* Effective March 31, 1995, the functions of the Secr etary of Health and

Human Services in social security cases were transf erred to the Commissioner of Social Security. P.L. No. 103-296. In the text we continue to refer to the Secretary because she was the appropriate party at the time of the underlying administrative decision.

** This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

*** Honorable Robin J. Cauthron, District Judge, UnitedStates District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, sitting by de signation. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### APR 2 1997 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

MARQUIS L. JONES,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. SHIRLEY S. CHATER, Commissioner, Social Security Administration, *

Defendant-Appellee. No. 96-5151 (D.C. No. 95-C-474-W) (N.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT **

Before BRORBY and KELLY, Circuit Judges, and CAUTHR ON, *** District Judge.1 By consent of the parties, this matter was assignedto a magistrate judge for

adjudication. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 73. -2- After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a dec ision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Th e case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Claimant Marquis L. Jones appeals from the order of the magistrate judge affirming the Secretary of Health and Human Service s’ denial of his application for supplemental security income benefits (SSI). 1 Claimant, a thirty-four-year-old man with a GED, claims disability from June 1992, d ue to back pain and depression. Claimant’s application for SSI benefits was denied initially and on reconsideration. Following a hearing, the administrative law judge (ALJ) denied claimant’s application at step five of the sequenti al process applied to determine disability. See Williams v. Bowen , 844 F.2d 748, 750-51 (10th Cir. 1988) (setting forth the five steps in detail). The ALJ found that although claimant could not return to his past relevant work as a mac hinist helper or a truck driver, he retained the residual functional capacity to per form a full range of sedentary, light, and medium work. The district court affirme d the decision of the Secretary, and claimant appeals.-3-

Our review of the Secretary’s decision is limited t o determining whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence and whether the Secretary applied correct legal standards. See Castellano v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs. , 26 F.3d 1027, 1028 (10th Cir. 1994). “To find th at the Secretary’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, ther e must be sufficient relevant evidence in the record that a reasonable person mig ht deem adequate to support the ultimate conclusion.” Bernal v. Bowen , 851 F.2d 297, 299 (10th Cir. 1988). However, we may neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute our judgment for that of the Secretary. See id. An individual is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act only if his impairments are so severe that he “is n ot only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, an d work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which ex ists in the national economy.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). If a claimant meets his burden of proving that he cannot return to his past work, the burden shifts t o the Secretary to show that the claimant can perform other jobs in the national eco nomy. Ray v. Bowen , 865 F.2d 222, 224 (10th Cir. 1989). On appeal, claimant argues that (1) the ALJ’s evalu ation of claimant’s mental impairment on the Psychiatric Review Techniq ue Form was not supported by the evidence; (2) the ALJ erred in concluding th at claimant’s mental-4-

impairment was not severe; (3) the ALJ failed to ad equately develop the record as to claimant’s I.Q.; and (4) the ALJ failed to adequ ately develop the record as to claimant’s mental impairment. The only issue claim ant raised to the district court was his contention that the ALJ failed to adequatel y develop the record as to his mental impairment. Because our scope of review is limited to those issues properly preserved and presented to the district co urt, the remaining issues are deemed waived. See Crow v. Shalala , 40 F.3d 323, 324 (10th Cir. 1994) The parties are familiar with the underlying facts, andwe will not restate them here. Where the evidence presented to the ALJ reveals that the claimant suffers from a mental disorder, but contains insufficient m edical evidence to evaluate the disorder and its effects on the claimant’s ability to work, the ALJ has a duty to further develop the record. See Carter v. Chater , 73 F.3d 1019, 1021-22 (10th Cir. 1996). Here, the record contains objective ev idence supporting claimant’s contention that he suffers from depression. Theref ore, the ALJ had a duty to, and did, develop the record concerning claimant’s depre ssion. See id. at 1022. The ALJ fulfilled his duty to develop the record byobtaining additional medical records as to material issues which came to his attention during the hearing testimony. See Carter , 73 F.3d at 1022. In conclusion, as developed, th e record contained sufficient medical evidence to eva luate claimant’s mental disorder.-5-

The judgment of the United States District Court fo r the Northern District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court

Paul J. Kelly, Jr. Circuit Judge