakes region?

Additionally, when you say that we should join with others in the

international community in providing both diplomatic encouragement and material assistance as the peace process evolves, my

question is, are we going to join with others or are we going to enjoin others, enjoin meaning are we going to lead other people to

join since people look to America or are we just going to wait for

something to develop and then say that we are supportive?

And in addition thereto, when you talk in terms of material assistance, what is the material assistance that we are willing to provide, and what shape would that take? And I agree with you, either

we need to invest now in the Great Lakes conflict resolution or we

are going to invest a lot more later on. I know what shape the later

on takes, but what do you mean when you say that, invest now?

I understand you say that’s what we should do, but what?

Ambassador WOLPE. Thank you very much, Congressman

Hastings. I want to take you back to the beginning of the Kabila

government. If you will recall, even then we were fully cognizant

of the enormous importance of the Congo, a country which is bordered by nine states. What happens in the Congo will impact greatly upon all of southern, eastern and central Africa and, therefore,

impact upon Africa and American interests in the region. So we

were hopeful at the time of the ouster of Mobutu that a new set

of possibilities had come upon the scene. We wanted to help that

process succeed, and so we were among the leaders in urging the

creation of a World Bank trust fund that could become a means of

quick disbursing assistance to the Congo. We and others fully intended to participate.
14

We established an assistance mission, several different offices in

fact, within the Congo to work at the local level, to help build capacity, to help encourage the transitional process, and we made

very clear that our fundamental desire was to have sufficient stability within the Congo as to permit a fully engaged effort in assisting with the reconstruction and the development of the Democratic

Republic of Congo.

I put all of that in historical context to say that our policy, and

our sense of importance that we would attach to developments in

the Congo, remain the same. That is why I was revisiting here the

things we had wanted to do then. Unfortunately, developments on

the ground in the Congo made that impossible. Either here with

significant concerns with respect to human rights violations, or the

economic policies that were being pursued by the government were

problematic to say the least. Even as we speak, the government

has not moved to implement the economic plan that had been presented to the Friends of the Congo meeting that had taken place

in Europe in early 1998, which was the basis for the establishment

of the trust fund.

Any kind of effective international partnership requires a partner. That is why I stress, even as I indicated our intention to reengage, once you have transitional institutions in place that have

some structure and some substance and some stability, it will still

require Congolese to be good partners. They will have to establish

the conditions of governance and human rights and in terms of economic policy, that will enable our assistance to make a difference.

Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Hastings. Thank you, Ambassador.

We are going to go to Mr. Tancredo, and then to Mr. Meeks and

then to Mr. Campbell. Mr. Tancredo of Colorado.

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ambassador Wolpe,

thank you very much for your testimony. You indicated that you

believe there would be close cooperation, I think those were your

words, close cooperation or consultation with the Congress regarding any potential for United States support or participation in a

peacekeeping operation in the Congo. Would you tell me, sir, how

you come to that information or knowledge? Is it just your observation what would probably happen?

And then second, if you could help me out by describing in more

detail exactly what you think that close cooperation will actually

look like.

Ambassador WOLPE. I am not sure I quite caught the thrust of

your question. Are you referring to cooperation with Congress?

Mr. TANCREDO. Yes, cooperation with Congress.

Ambassador WOLPE. What I was saying is we cannot move forward without congressional support, and as the phases of this process evolve, decisions with respect to peacekeeping will be made in

the closest consultation with the key Committees of the Congress

that are involved in this area. That is what I meant to say.

Mr. TANCREDO. OK. In consultation with the Committees. Well,

along those lines, if all the parties to a conflict are not in agreement, and certainly in the Congo there are groups who will never

apparently support the Lusaka agreement, then isn’t any peacekeeping operation a Chapter VII operation by definition?
15

Ambassador WOLPE. No, you could have a Chapter VII mandate

extended to a regional force. That is what has happened in East

Timor and that is what has happened in Kosovo. Effectively, rather

than establish a Chapter VII United Nations force, a unmandate

is extended to a regional force. That is how you would address the

enforcement dimension in the Congolese conflict. The direct United

Nations force would operate under Chapter VI with a more limited

mandate.

Mr. TANCREDO. I see. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. I have no

other questions.

Mr. ROYCE. We go to Mr. Meeks of New York.

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this hearing. Mr. Ambassador, I want to pick up somewhere where Congressman Payne

was talking about. I am interested in trying to have peace in the

Congo, and based upon the Lusaka peace agreement, where the

U.N. is to be involved with reference to overseeing what is going

on there. From my understanding, and I don’t know whether you

mentioned this prior to me coming in, there has not been any guarantees of the safety of the U.N. observation mission in the Congo

and that it, therefore, has not deployed any personnel to any combat zones, and I understand there is at least 20 or so liaison officers that have arrived in Kinshasa last week and they are still

awaiting to meet the Congolese officials.

I was wondering if you could shed any light on why the delay

and what is happening there.

Ambassador WOLPE. Sure. Thank you very much, Mr. Meeks.

The process of deployment of United Nations military liaison officers has been delayed in part because of the failure of one of the

rebel groups to resolve the issue as to who should sign the final

document. Those signatures are now in place, and it appears that

the cease-fire is generally holding. There has been some repositioning, some reinforcement of troops, but no significant fighting

has taken place recently, and we anticipate that as the security

conditions permit the United Nations military liaison observers will

now be able to be deployed in other parts of the Congo itself.

There are about I think 25 observers thus far that have already

been deployed in a number of the belligerent capitals, including

Lusaka and, as you note, in Kinshasa as well. Now that we have

passed the issue of the signatures, it should be possible to move

more speedily under conditions of greater security. But you are

quite right: the condition of security must exist to permit that kind

of deployment.

Mr. MEEKS. So do you believe that the United Nations will be

able to meet its 120 day deployment deadline?

Ambassador WOLPE. I think there you are referring to what is

stipulated in the Lusaka agreement, contemplation of the full deployment of the United Nations observer presence force within 120

days. It is very difficult to predict with certainty at this point, but

what we are doing and what I know other interested parties are

doing is to encourage the swiftest possible deployment because that

will, I think, directly contribute to confidence building and to permitting the peace process to go forward on the ground. But it is

very difficult to predict with any certainty any specific timeframe

that has been laid out.
16

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. At this time we will go to Mr. Campbell

of California.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador WOLPE. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. CAMPBELL. I want to let the Ambassador finish.

Ambassador WOLPE. Thank you, Mr. Campbell. Just to add one

other note, just so there is no confusion, at this point in time the

United Nations has deployed not observers but military liaison personnel officers to do the work of identifying what the needs really

are and how the United Nations might most effectively meet those

needs.

Mr. ROYCE. Very good. Mr. Campbell.

Mr. CAMPBELL. I just begin by saying thanks to you for holding

this hearing, and it is not your first. You have maintained a great

interest in this field. I remember the hearing that focused on the

potential use of hate radio in this context, and it is just very good

to see a Chairman care so much as you do, not to mention a Ranking Member of such knowledge and distinction as my colleague.

My three questions, I am going to state at the beginning and

then would like you to take them as you will. First, do we have any

interest from third countries in providing the military that is at

least permitted in the Lusaka Accord for the demobilizing and the

arrest of potential genocidaire?

Second, what in heaven’s name is Zimbabwe up to? I cannot figure this. Maybe you can be candid on the record, which is sometimes not possible.

And third and last, it would concern me if there were any further

occurrence of hate radio references to the ethnic Tutsi-Hutu distinction, for example, with the reflection in the war, and I wonder

if you have any evidence that has recurred from what we were told

existed at the beginning of the civil war.

So those are the three questions, and I will be happy to take

your answers in any order you wish, and by the way, thanks for

the good work you are doing. I have the highest admiration for it.

Ambassador WOLPE. Thank you very much, Mr. Campbell. We

appreciate the travel you and Mr. Payne have undertaken. The

conversations you have had in the region have helped, I think, to

communicate Congressional concern and interest. It has been a

very important part of this overall diplomatic effort. So I thank you

both.

First of all, we have been told that a number of countries have

signed up for and indicated their willingness to make elements of

their forces available for peacekeeping. I have not seen a breakdown as to whether the offers of any of these countries go beyond

the observation mission of the United Nations. So the answer is we

don’t know yet. But we do understand there has been a quite good

response among African states to the request that countries participate in peacekeeping generally within the Congo.

Your question regarding Zimbabwe was rather open ended.

Zimbabwe is a signatory to the Lusaka agreement. I was impressed, having been present in Lusaka, with the very great seriousness that Zimbabwe and all of the other state actors, as well as

the Congolese players who were participating in the negotiations,

how seriously they took the process. It was a difficult negotiation,
17

and it was difficult precisely because the principal parties were

very careful about the language that was inserted into the document. They wanted to have some confidence that they could live

with the language in the document. Their seriousness was very

much in evidence in Lusaka. Some of the key meetings, for example, took place without facilitators or observers. That in itself is

normally a sign of seriousness of purpose. So that is why we say

that this is an important document and an important beginning.

Mr. CAMPBELL. I will interrupt if I may just to tell you what I

had in mind. I didn’t understand with the economy Zimbabwe has,

why they were putting troops into a war in Congo, nor did I understand the side that they chose, and it is really that which I was

getting at.

Ambassador WOLPE. Well, the Zimbabweans have stated very

publicly and also in our diplomatic conversations that they felt very

strongly that there had been a violation of the territorial integrity

and sovereignty of a fellow SADC member, and President Mugabe

felt an obligation in his role as chairman of the security organ of

SADC to respond. That is what they have stated rather consistently.

They have also stated now their desire to secure a negotiated settlement and a sustainable resolution of the conflict. So we look forward to working with Zimbabwe, with all of the parties to the Accord, in trying to find our way through to that kind of sustainable

settlement.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Hate radio was the last question.

Ambassador WOLPE. On that last question, I have not seen the

reports to which you allude. We can certainly find out if there is

anything.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Hearings by this Committee, by this Subcommittee early on in the conflict.

Ambassador WOLPE. That was a long time ago, at the very outset. We have not seen any recent reports.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Nothing since.

Ambassador WOLPE. We have not seen anything recent of that

sort.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ROYCE. Let me just say that I think it was very instructive

of Mr. Campbell bringing to our attention the original hate broadcast, but not just to the attention of the Congress and the Administration. He also brought this to the attention of the government in

Congo and specifically to the Minister of Human Rights and had

an ongoing dialogue. It is our hope that very constructive dialogue

continues to guarantee that we do not hear further hate radio

broadcasts directed against ethnic groups in Congo.

We want to thank you very much, Ambassador, for your testimony here today. You have had a very difficult task that you have

been given, and we appreciate your commitment. We look forward

to working with you in the future on this very complex problem,

but as you say, it is imperative that this Committee and Congress

be part of the Administration’s thinking that we work together,

and so we invite you to continue the dialogue with members of this

Committee as we move forward, and again, very much appreciate

your testimony today.
18

Ambassador WOLPE. Mr. Chairman, let me express my appreciation to you and to the Members of your Committee both for the

timing of this hearing and for your continued interest in what is,

in fact, one of the most difficult and critical issues facing the entire

continent. Thank you very much.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Ambassador. We are now going to move

to our last panel, and we are going to ask our panelists to understand that we have written copies of your report to the Congress.

We have read those, and we will put them in their entirety into

the record, and so we ask you to please abide by the 5 minute rule

because that will then allow the Members here to engage in questions, follow-up questions, and the Members have, as I indicated to

you, already read your testimony, and so it would be most helpful

if you focus in your 5 minute summation on positive ideas in terms

of going forward, what can be done now, what recommendations

you are going to give us.

On our second panel we are going to have Dr. William Zartman,

Director of African Studies and Conflict Management at the Paul

Nitze School of Advanced International Studies in Washington D.C.

Dr. Zartman has written extensively on negotiation and conflict in

Africa. Dr. Zartman has testified before the Subcommittee before,

and we welcome him back.

And also we have Mr. Mwabilu Ngoye. He is a doctoral student

at Rutgers University at present. He is the President of the Congolese International Union, a nonprofit organization that aims to represent and articulate a broad spectrum of political views, Congolese

aspirations for national unity and of democracy, and I thank him

for coming down from New Jersey and sharing his experiences with

us today.

And so we will begin with Dr. Zartman.

STATEMENT OF DR. WILLIAM ZARTMAN, DIRECTOR OF AFRICAN STUDIES AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT, SCHOOL OF

ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

Dr. ZARTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Royce. It is a pleasure to be here

again, and I would like to express the admiration of Africanists,

people interested in the area, for the bipartisan leadership that

this Committee has shown in its attention to African affairs and

also the knowledge that it shows about what is going on in Africa.

I will try to be uncharacteristically brief and just pick up a couple

of highlights of my written testimony, particularly after Howard

Wolpe’s very good summary of the situation.

I think it is fair to characterize the Lusaka agreement as a

cease-fire of fatigue and stagnation. The war just didn’t go anywhere and people wanted to get out of it. But they are also left

with their original goals of getting in, and the Lusaka agreement

has a number of uncertainties and loose ends that don’t condemn

the agreement but leave us with an awful lot to deal with in the

coming months and even years, I think that is the aspect that we

should be looking at, and probably under an awful shadow that

hangs over us. There was another Lusaka agreement in 1994 that

supposedly brought peace for the third time to Angola next door

and it has fallen apart, an awful omen. We certainly hope that
19

what has gone on with that same name will not arrive at the same

conclusion.

A number of uncertainties that I would highlight. First of all, it

is not clear what the rebellion was about and what it took to be

satisfied or rather it is clear that there are a number of motives

in the rebellion but the mix is not certain. Certainly, people were

involved for personal and political and economic enrichment reasons. Other people were involved simply because they couldn’t

stand the inefficiencies of the regime that were going on in

Kinshasa, and then the support from the outside came because

neighboring states had valid concerns about the way the Congolese

territory was being used against them. So there were real security

concerns, and how these will be satisfied in the aftermath of the

Lusaka agreement is not certain.

It is not certain that the government of President Kabila and

President Kabila himself has the ability to carry out the kind of

opening up that is at least promised or the hope of which exists in

the Lusaka agreement. Certainly, the behavior of the government

toward its opposition, toward civil society groups over the past 28

months in which he has been in power, has not been a prima facie

promise of a very good opening, and those bona fides have to be

shown.

It is not sure, too, what the mix is of neighboring aims. I mention

the security concerns and there are also concerns, as one of the

questions asked, about economic enrichment, and these two will

have to be somehow satisfied or at least brought under control.

The Lusaka agreement has a number of loose ends that are important to consider as it goes into implementation. It is committed

to pursuing and disarming the rebellion, the armed groups as they

are called that have found sanctuary in the Congolese territory, but

armed forces of the neighboring countries have not been able to do

this, and there is somewhat of a perhaps pious hope that the neighboring countries will be able to attract these rebellions into some

kind of process of return. There is a big challenge there.

There is on the other hand very little mention—perhaps an allusion, but no real mention—of a reconciliation process within the

neighboring states, of pressure on the Ugandese, the Rwandese and

so on, to make peace at least with the parts of their opposition that

they can bring back into their fold. As Howard Wolpe said, the

home states are urged to encourage voluntary repatriation, but it

takes more than that to invite these people home particularly when

they are threatened with often a justified death sentence.

The round table or dialogue that is supposed to take place within

Congo itself is something that is lagging now in its timetable. By

mid-October talks are supposed to be started. Fifteen days after the

signatures there was supposed to be agreement on a mediator.

None of this has occurred, and if you can believe it, at the end of

November, there is to be a new political system that is to be set

up within Congo. Somebody asked about the 120 days. I don’t believe that we will make this 90 day deadline after the agreement

has been signed.

The agreement also talks about a regional conference to solve

some of the security problems, and these also need a venue and a

sponsor. SADC is a biased mediator. It has been able to bring off
20

an agreement, but it is a club of parties that are associated with

one side of the conflict, and it is a little hard to leave mediation

to parties to a conflict. Similarly, it will be difficult to leave the

convening of a conference in the whole area, an effective solution

or even effective consideration of the security problems, in the hand

of SADC.

In U.S. policy concerns, I think there are two things that are particularly important and worth emphasizing. When you go to Congo,

you hear everybody tell you that it is time for the international

community to take its responsibilities. On one hand that is an escapist kind of phrase. This conflict is the result of the lack of Congolese taking their responsibilities, government, oppositions and so

on, and that is where responsibility lies. But on the other hand,

that phrase is true. The international community, and in these

halls that means the United States, has certain responsibilities. I

think there are two things that can be emphasized.

It is extremely important to get Congolese to talk to each other.

The United States has a position of authority in the area, in the

world, within that region itself, within the state itself. It can do

much more to simply get dialogues going, in informal kinds of

ways, and get the armed opposition, the government, the unarmed

opposition and civil society discussing together. Otherwise, if nobody tries to pull them together, there are conflicts that have torn

up internal politics in the past and those conflicts will not be overcome.

Local groups are trying to do it. In Kivu that we have talked

about, there are local attempts to come together over ethnic differences. Some assistance is needed. The government needs some

encouragement to recognize those kinds of activities.

The other thing is the peacekeeping force. I think it bears repeating again and again that we have got blood on our hands for what

we didn’t do in Rwanda in 1994 and what we didn’t do in CongoBrazzaville in 1997, and we have got to get over that. We have got

to give Africans the same kind of treatment that we give an area

such as Kosovo, and respond sincerely and enthusiastically, and

that means that we have to face the possibilities of troops, logistic

support, money into the peacekeeping operations that is a vacuum

in the middle of Africa.

Recently, there is movement that is starting up called the National Summit on Africa, which is an encouraging thing here in the

United States. It seems to be building up a grassroots movement

of support for concern for African policy and for engagement within

Africa. Congressman Payne gave a good opening address to the regional meeting in Baltimore a couple of weeks ago of this group.

One of the things that they have criticized of American policy is

our neglect of Africa, and they have urged that the United States

be willing to face the sending of troops and the giving of monetary

support and logistic support to troop kind of operations in this

area. There is support out there for this. We have a responsibility.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Zartman appears in the appendix.]

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Zartman, for your testimony. We will

now go to Mr. Mwabilu Ngoyi for your testimony, sir.
21

STATEMENT OF MWABILU NGOYI, PRESIDENT, CONGOLESE

INTERNATIONAL UNION, RUTGERS UNIVERSITY, AND

KANYAND MATAND, VICE PRESIDENT, CONGOLESE INTERNATIONAL UNION, PROFESSOR, LANGSTON UNIVERSITY,

OKLAHOMA

Mr. NGOYI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished Mem- bers of the Subcommittee. It is a pleasure to testify this afternoon

before you for the first time. We hope that this is not the last time

to testify on behalf of the Congolese people, who are deeply worried

about the prospects for peace in the Congo. Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit the statement on the diskette for the record. With your permission, I would like to summarize it and request for my summary on the disk to be part of the

record.

Mr. ROYCE. Both will be part of the record. We thank you.

Mr. NGOYI. My organization, the Congolese International Union, has a broad range of membership. Our members have many different opinions and views as to the political future of our country.

We are opponents as well as supporters of the present government.

However, there is one subject on which we all agree. We, all Congolese people, reject the illegal invasion of our country by Rwanda,

Uganda and Burundi. We are unhappy and feel deeply disappointed by the failure of the U.S. Government to condemn the

invasion, aggression and pillage of our country by the Rwandese,

Ugandan, and Burindese armies. We fail to understand how the U.S. Administration can fall for

the lies being told by these government, especially by Rwanda,

about the need to invade the DR Congo, to overthrow the government and to carve up the Congo: all in the name of border security.

It boggles the mind to think the American Administration is falling

for this smoke screen. The Rwandan Ambassador, Mr. Chairman,

is on the record to have lied before this Subcommittee. The Administration has said they never encouraged the invasion and never

condemned them, but you know as well as I, Mr. Chairman, that

in Africa and the rest of the world, when the United States fail to

condemn, it is understood as encouragement. In this case, the

United States failure to condemn Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda is

tantamount to encouragement.

The causes of the conflicts in the regions are related to the culture of violence and militarism, ethnic killing mentalities, ethnic

self-serving interests that have set the stage for ethnic rivalries

and ethnic mutual exclusion or extermination that is in itself the

heart of genocide between Hutus and Tutsis. Unless these issues

are clearly dealt with, ethnic mutual mass killing between these

two rival groups will not end in the region; mass migration of refugees from these countries to Congo will not end, and the blaming

of outsiders by these two ethnic groups will not end.

We, all Congolese people, reject any form of partitioning of the

DR Congo. We have difficulties endorsing the Lusaka Accord in its

current form because: No. 1, it does not contain any obvious condemnation of the invaders, namely, Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda.

No. 2, it legitimizs and rewards terrorist behavior by allowing the

invading troops to hold on to their current position. No. 3, it authorizes the resupply of weaponry to the invaders. No. 4, it keeps
22

off the table of negotiation the nonarmed group. No. 5, it authorizes

the disarmament of the Mai-Mai resistant group, which are nonRwandan rebels fighting against their own ethnic extermination by

Rwandese, Ugandese and Burundian troops.

We recommend the following: (1) The U.S.A. has to take a more

active role to stabilize the region. (2) The money from international

institutions should either be allowed to both parties involved in the

crisis or prevented in all fairness. (3) There ought to be a strong

cry of outrage for the invasion of the DR Congo. (4) We strongly

recommend to the international community to not allow verdict or

judgment of the crisis on the sole basis of whether they support or

not the current government in the DR Congo. For, we human

beings pass, but no nations and institutions remain. President

Kabila is just one person in millions. The nation should not be destroyed on the basis of personal feelings by invaders against the

Congolese President. We believe that democracy is the best way of

change of government without bloodshed of innocent people.

(5) The U.S. Congress should hold accountable the invaders for

their lies, manipulations, and deceptions throughout the crisis. (6)

The United States should give the Congolese people a chance for

democracy by ordering an immediate withdrawal of the invaders

from the Congolese soil. (7) The U.S. Congress should request that

the Arusha jurisdiction should be broadened to cover all crimes

committed in Congo in order to combat impunity that perpetuates

the cycle of violence in central Africa.

The reason why we have recommended this is because of the several implications of the Lusaka Accords: (1) It guarantees instability in the region for many years to come because of mistrust it

is creating. (2) It prepares for another genocide, as real causes of

the crisis are not addressed. (3) It either kills or delays the democratization process and development in the region. (4) It sets the

stage for partition of not only the DR Congo, but also many other

African countries in the future. (5) It legitimizes an invasion as

long as there is an emotional or sympathetic reason. (6) It legitimizes all human rights abuses and other kinds of abuses associated

with the invasion.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ngoyi appears in the appendix.]

Mr. ROYCE. We thank you, Mr. Ngoyi. Let me begin by asking

a question of Professor Zartman. What weight do commercial interests, the control of resources and economic interests play in the

participation of states that are active in this Congo conflict? I think

there is a question of has this become a war for profit when we see

what is being looted out of the Congo from Zimbabwe to Uganda,

or actually most of the states in the region that seem to be involved

all seem to have financial interest. Let me ask you to comment on

that.

Dr. ZARTMAN. This is what happens when you have a power vacuum in an area of this kind. It is rich with raw materials. There

are certainly private profiteers, including people involved in some

of the military forces, and Zimbabwe, to your question about

Zimbabwe, the main purpose of Zimbabwe seems to be to be able

to benefit from its position in aspects of the economy, particularly
23

in southern Congo and particularly in Ge ́camines and other of the

mining areas. So I think that element is quite present.

Mr. ROYCE. Let me ask you this, is Rwanda’s rationale that it is

securing its borders, is that legitimate given that its military forces

are in fact several hundred miles into the Congo?

Dr. ZARTMAN. The concern is legitimate, and the concern, it

seems to me, goes back to the welcome that then Zaire gave to the

ge ́nocidaires, to the ex-FAR and Interahamwe, who used hundreds

of thousands of legitimate refugees as shields, as groups within

which to hide. These same groups then were used by the present

government in trying to fight the Rwandans. Now, how the

Rwandans do it and penetrating deep into the country is something

that obviously on its own is not condoned in interstate relations,

but there is a legitimate security concern to begin with.

Mr. ROYCE. Well, then let us play devil’s advocate for a moment.

I will turn to Mr. Ngoyi and ask him the derivative of that question. How can the Hutu-Tutsi problem, as you have delineated that

in your statement, how can that be solved in Rwanda and Burundi

when Hutu rebels are using Congo as a base to destabilize these

countries? Do these governments have a right to self-defense under

certain circumstances? And let me let you have the floor on that.

Mr. NGOYI. Mr. Chairman, if necessary, I would like to ask that

the Vice President be able to add some elements to the response

I provide whenever needed.

Mr. ROYCE. Certainly.

Mr. NGOYI. Thank you. I will try to give some elements. It seems

that the Hutus or the remnant of the former Rwandan army are

not only in the Congo, Mr. Chairman. They are also in other countries. So the rationale is that if the Rwandan government would invade Congo for that reason, therefore, we should expect Rwanda to

be invading Tanzania, the Congo-Brazzville and other countries

that surround Rwanda. I don’t know if that is something that is

being weighed.

Mr. ROYCE. Let me ask another question of you, Mr. Ngoyi,

where you said one of your concerns in terms of the Lusaka Accord

was that it excludes the Mai-Mai groups. Why were these groups

excluded? Was that a decision they made on their own part or did

we just fail to include them in the Accords and is there any reason

why they couldn’t be part of the national reconciliation and the establishment of a new political dispensation envisioned by the Accords?

Mr. NGOYI. They have been included for disarmament of armed

groups.

Mr. ROYCE. Right, they have been told to disarm, and these are

the groups that historically fought Mobutu and now aren’t in Accord with the current government. The question is they have been

asked to disarm but they haven’t had a seat at the table, I guess,

is the point that you were making.

Yes. And we will ask the Vice President of the Congolese organization to identify himself and then he can speak. Yes, sir.

Dr. MATAND. OK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. My

name is Kanyand Matand. I am a professor at Langston University

in Oklahoma.

Mr. ROYCE. Yes, Professor.
24

Dr. MATAND. Concerning the question you just asked, which is

very important to us. The Mai-Mai problem really is at the heart

of what is going on because, as you just mentioned earlier on, it

started with the fight against Mobutu. They did not start fighting

against Rwanda, but if now they become a problem, the only reason

is that when Rwandese army invaded Congo they systematically

started killing clan leaders and the family members belonging to

those groups. As the Congolese government was unable to protect

and defend them, they had to take up arms against self-extermination, and that is where the problem is. And all Congolese people

do feel that it is legitimate for them to defend themselves if the

Congolese government is unable to do so. So that is why really

Congolese people are against disarming them unless these invader

groups leave the country.

Mr. ROYCE. I am going to ask you at this time if you would just

identify yourself for the record again and give your name and your

position.

Dr. MATAND. OK. My name is Kanyand Matand. It is K-A-N-YA-N-D, M-A-T-A-N-D. I am a professor at Langston University in

Oklahoma.

Mr. ROYCE. And you are Vice President and delegate for Congolese International Union?

Dr. MATAND. Yes, in charge of the Americas.

Mr. ROYCE. And, Doctor, we thank you for your participation

today. My time has run out but at this time just for the record, I

want to insert a statement by the Chairman of the Full Committee.

He was unable to come to this hearing and regrets that his statement could not be made publicly, but we are going to insert Chairman Gilman’s statement into the record at this time, and now we

will go to the Ranking Member of the Committee Mr. Payne.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Benjamin Gilman appears in

the appendix.]

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. Dr. Zartman, could you give

us an idea of what the political climate is in Democratic Republic

of Congo with the level of a party of national unity or a vehicle to

bring political parties together to talk about the future government?

Dr. ZARTMAN. I don’t think that these efforts have really turned

into anything as yet. I mean, this dialogue has not taken place, and

in fact, one of the problems is the registration or re-registration of

political organizations within Congo. The former political parties

claim that they should not have to register because they continue

to exist, as a new organizations. Some of the leaders or members

have been interrogated, arrested and so on. It is not a very conducive atmosphere to setting up a dialogue. Hopefully, the implementation of the Accords will change that.

Mr. PAYNE. That is good. Do you know if Tshisekedi is playing

any role currently in the Congo? I know that at one point he went

back to the farm, and do you know if there is any political activity

with him in this process?

Dr. ZARTMAN. I think his activity has been much less. When I

last saw him he was in Kinshasa in from the farm, and his followers were around. Followers of the UDPS, as it is called, have

been arrested and their activity is diminished. It is a little hard to
25

tell, the public opinion polls are limited to Kinshasa, but there are

some good ones. He is still a leader of some recognition but doesn’t

have the same popularity that he had before.

Mr. PAYNE. How about Karara and Mbiya. They were active, as

you know, at the beginning of the new government.

Dr. ZARTMAN. Well, Karar is off with the RCD in Goma,

Kinsangani, wherever its headquarters is now located, and the feeling is that both in the Kivu in the east and certainly Kinshasa he

has lost enormous credibility, so he is not a leader of any account

within the Congolese politics itself. There have been other people

like Wamba dia Wamba, the one time president, still claiming to

be president of the RCD, who is a figure of recognized integrity and

suffering for it in the leadership that he can pull among the rebels.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. Very much. Let me ask, Mr. Ngoyi, you

may know that Congressman Campbell and I in the days before

Mr. Kabila was able to mount an offensive that was successful in

replacing Mr. Mobutu, that we visited Goma at that time and were

encouraged by what he wanted to do. As a matter of fact, it was

suggested that we not visit Mr. Kabila at that time because the official State Department did not feel it was the right thing to do,

but being so opposed to the Mobutu regime for so long, we went

anyway, and we had a very engaging and very good conversation

with Mr. Kabila and met him on several occasions after that.

I was just interested in the—your testimony is very clear that

the problem in the Congo is specifically Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi’s intervention in the Congo, and you did mention that they

have nothing to do with the Congo. As you may recall, Mr. Kabila

received a tremendous amount of support at the initial refusal of

Mr. Mobutu to recognize and ostracize the Banyamulenge people

who are against the basic ethnic Rwandans and his refusal to allow

them citizenship with their movement then joining with Mr.

Kabila, and then the other forces from Rwanda that assisted Mr.

Kabila in Uganda and went on to the victory.

The Rwandan, Burundians, I guess, and Ugandans, as you

charge them, have had a problem with the continued cross border

killings. As you may recall, there were tremendous attacks on the

villages on the border several years ago, and it was felt that the

government of Kabila was not supporting the—or patrolling the

borders even though the Rwandans were controlling the border

also, but they felt there was not enough support from that side and

felt that they had to actually take the situation into their own

hands as you know, as you recall. It is estimated between 500,000

and a million ethnic Hutus and moderate Tutsis were—I mean

Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed, and I suppose there is

some feeling that we need to be sure that this doesn’t happen

again.

I guess my question is, there is an intertwining of the two, and

the fact that there was such a close working relationship between

the Kabila Government and the forces of Rwanda and Uganda during the move through—as a matter of fact, it is very ironic that

Zimbabwe did absolutely nothing in the march of Kabila to

Kinshasa, which surprised me greatly for the tremendous interests

that they took after the fact and not before the fact. And so I just

wonder if you could just elaborate a little bit on your feeling, and
26

as we have indicated, Mr. Campbell and I were probably the biggest supporters Mr. Kabila had, and I speak for myself. I felt that

it was great that there was going to be a change of 30 years of a

tyrant of Mobutu. I have always opposed the U.S. policy of supporting Mobutu during the cold war, but that was the policy, and

I wasn’t Secretary of State.

But I just wonder how you conclude that it is only Rwanda and

Uganda’s fault, if we are talking about blame, and that all of the

other, Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia and others who came in

after, although Angola was supportive of Kabila, also. As a matter

of fact, they did many of the bridge construction, and the heavy

duty work was done by the cooperation of Angolans to assist Mr.

Mobutu, and even Ethiopia and Eritrea also gave assistance, everyone except Zimbabwe and Namibia.

So if you could kind of clarify for me your strong feeling. I am

not saying it is wrong or right. I would just like for you to try to

explain to me a little bit better about how—and I don’t point any

fingers. I think there is enough blame to go around in this very

complicated situation, but your fingers are only pointing at Rwanda

and Uganda and Burundi, as you say.

Mr. NGOYI. Thank you, Congressman Payne. I would like to state

that we don’t condone nor support crimes committed either by the

Congolese Government or the invaders.

First, when Mr. Kabila came to power, our understanding is that

the ones who were in control of the army and the security of boarders were the Rwandans and Ugandans.

Second, I would also like to mention that the Congolese have

been waiting for so long for democratic change in the country. Our

conviction is that if there were not these unfortunate events, the

Congolese would have speeded up with democratic change with the

current government. We strongly believe that. If the forces in place

were to leave, the Congolese people would push seriously for the

change, for the initiation of the democratic process, the rule of law

and the implementation of stable institutions and to have a government that is accountable to the people.

Dr. MATAND. If I may add this, Mr. Chairman, it is actually ironic, as Mr. Congressman Payne stated early on, that when Mr.

Kabila took power his mentors were Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi. As you may recall, that Kabila was not the first choice

among Congolese people, if it was not really the support from

Rwanda, Burundi, which claimed to be one of the best leaders. So

at the beginning the Congolese people were against Kabila. If we

have a problem now, and we are talking in terms of Rwanda ethnic

groups, it is built on what actually happens in the culture from the

past. Because the international community seems to forget—just

focus attention on the 1994 genocide and overlook exactly why

these two groups are responsible for what is happening.

In Congo, to remind you, we are 450 ethnic groups, although we

have internal ones, but never had one group tried to exterminate

another group. We cooperate, we have conflict but we still look the

way we can sit around the table and find a compromise. That is

why Mobutu’s regime was weakened by different position groups.

But in Rwanda we have mainly Rwanda, Burundi, we have mainly

two ethnic groups which cannot stand each other. So what they do,
27

if one takes power, the first thing to do is to chase the other group

and look out to exterminate all the members. So usually they cross

the border, they come to Congo because we know the importance

of their survival.

So in this case, unless this critical issue is dealt with, only time

the international community will be just letting Rwanda cross the

border to Congo to fight, actually is not even regular fighting but

it is causing genocide of Hutus, which are not actually being spoken intensely as the genocide of 1994.

So if there is a way of forcing these two groups around a table

to get them together, unified, it will solve the problem because if

they keep continuing with their policy or culture or modality of mutual exclusion, while we can blame Congo over and over, it will

never solve the crisis in the region.

Mr. PAYNE. I agree and I was just curious. As you mentioned,

that is a problem that must be solved, and of course, you say everyone got together, was all right on Mobutu, but there is still the

Banyamulenge people, who were still the Rwandans, were not

treated all right in the Congo, and also of course the people from

Chava province that moved to Angola for 30 years and came back,

felt uncomfortable about coming back until Kabila came to, I guess,

the Mai-Mai people.

So, like I said, my whole concern is that you can give examples

of almost any other country to point to a similar kind of problem,

but I think that the whole solution—and I believe that is what this

whole group of belligerents trying to come together to finally get

the ex-FAR and the Interahamwe and the genocidaires, disarm

them and have them return back to their countries, and that I

think would at least take away, as you say, maybe an excuse that

Rwanda uses in order to come through the borders of Congo.

Dr. MATAND. If I may add, Mr. Chairman, please.

Mr. ROYCE. OK. Then we are going to go to Mr. Meeks and then

Mr. Campbell. Go ahead.

Dr. MATAND. If you recall, not very long ago the Congolese Government agreed really to disarm the Interahamwe and the Hutus

army group, send them back either to Rwanda or to different countries. So that issue is really on the table. It is not excluded.

Mr. ROYCE. OK. Now, we are going to go to Mr. Meeks of New

Jersey and then Mr. Campbell of California—of New York, Mr.

Meeks of New York and Mr. Campbell of California, and that will

conclude our hearing. Mr. Meeks.

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Zartman, I have a

couple of quick questions, something similar to what was asked

earlier. What is your opinion, is the United States doing enough in

its role in the Congo now? And if not, what else do you think we

should be doing?

Dr. ZARTMAN. No, sir, I don’t think that we are doing enough. I

have pointed out one thing I think that we can be doing, and I

pointed this out as early as the beginning of this year when I was

out on a mission in Congo, and that is, to work for a dialogue

among Congolese people, among Congolese organizations. I think

that is an important role to play. Perhaps when you ask about

doing enough, you may be talking about money or something like
28

that. I think there are other things that don’t take a lot of money

that are crucially lacking and represent a role we can play.

In terms of money we could be doing more, but there it has been

very difficult and I think the Administration tried very hard in the

beginning. I was one of the people with Congressman Payne who

was very hopeful about the government that came in and replaced

Mobutu, but the situation was not a welcoming situation. I think

we made some mistakes as well, but there I think we have been

as forthcoming as we can be.

What we need at this point is to encourage this process now, the

process now that has been launched in the Lusaka agreements so

that it doesn’t get off track.

Mr. MEEKS. Let me ask this, and I don’t know whether I am

reading you correctly or not, but it seems to me that you are somewhat pessimistic about the hopes of the implementation of the

present cease-fire agreement. Is there anything that we can do as

far as policy or any option that we can to try to make sure that

the cease-fire agreement is implemented?

Dr. ZARTMAN. I am not pessimistic. I am an incorrigible optimist.

Anybody who knows me knows that. But I think we better keep

our eyes open and remember that this agreement is not self-implementing. We as Americans so frequently—and particularly in an

area like Africa, that we would like to get out of, that somehow is

troublesome to us in many perceptions—we have the idea that once

we get an agreement like this, well, then, everything is taken care

of, we have got peace and got cease-fire and it can go and take care

of itself. Whereas as I say, this needs tending. It needs encouragement. The parties need to be pushed to implement the action, and

we need to be engaged, and I particularly mentioned this area of

military either as troops or particularly financial and logistic support.

There is in your organization I think a resistance to committing

money to troops abroad, and I encourage you in your efforts to

overcome that resistance.

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Ngoyi, let me just ask this question. I think that

we had a hearing not too long ago, and I get confused also as to

whether or not you would describe some of the problems that are

going on in the Congo, is it based upon tribalism or ethnicity, or

just how would you describe it, either one of those two or something else. How would you describe some of that upheaval?

Mr. NGOYI. I will describe them as a problem based on, yes, ethnic problems, and I would also describe them as problems essentially military politics, that when you have a gun then you can dictate the politics. If we could ask the United States to strongly discourage the reliance of minority regime or any kind of regime in

central Africa, to always try to access to power by gun, that will

be a tremendous help.

Dr. MATAND. If I may add, Mr. Chairman, please. The way we

describe it, we describe them as being ethnic intolerance but not

to the level of wanting to eliminate an ethnic group. It does not rise

to the level of mutual extermination as to what is taking place in

Rwanda because you can see, we are 450 ethnic groups but we

learn to disagree and live together. There has never been a single

ethnic group claiming power in the name of ethnicity. This has
29

happened very often in Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda, and that is

why really we are completely different because they kill each other

massively just to eliminate completely the opposite ethnic group.

We don’t do that in Congo.

Mr. MEEKS. And the last question real briefly, are you optimistic

or pessimistic about the cease-fire and the peace agreement that is

taking place?

Mr. NGOYI. I am rather very pessimistic. Unless the U.S. Government tried to provide some strong leadership, the likelihood of continued violence is going to be there. I am very pessimistic about the

peace Accords.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you.

Dr. MATAND. If I may, please.

Mr. ROYCE. Yes, doctor.

Dr. MATAND. I agree. I am also pessimistic for the simple reason

that as long as those illegally invading troops hold to their position

there is no reason really why we should expect any kind of change

very soon.

Mr. ROYCE. We go to Mr. Campbell.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you. I wish to address Mr. Ngoyi or is it

Mr. Mwabilu?

Mr. NGOYI. Ngoyi will be fine.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Ngoyi, first name then.

Mr. NGOYI. That is the last name.

Mr. CAMPBELL. I apologize. My list of the witnesses make it unclear to me. I wish to address you and Professor Matand to give

to me and my colleagues a background of who the Congolese International Union is so that I can better weigh the advice you are giving. For example, are you elected by whom? Who can vote? A Congolese in France can vote, a Congolese in Belgium can vote, a Congolese in America can vote? Just tell me a bit about the organization of which you are president and of which you are Vice President.

Mr. NGOYI. Thank you very much. We think that we have submitted to the——

Mr. CAMPBELL. I have it, yes. I have read it.

Mr. NGOYI. And in the name of national unity to further dialogue, inter-Congolese dialogue, we were talking to all parties, including the Congolese Government, the rebels, Mai-Mai, and people

in the Congo. We are very grateful to Rutgers University’s Center

for Global Change which sponsored this conference. We had Congolese from Congo, Congolese from Europe, Congolese from Canada

and Congolese from various states in the United States who came

for 2 days conference in Newark and concluded by, of course, this

organization, the Congolese International Union, borne out of a

pact name, the pact of Newark, in recognition to the location and

to show our gratitude to the university which has supported us.

As I mentioned those groups, we have groups that are against

the government. We have also among us groups that are supporting the government, and both had elections. I was elected as

president, and we had also three vice presidents, one elected elected vice president for the Americas, one was elected vice president

for Europe, a vice president and a national president for Congo,

who is a priest.
30

Mr. CAMPBELL. And who is allowed to vote? Was it those who attended the conference in Newark or is it a broader group?

Mr. NGOYI. Those who were there voted.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you very much. Anything that comes out

of Newark has to have a presumption of legitimacy and credibility.

I have always said that.

Dr. Zartman, can you give me a thumbnail understanding, because I don’t have it, of why Uganda and Rwanda fell apart in

their backing of the rebel movement? It appeared that they were

together, and then obviously with the dispute that we saw at

Lusaka getting down to Wamba dia Wamba and these challenges

to who was actually heading up the rebel movement. I don’t understand where Uganda and Rwanda’s interests separated.

Dr. ZARTMAN. I think they fell apart because they were on, not

a joint track, but on parallel tracks; that is, each was concerned

about the same issue but in their own terms, that is, their security

zone on either side, this is the political aspect. And therefore, I

think the Rwandans have a deeper feeling of their security concerns because of this split that goes down the middle of their society—or off to one side because it is a minority issue—whereas for

the Ugandans there a number of different rebel groups, most of

them supported by Sudan but also that have sanctuary in the Congolese territories, and therefore, it is not a conflict that reaches

deep into the heart of Ugandan society but rather their peripheral

groups. Therefore, it became easier for them to bring the security

issue under control or imagine a control of the security issue.

Furthermore, the group under Bemba that was associated with

them was in some cases doing much better. So their security concerns were taken care of a little better, and they wanted to move

out more rapidly than Rwanda did. It was tiring them, and then

it was tarnishing their reputation.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Is there a difference between Uganda and Rwanda insofar as their willingness to come to terms with the Kabila

Government is concerned? I say that because here’s my prior and

then please rebut the prior or confirm the prior. The prior is that

Rwanda cannot come to an agreement with Kabila, that replacing

him is the long term possibility that might intrigue them, whereas

Uganda is perfectly capable of making an agreement with Kabila.

Dr. ZARTMAN. This is very hard to judge, but in the last trip we

had when in Rwanda, I did not come out with that impression. I

mean, we were told that Rwanda was not interested in overthrowing the government; it was interested in taking care of its security concerns; it was by no means interested in annexing territory. There was a trial balloon that was once floated by the President of Rwanda, and that was a big dud, nobody picked that up,

and that seems to have disappeared, and I think the issue of

redoing the boundaries or anything like that is quite legitimately,

happily a dead issue.

No, I think both can be players in this reconciliation and peace

engagement that they have taken.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Thanks to all three witnesses. Thanks, Chairman

Royce.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Campbell. Well, in conclusion let me

just comment on something that Dr. Matand had said in his testi-
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mony. I think there is a certain irony in the fact that it was a vibrant and pro-democratic culture that seemed to be evolving, especially in the last 2 years of the Mobutu regime, in Congo, and we

spoke by phone and we spoke in person when we were there several days after the Mobutu regime fell in Congo with some of these

Congolese who desired this transition to democratic governance,

and I think that as we move forward one of the important issues

is keeping the focus on bringing the rule of law and bringing democracy to Congo, while at the same time having us focused on

keeping all parties on board and committed to the Lusaka Accords

and having all parties withdraw their troops from Congo.

And I thank each of you, Dr. Zartman, again, and Mr. Ngoyi, for

coming here and testifying here today. Very much appreciate it.

Your testimony will be in the record. Thank you, members. The

Committee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:50 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

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