J-S54020-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

D.D.G.

v.

S.R.G. 

Appellant

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:

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 691 MDA 2020

Appeal from the Decree Entered April 10, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Civil Division at No(s): 

2012-CV-971-DV

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED: APRIL 1, 2021

In this appeal, S.R.G. (“Wife”) challenges the equitable distribution 

order entered by the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas. We conclude 

the court did not err in the equitable distribution award, the award of $1.00 

in alimony, or the denial of counsel fees and expenses, and affirm the order.

S.R.G. and D.D.G. (“Husband”) were married in 1981, and in 2012, 

Husband filed a Complaint in Divorce. Wife did not oppose the divorce but 

disputed the economic issues, which proceeded before a master. The Master 

held a hearing in December 2018 at which the parties entered into stipulations 

and presented testimony and exhibits. The trial court offered the following 

summary, in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, of the Master’s factual findings:

Husband, who was born in 1954 and is in good health, was 

the primary wage earner during the parties’ marriage. 

Husband entered the United States Air Force as an Officer 

in 1976, and served on active duty in the Air Force for 

approximately 16 years of the parties’ marriage, often 
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requiring him to be away from home. After retiring from the 

Air Force in 1997, Husband was employed by the 

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania until 2004, when he 

became employed by the Federal Government. As of 

December 2018, Husband remained employed full-time by 

the Federal Government and also worked as a part-time 

adjunct professor for Harrisburg Area Community College 

(“HACC”). Husband receives medical insurance, dental 

insurance, vision insurance, life insurance, and retirement 

plan participation through his employment with the Federal 

Government. As of November 2019, Husband’s gross annual 

income totaled $226,627.00, consisting of the following:

(a) $152,353.00 in wages from his full-time 

employment with the Federal Government;

(b) $21,440.00 in wages from his part-time 

employment . . .;

(c) $8,229.00 from a [Department of Veteran Affairs

(“VA”)] waiver;

(d) $40,755.00 from a VA retirement plan; and

(e) $3,850.00 in rental income, received from renting 

out the marital residence.

([Master’s Report and Recommendation (“R&R”), Nov. 27, 

2019, at 1-4]). A total of $31,989.00 of Husband’s annual 

income from his VA retirement plan is marital property that 

is subject to equitable distribution. Husband’s VA waiver, 

the non-marital portion of the VA retirement, and his share 

of the marital portion of the VA retirement will continue for 

Husband’s life even after he retires from his employment 

with the Federal Government. Additionally, when Husband 

reaches his full Social Security retirement age, he 

anticipates a Social Security retirement benefit of $2,834.00 

per month, as well as a Federal Employees Retirement 

System (“FERS”) benefit of at least $1,451.00 per month. 

At retirement, Husband will also have access to the portion 

of contributory retirement benefits awarded to him in 

equitable distribution. Husband’s monthly expenses total 

$6,829.00. 

The Master found that Husband’s separate non-marital 

estate consists of the following:
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(a) non-marital portion of Thrift Savings Plan, valued 

at $51,047.00 as of June 30, 2016;

(b) non-marital portion of FERS, valued at $82,634.00 

as of September 30, 2016;

(c) non-marital portion of VA retirement waiver, 

valued at $156,344.00 as of September 30, 2016; and

(d) non-marital portion of VA retirement benefits, 

valued at $62,386.00 as of September 30, 2016.

(R&R, at 11).

Wife, who was born in 1950, was working for the Federal 

Government at the time of the parties’ marriage in 1981. At 

some time after 1986, Wife resigned from her employment

to take care of the children and home, occasionally working 

outside the home when convenient to her homemaking and 

child-care duties. In 2004, Wife again became employed 

full-time by the Federal Government (specifically, the 

Department of Defense), where she is still employed. As of

November 2019, Wife’s gross annual income totaled 

$178,512.00, consisting of the following:

(a) $157,486.00 in wages from her employment with 

the Department of Defense; and

(b) $21,026.00 in Social Security Retirement.

(R&R, at 8, 18). Additionally, Wife receives $908.44 per

month in spousal support2from Husband pursuant to a June 

26, 2013 support order. Moreover, when Wife retires from 

the Federal Government, she anticipates a Civil Service 

Retirement System (“CSRS”) benefit of at least $4,950.00 

per month, and she also anticipates receipt of her portion of 

the marital component of Husband’s military retirement 

benefit and her contributory retirement benefits. Wife’s

monthly expenses total $4,676.05. 

The Master found that Wife’s separate non-marital estate 

consists of the following:

(a) non-marital portion of Thrift Savings Plan, valued 

at $50,147.00 as 30, 2016; of June and
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(b) non-marital portion of FERS,3 valued at 

$181,695.00 as of September 30, 2016.

(R&R, at 11).

2 Wife also recently filed a child support action against 

Husband, requesting child support for the parties' 

grandson. This Court denied Wife’s request, and the 

Superior Court affirmed this denial on October 16, 

2019.

3 As explained later in this Opinion, this benefit is in 

fact a CSRS benefit, rather than a FERS benefit.

Trial Court Opinion, filed July 14, 2020, at 3-6 (some citations omitted).

In the Report and Recommendation, the Master recommended Wife 

receive 55% of the marital portion of Husband’s military retirement benefit, 

and each party receive 50% of the remaining marital assets. The Master 

concluded an award of alimony was not appropriate, but was concerned that 

Husband would convert an additional portion of his military retirement benefit 

to disability, which would deprive Wife of the income from the military 

retirement benefit. R&R at 36-37. The Master therefore awarded Wife $1.00 

per year in alimony, which would be “modifiable only upon Husband’s election 

to waive military retirement benefits for disability.” Id. at 37. The Master 

recommended denying Wife’s claims for counsel fees, costs, and expenses 

associated with the divorce. Wife filed exceptions. The Master issued a 

Supplemental Report and Recommendation, in which she acknowledged that 

she had erroneously stated that Wife has a non-marital $181,695.00 FERS 

benefit, when in fact the benefit was a CSRS benefit. The trial court issued an 

order correcting the original R&R to reflect that the benefit was a CSRS benefit. 
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The trial court heard argument on the remaining exceptions. In April 

2020, the court granted an exception, and ordered Wife to retain her military 

identification and Husband to take the necessary steps to ensure Wife retained 

the military identification and its concomitant privileges and benefits.1 The 

court denied the remaining exceptions. Wife filed a notice of appeal.

Wife raises the following issues:

1. Whether the trial court [erred] in reducing the value of 

the marital residence by estimated costs of sale where the 

record does not demonstrate that Husband intends to sell 

the residence[?]

2. Whether the trial court erred in denying Wife’s request to 

be awarded one-half of the net fair rental value of the 

marital residence[?]

3. Whether the trial court erred by awarding 55% of 

Husband’s military benefit to Wife and erred in its equal 

distribution of the remaining marital assets[?]

4. Whether the trial court erred in determining that the cost 

of the former spouse survivor benefit be paid from Wife’s 

share of the benefit[?]

5. Whether the trial court erred by only awarding alimony 

in the amount of $1.00 to Wife[?]

6. Whether the trial court erred in denying Wife’s request 

for Husband to pay her reasonable counsel fees and 

expenses[?]

7. Whether the trial court erred in determining that each 

party is able to meet his/her reasonable needs with his/her 

own income[?]

8. Whether the trial court erred in failing to consider nearly 

$15,894.76 in unreimbursed medical expenses for 2013-

____________________________________________

1 Also in April 2020, the trial court entered a divorce decree.
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2018 owed by Husband to Wife in the parties’ APL case filed 

with the Dauphin County Domestic Relations Section[?]

Wife’s Br. at 4-5.

“Our standard of review when assessing the propriety of an order 

effectuating the equitable distribution of marital property is whether the trial 

court abused its discretion by a misapplication of the law or failure to follow 

proper legal procedure.” Carney v. Carney, 167 A.3d 127, 131 (Pa.Super. 

2017) (quoting Morgante v. Morgante, 119 A.3d 382, 386 (Pa.Super. 

2015)). We “will not find an ‘abuse of discretion’ unless the law has been 

overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised was manifestly 

unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will, as shown 

by the evidence in the certified record.” Id. (citation omitted). When reviewing 

“the propriety of an equitable distribution award, courts must consider the 

distribution scheme as a whole.” Id. (citation omitted). In doing so, court 

must “measure the circumstances of the case against the objective of 

effectuating economic justice between the parties and achieving a just 

determination of their property rights.” Id. (citation omitted). We will not 

reverse the trial court’s factual findings or credibility determinations unless 

they are unsupported by the record. Id. Further, the “master’s report and 

recommendation, although only advisory, is to be given the fullest 

consideration, particularly on the question of credibility of witnesses, because 

the master has the opportunity to observe and assess the behavior and 

demeanor of the parties.” Id. (citation omitted).
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The Pennsylvania Divorce Code governs the equitable distribution of 

property and provides for factors that courts should consider:

(a) General rule.--Upon the request of either party in an 

action for divorce or annulment, the court shall equitably 

divide, distribute or assign, in kind or otherwise, the marital 

property between the parties without regard to marital 

misconduct in such percentages and in such manner as the 

court deems just after considering all relevant factors. The 

court may consider each marital asset or group of assets 

independently and apply a different percentage to each 

marital asset or group of assets. Factors which are relevant 

to the equitable division of marital property include the 

following:

(1) The length of the marriage.

(2) Any prior marriage of either party.

(3) The age, health, station, amount and sources of 

income, vocational skills, employability, estate, 

liabilities and needs of each of the parties.

(4) The contribution by one party to the education, 

training or increased earning power of the other party.

(5) The opportunity of each party for future 

acquisitions of capital assets and income.

(6) The sources of income of both parties, including, 

but not limited to, medical, retirement, insurance or 

other benefits.

(7) The contribution or dissipation of each party in the 

acquisition, preservation, depreciation or appreciation 

of the marital property, including the contribution of a 

party as homemaker.

(8) The value of the property set apart to each party.

(9) The standard of living of the parties established 

during the marriage.

(10) The economic circumstances of each party at the 

time the division of property is to become effective.
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(10.1) The Federal, State and local tax ramifications 

associated with each asset to be divided, distributed 

or assigned, which ramifications need not be 

immediate and certain.

(10.2) The expense of sale, transfer or liquidation 

associated with a particular asset, which expense 

need not be immediate and certain.

(11) Whether the party will be serving as the 

custodian of any dependent minor children.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a).

A. Marital Home

Wife’s first two issues relate to the marital home. She argues the court 

erred in considering the sale of the home, and the associated costs of selling 

the home, when distributing the assets, and erred in denying her an award of 

fair rental value. 

Wife argues the court erred in considering the costs of selling the home, 

claiming that the record did not reflect that Husband wanted to sell the home 

and did not contain evidence regarding the costs. She argues Husband 

presented no evidence that the home was listed for sale, but, rather, the 

record established the Husband had attempted to sell the home in the past, 

but could not. Wife further argues Husband’s request to sell the house in 2013 

does not demonstrate he intends to sell the house now, and that his posthearing assertion that he planned to sell the house was not sworn testimony 

of record. She claims the Master erred in applying the Master’s own estimation 

of the cost of sale and deducting that from the fair market value of the home. 

She further claims the Master should have considered that Husband sold a 
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time-share to a friend for $1, but did not transfer the loan associated with the 

time-share. Rather, that time-share loan was rolled into a refinanced 

mortgage, thereby reducing the parties’ equity in the house. 

The trial court concluded that there was evidence Husband intended to 

sell the home, including that he filed a petition for special relief in 2013 

requesting that he be permitted to list the property for sale.2 1925(a) Op. at 

7. Further, the court noted that the “Pennsylvania Divorce Code mandates 

that in determining the equitable distribution of assets, a court consider, 

among other things, sales expenses associated with assets, ‘which expense 

need not be immediate and certain.’” Id. (citing 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a)(10.2)) 

(emphasis omitted). The trial court therefore found the Master did not err in 

reducing the value of the marital residence by the costs of the sale and it did 

not err in denying Wife’s exception to that decision. Id.

We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion. One factor a court 

should consider when equitably distributing the property is the expense

associated with the sale of a particular asset, regardless of whether such sale 

was “immediate” or whether the costs were “certain.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 

3502(a)(10.2). Therefore, the court properly considered the sale of the house. 

Further, in considering the sale of the asset, it was proper for the court to 

consider selling costs as part of the costs of selling the asset.

____________________________________________

2 The court also referenced Husband’s statement in his post-hearing 

memorandum that he “plans to sell the house immediately following divorce.” 

1925(a) Op. at 7. However, as this was not evidence presented at the hearing, 

we decline to consider it.
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Wife next claims that the court should have awarded her one-half of the 

rental value of the marital residence. She argues Husband has occupied the 

marital home during the separation, and rolled a time-share loan into the 

mortgage, thereby reducing the equity in the home. Therefore, according to 

Wife, although “he may have paid expenses for the marital home, he also 

reduced the equity by rolling in a loan for a timeshare that he could have sold 

for value but instead transferred for $1.00 to a third party.” Wife’s Br. at 17.

Whether to grant rental value of a property as part of an equitable 

distribution award is within the discretion of the trial court. Lee v. Lee, 978 

A.2d 380, 385 (Pa.Super. 2009). “The basis of the award of rental value is 

that the party out of possession of jointly owned property (generally the party 

that has moved out of the formal marital residence) is entitled to 

compensation for her/his interest in the property.” Id. (citation omitted).

“Generally, ‘parties have an equal one-half interest in the marital 

property,’ and thus ‘the dispossessed party will be entitled to a credit for onehalf of the fair rental value of the marital home.’” Id. (citation omitted). Courts

apply the following analysis when deciding whether to award rental credit:

First, the general rule is that the dispossessed party is 

entitled to a credit for the fair rental value of jointly held 

marital property against a party in possession of that 

property, provided there are no equitable defenses to the 

credit. Second, the rental credit is based upon, and 

therefore limited by, the extent of the dispossessed party’s 

interest in the property. . . . Third, the rental value is limited 

to the period of time during which a party is dispossessed 

and the other party is in actual or constructive possession 

of the property. Fourth, the party in possession is entitled 
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to a credit against the rental value for payments made to 

maintain the property on behalf of the dispossessed spouse. 

Generally, in regard to the former marital residence, 

payments made on behalf of the dispossessed spouse will 

be one-half of the expenses including debt service on the 

property. This is so because equity places a presumption 

upon the dispossessed spouse of responsibility for expenses 

to the extent of her/his ownership interest which is generally 

one-half. Finally, we note that whether the rental credit is 

due and the amount thereof is within the sound discretion 

of the court of common pleas.

Id. at 385-86 (citation omitted).

Here, the trial court concluded:

Regarding the instant matter, it would not be appropriate to 

award one-half of the fair rental value of the marital 

residence to Wife considering the facts of record. First, both 

parties have a similar income and similar assets, and when 

they retire, they will both have similar retirement incomes.

Therefore, Wife does not suffer from a significant financial 

discrepancy that would weigh in favor of awarding her rent. 

Second, Husband remained in the residence for many years 

after the parties’ separation and made all requisite 

payments associated with the home, including maintenance 

costs. By making these payments, Husband preserved the 

home as a marital asset and protected the parties’ credit 

ratings. Given that the Husband refrained from selling the 

marital residence for many years following separation and 

consistently maintained the residence even though he was 

not bound to do so, and considering the similarity of the 

parties’ present and future financial prospects, this Court did

not err in determining that it would be inequitable to award 

Wife one-half of the fair rental value of the marital 

residence.

1925(a) Op. at 8.

This was not an abuse of discretion. Wife has not lived at the marital 

residence since 2013. Although Husband has resided there since that time, he 

has been paying the mortgage and bills associated with the residence. The 
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Master thus concluded that, reviewing the totality of the case, an award of fair 

rental value would not be equitable. She noted the parties had $650,000, plus 

Husband’s military retirement benefit, as marital assets, and both had similar 

incomes. She noted that Husband maintained the asset, even though he would 

have preferred to sell it, and that by doing so he protected the parties’ credit 

rating. The record supports these findings, and it was not an abuse of 

discretion to deny an award of fair rental value. 

B. Military Retirement Benefit and Former Spouse Survivor Benefit 

Next, we will address Wife’s claims regarding the military retirement 

benefit and former spouse survivor benefit.

Wife claims the Master erred when it awarded her 55% of Husband’s 

military retirement benefit, paid to her over 20 years, with the remaining 

amount being returned to Husband if Wife predeceases him. She claims that 

she is not likely to collect the full award, and it therefore would be equitable 

to receive the military retirement payment over five years. Wife maintains 

that Husband has more retirement assets than she does and, as the court 

recognized, she sacrificed her career to support his. Wife claims that if the 

period of her distribution remains 20 years, than Husband’s distribution also 

should be over 20 years. 

The trial court found:

Wife claims that this Court erred by awarding her a greater 

percentage (55%) of the marital portion of Husband’s 

military retirement benefit to her and equally distributing 

the remaining marital assets (50% to each party), rather 

than giving her a greater percentage of the remaining 
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marital assets. Wife also contends that the Court erred by 

directing that she pay the former spouse survivor benefit of 

Husband’s military retirement. Such was not error for the 

reasons set forth below.

[The court set forth the Section 3502(a) factors].

Upon consideration of the equitable distribution factors, the 

Master determined, and this Court agreed, that most of the 

factors did not favor a greater distribution to either of the 

parties, and only four factors (3, 7, 8, and 11) favored a 

greater distribution to Wife. Factor 11 favors a greater

distribution to Wife because she has majority custody of the 

parties’ grandchild and has the primary responsibility for 

providing for the grandchild’s everyday needs, thereby 

raising her regular expenses. The other three factors, 

although they favor a greater distribution to wife, are 

related to Husband’s former service in the military. In 

particular, factors 4 and 8 favor greater distribution to the 

Wife because she largely sacrificed her career in the early 

stages of the parties’ marriage to take care of the home and 

children while Husband advanced his military career. Due to 

his ability to advance his career from the earliest stages of 

the marriage while [Wife] forewent her career to care for 

the home and children, Husband’s income is also superior 

such that Factor 3 favors a greater distribution to Wife as 

well. However, it is worth noting that despite Husband’s 

slight income superiority and his ability to advance his 

career from the earliest stages, Wife was able to commence 

a successful Federal Government career of her own in 1997. 

Since then, her earnings have sharply increased such that 

she has attained a current gross annual income of 

$178,512.00. Moreover, while Husband’s income is

superior, some of his income sources are not fixed and can 

change on a yearly basis. For example, his rental income 

from the marital residence will be eliminated if he sells the 

residence. Furthermore, while Husband teaches on an 

adjunct basis at HACC, this income can vary from year to 

year and is not guaranteed.

In sum, there were only four factors that favored a greater 

distribution to Wife, and most of those factors directly 

pertained to Wife’s personal sacrifices so that Husband could 

advance his military career. And while Husband’s income is 

superior and Wife’s expenses are somewhat higher, she has 
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attained a sizeable annual income from her employment 

over the last two decades, and she stands to receive a 

respectable CSRS retirement benefit upon her eventual 

retirement from the Department of Defense. Moreover, 

having been awarded 55% of the Husband’s military 

retirement, Wife will benefit from the fact that federal law 

regarding military retirement awards to former spouses

entitles her to receive a proportional share of any annual 

cost of living increases. See Morgante v. Morgante, 119 

A.3d 382 (Pa. Super. 2015). Taking all of this into 

consideration, it was equitable to award Wife a greater 

percentage (55%) of the marital portion of Husband’s 

military retirement to Wife and distribute the remaining 

assets equally between the two parties, and the Court did 

not err in doing so.

1925(a) Op. at 9-11. 

The record supports the findings, and the court did not abuse its 

discretion when it determined, based on all the evidence presented, that the 

award was equitable. 

Wife next claims the Master should have divided the cost of the former 

spouse survivor benefit between the parties, instead of requiring her to be 

responsible for the costs. She argues she is paying for a benefit she may not 

receive, as she will not receive the benefit if Husband pre-deceases her.

The trial court found it was not improper to direct Wife to pay the cost 

of the former spouse survivor benefit from her share of the military retirement 

benefits. The cost is “about $266.27 per month.” R&R at 20. The court 

reasoned that the survivor “benefit, at most recent valuation, totaled 

$98,042.00. However, its value would not be realized by Wife if she 

predeceased Husband.” 1925(a) Op. at 12. 
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The record supports the court’s factual findings and the court did not 

abuse its discretion. Wife stood to receive the survivor benefit, and it was 

therefore not inequitable to require her to bear the cost. The court considered 

the totality of the circumstances, and Wife has not established that requiring 

her to pay the cost from her share of the military retirement was an abuse of 

discretion. 

C. Alimony

In her next issue, Wife argues the Master erred in awarding her only 

$1.00 in alimony. She claims application of the factors “gravitate in favor of 

awarding Wife permanent alimony to ensure that her reasonable needs are 

met given that she will be unable to support herself through appropriate 

employment.” Wife’s Br. at 19. 

Section 3701 of the Divorce Code provides that “[w]here a divorce 

decree has been entered, the court may allow alimony, as it deems 

reasonable, to either party only if it finds that alimony is necessary.” 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(a). The purpose of alimony is not to reward or punish the 

parties, but rather “to ensure that the reasonable needs of the person who is 

unable to support himself or herself through appropriate employment, are 

met.” Isralsky v. Isralsky, 824 A.2d 1178, 1188 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation 

omitted). “Alimony is based upon reasonable needs in accordance with the 

lifestyle and standard of living established by the parties during the marriage, 

as well as the payor’s ability to pay.” Id. (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). “Following divorce, alimony provides a secondary remedy and is 
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available only where economic justice and the reasonable needs of the parties 

cannot be achieved by way of an equitable distribution.” Balicki v. Balicki, 4 

A.3d 654, 659 (Pa.Super. 2010).

“In determining the nature, amount, duration, and manner of payment 

of alimony,” the court must “consider all relevant factors,” including:

(1) The relative earnings and earning capacities of the 

parties.

(2) The ages and the physical, mental and emotional 

conditions of the parties.

(3) The sources of income of both parties, including, but not 

limited to, medical, retirement, insurance or other benefits.

(4) The expectancies and inheritances of the parties.

(5) The duration of the marriage.

(6) The contribution by one party to the education, training 

or increased earning power of the other party.

(7) The extent to which the earning power, expenses or 

financial obligations of a party will be affected by reason of 

serving as the custodian of a minor child.

(8) The standard of living of the parties established during 

the marriage.

(9) The relative education of the parties and the time 

necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to 

enable the party seeking alimony to find appropriate 

employment.

(10) The relative assets and liabilities of the parties.

(11) The property brought to the marriage by either party.

(12) The contribution of a spouse as homemaker.

(13) The relative needs of the parties.

(14) The marital misconduct of either of the parties during 

the marriage. The marital misconduct of either of the parties 
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from the date of final separation shall not be considered by 

the court in its determinations relative to alimony, except 

that the court shall consider the abuse of one party by the 

other party. As used in this paragraph, “abuse” shall have 

the meaning given to it under section 6102 (relating to 

definitions).

(15) The Federal, State and local tax ramifications of the 

alimony award.

(16) Whether the party seeking alimony lacks sufficient 

property, including, but not limited to, property distributed 

under Chapter 35 (relating to property rights), to provide 

for the party’s reasonable needs.

(17) Whether the party seeking alimony is incapable of selfsupport through appropriate employment.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(b).

Here, the trial court concluded the award of $1.00 was not error. It 

reasoned: 

The Master found, and this Court agreed, that a majority of 

the factors set forth in Section 3701(b) do not support 

awarding alimony to Wife at this time. Of particular 

relevance, th[e trial c]ourt notes that Wife is only slightly 

older than Husband; she is gainfully employed with the 

Department of Defense and earns a respectable annual 

income that is similar to that of Husband; she anticipates a

sizeable CSRS benefit upon her retirement from the 

Department of Defense. Moreover, since this Court upheld 

the Master’s recommendations, Wife is set to receive 55% 

of the marital portion of Husband’s military retirement 

benefit over the next twenty years. Taking all of this into 

consideration, awarding alimony to Wife would not be 

appropriate in this case to effectuate economic justice, as 

the reasonable needs of Wife can be achieved by way of an 

equitable distribution award in addition to the income that 

she receives from her gainful employment with the Federal 

Government.

Although Wife would not be entitled to an award of alimony 

at this time based upon the factors in the Divorce Code, the 

Master, in her R&R, noted her concern that following the 
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issuance of a final divorce decree, Husband may elect to 

convert an additional portion of his military retirement

benefit to disability, thereby depriving Wife from receiving 

her share of the Husband’s military retirement that the 

Master recommended be awarded to Wife as part of 

equitable distribution. To protect Wife against this potential 

scenario, the Master recommended Husband be ordered to 

pay $1.00 per year in alimony to Wife, said alimony award 

to only be modified if Husband converts an additional 

military retirement benefit to disability. In denying Wife’s 

exception to this recommendation, this Court adopted this 

recommendation by the Master. This nominal award of

$1.00 per year is equitable and does not constitute error 

because it acknowledges that an award of alimony to Wife 

is not appropriate given her current financial circumstances, 

but also protects Wife by providing her the option to revisit 

and request modification of her alimony award in the future

should Husband convert his military retirement benefit.

1925(a) Op. at 12-14.

The record supports the court’s factual findings, and it did not abuse its 

discretion in finding an award of alimony of $1.00 per year was sufficient. The 

factors did not support an award of alimony at this time, but the award of 

$1.00 ensured that if Husband converted his military retirement benefits, Wife 

would be able to recover her lost benefit. 

D. Reasonable Counsel Fees

Wife next claims the Master erred in denying her request for reasonable 

counsel fees and expenses. Wife claims Husband’s income “greatly exceeds 

Wife’s income and he has substantially more resources available to him as 

compared to Wife.” Wife’s Br. at 24. She states Husband did not challenge the 

reasonableness of the fees, and alleges that she “absolutely needs to have an 
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award of counsel fees, as the costs for litigating this protracted divorce matter 

have crippled her financially.” Id.

Section 3702 of the Divorce Code provides that “the court may allow a 

spouse . . . reasonable counsel fees and expenses.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3702(a). 

“The purpose of an award of counsel fees is to promote fair administration of 

justice by enabling the dependent spouse to maintain or defend the divorce 

action without being placed at a financial disadvantage; the parties must be 

‘on par’ with one another.” McCoy v. McCoy, 888 A.2d 906, 909 (Pa.Super. 

2005) (quoting Teodorski v. Teodorski, 857 A.2d 194, 201 (Pa.Super. 

2004)). “Counsel fees are awarded based on the facts of each case after a 

review of all the relevant factors. These factors include the payor’s ability to 

pay, the requesting party’s financial resources, the value of the services 

rendered, and the property received in equitable distribution.” Id. (quoting 

Teodorski, 857 A.2d at 201).

The trial court found it was not error to deny Wife’s request for counsel 

fees. It reasoned:

At the December 2018 Hearing before the Master, Wife did 

not express an inability to pay her attorney’s fees, nor did 

she suggest that Husband had acted in a vexatious, dilatory, 

or obdurate manner throughout the course of the divorce 

proceedings. Rather, she merely indicated that she believed 

Husband should pay the attorney’s fees because “[h]e’s the 

one that wanted the divorce”, he raised the idea of a divorce 

“out of the blue”, and, therefore, Wife opined that “this is 

[Husband’s] divorce.” (Notes of Testimony, 12/6/18 Divorce 

Master Hearing, at 208). However, the notion that a party 

can be ordered to pay legal fees in a divorce action merely 

because that party is the one who initiated the divorce is 
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entirely unsubstantiated by Pennsylvania law. In fact, such 

a notion is entirely inconsistent with one of the explicitly 

stated policy objectives of Pennsylvania’s Divorce Code, 

which is to [g]ive primary consideration to the welfare of the 

family rather than the vindication of private rights or the 

punishment of matrimonial wrongs.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. §[ 

]3102(a)(3). 

1925(a) Op. at 14.

The record support the court’s findings and it did not abuse its discretion 

in denying Wife’s request for counsel fees and expenses. Wife is not at a 

financial disadvantage, and fees and costs are not awarded based on who filed 

the divorce complaint. 

E. Factors

Wife next argues that the trial court erred in concluding that she was 

able to meet her reasonable needs. She claims the Master should have 

considered Wife’s expenses in caring for the parties’ grandson, who had been 

in the parties’ joint custody and is now in her primary custody. She claims her 

reasonable needs have increased and her income does not cover her 

expenses. She claims Husband’s needs are met by his income. 

The trial “acknowledge[d] that in addition to her own personal needs, 

Wife is the primary caretaker and provider for her grandchild.” 1925(a) Op. at 

15. The court, however, found there was no evidence “to suggest that Wife’s 

income is insufficient to cover both her and her grandchild’s expenses.” Id.

The court concluded that Wife’s gross annual income was $178,512.00 and 

that, “[e]ven if [Wife’s] $56,112.60 in annual expenses d[id] not include any 

expenses related to providing for her grandchild, a court, without concrete 
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evidence, would be hard pressed to find that Wife would have insufficient 

funds to provide for her grandchild . . . .”3

The court did not abuse its discretion. As the trial court noted, the 

parties’ grandson resides with Wife. However, the evidence presented 

established that Wife had adequate income to cover the expenses she claimed.

F. Unreimbursed Medical Expenses

In her last issue, Wife claims the master and court failed to address her 

concerns that Husband did not pay a percentage of the unreimbursed medical 

expenses. 

Pursuant to a support order, Husband was required to pay 55% of Wife’s 

unreimbursed medical expenses. Compliance with this order relates to the 

support action, not the equitable distribution order, which is the order on 

appeal.

Order affirmed.

____________________________________________

3 We note the trial court referenced Husband’s payment of $908.44 per month

in spousal support. However, we will not consider this payment, as it ceases 

with the entry of the equitable distribution order. See R&R at 23 (noting that 

if the recommendation is upheld, Wife will no longer receive spousal support, 

but will receive 55% of the marital portion of the military retirement, or “about 

$17,594 annually”); 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3103 (defining “alimony pendente lite” as 

“[a]n order for temporary support granted to a spouse during the pendency 

of a divorce or annulment proceeding”).
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 04/01/2021