### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs O ct obe r 30, 200 7

CHRISTOP HER

KEY LN DEA RIN G v. H OWAR D C ARLTON , WA RD EN

Appeal f rom the Cr im inal Cou rt for Johnson County No. 5037 Lynn Brown , Judge

No. E2007-01191-CC A-R3- HC - F iled Fe bruary 1, 2008

D. K ELLY T HOMAS , J R

. , J

. , d i s s en t i n g.

Irespe ctfully

dissent from the majority based upon my conclusion t hat t he trial court err ed in s umm ari ly di smissi ngthe pe tit ion fo r a wr it o f h a

be a s c or pu s th a t, i n my

vie w, pr e se nts a c og niza ble c la im f

or re lie f. Th e re c or d r e fl e c ts that th e pe tit ion e r p led guil ty to t he ft of pr op e rt y valued be tween $1,000 a

nd $10,000 and evading arr est, and that he rece ived concurre nt sentence s of t wo y ear s an d

o n e d ay an d o n e y e ar , r e s p e c ti v e ly

. I nh is Pe ti ti o nf o r Wr it o f H a b e a s Co r pus Relief, the pe titioner alleg es that the judg ment for the the ft conviction is void beca use he did not agr ee t o a s en t en ce o f t wo y ea rs an d o n e d ay an d t h at s u ch a s en t en ce “i s v o i d , as o b t ai n edt h ro u gh misrepre sentation and [an] unfulfilled promise [of] a total t wo (2) y ear sentenc e.” Additionally , he alleg es that his guilty plea was not knowing a nd voluntary

beca use he did not ag ree to the two y ear and one da

y sentenc e. I n support of t his alleg ation, the petit ion further asser ts that both the technica l
rec ord and the transcr ipt of t he g uilty plea pr ocee dings r efle ct that the sente nce imposed should have been two y ear s. Howeve r, neither the technic al re cord nor t h e transcr ipt of the g uilty plea we re attache d to the petition in the habeas c ourt. At tache d to the petition for the habe as cour t’s consideration is t he judg ment of convic tion reflec ting a sentenc e of two y ear s and one da y for the theft convic tion.

Ia g re e wi th t

he ma jor ity that th e tr ia l c ourt

c or re c tly fo un d th a t th e vo lun tari ne ss o f t he g uil ty plea c ould not be addre ssed pursuant to a pe tition for a writ of ha beas co rp u s b ec au se such a n alleg ation rende rs the judg ment mere ly voidable, not void. Arc her v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 164 (Tenn. 1993) ; Taylor v. State, 995 S.W .2d 78, 83 (Tenn. 19 9 9 ). Howe ver, I disag ree with the majority reg arding the conseque nce of the illega l se ntence ref lected in the judgme nt f

or th e t heft conviction.
“[A] s entenc e imposed in direc t contrave ntion of a statute is void and illeg al.” Stephenson v. Carlton, 28 S.W 3d 910, 911 (Tenn. 2000), citing State v. Bur khart, 566 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tenn. 1978). Tenne ssee Code Annotated section 40-35-211( 1) provides that a sente nce to the de partment1 Th e do c ume nts a tta c he d to a mot ion a sk ingthi s c ourt

to t a ke no tic e of

c e rt a in d oc ume nts
no t in c lud e d in

the ha be a s c ourt

te c hn ic al r e c or d in c lud e a “ Wai ve r o f R ig hts and

Gu ilty Ple a ” sig ne d b y

the c on vic tin g c ourt that ind ic a te s tha t the a g re e d s e nte nc e wa s tw o y e a rs

. of corr ection “shall be for a term of y ear s or months or life,” there by prec luding a sentenc e of one day as wa s imposed in this case . Neve rtheless, the majority opinion conclude s that “ a se ntence of two y ear s and one da

y may constitute, under c erta in circumstanc es, an illeg al sentenc e.” T he majority cites to this court’s opinion in J ames Gor don Coons, I I Iv. State, No. 01C01-9801-00014, 1 9 9 9 W L275009 (Tenn. Crim. App. Ma y 6, 1999) for

the proposition that a depa rture f rom the mandate of

40-35-211( 1) could be ag ree d to as part of the plea barg aining proce ss. I n my view, our supreme c ourt’s opinion in McConn el l v. State, 12 S.W .3d 795, 798 (Tenn. 2000) , limit ed such depar tures fr om our sentenc ing statute as par t of the plea

barg aining proce ss to elements of off ender cl as s i fi ca t ion and re lease elig ibilit y within the confines of

the sentenc ing statute applicable to a convicted of

fense and maintained “ the di stinction between the subjects of plea barg aining and the leng th of a sente nce

. ” M cC o n n ell, 12 S.W .3d at 798; see a lso, Hicks v. State, 945 S.W .2d 706 (Tenn. 1997)

.
Fur thermore , in Coons the post-conviction petitioner admitted at an evidentiar y hear ing that he ag ree d to the latter c halleng ed sente nce of six y ear s and one day

. I n my view, the f acts in Coons
are dis tin g uis ha

ble fr om the fa c ts pr e se nte d he re

. I nd e e d, in thi s c a se , the pe tit ion e r a sse rt e d in his petition that he did not ag ree to the sentenc e of two y ear s and one da y

.
For these re aso n s , Iwould reve rse the judg ment of the trial c ourt and re mand this case f or the appointment of c ounsel and a n evidentiar

y hear ing w here in the petit ioner may prese nt proof of the g uilty plea agree ment and tra

nscript of the same. I

would further

note that it appea

rs that the proper reme dy to corre ct this ill eg ality is not a complete withdrawa l of the g uilty plea a nd reve rsal of the c onvicti o n b ec au s e, i f t he alleg ations of the petition are true, the guilty plea a nd resulting
c on vic tio n d o n ot a

pp e ar t o b e ba se d u

po n th is i lleg ali ty

. I ns te a d, the pr op e r r e me dy wi ll b e to 1
corr ect the judgme nt by

removing the illeg al term of one day from the se ntence . Smit h v. L ewis, 202 S.W .3d 124, 130 (Tenn. 2006)

.

D

. K EL L Y T HOMAS , J R ., J UDGE