II 

118TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 5491 

To mobilize United States strategic, economic, and diplomatic tools to confront the challenges posed by the People’s Republic of China and to 

set a positive agenda for United States economic and diplomatic efforts 

abroad, and for other purposes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

DECEMBER 11, 2024 

Mr. CARDIN introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on Foreign Relations 

A BILL 

To mobilize United States strategic, economic, and diplomatic tools to confront the challenges posed by the People’s Republic of China and to set a positive agenda 

for United States economic and diplomatic efforts 

abroad, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. 

4 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the 

5 ‘‘Realizing Economic and Strategic Objectives while Lead6 ing with Values and Engagement Act of 2024’’ or the 

7 ‘‘RESOLVE Act of 2024’’. 


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1 (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for 

2 this Act is as follows: 

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. 

Sec. 2. Definitions. 

Sec. 3. Consultation and engagement with Congress. 

TITLE I—INVESTING IN A COMPETITIVE FUTURE 

Subtitle A—Combatting the PRC’s Economic Coercion 

Sec. 101. Definitions. 

PART I—ECONOMIC COERCION DETERMINATIONS

Sec. 105. Sense of Congress. 

Sec. 106. Targeted country determination. 

Sec. 107. Sunset. 

PART II—RESPONSE

Sec. 111. Economic defense response teams. 

Sec. 112. Economic Defense Response Fund. 

Sec. 113. Existing authorities that may be used to respond to economic coercion. 

Sec. 114. Sunset. 

PART III—RESILIENCE

Sec. 115. Office of the Chief Economist. 

Sec. 116. Economic support to allies and partners. 

PART IV—COORDINATION WITH ALLIES AND PARTNERS

Sec. 119. Coordination with Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development members on engagement from the People’s Republic 

of China. 

PART V—IMPLEMENTATION

Sec. 121. Report on strategy and implementation. 

PART VI—OTHER MATTERS

Sec. 124. Developing economic tools to deter aggression against Taiwan. 

Sec. 125. Intellectual property violators list. 

Sec. 126. Report on subsidies provided by the Government of the People’s Republic of China. 

Subtitle B—Economic Engagement With Allies and Partners 

PART I—INVESTING IN ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH

Sec. 131. Investing in talent in Southeast Asia, the Pacific Islands, sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America. 

Sec. 132. Enhancing United States-Africa trade and investment for prosperity. 

Sec. 133. Increasing the competitiveness of the United States in Africa. 

Sec. 134. Support for Bangladesh democracy and labor rights programs. 


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Sec. 135. Support for anti-corruption programs and other programs to address 

impunity and justice in Sri Lanka. 

PART II—ALIGNING WITH PARTNERS ON ECONOMIC TOOLS

Sec. 141. Assistance to advance foreign investment screening of United States 

allies and partners to protect national interests. 

Sec. 142. Assistance to counter corrupt practices in foreign countries. 

Sec. 143. Regulatory exchanges with allies and partners. 

Sec. 144. Pilot program to audit barriers to commerce in developing partner 

countries. 

Sec. 145. Strategy for promoting supply chain diversification. 

Sec. 146. Authorization to assist United States companies with global supply 

chain diversification and management. 

Sec. 147. Enhancing transatlantic cooperation on promoting private sector finance. 

PART III—COUNTERING EFFORTS TO UNDERMINE INTERNATIONAL

ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS

Sec. 151. International Monetary Fund new arrangements to borrow. 

Sec. 152. Participation of Taiwan in Inter-American Development Bank. 

Sec. 153. Increased United States cooperation with Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. 

Sec. 154. Opposition of the United States to an increase in the weight of the 

Chinese renminbi in the Special Drawing Rights basket of the 

International Monetary Fund. 

Subtitle C—Global Infrastructure and Energy Development 

Sec. 161. Department of State Infrastructure Coordination Task Force. 

Sec. 162. Authorization of Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment. 

Sec. 163. Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network. 

Sec. 164. Strategic Ports Initiative. 

Sec. 165. Next-generation shipping. 

Sec. 166. Global Strategic Infrastructure Investment Fund. 

Sec. 167. Modifications of requirements to become a Millennium Challenge Corporation candidate country. 

Sec. 168. Africa energy security and diversification. 

Sec. 169. Enhancing resilient critical infrastructure in the Pacific Islands. 

Sec. 170. Oceania Restoration and Hazards Removal Program. 

Sec. 171. Coordination with other Federal agencies and cooperation and participation of nongovernmental entities. 

Sec. 172. Findings related to the People’s Republic of China’s industrial pollution. 

Sec. 173. Promoting responsible development alternatives to the Belt and Road 

Initiative and Global Development Initiative. 

Sec. 174. International cooperation to secure critical mineral supply chains. 

Subtitle D—Digital Technology and Connectivity 

Sec. 176. Office of the Special Envoy For Critical and Emerging Technology. 

Sec. 177. Realigning the Regional Technology Officer Program. 

Sec. 178. Annual semiconductor industry monitoring report on the People’s Republic of China. 

Sec. 179. Combatting AI-enabled disinformation. 


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Sec. 179A. International collaboration on research and development. 

Sec. 179B. Oversight of the United States-European Union Trade and Technology Council. 

Sec. 179C. Digital connectivity in the Pacific Islands. 

Sec. 179D. Cyber and digital security cooperation with respect to developing 

countries. 

Subtitle E—Countering PRC Malign Influence 

Sec. 181. Sense of Congress distinguishing the PRC Government from the Chinese people. 

Sec. 182. Authorization of appropriations for countering the People’s Republic 

of China Influence Fund. 

Sec. 183. Global Engagement Center. 

Sec. 184. Amendment to the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act 

of 1961. 

Sec. 185. Countering malign information operations in the Americas. 

Sec. 186. Global Peace Operations Initiative. 

Sec. 187. Expansion of sanctions under the Fentanyl Sanctions Act. 

Sec. 188. Imposition of sanctions with respect to agencies or instrumentalities 

of foreign states. 

Sec. 189. Imposition of sanctions with respect to military and intelligence facilities of the People’s Republic of China in Cuba. 

Sec. 190. Strategic stability dialogue and arms control. 

Sec. 191. Track 1.5 dialogues with the People’s Republic of China on nuclear 

matters. 

Sec. 192. Oversight of life sciences dual use research of concern. 

Subtitle F—Strengthening United States Public Diplomacy 

Sec. 196. Authorization of appropriations to promote United States education, 

exchange, cultural, and the Fulbright-Hays Program. 

Sec. 197. Public diplomacy training. 

Sec. 198. Public diplomacy efforts. 

Sec. 199. Supporting independent media and countering foreign information 

operations. 

Sec. 199A. Support for local media. 

TITLE II—INVESTING IN ALLIANCES, PARTNERSHIPS, AND 

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 

Subtitle A—Strategic and Diplomatic Matters 

PART I—PROMOTING UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP ON MATTERS RELATED

TO THE INDO-PACIFIC

Sec. 201. Sense of Congress condemning the PRC’s support for Russia’s war 

on Ukraine. 

Sec. 202. United States commitment and support for allies and partners in the 

Indo-Pacific. 

Sec. 203. Sense of Congress on cooperation with the Quad. 

Sec. 204. Statement of policy on enhancing United States-Taiwan partnership. 

Sec. 205. Expanding expertise on Taiwan matters. 

Sec. 206. United States-South Korea alliance. 

Sec. 207. Sense of Congress on United States-Japan-Republic of Korea cooperation. 


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Sec. 208. Sense of Congress on the need for the Senate to give its advice and 

consent to the ratification of the United Nations Convention on 

the Law of the Sea. 

Sec. 209. Statement of policy on maritime freedom of operations in international waterways and airspace of the Indo-Pacific and on artificial land features in the South China Sea. 

Sec. 209A. Sense of Congress regarding universal implementation of United 

Nations sanctions on North Korea. 

Sec. 209B. Establishing a Senior Official for the Compacts of Free Association 

at the Department of State. 

PART II—ENHANCING DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH

Sec. 211. Enhancement of diplomatic support and economic engagement with 

Pacific Island countries. 

Sec. 212. Defense cooperation in Latin America and the Caribbean. 

Sec. 213. Support for Young African Leaders Initiative. 

Sec. 214. Strengthening diplomatic efforts in Africa. 

Sec. 215. Engagement with civil society in Latin America and the Caribbean 

regarding accountability, human rights, and the risks of pervasive surveillance technologies. 

Subtitle B—International Organizations 

Sec. 221. Safeguarding the integrity of the United Nations system. 

Sec. 222. United States membership in United Nations specialized agencies and 

related organizations. 

Sec. 223. Establishment of Office on Multilateral Strategy and Personnel. 

Sec. 224. Authorization of appropriations to promote United States citizen employment at the United Nations and international organizations. 

Sec. 225. United States leadership and representation in standards-setting bodies. 

Subtitle C—South China and East China Sea Sanctions Act of 2024 

Sec. 231. Short title. 

Sec. 232. Sanctions with respect to PRC persons responsible for the PRC’s activities in the South China Sea and the East China Sea. 

Sec. 233. Sense of Congress regarding portrayals of the South China Sea or 

the East China Sea as part of China. 

Sec. 234. Sense of Congress on 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration’s tribunal 

ruling on arbitration case between Philippines and People’s Republic of China. 

TITLE III—INVESTING IN OUR VALUES 

Subtitle A—Promoting Human Rights in People’s Republic of China 

PART I—PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS FOR CITIZENS OF THE PEOPLE’S

REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND FOR UNITED STATES CITIZENS IN CHINA

Sec. 301. Protecting human rights in the People’s Republic of China. 

Sec. 302. Report on corrupt activities of senior officials of Government of the 

People’s Republic of China. 

Sec. 303. China exit bans. 


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PART II—MATTERS RELATED TO HONG KONG

Sec. 305. Authorization of appropriations for promotion of democracy, human 

rights, and civilian security in Hong Kong. 

Sec. 306. Development and deployment of internet freedom and circumvention 

tools for the people of Hong Kong. 

PART III—MATTERS RELATED TO XINJIANG

Sec. 311. Sense of Congress on treatment of Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous region. 

Sec. 312. Sense of Congress calling on organization of Islamic cooperation 

members to take action on atrocities in Xinjiang. 

Sec. 313. Reauthorization of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act. 

Sec. 314. Imposition of sanctions with respect to systematic rape, coercive abortion, forced sterilization, or involuntary contraceptive implantation in the Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous region. 

PART IV—MATTERS RELATED TO TIBET

Sec. 317. Policy with respect to Tibet. 

Sec. 318. United States policy and international engagement on the or reincarnation of the Dalai Lama and religious freedom of Tibetan 

Buddhists. 

Subtitle B—Promoting Human Rights Globally 

Sec. 321. Removal of members of the United Nations Human Rights Council 

that commit human rights abuses. 

Sec. 322. Protecting human rights defenders at the United Nations and other 

multilateral bodies. 

Sec. 323. Inclusion of surveillance technology abuse in human rights report. 

Sec. 324. Strengthening public reporting on corruption. 

Sec. 325. Authorization of funding for public reporting on corruption and corrupt practices. 

TITLE IV—MODERNIZING THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE TO MEET 

THE CHINA CHALLENGE 

Sec. 401. Establishing an Assistant Secretary of State for Indo-Pacific Affairs. 

Sec. 402. Enhancing strategic competition at the Department of State. 

Sec. 403. Department of State professional development and rotational program related to strategic competition. 

Sec. 404. Refocusing international security efforts for strategic competition. 

TITLE V—OTHER MATTERS 

Sec. 501. Savings provisions. 

Sec. 502. Rule of Construction on Maintaining One China Policy. 

1 SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS. 

2 In this Act: 


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1 (1) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CON2 GRESS.—The term ‘‘appropriate committees of Con3 gress’’ means— 

4 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of 

5 the Senate; and 

6 (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 

7 the House of Representatives. 

8 (2) JOINT DECLARATION.—The term ‘‘Joint 

9 Declaration’’ means the Joint Declaration of the 

10 Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 

11 and Northern Ireland and the Government of the 

12 People’s Republic of China on the Question of Hong 

13 Kong, done at Beijing on December 19, 1984. 

14 (3) PRC.—The term ‘‘PRC’’ means the Peo15 ple’s Republic of China. 

16 (4) STRATEGIC INFRASTRUCTURE.—The term 

17 ‘‘strategic infrastructure’’ means infrastructure 

18 where a primary driver of United States national in19 terest in such infrastructure is— 

20 (A) to advance United States national se21 curity or economic security interest or those of 

22 the country in which the infrastructure is lo23 cated; or 


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1 (B) to deny the People’s Republic of China 

2 of ownership or control over such infrastruc3 ture. 

4 SEC. 3. CONSULTATION AND ENGAGEMENT WITH CON5 GRESS. 

6 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con7 gress that— 

8 (1) the strategic competition between the 

9 United States and the PRC will require the United 

10 States to marshal sustained and political will to pro11 tect its vital interests, promote its values, and ad12 vance its economic and national security objectives 

13 for decades to come; and 

14 (2) sustained prioritization of the challenge 

15 posed by the PRC requires the participation of the 

16 whole United States Government, including— 

17 (A) the President to lead and direct the 

18 entire executive branch to treat the PRC as the 

19 greatest geopolitical and economic challenge for 

20 United States foreign policy; 

21 (B) bipartisan cooperation within Con22 gress; and 

23 (C) frequent, sustained, and meaningful 

24 collaboration and consultation between the exec25 utive branch and Congress. 


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1 (b) ENGAGEMENT WITH CONGRESS.—Consistent 

2 with section 15(b) of the State Department Basic Authori3 ties Act (22 U.S.C. 2680(b)), the Department of State 

4 shall keep the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Sen5 ate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 

6 of Representatives fully and currently informed with re7 spect to all activities and responsibilities carried out in re8 lation to the provisions of this Act, including by regularly 

9 consulting with the appropriate committees of Congress 

10 in the development and implementation of each of the 

11 strategies called for by the provisions of this Act. 

12 TITLE I—INVESTING IN A 

13 COMPETITIVE FUTURE 

14 Subtitle A—Combatting the PRC’s 

15 Economic Coercion 

16 SEC. 101. DEFINITIONS. 

17 In this subtitle: 

18 (1) PRC ECONOMIC COERCION.—The term 

19 ‘‘PRC economic coercion’’ means actions, practices, 

20 or threats by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 

21 to unreasonably restrict, obstruct, or manipulate 

22 commerce or economic relations with, foreign aid to, 

23 debt of, or investment in, any United States ally or 

24 partner in a capricious, pretextual, or non-trans25 parent manner for the purpose of threatening or 


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1 causing economic harm to the United States allies or 

2 partners for the purpose of influencing, constraining 

3 or limiting such countries decision-making. 

4 (2) TARGET COUNTRY.—The term ‘‘targeted 

5 country’’ is a country or entity determined by the 

6 Secretary to have been the subject of unusually ad7 verse or acute PRC economic coercion. 

8 (3) TARGETED GOOD OR SERVICE.—The term 

9 ‘‘targeted good or service’’ is a good or service sub10 ject to export or import by a targeted country that 

11 is significantly or adversely affected by PRC eco12 nomic coercion. 

13 PART I—ECONOMIC COERCION 

14 DETERMINATIONS 

15 SEC. 105. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 

16 It is the sense of Congress that— 

17 (1) the PRC is increasingly using economic co18 ercion to pressure, punish, and influence the United 

19 States and United States allies and partners; 

20 (2) economic coercion causes economic harm to 

21 United States allies and partners, threatens their 

22 economic security and attempts to constrain their 

23 ability to undertake sovereign political actions; 

24 (3) economic coercion is often characterized 

25 by— 


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1 (A) arbitrary, abusive, or discriminatory 

2 actions that seek to interfere with sovereign ac3 tions, or violate international rules; 

4 (B) capricious, pretextual, or non-trans5 parent actions taken without due process af6 forded; or 

7 (C) intimidation or threats of punitive ac8 tions; 

9 (4) existing mechanisms for trade dispute reso10 lution and international arbitration may not apply to 

11 claims related to economic coercion, and are often 

12 inadequate for responding to economic coercion in a 

13 timely and effective manner as the PRC exploits 

14 plausible lengthy resolution processes to evade ac15 countability; 

16 (5) the United States should provide meaning17 ful economic and political support to foreign part18 ners at their request and consistent with United 

19 States interests, when they are the target of PRC 

20 economic coercion that causes significant economic 

21 and political harm; 

22 (6) responding to economic coercion will be 

23 most effective when the United States provides relief 

24 to affected foreign partners in coordination with al25 lies and like-minded countries; and 


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1 (7) such coordination will further demonstrate 

2 broad resolve against economic coercion. 

3 SEC. 106. TARGETED COUNTRY DETERMINATION. 

4 (a) SECRETARY OF STATE DETERMINATION.— 

5 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State may 

6 determine that a country is a targeted country and 

7 may exercise the authorities described in section 

8 111(b) and 112 with respect to that country. 

9 (2) DELEGATION AND CONSULTATION WITH

10 CABINET MEMBERS.—To inform any determination 

11 under paragraph (1) or exercise of authority de12 scribed in section 111(b) and 112, the Secretary 

13 may delegate the authorities under this section to an 

14 appropriate Senate-confirmed official at the Depart15 ment of State, who should consult with other Fed16 eral agencies, as appropriate. 

17 (3) NOTIFICATION AND TRANSMITTAL TO CON18 GRESS.—In making any determination, the Sec19 retary shall notify the appropriate committees of 

20 Congress not later than 10 days before issuing a de21 termination under paragraph (1) or exercising au22 thorities described in section 111(b) and submit 

23 such determination and a justification to the appro24 priate committees of Congress in an unclassified 

25 form, which may include a classified annex. 


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1 (b) EXPIRATION AND EXTENSION OF DETERMINA2 TION.— 

3 (1) EXPIRATION OF INITIAL DETERMINA4 TION.—Any determination made by the Secretary 

5 under subsection (a) shall expire 180 days after the 

6 date of such determination, unless the Department 

7 submits a notification to the appropriate committees 

8 of Congress pursuant to paragraph (2) that PRC 

9 economic coercion against the targeted country is 

10 ongoing and requires an additional response. 

11 (2) EXTENSION OF DETERMINATION; CONGRES12 SIONAL NOTIFICATION.— 

13 (A) IN GENERAL.—The Department may 

14 extend any determination under subsection (a) 

15 for a period of one year by submitting a con16 gressional notification to the appropriate com17 mittees of Congress for their review not later 

18 than 30 days in advance of an extension taking 

19 effect. 

20 (B) ELEMENTS.—Any notifications sub21 mitted to the appropriate committees of Con22 gress pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall in23 clude— 

24 (i) a description of the status of the 

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1 tial determination made under subsection 

2 (a); 

3 (ii) an assessment of the targeted 

4 country’s political and economic vulner5 ability to such PRC economic coercion; 

6 (iii) a description of the exercise of 

7 the authorities and activities described in 

8 section 111(b) or section 112 to date; 

9 (iv) a plan for the continued exercise 

10 of authorities under section 111(b) or sec11 tion 112; 

12 (v) a description of the actions taken 

13 by the PRC against a targeted country in 

14 response to support provided to the tar15 geted country by the United States or 

16 United States allies and partners; 

17 (vi) coordination conducted with and 

18 support provided by United States allies 

19 and partners to assist the targeted coun20 try; and 

21 (vii) a justification for why an exten22 sion is in the national interests of the 

23 United States. 

24 (C) CLASSIFICATION.—A notification 

25 under this subsection shall be submitted in unVerDate Sep 11 2014 18:11 Jan 13, 2025 Jkt 059200 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S5491.IS S5491

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1 classified form but may include a classified 

2 annex. 

3 (3) REVOCATION.—The Secretary may at any 

4 time revoke a determination made under subsection 

5 (a) or the extension of such determination made 

6 under paragraph (2). 

7 SEC. 107. SUNSET. 

8 The authorities under this part shall expire 8 years 

9 after the date of the enactment of this Act. 

10 PART II—RESPONSE 

11 SEC. 111. ECONOMIC DEFENSE RESPONSE TEAMS. 

12 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 

13 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State 

14 shall establish, in coordination with other relevant Federal 

15 departments and agencies as appropriate, a program for 

16 the creation of economic defense response teams that can 

17 provide rapid, targeted technical assistance and high-level 

18 diplomatic support to the targeted country. Such assist19 ance and support may include the following activities: 

20 (1) Developing and implementing bilateral or 

21 multilateral contingency plans to lessen the political 

22 and economic impact of PRC economic coercion, in23 cluding by surging technical assistance, diplomatic 

24 support and economic assistance, as needed, to the 

25 targeted country. 


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1 (2) Encouraging senior Department of State of2 ficials to engage with United States allies and part3 ners, the United States private sector and other rel4 evant interlocutors in support of the targeted coun5 try, as appropriate. 

6 (3) In coordination with the targeted country, 

7 developing plans and strategies for reducing 

8 vulnerabilities and improving resilience. 

9 (4) Deploying positive public messaging cam10 paigns to reinforce the policy independence and resil11 ience of the targeted country and to condemn PRC 

12 economic coercion. 

13 (b) ACTIVATION OF RESPONSE TEAMS.—Activation 

14 of an economic defense response team to support a tar15 geted country may involve the following elements and oth16 ers as the circumstances require: 

17 (1) Identification and designation of relevant 

18 personnel to the task force, including economists, 

19 data analysts, trade experts, legal experts and for20 eign policy and foreign assistance personnel within 

21 the United States Government with expertise rel22 evant to the activities described in subsection (a). 

23 (2) Negotiation of memoranda of understanding 

24 or contracting mechanisms, where appropriate, with 

25 other Federal departments and agencies and the 


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1 United States private sector, as needed, to ensure 

2 access to the technical assistance identified under 

3 subsection (a)(1) and expertise identified under 

4 paragraph (1). 

5 (3) Clear direction to United States diplomatic 

6 missions on the rapid and effective activation of 

7 such teams, and the establishment of appropriate li8 aison relationships, as appropriate, with local public 

9 and private sector officials and entities. 

10 SEC. 112. ECONOMIC DEFENSE RESPONSE FUND. 

11 (a) IN GENERAL.—There is hereby established an 

12 ‘‘Economic Defense Response Fund’’ within the Depart13 ment of State (in this section referred to as the ‘‘Fund’’) 

14 to provide support, including the provision of assistance 

15 or the provision of loans to facilitate the purchase or redi16 rection of targeted goods, in particular goods of a stra17 tegic, time-sensitive, or perishable nature, in the targeted 

18 country. 

19 (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 

20 authorized to be appropriated not less than $25,000,000 

21 for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029 for the estab22 lishment and operation of the Fund. The Fund shall be 

23 solely administered by the Secretary of State or the Sec24 retary’s designee, in consultation with the heads of other 

25 Departments and agencies, as appropriate. 


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1 (c) USE OF LOANS.—The Economic Defense Re2 sponse Fund may be used to support loan programs to 

3 underwrite purchases by third parties to redirect targeted 

4 goods or services. 

5 SEC. 113. EXISTING AUTHORITIES THAT MAY BE USED TO 

6 RESPOND TO ECONOMIC COERCION. 

7 The Secretary of State should use the following au8 thorities to respond to economic coercion against a tar9 geted country, as appropriate: 

10 (1) Requesting appropriations for foreign aid to 

11 the targeted country. 

12 (2) Requesting the necessary authority and ap13 propriations for sovereign loan guarantees to the 

14 targeted country. 

15 (3) The waiver of policy requirements (other 

16 than policy requirements mandated by an Act of 

17 Congress) to facilitate the provision of financing to 

18 the targeted country. 

19 (4) Requesting appropriations for loan loss re20 serves to facilitate the provision of financing to sup21 port United States exports to the targeted country. 

22 (5) Providing technical assistance and legal ex23 pertise to support a targeted country’s response to 

24 and redress of an act or acts of PRC economic coer25 cion. 


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1 (6) Other authorities that could benefit the tar2 geted country and that require coordination and con3 sultation with the relevant Federal departments and 

4 agencies. 

5 SEC. 114. SUNSET. 

6 The authorities under this part shall expire 8 years 

7 after the date of the enactment of this Act. 

8 PART III—RESILIENCE 

9 SEC. 115. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST. 

10 (a) IN GENERAL.—There is established at the De11 partment of State an Office of the Chief Economist. 

12 (b) DUTIES.—The Office will be led by the Chief 

13 Economist of the Department of State, at the Senior Ex14 ecutive Service or equivalent level, and shall be responsible 

15 for— 

16 (1) conducting economic research, collecting 

17 and analyzing data, and preparing reports and as18 sessments and policy recommendations to senior De19 partment leadership on international economic 

20 trends, opportunities, and challenges and unantici21 pated global developments with economic impacts; 

22 and 

23 (2) providing economic analysis to inform policy 

24 making, including related to— 

25 (A) international trade and trade policy; 


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1 (B) international macroeconomics and fi2 nance; 

3 (C) economic development; 

4 (D) competition and industrial strategy; 

5 (E) economic sanctions development and 

6 implementation, and sanctions evasion; and 

7 (F) capacity building; 

8 (3) coordinating with allies and partners, other 

9 relevant agencies, departments, and stakeholders on 

10 international economic matters; 

11 (4) identifying countries vulnerable to PRC eco12 nomic coercion, and analyzing commodities, prod13 ucts, services, and other economic linkages of each 

14 such country that may be vulnerable targets for 

15 PRC economic coercion, including examining risk 

16 factors such as— 

17 (A) perishability; 

18 (B) strategic or political value, or to re19 gional or global supply chains; 

20 (C) proportion of the total export value for 

21 the exporting country of the product being ex22 ported to a country engaged in economic coer23 cion; 


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1 (D) potential exposure of the product to 

2 arbitrary or excessive regulatory, phytosanitary, 

3 or other safety or inspection requirements; and 

4 (E) reliance of a country on the import of 

5 such commodities, product, or services; and 

6 (5) analyzing and monitoring economic linkages 

7 to identify goods and commodities with respect to 

8 which United States allies and partners may be vul9 nerable to economic coercion that is informed by— 

10 (A) current market data; 

11 (B) information, including United States 

12 intelligence, on economic coercion strategies; 

13 (C) relevant data from before, during and 

14 after past instances of economic coercion; and 

15 (D) any other relevant information needed 

16 to support economic analysis and policy rec17 ommendations, including access to information 

18 technology systems which integrate and syn19 thesize economic and related data. 

20 (c) PERSONNEL.—In addition to a qualified profes21 sional Chief Economist, the Secretary of State is author22 ized to employ sufficient full-time equivalent individuals 

23 to fully execute the Office of the Chief Economist, includ24 ing— 


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1 (1) a Deputy Chief Economist, who must be a 

2 qualified professional economist; 

3 (2) at least four qualified professional econo4 mists at the GS–15 level; 

5 (3) a Chief Data Officer; 

6 (4) a Chief of Staff; 

7 (5) research economists; 

8 (6) career members of the foreign service, in9 cluding program support staff; and 

10 (7) temporary staff, including fellows. 

11 (d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 

12 authorized to be appropriated $5,000,000 for each of fis13 cal years 2025 through 2029 for the Office for personnel 

14 costs, project and data services, and limited travel funds. 

15 SEC. 116. ECONOMIC SUPPORT TO ALLIES AND PARTNERS. 

16 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 

17 date of the enactment of this Act, the Undersecretary of 

18 State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environ19 ment, using the economic analysis as described in section 

20 115, shall coordinate with other relevant Federal depart21 ments and agencies, as appropriate, to develop and imple22 ment a strategy to provide proactive support to partners 

23 and allies at risk of becoming target countries for PRC 

24 economic coercion. Such support may include the following 

25 activities: 


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1 (1) Data and information sharing on economic 

2 risks and vulnerabilities, including specific sectors. 

3 (2) Technical support to establish proactive ac4 tion plan and contingency plans to reduce the part5 ner country’s vulnerability to coercive economic prac6 tices and limit the damage of economic coercion. 

7 (3) Implementing any bilateral or multilateral 

8 contingency plans for responding to the threat or 

9 use of PRC economic coercion. 

10 (4) Providing technical assistance to partner 

11 countries in screening foreign sovereign investment 

12 in physical and digital infrastructure, and foreign in13 vestment in other strategic sectors that may increase 

14 the partner country’s vulnerability to PRC economic 

15 coercion. 

16 (5) Funding non-governmental entities to sup17 port public conferences and reports on the use of 

18 economic coercion and options for response efforts. 

19 (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—Of the 

20 $25,000,000 authorized in section 112(b), $5,000,000 

21 may be allocated to the Bureau of Economic and Business 

22 Affairs to resource, staff, and implement the strategy in 

23 subsection (a). 


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1 PART IV—COORDINATION WITH ALLIES AND 

2 PARTNERS 

3 SEC. 119. COORDINATION WITH ORGANISATION FOR ECO4 NOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT 

5 MEMBERS ON ENGAGEMENT FROM THE PEO6 PLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. 

7 The Secretary of State shall coordinate with willing 

8 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 

9 member countries— 

10 (1) to study the effects of coercive economic 

11 practices associated with the PRC, such as those 

12 through the Belt and Road Initiative, the Digital 

13 Silk Road, and the Global Development Initiative, 

14 which may include the extent to which such prac15 tices— 

16 (A) are predatory or usurious; 

17 (B) are inconsistent with internally accept18 ed banking and accounting practices; 

19 (C) result in low quality infrastructure 

20 that does not meet international standards; 

21 (D) incorporate conditions intended to 

22 limit transparency, including lending with con23 ditional restrictions on debt reporting, incon24 sistent with the borrower’s obligations to the 

25 International Monetary Fund; and 


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1 (E) provide the PRC with undue influence 

2 over the borrower in the event of the borrower’s 

3 default; 

4 (2) to create a shared set of metrics to enable 

5 evaluation of whether the PRC is engaging in the 

6 practices referred to in paragraph (1) on particular 

7 initiatives or projects, and promote transparency 

8 with respect to those actions, including a joint anal9 ysis of— 

10 (A) the PRC’s distortive economic prac11 tices, such as subsidies provided by the PRC as 

12 it pertains to state-owned enterprises and other 

13 forms of market-distorting state intervention in 

14 the PRC’s economy; and 

15 (B) the potential negative global spillovers 

16 from such practices; 

17 (3) to establish— 

18 (A) a program or plan of action for future 

19 dialogues on the PRC’s unfair economic prac20 tices; and 

21 (B) a clear understanding of common con22 cerns and priorities among member countries 

23 with respect to such practices; and 


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1 (4) to issue joint informational reports that 

2 contain the results of the data gathering efforts de3 scribed in this section. 

4 PART V—IMPLEMENTATION 

5 SEC. 121. REPORT ON STRATEGY AND IMPLEMENTATION. 

6 (a) STRATEGY AND IMPLEMENTATION.— 

7 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days 

8 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec9 retary of State shall submit to the appropriate com10 mittees of Congress a report on activities under this 

11 subtitle. 

12 (2) ELEMENTS.—The report required under 

13 paragraph (1) shall include the following elements: 

14 (A) A description of the establishment of 

15 the program authorized by section 111(a) de16 scribing the development of the program, the 

17 major elements of the program, the personnel 

18 and institutions involved, and specifics on how 

19 the program incorporates the elements de20 scribed in section 111(a). 

21 (B) A description of the development and 

22 implementation of the strategy described in sec23 tion 116, including— 

24 (i) the development and use of data 

25 and analytical tools by the Office of the 


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1 Chief Economist in assessing potential 

2 interventions that could be pursued to ad3 dress identified vulnerabilities to economic 

4 coercion in advance of such coercion or in 

5 preparation for such coercion; 

6 (ii) a strategy for public engagement 

7 before, during and after instances of eco8 nomic coercion to build resilience, domestic 

9 and international support to counter such 

10 coercion; and 

11 (iii) how the Secretary of State will 

12 work with interagency stakeholders to im13 plement the strategy required under sec14 tion 116, and the potential contributions of 

15 other Federal departments and agencies to 

16 programs, initiatives, and activities that 

17 complement the Economic Defense Re18 sponse Fund authorized in section 112. 

19 (b) ECONOMIC DEFENSE RESPONSE TEAM RE20 PORTS.— 

21 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after 

22 the activation of an economic defense response team 

23 pursuant to section 111(b), and annually thereafter 

24 for so long as such team is active, the Secretary of 

25 State shall submit to the appropriate committees of 


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1 Congress a report describing the operations of the 

2 team with respect to the targeted country and an as3 sessment of its effectiveness in countering the nega4 tive impact to the targeted country of PRC economic 

5 coercion. 

6 (2) CLASSIFICATION.—the report required 

7 under paragraph (1) shall be unclassified but may 

8 include a classified annex. 

9 PART VI—OTHER MATTERS 

10 SEC. 124. DEVELOPING ECONOMIC TOOLS TO DETER AG11 GRESSION AGAINST TAIWAN. 

12 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con13 gress that the United States must be prepared to take im14 mediate action to sanction any military or non-military en15 tities owned, controlled, or acting at the direction of the 

16 Government of the PRC or the Chinese Communist Party 

17 that are supporting actions by the Government of the PRC 

18 or the Chinese Communist Party to— 

19 (1) overthrow or dismantle the governing insti20 tutions in Taiwan; 

21 (2) occupy any territory controlled or adminis22 tered by Taiwan; or 

23 (3) take significant action against Taiwan, or 

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1 wan’s outlying islands, or perpetrating a significant 

2 cyberattack on Taiwan. 

3 (b) TASK FORCE.—Not later than 180 days after the 

4 date of the enactment of this Act, the Office of the Sanc5 tions Coordinator of the Department of State and the Of6 fice of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the 

7 Treasury shall establish an interagency task force to iden8 tify military or non-military entities that could be sanc9 tioned immediately following any action taken by the PRC 

10 that demonstrates an attempt to achieve or has the signifi11 cant effect of achieving the physical or political control of 

12 Taiwan, including by— 

13 (1) overthrowing or dismantling the governing 

14 institutions in Taiwan; 

15 (2) occupying any territory controlled or admin16 istered by Taiwan as of the date of the enactment 

17 of this Act; or 

18 (3) taking significant action against Taiwan, or 

19 territory controlled or administered by Taiwan, in20 cluding— 

21 (A) the creation of a naval blockade of 

22 Taiwan; 

23 (B) the seizure of the outlying islands of 

24 Taiwan; or 


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1 (C) the initiation of a significant 

2 cyberattack that threatens civilian or military 

3 infrastructure of Taiwan. 

4 (c) STRATEGY.—Not later than 180 days following 

5 the establishment of the task force required under sub6 section (b), the task force shall submit to the appropriate 

7 committees of Congress a strategy for identifying targets 

8 that— 

9 (1) assesses how existing sanctions programs 

10 could be used following any action taken by the PRC 

11 that demonstrates an attempt to achieve, or has the 

12 significant effect of achieving, the physical or polit13 ical control of Taiwan as described in subsection (b); 

14 (2) develops or proposes, as appropriate, new 

15 sanctions authorities that might be required to im16 pose sanctions on targets identified under this sec17 tion; 

18 (3) analyzes the potential economic con19 sequences to the United States, and to allies and 

20 partners of the United States, of various types of 

21 such sanctions and to assess measures that could be 

22 taken to mitigate such consequences, including 

23 through the use of licenses, exemptions, carve-outs, 

24 and other approaches; 


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1 (4) includes coordination with allies and part2 ners to— 

3 (A) leverage sanctions and other economic 

4 tools to deter or respond to aggression against 

5 Taiwan; 

6 (B) identify and resolve potential impedi7 ments to coordinating sanctions-related efforts; 

8 and 

9 (C) identify industries, sectors, or goods 

10 and services where the United States and allies 

11 and partners can take coordinated action 

12 through sanctions, or other economic tools that 

13 will have a significant negative impact on the 

14 economy of the PRC; 

15 (5) assesses the resource gaps and needs at the 

16 Department of State and the Department of the 

17 Treasury, and other Federal departments and agen18 cies, as appropriate, to most effectively use sanctions 

19 and other economic tools to respond to the threat 

20 posed by the PRC; 

21 (6) recommends how best to target sanctions 

22 and other economic tools against individuals, enti23 ties, and economic sectors in the PRC, taking into 

24 account the role of such targets in supporting Gov25 ernment of the PRC or Chinese Communist Party 


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1 policies and activities that pose a threat to the na2 tional security or foreign policy interests of the 

3 United States, the negative economic implications 

4 for the PRC, including its ability to achieve its ob5 jectives with respect to Taiwan, and the potential 

6 impact of such sanctions on the stability of the glob7 al financial system, including with regard to— 

8 (A) state-owned enterprises; 

9 (B) government officials; 

10 (C) financial institutions associated with 

11 the government; and 

12 (D) PRC companies not formally des13 ignated by the Government of the PRC as 

14 state-owned enterprises; 

15 (7) identifies any foreign military or non-mili16 tary entities that would likely be used by the PRC 

17 in any action taken that demonstrates an attempt to 

18 achieve any, or has the significant effect of achiev19 ing, the physical or political control of Taiwan, as 

20 described in subsection (b), including entities in— 

21 (A) shipping; 

22 (B) logistics; 

23 (C) energy, including oil and gas; 

24 (D) aviation; 

25 (E) ground transportation; and 


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1 (F) technology; 

2 (8) describes policies, to be applied in the event 

3 of any PRC coercive action, including an invasion by 

4 the PRC that fringes upon the territorial sovereignty 

5 of Taiwan by preventing access to international wa6 terways, airspace, or telecommunications networks, 

7 to— 

8 (A) restrict the access of the People’s Lib9 eration Army to oil, natural gas, munitions, and 

10 other supplies needed to conduct military oper11 ations against Taiwan, United States facilities 

12 in the Indo-Pacific and Indian Oceans, and al13 lies and partners of the United States in the re14 gion; 

15 (B) diminish the capacity of the industrial 

16 base of the PRC to manufacture and deliver de17 fense articles to replace those lost in operations 

18 of the People’s Liberation Army against Tai19 wan, the United States, and allies and partners 

20 of the United States; and 

21 (C) inhibit the ability of the PRC to evade 

22 United States and multilateral sanctions 

23 through third parties, including through sec24 ondary sanctions; and 


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1 (9) identifies tactics used by the Government of 

2 the PRC to influence the public in the United States 

3 and Taiwan through propaganda and disinformation 

4 campaigns, including such campaigns focused on 

5 delegitimizing Taiwan or legitimizing a forceful ac6 tion by the PRC against Taiwan. 

7 (d) REPORT.— 

8 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days 

9 after the submission of the strategy required under 

10 subsection (c), the President shall submit to the ap11 propriate committees of Congress a report on poten12 tial sources of leverage against the PRC and rec13 ommendations to reduce United States 

14 vulnerabilities. The report shall— 

15 (A) identify goods and services from the 

16 United States that are relied on by the PRC 

17 such that reliance presents a strategic oppor18 tunity and source of leverage against the PRC, 

19 including during a conflict; 

20 (B) identify procurement practices of the 

21 United States Government, and critical sectors 

22 within the United States economy, that are reli23 ant on trade with the PRC and other inputs 

24 from the PRC (including drugs and active phar25 maceutical ingredients, critical minerals, and 


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1 metallurgical inputs) such that those sectors 

2 present a strategic vulnerability and source of 

3 leverage that the Chinese Communist Party or 

4 the PRC could exploit, including during a con5 flict; and 

6 (C) includes recommendations to Congress 

7 on steps that can be taken to reduce the 

8 sources of leverage described in subparagraph 

9 (B), including through— 

10 (i) provision of economic incentives 

11 and making other trade and contracting 

12 reforms to support United States industry 

13 in critical sectors and to indigenize produc14 tion of critical resources; and 

15 (ii) policies to facilitate ‘‘near- or 

16 friend-shoring’’, or otherwise developing 

17 strategies to facilitate that process with al18 lies and partners of the United States, in 

19 other sectors for which domestic reshoring 

20 would prove infeasible for any reason. 

21 (2) FORM.—The report submitted under para22 graph (1) shall be submitted in an unclassified form, 

23 but may include a classified annex. 


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1 SEC. 125. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY VIOLATORS LIST. 

2 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after the 

3 date of the enactment of this Act, and not less frequently 

4 than annually thereafter for 8 years, the Secretary of 

5 State, in coordination with the heads of other Federal de6 partments and agencies as the President determines ap7 propriate, shall create a list (referred to in this section 

8 as the ‘‘intellectual property violators list’’) that identi9 fies— 

10 (1) all state-owned enterprises incorporated in 

11 the PRC that have benefitted from— 

12 (A) a significant act or series of acts of in13 tellectual property theft that caused significant 

14 harm to an economic sector of the United 

15 States or a company, partnership or entity in16 corporated or organized in the United States or 

17 group or association of such entities; or 

18 (B) an act or government policy of involun19 tary or coerced technology transfer of intellec20 tual property owned by an entity identified 

21 company incorporated in the United States; and 

22 (2) any foreign person with operational control 

23 of an entity described in paragraph (1), including 

24 senior corporate officers and principal shareholders 

25 of the entity. 


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1 (b) RULES FOR IDENTIFICATION.—To determine 

2 whether there is a credible basis for determining that an 

3 entity should be included on the intellectual property viola4 tors list, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the 

5 departments and agencies specified in subsection (a) shall 

6 consider— 

7 (1) any final adjudication by a court of com8 petent authority in the United States that the entity 

9 has violated relevant United States laws intended to 

10 protect intellectual property rights; or 

11 (2) substantial and credible information re12 ceived from any entity described in subsection (c) or 

13 other interested persons. 

14 (c) CONSULTATION.—In carrying out this section, the 

15 Secretary of State, in coordination with the departments 

16 and agencies specified in subsection (a), may consult, as 

17 necessary and appropriate, with— 

18 (1) other Federal agencies, including inde19 pendent agencies; 

20 (2) entities in the private sector, including 

21 trade associations; 

22 (3) civil society organizations with relevant ex23 pertise; and 

24 (4) allies and partners of the United States. 

25 (d) REPORTS.— 


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1 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year 

2 after the date of the enactment of this Act, and an3 nually thereafter for 8 years, the Secretary of State 

4 shall publish in the Federal Register a report that— 

5 (A) lists the entities identified pursuant to 

6 subsection (a)(1) and the corporate officers of 

7 such entities identified pursuant to subsection 

8 (a)(2); 

9 (B) describes the circumstances sur10 rounding acts or policies described in subsection 

11 (a)(1), including any role of the Government of 

12 the PRC; 

13 (C) assesses, to the extent practicable, the 

14 economic advantage derived by the entities 

15 identified pursuant to subsection (a)(1); and 

16 (D) assesses whether each entity described 

17 in subsection (a)(1) is using or has used stolen 

18 intellectual property in commercial activity 

19 within the sovereign jurisdiction of the United 

20 States. 

21 (2) CLASSIFIED REPORT.—Concurrent with 

22 publication of the reports required under paragraph 

23 (1), the Secretary of State shall submit to the For24 eign Relations Committee of the Senate and the 

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1 resentatives a classified version of the report that in2 cludes greater detail and intelligence about the infor3 mation specified in subparagraphs (A) through (D) 

4 of paragraph (1). 

5 (e) REQUIREMENT TO PROTECT CONFIDENTIAL

6 BUSINESS INFORMATION.— 

7 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State and 

8 the head of any other Federal agency involved in the 

9 production of the intellectual property violators list 

10 shall protect from disclosure any proprietary infor11 mation submitted by a private sector party and 

12 marked as confidential business information, unless 

13 the party submitting the information— 

14 (A) had notice, at the time of submission, 

15 that such information would be disclosed by the 

16 Secretary; 

17 (B) subsequently consents to the disclosure 

18 of such information; or 

19 (C) is an entity listed on the intellectual 

20 property violators list. 

21 (2) INCLUSION IN CLASSIFIED VERSION OF RE22 PORT.—If confidential business information is pro23 vided by a private sector party in connection with 

24 the production of the intellectual property violators 

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1 mation in the classified version of the report under 

2 subsection (d)(2). 

3 (3) TREATMENT AS TRADE SECRETS.—Propri4 etary information submitted by a private sector 

5 party (except an entity listed on the intellectual 

6 property violators list) under this section— 

7 (A) shall be considered to be trade secrets 

8 and commercial or financial information exempt 

9 under subsection (b)(4) of section 552 of title 

10 5, United States Code, from being made avail11 able to the public under subsection (a) of that 

12 section; and 

13 (B) shall be exempt from disclosure with14 out the express approval of the party. 

15 SEC. 126. REPORT ON SUBSIDIES PROVIDED BY THE GOV16 ERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF 

17 CHINA. 

18 (a) REPORT.—Not later than one year after the date 

19 of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 

20 10 years, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the 

21 United States Trade Representative and the Secretary of 

22 Commerce, shall submit to the appropriate committees of 

23 Congress a report that identifies— 

24 (1) patterns of direct and indirect subsidies 

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1 ments of the PRC to state-owned enterprises and 

2 private entities under the direction or control of the 

3 Government of the PRC operating in economic sec4 tors deemed by the Government of the PRC to be 

5 strategic sectors, including by identifying such sec6 tors in major policy initiatives or by inclusion in the 

7 Chinese Communist Party’s five-year plans; 

8 (2) discriminatory, non-market treatment favor9 ing state-owned and private enterprises in the PRC 

10 and disadvantaging foreign market participants; 

11 (3) any impacts that the activities outlined in 

12 paragraphs (1) and (2) have on United States na13 tional security and economic competitiveness; and 

14 (4) any coordination with foreign allies and 

15 partners to address the impacts of the activities out16 lined in paragraphs (1) and (2). 

17 (b) ELEMENTS OF REPORT.—In compiling the report 

18 under subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall con19 sider— 

20 (1) regulatory and other policies enacted or pro21 moted by the central government of the PRC that— 

22 (A) discriminate in favor of enterprises in 

23 the PRC that disadvantage foreign market par24 ticipants; 


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1 (B) shield centrally administered, state2 owned enterprises from competition; or 

3 (C) otherwise suppress market-based com4 petition; 

5 (2) financial subsidies, including subsidized 

6 loans or below-market lending terms, from or pro7 moted by the central, provincial, or local govern8 ments of the PRC or state-owned enterprises in the 

9 PRC that materially benefit enterprises in the PRC 

10 over foreign market participants in contravention of 

11 generally accepted market principles; 

12 (3) any subsidy that meets the definition of 

13 subsidy under article 1 of the Agreement on Sub14 sidies and Countervailing Measures referred to in 

15 section 101(d)(12) of the Uruguay Round Agree16 ments Act (19 U.S.C. 3511(d)(12)); 

17 (4) any impacts that the activities outlined in 

18 paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) have on United States 

19 national security and economic competitiveness; and 

20 (5) any coordination with foreign allies and 

21 partners to address the impacts of the activities out22 lined in paragraphs (1), (2), and (3). 

23 (c) FORM OF REPORT.—Each report required by sub24 section (a) may be submitted in classified form. 


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1 (d) CONSULTATION.—In carrying out this section, 

2 the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary 

3 of Commerce and the United States Trade Representative, 

4 may, as necessary and appropriate, consult with— 

5 (1) other Federal agencies, including inde6 pendent agencies; 

7 (2) the private sector; and 

8 (3) civil society organizations with relevant ex9 pertise. 

10 Subtitle B—Economic Engagement 

11 With Allies and Partners 

12 PART I—INVESTING IN ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT 

13 IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH 

14 SEC. 131. INVESTING IN TALENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, THE 

15 PACIFIC ISLANDS, SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, 

16 AND LATIN AMERICA. 

17 (a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

18 (1) LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.—In 

19 this section, the term ‘‘Latin America and the Carib20 bean’’ does not include Cuba, Nicaragua, or Ven21 ezuela. 

22 (2) PACIFIC ISLANDS.—The term ‘‘Pacific Is23 lands’’ means the nations of Federated States of Mi24 cronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Palau, Papua New 


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1 Guinea, Republic of Marshall Islands, Samoa, Sol2 omon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. 

3 (3) SOUTHEAST ASIA.—The term ‘‘Southeast 

4 Asia’’ means the nations of Brunei Darussalam, 

5 Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, 

6 Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, 

7 Vietnam, and Timor-Leste. 

8 (4) SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA.—The term ‘‘sub-Sa9 haran Africa’’ means a country or successor political 

10 entity defined in section 107 of the African Growth 

11 and Opportunity Act (19 U.S.C. 3706). 

12 (b) ESTABLISHMENT OF CENTERS OF EXCEL13 LENCE.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the 

14 Administrator of the United States Agency for Inter15 national Development and, as appropriate, the heads of 

16 other relevant Federal departments and agencies, is au17 thorized to enter into public-private partnerships and es18 tablish centers of excellence located in countries in South19 east Asia, Pacific Islands, sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin 

20 America and the Caribbean to build and enhance the tech21 nical capacity of officials, emerging leaders, and other 

22 qualified persons from countries in those regions. 

23 (c) PRIORITY AREAS FOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

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1 sistance and capacity building in areas, such as the fol2 lowing: 

3 (1) Domestic resource mobilization. 

4 (2) Regulatory management. 

5 (3) Procurement processes, including tendering, 

6 bidding, and contract negotiation. 

7 (4) Budget management and oversight. 

8 (5) Management of key economic sectors, in9 cluding energy, digital economy, and infrastructure. 

10 (6) Project appraisal. 

11 (7) Sovereign financial management. 

12 (d) TERMS AND CONDITIONS.—The program author13 ized under this section shall— 

14 (1) leverage existing United States programs 

15 and activities in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Is16 lands, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America, 

17 which may include assistance provided under— 

18 (A) future leaders initiatives, such as the 

19 Young Southeast Asia Leaders Initiative and 

20 the Young Pacific Leaders Program; 

21 (B) the United States Agency for Inter22 national Development’s American Schools and 

23 Hospitals Abroad (USAID/AHSA) initiative; 

24 (C) the Millennium Challenge Act of 2003 

25 (22 U.S.C. 7701 et seq.); 


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1 (D) U.S.-Support for Economic Growth in 

2 Asia (US–SEGA); 

3 (E) programs related to the Asia-Pacific 

4 Economic Community (APEC); 

5 (F) the Young African Leaders Initiative; 

6 (G) the Young Leaders of the Americas 

7 Initiative; and 

8 (H) other relevant education or scholarship 

9 programs; 

10 (2) be supported by instructors that— 

11 (A)(i) currently serve in relevant areas of 

12 the United States Government with a rank of 

13 not less than 14 on the GS scale; or 

14 (ii) possess at least ten years of experience 

15 relevant to the areas of instruction identified in 

16 subsection (c); 

17 (B) meet high professional standards with18 in their fields; and 

19 (C)(i) are contracted by any center of ex20 cellence established pursuant to subsection (b); 

21 or 

22 (ii) are deployed or detailed directly from 

23 a Federal Government agency; 

24 (3) seek to attract participants who— 


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1 (A)(i) are currently senior or mid-career 

2 officials in key technical ministries of partici3 pating countries in Southeast Asia, the Pacific 

4 Islands, sub-Saharan Africa, or Latin America 

5 and the Caribbean; 

6 (ii) have demonstrated leadership potential 

7 and direct responsibility for crafting or imple8 menting policies relevant to the areas of in9 struction described under subsection (c); or 

10 (iii) demonstrate an intent to return to 

11 government service after completing the pro12 gram outlined in this section; or 

13 (B) are currently employed in utilities, 

14 publicly or privately owned companies, or other 

15 non-government entities with responsibility for 

16 implementing policy and regulation or sup17 porting government functions in the areas of in18 struction described under subsection (c); and 

19 (4) require financial or in-kind contributions 

20 from participating governments, commensurate with 

21 the gross domestic product of the countries. 

22 (e) AUTHORIZATION TO ENTER AGREEMENTS AND

23 NON-BINDING INSTRUMENTS.—To fulfill the terms and 

24 conditions specified by subsection (d), the Secretary of 

25 State is authorized to enter agreements and non-binding 


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1 instruments with participating governments to determine 

2 what financial or in-kind contributions will be made by 

3 the United States and what financial or in-kind contribu4 tions will be made by the participating government with 

5 respect to the activities described in this section. 

6 (f) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 

7 authorized to be appropriated $45,000,000 for each of fis8 cal years 2025 through 2029 to carry out this section. 

9 SEC. 132. ENHANCING UNITED STATES-AFRICA TRADE AND 

10 INVESTMENT FOR PROSPERITY. 

11 (a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the 

12 United States to increase United States investment in Af13 rica and to promote and facilitate trade between the 

14 United States and Africa, focused on key countries and 

15 sectors, that supports mutual economic growth and devel16 opment outcomes, long-term development of markets, and 

17 the strategic interests of the United States. 

18 (b) OFFICE TO COORDINATE POLICY.— 

19 (1) ESTABLISHMENT.—The President shall es20 tablish an office, to be known as the ‘‘Prosper Africa 

21 Office,’’ and assign it to a bureau within the United 

22 States Agency for International Development to co23 ordinate the activities of the United States Govern24 ment related to increasing trade and investment be25 tween the United States and Africa, which should 


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1 include representation from relevant agencies as des2 ignated by the President. 

3 (2) DUTIES.—The office established pursuant 

4 to paragraph (1) shall— 

5 (A) identify priority countries or sectors as 

6 appropriate for United States foreign invest7 ment in countries in Africa and sectors and 

8 countries that support United States economic 

9 growth and promotes trade based on the anal10 ysis required under subsection (c); 

11 (B) coordinate activities and implementing 

12 mechanisms, including at United States embas13 sies in Africa, to carry out the policy set forth 

14 in subsection (a), including by— 

15 (i) providing program support and 

16 guidance to implement the policy in sub17 section (a); 

18 (ii) providing information and analysis 

19 to United States companies and investors 

20 in countries and sectors identified in sub21 paragraph (A); and 

22 (iii) serving, as needed, as an informa23 tion clearinghouse for the United States 

24 Government for businesses, investors, and 

25 civic organizations, and others in the 


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1 United States seeking information related 

2 to investing in Africa, and connecting them 

3 with teams at United States embassies 

4 overseas; and 

5 (C) identify barriers to trade and invest6 ment in priority countries and sectors, and 

7 identify concrete actions to address them, in8 cluding strengthening programs and activities 

9 aimed at improving the enabling environment in 

10 those countries. 

11 (3) ORGANIZATION.— 

12 (A) IN GENERAL.—The office established 

13 under paragraph (1) shall be led by an Execu14 tive Director who shall be designated by the Ad15 ministrator of the United States Agency for 

16 International Development, and who shall— 

17 (i) coordinate interagency efforts re18 lated to paragraph (2); 

19 (ii) identify, not later than 90 days 

20 after the release of the analysis required 

21 under subsection (c), a list of priority 

22 countries for the purposes of carrying out 

23 this section; 

24 (iii) plan, coordinate, and oversee the 

25 policies, activities, and programs of United 


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1 States Government agencies, in the United 

2 States and in overseas missions, involved 

3 in promoting or facilitating trade and in4 vestment activities between the United 

5 States and Africa and development and co6 ordination of relevant activities meant to 

7 improve the enabling environment; 

8 (iv) identify and provide information 

9 about investment opportunities, market in10 formation, and United States Government 

11 programs to support trade and investment 

12 activities in priority countries and sectors 

13 identified pursuant to paragraph (2)(A); 

14 and 

15 (v) not less than 4 times per year, 

16 convene a committee consisting of the di17 rectors from each agency designated under 

18 subparagraph (B) to provide strategic 

19 guidance and coordination for the policy, 

20 programs, and activities of the office. 

21 (B) DESIGNATION OF AGENCIES.—The 

22 President shall designate Federal departments 

23 and agencies to participate in support of the 

24 policy set forth in subsection (a), and direct the 

25 head of each designated agency to— 


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1 (i) designate an employee to serve as 

2 a focal point for the agency’s respective ac3 tivities related to subsection (a), who shall 

4 coordinate the relevant activities of the 

5 agency and liaise with the Executive Direc6 tor designated pursuant to subparagraph 

7 (A); and 

8 (ii) designate an employee to serve at 

9 United States embassies in priority coun10 tries identified pursuant to subsection 

11 (b)(2)(A). 

12 (4) STAFFING.—In order to carry out this sec13 tion— 

14 (A) the Executive Director shall have the 

15 authority, as appropriate, to hire employees and 

16 contractors in a manner that is consistent with 

17 existing hiring authorities of USAID to support 

18 the execution of efforts described in paragraph 

19 (3)(A), and shall be supported, as appropriate, 

20 by staff detailed from any Federal department 

21 or agency designated pursuant to paragraph 

22 (3)(B); and 

23 (B) the Chief of Mission in relevant Sub24 Saharan and North Africa countries— 


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1 (i) shall take an active and direct 

2 leadership role in promoting, supporting, 

3 and facilitating activities pursuant to this 

4 section; 

5 (ii) shall designate a Foreign Service 

6 Officer, Foreign Commercial Service Offi7 cer, or other direct hire person under Chief 

8 of Mission authority to lead an interagency 

9 team to support activities pursuant to this 

10 section, who shall— 

11 (I) conduct assessments of mar12 ket conditions and business operating 

13 environments; 

14 (II) identify investment opportu15 nities; 

16 (III) foster relationships and 

17 communications between United 

18 States investors and businesses and 

19 African businesses and individuals 

20 within their country of responsibility; 

21 and 

22 (IV) carry out other duties as 

23 necessary; and 

24 (iii) is authorized to hire locally em25 ployed staff with relevant experience to 


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1 support the activities of the office estab2 lished pursuant to this subsection. 

3 (c) MARKET AND SECTOR ANALYSIS.— 

4 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days 

5 after the date of the enactment of this Act, and 

6 every 4 years thereafter until 2031, the Executive 

7 Director shall commission and publish a study every 

8 4 years of the investment environment in Africa that 

9 incorporates the following elements: 

10 (A) An analysis of which markets are the 

11 most promising for private investment. 

12 (B) An analysis of African markets that 

13 identifies which industries and sectors United 

14 States firms have an advantage in comparison 

15 to other sources of foreign direct investment. 

16 (C) An analysis of perceived and actual 

17 barriers to United States private investment, 

18 including— 

19 (i) significant legal and regulatory 

20 constraints to foreign investment and busi21 ness operating environments; 

22 (ii) reputational risks; 

23 (iii) investor information gaps; and 


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1 (iv) access to and affordability of cap2 ital, labor markets, currency volatility, and 

3 infrastructure. 

4 (2) AUTHORITY.—To produce the study re5 quired under paragraph (1), the Executive Director 

6 is authorized to engage the services of a qualified 

7 United States private sector consultant or subject 

8 matter expert. 

9 (3) SUBMISSION AND PUBLICATION.—The Ad10 ministrator of the United States Agency for Inter11 national Development shall submit each study re12 quired under paragraph (1) to the appropriate com13 mittees of Congress and shall make the study pub14 licly available. 

15 (4) DETERMINATION OF PRIORITY COUN16 TRIES.—The Executive Director shall determine the 

17 priority countries and sectors for purposes of sub18 section (b)(2)(A)(i) based on the findings of the re19 port required under this subsection. 

20 (d) SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES.—The office 

21 shall, to the extent practicable, promote and facilitate in22 vestments in small and medium enterprises, including by 

23 establishing and supporting relationships between United 

24 States Government institutions, philanthropic institutions, 


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1 and private lenders to mobilize blended finance for small 

2 and medium enterprises in Africa. 

3 (e) SUPPORT FOR DIASPORA INVESTMENT.—The of4 fice shall seek to support and facilitate investments in Af5 rica by United States citizens and residents who identify 

6 as members of the African diaspora. 

7 (f) PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY COUNCIL ON AFRICA DI8 ASPORA ENGAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES.— 

9 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Executive Director shall 

10 consult with the President’s Advisory Council on Af11 rican Diaspora Engagement in the United States 

12 (referred to in this subsection as the ‘‘Council’’) es13 tablished by Executive Order 14089 on issues relat14 ing to increasing, developing, and sustaining invest15 ments in Africa by United States members of the 

16 African diaspora. 

17 (2) MEMBERSHIP.—The Executive Director 

18 shall consult with the Chairman and Ranking Mem19 ber of the appropriate committees of Congress in de20 veloping recommendations to the President of not 

21 less than 3 persons for appointment to the Council 

22 who have significant relevant experience in the fields 

23 of trade, private investment, economics, inter24 national development, or other relevant fields. 


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1 (3) DUTIES.—The Council shall publish an an2 nual report on investment in Africa by United States 

3 members of the African diaspora and barriers to in4 creased investment by the diaspora. 

5 (4) DIASPORA BUSINESS FORUMS.—The Execu6 tive Director shall organize public meetings through7 out the United States with members of the African 

8 diaspora community that— 

9 (A) provide a forum for communication, 

10 education, and information about investment 

11 opportunities; and 

12 (B) as appropriate, may be coordinated 

13 with local civic, community, and business orga14 nizations. 

15 (g) BUSINESS-ENABLING ENVIRONMENT.—The Ex16 ecutive Director, in coordination with the respective Chiefs 

17 of Mission at designated United States embassies, shall 

18 seek to strengthen the business-enabling environment in 

19 Africa by— 

20 (1) identifying barriers to United States invest21 ment on a country-by-country basis; 

22 (2) identifying existing development and tech23 nical assistance programs that can serve to eliminate 

24 the barriers identified under paragraph (1); 


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1 (3) ensuring Country Development Cooperation 

2 Strategies and Regional Development Cooperation 

3 Strategies incorporate programs and activities fo4 cused on addressing specific barriers to private sec5 tor investment identified under paragraph (1); and 

6 (4) providing policy advice and technical assist7 ance to select African countries to develop and im8 prove regulatory and legal structures, taxation and 

9 customs regimes, policy frameworks, and other rel10 evant structures and practices to improve the oper11 ating environments for businesses and eliminate 

12 other barriers to competition. 

13 SEC. 133. INCREASING THE COMPETITIVENESS OF THE 

14 UNITED STATES IN AFRICA. 

15 The Comptroller General of the United States shall— 

16 (1) conduct a review of the number of Foreign 

17 Commercial Service Officers and Department of 

18 State Economic Officers at United States embassies 

19 in sub-Saharan Africa; and 

20 (2) develop and submit to the appropriate com21 mittees of Congress an assessment of whether 

22 human resource capacity in such embassies is ade23 quate to meet the goals of the various trade and eco24 nomic programs and initiatives in Africa, including 


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1 the African Growth and Opportunity Act (19 U.S.C. 

2 3701 et seq.) and Prosper Africa. 

3 SEC. 134. SUPPORT FOR BANGLADESH DEMOCRACY AND 

4 LABOR RIGHTS PROGRAMS. 

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State is author6 ized to provide assistance under the Foreign Assistance 

7 Act to support and develop programs in Bangladesh that 

8 promote or expand— 

9 (1) freedom of expression, including in the 

10 media, by— 

11 (A) supporting media personnel who are 

12 victims of arbitrary arrests and legal harass13 ment about educating them about their rights 

14 and resources under Bangladeshi law; and 

15 (B) education and training for media per16 sonnel on how to promote democratic values in 

17 a restrictive environment; 

18 (2) access to labor rights, including— 

19 (A) strengthened legal and policy frame20 works to protect workers seeking redress for 

21 gender-based violence; and 

22 (B) strengthened legal and policy frame23 works for migrant workers; and 

24 (3) improved working conditions, including in 

25 Bangladesh’s Ready Made Garment (RMG) sector. 


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1 (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 

2 authorized to be appropriated $10,000,000 for each of fis3 cal years 2025 through 2027 for the Secretary of State 

4 to carry out this section, which upon appropriation shall 

5 remain available until expended. 

6 SEC. 135. SUPPORT FOR ANTI-CORRUPTION PROGRAMS 

7 AND OTHER PROGRAMS TO ADDRESS IMPU8 NITY AND JUSTICE IN SRI LANKA. 

9 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con10 gress that— 

11 (1) democracy, respect for human rights, justice 

12 and reconciliation, and economic prosperity in Sri 

13 Lanka are critical for the Sri Lankan people and to 

14 safeguard United States interests in the Indo-Pa15 cific; 

16 (2) numerous factors contributed to Sri 

17 Lanka’s economic crisis, including government cor18 ruption, financial mismanagement, and dispropor19 tionate military expenditures at the expense of other 

20 public policy priorities; and 

21 (3) despite being a recipient of 16 International 

22 Monetary Fund loans, the Government of Sri Lanka 

23 has failed to address their governance and economic 

24 issues given their predatory lending, inability to 

25 tackle corruption, government impunity for atrocities 


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1 and justice for victims of atrocities, and other 

2 abuses of human rights. 

3 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy 

4 of the United States to— 

5 (1) support the peaceful, democratic, and eco6 nomic aspirations of the people of Sri Lanka; and 

7 (2) call on the Government of Sri Lanka to ad8 dress the recommendations of the International 

9 Monetary Fund of the need to address corruption 

10 and to hold officials accountable for past behaviors 

11 in order to address the dire governance and eco12 nomic concerns in Sri Lanka. 

13 (c) AUTHORIZATION.—The Secretary of State is au14 thorized to provide assistance to support and develop pro15 grams in Sri Lanka to address public sector corruption, 

16 support accountability for those responsible for atrocities, 

17 and promote justice for victims of atrocities. 

18 (d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 

19 authorized to be appropriated $5,000,000 for each of fis20 cal years 2025 through 2027 for the Secretary of State 

21 to carry out this section, which shall remain available until 

22 expended. 


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1 PART II—ALIGNING WITH PARTNERS ON 

2 ECONOMIC TOOLS 

3 SEC. 141. ASSISTANCE TO ADVANCE FOREIGN INVESTMENT 

4 SCREENING OF UNITED STATES ALLIES AND 

5 PARTNERS TO PROTECT NATIONAL INTER6 ESTS. 

7 (a) TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN PART8 NERS.—The Secretary of State, in consultation with the 

9 Secretary of the Treasury and, as appropriate, the heads 

10 of other Federal departments and agencies as the Presi11 dent determines appropriate, shall offer to provide tech12 nical assistance to the governments of countries that are 

13 allies and partners of the United States in establishing 

14 or improving legislative and regulatory frameworks to 

15 screen foreign investment for national security risks that 

16 are, to the extent possible, similar to the frameworks set 

17 forth in section 721 of the Defense Production Act of 

18 1950 (50 U.S.C. 4565). 

19 (b) ENGAGEMENT WITH FOREIGN PARTNERS.—In 

20 carrying out subsection (a), the Secretary of State, in con21 sultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and, as ap22 propriate, the heads of other Federal departments and 

23 agencies, shall actively encourage the government of each 

24 country that is an ally or partner of the United States— 


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1 (1) to establish transparent protocols for 

2 screening foreign investment that protect the na3 tional security interests of such country; and 

4 (2) to make decisions on the basis of the poten5 tial national security risk of such investments. 

6 (c) DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT.—In providing the 

7 technical assistance described in subsection (b), the Sec8 retary of State shall— 

9 (1) consult closely with the intended recipient of 

10 such assistance to reach a mutual understanding re11 garding the scope and nature of the country’s par12 ticular national security needs with respect to invest13 ment screening and the appropriate response to 

14 meet those needs, and take all reasonable care to en15 sure any screening process is transparent and na16 tional security-focused; 

17 (2) encourage governments of countries receiv18 ing technical assistance to establish or improve the 

19 regulatory and legislative frameworks to screen for20 eign investment as described in subsection (b) to 

21 meet the security identified pursuant to paragraph 

22 (1); and 

23 (3) prioritize the conduct of diplomatic engage24 ment with government officials, including legislators, 

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1 ment screening is deemed by the Secretary to be 

2 critical to the interests of the United States. 

3 (d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 

4 authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State 

5 for fiscal year 2025 $10,000,000 to carry out this section, 

6 which may be administered either by the Department of 

7 State or the United States Agency for International Devel8 opment. 

9 SEC. 142. ASSISTANCE TO COUNTER CORRUPT PRACTICES 

10 IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES. 

11 The Secretary of State, in consultation with the 

12 heads of other Federal departments and agencies as ap13 propriate, shall offer to provide technical assistance to 

14 help establish and implement regulatory and legislative 

15 frameworks to combat the bribery of foreign public offi16 cials consistent with the principles of the Convention on 

17 Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Inter18 national Business Transactions, adopted by the Negoti19 ating Conference of the Council of the Organisation for 

20 Economic Co-operation and Development on November 

21 21, 1997, to the government of any country— 

22 (1) that is an ally or partner of the United 

23 States; 

24 (2) that has demonstrated a will to responsibly 

25 combat corrupt practices in such country; and 


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1 (3) for which technical assistance will likely 

2 achieve measurable results within five years. 

3 SEC. 143. REGULATORY EXCHANGES WITH ALLIES AND 

4 PARTNERS. 

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in coordi6 nation with the heads of other participating Federal agen7 cies, shall establish and develop a program to facilitate 

8 and encourage regular dialogues between United States 

9 Government regulatory and technical agencies and their 

10 counterpart organizations in allied and partner countries, 

11 both bilaterally and in relevant multilateral institutions 

12 and organizations— 

13 (1) to promote best practices in regulatory for14 mation and implementation; 

15 (2) to collaborate to achieve optimal regulatory 

16 outcomes based on scientific, technical, and other 

17 relevant principles; 

18 (3) to seek better harmonization and alignment 

19 of regulations and regulatory practices; 

20 (4) to build consensus around industry and 

21 technical standards in emerging sectors that will 

22 drive future global economic growth and commerce; 

23 and 

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1 tions in regulatory formation and implementation, in 

2 keeping with the values of free, open, and demo3 cratic societies, including the rule of law. 

4 (b) PRIORITIZATION OF ACTIVITIES.—In facilitating 

5 expert exchanges under subsection (a), the Secretary shall 

6 prioritize— 

7 (1) bilateral coordination and collaboration with 

8 countries where greater regulatory coherence, har9 monization of standards, or communication and dia10 logue between technical agencies is achievable and 

11 best advances the economic and national security in12 terests of the United States; 

13 (2) multilateral coordination and collaboration 

14 where greater regulatory coherence, harmonization 

15 of standards, or dialogue on other relevant regu16 latory matters is achievable and best advances the 

17 economic and national security interests of the 

18 United States, including with the members of— 

19 (A) the European Union; 

20 (B) the Asia-Pacific Economic Coopera21 tion; 

22 (C) the Association of Southeast Asian Na23 tions (ASEAN); 

24 (D) the Organization for Economic Co25 operation and Development (OECD); 


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1 (E) the Pacific Alliance; and 

2 (F) multilateral development banks; and 

3 (3) regulatory practices and standards-setting 

4 bodies focused on key economic sectors and emerg5 ing technologies. 

6 (c) PARTICIPATION BY NONGOVERNMENTAL ENTI7 TIES.—With regard to the program described in sub8 section (a), the Secretary of State may facilitate, including 

9 through the use of amounts authorized for such purposes 

10 pursuant to subsection (d), the participation of relevant 

11 organizations and individuals with relevant expertise, as 

12 appropriate and to the extent that such participation ad13 vances the goals of such program. 

14 (d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 

15 authorized to be appropriated $2,500,000 for each of fis16 cal years 2025 through 2029 to carry out this section. 

17 SEC. 144. PILOT PROGRAM TO AUDIT BARRIERS TO COM18 MERCE IN DEVELOPING PARTNER COUN19 TRIES. 

20 (a) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary of State, in co21 ordination with the Administrator of the United States 

22 Agency for International Development, shall establish a 

23 pilot program— 


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1 (1) to identify and evaluate barriers to com2 merce in developing countries that are allies and 

3 partners of the United States; and 

4 (2) to provide assistance to promote economic 

5 development and commerce to those countries. 

6 (b) PURPOSES.—Under the pilot program established 

7 under subsection (a), the Secretary shall, in partnership 

8 with the countries selected under subsection (c)(1)— 

9 (1) identify barriers in those countries to en10 hancing international commerce with the goal of set11 ting priorities for the efficient use of United States 

12 trade-related assistance; 

13 (2) focus United States trade-related assistance 

14 on building self-sustaining institutional capacity for 

15 expanding commerce with those countries, consistent 

16 with their international obligations and commit17 ments; and 

18 (3) further the national interests of the United 

19 States by— 

20 (A) expanding prosperity through the 

21 elimination of foreign barriers to commercial 

22 exchange; 

23 (B) assisting such countries to identify and 

24 reduce barriers through the provision of foreign 

25 assistance to increase— 


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1 (i) international commerce; and 

2 (ii) foreign investment; 

3 (C) assisting each such country in under4 taking reforms that will promote economic de5 velopment, and promote conditions favorable for 

6 business and commercial development and job 

7 growth in the country; and 

8 (D) assisting private sector entities in 

9 those countries to engage in reform efforts and 

10 enhance productive global supply chain partner11 ships with the United States and allies and 

12 partners of the United States. 

13 (c) SELECTION OF COUNTRIES.— 

14 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall select 

15 countries for participation in the pilot program es16 tablished under subsection (a) from among coun17 tries— 

18 (A) that are developing countries and allies 

19 and partners of the United States; 

20 (B) the governments of which have clearly 

21 demonstrated a willingness to make appropriate 

22 legal, policy, and regulatory reforms that are 

23 proven to stimulate economic growth and job 

24 creation, consistent with international trade 

25 rules and practices; and 


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1 (C) that meet such additional criteria as 

2 may be established by the Secretary, in con3 sultation with, as appropriate, the Adminis4 trator of the United States Agency for Inter5 national Development and any other agency. 

6 (2) CONSIDERATIONS FOR ADDITIONAL CRI7 TERIA.—In establishing additional criteria under 

8 paragraph (1)(C), the Secretary and the Adminis9 trator shall— 

10 (A) identify and address structural weak11 nesses, systemic flaws, or other impediments 

12 within countries that may be considered for 

13 participation in the pilot program under sub14 section (a) that impact the effectiveness of 

15 United States assistance to and make rec16 ommendations for addressing those weaknesses, 

17 flaws, and impediments; 

18 (B) set priorities for commercial develop19 ment assistance building to focus resources on 

20 countries where the provision of such assistance 

21 can deliver the best value in identifying and 

22 eliminating barriers to trade and investment, 

23 including by fostering adherence to inter24 national trade obligations; 


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1 (C) developing appropriate performance 

2 measures and establishing annual targets to 

3 monitor and assess progress toward those tar4 gets, including measures to be used to termi5 nate the provision of assistance determined to 

6 be ineffective; and 

7 (D) ensure representation from across 

8 multiple geographic regions. 

9 (3) NUMBER AND DEADLINE FOR SELEC10 TIONS.— 

11 (A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 270 

12 days after the date of the enactment of this 

13 Act, and annually thereafter for 3 years, the 

14 Secretary, with the concurrence of the Adminis15 trator, shall select countries under paragraph 

16 (1) for participation in the pilot program under 

17 subsection (a). 

18 (B) NUMBER.—The Secretary shall select 

19 for participation in the pilot program under 

20 subsection (a)— 

21 (i) not fewer than 5 countries during 

22 the one-year period beginning on the date 

23 of the enactment of this Act; and 


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1 (ii) not fewer than 15 countries dur2 ing the 5-year period beginning on such 

3 date of enactment. 

4 (4) PRIORITIZATION BASED ON RECOMMENDA5 TIONS FROM CHIEFS OF MISSION.—In selecting 

6 countries under paragraph (1) for participation in 

7 the pilot program under subsection (a), the Sec8 retary shall prioritize— 

9 (A) countries recommended by chiefs of 

10 mission and other agencies present at the mis11 sions, such as the United States Agency for 

12 International Development— 

13 (i) that will be able to substantially 

14 benefit from expanded commercial develop15 ment assistance; and 

16 (ii) the governments of which have 

17 demonstrated the political will to effectively 

18 and sustainably implement such assistance; 

19 or 

20 (B) groups of countries, including groups 

21 of geographically contiguous countries, includ22 ing as recommended by chiefs of mission, that 

23 meet the criteria under subparagraph (A) and 

24 as a result of expanded United States commer25 cial development assistance, will contribute to 


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1 greater intra-regional commerce or regional eco2 nomic integration. 

3 (d) PLANS OF ACTION.— 

4 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary, in consulta5 tion with the Administrator, as appropriate, shall 

6 lead in engaging relevant officials of each country 

7 selected under subsection (c)(1) to participate in the 

8 pilot program under subsection (a) with respect to 

9 the development of a plan of action to identify and 

10 evaluate barriers to economic and commercial devel11 opment that then informs United States assistance. 

12 (2) ANALYSIS REQUIRED.—The development of 

13 a plan of action under paragraph (1) shall include 

14 a comprehensive analysis of relevant legal, policy, 

15 and regulatory constraints to economic and job 

16 growth in that country. 

17 (3) ELEMENTS.—A plan of action developed 

18 under paragraph (1) for a country shall include the 

19 following: 

20 (A) Priorities for reform agreed to by the 

21 government of that country and the United 

22 States. 

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1 essary, to achieve improvement in the business 

2 and commercial environment in the country. 

3 (C) Identification of the anticipated costs 

4 to establish and implement the plan. 

5 (D) Identification of appropriate sequenc6 ing and phasing of implementation of the plan 

7 to create cumulative benefits, as appropriate. 

8 (E) Identification of best practices and 

9 standards. 

10 (F) Considerations with respect to how to 

11 make the policy reform investments under the 

12 plan long-lasting. 

13 (G) Appropriate consultation with affected 

14 stakeholders in that country and in the United 

15 States. 

16 (e) TERMINATION.—The pilot program established 

17 under subsection (a) shall terminate on the date that is 

18 8 years after the date of the enactment of this Act. 

19 SEC. 145. STRATEGY FOR PROMOTING SUPPLY CHAIN DI20 VERSIFICATION. 

21 (a) STRATEGY.—The Secretary of State, in consulta22 tion with the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, as 

23 determined by the Secretary, shall develop, implement, 

24 and submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a 

25 strategy to increase supply chain resiliency and security 


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1 by promoting and strengthening efforts to incentivize the 

2 relocation of supply chains from the PRC. 

3 (b) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under sub4 section (a) shall— 

5 (1) be informed by consultations with the gov6 ernments of allies and partners of the United States; 

7 (2) provide a description of how supply chain 

8 diversification can be pursued in a complementary 

9 fashion to strengthen the national interests of the 

10 United States; 

11 (3) include an assessment of— 

12 (A) the status and effectiveness of current 

13 efforts by governments, multilateral develop14 ment banks, and the private sector to attract 

15 investment by private entities who are seeking 

16 to diversify from reliance on the PRC; 

17 (B) major challenges hindering those ef18 forts; and 

19 (C) how the United States can strengthen 

20 the effectiveness of those efforts; 

21 (4) identify United States allies and partners 

22 with comparative advantages for sourcing and manu23 facturing critical goods and countries with the great24 est opportunities and alignment with United States 

25 values; 


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1 (5) identify how activities by the United States 

2 Agency for International Development, the United 

3 States Trade and Development Administration, and 

4 the United States International Development Fi5 nance Corporation can effectively be leveraged to 

6 strengthen and promote supply chain diversification, 

7 including nearshoring to Latin America and the Car8 ibbean as appropriate; 

9 (6) advance diplomatic initiatives to secure spe10 cific national commitments by governments in Latin 

11 America and the Caribbean to undertake efforts to 

12 create favorable conditions for nearshoring in the re13 gion, including commitments— 

14 (A) to develop formalized national strate15 gies to attract United States investment; 

16 (B) to address corruption and rule of law 

17 concerns; 

18 (C) to modernize digital and physical infra19 structure; 

20 (D) to lower trade barriers; 

21 (E) to improve ease of doing business; and 

22 (F) to finance and incentivize nearshoring 

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1 dite customs operations, and facilitate economic inte2 gration and the World Trade Organization Trade 

3 Facilitation Agreement; and 

4 (8) develop and implement programs to finance, 

5 incentivize, or otherwise promote supply chain diver6 sification in accordance with the assessments and 

7 identifications made pursuant to paragraphs (3), 

8 (4), and (5), including, at minimum, programs— 

9 (A) to develop physical and digital infra10 structure; 

11 (B) to promote transparency in procure12 ment processes; 

13 (C) to provide technical assistance in im14 plementing national nearshoring strategies; 

15 (D) to mobilize private investment; and 

16 (E) to secure commitments by private sec17 tor entities to relocate supply chains from the 

18 PRC. 

19 (c) COORDINATION WITH MULTILATERAL DEVELOP20 MENT BANKS.—In implementing the strategy required 

21 under subsection (a), the Secretary of State and the heads 

22 of other relevant Federal agencies, as determined by the 

23 Secretary, should, as appropriate, coordinate with the 

24 United States Executive Director to the World Bank 


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1 Group and the United States executive directors to re2 gional development banks. 

3 SEC. 146. AUTHORIZATION TO ASSIST UNITED STATES COM4 PANIES WITH GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN DIVER5 SIFICATION AND MANAGEMENT. 

6 (a) AUTHORIZATION TO CONTRACT SERVICES.—The 

7 Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of 

8 Commerce, is authorized to establish a program to facili9 tate contracting by the Department of State for the pro10 fessional services of qualified experts, on a reimbursable 

11 fee-for-service basis, to assist interested United States 

12 persons, including business entities, with supply chain 

13 management issues related to the PRC, including— 

14 (1) exiting from the market of the PRC or relo15 cating certain production facilities to locations out16 side the PRC; 

17 (2) diversifying sources of inputs and other ef18 forts to diversify supply chains to locations outside 

19 of the PRC; 

20 (3) navigating legal, regulatory, or other chal21 lenges in the course of activities described in para22 graphs (1) and (2); and 

23 (4) identifying alternative markets for produc24 tion or sourcing outside of the PRC, including 

25 through providing market intelligence, facilitating 


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1 contact with reliable local partners as appropriate, 

2 and other services. 

3 (b) CHIEF OF MISSION OVERSIGHT.—An individual 

4 hired to perform services described in subsection (a) 

5 shall— 

6 (1) be under the authority of the United States 

7 chief of mission in the country in which the indi8 vidual is hired, in accordance with existing United 

9 States laws; 

10 (2) coordinate with officers of the Department 

11 of State and the Department of Commerce; and 

12 (3) coordinate with United States missions and 

13 relevant local partners in other countries as needed 

14 to provide those services. 

15 (c) PRIORITIZATION OF MICRO-, SMALL-, AND ME16 DIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES.—In carrying out the program 

17 authorized under subsection (a), the Secretary shall 

18 prioritize the provision of services described in that sub19 section to assist micro-, small-, and medium-sized enter20 prises with supply chain management issues described in 

21 that subsection. 

22 (d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 

23 authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State 

24 $15,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029 

25 for the purposes of carrying out this section. 


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1 (e) PROHIBITION ON ACCESS TO ASSISTANCE BY THE

2 PRC.— 

3 (1) IN GENERAL.—None of the funds appro4 priated pursuant to the authorization of appropria5 tions under subsection (d) may be provided to an en6 tity— 

7 (A) under the foreign ownership, control, 

8 or influence of the Government of the PRC or 

9 the Chinese Communist Party; 

10 (B) determined to have beneficial owner11 ship from foreign individuals subject to the ju12 risdiction, direction, or influence of the PRC; or 

13 (C) that, at the time any of such funds 

14 would be provided, has a contract in effect, or 

15 has had a contract in effect in the preceding 

16 year, with— 

17 (i) the Government of the PRC; 

18 (ii) the Chinese Communist Party; 

19 (iii) the Chinese military; 

20 (iv) an entity majority-owned, major21 ity-controlled, or majority-financed by the 

22 Government of the PRC, the Chinese Com23 munist Party, or the Chinese military; or 


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1 (v) a parent, subsidiary, or affiliate of 

2 an entity specified in any of clauses (i) 

3 through (iv). 

4 (2) FOREIGN OWNERSHIP, CONTROL, OR INFLU5 ENCE DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term ‘‘for6 eign ownership, control, or influence’’ has the mean7 ing given that term in the National Industrial Secu8 rity Program Operating Manual (DOD 5220.22–M), 

9 or a successor document, part 117 of title 32, Code 

10 of Federal Regulations (or a successor regulation). 

11 SEC. 147. ENHANCING TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION ON 

12 PROMOTING PRIVATE SECTOR FINANCE. 

13 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President should work with 

14 transatlantic partners to enhance coordination that fosters 

15 private sector-led development and provides market-based 

16 alternatives to state-directed financing in emerging mar17 kets, particularly as related to the PRC’s Belt and Road 

18 Initiative (BRI) and the Global Development Initiative 

19 (GDI), including by supporting efforts, including— 

20 (1) the 2023 MOU between the Development 

21 Finance Corporation and the European Investment 

22 Bank; 

23 (2) the European Union Strategy on Con24 necting Europe and Asia; 


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1 (3) the Three Seas Initiative and Three Seas 

2 Initiative Investment Fund; 

3 (4) a European Union-Japan initiative that has 

4 leveraged $65,000,000,000 for infrastructure 

5 projects and emphasizes transparency standards; 

6 (5) the Partnership for Global Infrastructure 

7 and Investment; and 

8 (6) cooperation with multilateral development 

9 banks and international financial institutions, in10 cluding the World Bank, International Finance Cor11 poration, Asian Development Bank, Inter-American 

12 Development Bank, and other regional multilateral 

13 development banks. 

14 (b) COOPERATION AT THE UNITED NATIONS.—The 

15 United States should coordinate efforts with the European 

16 Union and European countries to address the Government 

17 of the PRC’s use of the United Nations to advance and 

18 legitimize BRI as a global good, including the proliferation 

19 of memoranda of understanding between the PRC and 

20 United Nations funds and programs on BRI implementa21 tion. 

22 (c) STANDARDS.—The United States and the Euro23 pean Union should coordinate and develop a strategy to 

24 enhance transatlantic cooperation with the OECD and the 

25 Paris Club to provide alternatives to BRI projects for the 


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1 development of critical infrastructure, including by ena2 bling developing countries to negotiate more favorable 

3 terms that meet international performance and trans4 parency standards. 

5 PART III—COUNTERING EFFORTS TO UNDER6 MINE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANI7 ZATIONS 

8 SEC. 151. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND NEW AR9 RANGEMENTS TO BORROW. 

10 Section 17(a)(6) of the Bretton Woods Agreements 

11 Act (22 U.S.C. 286e–2(a)(6)) is amended by striking ‘‘De12 cember 31, 2025’’ and inserting ‘‘December 31, 2030’’. 

13 SEC. 152. PARTICIPATION OF TAIWAN IN INTER-AMERICAN 

14 DEVELOPMENT BANK. 

15 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con16 gress that— 

17 (1) the United States fully supports Taiwan’s 

18 participation in, and contribution to, international 

19 organizations and underscores the importance of the 

20 relationship between Taiwan and the United States; 

21 (2) diversifying the Inter-American Develop22 ment Bank’s donor base and increasing ally engage23 ment in the Western Hemisphere reinforces United 

24 States national interests; 


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1 (3) Taiwan’s significant contribution to the de2 velopment and economies of Latin America and the 

3 Caribbean demonstrate that Taiwan’s membership 

4 in the Inter-American Development Bank as a non5 borrowing member would benefit the Bank and the 

6 entire Latin American and Caribbean region; and 

7 (4) non-borrowing membership in the Inter8 American Development Bank would allow Taiwan to 

9 substantially leverage and channel the immense re10 sources Taiwan already provides to Latin America 

11 and the Caribbean to reach a larger number of bene12 ficiaries. 

13 (b) PLAN FOR THE PARTICIPATION OF TAIWAN IN

14 THE INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK.—The Sec15 retary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the 

16 Treasury, as appropriate, is authorized— 

17 (1) to initiate a United States plan to endorse 

18 non-borrowing membership in the Inter-American 

19 Development Bank for Taiwan, including by advanc20 ing amendments, as necessary, to the Agreement Es21 tablishing the Inter-American Development Bank, 

22 done at Washington April 8, 1959 (10 UST 3029); 

23 and 

24 (2) to instruct the United States Governor of 

25 the Bank to work with the Board of Governors of 


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1 the Bank to admit Taiwan as a non-borrowing mem2 ber of the Bank, including by advancing amend3 ments, as necessary, to that Agreement. 

4 SEC. 153. INCREASED UNITED STATES COOPERATION WITH 

5 ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION. 

6 The Secretary of State should pursue the following 

7 objectives at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 

8 (APEC) forum: 

9 (1) Improving efficiency in supply chains, par10 ticularly semiconductor supply chains. 

11 (2) Encouraging continued public-private dia12 logues with policymakers and promoting a common 

13 set of technology standards. 

14 (3) Promoting the development and use of pol15 icy recommendations for governments— 

16 (A) to adopt clean energy standards; and 

17 (B) to support research and development 

18 of clean energy, both renewable and non-renew19 able. 

20 (4) Advancing cooperation that reduces barriers 

21 to cross-border investment and creates opportunities 

22 for United States small- and medium-sized enter23 prises to access APEC emerging and growing mar24 kets. 


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1 (5) Improving cybersecurity in the Asia-Pacific 

2 region and developing tools for governments to com3 bat cyber threats, including ransomware, 

4 disinformation, and cyber hacks. 

5 (6) Increasing coordination in prohibiting and 

6 preventing the facilitation of trade in goods pro7 duced using forced labor. 

8 (7) Confronting issues such as intellectual prop9 erty theft and counterfeit goods. 

10 (8) Enhancing sufficient and sustainable food 

11 security by promoting the development of advanced 

12 agricultural technologies and farming practices. 

13 (9) Expanding the economic opportunities for 

14 women to fully and meaningfully engage in a busi15 ness environment that promotes women’s economic 

16 participation. 

17 SEC. 154. OPPOSITION OF THE UNITED STATES TO AN IN18 CREASE IN THE WEIGHT OF THE CHINESE 

19 RENMINBI IN THE SPECIAL DRAWING RIGHTS 

20 BASKET OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY 

21 FUND. 

22 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of the Treasury 

23 shall instruct the United States Governor of, and the 

24 United States Executive Director at, the International 

25 Monetary Fund (in this section referred to as the ‘‘Fund’’) 


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1 to use the voice and vote of the United States to oppose 

2 any increase in the weight of the Chinese renminbi in the 

3 basket of currencies used to determine the value of Special 

4 Drawing Rights, unless the Secretary of the Treasury has 

5 submitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 

6 Senate and the Committee on Financial Services of the 

7 House of Representatives a written report that includes 

8 an assessment that— 

9 (1) in the 12 months preceding submission of 

10 the report— 

11 (A) the PRC does not appear, based on 

12 publicly available data, to have been in violation 

13 of its obligations under Article VIII of the Arti14 cles of Agreement of the Fund; 

15 (B) the Secretary of the Treasury has not 

16 determined under section 3004 of the Omnibus 

17 Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (22 

18 U.S.C. 5304) that the PRC has manipulated 

19 the rate of exchange between its currency and 

20 the United States dollar for purposes of pre21 venting effective balance of payments adjust22 ments or gaining unfair competitive advantage 

23 in international trade; and 

24 (C) the President, through the Secretary of 

25 the Treasury, has not taken an action against 


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1 the PRC pursuant to section 701 of the Trade 

2 Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 

3 2015 (19 U.S.C. 4421) for failing to adopt ap4 propriate policies following enhanced bilateral 

5 engagement conducted pursuant to that section; 

6 (2) the renminbi is freely usable (within the 

7 meaning of Article XXX(f) of the Articles of Agree8 ment of the Fund); and 

9 (3) the PRC provides financing assurances and 

10 debt treatments consistent with debt sustainability 

11 analyses of the Fund for countries participating in 

12 the Common Framework for Debt Treatments be13 yond the Debt Service Suspension Initiative (com14 monly known as the ‘‘Common Framework’’) and 

15 debt treatments outside the Common Framework. 

16 (b) WAIVER.—The Secretary of the Treasury may 

17 waive any of the conditions described in paragraph (1), 

18 (2), or (3) of subsection (a) upon certifying to the Com19 mittee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Com20 mittee on Financial Services of the House of Representa21 tives that such a waiver is in the national interest of the 

22 United States. 

23 (c) SUNSET.—Subsection (a) shall have no force or 

24 effect on or after the date that is 8 years after the date 

25 of the enactment of this Act. 


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1 Subtitle C—Global Infrastructure 

2 and Energy Development 

3 SEC. 161. DEPARTMENT OF STATE INFRASTRUCTURE CO4 ORDINATION TASK FORCE. 

5 (a) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established at the 

6 Department of State a task force, to be known as the ‘‘In7 frastructure Coordination Task Force’’, which shall be led 

8 by an appropriate Senate-confirmed official at the Depart9 ment of State. If the leader of the Task Force is not the 

10 Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy 

11 and the Environment, then the leader of the task force 

12 shall coordinate with such Under Secretary on matters re13 lated to the task force. 

14 (b) DUTIES.—The Infrastructure Coordination Task 

15 Force shall— 

16 (1) coordinate international infrastructure poli17 cies and projects supported by the United States 

18 Government, with participation by the relevant Fed19 eral departments and agencies; 

20 (2) engage international partners such as the 

21 Group of Seven (G7), multilateral development 

22 banks, international financial institutions, the 

23 United States private sector, multinational corpora24 tions and banks, nongovernmental organizations, 

25 and other partners in industrialized countries; 


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1 (3) advance United States objectives through 

2 initiatives such as the Blue Dot Network, Infra3 structure Transaction Assistance Network, the 

4 Transaction Advisory Fund, and the Strategic Ports 

5 Initiative; and 

6 (4) produce strategic guidance that identifies 

7 international infrastructure projects. 

8 SEC. 162. AUTHORIZATION OF PARTNERSHIP FOR GLOBAL 

9 INFRASTRUCTURE AND INVESTMENT. 

10 (a) ESTABLISHMENT.—There shall be an office at the 

11 Department of State to support the Partnership for Global 

12 Infrastructure and Investment, or a successor entity 

13 (hereafter, ‘‘the Office’’). The Office shall be led by a ‘‘Co14 ordinator for Global Infrastructure and Investment’’ 

15 (hereafter, ‘‘the Coordinator’’) who shall be an official 

16 serving in a position to which the individual was appointed 

17 by the President, with the advice and consent of the 

18 United States Senate. 

19 (b) AUTHORITY.—The Coordinator shall have the au20 thority to convene the interagency on matters relating to 

21 its policy remit. The Office is authorized to deploy United 

22 States public and private sector capital and expertise for 

23 the purpose of mobilizing foreign public and private sector 

24 capital and expertise— 


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1 (1) to help identify and meet the strategic in2 frastructure needs of countries that are allies and 

3 partners of the United States; and 

4 (2) to provide allies and partners of the United 

5 States with mutually beneficial strategic infrastruc6 ture investment solutions that are alternatives to ex7 ploitative, coercive, or harmful foreign infrastructure 

8 investments. 

9 (c) PRIORITIZATION.—In evaluating proposals for 

10 strategic infrastructure projects funded through the Part11 nership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, the Sec12 retary of State, in consultation with other departments 

13 and agencies as appropriate, should prioritize— 

14 (1) projects that have the highest strategic 

15 value to the United States; and 

16 (2) projects related to— 

17 (A) strategic transport infrastructure, in18 cluding ports, airports, intermodal transfer fa19 cilities, railroads, and highways; 

20 (B) energy infrastructure, technology, and 

21 supply chains, critical minerals, and related 

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1 curity, energy transition and modernization, 

2 and resilience needs. 

3 (C) secure information and communica4 tions technology systems, networks, and infra5 structure to strengthen the potential for eco6 nomic growth and promote an open, interoper7 able, reliable, and secure Internet; and 

8 (D) global health security, including 

9 through infrastructure projects that increase 

10 the availability, accessibility, and affordability 

11 of health care in partner countries. 

12 (d) STANDARDS.—In carrying out the purposes de13 scribed in subsection (b), the Secretary of State shall ad14 here to standards for sustainable, transparent, and quality 

15 infrastructure investment and ensure interventions include 

16 opportunities to advance economic growth priorities in rel17 evant sectors in the partner country and support good gov18 ernance and the rule of law. 

19 (e) PROJECTS IN HIGH-INCOME COUNTRIES.—Sup20 port provided by the United States under the Partnership 

21 for Global Infrastructure and Investment shall not be pro22 vided in countries with high-income economies (as those 

23 terms are defined by the World Bank) unless the Sec24 retary certifies to the appropriate congressional commit25 tees that such support— 


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1 (1) is necessary to attempt to preempt or 

2 counter efforts by a strategic competitor of the 

3 United States to secure significant political or eco4 nomic leverage or acquire national security-sensitive 

5 technologies or infrastructure in a country that is an 

6 ally or partner of the United States; and 

7 (2) includes cost-sharing arrangements with 

8 partner countries to ensure effective burden-sharing 

9 and long-term sustainability, including through the 

10 involvement of private sector investments. 

11 (f) REPORT.— 

12 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days 

13 after the date of the enactment of this Act, and an14 nually thereafter for a period of two years, the Sec15 retary of State, in consultation with the Adminis16 trator for the United States Agency for Inter17 national Development and the heads of other Fed18 eral departments and agencies, as appropriate, shall 

19 submit a report to the appropriate committees of 

20 Congress that— 

21 (A) identifies all current infrastructure 

22 projects supported by the Partnership for Glob23 al Infrastructure and Investment; 


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1 (B) describes how the Partnership for 

2 Global Infrastructure and Investment supported 

3 each project; 

4 (C) explains the rationale of the United 

5 States and partner country interests served by 

6 the United States providing support to such 

7 projects, including as it relates to the priorities 

8 described in subsection (c); 

9 (D) describes how the Partnership for 

10 Global Infrastructure and Investment cooper11 ates with other entities in the United States 

12 Government that support infrastructure, includ13 ing de-confliction of efforts; and 

14 (E) to the extent possible, describes the es15 timated timeline for completion of the projects 

16 supported by the Partnership for Global Infra17 structure and Investment. 

18 (2) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required 

19 under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassi20 fied form, but may include a classified annex. 

21 SEC. 163. INFRASTRUCTURE TRANSACTION AND ASSIST22 ANCE NETWORK. 

23 (a) AUTHORITY.—There is established an initiative, 

24 to be known as the ‘‘Infrastructure Transaction and As25 sistance Network’’, under which the Secretary of State, 


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1 in consultation with the Administrator of the United 

2 States Agency for International Development and the 

3 heads of other relevant Federal agencies, as appropriate, 

4 shall carry out programs to advance the development of 

5 sustainable, transparent, and quality infrastructure glob6 ally in countries that are eligible for foreign assistance, 

7 by— 

8 (1) strengthening the capacities of United 

9 States allies and partners to improve infrastructure 

10 project evaluation processes, regulatory and procure11 ment environments, and infrastructure project prep12 aration; 

13 (2) providing transaction advisory services and 

14 project preparation assistance to support sustainable 

15 infrastructure; and 

16 (3) coordinating the provision of United States 

17 assistance for the development of infrastructure, in18 cluding infrastructure that utilizes United States19 manufactured goods and services, and catalyzing in20 vestment led by the private sector. 

21 (b) TRANSACTION ADVISORY FUND.—As part of the 

22 Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network de23 scribed under subsection (a), the Secretary of State, in 

24 coordination with the Administrator of the United States 

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1 tion, as appropriate, with other Federal departments and 

2 agencies, shall provide support, including through the 

3 Transaction Advisory Fund, for advisory services to help 

4 boost the capacity of partner countries globally to evaluate 

5 contracts in line with international standards, including 

6 through providing services such as— 

7 (1) legal services, including with the objectives 

8 of— 

9 (A) minimizing opportunities for corrupt 

10 practices; and 

11 (B) ensuring agreements are transparent, 

12 clear, and enforceable; 

13 (2) project preparation and feasibility studies; 

14 (3) debt sustainability analyses; 

15 (4) bid or proposal evaluation; and 

16 (5) other services relevant to advancing the de17 velopment of sustainable, transparent, and quality 

18 infrastructure. 

19 (c) INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGIC INFRASTRUCTURE

20 FUND.— 

21 (1) IN GENERAL.—As part of the ‘‘Infrastruc22 ture Transaction and Assistance Network’’ described 

23 under subsection (a), the Secretary of State is au24 thorized to provide support, including through the 

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1 nical assistance, project preparation, development, 

2 and execution, and other infrastructure project sup3 port in the countries of the Indo-Pacific region. 

4 (2) JOINT INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS.— 

5 Funds authorized for the Indo-Pacific Strategic In6 frastructure Fund should be used in coordination 

7 with the Department of Defense, the International 

8 Development Finance Corporation, the Export-Im9 port Bank of the United States, the United States 

10 Trade and Development Agency, like-minded donor 

11 partners, and multilateral banks, as appropriate, to 

12 support joint infrastructure projects in the Indo-Pa13 cific region. 

14 (3) STRATEGIC INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS.— 

15 Funds authorized for the Indo-Pacific Strategic In16 frastructure Fund should be used to support stra17 tegic infrastructure projects. 

18 (d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 

19 authorized to be appropriated, for each of fiscal years 

20 2025 through 2029, $50,000,000 for the Transaction Ad21 visory Fund and $100,000,000 for the Indo-Pacific Stra22 tegic Infrastructure Fund. 

23 SEC. 164. STRATEGIC PORTS INITIATIVE. 

24 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in con25 sultation with the Administrator of the United States 


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1 Agency for International Development, the Chief Execu2 tive Officer of United States International Development 

3 Finance Corporation, the Trade and Development Agency, 

4 and other relevant Federal departments and agencies, as 

5 appropriate, shall carry out a program entitled the ‘‘Stra6 tegic Ports Initiative’’ for the following purposes: 

7 (1) To provide training and technical assistance 

8 to partner country officials and institutions, and oth9 ers, as appropriate, responsible for building, man10 aging, and securing seaports, airports, and related 

11 infrastructure abroad. 

12 (2) To identify ports and airports vulnerable to 

13 ownership or other forms of control by strategic 

14 competitors, including the PRC, and make rec15 ommendations for United States Government action. 

16 (3) To contribute to United States Government 

17 diplomatic engagements and other efforts with part18 ner countries and economies, and relevant and trust19 ed private sector entities with respect to ownership 

20 or control of seaports and airports by strategic com21 petitors, including the PRC. 

22 (4) To generate priority countries and projects 

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1 ordination Task Force established pursuant to sec2 tion 161. 

3 (5) To ensure that all Department of State ini4 tiatives, activities, and funding related to seaports 

5 and airports align with the national security inter6 ests of the United States and account for the 

7 vulnerabilities, technical constraints, and other na8 tional security implications of seaport and airport in9 frastructure to construction, ownership, operation, 

10 or other forms of direct and indirect control by stra11 tegic competitors, including the PRC. 

12 (6) To ensure, to the greatest extent prac13 ticable, that projects supported by the United States 

14 use local labor and professional capacities, in con15 trast to infrastructure projects carried out by the 

16 PRC. 

17 (7) To assist in identifying and promoting al18 ternatives for port logistics data management sys19 tems currently offered by strategic competitors, in20 cluding the PRC. 

21 (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 

22 authorized to be appropriated, for each of fiscal years 

23 2025 through 2029, $6,000,000 to carry out the purposes 

24 of the Strategic Ports Initiative. 


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1 SEC. 165. NEXT-GENERATION SHIPPING. 

2 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State is author3 ized to carry out the following activities to support the 

4 development of next-generation shipping corridors or 

5 green shipping corridors: 

6 (1) Conduct analysis to determine United 

7 States priorities for cooperation with partner coun8 tries on next-generation shipping corridors or green 

9 shipping corridors. 

10 (2) Support research and development initia11 tives and technical assistance, as appropriate, in the 

12 following areas: 

13 (A) Next-generation port design, engineer14 ing, and architecture. 

15 (B) Hydrogen fuel production and hydro16 gen fuel storage and utilization capacities at 

17 ports. 

18 (C) Commercial-scale high-speed electric 

19 vehicle trucking fleet charging infrastructure. 

20 (D) Logistics and shipping corridor plan21 ning. 

22 (E) Hydrogen pipelines. 

23 (F) Liquid hydrogen power vessels, and 

24 other next-generation marine propulsion sys25 tems, design and manufacturing, including both 


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1 new vessels and retrofit and refurbishment of 

2 existing vessels. 

3 (3) Support private sector investment in next4 generation shipping infrastructure in partner coun5 tries with strong or emerging commercial ties with 

6 the United States that— 

7 (A) are strategically or centrally located 

8 markets in international commerce; or 

9 (B) face growing or concerning financial 

10 entanglements with malign foreign govern11 ments. 

12 (b) PARAMETERS.—In carrying out activities author13 ized under subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall en14 sure that all activities align with the national security in15 terests of the United States and the purposes of the Stra16 tegic Ports Initiative authorized pursuant to section 164. 

17 (c) INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION.— 

18 The United States shall use its voice, vote, and influence 

19 in the International Maritime Organization to– 

20 (1) counter any attempts by the PRC or other 

21 strategic competitors to advance or advocate for poli22 cies, regulations, or technical standards that unfairly 

23 benefit particular countries and their domestic in24 dustries and products to the detriment of free and 

25 fair markets; 


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1 (2) advocate for the adoption of next-generation 

2 shipping industry technologies and infrastructure 

3 standards, policies, regulations and cooperation ini4 tiatives that advance United States national and eco5 nomic security interests; 

6 (3) participate in the International Maritime 

7 Organization’s global technical cooperation projects 

8 to support growing the capacity of parties to develop 

9 and modernize global shipping industries tech10 nologies and infrastructure; and 

11 (4) represent the interests of United States 

12 stakeholders impacted by International Maritime Or13 ganization initiatives. 

14 (d) LIMITATION.—Prior to providing funding for ac15 tivities to support the establishment and development of 

16 next-generation shipping corridors or green shipping cor17 ridors, the Department of State shall obtain commitments 

18 from participating countries in the following areas: 

19 (1) Prohibiting exclusivity or preferences for 

20 specific international shipping routes, including ex21 clusive access for specific vessels, fleets, or maritime 

22 shipping companies of the PRC. 

23 (2) Preventing the sale, lease, or operational 

24 control of port operations, or any subsidiary oper25 ations, including security, communications and inforVerDate Sep 11 2014 18:11 Jan 13, 2025 Jkt 059200 PO 00000 Frm 00102 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S5491.IS S5491

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1 mation technology, or energy suppliers to entities 

2 owned or controlled by the PRC. 

3 (3) Prohibiting the use of, or contracts with 

4 communications, survey, and logistics management 

5 providers owned or controlled by the PRC. 

6 (4) Maintaining transparent and accountable 

7 security operations that are not contracted to enti8 ties owned or controlled by the PRC. 

9 (5) Ensuring that ports do not serve as ports 

10 of call for PRC military or research vessels. 

11 (6) Ensuring that ports are operated in a trans12 parent and accountable manner, consistent with do13 mestic and applicable international law. 

14 (e) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 

15 authorized to be appropriated $120,000,000 over the next 

16 three fiscal years to carry out activities under this section. 

17 SEC. 166. GLOBAL STRATEGIC INFRASTRUCTURE INVEST18 MENT FUND. 

19 (a) STRATEGIC INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT

20 FUND.— 

21 (1) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established in 

22 the Treasury of the United States a fund to be 

23 known as the ‘‘Global Strategic Infrastructure 

24 Fund’’ (in this section referred to as the ‘‘Fund’’) 

25 for the Secretary of State to provide for assistance, 


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1 including through contributions for strategic infra2 structure projects globally as authorized under this 

3 section. 

4 (2) APPROPRIATIONS.—In addition to amounts 

5 otherwise available for such purposes, there is appro6 priated to the Fund established in subsection (a)(1), 

7 out of amounts in the Treasury not otherwise appro8 priated— 

9 (A) for fiscal year 2025, $400,000,000, to 

10 remain available until expended; 

11 (B) for fiscal year 2026, $400,000,000, to 

12 remain available until expended; 

13 (C) for fiscal year 2027, $400,000,000, to 

14 remain available until expended; 

15 (D) for fiscal year 2028, $400,000,000, to 

16 remain available until expended; and 

17 (E) for fiscal year 2029, $400,000,000, to 

18 remain available until expended. 

19 (3) TRANSFER AUTHORITY.—Amounts in the 

20 Fund shall be transferred and merged with accounts 

21 within the Department of State, the United States 

22 Agency for International Development, the Export23 Import Bank of the United States, the United 

24 States International Development Finance Corpora25 tion, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and the 


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1 United States Trade and Development Agency, as 

2 appropriate, to be used for such purposes. 

3 (4) CONSULTATION.—The Secretary of State 

4 shall consult with the Administrator of the United 

5 States Agency for International Development on the 

6 allocations of the Fund. 

7 (5) LOANS AND LOAN GUARANTEES.—Amounts 

8 transferred from the Fund to the Export-Import 

9 Bank and the United States International Develop10 ment Finance Corporation, among other purposes, 

11 may be made available for the costs of direct loans 

12 and loan guarantees, including the cost of modifying 

13 such loans and loan guarantees, as defined in section 

14 502 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (2 

15 U.S.C. 661a). 

16 (b) PRIORITIZATION.—In evaluating proposals for 

17 strategic infrastructure projects funded pursuant to sub18 section (a), the Secretary of State shall prioritize— 

19 (1) projects that have the highest strategic 

20 value to the United States; and 

21 (2) projects related to— 

22 (A) strategic transport infrastructure, in23 cluding ports, airports, railroads, and highways; 

24 (B) energy infrastructure, technology, and 

25 supply chains, critical minerals, and related 


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1 areas that align with the officially conveyed en2 ergy needs of partner countries and with the 

3 objective of maximizing such countries’ energy 

4 access, energy security, energy transition, and 

5 resilience needs; 

6 (C) secure information and communica7 tions technology networks and infrastructure to 

8 strengthen the potential for economic growth 

9 and to promote an open, interoperable, reliable, 

10 and secure internet; and 

11 (D) global health security, including 

12 through infrastructure projects that increase 

13 the availability, accessibility, and affordability 

14 of health care in partner countries. 

15 (c) STANDARDS.—In evaluating proposals for stra16 tegic infrastructure projects funded pursuant to sub17 section (a), the Secretary of State shall adhere to stand18 ards for sustainable, transparent, and quality infrastruc19 ture investment and ensure projects include opportunities 

20 to advance economic growth priorities in the partner coun21 try and support good governance and the rule of law. 

22 (d) PROJECTS IN HIGH INCOME COUNTRIES.—Sup23 port provided under the Fund shall not be provided in 

24 countries with high-income economies (as those terms are 

25 defined by the World Bank) unless the President certifies 


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1 to the appropriate congressional committees that such 

2 support— 

3 (1) is necessary to preempt or counter efforts 

4 by a strategic competitor of the United States to se5 cure significant political or economic leverage or ac6 quire national security-sensitive technologies or in7 frastructure in a country that is an ally or partner 

8 of the United States; and 

9 (2) includes cost-sharing arrangements with 

10 partner countries to ensure effective burden-sharing 

11 and long-term sustainability. 

12 SEC. 167. MODIFICATIONS OF REQUIREMENTS TO BECOME 

13 A MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION 

14 CANDIDATE COUNTRY. 

15 (a) CANDIDATE COUNTRY QUALIFICATIONS.—Sec16 tion 606 of the Millennium Challenge Act of 2003 (22 

17 U.S.C. 7705) is amended to read as follows: 

18 ‘‘SEC. 606. CANDIDATE COUNTRIES. 

19 ‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—A country shall be a candidate 

20 country for purposes of eligibility to receive assistance 

21 under section 605 if— 

22 ‘‘(1) the per capita income of the country in a 

23 fiscal year is equal to or less than the World Bank 

24 threshold for initiating the International Bank for 


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1 Reconstruction and Development graduation process 

2 for the fiscal year; and 

3 ‘‘(2) subject to subsection (b), the country is 

4 not ineligible to receive United States economic as5 sistance under part I of the Foreign Assistance Act 

6 of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) by reason of the 

7 application of any provision of the Foreign Assist8 ance Act of 1961 or any other provision of law. 

9 ‘‘(b) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—For the purposes of 

10 determining whether a country is eligible, pursuant to sub11 section (a)(2), to receive assistance under section 605, the 

12 exercise by the President, the Secretary of State, or any 

13 other officer or employee of the United States Government 

14 of any waiver or suspension of any provision of law re15 ferred to in subsection (a)(2), and notification to the ap16 propriate congressional committees in accordance with 

17 such provision of law, shall be construed as satisfying the 

18 requirements under subsection (a). 

19 ‘‘(c) DETERMINATION BY THE BOARD.—The Board 

20 shall determine whether a country is a candidate country 

21 for purposes of this section.’’. 

22 (b) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.— 

23 (1) AMENDMENT TO REPORT IDENTIFYING

24 CANDIDATE COUNTRIES.—Section 608(a)(1) of the 

25 Millennium Challenge Act of 2003 (22 U.S.C. 


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1 7707(a)(1)) is amended by striking ‘‘section 

2 606(a)(1)(B)’’ and inserting ‘‘section 606(a)(2)’’. 

3 (2) AMENDMENT TO MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE

4 COMPACT AUTHORITY.—Section 609(b)(2) of such 

5 Act ( 22 U.S.C. 7708(b)(2)) is amended— 

6 (A) by amending the paragraph heading to 

7 read as follows: ‘‘COUNTRY CONTRIBUTIONS’’; 

8 and 

9 (B) by striking ‘‘with respect to a lower 

10 middle income country described in section 

11 606(b),’’. 

12 (3) AMENDMENT TO AUTHORIZATION TO PRO13 VIDE ASSISTANCE FOR CANDIDATE COUNTRIES.— 

14 Section 616(b)(1) of such Act ( 22 U.S.C. 

15 7715(b)(1)) is amended by striking ‘‘subsection (a) 

16 or (b) of section 606’’ and inserting ‘‘section 

17 606(a)’’. 

18 (c) MODIFICATION TO FACTORS IN DETERMINING

19 ELIGIBILITY.—Section 607(c)(2) of the Millennium Chal20 lenge Act of 2003 (22 U.S.C. 7706(c)(2)) is amended in 

21 the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking ‘‘con22 sider’’ and inserting ‘‘prioritize need and impact by con23 sidering’’. 


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1 SEC. 168. AFRICA ENERGY SECURITY AND DIVERSIFICA2 TION. 

3 Section 3 of the Electrify Africa Act of 2015 (Public 

4 Law 114–121; 22 U.S.C. 2293 note) is amended— 

5 (1) in paragraph (8), by striking ‘‘; and’’ and 

6 inserting a semicolon; 

7 (2) in paragraph (9), by striking the period at 

8 the end and inserting a semicolon; and 

9 (3) by inserting after paragraph (9) the fol10 lowing new paragraphs: 

11 ‘‘(10) advance United States foreign policy and 

12 development goals by assisting African countries to 

13 reduce their dependence on countries that use en14 ergy dependence for political influence, such as the 

15 Russian Federation or the People’s Republic of 

16 China, which have used energy and financial re17 sources to influence other countries; 

18 ‘‘(11) promote the energy security and domestic 

19 energy resource mobilization of allies and partners of 

20 the United States in Africa by— 

21 ‘‘(A) encouraging the development of ac22 cessible, transparent, and competitive energy 

23 markets that provide diversified sources and re24 liable and affordable power, including civil nu25 clear energy; 


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1 ‘‘(B) promoting domestic energy resource 

2 mobilization, advancing regulatory reforms in 

3 the energy sector, and supporting grid mod4 ernization and energy storage deployment ef5 forts; and 

6 ‘‘(C) facilitating the efforts of partner 

7 countries to meet their goals and commitments 

8 related to energy resource production and con9 sumption; 

10 ‘‘(12) encourage United States public and pri11 vate sector investment in African energy infrastruc12 ture projects to bridge the gap between energy secu13 rity requirements and commercial demand in a way 

14 that is consistent with the region’s capacity and the 

15 goals and commitments of partner countries; and 

16 ‘‘(13) help facilitate the trade and cooperation 

17 on energy production, advance energy technology de18 velopment and deployment, and provide technical as19 sistance to build capacities on regulatory improve20 ments and greater expertise on global markets in a 

21 way that benefits the energy security of allies and 

22 partners of the United States, including in Africa.’’. 

23 SEC. 169. ENHANCING RESILIENT CRITICAL INFRASTRUC24 TURE IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS. 

25 (a) PROGRAM.— 


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1 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in 

2 coordination with the heads of other relevant Fed3 eral departments and agencies, as appropriate, shall 

4 develop and implement a strategy for the expansion, 

5 improvement, and protection of resilient critical in6 frastructure in the Pacific Islands. 

7 (2) ELEMENTS.—The strategy and related pro8 gramming under paragraph (1) shall— 

9 (A) consider the— 

10 (i) current and forecasted gaps in 

11 functionality of, and threats to, critical in12 frastructure in the Pacific Islands, includ13 ing— 

14 (I) for disaster preparedness and 

15 response, transport connectivity, oper16 ability of health systems, information 

17 and communications technology, food 

18 security, coastal zone management, 

19 marine and water resource manage20 ment, and energy security and access 

21 to electricity; and 

22 (II) to the extent practicable, the 

23 rates, severity and drivers of deterio24 ration, structural deficiencies, and 

25 most pressing threats to public safety 


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1 from aging, at-risk, and failing infra2 structure; 

3 (ii) United States national security 

4 risks posed by weak, outdated, at-risk, and 

5 failing critical infrastructure in the Pacific 

6 Islands, with particular consideration for 

7 the interconnectedness of supply chains, 

8 interconnected transportation networks, 

9 technology, communications, and financial 

10 systems; and 

11 (iii) the policy-enabling environment 

12 for public and private sector investment in 

13 critical infrastructure in the Pacific Is14 lands, including through local resource mo15 bilization, early stage project preparation, 

16 development finance, and foreign direct in17 vestment; 

18 (B) seek to enhance the ability of Pacific 

19 Islanders, including governments at the na20 tional and local levels, civil society leaders, and 

21 private sector partners, to attract and effec22 tively manage public and private investment in 

23 critical infrastructure while resisting predatory 

24 lending and resource extraction deals by malign 

25 actors; 


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1 (C) identify priorities for critical infra2 structure improvement, reinforcement, re-engi3 neering, or replacement based on the signifi4 cance of such infrastructure to ensuring public 

5 health, safety, and economic growth; 

6 (D) support investment and improvement 

7 in natural resource management and conserva8 tion; 

9 (E) include recommendations for policy 

10 and governance reforms in the Pacific Islands, 

11 as necessary and appropriate, to strengthen 

12 critical infrastructure resilience; and 

13 (F) support trainings and information 

14 sharing, technology exchanges, reverse trade 

15 missions, and pilot projects that provide Pacific 

16 Islanders with access to proven, cost-effective 

17 solutions for mitigating the risks associated 

18 with critical infrastructure vulnerabilities and 

19 related interdependencies. 

20 (b) COORDINATION.—The program developed under 

21 this section should be coordinated with like-minded allies, 

22 partners, and regional and international organizations to 

23 encourage alignment of efforts and to avoid duplicative in24 vestments and programming. 


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1 (c) DISASTER PREPAREDNESS.—The Administrator 

2 of the United States Agency for International Develop3 ment, in consultation with the relevant Federal depart4 ments and agencies with technical and practical expertise, 

5 shall work with Pacific Island countries to— 

6 (1) provide technical assistance, education, and 

7 training, including through grants and cooperative 

8 agreements for qualified United States and local 

9 nongovernmental organizations, to enhance early 

10 warning systems, emergency management and pre11 paredness procedures, and post-disaster relief and 

12 recovery; and 

13 (2) enhance coordination of existing disaster 

14 mitigation and response plans in the Pacific Islands 

15 region, including by United States allies and part16 ners in the region. 

17 (d) INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.— 

18 The Secretary of the Treasury shall direct the representa19 tives of the United States to the World Bank Group, the 

20 International Monetary Fund, and the Asian Development 

21 Bank to use the voice and vote of the United States to 

22 support sustainable, resilient, and high quality infrastruc23 ture projects in the Pacific Islands. 


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1 SEC. 170. OCEANIA RESTORATION AND HAZARDS REMOVAL 

2 PROGRAM. 

3 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall es4 tablish an Oceania Restoration and Hazards Removal Pro5 gram (in this section referred to as the ‘‘Program’’). 

6 (b) PURPOSE.—The purpose of the Program is— 

7 (1) to coordinate with the countries of Oce8 ania— 

9 (A) to support survey and clearance oper10 ations of buried and abandoned bombs, mor11 tars, artillery shells, and unexploded ordnance 

12 from battlefields of World War II; and 

13 (B) to identify, isolate, and where appro14 priate, mitigate environmental risks associated 

15 with submerged maritime vessels that pose a 

16 threat to public health or marine resources be17 cause of the presence of oil, fuel, corrosive met18 als, or other toxins; and 

19 (2) to build the national capacity of the coun20 tries of Oceania to identify, isolate, and mitigate 

21 risks related to explosive ordnance hazards, sub22 merged maritime vessels, or related hazardous ma23 rine debris through survey and disposal training, 

24 funding to relevant nongovernmental organizations, 

25 and support to regional cooperation initiatives with 

26 countries that are allies and partners of the United 


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1 States, including Australia, France, Japan, New 

2 Zealand, the Republic of Korea, and the United 

3 Kingdom. 

4 (c) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 

5 authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of State 

6 $1,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029 

7 to carry out this section. 

8 SEC. 171. COORDINATION WITH OTHER FEDERAL AGEN9 CIES AND COOPERATION AND PARTICIPA10 TION OF NONGOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES. 

11 The Federal officials responsible for carrying out 

12 policies and actions under sections 168 and 169 should, 

13 as appropriate— 

14 (1) coordinate with existing programs and ef15 forts of relevant agencies of the United States Gov16 ernment, including with regard to the Republic of 

17 the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micro18 nesia, and the Republic of Palau; 

19 (2) seek the cooperation and participation of 

20 United States private sector, United States non21 governmental organizations, and United States insti22 tutions of higher education; and 

23 (3) work with civil society organizations and 

24 other relevant stakeholders in Pacific Island coun25 tries, as appropriate. 


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1 SEC. 172. FINDINGS RELATED TO THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC 

2 OF CHINA’S INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION. 

3 Congress makes the following findings: 

4 (1) State-owned enterprises of the PRC are 

5 subject to the direction of both the state and the 

6 Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and the CCP 

7 strives to increase their influence over the global 

8 economy by pursuing predatory and exploitative 

9 trade, economic, and industrial practices designed to 

10 out-compete the United States and other market 

11 economies. 

12 (2) The PRC’s control of key components of 

13 critical global supply chains, including critical min14 erals, semiconductors, batteries, solar panels, and 

15 pharmaceuticals, as outlined in the Office of the Di16 rector of National Intelligence’s February 2023 ‘‘An17 nual Threat Assessment’’, represents a direct threat 

18 to United States national security and harms global 

19 economic competition. 

20 (3) The CCP’s industrial strategy, as articu21 lated in the Made in China 2025 plan, aims to domi22 nate global manufacturing in crucial energy tech23 nologies, including advanced materials, batteries, 

24 and power equipment. 

25 (4) The PRC, by far the world’s largest polluter, accounts for approximately 1 26 ⁄3 of global carbon 


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1 dioxide (CO2) emissions according to the Inter2 national Energy Administration and subsidizes its 

3 industries, manufacturers, and exports by neither 

4 implementing nor enforcing adequate environmental 

5 or labor protection standards. 

6 (5) The PRC’s industrial sectors like agri7 culture, mining, automotive production, and com8 puter and electronics manufacturing emit 3 times 

9 more carbon dioxide as compared to the United 

10 States’ same industrial sectors, and nearly 2 times 

11 more carbon dioxide than the global average of the 

12 production of comparable goods in other foreign 

13 countries, according to industry tracking data from 

14 the International Energy Agency. 

15 (6) The CCP seeks to utilize the Belt and Road 

16 Initiative (BRI) and the Global Development Initia17 tive (GDI) to increase the dependence of low-income 

18 and lower-middle income countries in Asia, Africa, 

19 Europe, and the Americas on the PRC at the ex20 pense of trapping such countries in long-term, high21 polluting, debt-ridden, low-quality infrastructure 

22 projects that undermine developing countries’ efforts 

23 to sustainably grow and industrialize their economies 

24 to maximize benefits and participation for their citi25 zenry, while increasing global pollution. 


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1 (7) The United States— 

2 (A) has adopted many environmental pro3 tections, including the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 

4 7401 et seq.), the Federal Water Pollution Con5 trol Act (33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq.), the Toxic 

6 Substances Control Act (15 U.S.C. 2601 et 

7 seq.), and more than 15 other major environ8 mental protection laws that— 

9 (i) add costs to the production of 

10 goods in order to secure the benefits of en11 vironmental protection and conservation ef12 forts; and 

13 (ii) serve to meaningfully decrease 

14 greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide 

15 (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide 

16 (N2O), sulfur hexafluoride (SF6), 

17 hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), 

18 perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and other 

19 fluorinated greenhouse gases; 

20 (B) is the world’s largest consumer market 

21 and its economy is highly integrated into the 

22 world; and 

23 (C) bears responsibility to ensure that the 

24 United States market does not incentivize 

25 forum shopping for the production of goods to 


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1 jurisdictions with low environmental standards 

2 to obtain a competitive cost advantage while un3 dermining efforts to address transnational envi4 ronmental and resource challenges as well as 

5 global public health. 

6 (8) Any realistic pathway to substantially re7 duce global carbon emissions will require the PRC to 

8 be held accountable for its role as the world’s largest 

9 polluter. 

10 SEC. 173. PROMOTING RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT AL11 TERNATIVES TO THE BELT AND ROAD INITIA12 TIVE AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT INITIA13 TIVE. 

14 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President should seek oppor15 tunities to partner with multilateral development finance 

16 institutions to develop financing tools based on shared de17 velopment finance criteria and mechanisms to support in18 vestments in developing countries that— 

19 (1) support low carbon economic development; 

20 and 

21 (2) promote resiliency and adaptation to envi22 ronmental changes. 

23 (b) PARTNERSHIP.—The Chief Executive Officer of 

24 the United States International Development Finance 

25 Corporation should seek to partner with other multilateral 


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1 development finance institutions and development finance 

2 institutions to leverage the respective available funds to 

3 support low carbon economic development, which may in4 clude nuclear energy projects, environmental adaptation, 

5 and resilience activities in developing countries. 

6 (c) JOINT COOPERATION ON INFRASTRUCTURE

7 PROJECTS.— 

8 (1) JOINT SUPPORT.—Subject to paragraph 

9 (2), the Secretary of State, the Administrator of the 

10 United States Agency for International Develop11 ment, and other relevant agency heads may co-fi12 nance, or provide joint support for, infrastructure 

13 projects that advance the development of the United 

14 States overseas and provide viable alternatives to 

15 projects that would otherwise be included within the 

16 PRC’s Belt and Initiative and Global Development 

17 Initiative. 

18 (2) CONDITIONS.—Co-financing agreements 

19 and arrangements authorized pursuant to paragraph 

20 (1) may not be approved unless— 

21 (A) the projects to be financed— 

22 (i) promote the public good; and 

23 (ii) will have substantially lower envi24 ronmental impact than the proposed Belt 


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1 and Road Initiative and Global Develop2 ment Initiative alternative; and 

3 (B) the appropriate committees of Con4 gress are notified not later than 15 days in ad5 vance of entering into such co-financing ar6 rangements. 

7 SEC. 174. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION TO SECURE CRIT8 ICAL MINERAL SUPPLY CHAINS. 

9 (a) STATEMENT OF POLICY ON CRITICAL MINERAL

10 SUPPLY CHAINS.—It is the policy of the United States— 

11 (1) to collaborate with allies and partners of the 

12 United States to build secure and resilient critical 

13 minerals supply chains, including in the mining, 

14 processing, and valuation of critical minerals, as well 

15 as with respect to advanced manufacturing that in16 cludes critical minerals; 

17 (2) to prioritize the development and production 

18 of critical minerals domestically, both to supply do19 mestic needs and for export to allies and partners 

20 that participate in secure and resilient supply chains 

21 for critical minerals; 

22 (3) to reduce or eliminate reliance and depend23 ence on critical mineral supply chains controlled by 

24 the PRC, the Russian Federation, Iran, or any other 

25 adversary of the United States; 


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1 (4) to work with allies and partners on enhanc2 ing evaluation capability and technology in trusted 

3 countries that produce critical minerals to avoid the 

4 export of mined and processed critical minerals to 

5 adversaries of the United States; 

6 (5) to identify and implement market-based in7 centives for the purposes of facilitating the creation 

8 and maintenance of secure and resilient critical min9 eral supply chains in collaboration with allies and 

10 partners; 

11 (6) to prioritize securing critical mineral supply 

12 chains in United States foreign policy, including 

13 through the use of economic tools to invest respon14 sibly in projects in partner countries in a manner 

15 that both benefits local populations and bolsters the 

16 supply of critical minerals to the United States and 

17 allies and partners of the United States; and 

18 (7) that collaboration with allies and partners 

19 to build secure and resilient critical mineral supply 

20 chains shall not replace United States efforts to in21 crease domestic development and production of crit22 ical minerals. 

23 (b) INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS RELATING TO

24 PROTECTING CRITICAL MINERAL SUPPLY CHAINS.— 


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1 (1) IN GENERAL.—The President is authorized 

2 to negotiate an agreement with international part3 ners for the purposes of establishing a coalition— 

4 (A) to facilitate— 

5 (i) the mining, processing, and supply 

6 of critical minerals; and 

7 (ii) advanced manufacturing that in8 cludes critical minerals; and 

9 (B) to secure an adequate supply of critical 

10 minerals and relevant products, manufacturing 

11 inputs, and components that are heavily de12 pendent on critical mineral resources for the 

13 United States and other members of the coali14 tion (in this subsection referred to as ‘‘member 

15 countries’’). 

16 (2) NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVES.—The overall 

17 objectives for negotiating an agreement described in 

18 paragraph (1) should be— 

19 (A) to establish mechanisms for member 

20 countries to build secure and resilient supply 

21 chains for critical minerals, including in— 

22 (i) the mining, refinement, processing, 

23 and valuation of critical minerals; and 


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1 (ii) advanced manufacturing of prod2 ucts, components, and materials that are 

3 dependent on critical minerals; 

4 (B) to improve economies of scale and 

5 joint cooperation with international partners in 

6 securing access and means of production 

7 throughout the supply chains of critical min8 erals and manufacturing processes dependent 

9 on critical minerals; 

10 (C) to establish mechanisms, with appro11 priate market-based disciplines, that provide 

12 and maintain opportunities among member 

13 countries for creating industry economies of 

14 scale to attract joint investment among those 

15 countries, including— 

16 (i) cooperation on joint projects, in17 cluding cost-sharing on building appro18 priate infrastructure to access deposits of 

19 critical minerals; and 

20 (ii) creation or enhancement of na21 tional and international programs to sup22 port the development of robust industries 

23 by providing appropriate sector-specific in24 centives, such as political risk and other 


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1 insurance opportunities, financing, and 

2 other support, for— 

3 (I) mining and processing critical 

4 minerals; 

5 (II) manufacturing of products, 

6 components, and materials that are 

7 dependent on critical minerals and are 

8 essential to consumer technology 

9 products or have important national 

10 security implications; and 

11 (III) associated transportation 

12 needs that are tailored to the han13 dling, movement, and logistics man14 agement of critical minerals and prod15 ucts, components, and materials that 

16 are dependent on critical minerals; 

17 (D) to establish market-based rules for 

18 member countries regarding adoption of quali19 fying tax and other incentives to stimulate in20 vestment, as balanced by market-based dis21 ciplines to ensure a fair playing field among 

22 those countries; 

23 (E) to establish recommended best prac24 tices to protect— 

25 (i) labor rights; 


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1 (ii) the natural environment and eco2 systems near critical mineral industrial 

3 sites; and 

4 (iii) safety of communities near crit5 ical mineral industrial activities; 

6 (F) to advance economic growth in devel7 oping countries with critical mineral reserves, 

8 including for the benefit of the citizens of those 

9 countries; 

10 (G) to establish rules allowing for the es11 tablishment of a consortium that is resourced 

12 and empowered to bid and compete in acquiring 

13 and securing potential deposits of critical min14 erals in countries that are not members of the 

15 coalition described in paragraph (1) (in this 

16 subsection referred to as ‘‘nonmember coun17 tries’’); 

18 (H) to establish a mechanism for joint re19 source mapping with procedures for equitable 

20 sharing of information on potential deposits of 

21 critical minerals not less frequently than annu22 ally; 

23 (I) to establish appropriate mechanisms for 

24 the recognition and enforcement by a member 

25 country of judgments relating to environmental 


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1 and related harms caused by mining operations 

2 within such member country in contravention of 

3 that country’s laws; and 

4 (J) to improve supply chain security 

5 among member countries by providing for na6 tional treatment investment protections among 

7 those countries that are equal to, or better 

8 than, the standards in the United States model 

9 bilateral investment treaty. 

10 (c) MINERALS SECURITY PARTNERSHIP AUTHORIZA11 TION.— 

12 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, act13 ing through the Under Secretary of State for Eco14 nomic Growth, Energy, and the Environment, is au15 thorized to lead United States participation in the 

16 ‘‘Minerals Security Partnership’’, for the following 

17 purposes: 

18 (A) To identify and support investment 

19 and advocate for commercial critical mineral 

20 mining, processing, and refining projects that 

21 enable robust and secure critical mineral supply 

22 chains, in consultation with other Federal agen23 cies, as appropriate. 

24 (B) To coordinate with relevant regional 

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1 ment strategies related to critical minerals 

2 projects and to identify projects that are prior3 ities. 

4 (C) To coordinate with United States mis5 sions abroad on projects, programs, and invest6 ments that enable robust and secure critical 

7 mineral supply chains. 

8 (D) To coordinate with current and pro9 spective members of the Minerals Security 

10 Partnership. 

11 (E) To establish a mechanism for informa12 tion-sharing with members of the Minerals Se13 curity Partnership. 

14 (F) To establish policies and procedures, 

15 and if necessary, to provide funding to facilitate 

16 cooperation on joint projects with members of 

17 the Minerals Security Partnership and the Min18 eral Security Forum, including those related to 

19 cost-sharing agreements, political risk insur20 ance, financing, equity investments, and other 

21 support, in coordination with other Federal 

22 agencies, as appropriate. 

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1 lishment of the coalition described in that sub2 section. 

3 (2) DATABASE.—As part of the Minerals Secu4 rity Partnership, the Secretary, acting through the 

5 Under Secretary, is authorized to establish and 

6 maintain a database of critical mineral projects for 

7 the purpose of providing high quality and up-to-date 

8 information to the private sector in order to spur 

9 greater investment, increase the resilience of global 

10 critical minerals supply chains, and boost United 

11 States supply. 

12 (3) QUALIFICATIONS FOR PERSONNEL.—With 

13 respect to staffing personnel to carry out the Min14 erals Security Partnership, the Secretary shall 

15 prioritize individuals with the following qualifica16 tions: 

17 (A) Substantive knowledge and experience 

18 in issues related to critical minerals supply 

19 chain and their application to strategic indus20 tries, including in the defense, energy, and tech21 nology sectors. 

22 (B) Substantive knowledge and experience 

23 in large-scale multi-donor project financing and 

24 related technical and diplomatic arrangements, 


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1 international coalition-building, and project 

2 management. 

3 (C) Substantive knowledge and experience 

4 in trade and foreign policy, defense-industrial 

5 base policy, or national security-sensitive supply 

6 chain issues. 

7 (4) PRIVATE SECTOR COORDINATION.—The 

8 Secretary of State shall ensure close coordination be9 tween the Department of State, the private sector, 

10 and relevant civil society groups on the implementa11 tion of this subsection. 

12 (5) PROJECT SELECTION.— 

13 (A) IN GENERAL.—The United States, 

14 through its participation in the Minerals Secu15 rity Partnership, shall prioritize projects that 

16 advance the national and economic security in17 terests of the United States and allies and part18 ners of the United States. 

19 (B) CRITERIA REQUIREMENTS.—The 

20 United States should advocate for the Minerals 

21 Security Partnership to use environmental, so22 cial, or governance standards, including as cri23 teria for project selection, that are consistent 

24 with United States law or international agree25 ments approved by Congress. 


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1 (d) UNITED STATES MEMBERSHIP IN THE INTER2 NATIONAL NICKEL STUDY GROUP.— 

3 (1) UNITED STATES MEMBERSHIP.—The Presi4 dent is authorized to accept the Terms of Reference 

5 of and maintain membership of the United States in 

6 the International Nickel Study Group (INSG). 

7 (2) PAYMENTS OF ASSESSED CONTRIBU8 TIONS.—For fiscal year 2024 and thereafter, the 

9 United States assessed contributions to the INSG 

10 may be paid from funds appropriated for ‘‘Contribu11 tions to International Organizations’’. 

12 (e) CRITICAL MINERAL DEFINED.—In this section, 

13 the term ‘‘critical mineral’’— 

14 (1) has the meaning given the term in section 

15 7002 of the Energy Act of 2020 (30 U.S.C. 1606); 

16 and 

17 (2) includes any other mineral or mineral mate18 rial determined by the Secretary of State— 

19 (A) to be essential to the economic or na20 tional security of the United States; and 

21 (B) to have a supply chain vulnerable to 

22 disruption. 

23 (f) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 

24 authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State 

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1 eral supply chain security, including to implement this sec2 tion. 

3 Subtitle D—Digital Technology and 

4 Connectivity 

5 SEC. 176. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ENVOY FOR CRITICAL 

6 AND EMERGING TECHNOLOGY. 

7 (a) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary shall establish 

8 an Office of the Special Envoy for Critical and Emerging 

9 Technology (referred to in this section as the ‘‘Office’’), 

10 which may be located within the Bureau for Cyberspace 

11 and Digital Policy. 

12 (b) LEADERSHIP.— 

13 (1) SPECIAL ENVOY.—The Office shall be head14 ed by a Special Envoy for Critical and Emerging 

15 Technology, who shall— 

16 (A) be appointed by the President, by and 

17 with the advice and consent of the Senate; 

18 (B) have the rank and status of ambas19 sador; and 

20 (C) report to the Ambassador-at-Large for 

21 Cyberspace and Digital Policy. 

22 (c) MEMBERSHIP.—The Office may include rep23 resentatives or expert detailees from other key Federal 

24 agencies or research and technology-focused fellowship 

25 programs, as determined by the Special Envoy for Critical 


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1 and Emerging Technology and with the consent of the 

2 Ambassador-at-Large for Cyberspace and Digital Policy, 

3 in coordination with relevant Department stakeholders 

4 and appropriate senior officials of the Department of 

5 State and such agencies. 

6 (d) PURPOSES.—The purposes of the Office are to 

7 assist the Secretary of State in the coordination of Depart8 ment and interagency action in support of the functions 

9 described in subsection (e). 

10 (e) CRITICAL AND EMERGING FUNCTIONS.—The 

11 Secretary of State shall— 

12 (1) establish, in coordination with relevant bu13 reaus, offices and other Federal agencies, an inter14 agency security review process for proposals regard15 ing United States Government-funded international 

16 collaboration on certain critical and emerging tech17 nologies and associated research; 

18 (2) establish and coordinate an interagency 

19 strategy to facilitate international cooperation with 

20 United States allies and partners regarding the de21 velopment, use, and deployment of certain critical 

22 and emerging technologies and associated standards 

23 and safeguards for research security, intellectual 

24 property protection, and illicit knowledge transfer; 


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1 (3) facilitate technology partnerships with coun2 tries and relevant political and economic unions that 

3 are committed to— 

4 (A) the rule of law and respect for human 

5 rights, including freedom of speech, and expres6 sion; 

7 (B) the safe and responsible development 

8 and use of certain critical and emerging tech9 nologies and the establishment of related norms 

10 and standards, including for research security 

11 and the protection of sensitive data and tech12 nology; 

13 (C) a secure internet architecture governed 

14 by a multi-stakeholder model instead of central15 ized government control; 

16 (D) robust international cooperation to 

17 promote open and interoperable technological 

18 products and services that are necessary to 

19 freedom, innovation, transparency, and privacy; 

20 and 

21 (E) strengthening multilateral coordination 

22 on certain critical and emerging technologies, as 

23 defined in subsection (f), in coordination with 

24 relevant Department stakeholders and bureaus, 

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1 mation sharing, and other activities, to defend 

2 the principles described in subparagraphs (A) 

3 through (D) against efforts by state and non4 state actors to undermine them; 

5 (4) support efforts to harmonize critical and 

6 emerging technology governance regimes with part7 ners, coordinating on basic and pre-competitive re8 search and development initiatives, and collaborating 

9 to pursue such opportunities in certain critical and 

10 emerging technologies; 

11 (5) coordinate with other technology partners 

12 on export control policies for certain critical and 

13 emerging technologies, as defined in subsection (g), 

14 including countering illicit knowledge and data 

15 transfer related to certain critical and emerging 

16 technologies research and use; 

17 (6) conduct or support diplomatic engagement, 

18 in coordination with other relevant Department 

19 stakeholders and bureaus, offices, and relevant Fed20 eral departments and agencies, with allies and part21 ners to develop standards and coordinate policies de22 signed to counter illicit knowledge and data transfer 

23 in academia related to certain critical and emerging 

24 technology research; 


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1 (7) coordinate with allies, partners, and other 

2 relevant Federal agencies, with the concurrence of 

3 other relevant Department stakeholders and bu4 reaus, to prevent the exploitation of research part5 nerships related to certain critical and emerging 

6 technologies; 

7 (8) share information regarding the threat 

8 posed by the transfer of certain critical and emerg9 ing technologies to authoritarian governments, in10 cluding the People’s Republic of China and the Rus11 sian Federation, and the ways in which autocratic 

12 regimes are utilizing technology to erode individual 

13 freedoms and other foundations of open, democratic 

14 societies; and 

15 (9) collaborate with private companies, trade 

16 associations, and think tanks to realize the purposes 

17 described in paragraphs (1) through (8), in coordi18 nation with relevant Department stakeholders and 

19 bureaus. 

20 (f) REPORT.—Not later than 1 year after the date 

21 of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 

22 the following 3 years, the Secretary, in coordination with 

23 the Director of National Intelligence and the heads of 

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1 classified report, with a classified index, if necessary, re2 garding— 

3 (1) the activities of the Office related to para4 graphs (1) through (9) of subsection (e), including 

5 any cooperative initiatives and partnerships pursued 

6 with United States allies and partners, and the re7 sults of such activities, initiatives, and partnerships; 

8 (2) the activities of the Government of the Peo9 ple’s Republic of China, the Chinese Communist 

10 Party, and the Russian Federation in sectors related 

11 to certain critical and emerging technologies and the 

12 threats they pose to the United States; and 

13 (3) an inventory of all international research 

14 and development programs for certain critical and 

15 emerging technologies funded by the Department or 

16 USAID that include participation by institutions or 

17 organizations that are affiliated with, or receive sup18 port from, the Government of the People’s Republic 

19 of China or the Government of the Russian Federa20 tion. 

21 (g) CRITICAL AND EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES.—In 

22 this section, the term ‘‘certain critical and emerging tech23 nologies’’ means technologies determined by the Secretary 

24 from the critical and emerging technologies list published 

25 by the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) 


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1 at the Office of Science and Technology Policy, as amend2 ed by subsequent updates to the list issued by the NSTC. 

3 SEC. 177. REALIGNING THE REGIONAL TECHNOLOGY OFFI4 CER PROGRAM. 

5 Section 9508(a)(1) of the Department of State Au6 thorizations Act of 2022 (division I of Public Law 117– 

7 263; 22 U.S.C. 10305(a)(1)) is amended by inserting ‘‘, 

8 and shall be administered by the Bureau for Cyberspace 

9 and Digital Policy’’ before the period at the end. 

10 SEC. 178. ANNUAL SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY MONI11 TORING REPORT ON THE PEOPLE’S REPUB12 LIC OF CHINA. 

13 (a) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than May 1, 

14 2025, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary 

15 of State, in coordination with the heads other Federal de16 partments and agencies as appropriate, shall submit to the 

17 appropriate committees of Congress a report on the ad18 vanced semiconductor manufacturing capabilities of the 

19 PRC. 

20 (b) CONTENTS.—The report required by subsection 

21 (a) shall include— 

22 (1) the domestic semiconductor manufacturing 

23 capabilities of the PRC; 

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1 ductor manufacturing and artificial intelligence 

2 chipmaking, including relevant government plans 

3 and initiatives; 

4 (3) engagement between the PRC and other 

5 foreign countries with respect to advanced semicon6 ductor manufacturing equipment capabilities; 

7 (4) an analysis of the impact of United States 

8 and allied and partner export controls on covered 

9 items related to the development of advanced semi10 conductor manufacturing in the PRC; and 

11 (5) an assessment of whether such export con12 trols remain effective in curbing the development of 

13 advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment 

14 capabilities in the PRC and recommendations for en15 hancing effectiveness of such controls. 

16 (c) FORM.— 

17 (1) IN GENERAL.—The report required by sub18 section (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form 

19 and shall include a classified annex, providing addi20 tional details and supporting intelligence, as avail21 able. 

22 (2) PUBLIC AVAILABILITY.—The unclassified 

23 portion or a synopsis of the report required under 

24 subsection (a) shall be made available on a publicly 


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1 accessible internet website of the Federal Govern2 ment. 

3 SEC. 179. COMBATTING AI-ENABLED DISINFORMATION. 

4 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con5 gress that— 

6 (1) the rapid development of publicly available, 

7 affordable generative artificial intelligence (AI) tech8 nology, including the use of large language models 

9 (LLM) to fuel natural language processing applica10 tions, has the potential to fundamentally alter the 

11 nature of disinformation and propaganda campaigns 

12 by enabling finely tailored, auto-generated 

13 disinformation swiftly, in any language, at scale, and 

14 at low-costs; 

15 (2) academia and private industry, including so16 cial media platforms, play a critical role in estab17 lishing safeguards for powerful, publicly available 

18 tools for producing AI-generated content, and it is 

19 in the United States national security interest to en20 sure that these technologies are not misused by for21 eign malign actors to enhance influence operations 

22 abroad; 

23 (3) the ability to identify, track, and label origi24 nal text, audio, and visual content is becoming in25 creasingly vital to United States national interests 


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1 as sophisticated AI-generated content creation be2 comes increasingly available to the public at low 

3 costs; 

4 (4) coalitions such as the content authenticity 

5 initiative (CAI) and the coalition for content prove6 nance and authority (C2PA) play important roles in 

7 establishing open industry standards for content au8 thenticity and digital content provenance; and 

9 (5) the Department, as the lead agency for 

10 United States foreign affairs, including public diplo11 macy, should work within the interagency process to 

12 develop a common approach to United States inter13 national engagement on issues related to AI-enabled 

14 disinformation. 

15 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—it shall be the policy 

16 of the United States— 

17 (1) to share knowledge with allies and partners 

18 of instances when foreign state and non-state actors 

19 have leveraged generative AI to augment 

20 disinformation campaigns or propaganda; 

21 (2) to work with private industry and academia, 

22 as appropriate, to mitigate the risks associated with 

23 public research on generative AI technologies; and 

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1 nologies in line with United States national security 

2 interests. 

3 (c) ESTABLISHMENT OF COUNTERING AI-ENABLED

4 DISINFORMATION TASK FORCE.— 

5 (1) ESTABLISHMENT.—Not later than 180 days 

6 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec7 retary of State shall establish within the Department 

8 a Countering AI-Enabled Disinformation Task 

9 Force (referred to in this section as the ‘‘Task 

10 Force’’) to— 

11 (A) identify potential responses to the 

12 growing threat of AI-enabled disinformation 

13 and its use by foreign state and non-state ac14 tors to augment influence operations and 

15 disinformation campaigns; 

16 (B) work closely with private industry and 

17 academia to identify and coordinate efforts in 

18 developing digital content provenance detection 

19 techniques and technologies; 

20 (C) develop the department’s internal co21 ordination across regional and functional bu22 reaus on the issue of AI-enabled disinformation; 

23 (D) develop a unified approach to inter24 national coordination on— 


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1 (i) establishing standards around dig2 ital content provenance techniques and 

3 technologies, specifically as it relates to 

4 countering AI-enabled disinformation cam5 paign; and 

6 (ii) assessing the potential for estab7 lishing frameworks around the prolifera8 tion of tools that facilitate AI-enabled 

9 disinformation; and 

10 (E) identify any additional tools or re11 sources necessary to enhance the Department’s 

12 ability to— 

13 (i) detect AI-enabled foreign 

14 disinformation and propaganda; 

15 (ii) rapidly produce original counter16 messaging to address AI-enabled 

17 disinformation campaigns; 

18 (iii) expand digital literacy program19 ming abroad to include education on how 

20 media consumers in recipient countries can 

21 identify and inoculate themselves from syn22 thetically produced media; and 

23 (iv) coordinate and collaborate with 

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1 tions, civil society, the private sector, and 

2 others, as necessary. 

3 (2) MEMBERSHIP.—The Task Force shall be 

4 comprised of a representative from relevant offices, 

5 as determined by the Secretary, which may in6 clude— 

7 (A) the Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital 

8 Policy; 

9 (B) the Under Secretary for Public Diplo10 macy and Public Affairs; 

11 (C) the Global Engagement Center; 

12 (D) the Center for Analytics of the Office 

13 of Management Strategy and Solutions; 

14 (E) appropriate offices and Bureaus at the 

15 United States Agency for International Devel16 opment; and 

17 (F) any other officials or offices the Sec18 retary determines appropriate. 

19 (d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

20 (1) ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE.—The term ‘‘ar21 tificial intelligence’’ has the meaning given that term 

22 in section 238(g) of the John S. McCain National 

23 Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 

24 (Public Law 115–232; 10 U.S.C. 4001 note). 


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1 (2) DIGITAL CONTENT PROVENANCE.—The 

2 term ‘‘digital content provenance’’ means the 

3 verifiable chronology of the origin and history of a 

4 piece of digital content, such as an image, video, 

5 audio recording, or electronic document. 

6 SEC. 179A. INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION ON RE7 SEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. 

8 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find9 ings: 

10 (1) Innovation in artificial intelligence and 

11 other emerging technology domains has become in12 creasingly global. According to the Organisation for 

13 Economic Co-operation and Development, worldwide 

14 spending on research and development more than 

15 tripled between 2000 and 2020. The United States 

16 accounted for almost 70 percent of such spending in 

1960, but less than 1 17 ⁄3 in 2018. 

18 (2) Many allies and partners of the United 

19 States are technological powers in their own right, 

20 with robust research and development activities and 

21 world-leading capabilities in fields such as artificial 

22 intelligence, semiconductors, robotics, and bio23 technology. 

24 (3) Adversaries of the United States, including 

25 the PRC, the Russian Federation, and the Islamic 


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1 Republic of Iran, also emphasize technology and in2 novation in their geopolitical strategies. In par3 ticular, the Chinese Communist Party believes inno4 vation is essential to its continued rule and is invest5 ing heavily in research and development as part of 

6 a strategy to ‘‘leapfrog’’ the United States into glob7 al leadership. 

8 (4) The United States and its allies and part9 ners collectively control a much larger share of re10 search and development activity than the PRC. To11 gether, the United States and six like-minded coun12 tries, namely, Japan, Germany, the Republic of 

13 Korea, India, France, and the United Kingdom, account for more than 1 14 ⁄2 of global spending on re15 search and development, while the PRC accounts for 

approximately 1 16 ⁄4. 

17 (5) The National Science Board’s ‘‘Vision 

18 2030’’ report, issued in May 2020, states, ‘‘Staying 

19 at the frontiers of discovery requires leaning into 

20 internationalism, particularly given the nation’s fall21 ing share of global knowledge production, paired 

22 with the rising importance and impact of inter23 national collaboration and knowledge- and tech24 nology-intensive industries.’’. 


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1 (6) Previously, in 2008, the National Science 

2 Board reported, ‘‘The U.S. Government could play a 

3 more effective role in supporting international S&E 

4 (science and engineering) partnerships by developing 

5 a coherent international S&E strategy to coordinate 

6 the activities and objectives of the various Federal 

7 agencies that play a role in such partnerships. . . . 

8 No single U.S. agency is responsible for coordinating 

9 or supporting international S&E partnerships, and 

10 few U.S. agencies that do S&E work have explicit 

11 missions in international relations.’’. 

12 (7) Numerous Federal departments and offices 

13 administer joint research and development activities 

14 with international partners, including the Office of 

15 International Science and Engineering within the 

16 National Science Foundation, the Division of Inter17 national Relations within the National Institutes of 

18 Health, and the Office of International Science & 

19 Technology Cooperation within the Department of 

20 Energy. 

21 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con22 gress that— 

23 (1) international collaboration on research and 

24 development is critical to maintaining United States 


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1 leadership in artificial intelligence and other critical 

2 technologies; 

3 (2) Federal initiatives related to international 

4 collaboration on research and development should— 

5 (A) be consistently and adequately funded; 

6 (B) be coordinated across agencies to in7 crease impact, minimize undue duplication, and 

8 ensure alignment with policies and strategic ob9 jectives of the United States; and 

10 (C) incorporate national security safe11 guards, including vetting processes, to protect 

12 against exploitation by strategic competitors of 

13 the United States; 

14 (3) implement data privacy regimes, including 

15 with respect to data sharing agreements between the 

16 United States and its partners; 

17 (4) the United States should work expeditiously 

18 with its allies and partners to resolve issues related 

19 to data privacy; and 

20 (5) the United States, and Federal departments 

21 and agencies must adopt rigorous safeguards and 

22 countermeasures to protect research institutions, key 

23 science and technological research data, and national 

24 security-sensitive knowledge from efforts by United 

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1 tion, including by exploiting international research 

2 collaboration. 

3 SEC. 179B. OVERSIGHT OF THE UNITED STATES-EUROPEAN 

4 UNION TRADE AND TECHNOLOGY COUNCIL. 

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than December 1, 2024, 

6 and annually thereafter for a period of 3 years, the Sec7 retary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, and the 

8 United States Trade Representative shall jointly submit 

9 to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the 

10 United States-European Union Trade and Technology 

11 Council (TTC), including a description of— 

12 (1) the goals of the Council, its achievements to 

13 date, and opportunities for cooperation in key areas; 

14 (2) a status update on deliverables of the TTC, 

15 particularly those itemized in public statements and 

16 fact sheets published by the United States Govern17 ment; 

18 (3) the expected impact of the progress made 

19 on each deliverable on growing two-way trade, 

20 achieving mutual recognition of relevant regulatory 

21 standards, and increasing the ease of doing business, 

22 including quantitative assessments; 

23 (4) the expected impact of deliverables on na24 tional security, including technology security; 


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1 (5) a description of any trade or technology 

2 topics that the United States has sought to incor3 porate into the TTC; 

4 (6) a description of engagements during the re5 porting period with the private sector on issues ad6 dressed in the TTC, and the results of those engage7 ments; and 

8 (7) other relevant updates with respect to the 

9 work of the TTC’s working groups. 

10 (b) FIRST REPORT.—The first report submitted pur11 suant to subsection (a) shall cover progress from the first 

12 TTC ministerial on September 29, 2021, through June 

13 1, 2024. 

14 (c) SUBSEQUENT REPORTS.—All subsequent reports 

15 submitted shall cover the previous year. 

16 (d) FORM OF REPORT.—The reports required under 

17 this section shall be submitted in unclassified form, but 

18 may include a classified annex. 

19 SEC. 179C. DIGITAL CONNECTIVITY IN THE PACIFIC IS20 LANDS. 

21 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State and the 

22 Administrator for the United States Agency for Inter23 national Development, in coordination with other relevant 

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1 plement a digital connectivity initiative specific to Pacific 

2 Island countries. 

3 (b) ELEMENTS AND CONDUCT OF PACIFIC ISLANDS

4 DIGITAL CONNECTIVITY INITIATIVE.—The initiative de5 veloped pursuant to subsection (a) shall— 

6 (1) include an assessment of opportunities to 

7 coordinate with regional allies, including through the 

8 United States-Japan Global Digital Connectivity 

9 Partnership and the United States-Japan-Australia 

10 Trilateral Infrastructure Partnership; 

11 (2) identify and address country-driven digital 

12 transformation priorities; 

13 (3) conduct an assessment of the digital eco14 system of Pacific Island countries, such as through 

15 the United States Agency for International Develop16 ment’s (USAID) Digital Ecosystem Country Assess17 ments, to identify opportunities and risks; 

18 (4) seek to develop human and institutional ca19 pacity and infrastructure to catalyze private sector 

20 investments in Pacific Island countries’ digital eco21 system; 

22 (5) assist in the development of digital policy 

23 and regulatory schemes in Pacific Island countries, 

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1 nology (ICT) regulations and procurement best prac2 tices and relevant reforms; 

3 (6) advance digital platforms and solutions for 

4 the delivery of public services and enhance digital 

5 skills and literacy; 

6 (7) seek to expand access to open, interoper7 able, reliable, and secure internet for Pacific Island 

8 communities; 

9 (8) identify roles that digital technologies can 

10 play in addressing important challenges for Pacific 

11 Island countries, including the environment, sustain12 able fishing, readiness, including in response to tsu13 nami warnings; 

14 (9) identify ways to support women-owned en15 terprises in the digital ecosystem of Pacific Island 

16 countries; 

17 (10) seek to expand the availability of and ac18 cess to secure and reliable subsea cable systems; 

19 (11) regularly assess opportunities for which 

20 United States businesses, or those of other like21 minded partners, would be competitive; 

22 (12) promote exports of United States ICT 

23 goods and services to advance a secure ICT supply 

24 chain and increase United States company market 

25 share in Pacific Island digital markets; 


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1 (13) support the development and expand avail2 ability of telehealth services for Pacific Island coun3 try communities; and 

4 (14) build digital connectivity among edu5 cational institutions within the region as well as with 

6 educational institutions in the United States. 

7 (c) PACIFIC ISLAND COUNTRIES DEFINED.—In this 

8 section, the term ‘‘Pacific Island countries’’ means the 

9 Cook Islands, the Republic of Fiji, the Republic of 

10 Kiribati, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Fed11 erated States of Micronesia, the Republic of Nauru, Niue, 

12 the Republic of Palau, the Independent State of Papua 

13 New Guinea, the Independent State of Samoa, the Sol14 omon Islands, the Kingdom of Tonga, Tuvalu, and the Re15 public of Vanuatu. 

16 (d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 

17 authorized to be appropriated $3,500,000 for each of fis18 cal years 2025 through 2029 to carry out this section. 

19 SEC. 179D. CYBER AND DIGITAL SECURITY COOPERATION 

20 WITH RESPECT TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. 

21 (a) INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP TO COUNTER

22 PRC CYBER AND DIGITAL SECURITY ACTIVITIES IN DE23 VELOPING COUNTRIES.—The Secretary of State shall es24 tablish an interagency Working Group, which shall include 

25 the National Cyber Director and representatives from the 


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1 Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Of2 fice of the Director of National Intelligence, the United 

3 States Agency for International Development, and such 

4 other agencies of the United States Government as the 

5 Secretary considers appropriate, on means to counter PRC 

6 cyber and digital security activities in developing coun7 tries, which could coordinate, as appropriate, with other 

8 related interagency mechanisms. 

9 (b) DUTIES.—The Working Group established pursu10 ant to this section shall develop and submit to the appro11 priate committees of Congress a set of recommendations 

12 for— 

13 (1) bolstering the capacity of governments in 

14 governments in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the 

15 Caribbean to ensure the integrity of their data net16 works and critical infrastructure, where applicable; 

17 (2) providing alternatives to Huawei and other 

18 untrusted vendors of cyber and digital security tech19 nology; and 

20 (3) an action plan for United States embassies 

21 to assist host-country governments with respect to 

22 protecting their vital digital networks and infrastruc23 ture from the PRC. 


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1 Subtitle E—Countering PRC 

2 Malign Influence 

3 SEC. 181. SENSE OF CONGRESS DISTINGUISHING THE PRC 

4 GOVERNMENT FROM THE CHINESE PEOPLE. 

5 (a) FINDINGS.—Since the establishment of the Peo6 ple’s Republic of China in 1949, the Chinese people have 

7 attempted to highlight the abuses of the Communist Party 

8 of China, including in 1989 with the Tiananmen Square 

9 protests and resulting massacre, and most recently 

10 through mass demonstrations in November 2022, known 

11 as the ‘‘White Paper Movement’’ to protest censorship and 

12 the harsh zero-COVID policy, but the efforts of the Chi13 nese people have consistently been met with brutal sup14 pression by CCP authorities and further efforts to mon15 itors, control, and politically indoctrinate Chinese citizens. 

16 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con17 gress that— 

18 (1) the challenges and threats posed by the 

19 PRC stem primarily from the actions and behavior 

20 of the CCP and the PRC government, not the people 

21 of China or people of Chinese descent; 

22 (2) the United States Government should seek 

23 to support the aspirations of the Chinese people, and 

24 other peoples suffering in oppressive, authoritarian 

25 regimes, by promoting human rights and supporting 


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1 their ability to express their own opinions and views 

2 about their government; 

3 (3) the United States is a diverse nation, and 

4 the strength and vibrancy of the United States is en5 hanced by the diverse ethnic backgrounds and toler6 ance of its citizens, including Asian Americans and 

7 people of Chinese descent; and 

8 (4) the United States Government and govern9 ments around the world must actively oppose racism 

10 and intolerance in all forms, and use all available 

11 and appropriate tools to combat the spread of anti12 Asian racism and discrimination. 

13 SEC. 182. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR 

14 COUNTERING THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF 

15 CHINA INFLUENCE FUND. 

16 (a) COUNTERING THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF

17 CHINA INFLUENCE FUND.—There is authorized to be ap18 propriated $600,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2025 

19 through 2029 for the Countering the People’s Republic of 

20 China Influence Fund to counter PRC malign influence. 

21 Amounts appropriated pursuant to this authorization are 

22 authorized to remain available until expended and shall 

23 be in addition to amounts otherwise authorized to be ap24 propriated to counter such influence. 


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1 (b) POLICY GUIDANCE, COORDINATION, AND AP2 PROVAL.— 

3 (1) COORDINATOR.—The Secretary of State 

4 shall designate an existing senior official as the Co5 ordinator for the Countering the People’s Republic 

6 of China Influence Fund (in this section referred to 

7 as ‘‘Coordinator’’) to provide policy guidance, coordi8 nation within the Department and the interagency 

9 as appropriate, and recommendations for the obliga10 tion of funds authorized pursuant to subsection (a). 

11 (2) DUTIES.—The Coordinator designated pur12 suant to paragraph (1) shall be responsible for— 

13 (A) on an annual basis, the identification 

14 of specific strategic priorities for using the 

15 funds authorized to be appropriated under sub16 section (a), such as geographic areas of focus or 

17 functional categories of programming that 

18 funds are to be concentrated within, consistent 

19 with the national interests of the United States 

20 and the purposes of this section; 

21 (B) the coordination and approval of all 

22 programming conducted using the funds au23 thorized to be appropriated under subsection 

24 (a), based on an assessment that such program25 ming directly counters PRC malign influence, 


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1 including specific activities or policies advanced 

2 by such influence, pursuant to the strategic ob3 jectives of the United States; 

4 (C) ensuring that all programming ap5 proved bears a sufficiently direct nexus to coun6 tering PRC malign influence and adheres to the 

7 requirements outlined in subsection (d); 

8 (D) conducting oversight, monitoring, and 

9 evaluation of the effectiveness of all program10 ming conducted using the funds authorized to 

11 be appropriated under subsection (a) to ensure 

12 that it advances United States interests and de13 grades the ability of the Government of the 

14 PRC, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), or 

15 entities acting on their behalf, to advance the 

16 activities described in subsection (c); and 

17 (E) ensuring, to the maximum extent prac18 ticable, that all approved programming under 

19 subsection (a) is carried out in coordination 

20 with other Federal activities to counter the ma21 lign influence and activities of the Government 

22 of the PRC, the CCP, or entities acting on their 

23 behalf. 

24 (3) ASSISTANT COORDINATOR.—The Adminis25 trator of the United States Agency for International 


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1 Development shall designate an official with direct 

2 responsibility for policy with respect to the PRC to 

3 assist the Coordinator designated pursuant to para4 graph (1), particularly with respect to such assist5 ance handled by the United States Agency for Inter6 national Development. 

7 (c) PRC MALIGN INFLUENCE DEFINED.—In this 

8 section, the term ‘‘PRC malign influence’’ means influence 

9 of the Government of the PRC and the Chinese Com10 munist Party (CCP) or entities acting on their behalf glob11 ally that— 

12 (1) undermines a free and open international 

13 order; 

14 (2) advances an alternative, repressive inter15 national order that bolsters the PRC or the Chinese 

16 Communist Party’s hegemonic ambitions and is 

17 characterized by coercion and dependency; 

18 (3) undermines the national security, territorial 

19 integrity, or sovereignty of the United States or 

20 other countries; or 

21 (4) undermines the political and economic secu22 rity of the United States or other countries, includ23 ing by promoting corruption or elite capture, and 

24 advancing coercive economic practices. 


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1 (d) ACTIVITIES TO COUNTER PRC MALIGN INFLU2 ENCE.—In this section, countering malign influence 

3 through the use of funds authorized to be appropriated 

4 by subsection (a) include efforts— 

5 (1) to promote transparency and accountability, 

6 and reduce corruption, including in governance 

7 structures targeted by the malign influence of the 

8 Government of the PRC or the CCP; 

9 (2) to support civil society and independent 

10 media to raise awareness of and increase trans11 parency regarding the negative impact of activities 

12 and initiatives of the Government of the PRC and 

13 the CCP, or entities acting on their behalf, including 

14 the Belt and Road Initiative and other initiatives 

15 that lack transparency, fail to meet international 

16 standards, and are associated with coercive economic 

17 practices; 

18 (3) to counter transnational criminal networks 

19 that benefit, or benefit from, the malign influence of 

20 the Government of the PRC, the CCP, or entities 

21 acting on their behalf; 

22 (4) to encourage economic development struc23 tures that help protect against predatory lending 

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1 natives in key economic sectors, such as digital econ2 omy, energy, and infrastructure; 

3 (5) to counter activities that provide undue in4 fluence to the security forces of the PRC; 

5 (6) to expose foreign influence operations and 

6 propaganda of the Government of the PRC, the 

7 CCP, or entities acting on their behalf; 

8 (7) to counter efforts by the Government of the 

9 PRC, the CCP, or entities acting on their behalf to 

10 legitimize or promote authoritarian ideology and 

11 governance models, including its model of a state12 dominated cyber and digital ecosystem; 

13 (8) to counter efforts by the Government of the 

14 PRC, the CCP, or entities acting on their behalf, to 

15 silence, intimidate, or exact reprisal against individ16 uals outside of their sovereign borders, including 

17 members of diaspora populations such as political 

18 opponents, repressed religious or spiritual practi19 tioners, marginalized ethnic community members, 

20 civil society activists, human rights defenders, re21 searchers, and journalists; 

22 (9) to provide alternatives to problematic PRC 

23 technology offerings, which could provide the Gov24 ernment of the PRC undue access to or influence 

25 over global data flows or sensitive information, and 


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1 compete with problematic PRC efforts to leverage or 

2 make gains in the development of advanced and 

3 emerging technologies; 

4 (10) to counter PRC activities that directly en5 able critical supply chain monopolization or other 

6 monopolistic practices; 

7 (11) to counter aggressive PRC efforts to make 

8 inroads into the nuclear energy sectors of countries 

9 to the detriment of United States national security, 

10 strategic, and nonproliferation interests; and 

11 (12) to counter efforts by the Government of 

12 the PRC, the CCP, or entities acting on their behalf, 

13 to undermine the democratic processes and institu14 tions of United States allies and partners. 

15 SEC. 183. GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT CENTER. 

16 (a) EXTENSION.—Section 1287(j) of the National 

17 Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (22 

18 U.S.C. 2656 note) is amended by striking ‘‘the date that 

19 is 8 years after the date of the enactment’’ and inserting 

20 ‘‘the date that is 13 years after the date of the enact21 ment’’. 

22 (b) AMENDMENTS.—Section 1287 of the National 

23 Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (22 

24 U.S.C. 2656 note) is amended— 


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1 (1) in subsection (a)(2), by striking ‘‘foreign 

2 state and foreign non-state propaganda and 

3 disinformation efforts,’’ and inserting ‘‘foreign state 

4 and non-state influence operations’’; 

5 (2) in subsection (b)— 

6 (A) in paragraph (3)— 

7 (i) by striking ‘‘propaganda and 

8 disinformation,’’ and inserting ‘‘foreign in9 fluence operations’’; and 

10 (ii) inserting ‘‘, including by working 

11 directly with United States embassies and 

12 consulates’’ before the period at the end; 

13 (B) in paragraph (4), by striking ‘‘refute 

14 foreign propaganda and disinformation,’’ and 

15 inserting ‘‘counter foreign influence oper16 ations’’; and 

17 (C) in paragraph (8)— 

18 (i) by striking ‘‘propaganda and 

19 disinformation,’’ and inserting ‘‘foreign in20 fluence operations,’’; and 

21 (ii) by striking ‘‘propaganda and 

22 disinformation is’’ and inserting ‘‘foreign 

23 influence operations are’’. 

24 (c) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con25 gress that the Secretary of State should empower the 


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1 Global Engagement Center to expand its coordinating ca2 pacity, including through the exchange of liaison officers 

3 with Federal departments and agencies that manage as4 pects of identifying and countering foreign influence oper5 ations. 

6 (d) COMPLEMENTING UNITED STATES EMBASSY OP7 ERATIONS.—In carrying out its mandate as outlined in 

8 section 1287 of the National Defense Authorization Act 

9 for Fiscal Year 2017, the Global Engagement Center 

10 should ensure its efforts complement United States Em11 bassy operations where applicable, including— 

12 (1) working with key posts to equip and sup13 port officers tasked with countering foreign influence 

14 operations; 

15 (2) supporting posts in developing country-spe16 cific programs to counter foreign influence oper17 ations; and 

18 (3) working with regional bureaus to ensure ef19 fective coordination and mutual visibility and input 

20 into regional strategies and activities related to for21 eign influence operations. 

22 (e) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 

23 authorized to be appropriated $150,000,000 for fiscal year 

24 2025 for the Global Engagement Center to counter foreign 

25 state and non-state influence operations. 


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1 SEC. 184. AMENDMENT TO THE MUTUAL EDUCATIONAL 

2 AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE ACT OF 1961. 

3 Section 108A(a)(1) of the Mutual Educational and 

4 Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2458a) is 

5 amended— 

6 (1) in subparagraph (B), by striking ‘‘; and’’ 

7 and inserting a semicolon; 

8 (2) in subparagraph (C), by striking the semi9 colon and inserting ‘‘and,’’; and 

10 (3) by adding at the end the following new sub11 paragraph: 

12 ‘‘(D) which is not an exchange with the 

13 People’s Republic of China, unless the Sec14 retary of State has determined and certified to 

15 the appropriate committees of Congress that 

16 participation by Federal employees in the ex17 change is in the national security interest of the 

18 United States.’’. 

19 SEC. 185. COUNTERING MALIGN INFORMATION OPER20 ATIONS IN THE AMERICAS. 

21 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con22 gress that— 

23 (1) foreign influence operations pose serious 

24 threats to national sovereignty, democratic govern25 ance and human rights; 


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1 (2) foreign influence operations in Latin Amer2 ica and the Caribbean— 

3 (A) have been carried out by the Maduro 

4 regime and other foreign state actors, including 

5 the PRC, the Republic of Cuba, the Russian 

6 Federation, and the Islamic Republic of Iran; 

7 and 

8 (B) have undermined United States na9 tional interests, including by— 

10 (i) undermining democratic electoral 

11 processes; 

12 (ii) exacerbating political polarization; 

13 and 

14 (iii) spreading false narratives con15 trary to the interests of the United States 

16 and its allies; and 

17 (3) the United States Government should en18 sure sufficient attention and resources are allocated 

19 to efforts to protect independent media spaces, 

20 strengthen transparency of links between local media 

21 ecosystems and foreign actors, and counter Spanish22 language and other non-English language foreign in23 fluence operations in Latin America and the Carib24 bean, including through Global Engagement Center 

25 research, grants, and programs. 


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1 (b) STRATEGY.—The Secretary of State shall develop 

2 and implement a strategy for protecting independent 

3 media spaces and countering the creation and amplifi4 cation of foreign state and nonstate influence operations 

5 in Latin America and the Caribbean and to identify initia6 tives in Latin America and the Caribbean to counter ef7 forts by the Governments of the PRC and the Russian 

8 Federation to undermine sovereignty, territorial integrity, 

9 and democratic processes and institutions in the region. 

10 (c) MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY.—The Secretary of 

11 State should convene summits, forums, and multi-stake12 holder initiatives to address global threats to independent 

13 media ecosystems and develop solutions to the challenges 

14 posed by foreign influence operations, which could in15 clude— 

16 (1) a ‘‘Latin America and Caribbean Tech 

17 Challenge’’ that is— 

18 (A) sponsored by the Global Engagement 

19 Center; and 

20 (B) aimed at advancing the development of 

21 innovative solutions to counter disinformation 

22 and propaganda across Latin America and the 

23 Caribbean; and 


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1 (2) a high-level, multi-stakeholder summit con2 vened by the Secretary of State in Latin America 

3 and the Caribbean that seeks to— 

4 (A) strengthen information sharing and 

5 other cooperation among regional governments, 

6 independent media, academia, tech companies, 

7 and civil society organizations in Latin America 

8 and the Caribbean for purposes of developing 

9 joint solutions to counter disinformation; 

10 (B) counter efforts by the PRC and Russia 

11 to undermine the sovereignty, territorial integ12 rity, and democratic processes and institutions 

13 of United States allies and partners; and 

14 (C) promote efforts to protect the sustain15 ability of independent media and freedom of the 

16 press. 

17 SEC. 186. GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS INITIATIVE. 

18 Section 552 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 

19 (22 U.S.C. 2348a) is amended by adding at the end the 

20 following new subsection: 

21 ‘‘(e) RESTRICTION RELATED TO PEOPLE’S REPUB22 LIC OF CHINA.—None of the funds authorized to be ap23 propriated or otherwise made available to carry out this 

24 chapter, including for the Global Peace Operations Initia25 tive of the United States Department of State, may be 


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1 used to train or support foreign military forces in peace2 keeping training exercises by the Government of the Peo3 ple’s Republic of China or the People’s Liberation Army 

4 unless, by not later than October 1 of each year, the Sec5 retary of State certifies to the Committee on Foreign Rela6 tions of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs 

7 of the House of Representatives that such training or sup8 port is important to the national security interests of the 

9 United States.’’. 

10 SEC. 187. EXPANSION OF SANCTIONS UNDER THE 

11 FENTANYL SANCTIONS ACT. 

12 Section 7212 of the Fentanyl Sanctions Act (21 

13 U.S.C. 2312) is amended— 

14 (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ‘‘; or’’ and in15 serting a semicolon; 

16 (2) in paragraph (2), by striking the period at 

17 the end and inserting a semicolon; and 

18 (3) by adding at the end the following new 

19 paragraphs: 

20 ‘‘(3) the President determines has knowingly 

21 engaged in, on or after the date of enactment of this 

22 paragraph, a significant activity or financial trans23 action that has materially contributed to, foreign 

24 opioid trafficking; or 

25 ‘‘(4) the President determines— 


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1 ‘‘(A) has received any property or interest 

2 in property that the foreign person knows— 

3 ‘‘(i) constitutes or is derived from the 

4 proceeds of an activity or transaction de5 scribed in paragraph (3); or 

6 ‘‘(ii) was used or intended to be used 

7 to commit or to facilitate such an activity 

8 or transaction; 

9 ‘‘(B) has knowingly provided significant fi10 nancial, material, or technological support for, 

11 including through the provision of goods or 

12 services in support of— 

13 ‘‘(i) any activity or transaction de14 scribed in paragraph (3); or 

15 ‘‘(ii) any foreign person described in 

16 paragraph (3); 

17 ‘‘(C) is or has been owned, controlled, or 

18 directed by, or has knowingly acted or pur19 ported to act for or on behalf of, directly or in20 directly, any foreign person described in para21 graph (3) or subparagraph (A) or (B).’’. 

22 SEC. 188. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO 

23 AGENCIES OR INSTRUMENTALITIES OF FOR24 EIGN STATES. 

25 The President shall— 


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1 (1) impose one or more of the sanctions de2 scribed in section 7213 of the Fentanyl Sanctions 

3 Act (21 U.S.C. 2313) with respect to each agency or 

4 instrumentality of a foreign state (as defined in sec5 tion 1603(b) of title 28, United States Code) that 

6 the President determines— 

7 (A) has engaged in, on or after the date of 

8 enactment of this section, a significant activity 

9 or transaction that has materially contributed 

10 to opioid trafficking; or 

11 (B) has provided, or attempted to provide, 

12 financial, material, or technological support for, 

13 including through the provision of goods or 

14 services in support of, any activity or trans15 action described in subparagraph (A); or 

16 (2) impose the sanction described in subsection 

17 (a)(6) of such section 7213 on each foreign person 

18 that the President determines— 

19 (A) is a senior official of an agency or in20 strumentality of a foreign state described in 

21 paragraph (1); or 

22 (B) that the President determines is or has 

23 been owned, controlled, or directed by, or has 

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1 strumentality of a foreign state described in 

2 paragraph (1). 

3 SEC. 189. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO 

4 MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE FACILITIES OF 

5 THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN CUBA. 

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall impose the 

7 sanctions described in subsection (b) with respect to any 

8 foreign person that the President determines has engaged 

9 in, after the date of enactment of this Act, a significant 

10 transaction or transactions, or any significant dealings 

11 with, or, after the date of enactment of this Act, has pro12 vided significant material support to or for a military or 

13 intelligence facility of the PRC in Cuba. 

14 (b) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—The sanctions de15 scribed in this subsection with respect to a foreign person 

16 are the following: 

17 (1) ASSET BLOCKING.—The exercise of all pow18 ers granted to the President by the International 

19 Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 

20 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit 

21 all transactions in all property and interests in prop22 erty of the foreign person if such property and inter23 ests in property are in the United States, come with24 in the United States, or are or come within the pos25 session or control of a United States person. 


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1 (2) EXCLUSION FROM THE UNITED STATES

2 AND REVOCATION OF VISA OR OTHER DOCUMENTA3 TION.—In the case of a foreign person who is an 

4 alien, denial of a visa to, and exclusion from the 

5 United States of, the alien, and revocation in accord6 ance with section 221(i) of the Immigration and Na7 tionality Act (8 U.S.C. 1201(i)), of any visa or other 

8 documentation of the alien. 

9 (c) IMPLEMENTATION; PENALTIES.— 

10 (1) IMPLEMENTATION.—The President shall ex11 ercise authorities provided under sections 203 and 

12 205 of the International Emergency Economic Pow13 ers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out this 

14 section. 

15 (2) PENALTIES.—A person that knowingly vio16 lates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or 

17 causes a violation of subsection (b)(1) or any regula18 tion, license, or order issued to carry out that sub19 section shall be subject to the penalties set forth in 

20 subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the Inter21 national Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 

22 U.S.C. 1705) to the same extent as a person that 

23 commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) 

24 of that section. 

25 (d) EXCEPTIONS.— 


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1 (1) IMPORTATION OF GOODS.— 

2 (A) IN GENERAL.—The authorities and re3 quirements to impose sanctions authorized 

4 under this section shall not include the author5 ity or a requirement to impose sanctions on the 

6 importation of goods. 

7 (B) GOOD DEFINED.—In this paragraph, 

8 the term ‘‘good’’ means any article, natural or 

9 manmade substance, material, supply, or manu10 factured product, including inspection and test 

11 equipment, and excluding technical data. 

12 (2) COMPLIANCE WITH UNITED NATIONS HEAD13 QUARTERS AGREEMENT.—Sanctions under sub14 section (b)(2) shall not apply to an alien if admitting 

15 the alien into the United States is necessary to per16 mit the United States to comply with the Agreement 

17 regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, 

18 signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered 

19 into force November 21, 1947, between the United 

20 Nations and the United States, or other applicable 

21 international obligations. 

22 (e) NATIONAL SECURITY WAIVER.—The President 

23 may waive the imposition of sanctions under this section 

24 with respect to a foreign person on a case-by-case basis 

25 if the President submits to the appropriate committees of 


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1 Congress a determination that the waiver is in the na2 tional interests of the United States. 

3 (f) TERMINATION OF SANCTIONS.—Notwithstanding 

4 any other provision of law, this section shall terminate on 

5 the date that is 30 days after the date on which the Presi6 dent determines and certifies to the appropriate commit7 tees of Congress (and Congress has not enacted legislation 

8 disapproving the determination within that 30-day period) 

9 that all military or intelligence facilities of the PRC in 

10 Cuba have been closed. 

11 (g) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

12 (1) ALIEN.—The term ‘‘alien’’ has the meaning 

13 given that term in section 101 of the Immigration 

14 and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101). 

15 (2) FOREIGN PERSON.—The term ‘‘foreign per16 son’’ means a person that is not a United States 

17 person. 

18 (3) PERSON.—The term ‘‘person’’ means an in19 dividual or entity. 

20 (4) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term 

21 ‘‘United States person’’ means— 

22 (A) an individual who is a United States 

23 citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for perma24 nent residence to the United States; 


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1 (B) an entity organized under the laws of 

2 the United States or any jurisdiction within the 

3 United States, including a foreign branch of 

4 such an entity; or 

5 (C) any person in the United States. 

6 SEC. 190. STRATEGIC STABILITY DIALOGUE AND ARMS 

7 CONTROL. 

8 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find9 ings: 

10 (1) The United States and the PRC have both 

11 made commitments to advancing strategic security 

12 through enforceable arms control and non-prolifera13 tion agreements as states parties to the Treaty on 

14 the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at 

15 Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968. 

16 (2) The United States has long taken tangible 

17 steps to seek effective, verifiable, and enforceable 

18 arms control and non-proliferation agreements that 

19 support United States and allied security by— 

20 (A) controlling the spread of nuclear mate21 rials and technology; 

22 (B) placing limits on the production, stock23 piling, and deployment of nuclear weapons; 

24 (C) decreasing the risk of misperception 

25 and miscalculation; and 


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1 (D) avoiding the destabilizing effects of 

2 nuclear arms competition. 

3 (3) The PRC’s current nuclear expansion, part 

4 of a massive modernization of the PLA that is ex5 pected to be completed by 2035, combined with the 

6 PLA’s aggressive actions, has increasingly desta7 bilized the Indo-Pacific region. 

8 (4) The long-planned United States nuclear 

9 modernization program will not increase the United 

10 States nuclear weapons stockpile, predates China’s 

11 conventional military and nuclear expansion, and is 

12 not an arms race against China. 

13 (5) The United States extended nuclear deter14 rence— 

15 (A) provides critical strategic security 

16 around the world; 

17 (B) is an essential element of United 

18 States military alliances; and 

19 (C) serves a vital non-proliferation func20 tion. 

21 (6) The United States has, on numerous occa22 sions, called on the PRC to participate in strategic 

23 arms control negotiations, and has sought to engage 

24 the PRC in a strategic stability dialogue, but the 

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1 logue would benefit the entire world by developing 

2 guardrails to ensure that competition does not veer 

3 into conflict. 

4 (7) Provocations such as the ‘‘balloon incident’’ 

5 in 2023 and the inability of United States officials 

6 to reach PRC counterparts via deconfliction lines 

7 underscore the need for further engagement on risk 

8 reduction, including through near-term dialogue and 

9 eventual arms control negotiations. 

10 (8) The Governments of Japan, the United 

11 Kingdom, Poland, Slovenia, Denmark, Norway, Lat12 via, Lithuania, Estonia, the Netherlands, Romania, 

13 Austria, Montenegro, Ukraine, Slovakia, Spain, 

14 North Macedonia, Sweden, the Czech Republic, Cro15 atia, and Albania, as well as the Deputy Secretary 

16 General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 

17 have all encouraged the PRC to join arms control 

18 discussions. 

19 (b) REPORT ON THE FUTURE OF UNITED STATES20 PRC INTERACTIONS ON NUCLEAR AND STRATEGIC

21 ISSUES.— 

22 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days 

23 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec24 retary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of 

25 Defense and the Secretary of Energy, shall submit 


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1 to the appropriate committees of Congress a report 

2 that outlines the strategy and objectives in engaging 

3 the Government of the PRC on nuclear and strategic 

4 issues, which shall include— 

5 (A) areas of potential dialogue between the 

6 Governments of the United States and the 

7 PRC, including the interplay of ballistic, 

8 hypersonic glide, and cruise missiles, conven9 tional forces, nuclear, space, artificial intel10 ligence and cyberspace issues, as well as other 

11 new strategic domains, which could reduce the 

12 likelihood of war, limit escalation if a conflict 

13 were to occur, and constrain a destabilizing 

14 arms race in the Indo-Pacific region; 

15 (B) the types of strategic military capabili16 ties of the PRC that the United States Govern17 ment is most interested in limiting; 

18 (C) an assessment of whether additional 

19 crisis consultation mechanisms should be devel20 oped to avoid, manage, or control inadvertent 

21 nuclear, conventional, and unconventional mili22 tary escalation between the United States and 

23 the PRC; 


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1 (D) the personnel and expertise required to 

2 effectively engage the PRC in strategic stability 

3 and arms control dialogues; and 

4 (E) opportunities and methods to encour5 age transparency and predictability from the 

6 PRC with regard to the growth and purpose of 

7 its nuclear and related strategic forces. 

8 (2) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required 

9 under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassi10 fied form, but may include a classified annex. 

11 SEC. 191. TRACK 1.5 DIALOGUES WITH THE PEOPLE’S RE12 PUBLIC OF CHINA ON NUCLEAR MATTERS. 

13 Not later than 15 days before any United States Gov14 ernment official participates in a Track 1.5 dialogue on 

15 nuclear policy with any institution under the direct control 

16 of the PRC or the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), in17 cluding the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of 

18 Defense, or the People’s Liberation Army of the PRC, the 

19 Secretary of State shall submit to the Committee on For20 eign Relations in the Senate and the Committee on For21 eign Affairs in the House of Representatives a notification 

22 of such United States official participation and a justifica23 tion for such participation, including how— 

24 (1) the Track 1.5 dialogue supports official 

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1 public of China on arms control, crisis stability, or 

2 other dialogues related to nuclear policy; and 

3 (2) United States Government official participa4 tion in the Track 1.5 dialogue directly supports the 

5 national security interests of the United States. 

6 SEC. 192. OVERSIGHT OF LIFE SCIENCES DUAL USE RE7 SEARCH OF CONCERN. 

8 (a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

9 (1) BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION.—The 

10 term ‘‘Biological Weapons Convention’’ means the 

11 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 

12 Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and 

13 Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, done at 

14 Washington, London, and Moscow, April 10, 1972. 

15 (2) LIFE SCIENCES DUAL USE RESEARCH OF

16 CONCERN.—The term ‘‘life sciences dual use re17 search of concern’’ means life sciences research 

18 that— 

19 (A) involves the Peoples Republic of China; 

20 and 

21 (B) based on current understanding can be 

22 reasonably anticipated to provide knowledge, in23 formation, products, or technologies that could 

24 be misapplied to do harm with no, or only 

25 minor, modification to pose a significant threat 


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1 with potential consequences to public health 

2 and safety, agricultural crops and other plants, 

3 animals, the environment, materiel, or national 

4 security. 

5 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the 

6 United States to— 

7 (1) conduct rigorous scrutiny of, and regularly 

8 review, collaboration on international biological, bac9 teriological, virological, and other relevant research 

10 that could be weaponized or could reasonably be con11 sidered life sciences dual-use research of concern, 

12 and incorporate national security and nonprolifera13 tion considerations and country-specific conditions 

14 into decisions regarding such collaboration; 

15 (2) ensure that, in the search for solutions to 

16 pressing global health challenges, United States Gov17 ernment support for public health research and 

18 other actions does not advance the capabilities of the 

19 PRC in the area of life sciences dual use research 

20 of concern or inadvertently contribute to the pro21 liferation of biological weapons technologies; and 

22 (3) declassify, to the maximum extent possible, 

23 all intelligence relevant to the PRC’s compliance or 

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1 tional security concerns regarding PRC biological, 

2 bacteriological, virological, and other relevant re3 search that could be weaponized or could reasonably 

4 be considered life sciences dual use research of con5 cern that may be outside the scope of the BWC. 

6 (c) OVERSIGHT OF LIFE SCIENCES DUAL USE RE7 SEARCH OF CONCERN.— 

8 (1) SECRETARY OF STATE.—The Secretary of 

9 State shall— 

10 (A) ensure robust and consistent Depart11 ment of State participation in interagency proc12 esses and review mechanisms related to over13 sight of life sciences dual-use research of con14 cern; 

15 (B) participate in interagency working 

16 groups and task forces related to vetting United 

17 States Government funding related to inter18 national cooperation in nonproliferation, life 

19 sciences, high containment laboratories, and in20 fectious diseases, to develop policies and proc21 esses for post-award oversight of grants and 

22 funding for life sciences dual use research of 

23 concern, including as aligned with current laws 

24 and regulations and for grants or funding from 

25 other Federal departments and agencies, in 


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1 order to keep apprised of any national security 

2 or foreign policy concerns that may arise with 

3 respect to an international project or a project 

4 involving a foreign partner, funded by another 

5 Federal department or agency; 

6 (C) conduct periodic reviews of the ade7 quacy of consultative mechanisms with other 

8 Federal Departments and agencies with respect 

9 to oversight of life sciences dual use research of 

10 concern, especially consultative mechanisms 

11 mandated in United States law, and identify 

12 recommendations for improving such consult13 ative mechanisms; 

14 (D) direct Chiefs of Mission to ensure 

15 Country Team Assessments are submitted to 

16 the Department of State and the head of the 

17 Federal department or agency proposing to 

18 sponsor a program or collaboration to assess 

19 whether such program or collaboration involves 

20 life sciences dual use research of concern, and 

21 ensure that such Assessments are integrated 

22 into relevant interagency processes; and 

23 (E) direct Chiefs of Mission to increase 

24 embassy reporting on life sciences dual use re25 search of concern, biosecurity hazards trends in 


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1 the development of synthetic biology and bio2 technology, and other related matters. 

3 (2) ADMINISTRATOR OF THE UNITED STATES

4 AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT.—The 

5 Administrator of the United States Agency for 

6 International Development shall report to and con7 sult with the Department of State on any proposed 

8 programs, projects, initiatives, or funding for life 

9 sciences dual use research of concern. 

10 (d) UNITED NATIONS AGENCIES, PROGRAMS, AND

11 FUNDS.— 

12 (1) REQUIREMENT.—The Permanent Rep13 resentative of the United States to the United Na14 tions should use the voice, vote, and influence of the 

15 United States at the United Nations to block rep16 resentatives from any country listed in paragraph 2 

17 from serving in leadership positions within any 

18 United Nations organ, fund, program, or related 

19 specialized agency with responsibility for global 

20 health security (including animal health), biosecu21 rity, atomic, biological or chemical weapons, or food 

22 security and agricultural development. 

23 (2) LIST OF COUNTRIES SPECIFIED.—The 

24 countries described in paragraph (1) are— 

25 (A) the People’s Republic of China; 


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1 (B) the Russian Federation; 

2 (C) the Islamic Republic of Iran; 

3 (D) the Democratic People’s Republic of 

4 Korea; 

5 (E) the Assad Regime of Syria; and 

6 (F) any other country specified in the re7 port required by section 403(a) of the Arms 

8 Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 

9 2593a(a)) in the relevant calendar year. 

10 (3) SUNSET.—This section shall terminate on 

11 the date that is 5 years after the date of the enact12 ment of this Act. 

13 Subtitle F—Strengthening United 

14 States Public Diplomacy 

15 SEC. 196. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS TO PRO16 MOTE UNITED STATES EDUCATION, EX17 CHANGE, CULTURAL, AND THE FULBRIGHT18 HAYS PROGRAM. 

19 There is authorized to be appropriated, for each year 

20 of the 5-year period beginning on October 1, 2025, 

21 $20,000,000, to promote education, training, research, 

22 and foreign language skills through the Fulbright-Hays 

23 Program, in accordance with section 102(b) of the Mutual 

24 Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (22 

25 U.S.C. 2452(b)). 


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1 SEC. 197. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY TRAINING. 

2 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con3 gress that— 

4 (1) the PRC has invested heavily in public di5 plomacy efforts that promote positive narratives of 

6 the PRC while obfuscating the nefarious actions of 

7 the government against its own people, its use of 

8 threats and coercive diplomacy to demand deference 

9 from other countries, its use of United Front Work 

10 Department, affiliated organizations, and other tools 

11 and tactics to conduct malign influence operations 

12 and undermine democratic values in other countries, 

13 and its anti-competitive economic practices; 

14 (2) these include huge state-sponsored invest15 ments into media outlets throughout the world, ad16 vancement of censorship, and the establishment of 

17 cultural centers; and 

18 (3) the United States must respond with invest19 ment, training, and personnel to effectively counter 

20 these public diplomacy efforts. 

21 (b) HIRING.—The Secretary of State should 

22 prioritize increasing recruitment, hiring of, and the place23 ment of public diplomacy officers for the purposes of stra24 tegic competition. 

25 (c) TRAINING.—The Secretary of State shall require 

26 all Foreign Service Officers to regularly complete public 


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1 diplomacy training courses through the Foreign Service 

2 Institute or other Department-approved professional de3 velopment training in public diplomacy, including pre4 paring them to— 

5 (1) counter foreign malign influence, especially 

6 the effective use by the PRC, Russia, and other rel7 evant countries of tools to influence and manipulate 

8 foreign audiences, present narratives favorable to 

9 their regimes, undermine democratic values and fun10 damental freedoms, and obfuscate harmful or coer11 cive policies and practices; 

12 (2) understand foreign media landscapes to un13 derstand how United States public diplomacy efforts 

14 can be most effective; and 

15 (3) partner with local organizations focused on 

16 countering malign foreign influence, including 

17 through disinformation, public influence campaigns, 

18 and other means. 

19 (d) DEVELOPING DEPARTMENT-WIDE GUIDANCE.— 

20 The Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy shall, in con21 sultation with United States missions abroad, develop De22 partment-wide guidance for public diplomacy officers and 

23 senior officers at posts to enable them to better counter 

24 foreign malign influence, as described in subsection (c). 


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1 (e) FORM OF GUIDANCE.—The guidance required 

2 under subsection (d) may take the form of— 

3 (1) regularly updated cables; 

4 (2) a handbook for the development of public 

5 diplomacy efforts at post to counter foreign malign 

6 influence; and 

7 (3) other forms of guidance as determined ap8 propriate by the Under Secretary. 

9 SEC. 198. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY EFFORTS. 

10 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con11 gress that— 

12 (1) the Peoples’ Republic of China, Russia, and 

13 other strategic competitors vastly overshadow the 

14 United States in efforts to shape global public opin15 ion in favor of their own narrow political, commer16 cial, and economic interests, including through pro17 moting disinformation and propaganda as well as in18 vesting in exchange programs, scholarships, cultural 

19 diplomacy, and other programs; 

20 (2) the United States must utilize its full spec21 trum of public diplomacy tools to promote United 

22 States interests and security as well as combat Rus23 sian and PRC disinformation; and 

24 (3) the Department of State should ensure that 

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1 erate locally tailored public diplomacy programming 

2 that advances United States national security objec3 tives. 

4 (b) STRATEGY.—Not later than 180 days after the 

5 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State 

6 shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress 

7 a strategy to modernize and increase the operational and 

8 programming capacity of American Spaces, American Cor9 ners, and American Centers throughout the world, includ10 ing on— 

11 (1) leveraging public private partnerships; 

12 (2) options for United States Government sti13 pends or additional pay to augment the current sala14 ries of local staff at partner organizations hosting 

15 American Spaces to locally employed staff of Amer16 ican Spaces and American Corners; and 

17 (3) opportunities for United States businesses 

18 and nongovernmental organizations to better utilize 

19 American Spaces in alignment with overall United 

20 States Government priorities. 

21 SEC. 199. SUPPORTING INDEPENDENT MEDIA AND COUN22 TERING FOREIGN INFORMATION OPER23 ATIONS. 

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1 ence campaigns, advertising, and investments into state2 sponsored media publications outside of the PRC. This in3 cludes, for example, more than $10,000,000,000 in foreign 

4 direct investment in communications infrastructure, plat5 forms, and properties, as well as bringing journalists to 

6 the PRC for training programs. 

7 (b) THE UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR GLOBAL

8 MEDIA.—The United States Agency for Global Media 

9 (USAGM) and affiliate Federal and non-Federal entities 

10 shall, consistent with the other executive branch under11 takings in this Act led by the President or the Secretary 

12 of State, and in accordance with the highest standards of 

13 journalism, undertake the following actions to support 

14 independent journalism, counter foreign malign influence, 

15 and combat surveillance in countries where the Chinese 

16 Communist Party (CCP) and other malign actors are pro17 moting foreign information operations, propaganda, and 

18 manipulated media markets: 

19 (1) Radio Free Asia (RFA) and Voice of Amer20 ica (VOA) shall expand coverage and digital pro21 gramming in China for all China services and other 

22 affiliate language broadcasting services. 

23 (2) All USAGM operating entities shall seek to 

24 increase coverage on CCP influence in their coverage 

25 regions, including RFA in Asia, RFE/RL in Central 


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1 Asia, MBN in the Middle East, Office of Cuba 

2 Broadcasting in Cuba, and Voice America globally. 

3 (3) Radio Free Asia (RFA) shall expand its 

4 Mandarin-language Asia Fact Check Lab to expose 

5 and analyze false narratives on social media by pro6 Beijing influencers and content creators. 

7 (4) Voice of America shall continue the bilin8 gual Asia Fact Check Lab, established in 2022, and 

9 expand on the Jiehuang Pindao initiative to continue 

10 identifying and exposing PRC information oper11 ations. 

12 (5) Middle East Broadcasting Networks, Inc. 

13 (MBN) shall expand coverage of the PRC’s influence 

14 in the Middle East and North Africa, a topic that 

15 is void on indigenous media in the region. 

16 (6) USAGM shall expand existing training and 

17 partnership programs that promote journalistic 

18 standards, investigative reporting, cybersecurity, and 

19 digital analytics to help expose and counter false 

20 CCP narratives. 

21 (7) The Open Technology Fund shall continue 

22 its work to support applied research, and the devel23 opment and deployment of tools and technologies to 

24 circumvent censorship and surveillance by the CCP, 


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1 both inside the PRC as well as abroad where the 

2 PRC has exported these technologies. 

3 (8) Voice of America shall continue its mission 

4 of providing accurate, objective, and comprehensive 

5 news as well as presenting the policies of the United 

6 States clearly and effectively. 

7 (9) The Office of Cuba Broadcasting (OCB) 

8 shall continue its work promoting freedom and de9 mocracy by providing the people of Cuba with objec10 tive news and information, including exposing and 

11 reporting on Chinese disinformation and malign in12 fluence for its Cuban and Latin American audiences. 

13 (10) RFE/RL shall establish an investigative 

14 unit dedicated to working across Central Asia to de15 velop multimedia responses to local information op16 eration efforts by the CCP and other malign actors. 

17 (11) All USAGM operating units may establish 

18 or further develop investigative units. 

19 (12) The networks and grantees of the United 

20 States Agency for Global Media shall continue their 

21 mission of providing credible and timely news cov22 erage, including on the PRC’s malign behavior and 

23 activities across the world. 

24 (c) AUTHORIZATIONS OF APPROPRIATIONS.— 


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1 (1) USAGM.—There is authorized to be appro2 priated, for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029 

3 for the United States Agency for Global Media, 

4 $1,500,000. 

5 (2) MEDIA SUPPORT.—There is authorized to 

6 be appropriated, for each of fiscal years 2025 

7 through 2029, $250,000,000 for ongoing and new 

8 programs to support local media, build independent 

9 media, combat PRC information operations inside 

10 and outside of China, invest in technology to subvert 

11 censorship, and monitor and evaluate these pro12 grams. Such funds shall be directed to— 

13 (A) RFA to expand— 

14 (i) its China language services (includ15 ing Mandarin, Cantonese, Uyghur, and Ti16 betan); 

17 (ii) its coverage in Southeast Asia and 

18 the Pacific Islands to counter the Chinese 

19 Communist Party’s propaganda; 

20 (iii) its Global Mandarin digital brand 

21 WHYNOT/Wainao, which engages Chi22 nese-speaking populations both inside 

23 China and around the world; 

24 (iv) its investigative unit, which 

25 probes PRC influence and relevant issues 


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1 including transnational repression and 

2 cross-border crime in Asia, the Pacific, and 

3 globally; and 

4 (v) its Asia Fact Check Lab, which 

5 counters and analyzes PRC disinformation 

6 and malign influence in the information 

7 space. 

8 (B) RFE/RL to increase Kazakh, Kyrgyz, 

9 Tajik, Turkmen, and Uzbek language services; 

10 (C) the Open Technology Fund for censor11 ship circumvention and privacy enhancing tech12 nologies which contribute to— 

13 (i) enabling Chinese citizens to safely 

14 access independent news and information; 

15 and 

16 (ii) countering Chinese information 

17 control technologies in authoritarian coun18 tries where they are being exported and 

19 adopted; 

20 (D) MBN to increase coverage of China’s 

21 influence in the region through its award-win22 ning investigative reporting, including expan23 sion of its digital series ‘‘Did it Really Hap24 pen?’’ to counter false narratives being spread 

25 by the PRC through social media; 


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1 (E) OCB to increase efforts to expose and 

2 counter China’s active propaganda and 

3 disinformation machine within Cuba, including 

4 expanded fact-checking, journalistic training, 

5 and investments in technology; and 

6 (F) Voice of America to expand— 

7 (i) its coverage addressing China’s 

8 malign influences within China and across 

9 Africa, Latin America, Asia, and Eurasia; 

10 (ii) direct reporting in key regions, in11 cluding Taiwan and the Pacific Islands, in12 cluding establishing a Mongolian Service; 

13 and 

14 (iii) Open-Source Intelligence jour15 nalism, to leverage data mining capabilities 

16 to uncover insights into China’s domestic 

17 developments and its global activities. 

18 (d) REPORT TO CONGRESS.—Not later than one year 

19 after the date of the enactment of this Act, USAGM shall 

20 submit to Congress a report on the audience size and part21 nerships developed in furtherance of its efforts to counter 

22 CCP’s malign influence. 

23 SEC. 199A. SUPPORT FOR LOCAL MEDIA. 

24 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, acting 

25 through the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, the 


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1 Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human 

2 Rights, and Labor and in coordination with the Adminis3 trator of the United States Agency for International De4 velopment, shall support civil society and foreign media 

5 organizations in the implementation of programs to train 

6 foreign media personnel on investigative techniques, pro7 vide journalist protection, improve media literacy among 

8 the school-aged and general populations, boost access to 

9 accurate and reliable news and information generally, as 

10 well as other media-related activities in order to ensure 

11 public accountability related to the Belt and Road Initia12 tive and the Global Development Initiative, the PRC’s use 

13 of and export of surveillance and other technologies, and 

14 other influence operations abroad direct or directly sup15 ported by the Chinese Communist Party or the Govern16 ment of the PRC. 

17 (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 

18 authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State, 

19 for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029, $100,000,000 

20 in support of the activities outlined in subsection (a), in21 cluding for ongoing and new programs in support of press 

22 freedom, training, media literacy, and protection of jour23 nalists. 


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1 TITLE II—INVESTING IN ALLI2 ANCES, PARTNERSHIPS, AND 

3 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZA4 TIONS 

5 Subtitle A—Strategic and 

6 Diplomatic Matters 

7 PART I—PROMOTING UNITED STATES LEADER8 SHIP ON MATTERS RELATED TO THE INDO9 PACIFIC 

10 SEC. 201. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONDEMNING THE PRC’S 

11 SUPPORT FOR RUSSIA’S WAR ON UKRAINE. 

12 It is the sense of Congress that— 

13 (1) the PRC and the Russian Federation are 

14 strengthening their relationship to advance their mu15 tual interests, including in creating divisions between 

16 the United States and its allies and partners; 

17 (2) the PRC is supporting Russia’s unprovoked, 

18 full-scale, and brutal invasion of Ukraine, including 

19 through increasing trade with Russia by 30 percent 

20 in 2022, and another 26.3 percent in 2023, pur21 chasing 2,140,000 barrels of Russian crude oil per 

22 day in 2023 under embargo by the transatlantic alli23 ance, selling high-precision machinery, electronics, 

24 base metals, textiles and apparel, vehicles, ships, air25 craft to Russia, abetting sanctions evasion in counVerDate Sep 11 2014 18:11 Jan 13, 2025 Jkt 059200 PO 00000 Frm 00200 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S5491.IS S5491

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1 tries on Russia’s borders, and amplifying Russian 

2 propaganda and false information; 

3 (3) the PRC has explored providing weapons 

4 and ammunition to the Russian Federation in order 

5 to support that country’s unlawful, imperialist war 

6 of aggression against Ukraine; 

7 (4) the Government of the PRC is not taking 

8 sufficient action to prevent PRC-based companies 

9 from exporting lethal equipment to the Russian Fed10 eration, as revealed by the credible evidence that 

11 PRC companies and entities have— 

12 (A) shipped unmanned aerial vehicles to 

13 Russia that were designated on customs forms 

14 as being ‘‘for use in the special military oper15 ation.’’; 

16 (B) supplied Iran with drone parts that 

17 were later used by Russian forces in Ukraine; 

18 (C) sent ‘‘Tiger’’ armored personnel car19 riers to Chechen forces, raising the possibility 

20 that these vehicles being could be deployed to 

21 Ukraine; 

22 (D) shipped tens of thousands of kilograms 

23 of smokeless gunpowder to a munitions factory 

24 in Russia; 


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1 (E) provided Russia with optical parts 

2 used in tanks and armored vehicles; 

3 (F) provided nitrocellulose used in gun4 powder; and 

5 (G) allowed the shipment of dual use en6 gines for missiles and drones to Russia; 

7 (5) because of the PRC’s ongoing support for 

8 Russia’s war against Ukraine, the United States has 

9 sanctioned numerous PRC and Hong Kong-based 

10 entities; 

11 (6) the PRC’s support for Russia’s war against 

12 Ukraine threatens European stability and security, 

13 including that of those countries that the United 

14 States is committed to defend under the terms of 

15 the North Atlantic Treaty; 

16 (7) the United States, the European Union, 

17 and European countries must continue and increase 

18 implementation of sanctions and other appropriate 

19 economic tools against PRC firms supporting the 

20 Russian Federation’s war against Ukraine, including 

21 those supporting Russian paramilitary organizations; 

22 (8) the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s 

23 (NATO’s) 2022 Strategic Concept correctly recog24 nizes the need to prepare for, and respond to, the 

25 threats posed by the PRC to Euro-Atlantic security, 


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1 including threats derived from its relationship with 

2 the Russian Federation and its efforts to divide 

3 United States and European allies; 

4 (9) NATO members must work to implement 

5 and build on steps identified in NATO’s Strategic 

6 Concept, including building greater NATO expertise 

7 on the PRC and its military and intelligence 

8 apparatuses, using NATO summits as an oppor9 tunity to check progress and update priorities, and 

10 making any needed adjustments to NATO’s oper11 ational plans to account for the ownership or in12 volvement of PRC state-owned enterprises and other 

13 entities in space, key seaports, communications 

14 nodes, and airports; 

15 (10) the Government of the PRC has been clear 

16 about its desire to be included in diplomatic discus17 sions about ending Russia’s war in Ukraine, includ18 ing through the February 2023 publication of a 12- 

19 point position paper on the ‘‘political settlement of 

20 the Ukraine crisis’’ and the appointment of a Special 

21 Envoy for Eurasian Affairs; 

22 (11) the Government of the PRC has done 

23 nothing to deliver tangible outcomes on the elements 

24 of its position paper beyond symbolic actions; 


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1 (12) although the PRC’s position paper calls 

2 for the full implementation of the July 2022 United 

3 Nations-brokered Black Sea Grain Initiative as a 

4 means to maintain global food security, and despite 

5 Xi Jinping’s emphasis on food security for his own 

6 country, the Government of the PRC did nothing to 

7 pressure the Russian Federation to return to the 

8 deal, which it abrogated in July 2023; 

9 (13) President Joseph R. Biden rightly dis10 missed the PRC’s ‘‘peace plan’’ (referring to the 12- 

11 point position paper) as something that would not 

12 help ‘‘anyone other than Russia,’’ as he stated in 

13 February 2023; 

14 (14) the United States should remain wary of 

15 PRC engagement in Ukraine and instead focus its 

16 efforts on strengthening the coalition of like-minded 

17 partners in support of Ukraine’s full sovereignty and 

18 territorial integrity; 

19 (15) given the PRC’s significant support for 

20 Russia, Xi Jinping and the Government of the PRC 

21 should not be viewed as impartial brokers that will 

22 bring this war to an end on terms that will be posi23 tive for Ukraine, its independence, and the security 

24 of Europe; 


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1 (16) although Russia and the PRC have dis2 agreements, both countries assess that their partner3 ship is critical to countering the United States; 

4 (17) PRC diplomatic involvement in Ukraine 

5 would lead to greater PRC involvement in European 

6 security issues, while also presenting the PRC as a 

7 responsible party to the international community; 

8 (18) it is of vital importance that the United 

9 States and Europe remain united in confronting the 

10 security and economic risks posed by a significant 

11 PRC role in diplomatic efforts to end Russia’s war 

12 in Ukraine, executing policies that account for great13 er Sino-Russian alignment, and working together 

14 closely on planning ahead for reconstruction of 

15 Ukraine; 

16 (19) as earlier PRC investments in Ukraine 

17 targeted strategic sectors, any post-war PRC invest18 ments in Ukraine would give the PRC access to val19 uable military technology and know-how, as Ukraine 

20 inherited roughly one-third of the Soviet Union’s de21 fense-industrial base and 15 percent of Soviet mili22 tary research and development facilities, and during 

23 its war against Russia, has made great strides in the 

24 development of certain defense items; and 


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1 (20) given the PRC’s documented track record 

2 on corruption, a role for the PRC in Ukraine’s re3 construction would likely undercut extensive ongoing 

4 United States and European efforts to align Ukrain5 ian governance and anti-corruption standards with 

6 those of Western institutions, as well as the Euro7 pean Union’s (EU) progress in helping Ukraine ad8 here to the standards required for its eventual entry 

9 into the EU. 

10 SEC. 202. UNITED STATES COMMITMENT AND SUPPORT 

11 FOR ALLIES AND PARTNERS IN THE INDO-PA12 CIFIC. 

13 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con14 gress that— 

15 (1) the United States alliances in the Indo-Pa16 cific provide a unique strategic advantage to the 

17 United States and are among the United States’ 

18 most vital relationships, enabling the United States 

19 Government to advance its vital national interests, 

20 defend its territory, expand its economy through 

21 international trade and commerce, establish endur22 ing cooperation among like-minded countries, pre23 vent the domination of the Indo-Pacific by a hostile 

24 power or powers, and ensure the region’s sea, skies, 


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1 and other shared domains remain free and open and 

2 are lawfully governed; 

3 (2) the United States, Japan, the Republic of 

4 Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand are 

5 critical allies in advancing a free and open order in 

6 the Indo-Pacific region and tackling challenges with 

7 unity of purpose, and have a strong record of col8 laboration on shared interests in areas such as de9 fense and security, economic prosperity, infrastruc10 ture connectivity, and fundamental freedoms; 

11 (3) the United States greatly values other part12 nerships in the Indo-Pacific region, including with 

13 India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, New Zealand, 

14 Taiwan, and Vietnam as well as regional architec15 ture such as the Quad, the Association of Southeast 

16 Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Asia-Pacific Eco17 nomic Cooperation (APEC), which are essential to 

18 further shared interests; 

19 (4) the security environment in the Indo-Pacific 

20 region demands consistent United States and allied 

21 commitment to strengthening and advancing our al22 liances so that they are postured to meet key chal23 lenges, and will require sustained political will, con24 crete partnerships, economic, commercial, and tech25 nological cooperation, consistent and tangible comVerDate Sep 11 2014 18:11 Jan 13, 2025 Jkt 059200 PO 00000 Frm 00207 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S5491.IS S5491

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1 mitments, high-level and extensive consultations on 

2 matters of mutual interest, mutual and shared co3 operation in the acquisition of key capabilities im4 portant to allied defenses, and unified mutual sup5 port in the face of political, economic, or military co6 ercion; 

7 (5) fissures in the United States alliance rela8 tionships and partnerships benefit United States ad9 versaries and weaken collective ability to advance 

10 shared interests; 

11 (6) the United States must work with allies to 

12 prioritize human rights, good governance, and anti13 corruption throughout the Indo-Pacific region; 

14 (7) the Indo-Pacific region is vulnerable to nat15 ural shocks and stresses, making humanitarian and 

16 disaster relief, stewardship of natural resources, and 

17 food and water security important areas of coopera18 tion between the United States and partner coun19 tries; and 

20 (8) the United States should continue to engage 

21 and deepen cooperation with allies and partners of 

22 the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, in the 

23 areas of— 

24 (A) disaster risk reduction, including ef25 forts to enhance effective forecasting, reduce 


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1 vulnerability, and build resilience to natural 

2 shocks and stresses; 

3 (B) disaster response and early recovery; 

4 (C) humanitarian assistance and food secu5 rity; 

6 (D) sustainable uses of forest and water 

7 resources with the goal of promoting economic 

8 security while preserving biodiversity and access 

9 to safe drinking water; and 

10 (E) fisheries and marine resource con11 servation. 

12 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy 

13 of the United States— 

14 (1) to deepen diplomatic, economic, and secu15 rity cooperation between and among the United 

16 States, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, the 

17 Philippines, and Thailand, including, as appropriate, 

18 through diplomatic engagement, regional develop19 ment, energy security and development, scientific 

20 and health partnerships, educational and cultural ex21 changes, missile defense, intelligence-sharing, space, 

22 cyber, and other diplomatic and defense-related ini23 tiatives; 

24 (2) to uphold United States multilateral and bi25 lateral treaty obligations, including— 


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1 (A) defending Australia under article IV of 

2 the Australia, New Zealand, and United States 

3 Security Treaty (ANZUS); 

4 (B) defending Japan, including territories 

5 under the administration of Japan, under arti6 cle V of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and 

7 Security Between the United States of America 

8 and Japan; 

9 (C) defending the Republic of Korea under 

10 article III of the Mutual Defense Treaty Be11 tween the United States and the Republic of 

12 Korea; 

13 (D) defending the Philippines under Arti14 cle IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty Between 

15 the United States and the Republic of the Phil16 ippines; and 

17 (E) defending Thailand under Article IV of 

18 the 1954 Manila Pact and the Thanat-Rusk 

19 communique of 1962; 

20 (3) to strengthen and deepen the United States 

21 regional and multilateral partnerships, including 

22 with ASEAN, and to support ASEAN centrality in 

23 the region; 

24 (4) to cooperate with Australia, Japan, the Re25 public of Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand to 


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1 promote human rights bilaterally and multilaterally, 

2 including through regional fora; 

3 (5) to support the continued development and 

4 implementation of an enhanced trilateral security 

5 partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom, 

6 and the United States under the auspices of 

7 ‘‘AUKUS’’; and 

8 (6) to strengthen and advance diplomatic, eco9 nomic, and security cooperation with regional part10 ners, such as India, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zea11 land, Singapore, Taiwan, and Vietnam. 

12 SEC. 203. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON COOPERATION WITH 

13 THE QUAD. 

14 It is the sense of Congress that— 

15 (1) the United States should continue to reaf16 firm its commitment to quadrilateral cooperation 

17 among Australia, India, Japan, and the United 

18 States (the ‘‘Quad’’) to enhance and implement a 

19 shared vision to meet shared regional challenges and 

20 to promote a free, open, inclusive and resilient Indo21 Pacific that is characterized by democracy, rule of 

22 law, and market-based economic growth, and is free 

23 from undue influence and coercion; 

24 (2) the United States should seek to expand 

25 collaboration with Quad partners to bring concrete 


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1 benefits to the Indo-Pacific region, including benefits 

2 with respect to the rule of law, freedom of naviga3 tion and overflight, peaceful resolution of disputes, 

4 democratic values, economic prosperity and security, 

5 infrastructure development, energy access and secu6 rity, technological advancement, territorial integrity, 

7 peace and prosperity, and democratic resilience; 

8 (3) the United States should seek to expand 

9 avenues of cooperation with the Quad, including 

10 more coordinated policies related to such shared in11 terests as protecting cyberspace and advancing mari12 time security; 

13 (4) the cooperation under the Indo-Pacific Part14 nership for Maritime Domain Awareness, announced 

15 at the fourth Quad leaders meeting on May 24, 

16 2022, will contribute to the region’s shared maritime 

17 domain awareness picture, which is a critical compo18 nent to achieving peace, stability, and prosperity in 

19 the maritime domain; 

20 (5) Quad commitments to address shared chal21 lenges in new areas such as resilience in the Pacific 

22 Islands region, space, cyberspace, and critical and 

23 emerging technologies, and to continue to work to 

24 address pandemic preparedness, to provide quality 

25 infrastructure investment, humanitarian assistance, 


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1 and disaster relief, and to enhance people-to-people 

2 ties, including through the announcement of a Quad 

3 Fellowship in September 2021, further advance the 

4 important cooperation among Quad nations that is 

5 so critical to the Indo-Pacific region; 

6 (6) the United States and other Quad nations, 

7 including through partnerships with multilateral de8 velopment banks, should work together to finance 

9 and otherwise cooperate on development and infra10 structure projects in the Indo-Pacific region that are 

11 sustainable and offer a viable alternative to the in12 vestments of the PRC in that region under the Belt 

13 and Road Initiative and the Global Development Ini14 tiative; and 

15 (7) in consultation with other Quad countries, 

16 the President should continue to prioritize clear, 

17 concrete deliverables related to Quad priorities, par18 ticularly for leader-level working groups, to increase 

19 the Quad’s operational effectiveness and strategic 

20 value by demonstrating that the Quad can deliver 

21 tangible results while remaining agile enough to ad22 just as needs and conditions change. 

23 SEC. 204. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON ENHANCING UNITED 

24 STATES-TAIWAN PARTNERSHIP. 

25 It is the policy of the United States— 


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1 (1) to recognize Taiwan as a vital part of the 

2 United States Indo-Pacific strategy; 

3 (2) to advance the security of Taiwan and its 

4 democracy as key elements for the continued peace 

5 and stability of the greater Indo-Pacific region, and 

6 a vital national security interest of the United 

7 States; 

8 (3) to secure United States interests and pre9 serve the ability of the people of Taiwan to deter10 mine their own future, and to strenuously oppose 

11 any action by the PRC to use force to change the 

12 status quo of Taiwan; 

13 (4) to strengthen cooperation with the military 

14 of Taiwan under the framework of the Taiwan Rela15 tions Act (Public Law 96–8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) 

16 and the Six Assurances, with consideration of the 

17 ongoing military buildup in the PRC and the mili18 tary balance in the Taiwan Strait, and to transfer 

19 defense articles to Taiwan to enhance its capabili20 ties, including to advance its ability to contribute to 

21 denying the PRC coercion and potential invasion; 

22 (5) to support Taiwan’s implementation of its 

23 asymmetric defense strategy; 

24 (6) to encourage Taiwan to continue increasing 

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1 forms that enable the full resourcing and effective2 ness of its defense strategy; 

3 (7) to support Taiwan’s vibrant democracy and 

4 free and fair elections, and promote dignity and re5 spect for the democratically elected leaders of Tai6 wan, who represent more than 23,000,000 people, by 

7 using the full range of diplomatic and other appro8 priate tools available to promote Taiwan’s inter9 national space; 

10 (8) to advocate and actively advance Taiwan’s 

11 meaningful participation in the United Nations and 

12 its specialized agencies, the World Health Assembly, 

13 the International Criminal Police Organization, and 

14 other international bodies as appropriate; 

15 (9) to advocate for information sharing with 

16 Taiwan in the International Agency for Research on 

17 Cancer; 

18 (10) to promote meaningful cooperation among 

19 the United States, Taiwan, and other like-minded 

20 partners; 

21 (11) to enhance bilateral trade, including 

22 through new agreements and the United States-Tai23 wan 21st Century Trade Initiative; 

24 (12) to include Taiwan as a partner in the 

25 Indo-Pacific Economic Framework; 


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1 (13) to actively engage in negotiations in pursu2 ance of a bilateral free trade agreement and tax 

3 agreement to avoid double taxation and promote 

4 trade and investment; 

5 (14) to expand bilateral economic and techno6 logical cooperation, including improving supply chain 

7 security; 

8 (15) to support United States educational and 

9 exchange programs with Taiwan, including by pro10 moting the study of Chinese language, culture, his11 tory, and politics in Taiwan; 

12 (16) to expand people-to-people exchanges be13 tween the United States and Taiwan; 

14 (17) to ensure that distinctions in practice re15 garding United States relations with Taiwan are 

16 consistent with the longstanding, comprehensive, 

17 strategic, and values-based relationship the United 

18 States shares with Taiwan, and contribute to the 

19 peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues; and 

20 (18) to further enhance United States relations 

21 with Taiwan by forming a robust partnership that— 

22 (A) meets current geopolitical challenges; 

23 (B) fully accounts for Taiwan’s democratic 

24 status; and 


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1 (C) remains faithful to United States prin2 ciples and values, consistent with the Taiwan 

3 Relations Act and the Six Assurances. 

4 SEC. 205. EXPANDING EXPERTISE ON TAIWAN MATTERS. 

5 (a) PERMANENT PERSONNEL REALIGNMENT.—Not 

6 later than the end of fiscal year 2024, the Secretary of 

7 State shall realign up to twelve full-time equivalent per8 sonnel to the American Institute in Taiwan. 

9 (b) ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL.— 

10 (1) AMERICAN INSTITUTE IN TAIWAN.—The 

11 American Institute in Taiwan should increase staff12 ing by not less than four additional full-time equiva13 lent personnel at the American Institute in Taiwan 

14 in Washington. 

15 (2) OFFICE OF TAIWAN COORDINATION.—There 

16 is authorized to be appropriated $800,000 for four 

17 additional full-time equivalent personnel at the Of18 fice of Taiwan Coordination at the Department of 

19 State. 

20 (c) NOTIFICATION.—Not later than 30 days after the 

21 Secretary of State carries out the requirement in sub22 section (a), the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate 

23 committees of Congress a notification that includes a de24 scription of the role of each realigned full-time equivalent 

25 personnel and how such realignment addresses gaps in the 


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1 American Institute in Taiwan’s ability to advance United 

2 States interests with respect to Taiwan. 

3 SEC. 206. UNITED STATES-SOUTH KOREA ALLIANCE. 

4 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find5 ings: 

6 (1) On October 1, 1953, the United States and 

7 the Republic of Korea signed the Mutual Defense 

8 Treaty between the United States and the Republic 

9 of Korea. 

10 (2) First agreed to in 1991, the ‘‘Agreement 

11 between the United States of America and the Re12 public of Korea Concerning Special Measures Relat13 ing to Article V of the Agreement under Article IV 

14 of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United 

15 States of America and the Republic of Korea Re16 garding Facilities and Areas and the Status of 

17 United States Armed Forces in the Republic of 

18 Korea’’ (referred to in this section as the ‘‘SMA’’), 

19 established the sharing of non-personnel stationing 

20 costs associated with the presence of United States 

21 forces in the Republic of Korea. 

22 (3) After eight rounds of consultations, the 

23 United States and the Republic of Korea reached 

24 consensus on ad ref texts for a renewed SMA on Oc25 tober 3, 2024. 


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1 (4) The renewed SMA and the accompanying 

2 Implementing Arrangement for the Special Measures 

3 Agreement (‘‘SMA IA’’) were signed in Seoul, South 

4 Korea, on November 4, 2024, becoming the 12th 

5 iteration of the SMA. 

6 (5) Under the renewed SMA and consistent 

7 with United States objectives, the United States and 

8 the Republic of Korea agreed to a topline 8.3 per9 cent increase in the contribution from the Republic 

10 of South Korea as compared to the calendar year 

11 2025 contribution. 

12 (6) The renewed SMA meets additional United 

13 States priority objectives, including maintaining the 

14 United States position of protecting the authority of 

15 the United States Forces Korea (USFK) Com16 mander to allocate funds within and between the 

17 three cost categories in accordance with operational 

18 and mission requirements. 

19 (7) The renewed SMA and IA entered into 

20 force on November 29, 2024, following notification 

21 in writing by the United States and the Republic of 

22 South Korea that their respective domestic proce23 dures necessary for the agreement’s entry into force 

24 had been completed. 


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1 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the 

2 United States to uphold and reinforce the United States 

3 alliance with the Republic of Korea, including by— 

4 (1) maintaining the presence of approximately 

5 28,500 members of the United States Armed Forces 

6 deployed to the Republic of Korea; 

7 (2) affirming the United States extended deter8 rence commitment using the full range of United 

9 States defense capabilities, consistent with the Mu10 tual Defense Treaty Between the United States and 

11 the Republic of Korea, signed at Washington, Octo12 ber 1, 1953, in support of the shared objective of a 

13 peaceful and stable Korean Peninsula; and 

14 (3) upholding the renewed SMA agreement 

15 reached and signed on November 4, 2024, between 

16 the United States and the Republic of Korea. 

17 SEC. 207. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON UNITED STATES-JAPAN18 REPUBLIC OF KOREA COOPERATION. 

19 It is the sense of Congress that it is in the national 

20 interest of the United States— 

21 (1) to support Japan and the Republic in Korea 

22 (ROK) in building on the steps taken to address 

23 major issues in their bilateral relations, including 

24 the ROK’s plan to resolve a World War II forced 


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1 labor dispute announced in March 2023 and follow2 on bilateral leaders summit; 

3 (2) to encourage Japan and the ROK to in4 crease engagement in security cooperation on a bi5 lateral and trilateral basis with the United States; 

6 (3) to emphasize the shared threats that Japan 

7 and the ROK face as the Democratic People’s Re8 public of Korea (DPRK) accelerates its provocative 

9 missile tests with a tempo and diversity of missiles 

10 that suggests it is simulating wartime use to signal 

11 to United States allies that it can control escalation 

12 in a conflict; 

13 (4) to prioritize the exchange of information 

14 among the three militaries, particularly in the area 

15 of theater missile defense; 

16 (5) to encourage Japan and the ROK to resolve 

17 their history-related disputes with mutually accept18 able and durable solutions that allow cooperation to 

19 continue without interruption; 

20 (6) to encourage and facilitate Japan and the 

21 ROK deepening cooperation on cyber defense, in22 cluding through the NATO Cooperative Cyber 

23 Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE), which 

24 Japan joined in 2018 and the ROK joined in 2022; 


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1 (7) to participate in trilateral inter-parliamen2 tary exchanges with Japan and the ROK, including 

3 through efforts like the Japan-U.S. Friendship Com4 mission Thomas S. Foley Legislative Exchange pro5 gram; and 

6 (8) to promote trilateral development and hu7 manitarian assistance cooperation to collectively en8 hance the stability, security, and democratic norms 

9 of partner countries through an affirmative and sov10 ereign development model. 

11 SEC. 208. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE NEED FOR THE 

12 SENATE TO GIVE ITS ADVICE AND CONSENT 

13 TO THE RATIFICATION OF THE UNITED NA14 TIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE 

15 SEA. 

16 It is the sense of Congress that— 

17 (1) it is in the national interest for the United 

18 States to become a formal signatory of the United 

19 Nations Convention on the law of the Sea 

20 (UNCLOS), done at Montego Bay December 10, 

21 1982; 

22 (2) the United States Senate should promptly 

23 give its advice and consent to the ratification of the 

24 UNCLOS; and 


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1 (3) joining the UNCLOS should remain a top 

2 priority for the United States, the importance of 

3 which was most recently underscored by the stra4 tegic challenges the United States faces in the Indo5 Pacific, the Arctic, and the Black Sea regions. 

6 SEC. 209. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON MARITIME FREEDOM 

7 OF OPERATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL WATER8 WAYS AND AIRSPACE OF THE INDO-PACIFIC 

9 AND ON ARTIFICIAL LAND FEATURES IN THE 

10 SOUTH CHINA SEA. 

11 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—Congress— 

12 (1) condemns coercive and threatening actions 

13 or the use of force by the PRC to impede operations 

14 or freedom of overflight in international airspace by 

15 military or civilian aircraft, to alter the status quo, 

16 or to destabilize the Indo-Pacific region; 

17 (2) urges the Government of the PRC to refrain 

18 from implementing the declared East China Sea Air 

19 Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), or an ADIZ in 

20 the South China Sea, and to refrain from taking 

21 similar provocative actions elsewhere in the Indo-Pa22 cific region; 

23 (3) reaffirms that the 2016 Permanent Court 

24 of Arbitration decision is final and legally binding on 

25 both the Philippines and the PRC and that the 


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1 PRC’s claims to offshore resources across most of 

2 the South China Sea are unlawful; and 

3 (4) urge the PRC to abide by the 2016 Perma4 nent Court of Arbitration ruling, despite the PRC’s 

5 obligations as a state party to the United Nations 

6 Convention on the Law of the Sea. 

7 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy 

8 of the United States to— 

9 (1) reaffirm its commitment and support for al10 lies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region, includ11 ing longstanding United States policy regarding Ar12 ticle IV of the United States-Philippines Mutual De13 fense Treaty, and restate its position that the Japa14 nese-administered Senkaku Islands fall within the 

15 scope of Article V of the United States-Japan Mu16 tual Defense Treaty; 

17 (2) oppose claims that impinge on lawful use of 

18 the sea, or the airspace above it, and oppose the 

19 militarization of new and reclaimed land features in 

20 the South China Sea; 

21 (3) continue certain policies with respect to the 

22 PRC’s claims in the South China Sea, namely— 

23 (A) that the PRC claims in the South 

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1 sources across most of the South China Sea, 

2 are unlawful; 

3 (B) that the PRC cannot lawfully assert a 

4 maritime claim vis-a-vis the Philippines in areas 

5 that the Permanent Court of Arbitration found 

6 to be in the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic 

7 Zone (EEZ) or on its continental shelf; 

8 (C) to reject any claim by the PRC to 

9 waters beyond a 12-nautical mile territorial sea 

10 derived from islands it claims in the Spratly Is11 lands; and 

12 (D) that the PRC has no lawful territorial 

13 or maritime claim to James Shoal; 

14 (4) urge all parties to refrain from engaging in 

15 destabilizing activities, including occupation or ef16 forts to unlawfully assert administration over areas 

17 subject to disputed claims; 

18 (5) encourage disputes to be managed without 

19 intimidation, coercion, or force; 

20 (6) call on all claimants to clarify or adjust 

21 claims in accordance with international law; 

22 (7) uphold the principle that territorial and 

23 maritime claims, including claims to territorial 

24 waters or territorial seas, must be derived from land 


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1 features and otherwise comport with international 

2 law; 

3 (8) oppose the imposition of unilateral fishing 

4 regulations covering disputed areas in the South 

5 China Sea, regulations which have raised tensions in 

6 the region; 

7 (9) support a Code of Conduct only if that Code 

8 of Conduct reflects the interests of Southeast Asian 

9 claimant states and does not serve as a vehicle for 

10 the PRC to advance its unlawful maritime claims 

11 and keep the United States out of the Indo-Pacific 

12 region; 

13 (10) reaffirm that an existing body of inter14 national rules and guidelines, including the Inter15 national Regulations for Preventing Collisions at 

16 Sea, done at London October 12, 1972 (COLREGs), 

17 is sufficient to ensure the safety of navigation be18 tween the United States Armed Forces and the 

19 forces of other countries, including the PRC; 

20 (11) support the development of regional insti21 tutions and bodies, including the ASEAN Regional 

22 Forum, the ASEAN Defense Minister’s Meeting 

23 Plus, the East Asia Summit, and the expanded 

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1 operation in the region and reinforce the role of 

2 international law; 

3 (12) encourage the deepening of partnerships 

4 with other countries in the region for maritime do5 main awareness and capacity building, as well as ef6 forts by the United States Government to explore 

7 the development of appropriate multilateral mecha8 nisms for a ‘‘common operating picture’’ in the 

9 South China Sea among Southeast Asian countries 

10 that would serve to help countries protect their sov11 ereignty in a manner consistent with international 

12 law and deter risky and dangerous activities; 

13 (13) oppose actions by any country to prevent 

14 another country from lawfully exercising its sov15 ereign rights related to the resources of its exclusive 

16 economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf by mak17 ing claims to those areas in the South China Sea 

18 that are not consistent with international law; and 

19 (14) assure the continuity of operations by the 

20 United States in the Indo-Pacific region, including, 

21 when appropriate, operations in cooperation with 

22 partners and allies, to reaffirm the principle of free23 dom of operations in international waters and air24 space in accordance with established principles and 

25 practices of international law. 


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1 SEC. 209A. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING UNIVERSAL 

2 IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED NATIONS 

3 SANCTIONS ON NORTH KOREA. 

4 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—Congress— 

5 (1) condemns Russia’s March 2024 veto of, and 

6 the PRC’s abstention on, the United Nations Secu7 rity Council Resolution renewing the mandate of the 

8 Panel of Experts tasked with monitoring United Na9 tions sanctions against the Democratic People’s Re10 public of Korea (DPRK) as irresponsible and dan11 gerous actions that undermine international efforts 

12 to counter the threat posed by the DPRK’s unlawful 

13 nuclear and ballistic missile program; 

14 (2) despite the expiration of the mandate of the 

15 Panel of Experts, remains committed to working 

16 with relevant United Nations agencies, members of 

17 the Security Council, and all United Nations Mem18 ber States, to uphold the United Nations sanctions 

19 regime against the DPRK’s unlawful nuclear and 

20 ballistic missile program, and to advance the global 

21 nonproliferation regime; and 

22 (3) supports the establishment of new multilat23 eral mechanisms to monitor United Nations Member 

24 State implementation of United Nations Security 

25 Council resolutions targeting the DPRK to shine a 

26 light on Member States who are evading sanctions 


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1 and abetting the DPRK regime’s unlawful weapons 

2 program. 

3 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the 

4 United States to sustain economic pressure on the Govern5 ment of the DPRK until the regime undertakes actions 

6 toward complete, verifiable, and irreversible 

7 denuclearization, including by— 

8 (1) pressing all nations, including the PRC, to 

9 implement and enforce existing United Nations 

10 sanctions with regard to the DPRK and its nuclear 

11 and missile programs; 

12 (2) pressing all nations, including the PRC, and 

13 in accordance with United Nations Security Council 

14 resolutions, to end the practice of hosting DPRK 

15 citizens as guest workers, recognizing that such 

16 workers are demonstrated to constitute an illicit 

17 source of revenue for the DPRK regime and its nu18 clear ambitions; 

19 (3) pressing all nations, including the PRC, to 

20 pursue rigorous interdiction of shipments to and 

21 from the DPRK, including ship-to-ship transfers, 

22 consistent with United Nations Security Council res23 olutions; 

24 (4) pressing the PRC and PRC entities— 


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1 (A) to cease business activities with United 

2 Nations-designated entities and their affiliates 

3 in the DPRK; and 

4 (B) to expel from the PRC individuals who 

5 enable the DPRK to acquire materials for its 

6 nuclear and ballistic missile programs; 

7 (5) working with likeminded partners, think 

8 tanks, research organizations, and civil society to de9 velop and implement alternative, independent mecha10 nisms to monitor United Nations Member State ad11 herence to United Nations sanctions targeting the 

12 unlawful DPRK weapons program and publicly shine 

13 a light on Member States that evade and violate 

14 those sanctions; and 

15 (6) implementing and enforcing United Nations 

16 Security Council resolutions with respect to the 

17 DPRK and United States sanctions, including those 

18 pursuant to the North Korea Sanctions and Policy 

19 Enhancement Act of 2016 (Public Law 114–122), 

20 the Countering America’s Adversaries Through 

21 Sanctions Act (Public Law 115–44), the Otto 

22 Warmbier North Korea Nuclear Sanctions and En23 forcement Act of 2019 (title LXXI of Public Law 

24 116–92), and relevant United States executive or25 ders. 


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1 SEC. 209B. ESTABLISHING A SENIOR OFFICIAL FOR THE 

2 COMPACTS OF FREE ASSOCIATION AT THE 

3 DEPARTMENT OF STATE. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall designate a 

5 senior official at the Department of State responsible for 

6 administering the Compacts of Free Association at the 

7 Department of State (in this section referred to as the 

8 ‘‘Senior Official’’). The Senior Official shall report to the 

9 Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific 

10 Affairs. 

11 (b) DUTIES.—The Senior Official shall— 

12 (1) be responsible for the conduct of United 

13 States foreign policy with respect to the countries 

14 affiliated with the United States Government under 

15 the Compacts of Free Association (in this section re16 ferred to as the ‘‘Compacts’’), namely the freely as17 sociated states of— 

18 (A) the Republic of Palau; 

19 (B) the Marshall Islands; and 

20 (C) the Federated States of Micronesia; 

21 (2) assist the Assistant Secretary of State for 

22 East Asian and Pacific Affairs in providing overall 

23 direction, coordination, and supervision of inter24 departmental activities of the United States Govern25 ment in these countries, including ensuring the time26 ly transfer of assistance and provision of benefits 


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1 through the United States Department of the Inte2 rior, as laid out in the Compacts; 

3 (3) oversee and evaluate the adequacy and ef4 fectiveness of United States policy with respect to 

5 these countries as well as of the plans, programs, re6 sources, and performance for implementing that pol7 icy, including programs and other activities imple8 mented by the Department of the Interior; 

9 (4) directly supervise the policy and operations 

10 of the Compacts and provide guidance to relevant 

11 United States missions within the Indo-Pacific re12 gion; 

13 (5) ensure the provision of an adequate, regular 

14 flow of information to posts abroad on United States 

15 Government policies, policy deliberations, and diplo16 matic exchanges in Washington, DC; and 

17 (6) ensure the continuity of implementation of 

18 commitments and Compact obligations and benefits, 

19 consistent with United States national interests in 

20 the Indo-Pacific region. 

21 (c) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 

22 authorized to be appropriated $250,000 to support the 

23 Senior Official in the conduct and discharge of the duties 

24 described in subsection (b). 


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1 PART II—ENHANCING DIPLOMATIC 

2 ENGAGEMENT IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH 

3 SEC. 211. ENHANCEMENT OF DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT AND 

4 ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT WITH PACIFIC IS5 LAND COUNTRIES. 

6 (a) AUTHORITY.—The Secretary of State and the 

7 Secretary of Commerce are authorized to hire Locally Em8 ployed Staff in Pacific Island countries for the purpose 

9 of providing increased diplomatic support and promoting 

10 increased economic and commercial engagement between 

11 the United States and Pacific Island countries. 

12 (b) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.—There is authorized 

13 to be appropriated to the Department of State and the 

14 Department of Commerce for fiscal year 2025, not more 

15 than $10,000,000 to each agency to carry out the pur16 poses of this section. 

17 (c) EXCEPTION FOR AMERICAN SAMOA.—The Sec18 retary of State may, as appropriate, treat the territory of 

19 American Samoa as a foreign country for purposes of car20 rying out this section. 

21 SEC. 212. DEFENSE COOPERATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND 

22 THE CARIBBEAN. 

23 (a) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be appro24 priated to the Department of State $12,000,000 for each 

25 of fiscal years 2025 through 2029 for the International 


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1 Military Education and Training Program for Latin 

2 America and the Caribbean. 

3 (b) MODERNIZATION.—The Secretary of State shall 

4 take steps to modernize and strengthen the programs re5 ceiving funding pursuant to subsection (a) to ensure that 

6 such programs are rigorous, substantive, and the pre7 eminent choice for international military education and 

8 training for Latin American and Caribbean partners. 

9 (c) REQUIRED ELEMENTS.—The programs referred 

10 to in subsection (a) shall— 

11 (1) provide training and capacity-building op12 portunities to Latin American and Caribbean secu13 rity services; 

14 (2) provide practical skills and frameworks 

15 for— 

16 (A) improving the functioning and organi17 zation of security services in Latin America and 

18 the Caribbean; 

19 (B) creating a better understanding of the 

20 United States and its values; and 

21 (C) using technology for maximum stra22 tegic impact and effective operations; and 

23 (3) promote and ensure that security services in 

24 Latin America and the Caribbean respect civilian 

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1 national human rights law and international human2 itarian law. 

3 (d) LIMITATION.—Security assistance under this sec4 tion is subject to the limitations of section 620M of the 

5 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d). 

6 SEC. 213. SUPPORT FOR YOUNG AFRICAN LEADERS INITIA7 TIVE. 

8 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con9 gress that— 

10 (1) the Young African Leaders Initiative, 

11 launched in 2010, is a signature effort to invest in 

12 the next generation of African leaders; 

13 (2) Africa is a continent of strategic importance 

14 and it is vital for the United States to support 

15 strong and enduring partnerships with the next gen16 eration of African leaders; 

17 (3) the United States Government should 

18 prioritize investments to build the capacity of emerg19 ing young African leaders in sub-Saharan Africa, in20 cluding through efforts to— 

21 (A) enhance leadership skills; 

22 (B) encourage entrepreneurship; 

23 (C) strengthen public administration and 

24 the role of civil society; 


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1 (D) enhance peace and security in their re2 spective countries of origin and across Africa; 

3 and 

4 (E) connect young African leaders con5 tinentally and globally across the private, civic, 

6 and public sectors; 

7 (4) youth in Africa have a positive impact on 

8 efforts to foster economic growth, improve public 

9 sector transparency and governance, and counter ex10 tremism, and should be an area of focus for United 

11 States outreach on the African continent; and 

12 (5) the Secretary of State should increase the 

13 number of fellows from Africa participating in the 

14 Mandela Washington Fellowship above the estimated 

15 700 fellows who participated during fiscal year 

16 2021. 

17 (b) YOUNG AFRICAN LEADERS INITIATIVE.— 

18 (1) IN GENERAL.—There is established the 

19 Young African Leaders Initiative, (‘‘YALI’’). 

20 (2) PURPOSE.—YALI shall seek to build the ca21 pacity of young African leaders in sub-Saharan Afri22 ca in the areas of business and entrepreneurship, 

23 civic leadership, or public administration, including 

24 through efforts to— 


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1 (A) support young African leaders by of2 fering professional development, training, and 

3 networking opportunities, particularly in the 

4 areas of leadership, innovation, civic engage5 ment, elections, human rights, entrepreneur6 ship, good governance, peace and security, and 

7 public administration; 

8 (B) provide increased training to young 

9 African leaders to promote economic growth, 

10 strengthen ties between United States and Afri11 can businesses, build resilience to predatory 

12 lending practices, and improve capacity in stra13 tegic sectors, including critical minerals extrac14 tion, technology and media; and 

15 (C) identify additional ways to connect all 

16 YALI alumni to United States public and pri17 vate resources and institutions. 

18 (3) FELLOWSHIPS.— 

19 (A) IN GENERAL.—YALI shall support the 

20 participation in the United States in the 

21 Mandela Washington Fellowship for Young Af22 rican Leaders of fellows from Africa who— 

23 (i) are between 25 and 35 years of 

24 age; 


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1 (ii) have demonstrated strong capa2 bilities in entrepreneurship, innovation, 

3 public service, and leadership; and 

4 (iii) have had a positive impact in 

5 their communities, organizations, or insti6 tutions. 

7 (B) OVERSIGHT.—The fellowships de8 scribed in paragraph (1) shall be overseen by 

9 the Secretary of State through the Bureau of 

10 Education and Cultural Affairs. 

11 (C) ELIGIBILITY.—The Secretary of State 

12 shall establish and publish— 

13 (i) eligibility criteria for participation 

14 as a fellow under paragraph (1); and 

15 (ii) criteria for determining which eli16 gible applicants will be selected. 

17 (4) RECIPROCAL EXCHANGES.—Subject to the 

18 approval of the Secretary of State, United States 

19 citizens may— 

20 (A) engage in reciprocal exchanges with 

21 alumni of the fellowship described in paragraph 

22 (3); and 

23 (B) collaborate on projects with such fel24 lowship alumni. 


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1 (5) YALI REGIONAL LEADERSHIP CENTERS AND

2 NETWORKS.—The Administrator of the United 

3 States Agency for International Development shall 

4 establish not fewer than 4 regional leadership cen5 ters in sub-Saharan Africa to offer in-person and on6 line training throughout the year on business and 

7 entrepreneurship, civic leadership, and public man8 agement to young African leaders between 18 and 

9 35 years of age who have demonstrated strong capa10 bilities in entrepreneurship, innovation, public serv11 ice and leadership, and peace-building and conflict 

12 resolution, and who have had a positive impact in 

13 their communities, organizations, or institutions. 

14 (6) ACTIVITIES.— 

15 (A) UNITED STATES-BASED ACTIVITIES.— 

16 The Secretary of State, in coordination with the 

17 heads of relevant Federal departments and 

18 agencies, shall oversee all United States-based 

19 activities carried out under YALI, including— 

20 (i) the participation of Mandela 

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1 sional networking opportunities, leadership 

2 training, community service, and organized 

3 cultural activities; and 

4 (ii) the participation by Mandela 

5 Washington Fellows in an annual Mandela 

6 Washington Fellowship Summit, to provide 

7 such Fellows the opportunity to meet with 

8 United States leaders from the private, 

9 public, and non-profit sectors. 

10 (B) AFRICA-BASED ACTIVITIES.—The Ad11 ministrator for the United States Agency for 

12 International Development, in coordination with 

13 the Secretary of State and the heads of other 

14 relevant Federal departments and agencies, 

15 should continue to oversee and support YALI 

16 activities in sub-Saharan Africa, including— 

17 (i) continued leadership training and 

18 other professional development opportuni19 ties for Mandela Washington Fellowship 

20 for Young African Leaders alumni upon 

21 their return to their home countries, in22 cluding online courses, training, and access 

23 to funding; 

24 (ii) training for young African leaders 

25 at regional leadership centers established 


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1 in accordance with paragraph (5), and 

2 through online and in-person courses of3 fered by such centers; and 

4 (iii) opportunities for networking and 

5 engagement with— 

6 (I) alumni of the Mandela Wash7 ington Fellowship for Young African 

8 Leaders; 

9 (II) alumni of programs at re10 gional leadership centers established 

11 in accordance with paragraph (5); 

12 (III) United States and like13 minded diplomatic missions, business 

14 leaders, the diaspora, and others as 

15 appropriate; and 

16 (IV) where practicable and ap17 propriate, other United States-funded 

18 regional leadership programs, includ19 ing the Young Southeast Asian Lead20 ers Initiative (YSEALI), the Young 

21 Leaders of the Americas Initiative 

22 (YLAI), the Young Pacific Leaders 

23 (YPL), and the Young Transatlantic 

24 Innovation Leaders Initiative 

25 (YTILI), and through Department of 


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1 State programs such as the Commu2 nity Engagement Exchange Program 

3 and other initiatives. 

4 (C) IMPLEMENTATION.—To carry out this 

5 subsection, the Secretary of State and the Ad6 ministrator for the United States Agency for 

7 International Development, in coordination with 

8 the heads of other relevant Federal depart9 ments and agencies, shall seek to partner with 

10 the private sector to pursue public-private part11 nerships, leverage private sector expertise, ex12 pand networking opportunities, and identify 

13 funding opportunities as well as fellowship and 

14 employment opportunities for YALI. 

15 SEC. 214. STRENGTHENING DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS IN AFRI16 CA. 

17 (a) BOLSTERING UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC

18 PRESENCE IN AFRICA.— 

19 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days 

20 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec21 retary of State shall submit to the appropriate com22 mittees of Congress a plan to strengthen United 

23 States diplomatic presence in Africa, including to en24 sure that United States embassies in Africa have 


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1 sufficient personnel to focus on the activities, poli2 cies, and investments of the PRC. 

3 (2) ELEMENTS.—The plan required under sub4 section (a) shall include the following elements: 

5 (A) A review of the incentives available for 

6 United States diplomatic personnel who serve in 

7 posts in Africa, which includes proposals to pro8 vide additional incentives for hard-to-fill posts 

9 in Africa, including those that leverage relevant 

10 talent in the Department, including talent with11 in the civil service, and which addresses require12 ments for promotions and onward assignment 

13 for the Foreign Service. 

14 (B) An identification of— 

15 (i) the number and average duration 

16 over the last 5 years of vacancies in the 

17 political and economic sections of United 

18 States embassies relative to the full-time 

19 equivalent positions allocated for the eco20 nomic and political sections in such embas21 sies; and 

22 (ii) the number of Foreign Service Of23 ficers who are working in ‘‘stretch’’ posi24 tions in the political and economic sections 

25 of United States embassies in Africa and a 


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1 list of proposals to reduce those vacancies 

2 and stretch positions. 

3 (C) An assessment of whether United 

4 States embassies in Africa have adequate staff 

5 to implement initiatives such as Prosper Africa 

6 and those emanating from the African Leaders 

7 Summit and a proposal to better meet the staff8 ing needs to implement those and other high9 priority initiatives. 

10 (b) AFRICA HEADS OF STATE SUMMIT.— 

11 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year 

12 after the date of the enactment of this Act, and bi13 ennially thereafter, the President shall convene a 

14 United States-Africa Leaders Summit (in this sub15 section referred to as the ‘‘Summit’’) in order to es16 tablish stronger bilateral and multilateral diplomatic, 

17 economic, security, and cultural ties between the 

18 United States and African countries. 

19 (2) PARTICIPATION.—Each Summit convened 

20 pursuant to this subsection shall have participation, 

21 including in meetings with United States officials, 

22 from— 

23 (A) leaders of civilian-led governments of 

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1 rican Union, each of which the President has 

2 determined— 

3 (i) has held a credible election associ4 ated with the current head of government 

5 or state; or 

6 (ii) is the head of a transitional gov7 ernment, is implementing a roadmap to 

8 hold credible elections, and is unaffiliated 

9 with actions that were related to an uncon10 stitutional change of administration; and 

11 (B) civil society from each of the African 

12 countries represented at the Summit. 

13 (3) UNIT TO PLAN AND IMPLEMENT.— 

14 (A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State 

15 shall establish a dedicated unit within the Bu16 reau of African Affairs of the Department of 

17 State to coordinate, plan, and implement the 

18 Summit on a biennial basis, which should in19 clude robust interagency consultation and may 

20 include, on a temporary basis, personnel sec21 onded from the United States Agency for Inter22 national Development and other Federal agen23 cies as appropriate, and which shall be led by 

24 an individual who has previously been appointed 

25 by the President and confirmed by the Senate. 


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1 (B) PLANNING EFFORTS.—The unit estab2 lished under this paragraph shall— 

3 (i) use lessons learned from the 2022 

4 African Leaders Summit and subsequent 

5 Summits to inform planning of future 

6 Summits; 

7 (ii) lead interagency efforts to provide 

8 guidance to United States embassies in Af9 rican countries related to planning each 

10 Summit and engagement with governments 

11 and civil society in advance of each Sum12 mit; 

13 (iii) lead efforts to implement commit14 ments made at previous Summits; and 

15 (iv) consult regularly with the appro16 priate committees of Congress on the plan17 ning in advance of, and follow-up for, each 

18 Summit. 

19 SEC. 215. ENGAGEMENT WITH CIVIL SOCIETY IN LATIN 

20 AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN REGARDING 

21 ACCOUNTABILITY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE 

22 RISKS OF PERVASIVE SURVEILLANCE TECH23 NOLOGIES. 

24 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con25 gress that— 


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1 (1) the Government of the PRC is exporting its 

2 model for internal security and state control of soci3 ety through advanced technology and artificial intel4 ligence; and 

5 (2) the inclusion of communication networks 

6 and communications supply chains with equipment 

7 and services from companies with close ties to or 

8 that are susceptible to pressure from the Govern9 ment of the PRC or security services without reliable 

10 legal checks on governmental powers can lead to 

11 breaches of citizens’ private information, increased 

12 censorship, violations or abuses of human rights, 

13 and harassment of political opponents. 

14 (b) INTERNET FREEDOM PROGRAMS.—The Chief 

15 Executive Officer of the United States Agency for Global 

16 Media, working through the Open Technology Fund, and 

17 the Secretary of State, working through the Bureau of De18 mocracy, Human Rights, and Labor, shall expand and 

19 prioritize efforts to provide anti-censorship and anti-sur20 veillance technology and services to journalists in Latin 

21 America and the Caribbean, in order to enhance their abil22 ity to safely access or share digital news and information. 

23 (c) SUPPORT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY.—The Secretary of 

24 State, through the Assistant Secretary of State for De25 mocracy, Human Rights, and Labor, and in coordination 


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1 with the Administrator of the United States Agency for 

2 International Development, shall work with civil society 

3 partners to— 

4 (1) support and promote programs that support 

5 internet freedom and the free flow of information 

6 online in Latin America and the Caribbean; 

7 (2) protect open, interoperable, secure, and reli8 able access to internet in Latin America and the 

9 Caribbean; 

10 (3) provide integrated support to civil society 

11 for digital safety and related technology programs in 

12 Latin America and the Caribbean; 

13 (4) train journalists and civil society leaders in 

14 Latin America and the Caribbean on investigative 

15 techniques necessary to ensure public accountability 

16 and prevent government overreach in the digital 

17 sphere; 

18 (5) assist independent media outlets and jour19 nalists in Latin America and the Caribbean to build 

20 their own capacity and develop high-impact, in-depth 

21 news reports covering governance and human rights 

22 topics; 

23 (6) provide training for journalists and civil so24 ciety leaders on investigative techniques necessary to 


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1 improve transparency and accountability in govern2 ment and the private sector; 

3 (7) provide training on investigative reporting 

4 of incidents of corruption, unfair trade, and coercive 

5 and anti-competitive business and commercial prac6 tices perpetrated by the PRC, including the role of 

7 the Government of the PRC in such practices; 

8 (8) assist civil society organizations to strength9 en their capacity to monitor the activities described 

10 in paragraph (7); and 

11 (9) identify local organizations to support the 

12 activities to be carried out under this subsection. 

13 Subtitle B—International 

14 Organizations 

15 SEC. 221. SAFEGUARDING THE INTEGRITY OF THE UNITED 

16 NATIONS SYSTEM. 

17 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of the Con18 gress that— 

19 (1) the United Nations system is critical to ad20 vancing peace and security, human rights, and devel21 opment; 

22 (2) the United States benefits from opportuni23 ties at the United Nations to engage in multilateral 

24 diplomacy to advance its own interests and to work 


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1 with other members of the international community 

2 to address complex and shared challenges; and 

3 (3) the United States therefore has an interest 

4 in safeguarding the integrity the United Nations 

5 System. 

6 (b) PRIORITIZING THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM.— 

7 The Secretary of State, in coordination with the United 

8 States Ambassador to the United Nations as appropriate, 

9 shall prioritize and instruct the senior leadership of the 

10 United States Mission to the United Nations and other 

11 United States Missions to the United Nations to— 

12 (1) promote United States participation in the 

13 United Nations System, and that of United States 

14 allies and partners who are committed to upholding 

15 the integrity of the United Nations; 

16 (2) ensure that United Nations employees are 

17 held accountable to their obligation to uphold the 

18 United Nations charter, rules, and regulations; 

19 (3) hold United States citizens and lawful per20 manent residents serving within the United Nations 

21 accountable for conduct, or conspiring or attempting 

22 to engage in conduct, outside of the United States 

23 that would constitute a crime if the conduct had oc24 curred within the United States; 


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1 (4) monitor and counter undue influence, espe2 cially by authoritarian governments, within the 

3 United Nations System; 

4 (5) promote meaningful participation and inclu5 sion of Taiwan throughout the United Nations Sys6 tem and its affiliated agencies and bodies; and 

7 (6) advance other priorities deemed relevant by 

8 the Secretary of State and the United States Rep9 resentative to the United Nations to safeguard the 

10 integrity of the United Nations System. 

11 SEC. 222. UNITED STATES MEMBERSHIP IN UNITED NA12 TIONS SPECIALIZED AGENCIES AND RE13 LATED ORGANIZATIONS. 

14 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find15 ings: 

16 (1) Congress and the executive branch share re17 sponsibility for the foreign relations of the United 

18 States pursuant to Article I and Article II of the 

19 Constitution of the United States. 

20 (2) While the executive branch has a unique 

21 role in speaking for the United States with other 

22 governments, it is not unconstrained under United 

23 States law in doing so. 

24 (3) The Senate has a constitutional role in the 

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1 pressly imposes limitations or requirements that the 

2 executive branch must satisfy before withdrawing 

3 from or terminating a treaty relationship, the execu4 tive branch must adhere to those limitations or re5 quirements. 

6 (4) The Senate has provided advice and consent 

7 to ratification of various agreements for the United 

8 States to join United Nations bodies, and Congress 

9 has authorized United States participation in other 

10 United Nations bodies where treaty ratification was 

11 not required, including the World Health Organiza12 tion. 

13 (5) Congress therefore has a clear role—con14 sistent with its constitutional responsibilities in for15 eign affairs, advice, and consent to ratification of 

16 treaties, and the making of Federal law—in whether 

17 and how the United States participates in the 

18 United Nations, including whether it seeks to with19 draw from such participation. 

20 (6) Robust United States engagement in inter21 national organizations, including the World Health 

22 Organization, is critical in countering efforts by the 

23 PRC to bolster its influence around the world. 

24 (b) WITHDRAWAL FROM WORLD HEALTH ORGANI25 ZATION.—Section 4 of the Joint Resolution entitled, ‘‘ProVerDate Sep 11 2014 18:11 Jan 13, 2025 Jkt 059200 PO 00000 Frm 00252 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S5491.IS S5491

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1 viding for membership by the United States in the World 

2 Health Organization and authorizing an appropriation 

3 therefor,’’ approved June 14, 1948 (22 U.S.C. 290c), is 

4 amended by inserting before the period at the end the fol5 lowing ‘‘: Provided further, That not less than 180 days 

6 before providing notice to withdraw the United States 

7 from the World Health Organization, the President and 

8 Secretary of State shall jointly submit to the Committee 

9 on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee 

10 on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a noti11 fication that such withdrawal is in the national interests 

12 of the United States’’. 

13 (c) WITHDRAWAL FROM OTHER SPECIALIZED AGEN14 CIES OR RELATED ORGANIZATIONS OF THE UNITED NA15 TIONS.—Not less than 180 days before taking formal ac16 tion to initiate the United States withdrawal from a 

17 United Nations specialized agency or related organization, 

18 the President and Secretary of State shall jointly submit 

19 to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and 

20 the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Rep21 resentatives a notification that such withdrawal is in the 

22 national interests of the United States. 


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1 SEC. 223. ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICE ON MULTILATERAL 

2 STRATEGY AND PERSONNEL. 

3 There is established within the Bureau of Inter4 national Organizations of the Department of State an Of5 fice on Multilateral Strategy and Personnel (MSP) with 

6 the following responsibilities: 

7 (1) Developing, coordinating, and maintaining a 

8 whole-of-government strategy to strengthen United 

9 States engagement and leadership with multilateral 

10 institutions and international organizations, to in11 clude managing efforts to counter third-countries 

12 seeking to undermine the integrity of the United Na13 tions. 

14 (2) Coordinating whole-of-government efforts 

15 related to the United Nations Junior Professional 

16 Officer (JPO) program, including— 

17 (A) recruiting qualified individuals who 

18 represent the rich diversity of the United States 

19 to apply for United States-sponsored JPO posi20 tions; 

21 (B) collecting and collating information 

22 about United States-sponsored JPOs from 

23 across the United States Government; 

24 (C) establishing and providing orientation 

25 and other training materials with United States 

26 agencies sponsoring JPOs; 


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1 (D) maintaining regular contact with cur2 rent and former United States-sponsored JPOs, 

3 including providing career and professional ad4 vice to United States-sponsored JPOs; 

5 (E) making, informing, and advising on 

6 strategic decisions, including about the location 

7 and duration of United States-sponsored JPO 

8 positions to strengthen United States national 

9 security interests and the competitive advantage 

10 of United States-sponsored JPOs for future em11 ployment; and 

12 (F) sponsoring events, including represen13 tational events as appropriate, to support 

14 United States-sponsored JPOs. 

15 (3) Coordinating and overseeing a whole-of-gov16 ernment United States strategy and efforts in rela17 tion to promoting qualified United States candidates 

18 for elected or appointed senior positions at multilat19 eral institutions and international organizations, in20 cluding— 

21 (A) creating a whole-of-government strat22 egy that identifies and prioritizes upcoming 

23 openings of leadership positions at multilateral 

24 institutions and international organizations; 


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1 (B) developing and executing processes to 

2 identify and recruit qualified candidates to 

3 apply or run for these offices; 

4 (C) consulting across the Department and 

5 interagency as they implement selection proc6 esses; and 

7 (D) creating and implementing a strategy 

8 to obtain the support necessary for United 

9 States candidates for priority leadership posi10 tions including— 

11 (i) liaising and coordinating with 

12 international partners to promote United 

13 States candidates; and 

14 (ii) working with embassies to engage 

15 officials and other entities needed to sup16 port relevant United States candidates. 

17 (4) Promoting detail and transfer opportunities 

18 for qualified United States personnel to multilateral 

19 organizations including by— 

20 (A) liaising with multilateral institutions to 

21 promote and identify detail and transfer oppor22 tunities; 

23 (B) developing and maintaining a database 

24 of detail and transfer opportunities to multilat25 eral organizations; 


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1 (C) promoting these detail and transfer op2 portunities within the United States Govern3 ment and making the database available to 

4 those eligible for details and transfers; and 

5 (D) facilitating any relevant orientation, 

6 trainings, or materials for detailees and trans7 ferees, including debriefing detailees and trans8 ferees upon their return to the United States 

9 Government. 

10 (5) Promoting internship and volunteer oppor11 tunities at multilateral institutions and international 

12 organizations and coordinating orientation and ca13 reer development opportunities, as relevant. 

14 (6) Promoting and entering into partnership ar15 rangements with multilateral institutions and inter16 national organizations to encourage United States 

17 nationals participation in such organizations. 

18 SEC. 224. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS TO PRO19 MOTE UNITED STATES CITIZEN EMPLOY20 MENT AT THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTER21 NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. 

22 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President should direct 

23 United States departments and agencies to, in coordina24 tion with the Secretary of State— 


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1 (1) fund and recruit Junior Professional Offi2 cers for positions at the United Nations and related 

3 specialized and technical organizations; and 

4 (2) facilitate secondments, details, and trans5 fers to agencies and specialized and technical bodies 

6 of the United Nations. 

7 (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 

8 authorized to be appropriated an additional $50,000,000 

9 for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2031 for the Sec10 retary of State to support Junior Professional Officers, 

11 details, transfers, volunteers, and interns that advance 

12 United States interests at multilateral institutions and 

13 international organizations, including to recruit, train, and 

14 host events related to such positions, and to promote 

15 United States citizen candidates for employment and lead16 ership positions at multilateral institutions and inter17 national organizations. 

18 SEC. 225. UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP AND REPRESENTA19 TION IN STANDARDS-SETTING BODIES. 

20 (a) ENHANCING REPRESENTATION AND LEADERSHIP

21 OF UNITED STATES AT INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS22 SETTING BODIES.—The President shall— 

23 (1) establish an interagency working group to 

24 provide assistance and technical expertise to enhance 

25 the representation and leadership of the United 


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1 States at international bodies that set standards for 

2 equipment, systems, software, and virtually defined 

3 networks that support 5th and future generation 

4 mobile telecommunications systems and infrastruc5 ture, such as the International Telecommunication 

6 Union and the 3rd Generation Partnership Project; 

7 and 

8 (2) work with allies, partners, and the private 

9 sector to increase productive engagement with re10 spect to the standards described in paragraph (1). 

11 (b) INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP.—The inter12 agency working group described in subsection (a) shall— 

13 (1) be chaired by the Secretary of Commerce or 

14 a designee of the Secretary at the Deputy Assistant 

15 Secretary level or above; 

16 (2) be vice-chaired by the Secretary of State or 

17 a designee of the Secretary at the Deputy Assistant 

18 Secretary level or above to focus on cooperation with 

19 allies and partners with respect to international 

20 standards-setting bodies; and 

21 (3) consist of the head (or designee) of each 

22 Federal department or agency the President deter23 mines appropriate. 


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1 Subtitle C—South China and East 

2 China Sea Sanctions Act of 2024 

3 SEC. 231. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This part may be cited as the ‘‘South China Sea and 

5 East China Sea Sanctions Act of 2024’’. 

6 SEC. 232. SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO PRC PERSONS RE7 SPONSIBLE FOR THE PRC’S ACTIVITIES IN 

8 THE SOUTH CHINA SEA AND THE EAST CHINA 

9 SEA. 

10 (a) INITIAL IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—On and 

11 after the date that is 120 days after the date of the enact12 ment of this Act, the President may impose the sanctions 

13 described in subsection (b) with respect to any PRC per14 son, including any senior official of the Government of the 

15 PRC, that the President determines— 

16 (1) is responsible for or significantly contributes 

17 to large-scale reclamation, construction, militariza18 tion, or ongoing supply of outposts in disputed areas 

19 of the South China Sea; 

20 (2) is responsible for or significantly contributes 

21 to, or has engaged in, directly or indirectly, actions, 

22 including the use of coercion, to inhibit another 

23 country from protecting its sovereign rights to ac24 cess offshore resources in the South China Sea, in25 cluding in such country’s exclusive economic zone, 


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1 consistent with such country’s rights and obligations 

2 under international law; 

3 (3) is responsible for or complicit in, or has en4 gaged in, directly or indirectly, actions that signifi5 cantly threaten the peace, security, or stability of 

6 disputed areas of the South China Sea or areas of 

7 the East China Sea administered by Japan or the 

8 Republic of Korea, including through the use of ves9 sels and aircraft by the PRC to occupy or conduct 

10 extensive research or drilling activity in those areas; 

11 (4) has materially assisted, sponsored, or pro12 vided financial, material, or technological support 

13 for, or goods or services to, or in support of, any 

14 person subject to sanctions pursuant to paragraph 

15 (1), (2), or (3); or 

16 (5) is owned or controlled by, or has acted for 

17 or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, any person 

18 subject to sanctions pursuant to paragraph (1), (2), 

19 or (3). 

20 (b) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—The sanctions that 

21 may be imposed with respect to a person described in sub22 section (a) are the following: 

23 (1) BLOCKING OF PROPERTY.—The President 

24 may, in accordance with the International Emer25 gency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et 


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1 seq.), block and prohibit all transactions in all prop2 erty and interests in property of the person if such 

3 property and interests in property are in the United 

4 States, come within the United States, or are or 

5 come within the possession or control of a United 

6 States person. 

7 (2) INELIGIBILITY FOR VISAS, ADMISSION, OR

8 PAROLE.— 

9 (A) VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.—In 

10 the case of an alien, the alien may be— 

11 (i) inadmissible to the United States; 

12 (ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other 

13 documentation to enter the United States; 

14 and 

15 (iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted 

16 or paroled into the United States or to re17 ceive any other benefit under the Immigra18 tion and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et 

19 seq.). 

20 (B) CURRENT VISAS REVOKED.— 

21 (i) IN GENERAL.—An alien described 

22 in subparagraph (A) may be subject to rev23 ocation of any visa or other entry docu24 mentation regardless of when the visa or 


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1 other entry documentation is or was 

2 issued. 

3 (ii) IMMEDIATE EFFECT.—A revoca4 tion under clause (i) may— 

5 (I) take effect immediately in ac6 cordance with section 221(i) of the 

7 Immigration and Nationality Act (8 

8 U.S.C. 1201(i)); and 

9 (II) cancel any other valid visa or 

10 entry documentation that is in the 

11 alien’s possession. 

12 (3) EXCLUSION OF CORPORATE OFFICERS.— 

13 The President may direct the Secretary of State to 

14 deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland Secu15 rity to exclude from the United States, any alien 

16 that the President determines is a corporate officer 

17 or principal of, or a shareholder with a controlling 

18 interest in, the person. 

19 (4) EXPORT SANCTION.—The President may 

20 order the United States Government not to issue 

21 any specific license and not to grant any other spe22 cific permission or authority to export any goods or 

23 technology to the person under— 

24 (A) the Export Control Reform Act of 

25 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4801 et seq.); or 


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1 (B) any other statute that requires the 

2 prior review and approval of the United States 

3 Government as a condition for the export or re4 export of goods or services. 

5 (5) INCLUSION ON ENTITY LIST.—The Presi6 dent may include the entity on the entity list main7 tained by the Bureau of Industry and Security of 

8 the Department of Commerce and set forth in Sup9 plement No. 4 to part 744 of the Export Adminis10 tration Regulations, for activities contrary to the na11 tional security or foreign policy interests of the 

12 United States. 

13 (6) BAN ON INVESTMENT IN EQUITY OR DEBT

14 OF SANCTIONED PERSON.—The President may, pur15 suant to such regulations or guidelines as the Presi16 dent may prescribe, prohibit any United States per17 son from investing in or purchasing equity or debt 

18 instruments of the person. 

19 (7) BANKING TRANSACTIONS.—The President 

20 may, pursuant to such regulations as the President 

21 may prescribe, prohibit any transfers of credit or 

22 payments between financial institutions or by, 

23 through, or to any financial institution, to the extent 

24 that such transfers or payments are subject to the 


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1 jurisdiction of the United States and involve any in2 terest of the person. 

3 (8) CORRESPONDENT AND PAYABLE-THROUGH

4 ACCOUNTS.—In the case of a foreign financial insti5 tution, the President may prohibit the opening, and 

6 prohibit or impose strict conditions on the maintain7 ing, in the United States of a correspondent account 

8 or a payable-through account by the foreign finan9 cial institution. 

10 (c) IMPLEMENTATION; PENALTIES.— 

11 (1) IMPLEMENTATION.—The President may ex12 ercise all authorities provided under sections 203 

13 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic 

14 Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out 

15 this section. 

16 (2) PENALTIES.—The penalties provided for in 

17 subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the Inter18 national Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 

19 U.S.C. 1705) shall apply to a person that violates, 

20 attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a 

21 violation of regulations prescribed under subsection 

22 (b)(1) to the same extent that such penalties apply 

23 to a person that commits an unlawful act described 

24 in subsection (a) of such section 206. 

25 (d) EXCEPTIONS.— 


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1 (1) INAPPLICABILITY OF NATIONAL EMER2 GENCY REQUIREMENT.—The requirements of section 

3 202 of the International Emergency Economic Pow4 ers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701) shall not apply for pur5 poses of subsection (b)(1). 

6 (2) EXCEPTION FOR INTELLIGENCE, LAW EN7 FORCEMENT, AND NATIONAL SECURITY ACTIVI8 TIES.—Sanctions under this section shall not apply 

9 to any authorized intelligence, law enforcement, or 

10 national security activities of the United States. 

11 (3) COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL AGREE12 MENTS.—Paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection (b) 

13 shall not apply if admission of an alien to the United 

14 States is necessary to permit the United States to 

15 comply with the Agreement regarding the Head16 quarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Suc17 cess, June 26, 1947, and entered into force, Novem18 ber 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the 

19 United States and other international obligations of 

20 the United States. 

21 (4) EXCEPTION RELATING TO IMPORTATION OF

22 GOODS.— 

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1 ment to impose sanctions on the importation of 

2 goods. 

3 (B) GOOD DEFINED.—In this paragraph, 

4 the term ‘‘good’’ means any article, natural or 

5 manmade substance, material, supply, or manu6 factured product, including inspection and test 

7 equipment, and excluding technical data. 

8 (e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

9 (1) ACCOUNT; CORRESPONDENT ACCOUNT; PAY10 ABLE-THROUGH ACCOUNT.—The terms ‘‘account’’, 

11 ‘‘correspondent account’’, and ‘‘payable-through ac12 count’’ have the meanings given those terms in sec13 tion 5318A of title 31, United States Code. 

14 (2) ALIEN.—The term ‘‘alien’’ has the meaning 

15 given that term in section 101(a) of the Immigration 

16 and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)). 

17 (3) PRC PERSON.—The term ‘‘PRC person’’ 

18 means— 

19 (A) an individual who is a citizen or na20 tional of the PRC; or 

21 (B) an entity organized under the laws of 

22 the PRC or otherwise subject to the jurisdiction 

23 of the Government of the PRC. 

24 (4) FINANCIAL INSTITUTION.—The term ‘‘fi25 nancial institution’’ means a financial institution 


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1 specified in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), (D), (E), 

2 (F), (G), (H), (I), (J), (K), (M), (N), (P), (R), (T), 

3 (Y), or (Z) of section 5312(a)(2) of title 31, United 

4 States Code. 

5 (5) FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTION.—The 

6 term ‘‘foreign financial institution’’ has the meaning 

7 given that term in section 1010.605 of title 31, Code 

8 of Federal Regulations (or any corresponding similar 

9 regulation or ruling). 

10 (6) PERSON.—The term ‘‘person’’ means any 

11 individual or entity. 

12 (7) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term 

13 ‘‘United States person’’ means— 

14 (A) a United States citizen or an alien law15 fully admitted for permanent residence to the 

16 United States; 

17 (B) an entity organized under the laws of 

18 the United States or of any jurisdiction within 

19 the United States, including a foreign branch of 

20 such an entity; or 

21 (C) any person in the United States. 


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1 SEC. 233. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING PORTRAYALS 

2 OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA OR THE EAST 

3 CHINA SEA AS PART OF CHINA. 

4 It is the sense of Congress that the Government Pub5 lishing Office should not publish any map, document, 

6 record, electronic resource, or other paper of the United 

7 States (other than materials relating to hearings held by 

8 committees of Congress or internal work product of a Fed9 eral agency) portraying or otherwise indicating that it is 

10 the position of the United States that any part of the terri11 tory or airspace in the South China Sea that is disputed 

12 among two or more parties, or of the territory or airspace 

13 of areas administered by Japan or the Republic of Korea, 

14 including in the East China Sea, is part of the territory 

15 or airspace of the PRC. 

16 SEC. 234. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON 2016 PERMANENT 

17 COURT OF ARBITRATION’S TRIBUNAL RUL18 ING ON ARBITRATION CASE BETWEEN PHIL19 IPPINES AND PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. 

20 (a) FINDING.—Congress finds that on July 12, 2016, 

21 a tribunal of the Permanent Court of Arbitration found 

22 in the arbitration case between the Philippines and the 

23 PRC under the United Nations Convention on the Law 

24 of the Sea that the PRC’s claims, including those to off25 shore resources and ‘‘historic rights’’, were unlawful, and 


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1 that the tribunal’s ruling is final and legally binding on 

2 both parties. 

3 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con4 gress that— 

5 (1) the United States and the international 

6 community should reject the unlawful claims of the 

7 PRC within the exclusive economic zone or on the 

8 continental shelf of the Philippines, as well as the 

9 maritime claims of the PRC beyond a 12-nautical10 mile territorial sea from the islands it claims in the 

11 South China Sea; 

12 (2) the provocative behavior of the PRC, includ13 ing coercing other countries with claims in the South 

14 China Sea and preventing those countries from ac15 cessing offshore resources, undermines peace and 

16 stability in the South China Sea; 

17 (3) the international community should— 

18 (A) support the ruling described in sub19 section (a) in compliance with international law; 

20 and 

21 (B) take all necessary steps to support the 

22 rules-based international order in the South 

23 China Sea; and 

24 (4) all claimants in the South China Sea 

25 should— 


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1 (A) refrain from engaging in destabilizing 

2 activities, including illegal occupation or efforts 

3 to unlawfully assert control over disputed 

4 claims; 

5 (B) ensure that disputes are managed 

6 without intimidation, coercion, or force; 

7 (C) clarify or adjust claims in accordance 

8 with international law; and 

9 (D) uphold the principle that territorial 

10 and maritime claims, including over territorial 

11 waters or territorial seas, must be derived from 

12 land features and otherwise comport with inter13 national law. 


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1 TITLE III—INVESTING IN OUR 

2 VALUES 

3 Subtitle A—Promoting Human 

4 Rights in People’s Republic of 

5 China 

6 PART I—PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS FOR CITI7 ZENS OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 

8 AND FOR UNITED STATES CITIZENS IN 

9 CHINA 

10 SEC. 301. PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PEOPLE’S 

11 REPUBLIC OF CHINA. 

12 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall carry out pro13 grams, including through nongovernmental organizations, 

14 that prioritize the protection and advancement of the free15 doms of association, assembly, religion, and expression for, 

16 democracy and human rights activists, women, and ethnic 

17 and religious minorities in the PRC. 

18 (b) CONSULTATION REQUIREMENT.—In carrying out 

19 this section, the Assistant Secretary of Democracy, 

20 Human Rights, and Labor shall consult with the appro21 priate committees of Congress regarding— 

22 (1) strengthening the capacity of the organiza23 tions referred to in subsection (a); 

24 (2) protecting members of the groups referred 

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1 rest, harassment, forced sterilizations, coercive abor2 tions, forced labor, intimidation, or subject to 

3 transnational repression, including members residing 

4 outside of the PRC; and 

5 (3) messaging efforts to reach the broadest pos6 sible audiences within the PRC about United States 

7 Government efforts to protect freedom of associa8 tion, expression, assembly, and the rights of women 

9 and ethnic and religious minorities. 

10 SEC. 302. REPORT ON CORRUPT ACTIVITIES OF SENIOR OF11 FICIALS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE’S 

12 REPUBLIC OF CHINA. 

13 (a) ANNUAL REPORT REQUIRED.— 

14 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days 

15 after the date of the enactment of this Act, and an16 nually thereafter through 2028, the Secretary of 

17 State, in consultation with the Secretary of the 

18 Treasury and any other relevant United States Gov19 ernment official, shall submit to the appropriate 

20 committees of Congress a report identifying those 

21 senior PRC officials who are responsible for, or 

22 complicit in, or who have directly or indirectly en23 gaged in, significant corruption. 

24 (2) ELEMENTS.— 


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1 (A) IN GENERAL.—The report required 

2 under paragraph (1) shall include the following 

3 elements: 

4 (i) A general description of the cor5 rupt sources of wealth of senior PRC offi6 cials. 

7 (ii) A description of corruption, in8 cluding activities taking place outside of 

9 China, engaged in by senior PRC officials. 

10 (iii) A description of any gaps in the 

11 ability of the intelligence community to col12 lect information described in clauses (i) 

13 and (ii). 

14 (iv) The names of other individuals 

15 and entities who facilitate or benefit from 

16 significant corruption by senior PRC offi17 cials, both inside and outside of the PRC. 

18 (B) SCOPE OF REPORTS.—The first report 

19 submitted under paragraph (1) shall include 

20 comprehensive information on the matters de21 scribed in subparagraph (A). Each succeeding 

22 report submitted under paragraph (1) may con23 sist of an update or supplement to the pre24 ceding report submitted under that paragraph. 


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1 (3) FORM.—The report required under para2 graph (1) shall include an unclassified executive 

3 summary of the elements described in clauses (i) 

4 and (ii) of paragraph (2)(A), and may include a 

5 classified annex. 

6 (4) ASSESSMENT OF APPLICABILITY OF SANC7 TIONS.— 

8 (A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 

9 days after submission of each report required 

10 by paragraph (1), the Secretary of State, in co11 ordination with the Secretary of the Treasury, 

12 as appropriate, shall— 

13 (i) evaluate whether any foreign per14 son identified under this section may meet 

15 the criteria for the potential imposition of 

16 sanctions under existing sanctions authori17 ties, including— 

18 (I) the Global Magnitsky Human 

19 Rights Accountability Act (22 U.S.C. 

20 10101 et seq.); and 

21 (II) section 7031(c) of the De22 partment of State, Foreign Oper23 ations, and Related Programs Appro24 priations Act, 2023 (division K of 


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1 Public Law 117–328; 8 U.S.C. 1182 

2 note); and 

3 (ii) submit to the appropriate commit4 tees of Congress a report, in writing, set5 ting forth the results of that assessment. 

6 (B) FORM.—The report required by sub7 paragraph (A)(ii) shall be submitted in unclas8 sified form, but may include a classified annex. 

9 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con10 gress that the United States should undertake every effort 

11 and pursue every opportunity to expose the corruption and 

12 related practices of senior PRC officials, including General 

13 Secretary of the Communist Party and President Xi 

14 Jinping. 

15 (c) CORRUPTION DEFINED.—In this section the term 

16 ‘‘corruption’’ includes, among other activities— 

17 (1) the misappropriation of state assets; 

18 (2) the expropriation of private assets for per19 sonal gain; 

20 (3) abuse of an official position related to gov21 ernment contracts or the extraction of natural re22 sources; and 

23 (4) bribery. 


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1 SEC. 303. CHINA EXIT BANS. 

2 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall col3 lect and analyze available information on the application 

4 of exit bans by the PRC, including trends with respect 

5 to the application of such exit bans to United States na6 tionals. Such data shall be— 

7 (1) used to update of travel warnings as appro8 priate, and in disseminating such information to rel9 evant State and local authorities, with a special em10 phasis on domestic jurisdictions with large numbers 

11 of at-risk populations; 

12 (2) shared, as appropriate, with allies and part13 ner nations about potential risks and vulnerabilities 

14 their citizens may face in traveling to the PRC; 

15 (3) used to inform United States actions to 

16 hold the PRC accountable for these actions; and 

17 (4) submitted to the appropriate committees of 

18 Congress. 

19 (b) EXIT BAN DEFINED.—In this section the term 

20 ‘‘exit ban’’ means a restriction imposed by the Govern21 ment of the PRC that prevents foreign nationals, includ22 ing United States nationals, including legal permanent 

23 residents of the United States, from leaving the PRC with24 out a fair and transparent legal cause or recourse for the 

25 impacted party. 


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1 PART II—MATTERS RELATED TO HONG KONG 

2 SEC. 305. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR PRO3 MOTION OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, 

4 AND CIVILIAN SECURITY IN HONG KONG. 

5 (a) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 

6 authorized to be appropriated $5,000,000 for fiscal year 

7 2025 for the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and 

8 Labor of the Department of State to promote democracy, 

9 human rights, and civilian security in Hong Kong. 

10 (b) ADMINISTRATION.—The Secretary of State shall 

11 designate an office within the Bureau of Democracy, 

12 Human Rights, and Labor to administer and coordinate 

13 the provision of the funds described in subsection (a) with14 in the Department of State and across the United States 

15 Government. 

16 SEC. 306. DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF INTERNET 

17 FREEDOM AND CIRCUMVENTION TOOLS FOR 

18 THE PEOPLE OF HONG KONG. 

19 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find20 ings: 

21 (1) The PRC has repeatedly violated its obliga22 tions under the Joint Declaration by suppressing the 

23 basic rights and freedoms of Hong Kongers. 

24 (2) On June 30, 2020, the National People’s 

25 Congress passed a ‘‘National Security Law’’ that 


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1 further erodes Hong Kong’s autonomy and enables 

2 authorities to suppress dissent. 

3 (3) The PRC continues to utilize the National 

4 Security Law to undermine the fundamental rights 

5 of the people of Hong Kong through suppression of 

6 the freedom of speech, assembly, religion, and the 

7 press. 

8 (4) Article 9 of the National Security Law au9 thorizes unprecedented regulation and supervision of 

10 internet activity in Hong Kong, including expanded 

11 police powers to force internet service providers to 

12 censor content, hand over user information, and 

13 block access to platforms. 

14 (5) On January 13, 2021, the Hong Kong 

15 Broadband Network blocked public access to HK 

16 Chronicles, a website promoting pro-democracy view17 points, under the authorities of the National Secu18 rity Law. 

19 (6) On February 12, 2021, internet service pro20 viders blocked Hong Kong users’ access to the Tai21 wan Transitional Justice Commission website in 

22 Hong Kong. 

23 (7) Major tech companies, including Facebook, 

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1 ing requests for user data from Hong Kong authori2 ties. 

3 (8) On February 28, 2021, 47 pro-democracy 

4 activists in Hong Kong were arrested and charged 

5 under the National Security Law on the charge of 

6 ‘‘conspiracy to commit subversion’’. 

7 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con8 gress that the United States should— 

9 (1) support the ability of the people of Hong 

10 Kong to maintain their freedom to access informa11 tion online; and 

12 (2) focus on investments in technologies that 

13 facilitate the unhindered exchange of information in 

14 Hong Kong in advance of any future efforts by the 

15 Chinese Communist Party— 

16 (A) to suppress internet access; 

17 (B) to increase online censorship; or 

18 (C) to inhibit online communication and 

19 content-sharing by the people of Hong Kong. 

20 (c) HONG KONG INTERNET FREEDOM PROGRAM.— 

21 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall 

22 establish a Hong Kong Internet Freedom Program 

23 in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and 

24 Labor of the Department of State which shall in25 clude a working group dedicated to developing a 


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1 strategy to bolster internet resiliency and online ac2 cess in Hong Kong (in this subsection, the ‘‘Pro3 gram’’). The working group shall consist of— 

4 (A) the Under Secretary of State for Civil5 ian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights; 

6 (B) the Assistant Secretary of State for 

7 East Asian and Pacific Affairs; 

8 (C) the Chief Executive Officer of the 

9 United States Agency for Global Media; 

10 (D) the President of the Open Technology 

11 Fund; 

12 (E) the Administrator of the United States 

13 Agency for International Development; and 

14 (F) the Ambassador-at-large for Cyber15 space and Digital Policy; 

16 (2) INDEPENDENCE.—During the period begin17 ning on the date of the enactment of this Act and 

18 ending on September 30, 2027, the Program shall 

19 be carried out independent from internet freedom 

20 programs focused on the rest of the PRC. 

21 (3) CONSOLIDATION OF DEPARTMENT OF

22 STATE PROGRAM.—Beginning on October 1, 2026, 

23 the Secretary of State may— 


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1 (A) consolidate the Program with the 

2 mainland China initiatives in the Bureau of De3 mocracy, Human Rights, and Labor; or 

4 (B) continue to carry out the Program in 

5 accordance with paragraph (2). 

6 (d) SUPPORT FOR INTERNET FREEDOM TECH7 NOLOGY PROGRAMS.— 

8 (1) GRANTS AUTHORIZED.—The Secretary of 

9 State, working with the Administrator of the United 

10 States Agency for International Development and 

11 the President of the Open Technology fund as ap12 propriate, are authorized to award grants and con13 tracts to private organizations to support and de14 velop programs in Hong Kong that promote or ex15 pand— 

16 (A) open, interoperable, reliable, and se17 cure internet; and 

18 (B) the online exercise of human rights 

19 and fundamental freedoms of individual citi20 zens, activists, human rights defenders, inde21 pendent journalists, civil society organizations, 

22 and marginalized populations in Hong Kong. 

23 (2) GOALS.—The goals of the programs devel24 oped with grants authorized under paragraph (1) 

25 should be— 


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1 (A) to support unrestricted access to the 

2 internet in Hong Kong; 

3 (B) to increase the availability of internet 

4 freedom tools in Hong Kong; 

5 (C) to scale up the distribution of such 

6 technologies and tools throughout Hong Kong; 

7 (D) to prioritize the development of tools, 

8 components, code, and technologies that are 

9 fully open-source, to the extent practicable; 

10 (E) to conduct research on repressive tac11 tics that undermine internet freedom in Hong 

12 Kong; 

13 (F) to ensure information on digital safety 

14 is available to human rights defenders, inde15 pendent journalists, civil society organizations, 

16 and marginalized populations in Hong Kong; 

17 and 

18 (G) to engage private industry, including 

19 e-commerce firms and social networking compa20 nies, on the importance of preserving unre21 stricted internet access in Hong Kong. 

22 (3) GRANT RECIPIENTS.—Grants authorized 

23 under this subsection shall be distributed to multiple 

24 vendors and suppliers through an open, fair, com25 petitive, and evidence-based decision process— 


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1 (A) to diversify the technical base; and 

2 (B) to reduce the risk of misuse by bad ac3 tors. 

4 (4) SECURITY AUDITS.—New technologies de5 veloped using grants authorized under this sub6 section shall undergo comprehensive security audits 

7 to ensure that such technologies are secure and have 

8 not been compromised in a manner detrimental to 

9 the interests of the United States or to individuals 

10 or organizations benefitting from programs sup11 ported by these funds. 

12 (e) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.— 

13 (1) OPEN TECHNOLOGY FUND.—There is au14 thorized to be appropriated to the Open Technology 

15 Fund $2,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2025 

16 through 2029 to carry out this section. This funding 

17 is in addition to the funds authorized for the Open 

18 Technology Fund pursuant to section 309A of 

19 United States International Broadcasting Act of 

20 1994 (22 U.S.C. 6208a). 

21 (2) BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, 

22 AND LABOR.—In addition to the funds authorized to 

23 be made available pursuant to paragraph (1), there 

24 is authorized to be appropriated to the Office of 

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1 mocracy, Human Rights, and Labor of the Depart2 ment of State $2,000,000 for each of fiscal years 

3 2025 through 2029 to carry out this section. 

4 PART III—MATTERS RELATED TO XINJIANG 

5 SEC. 311. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON TREATMENT OF 

6 UYGHURS AND OTHER ETHNIC MINORITIES 

7 IN THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS RE8 GION. 

9 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find10 ings: 

11 (1) Uyghurs are one of several predominantly 

12 Muslim Turkic groups living in the Xinjiang Uyghur 

13 Autonomous Region (XUAR) in the northwest of the 

14 PRC. 

15 (2) Following Uyghur demonstrations and un16 rest in 2009 and clashes with government security 

17 personnel and other violent incidents in subsequent 

18 years, PRC leaders began a campaign of large-scale 

19 atrocities in the XUAR including arrests and ex20 treme security measures, under the pretext of com21 batting alleged terrorism, religious extremism, and 

22 ethnic separatism. 

23 (3) In May 2014, the PRC launched its ‘‘Strike 

24 Hard Against Violent Extremism’’ campaign, which 

25 resulted in additional human rights violations 


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1 against minorities in the XUAR under the pretext of 

2 fighting terrorism. 

3 (4) In August 2016, Chinese Communist Party 

4 (CCP) Politburo member Chen Quanguo, former 

5 Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) Party Secretary, 

6 known for overseeing intensifying security operations 

7 and human rights abuses in the TAR, was appointed 

8 as Party Secretary of the XUAR. 

9 (5) Beginning in 2017, XUAR authorities 

10 sought to forcibly ‘‘assimilate’’ Uyghurs and other 

11 Turkic minorities into Chinese society through a pol12 icy of cultural erasure known as ‘‘Sinicization’’. 

13 (6) Since 2018, credible reporting, including 

14 from the BBC, France24, and the New York Times, 

15 has shown that the Government of the PRC has 

16 built mass internment camps in the XUAR, which it 

17 calls ‘‘vocational training’’ centers, and detained 

18 Uyghurs and other groups in them and other facili19 ties. 

20 (7) Since 2015, XUAR authorities have arbi21 trarily detained an estimated 1,500,000 Uyghurs— 

22 12.5 percent of the XUAR’s official Uyghur popu23 lation of 12,000,000—and a smaller number of 

24 other ethnic minorities in the ‘‘vocational training’’ 


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1 centers and other detention and pre-detention facili2 ties. 

3 (8) In 2017, the XUAR accounted for less than 

4 two percent of the PRC’s total population but 21 

5 percent of all arrests in China. 

6 (9) The Atlantic, Radio Free Asia, and other 

7 sources have revealed that detainees are forced to re8 nounce many of their Islamic beliefs and customs 

9 and repudiate Uyghur culture, language, and iden10 tity. 

11 (10) Investigations by Human Rights Watch 

12 and other human rights organizations have docu13 mented how detainees are subject to political indoc14 trination, forced labor, crowded and unsanitary con15 ditions, involuntary biometric data collection, both 

16 medical neglect and intrusive medical interventions, 

17 food and water deprivation, beatings, sexual violence, 

18 and torture. 

19 (11) Research by the Australian Strategic Pol20 icy Institute suggests that, since late 2019, many 

21 detainees have been placed in higher security facili22 ties and convicted of formal crimes. 

23 (12) Human Rights Watch has reported that 

24 the PRC uses data collection programs, including fa25 cial recognition technology, to surveil Uyghurs in the 


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1 XUAR and to identify individuals whom authorities 

2 may detain. 

3 (13) PRC authorities have placed countless 

4 children whose parents are detained or in exile in 

5 state-run institutions and boarding schools without 

6 the consent of their parents. 

7 (14) New York Times reporting revealed that 

8 numerous local PRC officials who did not agree with 

9 the policies carried out in XUAR have been fired 

10 and imprisoned. 

11 (15) Associated Press reporting documented 

12 widespread and systemic efforts by PRC authorities 

13 to force Uyghur women to take contraceptives or to 

14 subject them to sterilization or abortion, threatening 

15 to detain those who do not comply. 

16 (16) PRC authorities prohibit family members 

17 and advocates inside and outside China from having 

18 regular communications with relatives and friends 

19 imprisoned in the XUAR, such as journalist and en20 trepreneur Ekpar Asat. 

21 (17) PRC authorities have imposed pervasive 

22 restrictions on the peaceful practice of Islam in the 

23 XUAR, to the extent that Human Rights Watch as24 serts the PRC ‘‘has effectively outlawed the practice 

25 of Islam’’. 


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1 (18) Individuals who are not detained in camps 

2 have been forced to attend political indoctrination 

3 sessions, subjected to movement restrictions, mass 

4 surveillance systems, involuntary biometric data col5 lection, and other human rights abuses. 

6 (19) International media, nongovernmental or7 ganizations, scholars, families, and survivors have 

8 reported on the systemic nature of many of these 

9 abuses. 

10 (20) On June 26, 2020, a group of 50 inde11 pendent United Nations experts jointly expressed 

12 alarm over China’s deteriorating human rights 

13 record, including its repression in Xinjiang, and 

14 called on the international community ‘‘to act collec15 tively and decisively to ensure China respects human 

16 rights and abides by its international obligations’’. 

17 (21) On October 6, 2020, 39 United Nations 

18 member countries issued a public statement con19 demning human rights violations by PRC authorities 

20 and calling on the PRC to allow the United Nations 

21 High Commissioner for Human Rights unfettered 

22 access to Xinjiang. 

23 (22) United States Congress passed the Uyghur 

24 Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 (Public Law 116– 

25 145). 


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1 (23) United States Congress passed the Global 

2 Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (sub3 title F of title XII of Public Law 114–328; 22 

4 U.S.C. 2656 note), which has been used to sanction 

5 PRC officials and entities for their activities in the 

6 XUAR. 

7 (24) United States Congress passed the Uyghur 

8 Forced Labor Prevention Act (Public Law 117–78.) 

9 (25) The United States Government has imple10 mented additional targeted restrictions on trade with 

11 Xinjiang and imposed visa and economic sanctions 

12 on PRC officials and entities for their activities in 

13 the XUAR. 

14 (26) The United States Government has docu15 mented human rights abuses and violations of indi16 vidual freedoms in the XUAR, including in the 2019 

17 Department of State Report on International Reli18 gious Freedom. 

19 (27) On January 19, 2021, then-Secretary of 

20 State Michael Pompeo ‘‘determined that the PRC, 

21 under the direction and control of the CCP, has 

22 committed crimes against humanity, genocide 

23 against the predominantly Muslim Uyghurs and 

24 other ethnic and religious minority groups in 

25 Xinjiang’’ and that these crimes are ongoing. 


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1 (28) On January 19, 2021, during his con2 firmation hearing, Secretary of State Antony 

3 Blinken testified that ‘‘forcing men, women, and 

4 children into concentration camps, trying to in effect 

5 reeducate them to be adherents to the Chinese Com6 munist Party—all of that speaks to an effort to 

7 commit genocide’’. 

8 (29) On January 19, 2021, Secretary of the 

9 Treasury Janet L. Yellen, during her confirmation 

10 hearing, publicly stated that China is guilty of ‘‘hor11 rendous human rights abuses’’. 

12 (30) On January 27, 2021, in response to a 

13 question from the press regarding the Uyghurs, Sec14 retary Blinken stated that his ‘‘judgement remains 

15 that genocide was committed against the Uyghurs’’. 

16 (31) On March 10, 2021, in response to a ques17 tion on Xinjiang during his testimony before the 

18 Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Rep19 resentatives, Secretary Blinken reiterated, ‘‘We’ve 

20 been clear, and I’ve been clear, that I see it as geno21 cide, other egregious abuses of human rights, and 

22 we’ll continue to make that clear.’’ 

23 (32) The 2020 Department of State Country 

24 Reports on Human Rights Practices: China states 

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1 curred during the year against the predominantly 

2 Muslim Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious mi3 nority groups in Xinjiang’’. 

4 (33) United Nations High Commissioner for 

5 Human Rights Michelle Bachelet traveled to China 

6 in May 2022 and during this mission visited the 

7 XUAR, but the PRC did not provide her with the 

8 unfettered and unmonitored access that would have 

9 been needed to make a fulsome assessment of the 

10 conditions and experiences of those most affected by 

11 the PRCs repressive policies. 

12 (34) On August 31, 2022, the United Nations 

13 Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights 

14 (OHCHR) issued its ‘‘Assessment of the Human 

15 Rights Concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autono16 mous Region, People’s Republic of China’’ and in 

17 this report noted that the human rights abuses being 

18 committed against the Uyghurs and other predomi19 nantly Muslim groups in the XUAR ‘‘may constitute 

20 international crimes, in particular crimes against hu21 manity’’. 

22 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con23 gress that— 

24 (1) the atrocities, including genocide, committed 

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1 nantly Muslim Turkic groups in Xinjiang, including 

2 forced labor, sexual violence, the internment of over 

3 1,000,000 individuals, and other horrific abuses 

4 must be condemned; 

5 (2) the President, the Secretary of State, and 

6 the United States Ambassador to the United Na7 tions should speak publicly about the ongoing atroc8 ities in the XUAR, including in formal speeches at 

9 the United Nations and other international fora; 

10 (3) the President, the Secretary of State, and 

11 the United States Ambassador to the United Na12 tions should appeal to the United Nations Secretary13 General to take a more proactive and public stance 

14 on the situation in the XUAR, including by sup15 porting calls for an investigation and accountability 

16 for individuals and entities responsible for abuses 

17 against the people of the XUAR; 

18 (4) the United States should continue to use 

19 targeted sanctions and all diplomatic tools, including 

20 the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act and the 

21 Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, available to 

22 promote accountability for those responsible for the 

23 atrocities in Xinjiang; 

24 (5) United States agencies engaged with China 

25 on trade, climate, defense, or other bilateral issues 


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1 should include human rights abuses in the XUAR as 

2 a consideration in developing United States policy; 

3 (6) the United States supports Radio Free Asia 

4 Uyghur, the only Uyghur-language news service in 

5 the world independent of PRC government influence; 

6 (7) United Nations High Commissioner for 

7 Human Rights Bachelet’s visit to China in May 

8 2022 may have inadvertently lent credence to the 

9 PRC’s narrative that its actions in the XUAR were 

10 part of a legitimate counter-terrorism operation 

11 given the PRC; 

12 (8) in any future visits to China senior United 

13 Nations officials, and in particular the United Na14 tions High Commissioner for Human Rights, should 

15 insist on unfettered and unmonitored access, includ16 ing to XUAR; and 

17 (9) the Secretary of State, working with the 

18 United States Ambassador to the United Nations, 

19 and the United States Ambassador-at-Large for 

20 Global Criminal Justice should outline a strategy to 

21 work with international partners to promote justice 

22 for the PRC’s crimes in the XUAR and investigate 

23 the atrocity crimes and other human rights abuses 

24 that have taken place in the XUAR, collect, pre25 serve, and analyze this evidence, so that it can be 


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1 used by a future competent court to adjudicate these 

2 cases. 

3 SEC. 312. SENSE OF CONGRESS CALLING ON ORGANIZA4 TION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION MEMBERS 

5 TO TAKE ACTION ON ATROCITIES IN 

6 XINJIANG. 

7 It is the sense of Congress that— 

8 (1) the United States is committed to the right 

9 to freedom of religion or belief and the principle that 

10 all persons should be free to practice or not practice 

11 the religion or belief of their choice without fear of 

12 persecution; 

13 (2) the international community plays an im14 portant role elevating awareness when countries are 

15 discriminating against, persecuting, or committing 

16 atrocities, including genocide, or other abuses 

17 against persons based on their religion or ethnicity; 

18 (3) countries that are home to significant popu19 lations of religious communities being persecuted 

20 and abused elsewhere are uniquely positioned to take 

21 a leadership role in exerting diplomatic pressure and 

22 promoting accountability with respect to such 

23 abuses; and 

24 (4) the Organization of Islamic Cooperation 

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1 tive Voice of the Muslim World’’, which ‘‘endeavors 

2 to safeguard and protect the interests of the Muslim 

3 world in the spirit of promoting international peace 

4 and harmony among various people of the world,’’ be 

5 the leading global voice in— 

6 (A) advocating, including with respect to 

7 Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minori8 ties in the PRC, for Article 18 of the Universal 

9 Declaration of Human Rights, which provides, 

10 ‘‘Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, 

11 conscience and religion; this right shall include 

12 freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief 

13 of his choice, and freedom, either individually or 

14 in community with others and in public or pri15 vate to manifest his religion or belief in wor16 ship, observance, practice, and teaching.’’; 

17 (B) seeking to raise awareness about the 

18 plight of the Uyghurs and other ethnic and reli19 gious minorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Auton20 omous Region and elsewhere in the PRC; 

21 (C) calling on the PRC to stop committing 

22 atrocities, including genocide, against Muslims 

23 and other religious and ethnic minorities in the 

24 Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and else25 where in the PRC; 


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1 (D) taking action to support justice for 

2 Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minori3 ties in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Re4 gion and elsewhere in the PRC; and 

5 (E) safeguarding against the refoulement 

6 of Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious mi7 norities back to the PRC. 

8 SEC. 313. REAUTHORIZATION OF THE UYGHUR HUMAN 

9 RIGHTS POLICY ACT. 

10 Section 6(h) of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act 

11 of 2020 (Public Law 116–145; 22 U.S.C. 6901 note) is 

12 amended by striking ‘‘5 years after’’ and inserting ‘‘10 

13 years after’’. 

14 SEC. 314. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO 

15 SYSTEMATIC RAPE, COERCIVE ABORTION, 

16 FORCED STERILIZATION, OR INVOLUNTARY 

17 CONTRACEPTIVE IMPLANTATION IN THE 

18 XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION. 

19 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 6(a)(1) of the Uyghur 

20 Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 (Public Law 116–145; 

21 22 U.S.C. 6901 note) is amended— 

22 (1) by redesignating subparagraph (F) as sub23 paragraph (G); and 

24 (2) by inserting after subparagraph (E) the fol25 lowing new subparagraph: 


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1 ‘‘(F) Systematic rape, coercive abortion, 

2 forced sterilization, or involuntary contraceptive 

3 implantation policies and practices.’’. 

4 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE; APPLICABILITY.—The amend5 ment made by subsection (a)— 

6 (1) takes effect on the date of the enactment of 

7 this Act; and 

8 (2) applies with respect to each report required 

9 by section 6(a)(1) of the Uyghur Human Rights Pol10 icy Act of 2020 submitted after such date of enact11 ment. 

12 PART IV—MATTERS RELATED TO TIBET 

13 SEC. 317. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO TIBET. 

14 (a) RANK OF UNITED STATES SPECIAL COORDI15 NATOR FOR TIBETAN ISSUES.— 

16 (1) IN GENERAL.—Section 621 of the Tibetan 

17 Policy Act of 2002 (subtitle B of title VI of Public 

18 Law 107–228; 22 U.S.C. 6901 note) is amended— 

19 (A) by redesignating subsections (b), (c), 

20 and (d), as subsections (c), (d), and (e), respec21 tively; and 

22 (B) by inserting after subsection (a) the 

23 following new subsection: 

24 ‘‘(b) RANK.—The Special Coordinator shall either be 

25 appointed by the President, with the advice and consent 


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1 of the Senate, or shall be an individual holding the rank 

2 of Under Secretary of State or higher.’’. 

3 (2) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section 

4 616(e)(2) of the Tibetan Policy Act of 2002 is 

5 amended by striking ‘‘section 621(d)’’ and inserting 

6 ‘‘section 621(e)’’. 

7 (b) TIBET UNIT AT UNITED STATES EMBASSY IN

8 BEIJING.— 

9 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall 

10 establish a Tibet Unit in the Political Section of the 

11 United States Embassy in Beijing, People’s Republic 

12 of China. 

13 (2) OPERATION.—The Tibet Unit established 

14 under paragraph (1) shall operate until such time as 

15 the PRC permits— 

16 (A) the United States Consulate General 

17 in Chengdu, People’s Republic of China, to re18 open; or 

19 (B) a United States Consulate General in 

20 Lhasa, Tibet, to open. 

21 (3) STAFF.— 

22 (A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary should 

23 assign not fewer than 2 United States direct24 hire personnel to the Tibet Unit established 

25 under paragraph (1). 


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1 (B) LANGUAGE TRAINING.—The Secretary 

2 shall make Tibetan language training available 

3 to the personnel assigned under subparagraph 

4 (A), consistent with the Tibetan Policy Act of 

5 2002 (subtitle B of title VI of Public Law 107– 

6 228; 22 U.S.C. 6901 note). 

7 SEC. 318. UNITED STATES POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL EN8 GAGEMENT ON THE OR REINCARNATION OF 

9 THE DALAI LAMA AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 

10 OF TIBETAN BUDDHISTS. 

11 (a) REAFFIRMATION OF POLICY.—It is the policy of 

12 the United States, as provided under section 342(b) of di13 vision FF of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 

14 (Public Law 116–260), that any ‘‘interference by the Gov15 ernment of the PRC or any other government in the proc16 ess of recognizing a successor or reincarnation of the 14th 

17 Dalai Lama and any future Dalai Lamas would represent 

18 a clear abuse of the right to religious freedom of Tibetan 

19 Buddhists and the Tibetan people’’. 

20 (b) INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO PROTECT RELI21 GIOUS FREEDOM OF TIBETAN BUDDHISTS.—The Sec22 retary of State should engage with United States allies 

23 and partners— 


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1 (1) to support Tibetan Buddhist religious lead2 ers’ sole religious authority to identify and install 

3 the 15th Dalai Lama; 

4 (2) to oppose claims by the Government of the 

5 PRC that the PRC has the authority to decide for 

6 Tibetan Buddhists the 15th Dalai Lama; and 

7 (3) to reject interference by the Government of 

8 the PRC in the religious freedom of Tibetan Bud9 dhists. 

10 Subtitle B—Promoting Human 

11 Rights Globally 

12 SEC. 321. REMOVAL OF MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 

13 HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL THAT COMMIT 

14 HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES. 

15 The President shall direct the Permanent Represent16 ative of the United States to the United Nations to use 

17 the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to— 

18 (1) reform the process for suspending rights of 

19 membership in the United Nations Human Rights 

20 Council for states that commit gross and systematic 

21 violations of human rights, including— 

22 (A) ensuring information detailing the 

23 member country’s human rights record is pub24 licly available before a vote on suspension of the 

25 rights of membership; and 


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1 (B) making the vote of each country on 

2 the suspension of rights of membership from 

3 the United Nations Human Rights Council pub4 licly available; 

5 (2) reform the rules on electing members to the 

6 United Nations Human Rights Council to seek to 

7 ensure United Nations members that have com8 mitted gross and systematic violations of human 

9 rights are not elected to the Human Rights Council; 

10 and 

11 (3) oppose the election to the Human Rights 

12 Council of any United Nations member— 

13 (A) currently assessed to engage in a con14 sistent pattern of gross violations of human 

15 rights pursuant to section 116 or section 502B 

16 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 

17 U.S.C. 2151n, 2304); 

18 (B) currently designated as a state sponsor 

19 of terrorism; 

20 (C) currently designated as a Tier 3 coun21 try under the Trafficking Victims Protection 

22 Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7101 et seq.); 

23 (D) the government of which is identified 

24 on the list published by the Secretary of State 

25 pursuant to section 404(b) of the Child Soldiers 


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1 Prevention Act of 2008 (22 U.S.C. 2370c–1(b)) 

2 as a government that recruits and uses child 

3 soldiers; or 

4 (E) the government of which the United 

5 States determines to have committed genocide, 

6 crimes against humanity, war crimes, or ethnic 

7 cleansing. 

8 SEC. 322. PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS AT 

9 THE UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER MULTI10 LATERAL BODIES. 

11 The Secretary of State and the United States Perma12 nent Representative to the United Nations shall use the 

13 voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the 

14 United Nations and other multilateral bodies— 

15 (1) to oppose efforts by the PRC and other au16 thoritarian actors to prevent the full participation of 

17 civil society actors, including human rights defend18 ers, and block the accreditation of non-governmental 

19 organizations at the United Nations and other mul20 tilateral bodies; 

21 (2) to ensure that the United Nations bolsters 

22 the protection and safe participation of civil society 

23 actors who are subject to transnational repression, 

24 state-sponsored harassment, and reprisals by the 

25 PRC and other governments; 


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1 (3) to increase monitoring and reporting to 

2 identify and track reprisals against human rights de3 fenders, who engage with the United Nations and 

4 other multilateral bodies; 

5 (4) to oppose efforts by the PRC and other au6 thoritarian actors to sponsor the participation of 

7 government-organized nongovernmental organiza8 tions in the Committee on Non-Governmental Orga9 nizations of United Nations Economic and Social 

10 Council, which organizations are used as instru11 ments of the state, including to repress participation 

12 and debate by legitimate civil society actors; 

13 (5) to support the use of targeted sanctions, 

14 censure of member states, and all diplomatic tools, 

15 including working with other foreign governments, 

16 available to hold accountable persons that engage in 

17 reprisals against human rights defenders; and 

18 (6) to oppose efforts by the PRC to reduce 

19 funding for human rights monitoring and civilian 

20 protection posts within Security Council approved 

21 United Nations peacekeeping missions. 

22 SEC. 323. INCLUSION OF SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY 

23 ABUSE IN HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT. 

24 The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 

25 et seq.) is amended— 


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1 (1) in section 116 (22 U.S.C. 2151n), by add2 ing at the end the following new subsection: 

3 ‘‘(h) SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY.— 

4 ‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—The report required under 

5 subsection (d) shall to the extent feasible include a 

6 description of the use of foreign commercial spyware 

7 by the government of each country in which there 

8 are systematic acts of political repression, to conduct 

9 surveillance, including passive or active monitoring, 

10 against activists, journalists, opposition politicians, 

11 or other individuals for the purposes of suppressing 

12 dissent or intimidating critics. 

13 ‘‘(2) DEFINED TERM.—In this subsection, the 

14 term ‘foreign commercial spyware’ means the term 

15 referred to in section 6318 of the James M. Inhofe 

16 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

17 2023 (Public Law 117–263).’’; and 

18 (2) in section 502B (22 U.S.C. 2304)— 

19 (A) by redesignating the second subsection 

20 designated subsection (i) as subsection (j); and 

21 (B) by adding at the end the following new 

22 subsection: 

23 ‘‘(k) SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY.— 

24 ‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—The report required under 

25 subsection (b) shall to the extent feasible include a 


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1 description of the use of foreign commercial spyware 

2 by the government of each country in which there 

3 are systematic acts of political repression, to conduct 

4 surveillance, including passive or active monitoring, 

5 against activists, journalists, opposition politicians, 

6 or other individuals for the purposes of suppressing 

7 dissent or intimidating critics. 

8 ‘‘(2) DEFINED TERM.—In this subsection, the 

9 term ‘foreign commercial spyware’ means the term 

10 referred to in section 6318 of the James M. Inhofe 

11 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

12 2023 (Public Law 117–263).’’. 

13 SEC. 324. STRENGTHENING PUBLIC REPORTING ON COR14 RUPTION. 

15 It is the sense of the Congress that— 

16 (1) the PRC and its representatives are en17 gaged in corruption across the globe, targeting pub18 lic sector officials with the goal of inducing them to 

19 make official decisions that suit the interests of the 

20 PRC in exchange for personal financial gain; 

21 (2) people across the globe do not want leaders 

22 who make deals to enrich themselves and their fami23 lies in exchange for their country’s natural resources 

24 or agreeing to take on onerous national debts and 


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1 loans, which the nation will be forced to pay back; 

2 and 

3 (3) uncovering and bringing to light evidence of 

4 this sort of corruption serves the objective of empow5 ering people everywhere to bring such practices to 

6 end. 

7 SEC. 325. AUTHORIZATION OF FUNDING FOR PUBLIC RE8 PORTING ON CORRUPTION AND CORRUPT 

9 PRACTICES. 

10 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall sup11 port and strengthen media and civil society initiatives to 

12 uncover and report on evidence of corruption, with a goal 

13 of bringing to light the corrupt practices of the PRC and 

14 its representatives in every region, and the local leaders 

15 who are accepting these payments. 

16 (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 

17 authorized to be appropriated an additional $3,000,000 

18 for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029 for the Sec19 retary of State to carry out this section. 


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1 TITLE IV—MODERNIZING THE 

2 DEPARTMENT OF STATE TO 

3 MEET THE CHINA CHAL4 LENGE 

5 SEC. 401. ESTABLISHING AN ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 

6 STATE FOR INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS. 

7 (a) REPEAL.—Section 122 of the Foreign Relations 

8 Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (22 

9 U.S.C. 2652b) is repealed. 

10 (b) AUTHORIZATION.—The Secretary of State is au11 thorized to establish a Bureau for Indo-Pacific Affairs, to 

12 be headed by an Assistant Secretary for Indo-Pacific Af13 fairs appointed by the President, by and with the advice 

14 and consent of the Senate. The Assistant Secretary shall 

15 report to the Under Secretary of State for Political Af16 fairs. 

17 (c) DUTIES.—The Assistant Secretary for Indo-Pa18 cific Affairs shall— 

19 (1) be responsible for overseeing and coordi20 nating diplomatic efforts related to the Indo-Pacific 

21 region, and to advance United States interests, pro22 mote regional stability, and foster economic growth 

23 and development through diplomatic engagement, 

24 public affairs, policy coordination, and strategic 

25 partnerships within the Indo-Pacific region; 


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1 (2) advance United States interests with respect 

2 to the PRC, especially by advancing a policy of stra3 tegic competition to contend with the threats and 

4 challenges posed by the PRC to the United States, 

5 its allies, and other partners in the Indo-Pacific re6 gion; 

7 (3) assist the Secretary of State in providing 

8 overall direction and coordination of interdepart9 mental activities of the United States Government in 

10 the countries within the Indo-Pacific region, includ11 ing directing United States policies for Indo-Pacific 

12 countries, directing and overseeing the effectiveness 

13 of the applicable strategies, plans, programs, re14 sources, and performance for implementing that pol15 icy, and monitoring for and indications of developing 

16 crises and initiating appropriate action in a timely 

17 manner; 

18 (4) provide active direction to chiefs of mission 

19 (COMs) in carrying out their official duty to imple20 ment U.S. foreign policy and lead their missions ef21 fectively, and facilitate supported needed by COMs 

22 at their missions; 

23 (5) directly supervise the policy and operations 

24 of the bureau and provide overall guidance to the 

25 United States missions within the region; 


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1 (6) direct and oversee the provision of an ade2 quate, regular flow of information to posts abroad 

3 on United States Government policies, policy delib4 erations, and diplomatic exchanges, especially on 

5 matters that may result in negotiations, initiatives, 

6 policy actions, or other official representations of 

7 Department policy abroad; and 

8 (7) other responsibilities, as determined by the 

9 Secretary, related to the advancement of United 

10 States foreign policy and national security in the 

11 Indo-Pacific. 

12 (d) REALIGNMENT.—The Secretary of State is au13 thorized to realign bureaus and offices within the Depart14 ment of State to implement this provision. 

15 (e) DEFINITIONS.—The terms ‘‘Indo-Pacific’’ and 

16 ‘‘Indo-Pacific region’’ mean the following 39 countries and 

17 their surrounding waterways: Australia, Bangladesh, Bhu18 tan, Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, the People’s Republic of 

19 China, Cook Islands, Democratic People’s Republic of 

20 Korea, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kiribati, Laos, Ma21 laysia, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Mongolia, 

22 Nauru, Nepal, New Zealand, Palau, Papua New Guinea, 

23 Philippines, Republic of Korea, Samoa, Singapore, Sol24 omon Islands, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga, 


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1 Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Vietnam. The terms also include 

2 Taiwan and its surrounding waterway. 

3 SEC. 402. ENHANCING STRATEGIC COMPETITION AT THE 

4 DEPARTMENT OF STATE. 

5 (a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the 

6 United States— 

7 (1) to pursue a strategy of strategic competition 

8 with the PRC in the political, diplomatic, economic, 

9 development, military, informational, and techno10 logical realms that maximizes the United States 

11 strengths and increases the costs for the PRC of 

12 harming United States interests and the values of 

13 United States allies and partners; 

14 (2) to lead a free, open, and secure inter15 national system characterized by freedom from coer16 cion, rule of law, open markets and the free flow of 

17 commerce, and a shared commitment to security and 

18 peaceful resolution of disputes, human rights, and 

19 good and transparent governance; 

20 (3) to strengthen and deepen United States alli21 ances and partnerships, prioritizing the Indo-Pacific 

22 and Europe, by pursuing greater bilateral and multi23 lateral cooperative initiatives that advance shared in24 terests and values and bolster the confidence of partVerDate Sep 11 2014 07:18 Jan 16, 2025 Jkt 059200 PO 00000 Frm 00311 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S5491.IS S5491

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1 ner countries that the United States is and will re2 main a strong, committed, and constant partner; 

3 (4) to encourage and collaborate with United 

4 States allies and partners in boosting their own ca5 pabilities and resiliency to pursue, defend, and pro6 tect shared interests and values, free from coercion 

7 and external pressure; 

8 (5) to pursue fair, reciprocal treatment and 

9 healthy competition in United States-China economic 

10 relations by— 

11 (A) advancing policies that harden the 

12 United States economy against unfair and ille13 gal commercial or trading practices and the co14 ercion of United States businesses; and 

15 (B) tightening United States laws and reg16 ulations as necessary to prevent the PRC’s at17 tempts to harm United States economic com18 petitiveness; 

19 (6) to demonstrate the value of private sector20 led growth in emerging markets around the world, 

21 including through the use of United States Govern22 ment tools that— 

23 (A) support greater private sector invest24 ment and advance capacity-building initiatives 

25 that are grounded in the rule of law; 


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1 (B) promote open markets; 

2 (C) establish clear policy and regulatory 

3 frameworks; 

4 (D) improve the management of key eco5 nomic sectors; 

6 (E) combat corruption; and 

7 (F) foster and support greater collabora8 tion with and among partner countries and the 

9 United States private sector to develop secure 

10 and sustainable infrastructure; 

11 (7) to lead in the advancement of international 

12 rules and norms that foster free and reciprocal trade 

13 and open and integrated markets; 

14 (8) to conduct vigorous commercial diplomacy 

15 in support of United States companies and busi16 nesses in partner countries that seek fair competi17 tion; 

18 (9) to ensure that the United States leads in 

19 the innovation of critical and emerging technologies, 

20 such as next-generation telecommunications, artifi21 cial intelligence, quantum information science, semi22 conductors, and biotechnology, by— 

23 (A) providing necessary investment and 

24 concrete incentives for the private sector and 


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1 the United States Government to accelerate de2 velopment of such technologies; 

3 (B) modernizing export controls and in4 vestment screening regimes and associated poli5 cies and regulations; 

6 (C) enhancing United States leadership in 

7 technical standards-setting bodies and avenues 

8 for developing norms regarding the use of 

9 emerging critical technologies; 

10 (D) reducing United States barriers and 

11 increasing incentives for collaboration with al12 lies and partners on the research and co-devel13 opment of critical technologies; 

14 (E) collaborating with allies and partners 

15 to protect critical technologies by— 

16 (i) crafting multilateral export control 

17 measures; 

18 (ii) building capacity for defense tech19 nology security; 

20 (iii) safeguarding chokepoints in sup21 ply chains; and 

22 (iv) ensuring diversification; and 

23 (F) designing major defense capabilities 

24 for export to allies and partners; 


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1 (10) to collaborate with advanced democracies 

2 and other willing partners to promote ideals and 

3 principles that— 

4 (A) advance a free and open international 

5 order; 

6 (B) strengthen democratic institutions; 

7 (C) protect and promote human rights; 

8 and 

9 (D) uphold a free press and fact-based re10 porting; 

11 (11) to develop comprehensive and holistic 

12 strategies and policies to counter PRC 

13 disinformation campaigns; 

14 (12) to demonstrate effective leadership at the 

15 United Nations, its associated agencies, and other 

16 multilateral organizations and defend the integrity 

17 of these organizations against co-optation by illiberal 

18 and authoritarian nations; 

19 (13) to prioritize the defense of fundamental 

20 freedoms and human rights in the United States re21 lationship with the PRC; 

22 (14) to cooperate with allies, partners, and mul23 tilateral organizations, leveraging their significant 

24 and growing capabilities to build a network of like25 minded states that sustains and strengthens a free 


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1 and open order and addresses regional and global 

2 challenges to hold the Government of the PRC ac3 countable for— 

4 (A) violations and abuses of human rights; 

5 (B) restrictions on religious practices; and 

6 (C) undermining and abrogating treaties, 

7 other international agreements, and other inter8 national norms related to human rights; 

9 (15) to expose the PRC’s use of corruption, re10 pression, and other malign behavior to attain unfair 

11 economic advantages and to pressure other nations 

12 to defer to its political and strategic objectives; 

13 (16) to maintain United States access to the 

14 Western Pacific, including by— 

15 (A) increasing United States forward-de16 ployed forces in the Indo-Pacific region; 

17 (B) modernizing the United States military 

18 through investments in existing and new plat19 forms, emerging technologies, critical in-theater 

20 force structure and enabling capabilities, joint 

21 operational concepts, and a diverse, operation22 ally resilient and politically sustainable posture; 

23 and 

24 (C) operating and conducting exercises 

25 with allies and partners— 


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1 (i) to mitigate the Peoples Liberation 

2 Army’s ability to project power and estab3 lish contested zones within the First and 

4 Second Island Chains; 

5 (ii) to diminish the ability of the Peo6 ple’s Liberation Army to coerce its neigh7 bors; 

8 (iii) to maintain open sea and air 

9 lanes, particularly in the Taiwan Strait, 

10 the East China Sea, and the South China 

11 Sea; and 

12 (iv) to project power from the United 

13 States and its allies and partners to dem14 onstrate the ability to conduct contested lo15 gistics; 

16 (17) to deter the PRC from— 

17 (A) coercing Indo-Pacific nations, includ18 ing by developing more combat-credible forces 

19 that are integrated with allies and partners in 

20 contact, blunt, and surge layers and able to de21 feat any PRC theory of victory in the First or 

22 Second Island Chains of the Western Pacific 

23 and beyond, as called for in the 2018 National 

24 Defense Strategy; 


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1 (B) using grey-zone tactics below the level 

2 of armed conflict; or 

3 (C) initiating armed conflict; 

4 (18) to strengthen United States-PRC military5 to-military communication and improve de-escalation 

6 procedures to de-conflict operations and reduce the 

7 risk of unwanted conflict, including through high8 level visits and recurrent exchanges between civilian 

9 and military officials and other measures, in align10 ment with United States interests; and 

11 (19) to cooperate with the PRC if interests 

12 align, including through bilateral or multilateral 

13 means and at the United Nations, as appropriate. 

14 (b) ESTABLISHING AND EXPANDING THE REGIONAL

15 CHINA OFFICER PROGRAM.— 

16 (1) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be es17 tablished at the Department of State a Regional 

18 China Officer (RCO) program to support regional 

19 posts and officers with reporting, information, and 

20 policy tools, and to enhance expertise related to stra21 tegic competition with the PRC. 

22 (2) AUTHORIZATION.—There is authorized to 

23 be appropriated $2,000,000 for each of fiscal years 

24 2025 through 2029 to the Department of State to 

25 expand the RCO program, including for— 


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1 (A) the placement of Regional China Offi2 cers at United States missions to the United 

3 Nations and United Nations affiliated organiza4 tions; 

5 (B) the placement of additional Regional 

6 China Officers in Africa; 

7 (C) the hiring of locally employed staff to 

8 support Regional China Officers serving abroad; 

9 and 

10 (D) the establishment of full-time equiva11 lent positions to assist in managing and facili12 tating the RCO program. 

13 (3) PROGRAM FUNDS.—There is authorized to 

14 be appropriated $50,000 for each of fiscal years 

15 2025 through 2029 for each Regional China Officer 

16 to support programs and public diplomacy activities 

17 of the Regional China Officer. 

18 (c) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON DATA-DRIVEN POLICY

19 MAKING.—It is the sense of Congress that— 

20 (1) the Office for China Coordination should 

21 employ at least one full-time equivalent Data Offi22 cer, who shall not be dual-hatted, focused on stra23 tegic competition with the PRC; and 

24 (2) the Department should, to the extent pos25 sible within existing authorities, prioritize access for 


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1 the Office for China Coordination to databases, com2 mercial software, and other data to support policy3 making related to strategic competition with the 

4 PRC. 

5 SEC. 403. DEPARTMENT OF STATE PROFESSIONAL DEVEL6 OPMENT AND ROTATIONAL PROGRAM RE7 LATED TO STRATEGIC COMPETITION. 

8 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall promote poli9 cies that enable greater opportunities for the Department 

10 of State workforce to acquire skills, education, training, 

11 and work experience relevant to strategic competition with 

12 the PRC and to promote the increased effectiveness of the 

13 workforce. 

14 (b) PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT.—The Secretary 

15 shall, to the extent possible and consistent with existing 

16 authorities, expand educational and professional develop17 ment opportunities for the workforce of the Department 

18 related to strategic competition with the PRC. 

19 (c) ROTATIONAL PROGRAM.— 

20 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall, con21 sistent with existing authorities and in order to im22 prove the Department’s coordination with other Fed23 eral departments and agencies with a significant role 

24 in the economic, technological, defense, public diplo25 macy, information, intelligence, and law enforcement 


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1 aspects of United States competition with the PRC, 

2 establish an interagency rotational program at the 

3 Department. 

4 (2) SKILLS AND EXPERIENCE OBJECTIVES.— 

5 The rotational program shall facilitate rotations for 

6 Department personnel to other relevant Federal de7 partments and agencies to acquire skills and experi8 ence related to— 

9 (A) PRC malign influence operations, in10 cluding activities and polices designed to sub11 vert or undermine open societies, repress funda12 mental freedoms in other countries, engage in 

13 information operations, shape narratives favor14 able to the Chinese Communist Party, or sup15 press narratives unfavorable to it, and other16 wise use coercive, covert, or corrupt methods to 

17 exert improper influence on governments, pri18 vate sector, civil society, universities and other 

19 academic institutions, State and local legisla20 tors, and other relevant actors in the United 

21 States and abroad; 

22 (B) economic tools relevant to national se23 curity, including sanctions, export controls, and 

24 investment screening; 


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1 (C) trade and investment in partner coun2 tries; 

3 (D) commercial diplomacy and advocacy 

4 for United States businesses in emerging mar5 kets; 

6 (E) energy security; 

7 (F) security cooperation; 

8 (G) cyber and technology; 

9 (H) space; 

10 (I) critical minerals and other strategic 

11 sectors where the PRC is dominant; 

12 (J) supply chain security and cooperation; 

13 (K) development and foreign assistance, in14 cluding executing high-standard infrastructure 

15 development, especially in the transport, energy, 

16 and digital sectors; 

17 (L) development finance; and 

18 (M) other issue areas that the Secretary 

19 determines necessary for the Department work20 force to develop for the purposes of strategic 

21 competition with the PRC. 

22 (3) PROGRAM DESIGN, MONITORING, AND EVAL23 UATION.— 

24 (A) ROTATIONS AND SECONDMENTS.—In 

25 designing the rotational program required 


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1 under this subsection, the Secretary may, if ap2 propriate and consistent with existing authori3 ties, include rotations or secondments for De4 partment personnel to international organiza5 tions, private sector entities, or to the govern6 ments agencies of United States partners and 

7 allies. 

8 (B) DATA TRACKING.—The Secretary shall 

9 collect and analyze data related to the rota10 tional program required under this subsection, 

11 including to track the— 

12 (i) number of personnel who partici13 pate; 

14 (ii) the duration of the rotations; 

15 (iii) the grade and job series and 

16 sending bureau or office; 

17 (iv) the receiving department or agen18 cy, bureau, and office; 

19 (v) information as to whether the ro20 tation was reciprocal between the sending 

21 and receiving bureau or offices; 

22 (vi) information regarding whether a 

23 backfill was acquired, and if so, through 

24 what mechanism; and 


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1 (vii) any other information that the 

2 Secretary deems necessary to inform ad3 justments to program design to meet the 

4 objectives described in subsection (a). 

5 SEC. 404. REFOCUSING INTERNATIONAL SECURITY EF6 FORTS FOR STRATEGIC COMPETITION. 

7 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con8 gress that— 

9 (1) the size of the United States diplomatic 

10 corps and Department of State civil service per11 sonnel must be sufficient to meet the current and 

12 emerging security challenges of the 21st century, 

13 particularly those posed by the PRC and Russia; 

14 (2) an increased focus on the PRC in the inter15 national security sphere is necessary to achieve De16 partment of State objectives in strategic affairs and 

17 nonproliferation; 

18 (3) this effort must be implemented with a 

19 focus on increasing the number of Foreign Service 

20 Officers and civil servants at the Department of 

21 State to— 

22 (A) ensure the Department is resourced at 

23 sufficient levels to ensure that diplomatic tools 

24 remain central to the implementation of a long25 term competitive strategy with the PRC; and 


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1 (B) coordinate with allies and partners ef2 forts to improve the security of United States 

3 and allied interests in the face of the PRC’s 

4 military modernization and expansion; 

5 (4) emerging technologies such as cyber, artifi6 cial intelligence, quantum technologies, space, 

7 hypersonic missiles, fractional orbit bombardment 

8 system and advances in missile defense systems will 

9 increasingly impact the strategic balance between 

10 the United States and its great power adversaries; 

11 and 

12 (5) strategic threats will be increasingly ad13 dressed through risk reduction measures such as the 

14 promotion of international norms in multilateral fo15 rums, increasing communication and fostering pre16 dictability with adversaries, and close cooperation 

17 and security integration with allies and partners. 

18 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy 

19 of the United States— 

20 (1) to ensure Department of State funding lev21 els for international security reflect the importance 

22 and significance of the Indo-Pacific region to the po23 litical, economic, and security interests of the United 

24 States; and 


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1 (2) to increase funding and the proportion of 

2 personnel dedicated to the Indo-Pacific region re3 spective to the Department of State’s International 

4 Security budget. 

5 (c) ACTION PLAN.—Not later than 180 days after the 

6 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State 

7 shall provide to the appropriate committees of Congress 

8 an action plan with the following elements: 

9 (1) Identification of requirements to advance 

10 United States international security objectives in the 

11 Indo-Pacific and the personnel and budgetary re12 sources needed to meet them, assuming an uncon13 strained resource environment. 

14 (2) Identification of offices responsible for man15 aging bilateral and multilateral arms control, non16 proliferation, and disarmament agreements that are 

17 expired, are expiring, or that have not been imple18 mented since calendar year 2021 with the objective 

19 of revising their mission to focus on competitive 

20 strategies and risk reduction initiatives in the Indo21 Pacific region. 

22 (3) A plan to increase the size of the Depart23 ment’s international security budget. 

24 (4) Budgeting dedicated to the Indo-Pacific, in25 cluding the reallocation of personnel and resources, 


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1 with a focus on the threat posed by PRC military 

2 modernization and expansion. 

3 (5) A plan to increase the number of positions 

4 in bureaus that report to the Under Secretary for 

5 Arms Control and International Security and over6 seas missions with responsibility for the Indo-Pacific 

7 region, including a description of increases and a de8 scription of how such increases in personnel will ad9 vance United States objectives in the Indo-Pacific 

10 region. 

11 (6) Defined concrete and annual benchmarks 

12 that the Department will meet in implementing the 

13 action plan. 

14 (7) A description of any barriers to imple15 menting the action plan. 

16 (d) UPDATES TO ACTION PLAN.—Not later than 180 

17 days after submitting the action plan required under sub18 section (c), and every 180 days thereafter for 2 years, the 

19 Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate commit20 tees of Congress an update on the implementation of the 

21 action plan, including supporting data and a detailed as22 sessment of benchmarks reached. 


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1 TITLE V—OTHER MATTERS 

2 SEC. 501. SAVINGS PROVISIONS. 

3 (a) CONSULTATION AND NOTIFICATION RE4 QUIRED.—The obligation of any funds authorized to be 

5 appropriated by the provisions of this Act shall be subject 

6 to prior consultation with, and consistent with section 

7 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 

8 2394–1), the regular notification procedures of— 

9 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and 

10 the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and 

11 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the 

12 Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep13 resentatives. 

14 (b) QUALIFYING NON-BINDING INSTRUMENTS.—Any 

15 nonbinding instrument related to the provisions of this Act 

16 shall be considered a qualifying non-binding instrument 

17 for purposes of section 112b of title 1, United States Code. 

18 SEC. 502. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION ON MAINTAINING ONE 

19 CHINA POLICY. 

20 Nothing in this Act may be construed as a change 

21 to the one China policy of the United States, which is 

22 guided by the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 et 

23 seq.), the three United States-People’s Republic of China 

24 Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances. 

Æ 


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