Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-1445 | December 28, 2020 Page 1 of 10

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Alex M. Ooley

Borden, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Sierra A. Murray

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Eric W. Guthrie,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

December 28, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

20A-CR-1445

Appeal from the Washington 

Superior Court

The Honorable Frank E. 

Newkirk, Jr., Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

88D01-1712-F2-854

Sharpnack, Senior Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-1445 | December 28, 2020 Page 2 of 10

Statement of the Case

[1] Eric W. Guthrie pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine as a Level 4

felony1and was sentenced to six years executed in the Indiana Department of 

Correction (DOC). He appeals his sentence. We affirm.

Issues

[2] Guthrie presents the following two issues for our review:

1. Whether his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature 

of the offense and the character of the offender; and

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing 

Guthrie to six years executed in the DOC with no time 

suspended.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] At approximately 11:00 p.m. on December 10, 2017, Deputy Tory Hildreth 

with the Washington County Sheriff’s Department observed a Ford F150 truck

with a broken taillight make a right hand turn without using a turn signal in 

Salem, Indiana. Deputy Hildreth initiated a traffic stop. Guthrie was identified 

as the driver of the truck, and Cierra Knieriem was identified as the passenger. 

[4] Additional law enforcement officers arrived at the scene to lend assistance, 

including Washington County Sheriff’s Deputy Brad Naugle and Officer Chad 

1

Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6.1(c)(2) (2014).
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Webb with the Salem City Police Department. Officer Webb saw what he 

believed to be a drug pipe on the rear passenger side floorboard of the truck. 

The pipe field tested positive for methamphetamine. Guthrie and his passenger 

were asked to step out of the truck and were handcuffed. The truck was 

searched and inventoried. A second pipe and a partially burned marijuana 

cigarette were discovered in the truck’s center console. 

[5] Deputy Naugle read Knieriem her Miranda rights and then spoke with her. 

Knieriem stated that she had been to Guthrie’s home and had observed a bag 

containing approximately a quarter ounce of marijuana in Guthrie’s bedroom 

and used needles in a closet. Deputy Naugle then read Guthrie his Miranda

rights. Guthrie told Deputy Naugle that the only drugs that would be found at 

his home would be two marijuana cigarettes. 

[6] Based on the information obtained during the traffic stop, a search warrant was 

obtained for Guthrie’s residence. A search of the residence was conducted 

shortly after midnight on December 11, 2017. During the search, the officers 

collected numerous drug related items, including methamphetamine. Guthrie 

was arrested and charged with a total of twenty-five drug related offenses. 

[7] On January 8, 2020, Guthrie pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to 

one count of Level 4 felony possession of methamphetamine. In exchange, the 

State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges. The agreement left sentencing to 

the discretion of the trial court but capped the executed time at twelve years. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-1445 | December 28, 2020 Page 4 of 10

That same day, the trial court accepted Guthrie’s guilty plea and entered a 

judgment of conviction.

[8] On July 8, 2020, the trial court sentenced Guthrie to six years executed in the 

DOC with no time suspended. At sentencing, the trial court provided the 

following statement: 

So I have a decision here. And I want to tell you that I have 

made an evaluation as required by law of the aggravating and 

mitigating circumstances. Which I found to be an aggravator, 

the fact that there is a history of criminal activity. I also find as 

mitigators that the defendant did accept guilt for a crime and 

entered into this open plea. Also, the fact that his son is without 

a mother now has been considered as a possible hardship, but I 

can’t really find that it’s an undue hardship,[2] but I have listed it 

under the categories of mitigating factors. And the reason that I 

can’t find that its [sic] an undue hardship, is the fact that there 

has not been payment of support and the fact that there are 

grandparents who are guardians of the child now. But I have 

listed it under the mitigating factor section. So I don’t really 

know whether you would have done well on probation, but I’m 

not going to put you on probation. I am simply going to impose 

the advisory sentence of six years for this.

Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 36-38. Guthrie now appeals.

2 Guthrie testified that his son’s mother is deceased. 
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Discussion and Decision

I. Inappropriate Sentence

[9] Guthrie argues his six-year sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his 

offense and his character. 

We may review and revise criminal sentences pursuant to the 

authority derived from Article 7, Section 6 of the Indiana 

Constitution. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) empowers us to revise 

a sentence “if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, 

the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the 

nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Because 

a trial court’s judgment “should receive considerable 

deference[,]” our principal role is to “leaven the outliers.” 

Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222-25 (Ind. 2008). “Such 

deference should prevail unless overcome by compelling 

evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense 

(such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) 

and the defendant’s character (such as substantial virtuous traits 

or persistent examples of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 

N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015). The defendant bears the burden to 

persuade this court that his or her sentence is inappropriate, 

Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006), and we may 

look to any factors appearing in the record for such a 

determination. Stokes v. State, 947 N.E.2d 1033, 1038 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2011), trans. denied.

Reis v. State, 88 N.E.3d 1099, 1101-02 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). The question under 

Appellate Rule 7(B) analysis is “not whether another sentence is more

appropriate” but rather “whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate.” King 

v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Whether a sentence is 

inappropriate “turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-1445 | December 28, 2020 Page 6 of 10

severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that 

come to light in a given case.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224. 

[10] We begin with the advisory sentence in determining the appropriateness of a 

sentence. Childress, 848 N.E.2d 1073. Since the advisory sentence is the 

starting point our General Assembly has selected as an appropriate sentence for 

the crime committed, the defendant bears a particularly heavy burden in 

persuading us that his sentence is inappropriate when the trial court imposes 

the advisory sentence. Golden v. State, 862 N.E.2d 1212, 1216 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2007), trans. denied. The sentencing range for a Level 4 felony is “a fixed term 

of between two (2) and twelve (12) years, with the advisory sentence being six 

(6) years.” Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5.5 (2014). Guthrie was sentenced to the 

advisory sentence for the Level 4 felony. 

[11] To determine the nature of the offense, we examine the details and 

circumstances surrounding the offense. Washington v. State, 940 N.E.2d 1220, 

1222 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. Here, when officers executed the 

search of Guthrie’s residence, they found evidence of drug use and drug 

dealing, including drug paraphernalia with drug residue inside, packaging 

materials, measuring spoons, weight scales, ten cell phones, and firearms. 

Originally, Guthrie was charged with twenty-five drug related offenses, which 

included felony and misdemeanor charges for dealing in and possession of 

methamphetamine, dealing in and possession of heroin, maintaining a common 

nuisance, and possession of a synthetic or synthetic lookalike drug. Guthrie

ultimately pleaded guilty to one count of Level 4 felony possession of 
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methamphetamine. He maintains that because his offense was a nonviolent 

offense he should have been sentenced to time served and probation. However,

we find that nothing about the nature and circumstances of Guthrie’s offense 

leads us to the conclusion that his six-year sentence is inappropriate.

[12] The character of the offender is found in what we learn of the offender’s life and 

conduct. Perry v. State, 78 N.E.3d 1, 13 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). When 

considering the character of the offender, one relevant fact is the defendant’s 

criminal history. Johnson v. State, 986 N.E.2d 852, 857 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). 

Guthrie argues that his sentence is inappropriate as to his character because, 

among other things, he has had no felony convictions prior to the instant case; 

he has not been charged with any violent offenses; he was not on probation at 

the time he committed the instant offense; and he has not been convicted of 

committing a crime in over ten years.

[13] Guthrie’s criminal history includes the following: In 1997, he was charged with 

public intoxication and minor consumption of alcohol. He was granted a 

deferral and the charges were eventually dismissed. The following year, he was 

charged with conspiracy to commit burglary. He entered into and successfully 

completed a pretrial diversion program for the offense. In July of 2006, he was 

charged with and pleaded guilty to operating a vehicle with .08 B.A.C. or 

greater. He was sentenced to sixty days with fifty-eight days suspended and 

placed on supervised probation for six months. We acknowledge that Guthrie’s 

criminal history is not extensive and resulted in few convictions; however, it 

still reflects poorly on his character and shows he was not deterred by previous 
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contacts with the criminal justice system from committing the current offenses. 

See Reis, 88 N.E.3d at 1105 (noting that “[e]ven a minor criminal record reflects 

poorly on a defendant’s character”). Given Guthrie’s criminal history – as well 

as his failure to pay child support, which also reflects poorly on his character –

we cannot say that his sentence is inappropriate for his character.

[14] Under these facts and circumstances, we find that both the nature of the offense 

and Guthrie’s character support the six-year sentence imposed by the trial court. 

Guthrie’s sentence is not inappropriate. 

II. Abuse of Discretion at Sentencing

[15] “[S]entencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and 

are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 

N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218. “So long as 

the sentence is within the statutory range, it is subject to review only for abuse 

of discretion.” Id. An abuse of discretion occurs “if the decision is ‘clearly 

against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or 

the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.’” Id.

(citation omitted). 

[16] First, Guthrie argues that the trial court abused its discretion at sentencing by 

failing to consider probation as a term of his sentence. However, to the 

contrary, the court did consider placing Guthrie on probation. In its sentencing 

statement, the trial court specifically noted that it did not know “whether 

[Guthrie] would have done well on probation” and ultimately determined that 
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it was “not going to put [Guthrie] on probation.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 38. 

Furthermore, we remind Guthrie that “consideration and imposition of 

alternatives to incarceration is a ‘matter of grace’ left to the discretion of the 

trial court.” See Wolf v. State, 793 N.E.2d 328, 330 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)

(quoting Million v. State, 646 N.E.2d 998, 1001-02 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995)). 

Because the trial court had the discretion to determine that incarceration was 

more appropriate than probation, its exercise of this discretion was not an abuse 

of discretion.

[17] Guthrie next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to

provide detailed reasons for imposing the fully executed sentence. Guthrie also 

argues that the trial court’s statement that it did not know “if [Guthrie] would 

do well on probation” “is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and 

circumstances before the court” because, according to Guthrie, the presentence 

investigation report recommended that he be placed on probation, and his prior 

successful completions of pretrial diversion and a six-month term of probation 

“show[ed] that he could do well under conditions similar to probation.” Reply 

Br. p. 5.

[18] It is well settled that a trial court may abuse its discretion by failing to enter 

a sentencing statement at all, by explaining reasons for imposing a sentence not 

supported by the record, or if “the sentencing statement omits reasons that are 

clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration[.]” Anglemyer, 

868 N.E.2d at 491. However, here, because the trial court sentenced Guthrie to 

the advisory sentence of six years for the Level 4 felony, the trial court was not 
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required to enter a sentencing statement. See Ward v. State, 113 N.E.3d 1242, 

1245 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (“[A] trial court is not required to enter a sentencing 

statement if it imposes the advisory sentence for a felony conviction.”); see also

Ind. Code § 35-38-1-1.3 (2014) (“After a court has pronounced a sentence for a 

felony conviction, the court shall issue a statement of the court’s reasons for 

selecting the sentence that it imposes unless the court imposes the advisory 

sentence for the felony.”). Though not required to do so, the trial court 

nevertheless entered a sentencing statement indicating that it considered

Guthrie’s criminal history as an aggravating factor and considered as mitigating 

factors Guthrie’s guilty plea and Guthrie’s argument regarding the undue 

hardship on his son that imprisonment would cause because Guthrie’s son is 

without a mother. The court also considered probation as an alternative to 

incarceration. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced 

Guthrie. 

Conclusion

[19] For the reasons stated, we conclude that Guthrie’s six-year sentence is 

not inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character and that 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion at sentencing.

[20] Affirmed.

Bailey, J., and Altice, J., concur.