Til liiiiii i

CSI REPORT

NO. 13

TACTICAL RESPONSES TO

CONCENTRATED ARTILLERY

COMBAT

STUDIES

INSTITUTE

90-1775
CSI Reports are short-term research papers

prepared in response to official inquiries. They

are based mainly on secondary sources and

provide basic information on the subject under

consideration. The views expressed in a CSI

Report are those of the author and not

necessarily those of the Department of the

Army or the Department of Defense.

Combat Studies Institute

Missions

The Combat Studies Institute was established on 18 June

1979 as a department-level activity within the U.S. Army

Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth,

Kansas. CSI has the following missions:

1. Conduct research on historical topics pertinent to the

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coordination of an integrated, progressive program of military

history instruction in the TRADOC service school system.
CSI REPORT

NO. 13

TACTICAL RESPONSES TO

CONCENTRATED ARTILLERY

Combat Studies Institute

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900

90-1775
In this publication, when the masculine gender is

used, both men and women are included.
CONTENTS

Page

Preface v

Introduction 1

Chapter

1 Soviet Artillery in Battle: A Historical Perspective 13

by Lieutenant Colonel James R. Holbrook

2 World War I: Elastic Defense and the U.S. 3d Division at

the Marne River 33

by Lieutenant Colonel Michael E. Dunn

3 The Impact of Massive Artillery Fires on Command,

Control, and Communications in the European and

North African Theaters During World War II 57

by Lieutenant Colonel Roy R. Stephenson

4 German Counterartillery Measures on the Eastern Front

in 1944-45: Operation Bagration 73

by Dr. Samuel J. Lewis

5 Japanese Counterartillery Methods on Okinawa,

April-June 1945 93

by Dr. Thomas M. Huber

6 The Korean War: The United Nations' Response to

Heavy Bombardment 107

by Dr. William Glenn Robertson

7 The Korean War: Chinese Forces' Response to Heavy

Bombardment 119

by Dr. Gary J. Bjorge

8 Israeli Defensive Measures Against Arab Artillery 131

by Dr. George W. Gawrych

in

PREFACE

The focus of this study is on how the armies of different nations;

countered the threat of massive concentrated artillery and/or other

types of preparatory fires. Not all were successful, and the reasons

for the success or failure of each army provides the contemporary

military commander an opportunity to learn from his "predecessors"

and benefit from their hard-learned lessons.

INTRODUCTION

The Western Front in World War I provides the classic case of a

response by defending armies to concentrated artillery fire. This is

the standard to which even conflicts as far removed as the recent

Iran-Iraq War are compared. All the methods available to counter

heavy artillery concentrations were present in the Great War:

fortification, armor, dispersion, constant movement, deception,

counterfire, and ground attack on the gun line. Yet the Great War

did not start out as an artillery war. Initially, the armies that became

locked in combat on the Western Front had seen artillery only as an

auxiliary to a battle between bodies of infantry and cavalry. The

scale of artillery used in earlier battles was modest compared to that

of later struggles where the number of artillerymen engaged could

approach the infantry strength as close as 8 to 10.1 Prewar tactical

emphasis was on light quick-firing artillery capable of supporting

forces fighting in the open, creating and protecting flanks, and

maintaining the advance of maneuver forces. Only the Germans,

who had to overcome Belgian frontier forts, invested much in heavy

artillery. Tactical doctrine was offensive, suitable it was thought, to

the spirit of the contending nations. It was not, of course, suitable

to the conditions of war the two sides found on the World War I

battlefield.

The contending armies were forced to ground at first, not by the

artillery, but by the fire of magazine rifles and the limited number of

machine guns available at the start of the war. By the end of 1914,

the armies faced each other across a no-man's-land from fairly

shallow trench systems that extended in breadth from the Alps to

the English Channel. It was then that artillery, particularly indirect

artillery of medium and heavy calibers, came into its own. Artillery

became the means to open new flanks by blasting penetrations into

enemy trench systems. For the defender, it became the means of
protecting or covering flanks. The attacker's artillery was required

to suppress the defender's direct-fire systems, to cut the defender's

wire entanglements that denied access to his trench lines, to

destroy the defender's positions, to block relief by his reserves

during an attack, and to neutralize the defender's artillery.

Knocking out the defender's guns would prevent him from

bombarding the attacker's artillery, his command and control, the

assaulting infantry, and those reserves that would concentrate on

the attacker's side of no-man's-land to sustain an offensive once

launched. On 1 July 1916, British units suffered significant numbers

of casualties on the way to their jumping-off point.2 By 1916,

sufficient artillery, guns, and stocks of ammunition were available to

give meaning to the aphorism, "Artillery conquers, infantry

Occupies."3

The creation of great concentrations of artillery, capable of

breaking a pathway into enemy trench systems, forced a change in

defensive tactics. Both sides moved to deeper defensive systems,

with German Colonel Fritz von Lossberg developing what has

become the classic concept of elastic defense.4 This called for a

thinning out of forward defenses, always subject to destruction by

enemy preparation fires. Lossberg recognized that artillery could

blast a path for infantry forces for a distance limited by its maximum

range. Once this distance was reached, however, the infantry

forces would find themselves at a distinct handicap with regard to

heavy fire support. Indeed, if maneuver forces could be held back,

out of the attacker's beaten zone, the attacker's forces could be

struck with a counterattack while they were still suffering from "the

disorganizing effects of victory,"5 the random and disorganizing

losses that accompanied any advance. Their withdrawal could be

blocked by a standing barrage, and they could be destroyed out of

sight of their own supporting fires.
Conceptually, the scheme of defense called for sighting a security

zone on the military crest of a piece of high ground. Since the

Germans had occupied about one-third of France in their initial

advance, they could select a good defensive line and then withdraw

to it, which they did on a large scale at least twice during the war.

Such a withdrawal was clearly more difficult for the Allies. The

defender would set up his forward line of defense on the reverse

slope of the terrain feature, out of direct observation and free from

direct or observed fires. Even this line was designed only to resist

local attacks, not general offensives. Behind this line was a zone of

machine-gun posts and/or successive trench lines whose purpose

was to support the forward defense line and to break up the

coherence of attacking forces strong enough to overcome the

forward defense. This zone was deep enough to draw the attacker

out from under his own artillery support, and it led to a final line of

resistance behind which were fresh counterattack troops whose

purpose was to apply that "flashing sword of vengeance,"6 which

Carl von Clausewitz saw as the source of the greater strength of the

defensive form, hopefully to restore the entire defensive zone. The

counterattack was the most important feature of the elastic defense,

and it remained a characteristic of German defensive fighting

through World War II. Interestingly enough, reserves designated for

the counterattack were committed under the command of the officer

responsible for a zone of the defensive system notwithstanding the

relative rank of the commander of the counterattack force versus

the commander of the defensive zone. This provided for the ability

to respond before the attacker could knit his own defense together

when the advance was stopped.

To deal with this sort of defensive zone, the armies armed their

maneuver forces with far more effective accompanying weapons

and decentralized their tactical execution. The combination of

infiltration tactics and limited objective attacks could minimize the

effect of the elastic defense and increase the cost to the defender,
but it could not lead to the strategic or operational success

necessary to bring the war to the end. The war of attrition, always

the consequence of an inability to win a decisive victory or find a

basis for negotiation, continued. This proved to be the case no less

on Okinawa and in Korea than on the Somme.

In World War II, several of the World War I problems were

corrected. Operationally, tactical air support provided

compensation for the immobility of an attacker's cannon artillery.

Mechanized forces, protected from small-arms and machine-gun

fire, using infiltration tactics and now controlled by radio, could

break through an enemy's defensive zone and exploit into the

operational depths, disrupting the coherence of the whole defense

until the defender too adapted to the requirements of mechanized

warfare, learned to control his own reserves (mechanized and air)

by radio, and recognized that defensive zones would have to be

deepened to correspond to the geometric increase in mobility

inherent in the shift from foot to mechanical traction or even aerial

insertion. For all that, the tactical problem remained very much the

same: absorb the enemy's preparation fires, break up his attack,

counterattack to destroy his forces, and restore the defense. While

the decisive defensive battle might now be fought by operational

reserves upon whose success or failure the entire theater defense

might rest, this was so largely because the defensive fighting in

secondary zones remained very much what it had been in World

War I. Modern armies, dependent on umbilical cords from their

rear, can move as self-sustained forces only for limited periods of

time. The "immobile mass,M or fixing force, protects the movement

of the means of sustainment from interference by enemy ground

combat units. By its presence, it requires the concentration of the

breakthrough force on limited axes. In World War II, the opposing

infantry divisions provided the framework for the mobile battles, and

to the extent that forces will continue to be required to hold ground

in modern defensive combat, they will continue to do the same.
To understand the tactical counters to artillery available to

maneuver forces, one must first place artillery in the combined arms

context and recognize its strengths and weaknesses. Artillery is a

means of placing destructive effects, normally of greater extent than

those possible by direct-fire weapons, at greater distances than can

be achieved by direct-fire systems. Artillery systems are flexible

because they are able to shift the effects of their fire without moving

their weapons, a consequence of their range. They are generally

handicapped by the weight of their ammunition which, as a direct

result of the need for range and effect, is heavy and bulky.

Artillery fires can be characterized as being area or precision.

The function of area fires is normally neutralization. Destruction by

such means is generally prohibitively expensive in both time and

weight of metal. With the exception of nuclear weapons, which

have their own drawbacks, it takes a large number of weapons and

a great amount of ammunition to achieve the density of fire

necessary to suppress a large area of ground. This normally

requires a large number of ammunition carriers or some sort of

prestockage that, in turn, provides some evidence of intentions and

additional congestion of road nets. Where targets can be located

with precision, predicted fire can reduce the weight of ammunition

required, but the total is still significant. Today, we count on smart

munitions and precise acquisition systems to keep the total weight

of ammunition (though not necessarily the cost) in bounds. In

World War I, gas was used as a means of suppression that would

achieve good effect even from a near miss, although it too required

continuous fire to maintain its effect.

Against an enemy who concentrates significant artillery weapons

to neutralize an area of a defender's position, there are three basic

defenses. The first is to use protection, either by digging in,

building field fortifications, or protecting with armor. Protection by

engineering reduces mobility and consequently makes forces
vulnerable to precision fires. Therefore, engineering activities must

be combined with action by some mobile force to avoid the

systematic reduction of the overall force over time. The second

method of defense is to thin out one's forces, as Lossberg did, and

to protect those left in place. This may make the enemy's task of

breaking into a position easier, but forces kept out of the beaten

zone are then intact for counterattack and, once intermingled with

the attacking enemy, harder to bring indirect fire upon. Lossberg's

response implies a force-oriented defense in which terrain is a tool

of defense, not an object. An active counter to neutralization fire is

a heavy program of counterfire. The drawback here is that it may

be difficult to acquire a clever enemy's units before they uncover to

fire, thus condemning one's own units to play catch-up, often under

fire, a "race" for parity, the most to be expected under these

circumstances.

Against precision fires, there are some additional counters.

Deception is the most common. If you deny an enemy a target

location, precision fire is impossible. A variety of methods have

been used successfully: false emitters, dummy positions to draw

fire, night occupation, and camouflage discipline. In addition,

frequent movement compounds the enemy's problem of targeting in

the absence of continuous observation. If you refuse an enemy

target identification, he must fall back on area fire and its

consequent logistic and temporal burden.

One final caution is in order. High densities of indirect fire are

characteristic of breakthrough battles, not meeting engagements.

Current artillery cannon range extends about thirty kilometers

beyond the forward line of own troops. It is in the zone of cannon

artillery that maneuver forces must move and fight in the face of the

heaviest concentrations of indirect fire. Soviet forces, in a

movement to contact, will have accompanying artillery, but its effect

will be much diminished until forward movement slows and a
situation approaching a thirty-kilometer artillery zone is

reestablished. To displace artillery still takes time, as does building

a coordinated program of fires. On the other hand, multiple rocket

launcher systems, used against area targets, and fixed-wing aircraft

in close air support, if they are free from interference from low- and

mid-altitude air defenses, can carry heavy fire effects beyond the

range of cannon. Both have drawbacks in their ability to sustain

fire, but the impact of concentrated aerial artillery at General Heinz

Guderian's crossing of the Meuse in May 1940 is indicative of the

operational effect of tactical concentration at the right place and

time. If we can deny the enemy the targets for his rocket batteries

and freedom to use his air support, he will be driven inevitably and

by his own proclivities back on his cannon. Much of the Soviet

artillery's means of sustainment, like ours, is relatively road bound,

thin skinned, and hence subject to interdiction. The "Red God of

War" may have significant difficulty moving forward on a battlefield

marked by intermingled forces and heavy interdiction.
8
INTRODUCTION

NOTES

1. At 3d Ypres, July 1917. Shelford Bidwell and Dominick

Graham, Fire-Power: British Army Weapons and Theories of War,

1914-1945 (Boston, MA: George Allen & Unwin, 1985), 90.

2. Martin Middlebrook, The First Day on the Somme (London:

Penguin Press, 1971), 159.

3. Attributed to the French General Staff by J. F. C. Fuller, The

Conduct of War, 1789-1961 (London: Minerva Press, 1968), 166.

4. Graeme C. Wynne, If Germany Attacks: The Battle in Depth in

the West (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1976), 202 et. seq.

Wynne is the classic study of tactical adaptation on the Western

Front in World War I.

5. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael

Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,

1976), 206.

6. Ibid., 370.
10
INTRODUCTION

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bidwell, Shelford, and Dominick Graham. Fire-Power: British Army

Weapons and Theories of War, 1914-1945. Boston, MA:

George Allen & Unwin, 1985.

Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Edited and translated by Michael

Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University

Press, 1976.

Fuller, J. F. C. The Conduct of War, 1789-1961. London: Minerva

Press, 1968.

Middlebrook, Martin. The First Day on the Somme. London:

Penguin Press, 1971.

Wynne, Graeme C. If Germany Attacks: The Battle in Depth in the

West. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1976.

11

CHAPTER 1

SOVIET ARTILLERY IN BATTLE: A

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

by Lieutenant Colonel James R. Holbrook

In the introduction to his book, The Red God of War, British

military analyst Chris Bellamy vividly describes some of the effects

of massive artillery barrages. Basing his description on eyewitness

reports from several wars, he recounts the "sheer horror" and the

"sense of hopelessness" artillery barrages create among those on

the receiving end. For soldiers subjected to massive artillery

barrages, artillery is a "monstrous, apparently unstoppable machine,

slicing mechanically through earth, rock, flesh, bone and spirit."

The "psychological effect multiplies its cold lethality many times."

Bellamy continues:

Artillery oppresses, jars, stuns and disorientates the

enemy and lifts the morale of its own troops. Artillery

and rockets provide the greatest firepower and sear a

path for infantry, mechanized forces and armour both

physically and spiritually. Throughout the centuries,

no army has understood this better than the Russian.1

This chapter highlights the preeminent role artillery has played in

Russian and Soviet military history. The artillery heritage from the

Imperial period, including the influence of tsarist officers on the new

Red Army in the 1920s and 1930s, is very important for our

appreciation of the role of artillery in the modern Soviet Army.

Then, after a general discussion of Soviet artillery support of

13
offensive operations during World War II, this chapter will conclude

with some comments on possible current trends.

Imperial Russian Heritage

Since its introduction into Muscovy in the fourteenth century,

artillery has arguably been the centerpiece of Russian combat

power. According to medieval records, the Russians first used

guns to defend Moscow against the Mongols in the late summer of

1382.2 Based on this chronicled date, in 1982 the Soviet Army

celebrated the 600th anniversary of Russian artillery with great

fanfare. During those 600 years, Russian artillery has maintained a

record of progressive and innovative developments in both doctrine

and technology, as well as their applications on the battlefield.

In modern history, during the early eighteenth century, Peter the

Great took a personal interest in the development of artillery

weapons and doctrine. He had bells taken from churches and

monasteries and melted down for their metal. He personally wrote

a field manual, Rules of Combat, the first three paragraphs of which

dealt with the means of neutralizing or carrying off the enemy's

artillery.3

Two great Russian battle captains of the late eighteenth

century-Field Marshal P. A. Rumyantsev and his pupil, the

legendary Generalissimo Alexander Suvorov-devoted considerable

attention to artillery. The outlines of the combination of Soviet

massed fires and mobility can already be seen in their own

employment of artillery. During the Seven Years1 War (1756-63), for

example, Rumyantsev used his field guns in large massed batteries.

During the Russo-Turkish War of 1769-74, he showed great skill in

the development of mobile firepower, moving his guns from place to

place on the battlefield and achieving impressive concentrations of

fire.4 Recognizing the value of concentrated artillery in support of

14
the main attack, Suvorov successfully concentrated fire at the

decisive point during the storming of Ismail in 1790. Altogether, he

allocated 67 of the 110 guns available, plus all the firepower of the

fleet (500 guns), to support an amphibious assault.5

One of the earliest manuals anywhere in the world devoted to

artillery tactics was the General Rules for Artillery in Field Combat,

written on the eve of the Russian War of 1812 by Russian Major

General Alexander Kutaysov. Kutaysov's work reflected not only a

further sophistication of massed fires and mobility but also the

beginnings of doctrine for the employment of artillery reserves and

counterbattery fire. Kutaysov paid particular attention to the

massing of artillery against a breakthrough sector and the creation

of an artillery reserve that, he said, could be comprised of horse

artillery whose speed and lightness enabled it to move swiftly to

various points. According to his General Rules, the artillery's main

task in the offense was to destroy the enemy's artillery. This

emphasis on counterbattery was several years ahead of its time.6

Drawing on the experiences of the Napoleonic Wars, Russian

Lieutenant General N. Okunev appears to be one of the first to

recognize the totality of the destructive and decisive nature of

massed artillery fires. According to his book, Memoranda on the

Change Which Artillery Used Correctly Will Produce on Modern

Grand Tactics (1831), artillery was not merely a "supporting arm"

but could achieve results by itself. Okunev believed that the secret

of success in the attack was an enormous massed battery of 80 to

100 guns. "In order to survive, the artillery had to be fearless; it

was necessary to swamp the enemy with fire before he had the

chance to retaliate."7

15
Early Soviet Artillery

Such were some of the main concepts for field artillery

employment that came, together with many Imperial Russian artillery

officers, to the young, ragtag Red Army after the revolutions of

1917. Bellamy argues convincingly that, due to the need for

specialized technical expertise in artillery, the influence of the

Imperial artillery on the Red Army was more pronounced than that

of other arms. The new army was forced to rely on former officers

of the tsar.8 One example of this carryover from the Imperial

artillery tradition was that the Main Artillery Directorate (GAU), which

had been established in 1862, was taken over completely intact

after the Bolshevik Revolution by the leaders of the Red Army.

Former Imperial staff officers were simply told that they would now

devote their efforts to the defense of the revolution and Soviet

power.

In addition to acquiring this important organization, the young

Soviet regime had the more or less voluntary services of two tsarist

artillery experts: Lieutenant General Y. Sheydeman and Colonel V.

Grendal. They wrote many of the most influential artillery manuals

in the 1920s. Sheydeman, in particular, presided over the analysis

of problems revealed in World War I-using air photos, adjusting

fire from aircraft observers, compensating for meteorological

conditions, and using sound ranging. A measure of this tsarist

artilleryman's influence in the young Red Army is that, by the end of

1922, he had become chief not only of artillery but also of armored

forces.

In 1924, the Red Army held the Ail-Union Artillery Conference at

which Mikhail Tukhachevsky, the young Red Army,Civil War Front

commander, delivered a paper "Maneuver and Artillery." This

paper, together with other conference discussions of artillery

combat against aviation, tanks, and armored vehicles, strongly

influenced the Frunze reforms of 1925. Many of these reforms were

16
reflected in the 1929 Field Service Regulations. These regulations

articulated principles for employing artillery that apply to Soviet

artillery even today:

• Close cooperation with all arms throughout the entire battle.

• Massing of fire.

• The suddenness and flexibility of fire.

Another aspect of modern Soviet artillery doctrine that surfaced in

clear terms during the 1920s was the issue of artillery and

maneuver. Some Red Army leaders tended to view artillery as

incompatible with the war of maneuver they wished to fight.

Another former tsarist artilleryman, General Golovin, argued in a

1925 article that artillery was even more important in maneuver

warfare. According to Golovin, it is necessary in order to preserve

one's freedom to maneuver and to deny it to the enemy: "The

initial collision between opposed forces in any future war should be

pursued with the utmost savagery and therefore, everything had to

be thrown into a massive fire blow right at the start."9

By the late 1920s, V. Triandafillov, a new young star, appeared on

the horizon. Here was an officer who was almost entirely of Soviet

military upbringing. Although he had served briefly in the tsarist

army, Triandafillov was a truly gifted Red Army officer whose

theoretical contributions were based on his experience during the

civil war and his innate abilities to perceive the essence of future

warfare. In his Character of the Operations of Modern Armies

(1929), Triandafillov saw clearly the need for artillery to accompany

advancing troops through the enemy defense, not

 ttjust with fire, but

also with wheels." His scheme of artillery operations remains valid

even today. According to him, great quantities of artillery were

esential for the successful breakthrough of positions held by infantry

armed with the heavy weapons of modern war. He believed that

17
the artillery should outnumber the infantry by 2 to 1. As Bellamy

suggests, "this may be the reason for the colossal Soviet artillery

build-up in the 1930s and the high proportion of artillery to other

arms in the Soviet Army today." Triandafillov is the originator of

the famous "norms" that Soviet planners use today. For example,

he determined that the amount of artillery needed to support an

offensive would be such that a "corps attacking on a 5 km sector

would require some 300 guns, which meant reinforcing it with 4-7

artillery regiments. This density of artillery was generally attained by

Soviet forces during 1942 and was greatly surpassed by the end of

the war."11

Soviet Artillery in World War II

The results of the Imperial Russian Army heritage and the

creativity of the more gifted Red Army commanders can be seen

during the Soviets1 war with Germany from 1941-45.

One of the first developments in Soviet artillery during the early

stages of the war was a reduction in the number of artillery pieces

in frontline divisions. This artillery was reorganized into the reserve

of the Soviet High Command. As the war progressed, control of

artillery became more and more centralized. (By 1945, 35 percent

of all Soviet artillery was under the control of the Supreme High

Command Reserve, where it would be allocated according to need.)

Stalin's directive "On the Artillery Offensive" (January 1942) stressed

the principles developed in the 1920s and 1930s:

• Concentration on the main breakthrough sector.

• Maintenance of continuous support throughout the entire

period of the offensive.

• Artillery and mortar fire moving with the infantry and tanks into

the attack, and from one objective to the next.

18
In 1942, the Soviet Army re-created the artillery division, a

formation that had first appeared in 1819. By 1943, divisions were

being combined into artillery corps. The composition of corps, as

well as several other artillery formations, was often tailored to a

particular operation. Figure 1 shows the massive number of artillery

pieces concentrated on breakthrough sectors, as well as the

tailoring for different Soviet operations.

In addition to providing massive artillery support for

breakthroughs, artillery formations devoted considerable attention to

counterpreparation. For example, the counterpreparation at Kursk

on 5 July 1943-3,000 guns and aircraft-severely disrupted the

German deployment at the outset of Operation Citadel.

Counterbattery fires also were carefully planned and viciously

executed. Figure 2 shows the counterbattery actions during some

of the same major operations listed in figure 1.

Artillery Support for Operation Bagration, 22 June29 August 1944

One good example of artillery support of an offensive is Operation

Bagration, the Belorussian operation in 1944. At the start of 1944,

the Soviets clearly had the strategic initiative. Soviet war production

was at its peak, lend-lease materiel was at its maximum levels, and

Soviet military commanders and units had matured under fire. The

Battles of Moscow, Stalingrad, and Kursk were behind them.

Between January and 22 June 1944, the Red Army had inflicted

serious damage on the Wehrmacht: the Leningrad siege had been

broken, the Crimea and most of the Ukraine had been liberated,

and Finland had been forced out of the war, ending its collaboration

with Germany. Five German armies had been smashed. In late

spring, all Soviet forces along the front went to the defensive and

began to prepare for the summer offensive. On 6 June, the Allies

invaded Europe.

19
Type and Density of Artillery on Breakthrough Sectors in Selected Operations of the Great Patriotic War

Offensive

operation

Stalingrad

counter-offensive

19-20.11.42

Kursk counteroffensive

7-8.43

Belorussian

operation

6.44

Unit or

Formation

5TA

119RD

421 RR

65A

11GA

8GRC

11GRD

5GA

33GRC

65A

18RC

37GRD

Breadth of

sector, km

35

5

2

12

36

3

1.5

16

6

24

8

•>

Total guns,

mortars.

rocket

launchers •

2166

570

183

2405

3703

930

—

2325

1680

2146

1572

500

Breakthrough

sector, km

10

5

2

9

14

3

1.5

6

6

8

8

2

Total guns,

mortars,

rocket

launchers

on breakthrough

sector

1067

554

183

1980

2516

734

381

1610

1610

1572

1572

470

Density of artillery of 1 km of

breakthrough sector

Operational Tactical

Over 76 mm Over 76 mm

Over 76 mm Over 76 mm

without without

rocket

General launchers

107 103

64

— —

— —

220 203

122

180 170

142

— —

— —

268 260

190

— —

197 185

140

— —

rocket

General launchers

— —

111 102

64

91 87

60

— —

— —

245 235

227

254 233

225

— —

268 260

190

197 185

140

235 214

169

Source: Bellamy, Red God of War, 52-53.

Figure 1. Type and density of artillery on breakthrough sectors in

selected operations of the Great Patriotic War

20
L'vov-Sandomir

7.44

Yassy- Kishinev

8.44

PetsamoKirkeness

10.44

Vistula-Oder

1.45

Berlin

4.45

60A

28RC

302RD

37A

6GRC

14A

131RC

10GRD

8GA

29GRC

27GRC

76GRR

5SA

13A

102RC

147RD

64ORR

30

4

1.5

9

5.5

up to 60

(Arctic

conditions)

7

2

30

2.5

1.8

0.8

9

9

5

1.5

0.8

2641

—

—

2272

956

2454

710

460

2846

1090

540

—

2825

2403

1373

458

—

8.3

4

1.5

6

2.5

9

4

2

7

2.5

1.8

0.8

7

9

5

1.5

0.8

2183

1090

489

1877

900

1540

684

440

2438

1051

517

250

2430

2356

1350

450

—

264 250

209

— —

— —

313 266

235

— —

171 153

114

— —

— —

348 327

291

— —

— —

— —

347 308

265

252 242

230

— —

— —

— —

—

272

326

—

360

—

171

220

420

287

312

—

270

300

300

—

256

215

320

280

—

336

305

—

150

123

210

156

396

369

277

250

300

270

__

—

252

240

280

260

—

(Source: Peredefskiy etaL, pp. 130-35)

Figure 1 (continued)

21
^00 120 140 160 180 200 220 240

Yas«y--Kishinev

Operation

20.8.44

Petsamo-K irkenest

OparatKxi (Arctic)

7 10.44

East Prussian Operation

13-14.1.45

Virtu !a-Od«r Operation

12-14.1.45

East Pomeranian

Operation

24.2.45

Berlin Operation

16.4.45

65A

(20.4.45)

Artillery fire, generally by lonq ranoa (Army and

Corps) artillery and mortar batteries.

Fire by all artillery (by batteries only)

Deliberate fire (one or two guns at a time)

Battery squalls' of rapid fire

Fire by direct fire guns

'HfHour

Opposed water crossinq

Source: Bellamy, Red God of War, 56.

Figure 2. Suppression of enemy batteries during selected

operations of the Great Patriotic War: type and duration

of counterbattery fire (Simplified). Time shown in minutes

along the top.

22
The Soviets1

 primary strategic objectives for Operation Bagration

were to liberate Belorussia from German occupation and to destroy

or defeat German Army Group Center. German strategy was

essentially to defend in place. Hitler was convinced the Allied

invasion was coming, and he believed it necessary to defeat the

Allies on his Western Front before he could renew offensive

operations in the East.

As the Soviets prepared to launch Bagration, they amassed within

the four operational Fronts (a Front is roughly equivalent to a U.S.

army group):

5 air armies (5,327 aircraft, in addition to 700

bombers from the Long Range Bomber Force)

15 armies, 8 tank and mechanized corps (a total of

166 rifle divisions)

2,715 tanks

1,355 self-propelled artillery guns

33,000 guns and mortars (including 13 artillery

divisions and more than 20 antiaircraft artillery divisions

from the Supreme High Command Reserve)13

The correlation of forces heavily favored the Soviets: 3 to 1 in

manpower, 10 to 1 in tanks and self-propelled artillery, and 8 to 1 in

guns and mortars. Figure 3 shows the variety of artillery equipment

and task organizations within one of the armies (11th Guards) of the

3d Belorussian Front. Artillery support was carefully tailored to the

tasks and conditions of each major formation. Likewise, the artillery

preparation by each Front differed according to the mission, nature

of the terrain, and enemy defenses.14

23
Some other notable features of in Operation

Bagration were:

• In the 1st Belorussian Front atone, up to forty regiments of

artillery arrived by train and stxty-nin© * artillery regiments were

regrouped within the Front.

• In the 43d Army, 1st Baltic Front, more than 150 artillery

batteries were concentrated to support a 7-kilometer-wide

breakthrough sector.

• Tactical density for artillery in 1 rifle division was 235 guns,

mortars, and multiple rocket launchers per kilometer.

• Most of the artillery deployments occurred within eight to ten

days before the start of the operation. Enough went

undetected that the Germans failed to identify the major

concentrations and axes of advance accurately.

• Eighty to 90 percent of all artillery within the Fronts was

concentrated in the Frontal breakthrough sectors (which

represented 11 to 20 percent of the overall width of the

Fronts).15

Possible New Trends in Soviet Artillery

Many observers have noted that the Soviets place great

emphasis on their World War II experiences. This is understandable

in light of the great successes they enjoyed during the last two

years of that war. Moreover, a future war in Europe would involve

many of the same techniques that worked forty-five years ago. But

there is ample evidence that Soviet military planners are well aware

of the changes that have occurred in doctrine and technology.

24
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gun how

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regt Ulloc

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243

52 gds arty

regt Ulloc

ated to 2nd

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how

p 245

1618 light any

regt: 24 x 76mm

gun

p 247

1 guards ami

tank any regt:

20 x 76 mm gun

p 49

3bn44gds

any regt. 1

bn 1620l»ght

arty regt:

p 46

3 gds anti-tank

arty regt: 20

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0 43

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regt: 20 x

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203 mm how. 6 «

280 mm mor

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33 gds mor ode.

207 gas any

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28 x 122 mm how

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1158 how

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1185 how

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1209 how

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arty bn. 24 x

203 mm how, 6 x

E CORPS

ny

102/now

arty od«

93 hy how

arty bde.

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ny bty, 226

speoat super

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305 mm how

6 x 280 mm mor

in Army

Guards Mortar

IMRU Grouo

S> -"V

( 18 gds nfie d.v J

/

Subgroup 8 gds

rifle corps. 317

gds mor rtgt

20x8M-13

4 x BM-8

Subgroup 36

gds rifto corps

67 and 42 gds oor

regt. 1 1 gds

mor bde, 24 gds

morbde: 48 x

BM-13. 280 x

M-31 fixed rkt

launchers

f( 8 ^ 3 gds ntte div J

Long Ranqe

(DO) Any Go

Subgroup 16 gds

rifle corps 114

gun «rty buc. 523

gun any rtgt 16

k 122 mm gun, 34 x

152 mm gun-how

Subgroup 8 gds rifte

corps : 6 gds gun

any bde. 1093 corps

any bde. 149 army gun

any ode, 402 independent

super hy arty bn

76 x 152 mm gun-how

6 x 152 mm gun (BR- 2)

Subgroup 36 gds

rifle corps: 53

gun any bde. 2 x bt

tnys 46 speaai

super hy any bn.

1165 corps arty

regt 16 x 122 mm

gun, 35 x 152 mm

gun-how, 4 x

152mmgun8R-2

Source: Bellamy, Red God of War, 59.

Figure 3. The Belorussian strategic offensive operation, artillery

grouping of 11th Guards Army, 23 June 1944

25
Chris Donnelly points out in a 1982 article that several military

writers are questioning the applicability of many of the experiences

of World War II.16 The changing battlefield environment-primarily

new weapons and high-speed maneuver of all units-suggests

problems that they did not have to deal with in World War II.

Some of their specific concerns, as reflected in the contemporary

Soviet press, are:

• High proportion of moving armored targets that are difficult to

locate, hit, and damage.

• Constant and rapid relocation of artillery units necessary for a

high-speed offensive.

• High (and fluctuating) speeds of the assault being supported by

the artillery.

• Extreme effectiveness of enemy counterbombardment,

especially with advanced projectiles.

• Difficulty of locating enemy batteries in defensive positions.

• Need to locate and destroy individual weapons capable of

delivering nuclear warheads.

• Enormously increased frequency of meeting engagements.17

Some Soviet officers have even challenged the validity of the

Soviet artillery norms. For example, doctrinal norms for

suppressing fire are supposed to destroy 25 percent of the men

and equipment. But, for some military doctrinal writers, this is not

good enough. What is needed is a rolling barrage, combined with

directed or concentrated fire at known enemy targets in order to

continually neutralize the enemy. This thesis is supported by those

who believe the psychological aspects of artillery fire are most

important during the preparation and support phases of the attack:

26
"The attacker's success depends not so much on the degree of

destruction as on the fact that the survivors are unable to fight for

some time after the shelling has stopped."18

Conclusion

Artillery appears to be the most prestigious and influential arm of

the Soviet Ground Forces today. For example, only artillery has

retained a chief marshal, a rank that has been eliminated in the

other arms. The quantity and quality of Soviet artillery weapons,

already impressive, continue to grow.19 Soviet artillerymen are

constantly studying ways to adapt their historically successful tactics

to meet the needs of the modern battlefield. But the principles of

massed fire and mobility, principles that have stood the test of time

in Russian military history for hundreds of years, continue to form

the framework for Soviet tactical and operational innovation.

27

90-1775
28
CHAPTER 1

NOTES

1. Chris Bellamy, Red God of War: Soviet Artillery and Rocket

Forces (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1986), 1. This

excellent volume forms the basis, along with Duffy (below), of the

historical account in this chapter. Bellamy has used the works of

the most prominent Soviet artillerymen, who themselves have

combined memoirs with data from the Soviet Ministry of Defense

Archives. Historical data on artillery in World War II in Soviet

publications since 1986 adds little that is new to the survey

compiled by Bellamy. His book provides the best comprehensive

treatment of Soviet artillery in the English language.

2. Ibid., 9.

3. Christopher Duffy, Russia's Military Way to the West: Origins

and Nature of Russian Military Power, 1700-1800 (London:

Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981), 17-18, 22-23.

4. Ibid., 177.

5. Bellamy, Red God of War, 18.

6. Ibid., 20.

7. Ibid., 21.

8. Ibid., 43.

9. Ibid., 44.

10. Ibid., 46.

29
11. Ibid.

12. Ibid, 49-50.

13. Although there are discrepancies in actual numbers between

the sources, the following sources provide background and data on

the Belorussian operation: John Erickson, The Road to Berlin

(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983), 214; V. Mikhalkin, "Boevoe

primenenie artillerii v Belorusskoi operatsii [Combat use of artillery in

the Belorussian operation]," Voenno istoricheskii zhurnal [Military

history journal], June 1984:25-26; and William M. Connor, "Analysis

of Deep Attack Operations: Operation Bagration, Belorussia,

22 June-29 August 1944," unpublished report, Combat Studies

Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, March

1987, AnnexC, 1-2.

14. Interestingly, artillery preparation in the 1st Baltic Front never

fully developed according to plan. On 22 June, the Front

commander, General Bagramyan, sent out a reconnaissance in

force that was so successful that he decided to advance the timing

of his main attack without using fully the planned artillery

preparation.

15. Mikhalkin, "Boevoe primenenie artillerii,'1 25-26.

16. C. N. Donnelly, "The Wind of Change in Soviet Artillery,"

International Defense Review 15 (No. 6-1982):737-44.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid., 79.

19. See, for example, "Soviets Revive Heavy Artillery

Formations," Jane's Defence Weekly, 19 March 88:534-535,

reprinted in Field Artillery, August 1988:44-45.

30
CHAPTER 1

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bellamy, Chris. Red God of War: Soviet Artillery and Rocket

Forces. London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1986.

Connor, William M. "Analysis of Deep Attack Operations:

Operation Bagration, Belorussia, 22 June-29 August 1944."

Unpublished report, Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army

Command and General Staff College, March 1987.

Donnelly, C. N. "The Wind of Change in Soviet Artillery."

International Defense Review 15 (No. 6-1982):737-44.

Duffy, Christopher. Russia's Military Way to the West: Origins and

Nature of Russian Military Power, 1700-1800. London:

Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981.

Erickson, John. The Road to Berlin. Boulder, CO: Westview

Press, 1983.

Mikhalkin, V. "Boevoe primenenie artillerii v Belorusskoi operatsii

[Combat use of artillery in the Belorussian operation]." Voenno

istoricheskii zhurnal [Military history journal], June 1984:25-33.

"Soviets Revive Heavy Artillery Formations." Jane's Defence

Weekly, 19 March 1988:534-45, reprinted in Field Artillery,

August 1988:44-45.

31

CHAPTER 2

WORLD WAR I: ELASTIC DEFENSE AND

THE U.S. 3d DIVISION AT THE

MARNE RIVER

by Lieutenant Colonel Michael W. Dunn

Facing a defender on either side of the Western Front in World

War I were tons of explosives from massed artillery that literally

chewed up and destroyed all in its path, including the ground itself.

The common defenses of massed forward positions were either

totally destroyed and broken through or suffered the tremendous

casualties that were bleeding both sides white.

To hold against this onslaught, the defender needed to minimize

the effects of massive artillery fires. The defensive tactics that

proved successful used flexibility, decentralized control, thinning of

forward lines, deception, and protection provided by entrenchments.

The defender relied on counterattack to accomplish the mission of

keeping the enemy in check and retaining terrain.

Trench Warfare and Doctrine Development

Trench warfare in World War I evolved as a direct result of the

destructive power of modern weapons. Early battles of maneuver

became too costly in terms of casualties. French and British troops

in exposed areas suffered heavily from well-placed German artillery

and machine guns. The Germans, likewise, were shocked by the

accuracy and rapid fire of the French and British weapons. Thus,

with infantry attacks prohibitively expensive, trench warfare became

the norm. Destruction of enemy defenses by massive artillery fire

33
appeared to be the best way to achieve tactical penetration of

enemy lines.1

The massive artillery preparations that developed were plagued

with problems. Surprise was needed but often lost. Close

coordination between artillery and advancing infantry was difficult.

Wire communications and messengers were used, as only a few

poor radios were available. When the attacker tried to displace

forward, his attacking infantry became exhausted, and moving the

artillery was difficult, especially over the cratered and torn-up terrain.

As the attacker struggled to exploit early successes, the defender

usually had time to bring up reserves and establish new defensive

lines. Movement of reserves was easier for the defender, who

could use rail, trucks, and good roads. The attacker had to

reinforce over the broken ground of the cratered trench lines. The

defender also had the advantage of being able to concentrate his

artillery fires, especially on a narrow penetration.2

Early in the war, both sides emphasized rigid defense of forward

lines. As the cost of attacking increased, voluntary surrender of any

terrain to an enemy attack was viewed as treasonous. Many

believed a defense in depth, with troops allowed to withdraw under

pressure, would encourage cowardice, and units expecting to

withdraw would only halfheartedly defend their positions.3

As the war progressed, the Germans developed a defensive

technique known as the elastic defense. Since the German strategy

in 1915-17 was to defend in place on the Western Front while

attempting to attack and win first in the East, the French and British

received fewer attacks. Consequently, later on in the war, the Allies

developed their own tactics for elastic defense.4

The German elastic defense, and later Allied versions,

emphasized three principles: flexibility, decentralized control, and

34
counterattack. The defense sector contained up to five defensive

lines in depth, with the first two or three on the reverse slope, if

possible. Only about 25 percent of the infantry was positioned in

the first two trenches. A further refinement of this tactic had troops

move from the trenches into deep bunkers during heavy

bombardment. Troops in forward outposts would leave their

trenches and take cover in nearby shell holes. After the barrage

targeted on their trenches had passed and before the attacking

infantry arrived, troops would return to the shattered trench lines

and open fire.5

Decentralized control was achieved by giving squad and platoon

leaders independence of action, such as defending anywhere

forward of the main defensive line, normally the third trench line. A

further innovation was to have the forward battalion commander

direct the defense for a regiment. With the forward battalion in the

first two trenches and the other battalions positioned farther back,

this forward battalion commander had the authority to order a

regimental counterattack at the most appropriate time. This system

contrasted sharply with the French and British decision cycles.

Their commanders had to get orders and reserves from the corps

or army commander who was miles to the rear. The third principle

called for counterattacks at every level to retake lost ground before

the attacker could consolidate his gains.6

The British and French used massive artillery preparations lasting

days in their attempts to totally destroy an area before infantry

pushed to penetrate and break through. These attempts often

proved unsuccessful and continued to be costly in resources,

especially casualties. At the Somme (June-July 1916), the British

Fourth Army fired more than 1.6 million rounds on a 14-mile front

over 6 days. This inflicted great damage but did not destroy the

German defenders. The British suffered 57,470 casualties on the

first day of their assault.7

35
Russia's withdrawal from the war in 1917 and the arrival of U.S.

forces caused the Germans to plan an offensive in the West for

1918. This offensive was to defeat the Allies before the United

States could bring more combat units to bear. As the Germans

planned their attack, they studied the lessons of the war to develop

new offensive tactics.

An early reformer of offensive tactics was a French Army captain,

Andre Laffargue, whose pamphlet "The Attack in Trench Warfare"

was based on his 1915 combat experiences. Although the French

published it, distribution was for information only, and the British did

not even translate it. In contrast, the Germans captured a copy in

1916, immediately translated it, issued it to units, and used the

concepts in their tactical development.8

Laffargue advocated a sudden attack to achieve a

deep penetration. His attack resembled a gulp, not a

nibble. The momentum of the in-depth attack would

disrupt the enemy, keep him off balance, and prevent

him from organizing an effective response. To

capitalize on disruption, the assault had to advance as

far as possible. The first wave would identify-not

reduce-defensive strongpoints and subsequent

attack waves would destroy them. An artillery

bombardment applied suddenly in depth throughout

the enemy area would precede the infantry assault.

Disruption of enemy artillery batteries was particularly

important to protect the infantry advance.9

The Germans published their new offensive tactics in January

1918 as The Attack in Position Warfare, which described "an

attack-in-depth, a devouring of the entire enemy position instead of

nibbling away at the enemy front line."10 These tactics, known as

Hutier tactics or infiltration tactics, stressed infantry-artillery

cooperation, with pyrotechnic control measures, with the infantry

36
determining the speed of the attack, not the artillery. All artillery

missions (preparatory fire, creeping barrage, isolating the objective)

were addressed in detail. The intent was that artillery would

neutralize, not destroy, enemy positions and would avoid an artillery

duel, which would favor the Allies weight of numbers and

ammunition. Attack formations were organized for depth and

speed, initially to bypass enemy strengths and push deep, with the

lead echelon attacking until exhausted rather than losing momentum

by the forward passage of lines. Small-unit leadership continued to

be necessary for initiative and independent action in this fluid

situation. However, higher headquarters (corps or army) controlled

the reserve units.11

The artillery concept was refined as follows:

First Stage: Surprise concentration, hitting

headquarters, phone links, command posts, enemy

batteries, and infantry positions. Fire is sudden,

concentrated, and makes extensive use of gas.

Second Stage: Most batteries reinforce those

batteries already firing on enemy batteries.

Third Stage: Fire for effect on designated targets

according to range. Some batteries continue to shell

infantry positions, and heavy pieces engage long

range targets.12

After detailed and concentrated training, the Germans launched

their offensive in March 1918 and were successful until they were

halted by stiffening Allied resistance at the Marne River, including

U.S. actions at Chateau-Thierry and Belleau Wood, and their own

overextension of lines of supply. This early German success was

enhanced by the use of a rigid forward defense by some French

commanders.13 The Germans regrouped and began their last

37
attack of this offensive on 15 July 1918. Their objective was to cross

the Marne River and break the Allied line.

Rock of the Marne (Battle of Mezy)

On 30 May 1918, the U.S. 3d Division "stepped into history."14

Having recently arrived in France, the 3d had not yet completed its

scheduled training in the tactics developed by the French and

British, but General John J. Pershing ordered it forward to assist in

stopping the German advance. Attached to the French 38th Army

Corps of the French Sixth Army in the Chateau-Thierry area, initially

the 3d Division was committed piecemeal, by battalions and

regiments, to strongpoints along the Marne. The division was finally

reunited, received its own sector, and began to prepare defenses

(see map 1).15

Early in 1918, French commanders had been split on whether to

use the rigid forward defense or the flexible defense in depth. After

the German successes of that spring against the rigid defense, the

French commanders changed to an elastic-type defense.16

The French 38th Corps (to which the U.S. 3d Division was

attached) now organized the defense along the Marne following the

principles of flexibility, decentralized control, and counterattack. The

forward divisions (left to right-French 39th, U.S. 3d, and French

125th) were to defend in depth using multiple lines of resistance,

with the third line as the main line of resistance (MLR). The 38th

Corps directed that forward troops were to "fight with their feet in

the water, so to speak."17 If the forward lines were pierced and

counterattacks failed, the forward combat groups were to "hold out

individually to break the enemy's formations."18 The corps then

placed two reserve divisions in the center behind the U.S. 3d

Division. The U.S. 28th Division was put in defensive positions on

the reverse slopes of hills, and the French 73d Division, the corps

38
10 DIV

The 3r<i Division at

Marne - 15 July

(THt LIMIT Of TH€ GCP^AN

10 LOW DIV

Bois de Barbillon

377

^\ \ ° s * *\ \ r* • . * VOJonnivis

•j /( f ^ f ;i '\«^/. *

Source: Rexmond C. Cochrane, 7/?e 3rd Division at Chateau Thierry: July 1918

(Army Chemical Center, MD: Historical Office, U.S. Army Chemical Corps, 1959),

49.

Map 1. The 3d Division at the Marne, 15 July 1918

39
counterattack force, was positioned so it could move either left or

right.19 Both reserve divisions were three to five miles south of the

river and just out of range of the bulk of German artillery. The

corps was thus defending with three divisions up and two back.

To defend along the south (near the bank) of the Marne River,

the U.S. 3d Division deployed all four infantry regiments on line (left

to right, the 4th, 7th, 30th, and 38th) with only three companies

(one battalion) of the 4th Infantry in division reserve, positioned on

the far left in the rear of the 4th's sector. The three artillery

regiments of the division were deployed: the 76th Field Artillery

(75-mm) on the western half of the sector, the 10th Field Artillery

(75-mm) on the eastern half, and the 18th Field Artillery (155-mm),

together with five French artillery batteries (75-mm, 105-mm, and

155-mm), in general support.20

U.S. 30th Infantry

The U.S. 30th Infantry assumed its sector on the night of

10-11 June 1918 in the center of the 3d Division's area. The Marne

River was seventy yards wide and too deep to ford. On the

German side, the ground rose steeply to a 425-foot plateau, and on

the U.S. side, the riverbank was low and led to an open plain

three-fifths of a mile (one kilometer) deep. Behind this plain, the

ground rose to a 500-foot forested ridge that provided observation

to the river and throughout the entire regimental sector. The town

of Mezy was in the right front of the sector on the river. A railroad

generally followed the river on the U.S. side, with an embankment

high enough to provide some cover for an attacker crossing the

river.21

The forested ridge, judged the key terrain, was made the MLR.

The regiment deployed its three battalions in a stacked one-one-one

configuration. Outposts (the first forward defense line [FDL]) were

40
placed along the river, except for the town of Mezy on the right and

a farm on the left front, which were made strongpoints. A second

FDL was placed on the plain in front of the ridge. The 1st Battalion

manned both forward lines. The 3d Battalion, reinforced with two

companies of the 38th Infantry, was placed in the MLR, generally

along the ridge. Dummy trenches were dug on the ridge during

daylight, but during darkness, actual camouflaged fighting positions

were dug 100 yards down the slope. As expected, the German

observers mistook the higher fake trenches as the U.S. MLR.22 The

2d Battalion was orginally positioned far in the rear near Courboin

and thus out of range of most German artillery.23

The FDL positions were also constructed at night and

camouflaged. The forward battalion was directed to prepare

small-unit perimeter defenses that could be defended from any

direction. For communications, two separate telephone lines linked

the battalions to the regiment. The 10th Field Artillery was located

behind the forested ridge of the MLR and was in range of most

German artillery.24

Unknown to the defenders, the Germans1 final offensive of the

war was to begin at midnight, 14 July, with the German 10th

Division of three regiments attacking the sector held by the 30th

Infantry (see map 2). The attack plan called for two regiments to

cross the river at midnight in boats (one on each side of the SOth's

front), eliminate the outposts on the river line, and use the railroad

embankment for cover and concealment to move laterally and link

up. With the crossing sites secure, a pontoon bridge would be put

in to cross the third regiment and the heavy equipment in the

center. Then, just before dawn (0400), all three regiments would

assault the ridge. The German plan called for a massive artillery

preparation, first barrages on the outpost line and the ridge to assist

the crossing, then shifting fires to the ridge (MLR) and suspected

U.S. artillery positions. Finally, a creeping barrage would precede

41
5oOft«

w\

CORPS KATME

OF ATTACK

3

Ro

 DIVISION

N

\N

ECTOR

So*

Ger

,

Bo ^a^ . f.1 CourBbjr}

MAP NO.

Source: Cochrane, 3rd Division, 24.

Map 2. Corps Kathen plan of attack in 3d Division sector

42
the infantry assault on the ridge. Because of the river, telephone

communication between the German infantry and artillery was

impossible, and observed adjustments from the German side of the

river were unreliable due to darkness. Therefore, the Germans

scheduled firings based on a timetable.25

The Germans had massed eighty-four batteries against the

thirty-one Allied batteries in the 3d Division area.26 Most of the

German artillery had ranges of just over 9,000 yards (8,000 meters).

Attacking German divisional batteries were equipped with 77-mm

field guns and 105-mm light field howitzers with ranges of 9,405 and

9,733 yards respectively. German corps batteries had 150-mm field

howitzers (50 percent), with a range of 9,296 yards; 210-mm

mortars (25 percent), with a range of 11,155 yards; and others

(25 percent), including heavier weapons, with ranges of 12,000 to

possibly 29,000 yards.27

The thirty-one defending Allied batteries were equipped primarily

with French 75-mm guns, which had a range of 9,350 yards. Some

105-mm howitzers (range 13,400 yards) and 155-mm howitzers

(range 12,250 yards) added longer reach to Allied firepower.28

Organic to the 3d Division were twelve batteries of 75-mm guns and

four batteries of 155-mm howitzers (one of which was moved into

position at the start of the battle and immediately was put out of

action).29

Exact German firing positions are not known, but assuming guns

were placed with two-thirds of their range into enemy territory, the

bulk of the 3d Division, including all its 75-mm artillery, was in

enemy range. The French 38th Corps had positioned its reserve

divisions just out of range of all German divisional artillery and most

corps artillery.

The 3d Division had positioned its 75-mm batteries forward with

two-thirds of their range into enemy territory also. This placed them

43
under severe counterbattery fire, but they could also return it. This

position just behind the MLR could provide deeper fires and very

accurate fires to the FDLs; however, they were vulnerable if the

main line was heavily engaged or broken. The 155-mm batteries

and supporting French batteries were positioned farther to the rear

and out of range of most German fire, but they were still capable of

placing counterbattery fire on most German firing positions. The

forward slope of the forested ridge in the 30th Infantry's sector and

other hilltops provided excellent observation posts for adjustment of

fire throughout the sectors and across the river.

The German 10th Division successfully assembled next to the

river and was ready to cross with two regiments at midnight

(6 battalions totaling 4,200 against the forward defense battalion of

800), with artillery fires to start at 0010.30

Eleventh-hour Allied intelligence learned of the enemy attack, and

a preemptive Allied barrage was fired at 2345, disrupting the

German crossing and attack plan. The counterpreparation included

the 3d Division artillery firing 3,300 rounds of gas, including mustard

gas.31

The U.S. barrage caught the Germans in their boats and inflicted

considerable physical and psychological damage to the lead

elements. The confusion and delays caused by this initial

preemptive fire also disrupted the time schedules for German

artillery, although it opened fire as planned at 0010.32

In the 3d Division sector, the German barrages totaled

approximately 100,000 rounds during the day. Half the total was

gas, with about 75 percent gas during the first three hours.33 U.S.

soldiers were forced to wear gas masks for up to seven hours.34

The German artillery ranged up to seven miles into the Allied sector,

with the heaviest density during the first three hours. Some

44
reported nearly 2,000 gas shells around each battery of the 10th

Artillery.35

The 30th Infantry's outposts on the river met the attacking

Germans with heavy small-arms fire. After fierce fighting, the

Germans took some of the positions, but unknowingly bypassed

some, including one platoon at Mezy. The platoon leader chose to

wart until dawn and try to fight his way back to friendly lines.36

With the two lead regiments having taken heavy casualties, but

across the river, the German artillery started its creeping barrage at

0400 for the attack on the ridge. However, the two regiments had

not succeeded in linking up. The 6th Grenadier Regiment, attacking

on the U.S. right, started forward behind the artillery barrage and

ran into the undetected second FDL. Heavy losses stopped this

attack. Then, while the confused Germans hesitated, the bypassed

platoon from Mezy moved into the Germans' rear and opened fire.

The psychological shock of this small attack in their rear broke the

German regiment, and rt fled back toward the river. The remnants

of another bypassed platoon also moving back to friendly lines

captured 146 of the confused Germans. By the time the survivors

of the 6th Grenadier Regiment reached the river, it had taken 40

percent casualties in six hours of combat.37

The German 398th Infantry Regiment, attacking on the U.S. left,

had also taken heavy casualties in the crossing, including the lead

battalion commander. The regiment was then held up by heavy

resistance from the U.S. outposts, not destroying them until 0400.

As the German artillery creeping barrage started moving on

schedule, the 398th Regiment also moved forward, still trying to link

up with the 6th Grenadier Regiment. A left-flank U.S. strongpoint

stopped them at 0500. Heavy small-arms fire from the strongpoints,

mortar fire from the second FDL, and accurate U.S. artillery fire

slowly forced the regiment back to the river bank by 1000.38

45
The third German regiment, the 47th Infantry, crossing later on

the U.S. right front behind the 6th Grenadier Regiment, also took

heavy losses from U.S. artillery and camouflaged infantry outposts.

The 47th withdrew back across the river and moved one mile

laterally, with the intention of crossing again to support the 398th.

By the time the 47th reached its destination, the 398th had been

forced back to the river.39

The Germans finally got the 47th and 398th Regiments securely

placed behind the railroad embankment on the U.S. side of the river

by late morning, but they were contained by accurately adjusted

U.S. fires.40

The U.S. 30th Infantry command post had little knowledge of the

early stages of the battle. The German artillery barrages had

missed most of the U.S. forces by hitting the false trenches near the

ridge crest, but both telephone lines to the forward battalion had

been cut. Few runners survived with messages, and the few that

did survive indicated the forward battalion had been overrun (which

was not the case). The regimental commander decided to withhold

reinforcements, figuring it was too late to save the forward battalion

by counterattack. He did not want to commit another battalion in

the dark.41 Additionally, the 2d Battalion, in reserve, had been

scheduled to replace the 1st Battalion on the forward lines that

night. It was moving up the back side of the ridge about midnight,

was caught in the open by the German preparation, and took heavy

casualties, both physically and psychologically. The regimental

counterattack force was not in condition or in position to deal a

counterblow.

First light came at 0500, and a patrol of four officers from the

regimental command post went forward to determine the status of

the forward battalion. Seeing Germans approaching the MLR, the

patrol returned. This information caused the regimental command

post to move 500 yards to the rear, behind the ridge. One

46
company saw the command post moving and began its own

retrograde before it could be stopped.42 It was 0600 before

regimental headquarters determined that the forward battalion was

still in place, the attack on the right and center had been driven

back, and the remaining threat was now on the left. The 3d Division

headquarters telephoned that the French 73d Division was to

counterattack to restore the 30th Infantry's position. The regimental

commander convinced the 3d Division that French reinforcements

were not needed; however, the division reserve of three companies

(one battalion) from the U.S. 4th Infantry was sent to the 30th

Infantry.43

The remainder of the day consisted of sporadic sniping and

shelling. The Germans, determining their losses, finally withdrew

across the river at 2130, and the battle closed.44

Analysis

The battle had lasted twenty-one and one-half hours, with the

decisive phases occurring within the first ten hours. The U.S. 30th

Infantry suffered almost 39 percent casualties (1,425) of its strength

of 3,800. It could be counted as 100 percent casualties, as it was

withdrawn from the line the next day for gas decontamination.45

The forward battalion lost about 50 percent of its approximate 800.

Significantly, most American casualties were from artillery fire,

especially in the 2d Battalion, which was moving in the open at

midnight. German casualties amounted to 40 percent, 30 percent,

Af*.

and 17 percent of the attacking regiments, a total of 1,872.

The fire from the eighty-four German batteries was so intense that

a French observer with the 30th stated he had seen nothing like it

since Verdun. For various reasons, this massive fire was not fully

effective. U.S. infantry forces had held their ground and repulsed

the German attack because they were prepared for the gas, and

47
many barrages fell on the fake trench line, missing the camouflaged

positions. Later, 1,800 shell craters were counted in and around

the fake trenches of the 30th Infantry. Lack of communications

between the assaulting infantry and the artillery and reliance on a

preplanned timetable hampered coordination and failed to allow the

German infantrymen to shift fire to the actual U.S. positions.47

U.S. artillery was greatly outnumbered but was far more accurate

and effective. The preemptive counterpreparation and the adjusted

accurate fire after daylight offset the weight of numbers.

The 30th Infantry suffered losses from the gas shells that forced

the soldiers to wear uncomfortable masks for hours, and many

were killed and wounded in the hail of high explosives. There were,

however, other forms of casualties due to the massive

bombardment.

A medical officer in the 30th Infantry, Major William

E. Boyd, described the shell shock cases: "some of

them cursed and raved and had to be tied to their

litters; some shook violently . . . some trembled and

slunk away in apparent abject fear of every incoming

shell, while others simply stood speechless, oblivious

of all surroundings."48

A division report of 5 August 1918 included the lessons learned of

(1) the importance of trenches as protection against artillery fire and

(2) that reserves cannot be maneuvered in the open during a

bombardment. Two battalions had been in motion to the front

when the enemy preparation started (one each in the 30th and 7th

regiments). Caught in the open by enemy artillery, they were

combat ineffective for the duration of the battle.49

This example of successful defense demonstrates the

effectiveness of the principles of an elastic-type defense: flexibility,

48
decentralized control, and counterattack. The flexibility of defense

in depth with several lines was able to absorb the attack, forcing the

attackers to expend their energy before breaking through. The

concealment and deception of all defensive positions allowed them

to withstand the massive artillery preparation, as false positions took

the brunt of the fires. These camouflaged positions were then very

effective in surprising the attacking infantry.

Decentralized control was critical as communications were

immediately shattered. The first five hours of the fight was "in the

dark," both literally and figuratively. The rough control that was

achieved through visual observation after daylight was definitely

enhanced by the initiative of lower-level leaders fighting hard without

specific orders but in accordance with the planned concept. The

surprise action of a small platoon hitting the rear of an attacking

enemy regiment and routing it demonstrates what is possible when

leaders and men continue to fight in a fluid situation.

Counterattack was not employed above battalion level in this

example, but again, the effectiveness of counterattack can be seen

in the example of a small platoon routing an enemy regiment. The

planned defense had the capabilities to counterattack at all levels,

including the not-executed, but available, French division. Corps

placement of reserve and counterattack divisions out of most of the

artillery range kept them fully operational for contingencies.

This battle demonstrates that the effects of massive fires from an

attacking enemy can be reduced and fought through by a

combination of sound infantry actions and the accurate timely fires

of smaller amounts of friendly artillery.

49
Summary

The 3d Division minimized the effects of massive artillery fires at

the Marne with an elastic defense (flexibility, decentralized control,

counterattack), plus deception, entrenchments, preemptive actions,

and timely intelligence. The "Rock of the Marne" was hit hard but

didn't shatter; it absorbed the attack and "snapped" back.

50
CHAPTER 2

NOTES

1. Jonathan M. House, Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A

Survey of 20th-century Tactics, Doctrine, and Organization,

Research Survey no. 2 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies

Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, August

1984), 19-24.

2. Ibid., 24.

3. Ibid., 25; and Graeme C. Wynne, If Germany Attacks: The

Battle in Depth in the West (1876; reprint, Westport, CT:

Greenwood Press, 1940), 15-17.

4. House, Toward Combined Arms Warfare, 2.7\ and Wynne, If

Germany Attacks, 19-25.

5. House, Toward Combined Arms Warfare, 26.

6. Ibid., 26-27.

7. Wynne, If Germany Attacks, 105-17.

8. Timothy T. Lupfer, The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes

in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War,

Leavenworth Papers no. 4 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies

Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, July

1981), 38-39.

9. Ibid., 39.

10. Ibid., 41.

51
11. Ibid, 41-43.

12. Ibid., 44-45.

13. Ibid, 53.

14. Frederick Vinton Hemenway, comp., History of the Third

Division in the World War for the Period, December, 1917 to

January 1, 1919 (Cologne, Germany: M. Dumont Schaulberg,

1919), 2.

15. Ibid, 3-7.

16. Lupfer, Dynamics of Doctrine, 53.

17. Rexmond C. Cochrane, The 3rd Division at Chateau Thierry:

July 1918 (Army Chemical Center, MD: Historical Office, U.S. Army

Chemical Corps, 1959), 15.

18. Ibid., 16.

19. Hemenway, Third Division, 28; and Cochrane, 3rd Division,

15.

20. Hemenway, Third Division, 28; and Cochrane, 3rd Division,

15.

21. U.S. Army Combat Developments Command, Dynamics of

Fire and Maneuver (FIRMS III) (U), Final Report (Fort Belvoir, VA,

15 August 1969), FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY, DTIC AD 857809, 1-6-1.

22. Ibid., I-6-3.

23. Hemenway, Third Division, 137.

24. USACDC, Fire and Maneuver, I-6-3 to I-6-4.

52
25. Ibid., 1-6-4.

26. Ibid., 1-6-9.

27. Great Britain, Army, German Army Handbook, April 1918

(1918; reprint, New York: Hippocrene Books, 1977), 67-68.

28. Arthur R. Wilson, Field Artillery Manual (Menasha, Wl:

Collegiate Press, George Banta Publishing Co., 1925), vol. 1, chaps.

44-45.

29. Hemenway, Third Division, 192-267.

30. USACDC, Fire and Maneuver, I-6-5.

31. Cochrane, 3rd Division, 29; and USACDC, Fire and

Maneuver, I-6-5.

32. USACDC, Fire and Maneuver, I-6-5.

33. Cochrane, 3rd Division, 37.

34. Hemenway, Third Division, 137, 157.

35. Cochrane, 3rd Division, 33.

36. USACDC, Fire and Maneuver, I-6-5.

37. Ibid., I-6-6.

38. Ibid., I-6-6.

39. Ibid., I-6-6.

40. Ibid., I-6-7.

41. Ibid., I-6-7.

53
42. Ibid., 1-6-7.

43. Ibid., 1-6-8.

44. Ibid., 1-6-8.

45. Ibid., 1-6-8; and Cochrane, 3rd Division, 53.

46. USACDC, Fire and Maneuver, 1-6-8.

47. Ibid., 1-6-9.

48. Cochrane, 3rd Division, 35.

49. Ibid., 98-99.

54
CHAPTER 2

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Blunt, Brian, and Tolley Taylor. Brassey's Artillery of the World.

Edited, by Shelford Bidwell. New York: Bonanza Books, 1979.

Cochrane, Rexmond C. The 3rd Division at Chateau Thierry: July

1918. Army Chemical Center, MD: Historical Office, U.S. Army

Chemical Corps, 1959.

Coffman, Edward M. The War to End All Wars: The American

Military Experience in World War /. Madison: University of

Wisconsin Press, 1986.

Dooly, William G. Great Weapons of World War L New York:

Bonanza Books, c1970.

Fitzsimons, Bernard, ed. Tanks and Weapons of World War I.

London: Phoebus, 1973.

Great Britain. Army. German Army Handbook, April 1918. 1918.

Reprint. New York: Hippocrene Books, 1977.

Hemenway, Frederick Vinton, comp. History of the Third Division in

the World War for the Period, December, 1917 to January 7,

1919. Cologne, Germany: M. Dumont Schaulberg, 1919.

House, Jonathan M. Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of

20th-century Tactics, Doctrine, and Organization. Research

Survey no. 2. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute,

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, August 1984.

Lupfer, Timothy T. The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in

German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War.

55
Leavenworth Papers no. 4. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat

Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff

College, July 1981.

U.S. Army Combat Developments Command. Dynamics of Fire

and Maneuver (FIRMS III) (U). Final Report. Fort Belvoir, VA,

15 August 1969. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. DTIC AD 857809.

Wilson, Arthur R. Field Artillery Manual. 2 Vols. Menasha, Wl:

Collegiate Press, George Banta Publishing Co., 1925.

Wynne, Graeme C. If Germany Attacks: The Battle in Depth in the

West, 1876. Reprint. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1940.

56
CHAPTER 3

THE IMPACT OF MASSIVE ARTILLERY

FIRES ON COMMAND, CONTROL, AND

COMMUNICATIONS IN THE EUROPEAN

AND NORTH AFRICAN THEATERS

DURING WORLD WAR II

by Lieutenant Colonel Roy R. Stephenson

The U.S. Army had limited experience in countering or minimizing

the effects of massive artillery preparatory fires in the European

Theater of Operations (ETO). Except for two isolated occasions,

Kasserine in 1942 and the Ardennes counteroffensive in 1944, U.S.

units were not subjected to massive enemy preparatory fires and

did not develop tactical- or operational-level dispositions to counter

the effects of such a bombardment.

The absence of formidable German artillery beginning with the

Normandy campaign served to focus the attention of both the

infantry and artillery commanders on the German mortars, which

were considered more lethal. Even after U.S. Army units were

subjected to massive preparatory fires during the German

counteroffensive in the Ardennes (December 1944), afteraction

reports indicated that the "experts" did not believe there was a need

to develop a means to counter the effects of a preparatory fire by

anything more than to ensure that field fortifications were promptly

emplaced.1

The Germans, on the other hand, were forced early in the war to

counter the effects of intense artillery preparatory fires. In almost all

cases, the German commanders turned to a modification of the

57
elastic defense, which the German Army had developed in World

War I. German General Hermann Balck used a variation of this

defense in Lorraine against the U.S. Third Army late in in 1944.2

The battles in the Huertgen Forest, in which the U.S. First Army

attempted to break through the German defenses, also

demonstrated how effective this type of defense can be. Four U.S.

divisions were severely mauled attempting to penetrate the German

lines. Even though the Germans were aided by the poor weather

conditions during the fall season, which prevented effective use of

American air power, the German elastic defense proved quite

effective for the situation at the time.3

Although massive preparatory fires were not extensively used in

the African and European theaters, significant lessons can still be

learned from the experiences. The three case studies addressed in

this chapter-one involving an American defense and two dealing

with the Germans—illustrate how devastating massive preparatory

fires can be to the defending command's C3 (command, control,

and communications) networks. Thus, disrupting the defenders'

C

3

, as these three studies show, may be just as effective as

destroying their combat units.

Ardennes

The Ardennes counteroffensive provides the most illuminating

information for American commanders concerning the effects of

preparatory fires. Prior to 16 December 1944, the Ardennes sector

of the ETO was regarded as a "quiet" sector where untried units

could get experience and tired units could rest and refit. Three U.S.

infantry divisions in this sector met this criteria. The 106th Infantry

Division had just arrived from the United States, while the other two,

the 28th and 4th Infantry Divisions, were recuperating from the

Heurtgen Forest battle and refitting and training their 9,000

replacements. Because of the low probability of an enemy

58
attacking in the Ardennes, the high command took a calculated risk

in defending with less troops than elsewhere on the front. This

meant that VIII Corps frontages were abnormally long; the three

divisions defended an 85-mile frontage, three times the accepted

frontage for a 1944 division. Thus, VIII Corps was forced into

manning strongpoints on the likely avenues of approach. By this

curious quirk of chance, the U.S. VIII Corps was required to

organize itself into a defense that, in outward appearance, was

remarkably similar to the German elastic defense. However, here

the similarity ends. The American concept, if it could be called that,

differed from the German doctrine because German doctrine called

for a counterattack force, which U.S. VIII Corps lacked.

At 0530 on 16 December, three German field armies opened the

preparatory fire by employing over 1,000 guns and rocket launchers

on a 75-mile front in the Ardennes.4 Although the German

preparatory fires were massive and the American defenses

collapsed, some interesting facts arise. First, and most striking, is

that the preparation by over 1,000 German artillery pieces and

rocket launchers ranging from 76-mm to 14-inch railroad guns did

not result initially in large numbers of casualties or losses of

equipment. These preparatory fires did, however, disrupt the

American communications. Hugh Cole, in his official study of the

battle for the U.S. Army Center of Military History titled, The

Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge, indicates that the initial German

barrage severely damaged the U.S. communications nets,

particularly the artillery net. Additionally, the Germans jammed the

U.S. radio frequencies by playing phonograph records on the U.S.

radio nets. Due to the communications failures, many units were

unaware of approaching German troop units until the Germans

literally were on their doorsteps. For example, the 559th Field

Artillery Battalion, an VIII Corps artillery unit, did not learn of the

German force to its front until 1215, seven hours after the attack

began.5 Cole states that numerous artillery units, especially towed

59

90-1775
units, proved vulnerable to the attacking enemy infantry and armor

because they either did not know the location of enemy forces or

could not displace fast enough to keep out of harm's way. A

Historical Evaluation and Research Organization (HERO) study,

which focuses on artillery units, indicates that U.S. forces lost a

large number of artillery pieces during the Ardennes

counteroffensive. Yet during the entire length of the battle, only

fifteen tube losses were directly attributable to enemy artillery fire.6

The initial success of the German preparatory fires was due not

only to limiting U.S. artillery response but also to disrupting the U.S.

communications network-the normal command and control

channels of the American division and corps commanders. The

Americans simply could not get intelligence upon which to act. The

catastrophic losses suffered by VIII Corps units occurred because

the frontline units lost communications with their higher

headquarters and supporting units. American afteraction reports

are replete with commanders lamenting that they could not get

information due to severed or disrupted communications. The

confusion in the minds of the operational-level American

commanders caused by the preparatory fires disrupting their

communications with their subordinates caused those commanders

to not respond (or to respond incorrectly) to the situation.

The example of Major General Norman D. Cota, commanding the

28th Infantry Division, is a classic case. He could not commit the

armored forces under his command because he did not know

where the main threat in his division's sector was and because he

could not communicate with his other headquarters. He felt he

needed to keep the armor in reserve until he could determine where

the main threat was. By the time he determined that the main

threat was, in fact, in the 110th Infantry's sector and he committed

tanks to aid the regiment, it was too late to prevent the German

breakthrough. Had the U.S. armor in the 110th Infantry's sector on

60
16 December been committed twenty-four hours earlier, it might

have dramatically affected the outcome of the battle. As it turned

out, the Fifth Panzer Army was unable to aet its armor across the

Our River until the second day of the battle.

Operation Cobra

The concept that the disruption caused by massive preparatory

fires may be the most damaging effect can be supported by one

other short example: Operation Cobra. During Operation Cobra

(25-31 July 1944), German forces of the 2d SS Panzer and the

Panzer Lehr Divisions were subjected to an intense bombardment

along a narrow front seven miles west of Saint-Lo. There was a

total of 1,500 B-17s and B-24s, each dropping forty 100-pound

bombs, followed by 396 B-25s and 1,000 artillery pieces hitting the

same area.8 Yet according to German Seventh Army afteraction

reports, casualties due to the bombardment were less than 10

percent of the personnel. The German artillery two miles back was

virtually unscathed. The major damage was in combat vehicles,

crew-served weapons, and communications equipment. The

bombardments put communications into a state of chaos. The

German Seventh Army could not communicate with the troops in

the bombardment box and, like the defenders at the Ardennes,

could not react immediately. No one could tell what was

happening. By the time a reasonable idea of what was occurring

emerged, the American forces had achieved a breakthrough.

North Africa

An example of the disruption of C3 can also be found in North

Africa. At El Alamein, Field Marshal Erwin Rommel based his

defense on his study of British attack methods and the terrain.

Rommel believed the British (Sir Bernard L. Montgomery) would be

61
forced to revert to a World War I style of attack to assault German

positions. Accordingly, Rommel's concept of defeating this form of

attack was a modification of General Erich Ludendorffs elastic

defense of World War I.

Rommel fortified the German infantry into hard-point defensive

positions and laid minefields that contained 445,000 mines along the

entire length of his 31-kilometer front. He positioned the reserves

behind the minefields, scheduled to attack around them to block

any penetrations. Farther back were two additional mechanized

infantry divisions that would provide greater depth to the defense.

On the night of 23 October 1942, at 2200, 802 artillery pieces,

supported by Wellington bombers dropping an additional 125 tons

of explosives, completely saturated the German positions within the

first 15 minutes. Some known German artillery positions received

100 rounds during this 15-minute period.9 Surprisingly, this

bombardment produced relatively few casualties, but it completely

destroyed or disrupted the German communications nets and

caused severe damage to towed artillery positions. A combination

of cutting the landlines and jamming the VHP radios by Wellington

bombers resulted in the disruption of German communications.

The normal German command system was rendered inoperable.

The only initial communications received at RommePs Africa Group

headquarters were from runners, and their information was sketchy.

The inability to get a comprehensive idea of what was occurring

caused General Georg Strumme (who, when the battle began, was

in command while Rommel was in Germany) not to deploy his

reserves. Lack of communications caused Strumme to withhold

permission for the artillery to counterfire (the Germans were also

short on artillery rounds), as he could not ascertain the location of

the main attack. In an effort to get information, he decided to go

forward to the 90th Light Division's command post. Because the

British had seized territory in between Strumme's headquarters and

62
the division command post, Strumme and his small staff were

forced to evade capture on their return to the command post. In

the ensuing excitement, Strumme suffered a heart attack and died.

By the time General Rttter von Thoma (who replaced Strumme as

acting commander of the German Africa Group) assumed command

and ascertained what was happening, the battle was lost.

Conclusions

A cursory look at the effects of massive preparatory fires based

on these three cases from World War II might give the impression

that defenses cannot withstand massive integrated preparatory fires

(air, artillery, direct-fire weapons) without collapsing. However,

careful examination of the circumstances does not support the

contention that the preparatory fires were totally responsible for the

collapse of the defense. The bombardments themselves did not

cause damage as serious as was expected. In all cases,

determined defenders inside the areas hit with the preparatory fires

were able to respond to the follow-on attacks. In none of these

examples did the bombardments themselves result in immediate

breakthroughs by the attackers. In Operation Cobra, after the

preparatory fires, the farthest advance by any U.S. unit was only

2,300 yards, hardly a spectacular gain.10 The German Ardennes

counteroffensive was behind schedule because of the stiff

resistance the Germans encountered from the American troops

isolated in the villages, which had been turned into impromptu

strongpoints. Until the Americans were forced out, they blocked

roads critical for the German advance.11 Likewise, at El Alamein,

the German defenders did not crack under the initial bombardment.

They offered stiff resistance and were not forced to retreat for ten

days.

In the World War II examples cited in this chapter, the inabilty of

the commanders to get intelligence or command orders explains

63
why the attacks following the massive bombardments initially

succeeded. This was a direct result of the bombardment's

interdiction or disruption of the communications systems. In World

War II, wire was the primary means of communication in defensive

operations, and the wire was laid on top of the ground or strung

from trees or poles. It was extremely vulnerable to the preparatory

fires, thereby reducing the defender's ability to coordinate the

defense after it was destroyed. The lesion to the modern

commander is that, if wire communications are to remain a viable

communications means, either the wire must be, buried to ensure its

survival as was done in World War I or, as suggested in the World

War II General Board at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, multiple -redundancy

must be incorporated into the system to enhance its survival.

Additionally, based on the lessons from El Alamein and the

Ardennes, some communications means to supplement radios

should be employed to reduce the effects of jamming. In both

cases, jamming, coupled with the interruption of the wire nets,

severely reduced the commanders' ability to take decisive action.

Other World War II lessons concerning large preparatory fires

also have validity today. For example, battle casualties for both

German and U.S. forces among artillery personnel were significantly

greater in towed batteries than in self-propelled batteries during the

preparatory fires. Both the Americans and Germans agreed that,

once a battle position was identified, it was subjected to repeated

artillery attacks to prevent its use. The inherent lack of mobility and

protection of personnel by armor are the major contributing factors

to the vulnerability of towed artillery and their personnel. For U.S.

forces, self-propelled artillery personnel losses were less than half

than those suffered by towed artillery.12

Another lesson derived from the World War II experience is the

effectiveness of field fortifications that enable units to endure

preparatory fires. Battlefield personnel casualties and gun losses by

64
artillery were in inverse proportion to the extent units were dug into

field fortifications.13

In summary, a study of the ETO during World War II does not

offer any new, startling concepts to overcome the effects of massive

preparatory fires. The World War II examples from the ETO do,

however, provide two very significant lessons for the modern

commanders facing an enemy capable of massive preparatory fires.

First, the communications networks must be able to survive

preparatory fires. This can be done either through redundancy or

some type of protective means. Second, current defensive doctrine

should be reevaluated. Present doctrine, similar to that of World

War II, requires centralized command and control. As the World

War II examples indicate, this may be the weakest link in a defense

subjected to massive preparatory fires. There may be a need to

revamp existing defensive doctrine to allow for a greater

decentralization of the command and control functions of the

defense.

65
66
CHAPTER 3

NOTES

1. Afteraction reports, observer reports, and the General Boards

convened after the conclusion of the war to record lessons learned;

all indicate interest, almost exclusively, in "passive" means of

surviving artillery attacks. Survival recommendations included

actions such as ensuring redundancy in wire communications,

improving armor protection on self-propelled artillery, and protecting

positions with field fortifications. The only active defensive means

discussed was counterbattery fire and the procedures necessary to

improve it.

2. In his book, Panzer Battles: A Study of the Employment of

Armor in the Second World War (Norman: University of Oklahoma

Press, C1956), Major General Friedrich Wilhelm von Mellenthin

describes the defensive operations of German Army Group B in

defending the Lorraine in 1944.

3. All the German afteraction reports show that the German

artillery would not fire if a U.S. artillery spotter plane or

fighter-bomber was observed. U.S. Army Ground Forces, Report

no. 935, "Germany Artillery Commander's Views on U.S. Artillery"

(APO 887: European Theater of Operations, United States Army, 10

May 1945).

4. The bombardment varied to some extent in each German field

army area. In the Fifth Panzer Army, the bombardment was twenty

minutes long and concentrated on the destruction of wire

communications; isolation of observation post and command post

positions; interdiction of crossroads and assembly areas; and finally,

neutralization of U.S. artillery. In the Sixth Panzer Army and

67
Seventh Army areas, the bombardment was thirty minutes long and

concentrated more on frontline and artillery positions. In all

instances, at the point of penetration, the Germans mustered

approximately twenty tubes per kilometer. Historical Evaluation and

Research Organization, Modem Artillery Experience in Combat:

Ardennes (Dunn Loring, VA, 1977), hereafter cited as HERO,

Ardennes.

5. Hugh Cole, The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge. U.S. Army in

World War II (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military

History, U.S. Army, 1965), 658.

6. The U.S. First Army lost forty-one artillery pieces during

16-26 December 1944. Of the tubes lost, fifteen were losses to

artillery fire, and twenty-two were losses for other unspecified

reasons. HERO, Ardennes.

7. In addition to being unable to get their armor across, the

Germans blocked their bridge sites with armor and infantry units to

such an extent that their artillery units could not displace forward to

aid in the reduction of U.S. positions. This left the task to armor

and infantry units, which took much longer. The Fifth Panzer Army

did not get artillery units across the Our River until 19 December.

Cole, Ardennes, 657.

8. David Eisenhower, Eisenhower at War, 1943-1945 (New York:

Random House, 1986), 350.

9. Barrie Pitt, The Crucible of War, vol. 3 Montgomery and

Alamein (London: Papermac/Macmillan, 1986), 95.

10. Eisenhower, Eisenhower at War, 381.

11. General Hasso-Eccard von ManteufePs artillery preparation

plan may have actually worked against him. As commander of Fifth

Panzer Army, General Manteufel had planned to use the artillery to

68
pin the Americans to the villages so they could be bypassed by his

attacking infantry. The problem this created was that these villages

were astride the very same routes his vehicles needed to continue

the attack. The result was that the Germans had to root the

Americans out of each village in order to clear the roads.

Consequently, the battles for these villages delayed the German

advance forty-eight critical hours. B. H. Uddell Hart, The German

Generals Talk (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1948), 76-78,

272-93.

12. U.S. Army, Field Artillery Advisory Panel, "Report of Army

Field Artillery Advisory Panel on Field Artillery" (N.p., 18 February

1949), appendix A, annex B, 36.

13. HERO, Ardennes, 11.

69
70
CHAPTER 3

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Cole, Hugh. The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge. U.S. Army in

World War II. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military

History, U.S. Army, 1965.

Eisenhower, David. Eisenhower at War, 1943-1945. New York:

Random House, 1986.

Historical Evaluation and Research Organization. Modem Artillery

Experience in Combat: Ardennes. Dunn Loring, VA, 1977.

Liddell Hart, B. H. The German Generals Talk. New York: William

Morrow & Co., 1948.

Mellenthin, Friedrich Wilhelm von. Panzer Battles: A Study of the

Employment of Armor in the Second World War. Norman:

University of Oklahoma Press, C1956.

Pitt, Barrie. The Crucible of War. Vol. 3. Montgomery and

Alamein. London: Papermac/Macmillan, 1986.

U.S. Army. Field Artillery Advisory Panel. "Report of Army Field

Artillery Advisory Panel on Field Artillery." N.p., 18 February

1949.

U.S. Army Ground Forces. Report no. 935. "Germany Artillery

Commander's Views on U.S. Artillery." APO 887: European

Theater of Operations, United States Army, 10 May 1945.

71

CHAPTER 4

GERMAN COUNTERARTILLERY

MEASURES ON THE EASTERN FRONT IN

1944-45: OPERATION BAGRATION

by Dr. Samuel J. Lewis

Insufficient data is available to answer with certainty the question

of what the German Army did in 1944-45 to negate or avoid the

effects of massive Russian artillery barrages (excluding the use of

an operational withdrawal). For this late period, relatively little has

been written on Eastern Front operations below corps level, and

most German records were destroyed or remain in Warsaw Pact

nation archives. Even if those records were available, the size of

the theater, variations in terrain, missions, and force composition

would suggest a tactical diversity as great as that experienced

during World War I. In all probability, however, the German infantry

divisions attempted to rely on the elastic defense to the limited

extent that was possible. The lack of forces to defend ground

drastically altered that tactic, replacing the outpost zone and most

of the battle zone with a thin line of weapons pits, a line of

strongpoints, or a combination of the two-all depending on the

local circumstances.

The Conceptual Framework

The German Army developed the elastic defense during World

War I and incorporated it into its 1933 regulations that remained in

effect through the end of World War II.1 Major Timothy A. Wray

ably summarized the elastic defense in the Combat Studies

73
Institute's Research Survey No. 5, Standing Fast: German

Defensive Doctrine on the Russian Front During World War //,

Prewar to March 1943:

This doctrine [elastic defense] focused on defeating

enemy attacks at a minimum loss to defending forces

rather than on retaining terrain for the sake of prestige.

The Elastic Defense was meant to exhaust Allied

offensive energies in a system of fortified trenches

arrayed in depth. By fighting the defensive battle

within, as well as forward of, the German defensive

zone, the Germans could exploit the inherent

limitations and vulnerabilities of the attacker while

conserving their own forces. Only minimal security

forces would occupy exposed forward trenches, and

thus, most of the defending troops would be safe from

the worst effects of the fulsome Allied artillery

preparation. Furthermore, German firepower would

continuously weaken the enemy's attacking infantry

forces. If faced with overwhelming combat power at

any point, German units would be free to maneuver

within the defensive network to develop more

favorable conditions. When the Allied attack faltered,

German units (including carefully husbanded reserves)

would counterattack fiercely. Together, these tactics

would create a condition of tactical "elasticity":

advancing Allied forces would steadily lose strength in

inverse proportion to growing German resistance.

Finally, German counterattacks would overrun the

prostrate Allied infantry and "snap" the defense back

into its original positions [see figure 1].2

For the German Army on the Eastern Front in 1944-45, the

dilemma of defending too great a frontage with insufficient forces

74
dictated drastic changes to the tactic of elastic defense, as can be

observed in Operation Bagration.

Operation Bagration

One of the particularly heavy barrages of World War II supported

the Red Army offensive against German Army Group Center,

beginning on 22 June 1944. The Soviet fire plan incorporated the

following:

• Fifteen minutes of fire on German defensive positions up to a

depth of three kilometers.

• Ninety minutes of fire on observed targets, artillery positions,

and heavy weapons positions.

• Twenty minutes of fire on the German main defensive line and

positions to the rear.

• On-call fire from observers throughout the remainder of the day.

Along the 690-kilometer line, the four Soviet Fronts deployed

some 24,000 gun and mortar tubes. Some 17,000 tubes were

deployed in support of the specific breakthrough sectors. Along the

line, the Soviets deployed 35 artillery pieces per kilometer, but 178

per kilometer in the breakthrough sectors. Naturally, the Soviet

barrages did vary from sector to sector. The war diary of the

German Fourth Army stated that the three-hour barrage Fourth

Army received was the heaviest it had yet encountered.3

75
ENEMY

OUTPOST

ZONE

BATTLE

ZONE

REARWARD

ZONE

ii HI

Cross Section of German Defense Zones (Ideal)

ENEMY

REARWARD

ZONE

Source: Wray, Standing Fast, 4.

Figure 1. The elastic defense, 1917-18

76
How the twenty-nine German divisions deployed and reacted to

such barrages remains open to question due to the nonavailability

of the German records, particularly at the regimental and divisional

levels. Surviving records of the Fourth and Ninth Armies, however,

shed some light on how the Germans deployed. Each division

defended a front of twenty-four to thirty-two kilometers, sectors far

too large for the divisional artillery to cover. The divisions fielded

about fifty infantrymen per kilometer of front, eighty per kilometer of

front if one includes the crews of the infantry heavy weapons. The

divisions defended sectors five to six kilometers in depth with from

three to five trench systems covered by minefields and wire

entanglements where applicable. The Germans possessed

sufficient mines, but artillery ammunition remained in short supply.4

That shortage of ammunition limited the defender's ability to use

counterbattery fire against the Red Army. On 20 June 1944, when it

became clear that the Soviet buildup indicated the threat of a large

offensive and there occurred a noticeable increase in artillery fire,

the German Third Panzer and Ninth Armies possessed only 2,000 to

3,000 105-mm howitzer shells for counterbattery fire. Another

solution to the problem, withdrawing to another defensive line, was

not possible due to Hitler's stand-fast, fight-to-the-last-bullet policy.

Even after the huge Soviet breakthroughs during the first two days

of battle, the commander of Army Group Center prohibited

withdrawals.5

The German General Staff Training and Foreign Armies East

Branches continued to compile lessons learned through 1945 on

combat against the Red Army. The following lessons learned from

the 1944-45 period indicate several tendencies of the Red Army

when it undertook large-scale offensives using massive artillery

barrages:

• Even average intelligence work on the Germans1 part would

indicate the Russian buildup, materiel being brought forward,

77
construction of artillery dummy positions, improvement of roads

and paths, detailed rehearsals in the Russian rear area by the

assault troops, and aggressive patrolling (probes up to

company strength). Historically, the large tank formations were

last to arrive in the assembly area. The best solution in dealing

with such a buildup would have been for the Germans to use

air power and artillery to heavily pound the builtup area,

particularly the artillery positions and the forward assembly

area.6

• Until late 1944, the large Russian artillery preparation (30 to 100

minutes) served as an "alarm clock" to warn the Germans of

the impending attack. At that time, the Soviets began to vary

the timing and pattern of their traditional rolling barrage. They

did this because German infantry had learned to withdraw from

the first to the second trench during the barrage and,

immediately following the barrage, move back to the first

trench. Consequently, the Soviets began using "feint

barrages," which usually took place two to three hours before

the actual attack, to determine the Germans1 intentions. The

Germans' best solution to this problem was to move back to

another trench line (already prepared) and have their artillery

fire concentrate on the forward Soviet positions. Once the

attack began, Soviet infantry tended to cling to the initial assault

objectives. German artillery concentrations on these positions

proved effective until the Soviets learned to avoid occupying

enemy positions.7

• Following the end of the rolling artillery barrage, there was

usually a lull in Soviet artillery activity. Although some guns

concentrated on reducing German strongpoints, Soviet guns

had little to shoot at. There were so many guns that, when

they attempted to move forward, they created ever worsening

traffic jams.8 Such traffic jams provided lucrative targets.

• Soviet infantry in the attack, when fired on or in the presence of

enemy tanks, had a tendency to hit the dirt and not move.

78
When a Soviet attack was stopped, the infantry began digging

in systematically. The Germans found that their best chance

rested in an immediate counterattack. The best location for

such a counterthrust was at the base of the breakthrough

corridor.9

• Ten minutes before the rolling barrage passed the German

front line, Soviet infantry units opened fire with heavy weapons

to keep the Germans pinned down. The assaulting Soviet

infantry hoped in this way to arrive at the German positions

while the German defenders were still in full cover. To nullify

this tactic, the Germans constructed concrete shields with

observation and firing ports.10

• Before an offensive, the Russians removed the obstacles they

had erected previously. It was important to observe such

changes.11

1st Battalion, 27th Fusilier Regiment,

12th Infantry Division

There are relatively few German Army battalion-level accounts

concerning Operation Bagration. The following recollection by a

battalion commander cannot be substantiated by documentation,

but it does reflect how the Germans attempted to maneuver within

the battle zone, which was consistent with the elastic defense.

The 12th Infantry Division served under the XXXIX Panzer Corps

of the German Fourth Army. Since March 1944, the division fought

east of Mogilev defending a 32-kilometer front along the Pronja

Bend with no reserves, excluding the field replacement battalion.

The 1st Battalion defended a front of more than four kilometers

behind the Pronja River, which was fifteen to twenty-five meters wide

and served as an antitank obstacle. Throughout May, the arrival of

replacements and the return of convalescents increased the

battalion's strength to about 430 men. By June, the 4 companies

79
each fielded 70 to 100 men. The battalion held the northern flank of

the division, with its neighbor to the north being the 337th Infantry

Division. The battalion aggressively patrolled the 1 1/2-kilometer

gap between it and its neighbor to the north and the front down to

the river, most of which could not be observed from the main line of

resistance.12

The battalion did not defend the river line but, rather, established

its first line on a series of hilltops and rises (30 meters above the

river) 300 to 500 meters from the river. That trench linked a series

of weapons pits, each sited to provide flanking fire for another.

Where appropriate, the infantry had placed mines and wire in front

of the line. The troops lived in squad bunkers sited on reverse

slopes. The battalion commander set up a second line 400 to 600

meters behind the first, mostly on reverse slopes. Covered

communications trenches linked the first and second lines. It took

the battalion eight weeks to complete five such lines.13

The Red Army's 2d Belorussian Front faced the German Fourth

and Ninth Armies. It occupied a 160-kilometer front and achieved

an artillery density of 181 guns and mortars per kilometer. The

Front's main effort rested with the 49th Army, which concentrated

ten rifle divisions to strike the German 337th Infantry Division, the

northern neighbor of the aforementioned 1st Battalion.14

The usual harbingers of a Soviet offensive alerted the German

defenders, accentuated on 22 June by Red Army loudspeaker

psychological operations broadcasts, artillery fire, and aggressive

patrolling. By the evening of the 22d, the battalion had driven the

Soviet advance parties back across the Pronja River. The battalion

commander expected the major attack on the following day, so

during the night, he evacuated the first line and occupied the

second line. However, he left several forward observers in the first

line. After illuminating the battlefield during the night, the Soviets

began their barrage of all calibers at about 0400. The rolling

80
barrage lasted about three hours, moving back and forth several

times across the first line and destroying just about all the positions

and communications links in the first line. The German battalion in

the second line suffered forty casualties from the barrage.15

Following the three-hour barrage, the German battalion

commander took the unorthodox measure of moving forward to the

first line. He found that a sufficient number of positions had

survived for his troops to occupy. The first Soviet attack broke

down about 200 meters in front of the first line. Subsequent attacks

in regimental strength met the same fate. During the night, the

German battalion once again withdrew to the second line where it

once again averted the brunt of the morning Soviet artillery barrage

and subsequently moved back to the first line. To avoid being

surrounded, the battalion finally retreated on the night of 24 June.16

A Critical Summary

In all probability, the tactical measure of withdrawing to a second

line was a viable alternative in 1944 and 1945, certainly one of the

few available to the German infantry. It also remained consistent

with the World War I tactic of elastic defense, in which the defender

maneuvers within the defensive zone.17 An earlier exchange of

ideas within the German Fourth Army indicated that most

commanders viewed any form of linear defense superior to a

system of strongpoints. One commander observed that the only

thing strongpoints accomplished was to draw heavy artillery fire.18

At least within the German Fourth Army, therefore, the use of a

modified elastic defense remained an accepted practice. In

addition, one Red Army lessons learned report for Operation

Bagration concluded that its artillery preparation failed to strike the

German positions in depth sufficiently, particularly German reverse

slope positions.19

81
Another variation of German defensive tactics consisted of a line

of strongpoints as the main line of resistance, with reserves behind

used to counterattack. As late as October 1944, the German 2d

Mountain Division used such a tactic in northern Finland,

undoubtedly as a result of the extended frontage and the peculiar

nature of arctic terrain. When attacked by an overwhelming Soviet

force that same month, those strongpoints simply drew heavy

Soviet artillery fire and were surrounded by the attackers.20

German coastal defenses in France were also based on the

strongpoint system. During the Normandy invasion in June 1944,

several of the sturdier, reinforced concrete strongpoints (like several

of the 2d Mountain Division's strongpoints) survived heavy artillery

bombardments, only to be reduced by the attacker within seven

days. Maintaining such strongpoints managed to inflict losses on

the enemy and to tie down the attacker's forces, but in the absence

of large reserves for a counterattack, strongpoints served as little

more than traps for the defending garrisons.21

Major Timothy A. Wray observed that the German tactic of

defense in depth remained a viable solution for the defender but

that there were not enough German divisions for the actual tactic to

be used. He remarked that the German divisions, usually having to

defend great frontages, used the principles of the elastic defense

but were forced to use a linear defense with small reserves.

Consequently, Wray noted that it remains difficult to find an actual

example of the elastic defense in depth as described in German

doctrinal literature.22

There is some probability that the actions of the 1st Battalion

cited above did occur in spite of the lack of documentary evidence.

It would appear, therefore, that one possible solution to the problem

of facing massive artillery barrages in positional warfare is

withdrawal to a second prepared position. Most important,

however, is the realization that, no matter how sound a tactical

82
defensive doctrine is, there comes a point when the attacker's

strength is so preponderant that the defender can be overwhelmed

and destroyed regardless of tactics. It should be remembered that

the 1st Battalion did not bare the brunt of the major offensive, and

that could be one of the reasons why it survived.

83
84
CHAPTER 4

NOTES

1. See Germany, Generalstab, Truppenfuhrung [Troop leading],

Heeresdruckvorschriften 300/1 (Berlin: E. S. Mittler und Sohn,

1936); Germany, Heer, Oberkommando des Heeres,

Ausbildungsvorschrift fur die Infanterie [Training manual for

infantry], pt. 11, Feldbefestigung der Infanterie [Field fortifications

for infantry], H.Dr. 130/11 (Berlin: E. S. Mittler und Sohn, 1940) (the

author listed here is hereafter cited as Germany, OKH); and

Germany, OKH, Der Stellungskrieg [Positional warfare], H.Dr. 91

(Berlin: E. S. Mittler und Sohn, 1940).

2. Timothy A. Wray, Standing Fast: German Defensive Doctrine

on the Russian Front During World War II, Prewar to March 1943,

Research Survey no. 5, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies

Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1986), 3.

3. Gerd Niepold, Battle for White Russia, translated by Richard

Simpkin (London: Brassey's, 1987), 60-62.

4. Ibid., 28-35.

5. Rolf Hinze, Der Zusammenbruch der Heeresgruppe Mitte im

Osten 1944 [The destruction of Army Group Center in the East

1944] (Stuttgart: Motorbuch Verlag, 1980), 18-41.

6. Germany, Generalstab des Heeres, Abteilung Fremde Heer

Ost (lla), "SUanuar 1945, Vortragsnotiz: Hinweise fur die einige

Abwehr nach Erkenntnissen uber die sowjetrussische Kampfweise"

[Notification for defense in accordance with recent Soviet tactics],

signed Gehlen, microfilm series T-78, roll 304, National Archives and

Records Administration, Washington, DC, hereafter cited as NARA.

85
7. See note 6.

8. See note 6.

9. See note 6.

10. See note 6.

11. See note 6.

12. General Lemm, "Defense of Mogilev by the 12th Infantry

Division," in 7985 Art of War Symposium—From the Dnepr to the

Vistula: Soviet Offensive Operations, November 1943-August 1944,

a Transcript of Proceedings, edited by Colonel David M. Glantz

(Carlisle Barracks, PA: Center for Land Warfare, U.S. Army War

College, 1985), 359-64. General Lemm subsequently rose to the

rank of lieutenant general in the Bundeswehr.

13. Ibid.

14. Niepold, Battle for White Russia, 55.

15. Lemm, "Defense of Mogilev." The usual indicators of an

impending Soviet offensive began with knowledge of increased rail

traffic, road improvements, and construction of additional artillery

positions—gleaned through aerial reconnaissance photos. On the

ground, the indicators consisted of more aggressive patrolling and

the ranging in of Soviet guns.

16. Ibid.

17. See Graeme C. Wynne, If Germany Attacks: The Battle in

Depth in the West (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1976); and

Timothy T. Lupfer, The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in

German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War, Leavenworth

86
Papers no. 4 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, U.S.

Army Command and General Staff College, 1981).

18. See "Kdr. l./lnf.Rgt. 20 (mot.) Erfahrungsbericht" of 17 August

1942, "Stuetspunktsystem Oder H.K.L" [Experience report of

17 August 1942, strongpoint system or main line of resistance],

signed Hauptmann Haderecker, and letter from the Operations

Officer, 267th Infanterie Division, 24 August 1942, microfilm series

T-312, roll 184, NARA.

19. Cited in Niepold, Battle for White Russia, 62.

20. James F. Gebhardt, "Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation,

7-30 October 1944: A Soviet Joint and Combined Arms Operation

on Arctic Terrain," July 1988, manuscript being prepared for future

publication by Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and

General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

21. Germany, Heer, Oberbefehlshaber West (Oberkommando

Heeresgruppe D), la Nr. 5050/44 geheim of 20 June 1944,

Erfahrungen aus den Invasionskaempfen Normandie [OB West

lessons learned report for the invasion of Normandy], microfilm

series T-312, roll 1059, NARA.

22. Wray, Standing Fast, 57-177.

87
88
CHAPTER 4

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Gebhardt, James F. "Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation, 7-30 October

1944: A Soviet Joint and Combined Arms Operation on Arctic

Terrain." July 1988. Manuscript being prepared for future

publication by Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command

and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Germany, Generalstab. Truppenfuhrung [Troop landing].

Heeresdruckvorschriften 300/1. Berlin: E. S. Mrttler und Sohn,

1936.

Germany, Generalstab des Heeres, Abteilung Fremde Heer Ost

(Ha). "SUanuar 1945, Vortragsnotiz: Hinweise fur die einige

Abwehr nach Erkenntnissen uber die sowjetrussische

Kampfweise" [Notification for defense in accordance with recent

Soviet tactics]. Signed Gehlen. Microfilm series T-78, roll 304,

National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, DC.

Germany, Heer, Oberbefehlshaber West (Oberkommando

Heeresgruppe D), la Nr. 5050/44 geheim of 20 June 1944.

Erfahrungen aud den Invasionskaempfen Normandie [OB West

lessons learned report for the invasion of Normandy]. Microfilm

series T-312, roll 1059, National Archives and Records

Administration, Washington, DC.

Germany, Heer, Oberkommando des Heeres, Ausbildungsvorschrift

fur die Infanterie [Training manual for infantry]. Pt. 11.

Feldbefestigung der Infanterie [Field fortifications for infantry].

H.Dr. 130/11. Berlin: E. S. Mittler und Sohn, 1940.

89
. Der Stellungskrieg [Positional warfare]. H.Dr. 91. Berlin:

E. S. Mittler und Sohn, 1940.

Hinze, Rolf. Der Zusammenbruch der Heeresgruppe Mitte im

Osten 1944 [The destruction of Army Group Center in the East

1944]. Stuttgart: Motorbuch Verlag, 1980.

"Kdr. l./lnf.Rgt. 20 (mot.) Erfahrungsbericht" of 17 August 1942,

"Stuetspunktsystem Oder H.K.L." [Experience report of

17 August 1942, strongpoint system or main line of resistance].

Signed Hauptmann Haderecker. Microfilm series T-312, roll

184, National Archives and Records Administration,

Washington, DC.

Lemm, Hans-Georg, General. "Defense of Mogilev by the 12th

Infantry Division." In 1985 Art of War Symposium—From the

Dnepr to the Vistula: Soviet Offensive Operations, November

1943-August 1944, a Transcript of Proceedings, edited by

Colonel David M. Glantz, 359-84. Carlisle Barracks, PA:

Center for Land Warfare, U.S. Army War College, 1985.

Letter from the Operations Officer, 267th Infanterie Division,

24 August 1942. Microfilm series T-312, roll 184, National

Archives and Records Administration, Washington, DC.

Lupfer, Timothy T. The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in

German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War.

Leavenworth Papers no. 4. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat

Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff

College, 1981.

Niepold, Gerd. Battle for White Russia. Translated by Richard

Simpkin. London: Brassey's 1987.

Wray, Timothy A. Standing Fast: German Defensive Doctrine on

the Russian Front During World War II, Prewar to March 1943.

90
Research Survey no. 5, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat

Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff

College, 1986.

Wynne, Graeme C. If Germany Attacks: The Battle in Depth in the

West. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1976.

91

90-1775

CHAPTER 5

JAPANESE COUNTERARTILLERY

METHODS ON OKINAWA,

APRIL-JUNE 1945

by Dr. Thomas M. Huber

In the spring of 1945, the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) on

Okinawa was ordered to hold the island at all costs. IJA

commanders faced potential massive bombardment from three

sources: U.S. Army field artillery, Army Air Force aerial bombing,

and U.S. Navy offshore bombardment. The IJA had little field

artillery of its own to rely on and no friendly air or naval presence.

This meant U.S. ships and planes could bombard IJA's positions to

any degree and at will. How did the commanders on Okinawa cope

with this problem of unlimited enemy bombardment?

The Bombardment

Okinawa is sixty miles long and two to eighteen miles wide. The

task of the IJA 32d Army was to hold the island as long as possible

to prevent U.S. forces from using it as a staging area for attacks on

Japan itself. To do this, the 32d Army chose to go underground in

the island's southernmost tip, an area about sixteen miles long and

three to twelve miles wide. Into this limited area, it carved sixty

miles of caves and tunnels. Onto this same zone of approximately

eighty square miles, U.S. forces, between 24 March and 22 June,

fired 2.4 million artillery rounds, 1.8 million by ground forces and .6

million by naval forces (see tables 1 and 2). These numbers do not

include aerial bombardment or direct fire from guns of 75-mm or

less. (For example, the U.S. Army XXIV Corps fired 100,000 rounds

of 75-mm ammunition.)

93
TABLE 1

AMMUNITION EXPENDED BY U.S. TENTH

ARMY FIELD ARTILLERY,

1 APRIL-3Q JUNE 1945

Type Rounds Fired

Howitzer, 75-mm 166,068

Howitzer, 105-mm 1,104,630

Howitzer, 155-mm 346,914

Gun, 155-mm 129,624

Howitzer, 8-inch 19,116

Total 1,766,352

Source: Roy E. Appleman, et al., Okinawa: The Last Battle, U.S. Army in World

War II: The War in the Pacific (Washington, DC: Historical Division,

Department of the Army, 1948), 498.

94
TABLE 2

AMMUNITION EXPENDED BY THE U.S.

NAVY IN THE RYUKYUS CAMPAIGN,

MARCH-JUNE 1945

Type Rounds Fired

Star illumination, 5-inch 66,653

High-capacity fragmentation, 5-inch 432,0X38

High-capacity fragmentation, 6-inch 46,020

High-capacity fragmentation, 8-inch 32,180

High-capacity fragmentation, 12-inch 2,700

High-capacity fragmentation, 14-inch 16,046

High-capacity fragmentation, 16-inch 4,411

Total 600,018

Source: Appleman et al., Okinawa, 500.

95
U.S. artillerymen relied mainly on radio-bearing forward observers

for spotting. Since the IJA had no air presence, U.S. forces also

used "cub" reconnaissance planes to locate targets. In addition to

these methods, U.S. forces used new GR-6 sound locator sets to

aim artillery.

In preparation for assault landings on 1 April 1945, U.S. carrier

planes bombed Okinawa on 23 March, and on 24 March, U.S.

Naval vessels implemented a preparatory bombardment of 13,000

6-inch and 12-inch shells. From this point on, U.S. forces were able

to lay saturation bombardments on any target they could discover.

Japanese Countermeasures

Despite continuous savage bombardment, the IJA 32d Army held

out on Okinawa for ten weeks (1 April to 22 June). Its

100,000-troop force (76,000 regulars and 24,000 Okinawan Home

Guards) was outnumbered by U.S. Tenth Army (180,000 troops

including replacements). The IJA 32d Army was further

disadvantaged by having few tanks and none that could face the

Sherman M-4, of which U.S. Tenth Army had many.

To counter the U.S. forces1 terrific firepower, the Japanese

resorted to a variety of methods, including the underground

construction of caves, carefully sited pillbox caves, reverse-slope

combat, pre-positioning of supplies, concealment, dummy positions,

and night operations. The keystone of the Japanese counterartillery

defense was the 32d Army's construction of an elaborate system of

underground caves, sixty miles of them in all. The 32d Army's

operational task was defined a year before the battle began, and in

this year, its 100,000 troops labored on the cave systems as if their

lives depended on it, which they did. They built two kinds of caves,

headquarters and frontline firing positions (pillboxes). The 32d

Army headquarters cave was 1,300 feet long and was situated 100

96
feet below the surface. Its walls were planked, and it was furnished

sparsely with desks and chairs. It also boasted electricity and a

lavishly stocked kitchen. It housed 1,000 troops, including staff,

clerks, messengers, and the headquarters company. Though safe

from fire and well provisioned, it was hot, humid, and cramped.

Subordinate to the 32d Army were the IJA 24th and 62d Divisions

and the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade, each of which had a

similar headquarters cave on a reduced scale.

Several miles north of the headquarters tunnels, the Japanese

stretched a web of fireport caves across the Okinawan isthmus,

interdicting the U.S. forces' anticipated axis of advance southward

from the Hagushi beaches (see map 1). Each cave was

constructed as a pillbox, with the fireport opening out just beneath

the dome of a hill or the crest of a ridge. The fire openings were

sited against the reverse slope of hills or ridges in their front so that

they were not visible to the enemy until he reached the reverse

slope and so that nothing was visible to artillerists farther away.

Machine guns were the usual weapon placed in the fireport,

although direct-fire guns of up to 47-mm were also used. Behind

the fireport, into the earth of the hilltop or ridge, the Japanese cut a

narrow shaft for fifteen feet or more. They widened the end into a

room to provide living quarters for the troops who manned the

weapon and to allow for storage space for ammunition and food.

They also cut further shafts to the rear of the hill or ridge to provide

one or more rear entrances to the cave so that troops could come

and go without being under fire from enemy troops advancing on

the fireport. Each battalion built and inhabited its own fireport caves

so that fields of fire were well integrated between them, but only up

to battalion level. The genius of the pillbox caves was that they

allowed the IJA to interdict the advance of U.S. infantry with

machine gun and artillery fire while completely protecting the caves1

inmates from even the heaviest bombardment.

97
JAPANESE DEFENSIVE POSITIONS

I April 1945

Two BNS, 2o INF Unit

on Motobu Peninsula

and le Shima island

,X MINATOGA

BEACHES

Source: Appleman, et al., Okinawa, map no. VI.

Map 1. Japanese defensive positions on Okinawa, 1 April 1945
One of the methods that made the IJA's antiartillery cave

operations feasible was the pre-positioning of weapons,

ammunition, food, and other necessary items in the caves. Each

battalion stocked underground all the material it would need for a

six-month period. Imperial General Headquarters in Tokyo made

furnishing these supplies a priority during the year prior to the battle

so that the whole campaign was conducted with little need to move

supplies during the fighting.

Even though the IJA caves were almost impervious to fire, the

Japanese devoted much effort to concealing their location and

entrances and also to concealing trucks, tanks, antiaircraft guns,

midget submarines, motorboats, and other items that could not be

taken into the caves. The numerous entrances to the caves were

kept small and were covered with a wooden lid that was topped

with sod and foliage, making the entryway nearly invisible. Cooking

smoke from headquarters caves was routed by a special shaft away

from each cave so as not to reveal its location, and cooking was

done only at night. Trucks, motorboat pens, and such were

concealed using netting and foliage. Antiaircraft guns, unusable in

the caves, also had to be left in the open. They, too, were covered

with netting and foliage and protected further by the construction of

numerous dummy antiaircraft guns that were then positioned and

camouflaged like the real ones. From the air, it was impossible to

tell the difference. In practice, U.S. artillery spotters could not

identify IJA positions unless they were active.

When forces had to move on the surface, the IJA 32d Army

strove for concealment by conducting all operations at night. At

several junctures in the battle, the 32d Army ordered a large-scale

offensive or a large-scale retreat. In these cases, the involved units

and their supplies moved and assembled at night. All IJA attacks

were carried out at night, and U.S. artillery could not be brought to

bear on these movements.

99
The IJA 32d Army on Okinawa faced firepower on the ground

alone that was ten times its own. Nonetheless, it was able to hold

out against U.S. forces for ten weeks by using methods that were

elaborate and unorthodox: extensive underground construction,

lavish supply stockage, reverse slope tactics, meticulous

concealment, and night operations.

Effectiveness: Vulnerability to Artillery-Infantry

Combined Arms

The Japanese caves largely neutralized the Americans' massive

advantage in firepower. This alone did not assure the Japanese of

victory, however, because U.S. commanders found they could use

infantry to partially restore their firepower advantage. To destroy

the cave positions, U.S. forces sent tank-infantry teams against

them to locate and blow up each fireport and rear entrance one by

one. The Japanese were forced to deploy infantry on the surface to

prevent this. The result was searing small-arms battles between

U.S. tank-infantry teams duelling with, in effect, Japanese

pillbox-infantry teams to see who would control the cave entrances

on the surface.

One result of this aggressive U.S. use of infantry was that remote

bombardment was able to eliminate some Japanese infantry.

Before attacking, the U.S. forces mounted a saturation

bombardment on the IJA cave positions they faced, then

immediately rushed U.S. infantry teams forward to capture and seal

the cave openings. The Japanese could prevent this only by having

surviving infantry already deployed at the moment the bombardment

ceased. They were to delay the American forces' onrush long

enough for additional IJA troops to deploy out of the caves and

defend the openings. This meant that ten IJA troops per company

had to remain on the surface during the bombardment, where many

became artillery casualties. Once U.S. infantry crossed onto the

100
reverse slope and engaged IJA infantry at close quarters in the

vicinity of the cave openings, the U.S. troops did not call in further

friendly artillery for fear of friendly casualties. Even when

bombardment stopped, however, only one-third of the IJA troops in

the crowded fireport caves could safely deploy outside when U.S.

infantry was in the area. So when U.S. troops did finally overrun the

cave openings, two-thirds of the defenders and their main fire

weapon were helplessly trapped inside. Thus, although the caves

reduced IJA's vulnerability to artillery, Japanese vulnerability to

ground maneuver elements increased greatly.

The American attack was successful, in part, because it used

massive bombardment and aggressive infantry in rapid succession.

In this way, U.S. bombardment sometimes caught the Japanese

outside their ingenious caves, while U.S. infantry sometimes caught

them inside. The caves prevented the IJA 32d Army from being

easily annihilated by massive U.S. artillery, but use of superior

infantry forces in combination with artillery eventually allowed U.S.

forces to destroy the cave positions by attrition warfare.

Results: C3 Aspects

The IJA's innovative cave positions were extremely effective at

frustrating U.S. battlefield intelligence but created major problems of

command, control, and communications (C3). For example,

although Japanese night movement confounded both U.S. artillery

spotters and field intelligence, such night operations produced

serious problems of command and control for the Japanese.

Officers found it was exceptionally difficult to coordinate the

assembly and deployment of forces on a large scale, especially for

an attack, where organization had to be achieved before dawn and

in close proximity to the enemy. Night marshaling for attack or

retreat had to be done on the surface because there was not

enough room for force concentration or staging in the caves. U.S.

101
artillerymen contributed to the night control problem by maintaining

a steady interval bombardment all night on major road intersections

and bridges. Japanese units could only pass these points

piecemeal, causing IJA units to be delayed-or worse, dispersed.

Since the IJA conducted both assembly for attack and the attack

itself at night, IJA's attacks tended to be poorly coordinated,

fragmented, and ineffective.

The caves did nothing to solve the problem of operational

movement by day, which was when U.S. Tenth Army forces chose

to fight. During the day, IJA troops could neither concentrate for

counterattack nor retreat without being vulnerable to lethal direct fire

or bombardment. This was especially a problem for the Japanese

holding caves that were being overrun. They could not flee their

caves at the last moment before American troops reached the

openings because they could not tell from inside their caves where

the Americans were. Additionally, once the Americans bypassed

the cave openings, IJA troops could not exit the caves without

being shot or forced to surrender. In practice, the cave troops

could go neither forward nor backward and usually died in place.

The caves greatly complicated the problem of communication

between the headquarters and line units of the IJA 32d Army. The

32d Army staff failed to make adequate preparations in this area.

The 32d Army had few radios and, for communication, used field

telephone wire (often cut by artillery) or messengers, who were

slow. Artillery requests by IJA frontline units took many hours to fill,

because it iook the messenger that long to make his way to

rear-area artillery positions. Striking targets of opportunity was

impossible.

The IJA 32d Army and division headquarters often received

information from line units by messenger, which meant such reports

were hours old. Orders went back to the line units the same way,

making for further delays. The headquarters could not give

102
elaborate instructions in response to events of the battle because

the headquarters did not know them until some while afterward. At

any given moment, the 32d Army headquarters did not know

exactly where the battle line was. This obliged the 32d Army to rely

mainly on standing orders to the line units to resist U.S. forces as

long as possible if they were attacked.

All in all, the IJA cave positions lent themselves to successful

cover and concealment, as did IJA night operations. However,

these same methods impaired IJA C3 efforts. The cave positions

were well suited for a fixed defense, but dependence on them did

not allow agility or accommodate attack.

Conclusion

The IJA 32d Army staff developed ingenious methods to carry out

its mission in spite of being extremely handicapped by inferior

artillery. Because it had inferior infantry assets as well, the arduous

underground construction and courageous reverse slope tactics

bought the 32d Army only time, not victory.

103
104
CHAPTER 5

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Appleman, Roy E., et al. Okinawa: The Last Battle. U.S. Army in

World War II: The War in the Pacific. Washington, DC:

Historical Division, Department of the Army, 1948.

U.S. Army. Tenth Army. G-2. Intelligence Monograph, Ryukyus

Campaign. 8 vols. Okinawa, 1945.

U.S. Army Forces Far East. Military History Section Japanese

Monograph No. 135. Okinawa Operations Record.

Washington, DC, 1949.

U.S. Marine Corps. Okinawa: Victory in the Pacific. By Charles S.

Nichols Jr., and Henry I. Shaw Jr. Washington, DC: Historical

Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1955.

U.S. Marine Corps. 6th Division. "Sixth Marine Division on Okinawa

Shima, G-2 Summary." Okinawa, August 1945.

105

CHAPTER 6

THE KOREAN WAR: THE UNITED

NATIONS' RESPONSE TO HEAVY

BOMBARDMENT

Dr. William Glenn Robertson

For analytical purposes, the Korean War can be divided into two

phases. The first phase, which lasted from June 1950 to November

1951, can be characterized as a war of movement in which the

opposing forces maneuvered up and down the Korean peninsula in

successive offensives and counteroffensives. In November 1951,

with the resumption of serious truce negotiations, United Nations

(UN) forces ceased offensive operations and assumed a posture of

active defense. From that date until the signing of the armistice in

late July 1953, the conflict can be characterized as having entered a

static phase. Only in the static phase was Communist heavy

bombardment a significant factor in operations. Prevented by

political considerations from adopting a policy of dispersal/defense

in depth, UN forces responded to this heavy bombardment primarily

through programs of enhanced field fortification and massive

counter-fires.

The Mobile Phase

Throughout the mobile phase of the conflict, North Korean and

Chinese Communist artillery, while often present, played no

significant role in combat activity. The Communist forces lacked

both artillery materiel and trained artillerymen. The principle of mass

for the Communists therefore tended to be expressed almost

107
completely in terms of infantry manpower rather than in terms of

artillery concentrations. During this period, Communist forces

generally did not use artillery for close support of attacks, nor did

they concentrate artillery for preattack bombardment. As of

1 October 1951, Eighth Army estimated that only 530 tubes were

available to Communist forces in the Korean peninsula. In contrast,

UN forces on the same date had 1,050 tubes available for use. The

inequity did not end there because UN artillery had by far the

heavier weight of metal. Virtually all Communist artillery was of

76.2-mm caliber (13,300-meter range), while UN artillery ranged

from 105-mm through 8-inch caliber.1

Communist Artillery During the Static Phase

As the war entered its static phase, Communist artillery began to

show marked improvement in both quantity and quality. Eighth

Army's estimate of tubes available to Communist forces stood at

852 at the beginning of 1952, but by 1 July of the same year, the

number had grown to 1,246 tubes. Nevertheless, prior to

September 1952, there was no recorded instance of deliberate

artillery preparatory fires or programmed bombardments by

Communist artillery.

In September 1952, Communist artillery came into its own

through the institution of preparatory massed fires preceding

attacks, as well as an intensified program of bombarding UN forces'

rear areas. From the fall of 1952 until the armistice in July 1953,

Communist artillery was an omnipresent and potent force that had

to be considered by UN planners. Communist artillery ammunition

expenditures, which had been as low as 11,900 rounds in February

1952, jumped to 220,600 rounds in October 1952. While receding

from that high point for most of the remainder of the war,

Communist artillery ammunition expenditures never again declined

below 36,000 rounds per month. During the last two months of the

108
war, Communist artillery ammunition expenditures climbed to their

highest totals ever. For example, Communist gunners fired an

estimated 375,400 rounds in July 1953.2

Although the increased amount of artillery materiel available and

improved efficiency in gunnery gave Communist forces more

options after mid-1952, Communist artillery tactics and techniques

remained very conservative in nature. Even in offensive operations,

the guns were emplaced farther to the rear than was the UN

practice. Communist artillery remained relatively immobile and was

hampered by inadequate ammunition transportation assets. The

guns were heavily camouflaged in holes, caves, and tunnels, with a

great excess of gun positions over tubes. Hampered by inadequate

communications gear, lack of maps, and no aerial observation,

Communist artillery fire control seemed relatively inflexible. Massing

of fires seems to have been done only by prearrangement, there

being no documented instance of massing fires on a target of

opportunity. Most Communist artillery (and mortar) fire was thus

concentrated in intense bombardments of very small areas in

support of local actions.

Such use soon assumed a familiar pattern that continued

throughout the remainder of the war: a methodical increase in

registration fire accompanied by growth in the number of

emplacements and increased rear-area traffic; a violent flat trajectory

barrage, which fell on both the objective and nearby positions of the

main line of resistance, with special emphasis on outposts; and an

equally violent infantry attack, often mounted through the barrage.

While covering a geographically small area, these barrages could

result in the dumping of large numbers of shells on a position in a

relatively short time. For example, 6,000 rounds fell on Hill 281

(Arrowhead) in one day in the fall of 1952. Similarly, Pork Chop Hill

and its vicinity were drenched with 20,000 rounds of artillery and

mortar fire during an action in the summer of 1953.3

109
UN Forces' Responses

The response of UN forces to bombardments of such magnitude

took several forms, most notably an increase in the strength of

fortifications and increased use of counterbattery techniques. One

response not generally available was the possibility of extending the

depth of the defensive belt and holding the forwardmost positions

very lightly, thereby adding an elasticity to the defense that

accepted the loss of ground, even if only temporarily.

As a result of the relatively sudden resumption of truce

negotiations in the fall of 1951, UN forces found themselves holding

a line across the peninsula that was far less than optimal for

protracted defense. In an effort to give the defensive line some

depth, a number of outposts were sited on hills and ridges forward

of the heavily fortified main line of resistance. In many cases, this

outpost line of resistance was badly located for defense, but it was

deemed politically inexpedient to relinquish ground already gained.

With a more rational defensive trace impossible to achieve for

political reasons, weak outposts had to be defended at all costs.

These outposts became the scene of virtually all the battles that

occurred during the static phase of the war.4

With defense in depth possible only in a very limited sense, other

responses to Communist heavy bombardment had to be devised.

An obvious answer was to burrow more deeply into the Korean soil.

Sandbags, railroad iron, and heavy timbers appeared in large

quantities as the Communist guns became more assertive. Bunker

building became a fine art in an effort to shield the infantry from the

rain of shells. Observation posts and command posts also

occupied bunkers, many of them very elaborate structures.

Because most of the Communist artillery fire was 76.2-mm, bunkers

were mostly built to a standard that would withstand a direct hit

from a 105-mm projectile. UN artillerymen also went to ground,

110
heavily revetting their gun positions and placing fire direction

centers under the cover of timbers, rails, and several feet of earth.

Recognition that Communist barrages almost invariably broke

unprotected communications wire led to various techniques of

protecting those vital lines. These techniques included burying the

wire at least eighteen inches deep, suspending the wire from the

sides of trenches, running large numbers of redundant wire links

over different routes, and practicing the conduct of operations by

using radio links alone. Not practiced to any great extent (and

realized as a failing by the end of the war) was the ancient art of

camouflage, especially as it related to protecting observation posts

from early obliteration.5

Along with increased attention to field fortifications, UN forces

made effective counterbattery activities a cornerstone of their

response to Communist heavy bombardment. This counterbattery

program relied on a thorough and systematic intelligence-gathering

effort to identify sectors threatened with large concentrations of

Communist artillery, as well as all potential firing positions within that

sector. This task was made somewhat easier by the nature of the

Communist artillery system: relative inflexibility of procedure,

inadequate transportation assets, and the propensity to expend

great effort fortifying gun positions. The task of the Intelligence

teams was also simplified to a degree through access to aerial

observation and photoreconnaissance missions (a service

unavailable to Communist gunners).

Due to the extensive nature of the Communist fortification

program, UN artillerymen emphasized precision destruction rather

than neutralization in their counterbattery programs. These

programs became increasingly sophisticated as the war progressed.

One division mounted Operation Scrap Iron on a regular basis. In

this program, certain known Communist gun positions (active or

inactive) were selected, ground and aerial surveillance was focused

111
on these positions, and precision fires were begun that would

continue until each position was destroyed in turn. Similar

programs were instituted at higher echelons. Often, nondivisional

medium and heavy artillery assets in a corps were concentrated,

then moved through successive division zones destroying

Communist gun positions systematically. Occasionally, all

nondivisional artillery assets in Eighth Army would be massed in

one corps zone for a similar purpose. During the last six months of

the war, counterbattery missions of UN artillery represented

9 percent of total artillery missions. An average of 5,400 rounds per

day was expended in the counterbattery effort along the 150-mile

front in 1953.6

Hill 395

An excellent case study of UN counterbattery efforts can be

found in the battle for Hill 395 (White Horse Mountain),

6-15 October 1952. The position, a hill mass that anchored the left

flank of the IX Corps sector, was defended by Republic of Korea

(ROK) infantrymen supported by both ROK and American artillery

units. Communist preparations for a massive attack were detected

early, permitting IX Corps artillerymen to move into position just

prior to the opening of the action. By the time of the initial assault,

the defenders had completed their prior fire planning, including a

complete counterbattery plan. When the action opened on

6 October, this counterbattery plan was instantly implemented, and

it was constantly revised during the course of the engagement.

Available assets for UN forces were four battalions of 105-mm

howitzers, two battalions of 155-mm howitzers, one battalion of

155-mm guns, two batteries of 8-inch howitzers, one 4.5-inch rocket

battery, and one 4.2-inch mortar company.

Communist artillery assets are unknown, but ammunition

expenditures exceeded 50,000 rounds during the operation. For

112
thirty days prior to the opening of the battle, Communist gunners

averaged 244 rounds per day in the sector. Four days into the

operation, Communist artillerymen fired over 12,000 rounds in a

single day. During the same period, UN artillerymen responded

with over 31,000 rounds, many of which were expended in

counterbattery missions. Thereafter, a marked decrease in the

effectiveness of Communist artillery was noted. Although the action

continued for nearly another week, Communist artillery was never

so prominent again. Effective friendly counterbattery fire was thus a

contributing factor in the ability of UN forces to maintain their

original positions.7

Conclusion

Only two of the three general categories of response to heavy

bombardment (dispersal/defense in depth, field fortification, and

counterbattery) were employed to any great extent by UN forces in

Korea. With dispersal/defense in depth not an option, field

fortification and extensive counterbattery programs became the

options of choice. Contemporary analyses indicate that, although

field fortifications generally provided adequate protection against

Communist artillery, counterbattery efforts appear to have been the

key defensive measure.

113
114
CHAPTER 6

NOTES

1. U.S. Army, IX Corps, G2 Section, "Enemy Tactics, Techniques

and Doctrine" (Korea, September 1951), 38, 51; and U.S. Army,

Eighth Army, Artillery Officer, A Study of the Employment and

Effectiveness of the Artillery With the Eighth Army During the Period

October 1951-July 1953 (Seoul, Korea?, 1954), 9, 42, hereafter

cited as Eighth Army, Artillery.

2. Eighth Army, Artillery, 39, 42, 43; and Matthew B. Ridgway,

The Korean War (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., 1967),

217-18.

3. Eighth Army, Artillery, 21, 40; and "Requested Comments to

General Maxwell D. Taylor by Major General Lionel C. McGarr, May

1954," pt. 1, sect. II, p. 9, and pt. 1, sect. Ill, pt. B, p. 2, hereafter

cited as "McGarr Comments."

4. "McGarr Comments," pt. 2, sec. II, pt. B, and pt. V, p. 1-2;

and Ridgway, Korean War, 217-25.

5. "McGarr Comments," pt. 1, sect. Ill, pt. B, p. 2, 8; Eighth

Army, Artillery, 9; Mark M. Boatner III, "Countering Communist

Artillery," Combat Forces Journal 4 (September 1953):24-25; and

Jerry F. Dunn, "Self-Propelled Artillery in Positional Warfare,"

Combat Forces Journal 4 (November 1953): 14-17.

6. "McGarr Comments," pt. 1, sect. II, p. 9; Boatner, "Countering

Communist Artillery," 25; U.S. Army Artillery School, "Report of the

Artillery School Observer Team, 12 January-18 February 1953"

(Fort Sill, OK, 1953), tab B, p. 2; and Eighth Army, Artillery, 21.

115
7. U.S. Army, IX Corps, G3 Section, "Special After Action Report

Hill 395 (White Horse Mountain), 6-15 October 1952" (Korea,

23 October 1952), 24, 29-31, 49, 51-52.

116
CHAPTER 6

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Boatner, Mark M., III. "Countering Communist Artillery," Combat

Forces Journal 4 (September 1953):24-25.

Dunn, Jerry F. "Self-Propelled Artillery in Positional Warfare,"

Combat Forces Journal 4 (November 1953): 14-17.

"Requested Comments to General Maxwell D. Taylor by Major

General Lionel C. McGarr, May 1954." N.p., 1954.

Ridgway, Matthew B. The Korean War. Garden City, NY:

Doubleday & Co., 1967.

U.S. Army. Eighth Army. Artillery Officer. A Study of the

Employment and Effectiveness of the Artillery With the Eighth

Army During the Period October 1951^July 1953 (Seoul,

Korea?, 1954).

U.S. Army Artillery School. "Report of the Artillery School Observer

Team, 12 January-18 February 1953." Fort Sill, OK, 1953.

U.S. Army. IX Corps. G2 Section. "Enemy Tactics, Techniques

and Doctrine." Korea, September 1951.

U.S. Army. IX Corps. G3 Section. "Special After Action Report Hill

395 (White Horse Mountain), 6-15 October 1952." Korea,

23 October 1952.

117

CHAPTER 7

THE KOREAN WAR: CHINESE FORCES1

RESPONSE TO HEAVY BOMBARDMENT

by Dr. Gary J. Bjorge

The Chinese armies sent to Korea during the Korean War

consisted basically of light infantry divisions with no air, no armor,

and little artillery support. The United Nations (UN) forces they

faced enjoyed air supremacy over the front lines and an enormous

superiority in artillery firepower. During the first half of 1951, the UN

Command used its air assets and artillery to inflict heavy casualties

on the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) and forced the CCF to

develop special defensive measures. First, offensive operations

were reduced in scale. Second, the CCF attempted to reduce the

number of lucrative targets and placed as much of the army

underground as possible. These efforts were successful enough to

allow the CCF to maintain the combat power needed to achieve an

operational and strategic stalemate on the Korean peninsula.

April and May 1951

The devastating effect of artillery fire and aerial bombing on CCF

maneuver units is illustrated by what happened during the CCF's

April and May offensives in 1951. The April offensive against the

U.S. I Corps north of Seoul pushed UN lines back to the northern

outskirts of the city but then ground to a haft in the face of heavy

casualties and disorganizaton caused by UN air and artillery

attacks. Interdiction of CCF rear areas by UN bombers and

long-range artillery caused the Chinese supply system to collapse

and disrupted communications between units. As confusion

119
increased, CCF commanders were forced to issue such generalized

orders as "go as far south as possible." Reserve units passed

through forward units without knowing the number of casualties

already sustained or the state of confusion that existed.1 When the

offensive ended after nine days, an estimated 71,712 Chinese and

North Korean soldiers had been killed.2

Early in May, the CCF shifted its units to central Korea and, on 16

May, launched an offensive against X Corps. During the resulting

battle, which UN forces called the Battle of the Soyang River,

restrictions on the use of ammunition by UN artillery were lifted for

the first time in Korean operations, and artillery units achieved

record rates of fire. For example, during one 12-hour period on 17

May, the 38th Field Artillery Battalion of the 2d Infantry Division fired

11,600 rounds from its 105-mm howitzers. When the battle opened

on 16 May, the artillery available in X Corps consisted of the

following:

4 medium battalions (U.S.)

7 light battalions (U.S.)(1 armored SP)

1 battery, 155-mm (SP) (U.S.)

1 provisional battery, 8-inch howitzer (U.S.)

2 light battalions (ROK)

 3

While the battle was in progress, X Corps received additional

artillery, including another battery of 8-inch howitzers, bringing the

total number of battalions to almost twenty. The X Corps deployed

this artillery to a depth of thirty miles along a forty-mile front, and

120
during the six crucial days when the CCF offensive was blunted and

finally broken, it fired the following amount of ammunition:

pate Rounds Tons

16 May 17,113 504.71

17 May 38,885 1,088.46

18 May 41,357 1,187.45

19 May 47,184 1,357.42

20 May 50,102 1,377.53

21 May 47,188 1,287.55

Total 241,829 6,803.124

During these six days, B-26 and B-29 bombers on night-bombing

missions also supported X Corps. Operating under radar control,

they dropped as many as 200 tons of bombs a night on CCF

reserves and suspected assembly areas.5 CCF casualties from this

artillery fire and bombing were extremely heavy, and their units often

fell into a state of great confusion. This was especially true at night

when, despite the CCF's tradition of night fighting, they found it

hard to collect troops and reorganize.

The following incident illustrates what was happening to the CCF

at this time. On 19 May, the Chinese captured two U.S. soldiers

and took them to the headquarters of a CCF battalion preparing to

join the attack. On the night of 20 May, this battalion came under

heavy bombing just as it was forming to attack south. Terrible

explosions inflicted so many casualties that the surviving troops fled

northward in disorder. Amid this confusion, one of the U.S. soldiers

escaped and made his way back to the U.S. lines. A patrol from

the 9th Infantry was sent out to try to locate the other American.

121
The patrol found him dead, but in the same area, there were also

approximately 300 dead fully armed CCF soldiers.6 Since the CCF

always placed great stress on salvaging weapons from the

battlefield, the presence of all these weapons was another indication

of how CCF unit organization was breaking down under the impact

of UN firepower.

When the CCF headquarters realized the destructive effect of UN

firepower, it promptly took action to counter what the Chinese

called the "inflict-casualties-war" being carried out by the UN

Command. One major step was to reduce the number of troops

deployed within the effective range of UN artillery. By means of

shell fragment analysis and the study of sound and flash, the CCF

quickly determined the type of UN artillery deployed across the front

line from its units and then positioned them accordingly. Following

what they called the principle of "with troops light to the front and

heavy to the rear, with firepower heavy to the front and light to the

rear,"7 the CCF placed a relatively small number of soldiers along

the front line while the main body was positioned along a second

line and on the flanks in preparation for counterattacks. The

headquarters then directed that large numbers of troops should not

concentrate in one place and that there should be no more

defending of positions to the death. The CCF objective was "to limit

casualties while still fighting to kill and wound more of the enemy

and gain the time that was needed."8

During the first half of 1951, when the CCF was applying the

principle of deploying troops "light to the front and heavy to the

rear," the U.S. Eighth Army described it as a "one up, two back"

defensive formation.9 In this disposition of forces, a forward corps

had one division on the front line with two divisions in reserve. An

army had one corps forward with two corps in reserve. Frontline

regiments still had the mission of digging in and offering stiff

resistance to advancing UN troops, but the holding of terrain was

122
now of minor importance. The CCF objective was to create

weaknesses in a UN offensive and then exploit them using

counterattacks by its deep reserves.

After June 1951

After June 1951, with the front line roughly along the 38th Parallel,

the CCF began to employ a position-type defense along a main line

of resistance. In order to withstand intense UN air and artillery

bombardment, the CCF deployed units in great depth along narrow

fronts and erected an elaborate system of field fortifications with

extended outposts and key terrain features organized for an

all-around defense. Primary defensive positions were commonly

placed on the forward slope, with personnel shelters on the reverse

slope. The forward defensive trenches had shelter holes for

individual soldiers dug into the bottom at intervals of several feet.

Recesses for storing hand grenades were dug into the sides.

Tunnels and alternate trenches connected the forward slope

defensive positions and the personnel shelters. Ammunition storage

spaces were also connected with the defensive positions by

trenches. All positions were constructed to provide cover from

high-angle fire while still maintaining good fields of fire. The

fortifications on hilltops were covered with alternate layers of logs

and dirt to a depth of up to fifteen feet. From three to twelve layers

of logs were used, depending on their availability.10

In addition to digging in to provide cover, the CCF also used the

terrain, natural vegetation, darkness, unfavorable weather

conditions, and smoke to cover its movements. In forward areas,

marches took place at night, with the men walking in single file three

to five paces apart. Secondary roads and trails were used, and

march discipline was very strict. The Chinese launched attacks only

at night or during poor weather, unless the opportunity for a major

success clearly outweighed the extra casualties to be taken in a

daytime operation. If an objective was to be held, the attack began

123

90-1775
early enough in the evening so that the battle would be over by

midnight. The rest of the night could then be spent digging in and

organizing a defensive position. Attacks designed to delay or halt

UN advances began early enough to allow an end to the

engagement by daybreak. Planned withdrawals took place under

cover of darkness and only rarely were supported by mortar or

artillery fire. According to Chinese prisoners of war, this was done

because, if CCF soldiers opened fire, they immediately became

primary targets for UN artillery.11

Camouflage was another CCF defense against UN artillery. Unit

commanders paid great attention to the initial camouflaging of their

positions and instructed th^ir troops to always take maximum

advantage of natural cover and concealment. Troops dug foxholes

very carefully and not only concealed the hole with natural

vegetation but also scattered the dirt around to avoid attracting

attention. When resting outside of foxholes, the troops would

scatter about under trees or other natural cover, always keeping a

distance of at least ten feet between them. If an aircraft

approached, the men would freeze in place in order not to disclG&fe

their position by movement. This kind of camouflage discipline

often saved CCF units from detection while they were on the march

or crossing open terrain. The uniform caps worn by CCF soldiers

had loops on them for attaching natural vegetation, and this helped

them blend in with their surroundings. The CCF also was careful to

camouflage mortars, artillery pieces, and all vehicles near the front.

Although mortar firing positions were almost always in cleared

areas, after firing five to ten rounds, crews would place the mortar

in a camouflaged hole some ten yards from the firing position and

then take shelter in individual foxholes. To heighten the effect of

camouflage, the Chinese made decoys using materials found at

hand. They stuffed straw into discarded clothing to create realistic

dummy riflemen and also constructed dummy artillery positions

using logs for barrels, steel plates for shields, boards for trails, and

124
straw for wheels.12

 Although made with simple material, these

decoys were realistic enough to attract a significant amount of UN

fire. So effective were CCF camouflage efforts that, according to a

report written by the U.S. IX Corps G2 in September 1951, they

were a major reason for the CCFs ability to survive in the face of

constant aerial surveillance and fierce bombardment by UN forces.13

Conclusion

The Communist Chinese Forces reduced casualties from UN

firepower in three ways:

• The CCF reduced the scale of offensive operations. Initially,

the CCF had planned and initiated operations intended to

destroy UN division-sized units. The need to defend against

massive UN artillery, however, forced the CCF to change its

focus to planning operations designed to destroy companyand battalion-sized units. It became obvious to the CCF very

soon that the concentrations of men and materiel required for

large-scale operations created too many good targets for UN

air and artillery forces.

• The CCF dispersed troops and supplies and protected them

underground as much as possible.

• The CCF exerted every effort to counter UN target acquisition

efforts through the effective use of cover and concealment.

By using these defensive measures, the CCF, a force whose

firepower was decidedly inferior to that of the UN Command,

maintained enough combat power in the field to allow the Chinese

government to achieve certain strategic objectives in Korea. If

success is defined by achieving political-military objectives,

Communist Chinese defensive measures against UN artillery were

successful.

125
126
CHAPTER 7

NOTES

1. U.S. Army, I Corps, "The Communist First Phase Spring

Offensive, April 1951" (Korea, 1953), 35.

2. Ibid, 38.

3. Edward M. Almond, Conference on Battle Employment of

Artillery in Korea (Fort Sill, OK: Artillery Center, 11 February I952), 5.

4. U.S. Army, X Corps, Artillery, Battle of the Soyang River: An

Analysis of Artillery Support X Corps Sector (Korea, 29 May 1951)

[Inclosure 5].

5. Almond, Artillery Conference, chart 16.

6. Ibid., 7.

7. Jiang Zhongan, "Tan Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanzhenzhong

Yundong Fangyu Zuozhan ti Jingyan" [A discussion of the

experiences of mobile defense operations during the war to resist

America and aid Korea], Junshi Lishi [Military history], No.

4-1987:17.

8. Ibid.

9. U.S. Army, Eighth Army, "Enemy Tactics" (Korea, December

1951), 76, hereafter cited as Eighth Army, "Enemy Tactics."

10. Ibid., 91-92.

127
11. U.S. Army, IX Corps, G2 Section, "Enemy Tactics,

Techniques and Doctrine" (Korea, September 1951), 28, hereafter

cited as IX Corps, "Enemy Tactics."

12. Eighth Army, "Enemy Tactics," 95-96.

13. IX Corps, "Enemy Tactics," 6.

128
CHAPTER 7

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Almond, Edward M. Conference on Battle Employment of Artillery

in Korea. Fort Sill, OK: Artillery Center, 11 February 1952.

Jiang Zhongan. "Tan Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanzhenzhong Yundong

Fangyu Zuozhan ti Jingyan" [A discussion of the experiences of

mobile defense operations during the war to resist America and

aid Korea]. Junshi Lishi [Military history], No. 4-1987:15-17.

U.S. Army. Eighth Army. "Enemy Tactics." Korea, December 1951.

U.S. Army. I Corps. "The Communist First Phase Spring Offensive,

April 1951." Korea, 1953.

U.S. Army. IX Corps. G2 Section. "Enemy Tactics, Techniques

and Doctrine." Korea, September 1951.

U.S. Army. X Corps. Artillery. Battle of the Soyang River: An

Analysis of Artillery Support X Corps Sector. Korea, 29 May

1951.

129

CHAPTER 8

ISRAELI DEFENSIVE MEASURES

AGAINST ARAB ARTILLERY

by Dr. George W. Gawrych

The Egyptians and Syrians began the 1973 war on 6 October at

1405 with air strikes and massive artillery barrages on Israeli

positions both in the Sinai and on the Golan Heights. Caught by

surprise and deprived of critical air support, the Israeli Defense

Forces (IDF) went to war without a strong combined arms doctrine.

Consequently, Israeli troops initially found themselves very

vulnerable to Arab artillery fire. But the Israelis doggedly maintained

their defenses and eventually went on the attack to seize back

territory lost in the initial Arab offensives. What methods the Israelis

used against massive Arab artillery fire forms the main thrust of this

chapter.

Arab Artillery on the Offensive

The Egyptians employed over 2,000 field artillery pieces along a

170-kilometer front for 53 minutes, firing some 3,000 tons of

explosives, while the Syrians fired 600 pieces along a 65-kilometer

frontage for 55 minutes. During the first minute of the war, some

10,500 shells, or 175 shells per second, fell in the canal area of the

Sinai alone.1 Syrian saturation of the Golan was of a similar scale

and intensity. The Arabs used the wide-front artillery barrage to

confuse the Israelis in locating their main efforts.

131
The Arab arsenal was based almost exclusively on Soviet

weaponry with the following main types and corresponding ranges:

Weapon Range

(kilometers)

122-mm howitzer, M-30 11.8

122-mm howitzer, D-30 15.3

130-mm gun, M-46 27.1

152-mm gun/howitzer, ML-20 17.3

152-mm howitzer, M1943 (D-1) 12.4

152-mm gun/howitzer, D-20 17.4

180-mm gun, S-23 30.4

Multiple rocket launchers included the 240-mm BM-24 (10.3

kilometers); 140-mm BM-14-16 (9.8 kilometers); 122-mm BM-21

(20.4 kilometers); and 132-mm BM-13-16 (9 kilometers). The

mortars were of the 120-mm, 160-mm, and 240-mm caliber. The

Egyptians and Syrians also had FROG rockets and SCUD missiles,

but when these were employed remains a point of controversy. In

addition to this equipment, the Arabs deployed an untold number of

tanks to fire directly on Israeli concrete pillboxes and other targets

visible from the West Bank, while Egypt committed 220 and Syria

over 100 planes in air strikes on key Israeli positions. All told, both

Arab countries had no difficulty in saturating Israeli positions along

Artillery Road in the Sinai (10-12 kilometers) and in most of the

Golan.

132
Arab priorities on the two fronts appeared similar, though more

detailed information is now available for the Egyptian side. In the

crossing operation, the Egyptian High Command initially

concentrated its artillery fire on the Israeli strongpoints of the Bar

Lev Line to a depth of one to three kilometers. The Egyptians

wanted to pin down the Israeli defenders inside their bunkers, as

well as to create gaps in the minefields and barbed wire for the

passage of Egyptian troops into the Israeli rear.

After fifteen minutes of heavy artillery fire (that is, at the point

when Egyptian infantry began to cross the Suez Canal), Egyptian

artillery shifted its fire to Israeli targets rearward in order to disrupt

expected Israeli counterattacks. In this phase, the Egyptian

planners assigned greater resources to silencing Israeli artillery and

to hitting command posts, roads, supply depots, and assembly

areas with long-range artillery. In addition to this preplanned list of

targets, Egyptian observers moved forward, while others infiltrated

behind enemy lines and provided information on Israeli troop

movements. Some thirty minutes into the war, artillery and infantry

equipped with antitank weapons began to coordinate their fires to

foil counterattacks by Israeli armor. Artillery fires helped force Israeli

tanks into kill zones for antitank weapons. Meanwhile, the Egyptian

Air Force flew missions against the strongpoints, artillery positions,

command posts, electronic warfare facilities, and airfields.2

Through the fourth day of the war, the Egyptians relied on heavy

artillery fire to support the expansion of bridgeheads and to stop

Israeli counterattacks. On 14 October, the Egyptians launched their

last and ill-fated offensive with a thirty-minute fire preparation. On

the northern front, Syrian offensive operations had ground to a halt

on the 8th. Thereafter, the Syrians fought on the defensive to the

end of the war and hence employed heavy artillery fire for the sole

purpose of stopping Israeli attempts to advance into Syrian territory.

133
Initial Effects

According to some authors, artillery was the greatest killer on the

battlefield in the 1973 Middle East War.3 The Egyptians possessed

excellent intelligence concerning Israeli deployments and war plans

so that virtually every artillery and tank bivuoac along Artillery Road

suffered hits on the first day of the war.4 The Israeli Artillery Corps,

forced on the defensive on both fronts, suffered its heaviest

casualties in any war: 191 killed in action.5 A majority of these no

doubt occurred during the first few days of the war.

Heavy artillery fire caused much confusion and dispersion of

effort for the defenders. Egyptian military writers attribute part of

the Egyptian success in establishing bridgeheads and in defeating

Israeli counterattacks throughout the war to the role played by the

artillery in disrupting Israeli counterattacks.6 Direct hits on

communications vehicles and wire caused communications

interruptions, while heavy artillery fire sometimes forced forward

command posts to move farther back, losing direct observation of

the battlefield. Moreover, smoke from artillery shells created

difficulties of identification for both sides. Further, many Israeli

commanders, shaken by the artillery saturation, frequently

overloaded communications nets, making it more difficult for senior

commanders to assess properly the tactical situation.

Overall, Egyptian artillery, including rockets and the air force, hurt

Israeli attempts to conduct combined arms counterattacks and

thereby facilitated Egyptian offensive operations designed to

establish and then expand the bridgeheads. As the Israelis became

"accustomed11 to the fire, unit commanders adhered more to

doctrinal communications procedures, which resulted in more

accurate reporting and better control of the battlefield.7

But many soldiers found dealing with massive artillery preparation

of a battlefield extremely difficult. During the 1973 war, the IDF

134
reported an unusually large number of incidents of battle shock,

and these proved highest during the extremely intense first hours of

constant shelling. They accelerated again two weeks later when

Egyptian fire concentrated on those Israeli forces attempting a

countercrossing to the West Bank. In studies conducted by the IDF

after the war of all the combat arms, battle shock proved most

frequent among armor units, followed by artillery and then infantry.

Support units, perhaps less prepared for battle, apparently faced an

even greater risk of psychological breakdowns than the combat

units.8

Israelis on the Defensive

Israeli doctrine called for the ground forces to conduct operations

with the air force, which provided support in the role of a flying

artillery. But the Egyptians, and the Syrians to a lesser extent,

neutralized the Israeli Air Force on the first day of the war with their

air defense systems. Weaknesses in combined arms doctrine

resulted in Israeli ground forces suffering heavily from Arab artillery.

Israel could ill afford, or just did not want, to give up any territory

on the Golan or in the Sinai. Hence, the IDF built an elaborate

system of fortifications on both fronts designed to sustain heavy

artillery barrages. Troops at the front line were expected to hold

their ground while reinforcements arrived to stop any breakthroughs.

Although massive in scale, Arab artillery proved incapable of

destroying all fortified Israeli strongpoints in the Sinai and on the

Golan. In the Sinai, for example, the Budapest strongpoint, just

east of Port Said, never surrendered, and Israeli forces finally

relieved the beleaguered garrison on the 11th. Port Tawfik, on the

other hand, held out until the 13th when the defense collapsed

because of ammunition shortages. On the Golan, most

strongpoints held out, but here, unlike in the Sinai, the Arab

135
offensive came to a halt on the second day of the war. By the third

day, Israeli forces were pushing back the Syrians.

Weak in combined arms doctrine, the IDF neglected artillery in

favor of armor. The Israelis had planned to fight with air support

and to be on the defensive for only brief periods. Ground forces

deprived of air support consequently had to fight without effective

counterbattery fire. Artillery Road in the Sinai, for example, had

slightly more than twelve batteries or forty-eight guns and howitzers

(mainly 105-mm, 155-mm, and 175-mm) on the eve of hostilities, a

token force in comparison to the Egyptian side. By the end of the

first day of the war, only one gun of the forty-eight could fire; the

others either suffered hits or became inoperative due to wear and

tear from sustained heavy firing.9

This force ratio disparity in artillery pieces changed little during the

course of the war as the Israeli High Command still emphasized

armor. Artillery received a very low priority for transporters moving

to the Sinai front, a grave error according to some Israeli analysts.10

Thus, Israeli counterbattery fire, when it did exist, usually had to be

sporadic, highly selective, concentrated, and brief. In some

instances, a short burst of counterbattery fire sufficed to silence

Arab artillery fire.11 But such a result was infrequent, and Israeli

field commanders frequently complained of no or insufficient air and

artillery support in response to Egyptian offensive operations.

Mobility, in particular lateral dispersion rather than in depth,

formed the essense of Israeli defensive practices on the ground

against heavy artillery fire. Many Israeli artillery units, for example,

changed positions five to fifteen times daily, or even at twenty- to

thirty-minute intervals, to prepared positions.12 The self-propelled

U.S. 155-mm howitzer performed well in this regard. The Israelis

had little choice against Arab fire, since it was imperative not to give

up territory to the Arabs. Avigdor Kahalani, the Israeli commander

of the 77th Tank Battalion of the famous 7th Armored Brigade,

136
tersely described the difficulty facing his men: "We stood helpless

under accurate Syrian artillery fire. I ordered the tanks to spread

out."13 Tankers closed their hatches, and maneuver forces

"thrashed or shuffled about" rather than give ground to the enemy.

One Israeli writer succinctly described the centrality of mobility of

the defensive system for the Golan, a description whose general

outlines conformed with defenses in the Sinai as well:

With the exception of the bunkers and village

defensive positions, the entire Israeli defensive force

was capable of movement. Tanks, self-propelled

artillery, infantry, and armored infantry were all in

motion, or could be on short notice. Artillery batteries

moved, set-up, fired, rested, moved, and fired again

within minutes of receiving an order .. . the entire

firepower of the Israeli battle force could move from

one fulcrum to another in an infinite variety of

combinations. An attacker could never be certain just

what combination he might encounter. It was a

strategy based on mobility and the paramount Israeli

requirement that the expense in men and equipment

be minimal.14

Effective lateral dispersion in the heat of battle as described

above depended on a commander possessing intimate knowledge

of the terrain so that he could relocate to positions that offered

suitable protection but yet were not likely targets for the adversary.

Here, variations occurred in the Israeli experience. Units that had

trained to fight in the Sinai unexpectedly found themselves on the

Golan and vice versa. In relocating to another theater of

operations, Israelis soldiers lost the combat multiplier possessed by

the defender who knows his terrain intimately.15

137
Camouflage and Deception

In addition to employing elaborate strongpoints, counterbattery

fire, and mobility, the Israelis resorted to using camouflage to

conceal positions, setting up dummy artillery positions to deflect fire

from true targets, and sending false messages over radio

transmitters to misdirect artillery fire.16

Conclusions

During the 1973 Middle East War, the IDF understood the value

of mobility in the defense but learned that effective countermeasures

against artillery needed to be of a combined arms nature. In this

regard, the most important lesson learned was the need for massive

artillery in a counterbattery role. In 1973, the IDF had only three

artillery brigades, but by 1982 when Israel invaded Lebanon, the

army had fifteen. During this brief period, the number of

self-propelled guns grew from roughly 300 to over 950 (over a 200

percent increase). With this significant increase in self-propelled

artillery, the IDF was able to acquire both more firepower and

mobility.17

The IDF experience in 1973 clearly pointed out the feasibility of a

defense based on strongpoints on the front line, with limited

dispersion in the rear. Israeli commanders had to employ such

tactics because the nation's leadership was determined not to

surrender any critical ground unless absolutely necessary. But the

cost for the IDF was high in both men and materiel.

138
CHAPTER 8

NOTES

1. Muhammad

 fAbd al-Halim Abu Ghazala, Wa-lntalaqat

al-Madafi' 'inda al-Zuhr: al-Midfa'iya al-Misriya min Hilal Harb

Ramadan [And the guns opened fire in the afternoon: Egyptian

artillery during the Ramadan War] (Cairo: Mu'assasa Dar al-Sha'ab,

1974), 116; Hassan al-Badri, Taha al-Magdoub, and Mohammad Zia

al-Din Zohdi, The Ramadan War, 1973 (New York: Hippocrene

Books, 1978), 72; and Chaim Herzog, The War of Atonement,

October 1973 (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1975), 159. Abu Ghazala,

a brigadier general in the 1973 October War, commanded the

divisional artillery for the Second Army and is currently the minister

of defense and commander in chief of the Egyptian armed forces.

2. On Egyptian artillery, see Abu Ghazala, Wa-lntalaqat al-Madafi'

'inda al-Zuhr, 97-101, 115-16; al-Badri, al-Magdoub, and Zohdi,

Ramadan War, 62, 72-74; Sa'ad al-Din Shazli, The Crossing of the

Suez (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1980), 222, 225-26; Hasan

Mustafa, Ma'arik al-Jabhah al-Misriyah fi Harb Ramadan 1973 [The

battlefield of the Egyptian front in the Ramadan War of 1973]

(Baghdad: Mudiriya al-Mutabi1 al-Askariya, 1982), 242-43, 257-58;

D. K. Palit, Return to Sinai: The Arab Offensive, October 1973 (New

Delhi: Palit & Pal'rt, 1974), 64-65; and Robert D. Lewis, "The

Ramadan War: Fire Support Egyptian Style," Field Artillery, August

1988:33-34.

3. Trevor Dupuy, Elusive Victory: The Arab-Israeli Wars,

1947-1973 (Fairfax, VA: Hero Books, 1984), 594; and Lewis, "The

Ramadan War," 36.

139
4. Jac Weller, "The Fight at Suez," National Defense 63

(July-August 1974): 131.

5. Yoram Movshovttz and Dan Petreanu, The Artillery

Corps-1948 to the Present," IDF Journal 4 (Fall 1987):19.

6. Abu Ghazala, Wa-lntalaqat al-Madafi' 'inda al-Zuhr, 114-26;

and al-Badri, al-Magdoub, and Zohdi, Ramadan War, 73-75.

7. Avraham Adan, On the Banks of the Suez (Novato, CA:

Presidio Press, 1980), 141-42, 198, 202-3, 221, 224, 225;

discussions with Israeli and Egyptian officers attending the U.S.

Army Command and General Staff College; Martin Van Crevald,

Command in War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,

1985), 218-19, 224; and Lewis, "The Ramadan War," 35. Adan

served as the commander of the 162d Armored Division in the Sinai

during the 1973 Middle East War.

8. Reuven Gal, A Portrait of the Israeli Soldier (Westport, CT:

Greenwood Press, 1986), 212-14. Gal was chief psychologist of

the IDF.

9. Adan, On the Banks of the Suez, 23-24.

10. Ze'ev Schiff, A History of the Israeli Army: 1874 to the

Present, 2d ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1985), 215.

11. Avigdor Kahalani, The Heights of Courage: A Tank Leader's

War on the Golan (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1984), 55-57;

and T. L. Morony, "Artillery Support in the Yom Kippur War," Field

Artillery Journal 43 (September-October 1975):42.

12. Jerry Asher and Eric Hammel, Duel for the Golan: The

100-Hour Battle That Saved Israel (New York: William Morrow,

1987), 141; Morony, "Artillery Support," 41; Ellsworth Grev,

"Employment of Field Artillery: The Mid-East 1973 War," Student

140
paper, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort

Leavenworth, KS, 1976, 12, 15; and U.S. Army Command and

General Staff College, RB 100-2, Selected Readings in Tactics:

The 1973 Middle East War, vol. 1 (Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1980),

5-20.

13. Kahalani, Heights of Courage, 42.

14. Asher and Hammel, Duel for the Golan, 141.

15. Ibid., 107; Geoffrey G. Prosch, "Israeli Defense of the Golan:

An Interview With Brigadier General Avigdor Kahalani," Military

Review 59 (October 1979):4; and material obtained from Ze'ev

Eytan, a former Israeli tank battalion commander who studied this

problem of unit transfers between the two fronts and published an

article about this subject in an Israeli military journal.

16. Vernon B. Lewis Jr., "Evolving Field Artillery Tactics and

Techniques," Field Artillery Journal 43 (January-February 1975):46;

and Grev, "Employment of Field Artillery," 12, 15.

17. Richard Gabriel, Operation Peace for Galilee: The

Israeli-PLO War in Lebanon (New York: Hill and Wang, 1984),

20-21. Gabriel wrongly states the IDF had no artillery brigades in

1973 when, in fact, there were three, one each for the area

commands. Admittedly, the Israelis expanded their artillery in large

measure for offensive purposes, but defensive considerations, when

the IDF would have to face massive artillery fire, played an important

part as well.

141
142
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