1 A debtor in possession has (with a few exceptions) th e rights and duties of a Chapter 11 Trustee. See 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a). IN RE: AMERICAN STEEL PRODUCT, INC., Debtor. Inglesby, Falligant, Horne, Courington & Nash, P.C., Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. Anne R. Moore, Chapter 7 Trustee, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 98-8831. United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Dec. 15, 1999. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia.(No. CV 695-102), B. Avant Edenfield, Judge. Before BLACK and WILSON, Circuit Judg es, and RONEY, Senior Circuit Judge. WILSON, Circuit Judge: This case involves an issue of statutory interpretati on. We consider whether a Chapter 7 debtor' s attorney is entitled under the Bankruptcy Code to comp ensation from the debtor's bankruptcy estate. The district and bankruptcy courts, interpreting 11 U.S.C. § 330, determined that the debtor's attorney is not so entitled. We agree and affirm.
BACKGROUND Debtor, American Steel Products, Inc. ("ASP"), was placed in involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy by its creditors. The bankruptcy court subsequentlyconverted it to a Chapter 11 proceeding and then reconverted it back to a Chapter 7. Although ASP was initially a debtor in possession, 1 Anne R. Moore ("Trustee") was appointed as Chapter 11 Trustee and remained as trustee when the case was reconverted to a Chapter 7. Inglesby, Falligant, Horne, Courington & Nash, P.C., ("the Inglesby firm"), a law firm, was subsequently appointed as counsel.At the conclusion of the bankruptcy proceedings, the Inglesby firm submitted for court approval its application for compensation for services provided to the bankruptcy estate in the total amount of $30,141.87. A part of that proposed fee, $19,600.00, had been paid in the form of a retainer prior to the filing of the initial petition. The bankruptcy court entered an order permitting payment of $10,541.87, the difference between the fee application and the retainer fee initially paid , but reserved ruling on whether that payment should be derived from the bankruptcy estate itself or from the initial retainer. After receiving authority on the effect of the 1994 Amendments to 11 U.S.C. § 330, the bankr uptcy court vacated its prior order and disallowed attorney's fees out of the estate. The bankruptcy court found that the plain language of § 330 precluded an award of attorney's fees to a debtor's attorney in both Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 cases. The district court affirmed. We now have jurisdiction to consid er this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d).
STANDARD OF REVIEW In bankruptcy proceedings, we review factual findings for clear error and conclusions of law de novo. See General Trading, Inc. v. Yale Materials Handling Corp., 119 F.3d 1485, 1494 (11th Cir.1997).
DISCUSSION The district court's ultimate denial of Ingelesb y's compensation request was based on a plain reading of § 330 barring compensation to debtor's counsel in a Chapter 7 or 11 proceeding. In the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Congress amended § 330 to eliminate the form er authorization for payment of debtor's counsel from estate assets in a Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 case. Prior to the 1994 amendments, § 330(a) provided in pertinent part: (a) After notice to any parties in interest and to the United States trustee and a hearing, and subject to sections 326, 328, and 329 of this title, the court may award to a trustee, to an examiner, to a professional person employed under section 327 or 1103 of this title, or to the debtor's attorney

— (1) reasonable compensation for actual, n ecessary services rendered by such trustee, examiner, professional person, or attorney, as th e case may be, and by any paraprofessional persons employed by such trustee, professional person, or attorney, as the case may be, based on the nature, the extent, and the value of such services, the time spent on such services, and the cost of comparable services other than in a case under this title; (emphasis added).As a result of the amendments, Bankruptcy C ode § 330(a) now provides in pertinent part: (a)(1) After notice to the parties in interest and the United States Trustee and a hearing, and subject to sections 326, 328, and 329, the court may award to a trustee, an examiner, a professional person employed under section 327 or 1103— (A) reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered by the trustee, examiner, professional person, or attorney and by any para professional person employed by any such person; and (B) reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses

... (4)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the court shall not allow compensation for— (i) unnecessary duplication of services; or (ii) services that were not— (I) reasonably likely to benefit the debtor's estate; or (II) necessary to the administration of the case. (B) In a Chapter 12 or Chapter 13 case in which the debtor is an individual, the court may allow reasonable compensation to the debtor's attorney for representing the interests of the debtor in connection with the bankruptcy case based on a c onsideration of the benefit and necessity of such services to the debtor and other factors set forth in this section .... (emphasis added) We agree with the district court that the plain r eading of § 330 precludes an award of attorney's fees to a debtor's attorney in a Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 pro ceeding. The Inglesby firm attempts to avoid the plain meaning of the statute by suggesting that the statute contains a drafting error or is ambiguous since the amendment specifically authorizes the bankruptcy court to award reasonable compensation to the debtor's attorney in a Chapter 12 or Chapter 13 in cases where the debtor is an individual. We must presume, however, that Congress intended what it said when it re vised § 330 to delete any provision for the award of compensation to a debtor's attorney ineither a Chapter 7 or a Chapter 11 case. It is well-settled that courts are required to a pply the plain meaning canon of statutory construction in interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code. "[A]s long as th e statutory scheme is coherent and consistent, there generally is no need for a court to inquire beyond the plain language of the statute." United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989). We are thus obligated in thisinstance to apply the plain meaning of § 330 precluding an award of attorney's fees to a debtor's attorney in a Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 case. The statute is clear te xtually on its face and the plain meaning of the statute is conclusive. Both the Fifth and the Ninth Circuits have considered this identical issue and have reached contrary results. In In re Pro-Snax Distributors Inc., 157 F.3d 414, 425 (5th Cir.1998), the Fifth Circuit rejected the argument that a literal application of § 330(a) would produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters, stating: Although the legislative history and, indeed, a brief syntactical evaluation of the clause at issue suggest that Congress inadvertently neglected to include attorneys, our cannons of construction do not require-nay, do not permit-us to consider these exogenous sources when the statute is clear textually on its face. Pro-Snax, 157 F.3d at 425. On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit in In re Century Cleaning Services, Inc., 195 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir.1999), found the statutory language of § 330(a) "substantially ambiguous", concluding that "Congress made a drafting error of some kind". Id. The divided Ninth Circuit panel attributes the deletion of attorneys from the first list of compensable persons as "an unintended slip of the pen and not from a deliberate change." Id. We do not believe that it is within our province to make such an assumption in this case. We agree with the In re Century dissent by Judge Thomas who reasoned, as we do, that the unambiguous statutory language "s hould end the discussion, as it did for the Fifth Circuit." Id. Where the statute's language is plain, as here, our sole f unction is to enforce it according to its terms. See Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 241, 109 S.Ct. 1026. The Inglesby firm suggests that, at the very l east, it is entitled to compensation for "professional services" rendered while representing the debtor prior to the appointment of the Chapter 11 trustee. We will not reach the merits of this issue because it w as not considered by the district court. See Ochran v. U.S., 117 F.3d 495, 502 (11th Cir.1997). Moreover, this case do es not present compelling circumstances which warrant departure from this general rule. See id. at 502-503.
CONCLUSIONWe conclude that the plain language of 11 U.S.C. § 330 precludes an award of a attorney's fees to the debtor's attorney from the Chapter 7 bankruptcy estate.
AFFIRMED.