IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 21-1098

Filed August 17, 2022

IN THE INTEREST OF L.E., E.E., and S.B., 

Minor Children,

S.E., Father, 

Appellant,

M.E., Mother,

Appellant,

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Kimberly Ayotte, 

District Associate Judge.

A mother and father separately appeal the termination of their parental 

rights. AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.

Jonathan M. Causey of Causey & Ye Law P.L.L.C., Des Moines, for 

appellant father.

Nancy L. Pietz, Des Moines, for appellant mother.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Ellen Ramsey-Kacena, Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellee State.

Nicole Garbis Nolan of The Youth Law Center, Des Moines, attorney for 

minor children, E.E. and S.B., and guardian ad litem for minor children.

Magdalena Reece of The Juvenile Public Defender, Des Moines, attorney 

for minor child, L.E.

Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Tabor and Badding, JJ.
2

BADDING, Judge.

Morgan is the mother of three high-needs children—L.E., born in July 2009; 

E.E., born in February 2012; and S.B., born in June 2014. Shane is the father of 

L.E. and E.E., although he has raised S.B. as his own child. The family has a long 

history with the Iowa Department of Human Services, dating back to when L.E. 

was just one year old. Their most recent case started in June 2018 because of

Morgan’s alcoholism. After more than two years of services, the juvenile court 

decided it was time for the children to get off the “endless merry-go-round” of 

removal and reunification with their parents. The court directed the State to file a 

termination petition, which it then granted after a hearing that spanned eight days 

over three months. Both parents appeal,1 challenging each step in the termination 

framework and raising some ancillary issues.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

This family’s story starts in 2009 with the birth of L.E., who has a micro 

chromosome deletion syndrome that causes “cognitive and behavioral 

development issues, including autism spectrum disorder.” When L.E. was just 

eight months old, the department investigated a report related to Morgan’s alcohol 

use. Since then, the family has been the subject of twenty-two family assessments 

and child abuse reports plus three child-in-need-of-assistance proceedings. 

The first founded report against Morgan was in December 2011, when she

was caring for then two-year-old L.E. while intoxicated. A child-in-need-of1 S.B.’s biological father, whose parental rights were also terminated, is not 

involved in this appeal. And although the oldest child at first filed an appeal through 

his attorney, that appeal was withdrawn.
3

assistance petition was filed, resulting in L.E.’s removal from Morgan’s care. 

Although Shane was “very involved” with L.E. at the time, he was living with his 

parents and did not believe he could care for L.E. on a full-time basis. So L.E. was 

placed with his maternal grandmother.

E.E. was born while the first child-in-need-of-assistance case was pending. 

He remained in Morgan’s care after his birth at her residential treatment facility. 

Once Morgan successfully completed treatment, L.E. was returned to her care, 

and the juvenile court proceedings ended in April 2013. Morgan started drinking 

again within months of that case closing. And she kept drinking while pregnant 

with S.B., who was born positive for alcohol and diagnosed with fetal alcohol 

spectrum disorder. 

This led to the family’s second child-in-need-of-assistance case. The 

children were removed from Morgan’s care in August 2014. The older two were 

placed with their maternal grandmother, and the infant was placed with a paternal 

relative. Even though Shane was still involved with the children, he felt it was best 

for them to be with their grandmother. During the second case, Morgan was again 

able to achieve sobriety. The children were returned to her care, and the case was 

closed in July 2015.

The family’s success was short-lived. By January 2016, a report was made 

about Shane’s rough treatment of E.E. as witnessed by a service provider. It was 

not confirmed because E.E. did not have any physical injuries. Later that year, 

Shane was charged with domestic abuse assault against Morgan. Child abuse 

reports continued to be made to the department for the next two years, mostly 

related to claims that Shane was throwing things at L.E. However, none of these 
4

reports were confirmed because, with L.E.’s diagnoses, it was hard to tell what 

was true and what was not. During this time, Morgan started drinking again. And 

L.E.’s behavior became increasingly aggressive and violent. He was hospitalized 

multiple times in 2017 and 2018 “due to physical aggression towards himself and 

others.” 

Things became even more chaotic for the family in 2018, a year marked by 

multiple investigations by the department and visits from the police for help with 

L.E.’s behavior. In May 2018, Shane was again arrested for domestic abuse 

assault after throwing plates at a wall during an argument with Morgan while the 

children were present. A no-contact order was entered, and Shane moved into his 

parents’ home. Later that month, Shane dropped the older two children off at 

Morgan’s home. He left before ensuring they were able to get inside. Morgan was 

asleep and the door was locked, so L.E. had to go to a neighbor’s house to ask for 

help. The department investigated the incident and issued a founded report 

against both Morgan and Shane for failure to provide proper supervision.

In June, L.E. again went to a neighbor’s house for help because “his mother 

was sleeping and wouldn’t wake up.” L.E. was dehydrated and lethargic. When 

the neighbor brought L.E. home, they found Morgan lying on the bed, incoherent. 

The two younger children were sleeping and difficult to wake. Police transported 

Morgan and the children to the hospital. Once there, hospital staff found bottles of 

vodka in Morgan’s purse. Morgan was criminally charged with child 

endangerment, a founded child abuse report was issued against her, and the 

children were once again removed from her care. Because Shane had told a child 

protective worker the month before that “he couldn’t handle being a full time [d]ad,” 
5

the children were placed into shelter care. The parents stipulated to the children’s 

adjudication under Iowa Code section 232.2(6)(c)(2) and (n) (2018). L.E. remained 

in shelter care for several months but, in July, the two younger children were placed 

with Shane.

In the months that followed, Morgan began outpatient substance-abuse 

treatment and continued in individual therapy. Shane received help for the children 

in his care who, like their older brother, had significant mental-health diagnoses. 

These diagnoses meant the children were involved in an array of services, 

including medication management, individual counseling, speech therapy, and 

occupational therapy to name a few. Shane was able to get the children to their 

appointments, but he often reported feeling “exhausted and overwhelmed.”

By 2019, L.E. had transitioned from shelter care, where he experienced a 

significant regression in behaviors, into a psychiatric medical institution for 

children. L.E. did well there and participated in family therapy and home visits with 

Shane. Morgan, however, was not doing well. She attempted suicide in March 

2019 and stopped attending substance-abuse treatment. As a result, the 

department recommended that Morgan’s parental rights to S.B. be terminated in a 

June report to the court. The department further recommended that custody of 

E.E. be transferred to Shane, who also wanted to retain S.B. in his care, and a sixmonth extension be granted as to L.E. In its ensuing permanency order, the 

juvenile court found that, while concerns remained “about the level of progress that 

has been made so far towards the goal of reunification,” a six-month extension 

was “appropriate given [L.E.’s] placement . . . , the father’s intention to remain 

married to the mother, and the mother’s reported recent engagement in treatment.”
6

Morgan did well once she got back into substance-abuse treatment. By the 

time L.E. was ready to be discharged from his psychiatric placement, Morgan felt 

ready to care for him. Shane did not, reporting that he did “not believe he can meet 

[L.E.’s] needs and keep the other children safe with [L.E.] in the home.” In a motion 

to modify L.E.’s placement, the State informed the court that when Morgan “is 

sober, all parties agree that she does a wonderful job parenting this very high 

needs child.” L.E. was accordingly released to his mother’s care in October, while 

the other children continued in Shane’s care.

Unfortunately, Morgan relapsed within months. In January 2020, the 

department received a report that Morgan “was at the children’s school and 

smelled like mouthwash.” When the family’s caseworker arrived at Morgan’s 

apartment, she was intoxicated and caring for L.E. Shane was contacted to see if 

he would take L.E., but he asked that L.E. go to the maternal grandmother’s house 

instead. A couple of weeks later, E.E. showed up to school with a missing tooth. 

He told a child protective worker that “it was loose but his dad knocked it out when 

he was mad at him by hitting him in the face.” 

E.E.’s report was investigated by the department and not confirmed. When 

asked about the tooth, Shane said it happened when he was wrestling with S.B. 

on the floor. E.E. “was on his back. He reported he went to twist him off onto the 

floor. He described that [E.E.’s] tooth hit his elbow and his tooth came out.” 

Shane’s mother was present when this happened and reported the same version 

of events to the child protective worker. The worker observed that E.E. did not 

have “any like mouth trauma or anything. It looked typical of a tooth falling out.” 
7

The two younger children remained in Shane’s care after this report was 

completed until a visit from the family’s caseworker in March. During that visit, 

both E.E. and S.B. told the family’s caseworker that “Shane was angry and hit 

[E.E.] in the face open handedly and accidentally elbowed him in the mouth 

knocking his tooth out.” The caseworker also observed a broken easel in E.E.’s 

bedroom. When asked what happened, the children said Shane threw a “statue 

of a baby white tiger” when he was angry. They also said that he “put a hole in the 

wall” in S.B.’s room. 

With these new disclosures, a hearing to modify the children’s placement 

started in mid-March. While that hearing was pending, E.E. and S.B. were 

removed from Shane’s care and placed with their paternal uncle and his wife. L.E. 

stayed with his maternal grandmother. Morgan entered residential treatment 

where she planned to remain for one year. At the end of the modification hearing, 

the juvenile court found “[t]hese children have been systematically exposed to 

abuse and threats of violence while in the care of Shane.” The court continued:

All the children have struggled with anger issues. This is consistent 

with being exposed to domestic violence/anger management issues 

within the home. Shane has struggle[d] to consistently provide for 

their mental health, physical health, and occupational therapy needs. 

The children have been told not to tell what is happening within the 

home. This places [them] at further risk of ongoing physical and 

emotional abuse.

The court ordered Shane to “address anger management, take accountability for 

the effect of his actions on the children, and participate in their services as 

recommended by their providers.” 

This order marked a turning point of sorts for Morgan and Shane. Morgan 

made great strides in her recovery while in residential treatment. She also began 
8

to seriously address her mental-health issues. Shane did as well by participating 

in individual counseling and taking classes geared toward anger management. 

The parents consistently attended supervised visits with the children, stayed in 

contact with their service providers, went to their medical appointments, and 

participated in their schooling. 

In a July 14, 2020 report to the court, ahead of a permanency hearing the 

next week, the department noted that Morgan was preparing to successfully

discharge from residential treatment. While Morgan said she was okay with E.E. 

and S.B. being placed with her at treatment before her discharge, she told the 

department her facility “would not be able to house” L.E. because of his behaviors. 

So Morgan asked for the children to be placed with Shane. She planned to move 

in with him after her release. The department seemed to go along with this plan, 

recommending in this report that the parents’ visits with the children increase and 

move to semi-supervised. A trial home visit with Shane was also contemplated.

But after the report was filed, the permanency hearing was continued 

because one of the attorneys had a family emergency. By the time the hearing 

was held, the department had abandoned the plan that was outlined in its prior 

report. Rather than having the parents’ visits progress forward, the department 

reduced the in-person visits to ninety minutes per week and recommended 

termination of parental rights. 

A contested hearing began in August and continued for eleven days spread 

out over six months. In the midst of the protracted proceedings, the juvenile court 

entered an order stating that “[v]istation is at [the department’s] discretion with 

input from the children’s therapists.” The parents then filed motions for reasonable 
9

efforts, requesting increased visits with the children. Shane also asked to 

intervene in S.B.’s case. Ultimately, the court entered a permanency order in 

January 2021 denying the motions for reasonable efforts and Shane’s motion to 

intervene. On the question of permanency, the court found:

These children have been on an endless merry-go-round for 

years as they have waited for their mother to demonstrate long-term, 

meaningful sobriety. They have waited for Shane to demonstrate the 

ability to meet their needs. They have waited for a home free from 

violence or threats of harm. The children are in need of permanency.

The court accordingly directed the State to file petitions to terminate the parents’ 

rights.2

The State did so, and a termination hearing began in April. Like the prior 

hearing, the termination proceedings were contentious and took several months to 

complete. Both parents renewed their motions for reasonable efforts, again 

seeking more visits with the children. Shane once more sought to intervene in 

S.B.’s case. And Morgan revealed she was pregnant with her fourth child. 

In the end, the juvenile court entered an order in July 2021 terminating 

Morgan’s parental rights to all three children under Iowa Code 

section 232.116(1)(f) and (i) (2021) and Shane’s parental rights to L.E. and E.E. 

under the same grounds. The court denied the parents’ motions for reasonable 

efforts and Shane’s motion to intervene in S.B.’s case. Morgan and Shane 

appeal.3

2 The parents filed interlocutory appeals of this order, which were denied by our 

supreme court.

3 Despite the parents’ timely appeals, it took about a year for the case to be 

submitted to this court. The transcripts ordered by the parties, which included the 

multiple days of permanency review and termination hearings, totaled 2659 pages. 

On top of these voluminous transcripts are the thousands of pages of pleadings 
10

II. Analysis

We apply a three-step analysis to our de novo review of termination 

proceedings. See In re L.B., 970 N.W.2d 311, 313 (Iowa 2022) (noting that in 

conducting our de novo review, we “give weight to the [court’s] factual findings but 

are not bound by them”). The parents challenge each of the three steps, the first 

of which asks (1) whether a statutory ground for termination is satisfied. Id.; see 

also Iowa Code § 232.116(1). If so, we then consider whether (2) the children’s 

best interests are served by termination and (3) any statutory exceptions exist and 

should be applied to preclude termination. L.B., 970 N.W.2d at 313; see also Iowa 

Code § 232.116(2)–(3). If all three steps support termination, we consider the 

ancillary issues of whether an alternative to termination should be exercised or a 

parent should be granted additional time. See Iowa Code § 232.117(5); see also 

id. § 232.104(2)(b), (d).

A. Grounds for Termination

Although Morgan and Shane challenge both of the grounds for termination 

the juvenile court relied on, we choose to focus on Iowa Code 

section 232.116(1)(f). See In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 707 (Iowa 2010) (“On 

appeal, we may affirm the juvenile court’s termination order on any ground that we 

find supported by clear and convincing evidence.”). The parents contest only the 

last element of this ground—whether the children could safely be returned to their 

home at the present time. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(f)(4) (requiring “clear and 

and exhibits from the child-in-need-of-assistance and termination proceedings. 

While the parents are entitled to their day in court, it bears repeating “that delays 

in the resolution of termination cases is ‘decidedly antagonistic to the children’s 

best interest[s].’” In re C.M., 652 N.W.2d 204, 211 (Iowa 2002) (citation omitted). 
11

convincing evidence that at the present time the child cannot be returned to the 

custody of the child’s parents”); In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 473 (Iowa 2018) 

(stating the same element in section 232.116(1)(h) is satisfied only if “the child 

could not be safely returned” to the parent “at the time of the termination hearing”).

A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting this ground for 

termination implicates the reasonable-effort requirement, which is at the center of 

the parents’ appeals and entwined with their arguments that the State did not meet 

its burden of proof under paragraph (f). See In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 493 (Iowa 

2000) (“The State must show reasonable efforts as a part of its ultimate proof the 

child cannot be safely returned to the care of a parent.”). “When a child has been 

removed from a parent’s care, the State has the responsibility to ‘make every 

reasonable effort to return the child to the child’s home as quickly as possible 

consistent with the best interests of the child.’” In re K.P., No. 11-1869, 2012 

WL 2122227, at *9 (Iowa Ct. App. June 13, 2012) (quoting Iowa Code 

§ 232.102(7)). 

Although the focus of reasonable efforts “is on services to improve 

parenting,” “it also includes visitation designed to facilitate reunification while 

providing adequate protection for the child.” C.B., 611 N.W.2d at 493. The parents 

argue the State failed to make reasonable efforts because they were not afforded

increased or less supervised visits with their children despite their compliance with 

all requested services after March 2020. 

“Visitation, however, cannot be considered in a vacuum. It is only one 

element in what is often a comprehensive, interdependent approach to 

reunification.” In re M.B., 553 N.W.2d 343, 345 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996). “[T]he nature 
12

and extent of visitation is always controlled by the best interests of the child,” which 

may “warrant limited visitation.” Id. If services directed at removing the risk or 

danger responsible for the limited visitation have failed their objective, “increased 

visitation would most likely not be in the child’s best interests.” Id.

In denying the parents’ request to progress with their visits, the juvenile 

court found:

These children have experienced significant trauma by Shane and 

Morgan. . . . They have been exposed over a period of years to 

substance abuse, domestic violence, physical and emotional abuse, 

and neglect. They have been prohibited by their parents from 

sharing information with mandatory reporters. Shane and Morgan 

deny that intentional abuse has happened. That position affects the 

children’s feelings of safety and security with their parents. The 

children have disrupted attachments with one or both of their parents. 

It is accountability work, not visitation that will repair the children’s 

sense of safety.

Shane and Morgan stress that they took accountability for their actions, 

pointing to their work in individual therapy, couples’ counseling, family therapy, 

Shane’s anger management and parenting classes, and their accountability letters 

to E.E. But that work was not successful. After E.E.’s accountability session with 

Shane, E.E. shut down and told his therapist to “[c]ancel Mom’s letter.” He was 

fearful of Shane, reporting that he only felt safe at visits because they were 

supervised. As a result, the therapist recommended that the visits remain 

supervised in a neutral location. And while both Shane and Morgan acknowledged 

their actions harmed the children, they refused to admit that Shane did so

intentionally. The most Shane would acknowledge was that he “intentionally 

harmed [his] children by . . . lack of proper care of both [himself] and [the] kids.” 
13

The parents argue that this case is like K.P., 2012 WL 2122227, at *11, 

where we found the juvenile court erred in denying the mother’s motion for 

reasonable efforts to increase visitation and attempt reunification. The mother in 

that case, like Shane and Morgan, “participated in numerous services and made 

improvements in her life.” K.P., 2012 WL 2122227, at *10. We found that she did 

“everything that every service provider and the juvenile court ha[d] asked of her,”

as Shane and Morgan have since March 2020, “except give a different explanation 

for the injury than that found by the juvenile court.” Id. And “[e]very supervised 

visitation has gone well, and she parented appropriately on all those occasions”—

the same as Shane and Morgan. Id. We concluded the fact that the mother’s 

progress was “at a ‘standstill’ is not a result of the mother failing in her treatment 

or being unreceptive to services, but on [the department’s] requirement she admit 

guilt before receiving additional services.” Id.; accord In re C.H., 652 N.W.2d 144, 

150 (Iowa 2002).

But a “parent’s failure to address his or her role in the abuse may hurt the 

parents’ chances of regaining custody and care of their children.” C.H., 652 

N.W.2d at 150. That is what happened here—the parents’ minimization of the 

children’s abuse prevented them from moving forward, as did their long history of 

involvement with the department in the decade leading up to the termination 

proceedings. That history was not present in K.P., 2012 WL 2122227, at *1, which 

involved an isolated incident of abuse. See In re T.S., 868 N.W.2d 425, 444–45 

(Iowa Ct. App. 2015) (noting termination cases are “intensely fact-based” and 

“whether to reverse or not is often based on a single, or seemingly minor fact or 

factor”). 
14

Had this case started in March 2020, we would have much less trouble 

concluding that the parents’ requests for more visitation should have been granted. 

But by the time the parents started engaging in services, the case had been open 

for more than a year and seen an extension of time, a return of the children, and 

then their removal after Morgan’s relapse and Shane’s inability to control his anger. 

A social work supervisor assigned to the case in its late stages recognized the 

parents’ progress and commended them for it, as do we. But once she dug into 

the case, the supervisor concluded:

While Morgan and Shane could be considered minimally 

adequate for a neurotypical child at this time, they have three special 

needs children. The Department needs to consider whether Morgan 

and Shane are minimally adequate for these children. The parents 

are currently doing well in their engagement in services, [but] history 

has shown that Morgan cannot maintain long-term sobriety and 

Shane struggles with coping appropriately with his anger as well as 

adapting his parenting strategies to the child’s needs. The stress of 

parenting three children with special needs and an infant in one 

household while in a relationship with a history of domestic violence 

increases the likelihood of Morgan relapsing and increases the risk 

of abuse and neglect of the children.

We agree. The efforts these parents have made since the children were 

last removed from their care cannot be overlooked. But given what came before, 

there was still so much work to do before the children could safely be returned. 

See In re L.M., No. 19-0165, 2019 WL 1486618, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2019) 

(“A parent’s past performance is a reliable indicator of what the children can expect 

going forward.”). We accordingly find clear and convincing evidence that the State 

made reasonable efforts to reunify the children with these parents but, despite 

those efforts, grounds for termination exist under section 232.116(1)(f).
15

B. Best Interests

Shane and Morgan next argue that termination was not in their children’s 

best interests. In examining this question, we give primary consideration to the 

children’s safety; the best placement for furthering their long-term nurturing and 

growth; and their physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs. See Iowa 

Code § 232.116(2); see also In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010). 

All of the many professionals involved here testified that these children were 

in desperate need of stability. The years-long cycle of removal, return, and 

removal have harmed each one of them. See L.M., 2019 WL 1486618, at *4 

(finding termination was in the children’s best interests where they faced a similar 

“experience of removal followed by return followed by removal”). The longer the 

case wore on, the more the children’s behaviors worsened, which their therapists 

attributed to the lack of permanency in their lives. As the social worker supervisor 

questioned, “when do we say enough is enough” for these children? They need 

and deserve permanency now. See C.B., 611 N.W.2d at 494 (stating that once 

grounds for termination have been established, the “proceedings must be viewed 

with a sense of urgency”). On our review of the record, we find the children’s best 

interests are served by termination of both parents’ rights. 

C. Permissive Exceptions

Both Shane and Morgan claim termination would be detrimental to the 

children because of the closeness of the parent-child relationships. See Iowa 

Code § 232.116(3)(c). They also assert termination is unnecessary because “[a] 

relative has legal custody of the child[ren],” and L.E. “is over ten years of age and 

objects to the termination.” Id. § 232.116(3)(a), (b).
16

We begin by noting that the factors in section 232.116(3) “are permissive, 

not mandatory.” In re A.R., 932 N.W.2d 588, 591 (Iowa Ct. App. 2019). With that 

in mind, we find it is clear from the record that all three children are bonded to the 

parents at some level. But, as one therapist explained, a bond is different from an

attachment: “So a bond is . . . maybe that there’s the ability to have loving feelings 

and affection. Attachment is more with a felt sense of safety, security, and trust.” 

All the children’s attachments to their parents were ruptured, some more than 

others. Morgan was still working on her attachment to S.B. in family therapy. And 

neither parent had started attachment work with E.E., who was resistant to therapy

sessions with them. While there was evidence that terminating Morgan’s parental 

rights to L.E. would be detrimental, we cannot say that it was enough to override 

his need for a safe and permanent home. Given the back-and-forth all of these 

children have already experienced in their young lives, we decline to exercise any 

of these permissive exceptions. See A.S., 906 N.W.2d at 475 (“We may use our 

discretion ‘based on the unique circumstances of each case and the best interests 

of the child, whether to apply the factors in this section to save the parent-child 

relationship.’” (citation omitted)).

Morgan relatedly claims the juvenile court should have placed L.E. in the 

guardianship of his maternal grandmother, which was the State’s recommendation 

at the beginning of the termination proceedings. But that recommendation largely 

flowed from the fact that the department had been unable to find a foster home 

willing to care for L.E. and his special needs, including the paternal uncle’s home 

where the younger two children were placed. That changed by the end of the 

proceedings. 
17

The paternal uncle and aunt began visiting L.E. at his shelter placement in 

March 2021 when he was removed from his grandmother’s care for a short time

after she hurt her hand. The visits went well, prompting the relatives to inform the 

department in June that they were willing to be a concurrent home for L.E. The 

State accordingly changed its recommendation to termination. We agree that was 

a better permanency option for L.E., despite the close and loving relationship he 

shared with his grandmother. At the time of the termination hearing, she was 

seventy-two years old and dependent on a walker. While she was able to deal 

with L.E.’s behaviors, there was some concern from L.E.’s medical providers about 

her long-term ability to care for him. We have also considered that “a guardianship 

is not a legally preferable alternative to termination.” Id. at 477 (citation omitted). 

For these reasons, we agree with the juvenile court’s decision to not place L.E. in 

his maternal grandmother’s guardianship.

D. Additional Time

Morgan finally argues that the “[e]vidence presented to the [c]ourt supported 

a finding that i[t] was reasonably likely that the children could be returned to the 

custody of their parents within the next six months.” See Iowa Code 

§§ 232.117(5), .104(2)(b) (allowing the juvenile court to grant additional time if 

parental rights are not terminated after the termination hearing). But the parents 

were already granted an extension of time in these lengthy proceedings. Given 

how long these children have already been out of their home, we must view the 

case with a sense of urgency. In re A.A.G., 708 N.W.2d 85, 93 (Iowa Ct. App. 

2005); see C.B., 611 N.W.2d at 495. Considering the history of this case, we 
18

cannot say the need for removal would no longer exist at the end of the extension. 

See Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b). So we deny Morgan’s request for more time.4

E. Motion to Intervene

This leaves us with Shane’s motion to intervene in the termination 

proceeding for S.B.,

5

the denial of which we review for the correction of errors at 

law. See In re A.G., 558 N.W.2d 400, 403 (Iowa 1997). While the juvenile court 

refused to grant Shane’s motion to intervene in S.B.’s case, this ruling did not result 

in any prejudice to him. S.B.’s termination proceeding was tried at the same time 

as the proceedings for the other children. Shane was allowed to present evidence 

and argument in opposition to termination for all three children. Thus, if any error 

occurred in the court’s denial of intervention, it was not prejudicial to Shane “and 

serves as no basis for reversal of the juvenile court ruling.” In re V.S.S., 

No. 04-1463, 2004 WL 2805535, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 8, 2004).

III. Conclusion

We find clear and convincing evidence that the State made reasonable 

efforts to reunify the children with these parents but, despite those efforts, grounds 

for termination exist under section 232.116(1)(f). We further find that termination 

is in the children’s best interests and that no permissive exception should be 

4 We also find the miscellaneous claims Morgan makes without citation to the 

record or supporting authority have been waived, specifically her objection to 

“impermissible questioning by the guardian ad litem in the proceedings spanning 

from August 2020 until June 2021” and the juvenile court’s refusal to allow an 

unspecified offer of proof. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(2)(g)(3); L.N.S. v. 

S.W.S., 854 N.W.2d 699, 703 (Iowa Ct. App. 2013) (“Where a party has failed to 

present any substantive analysis or argument on an issue, the issue has been 

waived.”).

5 Although Shane also mentions his motion to intervene in the permanency 

proceeding, his argument is limited to the motion in the termination proceeding.
19

applied to preclude that result. We agree with the juvenile court’s rejection of a 

guardianship for the oldest child and its denial of Morgan’s request for additional 

time. Finally, we conclude that if any error occurred in the court’s denial of 

intervention, it was not prejudicial to Shane. The court’s ruling is affirmed as to 

both parents.

AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.