This project was supported, in whole or in part, by cooperative agreement number 2014-CK-WX-K023 

awarded by the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. The 

opinions contained herein are those of the author(s) or contributor(s) and do not necessarily represent 

the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. References to specific individuals, 

agencies, companies, products, or services should not be considered an endorsement by the author(s) 

or contributor(s) or the U.S. Department of Justice. Rather, the references are illustrations to supplement 

discussion of the issues.

The internet references cited in this publication were valid as of the date of publication. Given that URLs 

and websites are in constant flux, neither the author(s) or contributor(s) nor the COPS Office can vouch 

for their current validity.

Recommended citation:

Daniels, Jeffrey A. 2019. A Preliminary Report on the Police Foundations Averted School Violence 

Database. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.

Published 2019


A Preliminary Report on the Police 

Foundation’s Averted School Violence Database iii

Contents

Letter from the Director of the COPS Office. 

Background...... . vii

Introduction 1

Case Study 3

Background ............... 3

Averted attack. ............

. .............

4

Police actions 4

Disposition . ............... 4

Plotter information . ........ 4

Lessons learned. .......... 4

Recommendations . ....... 5

Data Analyses ........ .

........ .

.........

7

Basic information .......... 7

School Information . ........

. .........

. ..........

7

Plotter information .......

.......

.......

...... .

.......

.......

.......

11

Event information 14

Findings. .................... 17

Students .................. 17

Parents . .................. 18

Schools. .................. 18

Police. ...................... 19

Recommendations. ............

 .... ..............

.......

...... .

.......

...... .

.......

.......

...... .

.......

.......

.......

21

Preparation 21

Develop relationships. ........ 21

Break the “code of silence” 22

Know the school’s culture. .... 22

Know the physical facilities. ... 22

Take all reports seriously 22

Assume nothing. ............. 22

There is no profile. ........... 22

Conclusion. ...................

 .................... ...... .

...... .

...... .

23

References 25

About the Police Foundation27

About the COPS Office 28

A Preliminary Report on the Police 

Foundation’s Averted School Violence Database v

Letter from the Director 

of the COPS Office

Colleagues:

It is essential that our children’s schools be safe and supportive learning environments.

Unfortunately, communities across the country have been shattered by school violence for far too 

long. Leaders of government, school administrations, law enforcement agencies, and community 

stakeholders are diligently working to protect children and education personnel from school 

attacks. The Police Foundation, in collaboration with the COPS Office, implemented the Averted 

School Violence (ASV) database in 2015 as a platform for law enforcement, school staff, and 

mental health professionals to share information about ASV incidents and lessons learned with 

the goal of mitigating and ultimately preventing future injuries and fatalities in educational institutions. The database was begun with accounts of past incidents—starting with Columbine High 

School (1999)—and is available for submission of further incidents as they continue to occur.

The reports in the database can document “close calls” with weapons—guns, knives, improvised 

explosive devices—and can include information about incidents that were thwarted in the planning stages and incidents that were contained as well as what we know about incidents that were 

completed. Users can submit reports anonymously; the reports are never used for punitive 

measures but rather as a research tool and information resource for stakeholders. 

The Police Foundation has completed a comprehensive analysis of the information collected from 

the ASV database as well as interviews with law enforcement and stakeholders to write two 

companion reports. The first is a preliminary analysis of the ASV database and detailed case 

study of an averted attack, and the second is a comparison of averted and completed school 

attacks. The reports provide a detailed picture of school-based violence, including the type of 

attacks, student demographics and type of school, and security measures in place on campus at 

the time of the averted incidents. The case study of one averted attack details lessons learned, 

including the code of silence—students’ reluctance to trust school staff with information about a 

peer who may want to harm themselves or others. The reports provide findings and recommendations for schools to increase the safety and well-being of all the students on campus. Ultimately, we want teens and children to be happy and successful in their school careers. Through 

the information in these reports, communities can learn about best practices and methods to 

improve school safety. 
On behalf of the COPS Office, I thank all the law enforcement, school staff, and mental health 

professionals who have submitted reports and work each day with teens and children in our 

schools. We applaud their commitment to making a difference in their communities and the lives 

of children. I urge everyone to continue to use the ASV database to report incidents of school 

violence, both completed and averted, in the hope that school shootings will soon be a thing of 

the past. I also thank the staff and leadership of Police Foundation for their work on the ASV 

database and these companion publications on averted school violence.

Sincerely,

Phil Keith

Director

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services
A Preliminary Report on the Police 

Foundation’s Averted School Violence Database vii

Background

In 2014, the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of 

Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) 

and the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) provided 

funding to the Police Foundation to initiate the Averted 

School Violence (ASV) project. Through this project, 

the Police Foundation developed a database (Police 

Foundation 2018) to collect, analyze, and publish (in 

an online library [Police Foundation 2018b]) incidents 

of averted and completed acts of school violence that 

have occurred since the attack on Columbine High 

School in Littleton, Colorado, on April 20, 1999. The 

data are drawn from the public domain as well as 

from law enforcement, school officials, and others 

entering reports into the database. The database is 

intended to serve as a resource to law enforcement, 

school, mental health professionals, and others 

involved in preventing school violence by sharing 

ways in which other school attacks across the country have been identified and prevented.

In this report, 51 averted incidents of school violence, 

a sample drawn from the Averted School Violence 

(ASV) database, were analyzed to help further our 

understanding of averted school attacks. The ASV 

project defines an incident of averted school violence 

as a violent attack planned with or without the use of 

a firearm that was prevented either before or after the 

potential perpetrator arrived on school grounds but 

before any injury or loss of life occurred. 

The 51 averted attacks do not constitute every incident of school violence that has occurred in the 

United States since April 20, 1999, nor do they constitute a representative sample. Rather, averted 

attacks (those that were identified from open sources) 

were selected based on the amount of information 

available in open sources and with an effort made to 

find reports in a wide range of states. 

Information collected on each averted school violence consisted of the following categories as displayed in the database:

 Basic information (about the person submitting

the report)

 School information (about school security procedures, size, education level, etc.)

 Event information (about the planned attack and

its discovery)

 Suspect information (about the plotter’s behavioral 

history, background, warning signs exhibited, etc.)

 Documentation (lessons learned from the planned 

attack and recommendations on how to prevent 

future planned attacks of a similar nature)

Because the majority of the data came from open 

sources, it was not always possible to gather data for 

all the information categories presented in the database.1

 Thus, in some areas, the data cannot be 

assumed to be complete.

1. For example, whether or not a perpetrator had ever received mental health treatment or what kind of emergency preparedness plans 

a particular school had in place at the time of the attack was not always available.

1

Introduction

LETHAL SCHOOL VIOLENCE IS NOT A NEW PHENOMENON, but since Columbine 

(1999), there have been many resources devoted to understanding lethal school violence 

and methods of preventing these attacks. Federal agencies studied school shooters to 

determine if there are common characteristics or if they exhibit any warning signs (O’Toole 

2000; Vossekuil, et al. 2004). There has also been much research conducted on school 

violence from a multidisciplinary perspective, including psychologists (e.g., Langman 2009; 

2013) sociologists (e.g., Newman, Fox, Harding, Mehta, and Roth 2004), and criminologists 

(e.g., Levin and Madfis 2009). Through all of this research, much has been learned about 

school shooters, the schools at which shootings occur (Flores de Apodaca et al. 2012), and 

the social conditions surrounding school shootings (Brown, Osterman, and Barnes 2009). 

While a significant body of research exists on completed acts of school violence, less is 

known about school attacks that were averted. In the first published article that addressed 

averted shootings in K–12 schools, Daniels, Buck, et al. (2007) conducted a content analysis of published news reports of averted school shootings. Of interest to the present report, 

they found that 76.7% of plots were for high school attacks, 13.3% were for middle schools, 

and 10% were for elementary schools. In 80% of the cases, firearms were the intended 

weapon of choice, and many cases also included bombs or incendiary devices. Almost all 

(91.4%) of the would-be attackers were male. 

Daniels, Bradley, et al. (2007) found six ways in which the planned attacks were discovered. 

The most common was when concerned students came forward and reported the plot to 

school personnel or the police (57.1%). In 25% of the cases, alert administrators and other 

school staff discovered plots. Other ways in which plots were discovered were when the 

police received tips, notes or email messages were discovered, school staff overheard 

rumors, or specific threats were made. 
A Preliminary Report on the Police 

2 Foundation’s Averted School Violence Database

Following up on the initial study, Daniels, Volungis, et 

al. (2010) conducted interviews with school staff and 

administrators and school resource officers (SRO) 

who intervened to prevent a school attack. Primary 

themes that emerged from the qualitative analyses 

included school conditions, interventions, crisis planning, interpersonal relationships, prevention efforts, 

and problematic issues. School conditions represents 

the environments within the school that participants 

believed contributed to the prevention of the attack 

and includes efforts to break the code of silence, 

watchfulness, and establishment of meaningful relationships with students, among others. Intervention

represents actions that were taken once the plot was 

discovered, such as notifying school authorities, conducting search and seizure and maintaining order, 

and de-escalation. Crisis planning entailed training 

and practice and adherence to established policies 

and procedures. Interpersonal relationships referred 

to prevention through establishment of trusting relationships between school personnel and students. 

These processes included activities such as establishing trust, treating students with respect and compassion, and accentuating student strengths. Some 

examples of prevention efforts included following 

established roles, training and practice, and crisis 

planning. Finally, problematic issues represents 

unforeseen problems that emerged during the crisis 

including missed warning signs and handling the 

media. Among these, four pertain to conditions the 

schools had in place that participants believed prevented the attacks. Interventions occurred once the 

plot was discovered, and problematic issues were 

identified following closure of the events. 

The final study of averted school shootings Daniels, 

Volungis, et al. (2010) identified was a study of the 

extent to which students broke the “code of silence” 

and reported plots to authorities (Madfis 2014). The 

code of silence was identified in the Federal Bureau 

of Investigation’s (FBI) assessment of school shooters 

(O’Toole 2000), and represents students’ hesitancy in 

reporting a fellow student’s threats, plot, or other 

concerning behavior. From interviews with school 

personnel and police officers, Madfis (2014) found 

that post-Columbine, interviewees believed that the 

code of silence has been diminished but still exists to 

some extent. 

This paper presents initial findings from 51 averted 

school attacks in the Police Foundation’s ASV database, focusing first on case studies and followed by 

analyses of various data points. 
3

Case Study

Background 

A FAMILY OF FOUR (parents, an 18-year-old daughter, and a 17-year-old son) moved to a 

small town in the southwestern United States prior to the 2017–2018 school year. Despite 

the fact that the father had a good job, the family was homeless because most of the money 

he made went to support the parents’ methamphetamine addiction. They found a house 

that was being demolished, with one back room remaining. The four moved into this shack 

with no running water. A neighbor, living in a camper, allowed them to run an extension cord 

into the room so they had minimal electricity. 

When school started, the son, Robert,2

 stood out in several ways. First, he was new to a 

small school; second, he had long hair and appeared somewhat “goth;” and third, because 

the family had no running water, he wore the same clothes each day and had poor hygiene. 

Some of the other students began teasing him; specifically, they started calling him

“school shooter.” 

On Thursday, November 9, 2017, during a class, four students asked Robert when he was 

going to shoot up the school. By now, growing tired of the teasing, Robert responded: “Y’all 

better not come to school tomorrow, because I’m going to shoot the place up.” 

2. Names have been changed to protect individuals’ privacy. 

Code of Silence

A common phenomenon surrounding school shootings is the code of silence (O’Toole 

2000). In a report for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on school shooters, 

O’Toole defined the code of silence: “A ‘code of silence’ prevails among students. Few 

feel they can safely tell teachers or administrators if they are concerned about another 

student’s behavior or attitudes. Little trust exists between students and staff.” (O’Toole 

2000, 23) In a qualitative study (Daniels, Volungis, et al. 2010), scholars found that an 

important factor in averting school shootings was that school personnel took active

steps to break the code of silence. In the present case, none of the four students 

reported Robert’s statement to school staff or administration. 
A Preliminary Report on the Police 

4 Foundation’s Averted School Violence Database

Averted attack

That evening, one of the four students told his parents what Robert had said. The parent notified school 

staff, and they called the school superintendent and 

the police. 

Police actions

Because it was late at night by the time the police 

were notified, a decision was made to apprehend the 

student the next morning when he left for school. The 

local police force consists of a chief, a part-time officer, and an on-call officer. Therefore, the chief called 

in the county sheriff and other regional officers. The 

next morning, Friday, several officers were sent to the 

school to guard each of the entry points in case Robert had already set out for school. The remainder 

went to the residence and waited. When Robert and 

his sister came out to go to school, he was apprehended by three officers without incident. 

One of the reasons the chief decided to wait until 

morning is that, because it was such a small town, he 

knew that there had been no reports of stolen firearms. He did not believe Robert had access to any. 

Robert was taken to the school, where he was questioned in the principal’s office. The officers also took 

statements from the four students who had witnessed his threat. 

Disposition 

Robert openly admitted that he made the statement 

but said that afterward he realized he should not have 

because he was not serious about the threat. He said 

he was just kidding because of the teasing about 

being a school shooter. In addition, he did not have 

any weapons. However, the police believed they had 

enough to take him into custody and did not want to 

take any chances. Robert was sent to a juvenile facility in a nearby city and was released after three 

weeks, with mandated counseling. The family relocated to the city, where the children were homeschooled after Robert’s release. 

Plotter information 

Robert had a history of poor academic performance. 

He tended to earn low grades and had been held 

back one year. However, there were no known prior 

disciplinary issues. According to the police report, he 

had undergone prior treatment for a diagnosis of 

depression. The responding officer reported that he 

appeared to have a depressed mood and had problems with social withdrawal and isolation from peers. 

There were no reports of physical bullying (Robert is a 

large young man, so the responding officer doubted 

many would physically provoke him), but as previously described, he was verbally bullied. These issues 

notwithstanding, the officer reported that he was a 

personable and even likable young man. 

Robert and his sister lived in poverty conditions for 

much of their life. In the city in which they lived prior 

to coming to the small town, they had reportedly lived 

in a storage unit. In addition to the chaotic family environment in which Robert and his sister lived, he had 

been reported to Child Protective Services because 

of the family’s living conditions. 

Lessons learned

A follow up phone call with the police chief was conducted, and he shared the following lessons learned 

for other law enforcement officers: 

1. Never take reported threats lightly. Assume all 

reports have merit and then take the necessary 

action. 

2. Always err on the side of caution. 

3. Cover all the bases; do not give a student an 

opportunity to carry out the attack. 

4. In a small department, there are specific challenges 

to bringing in other agencies and coordinating the 

efforts. The chief in this case needed to call in several other agencies and coordinate all of their efforts. 

5. Parents were upset that they were not notified about

a possible attack. Some would have kept their children home that Friday. This was not the chief’s call;

the school superintendent made that decision. 
Recommendations 

This case may not have escalated to a verbal threat 

had there been a greater awareness of the verbal bullying that Robert experienced. School faculty, staff, 

and administrators need to be aware of the culture of 

their school and notice when any student is being 

singled out for teasing or bullying from his or her 

peers. In their study of averted school shootings, 

Daniels, Volungis, et al. (2010) found that an important deterrent to misbehavior, including bullying, is to 

maintain a watchful presence throughout the school, 

especially during movement times. 

Second, schools should develop a culture of respect 

wherein students are treated with dignity by school 

personnel and learn to treat others in the same manner (Daniels, Volungis, et al. 2010). These efforts 

seem to decrease teasing and bullying. 

A third recommendation is for schools to develop an 

environment that will help to break the code of silence. 

In this case, none of the four witnesses reported 

Robert’s threat to their teacher or anyone else in the 

school. Perhaps they did not believe Robert was serious, or perhaps they did not know whom to tell. 

Either way, schools can open lines of communication 

by building positive relationships with all students and 

expressing the importance of reporting their concerns to a trusted adult. These efforts also include 

making a distinction between “snitching” (which is 

reporting to get somebody in trouble) and reporting a 

concern (which is intended to help others). 

Case Study 5
Figure 1. Averted school violence incidents in reports analyzed from Police Foundation database (n=51)

A Preliminary Report on the Police 

6 Foundation’s Averted School Violence Database

Figure 2. Types of schools where violent incidents were averted (n=51)

Suburban 

25.5%

48 94.1%*

2 3.9%*

 1 2%*

Public school

Faith-based 

school

Other affiliation

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45

Number of incidents (n=51)

* Percentages may not add up exactly to 100 because of rounding.
7

Data Analyses

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICAL ANALYSES WERE CONDUCTED on the 51 cases that had 

been entered into the database as of January 2018. Analysis begins with basic information 

about each case, followed by descriptions of the schools at which the events were averted, 

an examination of how the plots were discovered, and what actions were taken to avert 

violence in schools. 

Basic information 

The information used to develop most (49, or 96.1%) of the 51 reports on averted incidents 

analyzed for this publication was gleaned by Police Foundation staff and project subject 

matter experts from open sources including news reports, websites of the involved schools, 

Campus Safety magazine, and court documents. Two of the 51 reports (3.9%) were entered 

by a law enforcement officer and a school administrator directly involved in the incidents of 

averted violence. 

School Information 

As shown in figure 1 on page 6, averted school shootings analyzed for this publication occurred in 27 states throughout the United States. Fourteen states had more than

one averted incident (California, 5; Michigan, 4; Kansas, 3; Oklahoma, 3; Pennsylvania, 3; 

Texas, 3; Alabama, 2; Georgia, 2; Indiana, 2; Ohio, 2; Oregon, 2; Tennessee, 2; Virginia, 2; 

and Washington, 2). Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Massachusetts, 

Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, South Carolina, Utah, Wisconsin, and West Virginia each 

had one averted incident. 
A Preliminary Report on the Police 

8 Foundation’s Averted School Violence Database

Figure 3. Education level of schools where violent incidents were averted (n=51)

Kindergarten through 12th grade

College/University

35 68.6%*

8 15.7%*

6 11.8%*

2 3.9%*

High School

Middle School/ 

Jr. High

College/University

Elementary 

School

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40

Number of schools (n=51)

18 35.3%*

15 29.4%*

7 13.7%*

5 9.8%*

2

1 2%*

1 2%*

1 2%*

1 2%*

3.9%*

Number of students

501–1,000

1,001–2,000

2,001 or more

500 or less

10,001–20,000

20,001–30,000

1,000 or less

1,001–5,000

Above 40,000

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20

Number of schools (n=51)

Figure 4. Size of student body at schools where violent incidents were averted (n=51)

* Percentages may not add up exactly to 100 because of rounding.
Data Analysis 9

As shown in figure 2 on page 6, of the 51 averted 

school attacks, 48 or 94.1% occurred in public 

schools while just two attacks (3.9%) were averted at 

a faith-based school and one attack (2.0%) was 

averted at a charter school. Furthermore, attacks 

were most frequently averted at high schools in the 

sample (68.6%), as shown in figure 3.

Figures 4 and 5 present numbers and percentages 

for the size of the school and the community population classification in which each school was located.

Figures 2 through 5 suggest that the model averted 

school shooting from the ASV sample of incidents 

occurs at a public high school with a student body 

between 501 and 2000 in a suburban community. 

However, these figures also point out that an averted 

school shooting can occur anywhere and at any 

grade level (between elementary school and a college 

or university). 

Counselors

We asked about the presence of one or more counselors at the school. Most schools did have a counselor at the time of the averted shooting. Of the 35 

K–12 schools in the sample, all either had a counselor (30, 85.7%) or it was not reported or unknown 

(5, 16.7%). 

Figure 5. Population classification of 

communities where incidents of school 

violence were averted (n=51)

Urban 

5.9%

Rural 

25.5%

Suburban 

68.6%
A Preliminary Report on the Police 

10 Foundation’s Averted School Violence Database

Security systems

The schools’ security measures were assessed. 

Table 1 presents each area that was queried and the 

number of schools at which each was reported. As 

shown in table 1, most schools (58.8%) have a security officer or a police officer at the school as the primary security measure. Interestingly, few schools 

reported limiting access to the building or school 

grounds. Also of note, following Columbine many 

security experts recommended metal detectors, 

which many schools invested in—but none of the 

schools in this database had a metal detector. 

When “Other” was chosen, respondents were asked 

to indicate what security measures they took at their 

school that were not included in the provided checklist. At one school, the respondent described a twoprong security system, consisting of lockdowns and 

a “secure mode.” In this person’s words: 

Lockdown. “Staff is trained to gather students 

into the nearest locked classroom and wait for 

direction. Law enforcement officials are trained to 

enter the school building to assist with the crisis 

at hand, and members of the fire department are 

skilled in securing the perimeter and assisting 

with people who may be trying to enter the premises. If a critical incident were to occur, parents 

would be provided with information using our 

emergency phone system.” 

Secure mode. “All of the exterior and interior 

doors are locked, visitors are restricted from 

entering the building, and children may not leave 

the classroom unless accompanied by an adult. 

Otherwise, school proceeds as normal until the 

incident is resolved. Typically, a Secure Mode

protocol is the level of security that is most 

often rehearsed.”

Table 1. Security measures at schools where incidents of school violence were averted* 

Security measure

ASV schools where 

measure was used (N)

ASV schools where measure was used (%)

Security officers or police officers at or in school 30 58.8

Security cameras used to monitor the school 14 27.4

Controlled access to buildings during school hours 9 17.6

Visitors required to sign in 8 15.7

Controlled access to grounds during school hours 7 13.7

Visitors required to wear badges or ID 7 13.7

Other 6 11.8

School staff monitoring hallways 6 11.8

Locked entrance or exit doors 5 9.8

Locker checks 5 9.8

Teachers and staff required to wear badges or ID 2 3.9

School police department 1 2.0

Visitors must be escorted into the building 1 2.0

Behavior threat assessment team 0 0.0

Blue Light college security systems 0 0.0

Students required to go through metal detectors 0 0.0

*Schools could report more than one type of security measure.
Data Analysis 11

Other responses for the “Other” category for security 

systems included an emergency alert system with 

escorts and emergency phones, a computerized 

lockdown system, and occasional bomb- and 

drug-sniffing dogs. In one school, there is a security 

officer assigned to the whole district, so at any given 

time the officer may be absent from the reporting 

school. Finally, although one respondent checked the 

“Security officers or police officers at or in school,” 

that respondent also wrote in “Other:” “Security officers or police officers at or in school.” 

Response training

Response training protocols were also assessed, 

even though this information was not available for 

most of the cases in the database. Overall, we have 

data that five schools practice lockdown drills, four 

practice active shooter scenarios, and three have 

all-hazards drills. 

Two reported evacuation drills, and five reported 

“other” response training. These included covering 

the school’s crisis and emergency plans and practice 

with the school’s emergency notification system. One 

individual reported having a “comprehensive emergency operations plan that addresses emergency 

mitigation and prevention, preparedness, response, 

and recovery procedures relevant to natural and 

human-caused disasters.” 

3. “Leakage” means disclosing violent intentions to other people.

Plotter information

This section addresses information about lone or primary plotters. Secondary and other plotter information is not included because of low sample sizes. 

Also, it is presumed that the primary plotter in most 

cases was the “mastermind” of the plot, although we 

do not have clear data to support this. Plotter information includes the sex and age of the plotters, the 

number of plotters involved in the plot, and the race 

or ethnicity of each. The plotter’s relationship to the 

school was assessed as well as the plotter’s academic standing and performance. We also assessed 

prior disciplinary actions and prior offenses. Because 

“leakage”3 is a common characteristic of school 

shooters (O’Toole 2000), we assessed for any preevent warning signs and behaviors. 

Plotted attacks ranged from one plotter (30, 58.8%) 

to four or more plotters (6, 11.8%). Figure 6 represents these data.

Figure 6. Average number of victims by education level of school in completed attacks (n=51)

11.8%*

3 5.9%*

12 23.5%*

30 58.8%*

4+ Plotters 6

3 Plotters

2 Plotters

1 Plotter

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40

Number of schools (n=51)

* Percentages may not add up exactly to 100 because of rounding.
A Preliminary Report on the Police 

12 Foundation’s Averted School Violence Database

Figure 7 shows plotters’ demographic information. 

Most of the plotters were male (48, 94.1%), although 

three (5.9%) were female. Ages ranged from 12 to 

47, with an average of 18.1 years. 

Information about the race or ethnicity of the primary plotters was reported for 22 cases (43.1%). Of 

these, the majority were Caucasian – Non-Hispanic 

(n19, 86.4%), with one each (4.5%) Black/African 

American, Asian/Asian American, and Latinx. The 

race or ethnicity of the remaining individuals was 

either unknown or not reported. 

As shown in figure 8, most of the plotted attacks 

were from current students at the school (39,

76.5%). Seven would-be attackers (13.7%) were former students, and five (9.8%) were categorized as 

“Other affiliation.” 

Table 2 on page 13 shows the grade level of the 

would-be attackers who were currently affiliated with 

the school at the time of the incident (n=39). 

Academic performance was reported for only five 

plotters—two college undergraduates, one high 

school senior, one high school freshman, and one 

non-student. Of these, three (one of the undergraduates, the non-student, and the high school senior) 

had a history of poor academic performance, and the 

remaining two students had a history of above average academic performance. Only one plotter was 

known to have a history of disciplinary problems at 

school. In most cases the student’s academic history 

was unknown. 

Nine plotters were known by law enforcement prior to 

the plot discovery. In some cases, there had been a 

prior arrest, and in others, the plotter was part of an 

abuse investigation. 

Warning signs

We also gathered information about behaviors or 

warning signs that may have appeared prior to the 

plotted attack those signs can include one or more of 

the following:

 Impaired social/emotional functioning

 Social withdrawal

 Depressed mood

 Easily enraged

 Hypersensitivity to criticism

The most common warning signs were depressed 

mood and social withdrawal. 

Figure 7. Demographics of plotters of averted school violence incidents

Male 

48/94.1%

Younger than 18 

31/60.8%

Unknown or not reported 

29/56.9%

18 and older 

16/31.4%

White 

19/37.3%

Female 

3/5.9%

Unkown 

4/7.8% Black/African American

1/2.0%

Asian/Asian American

1/2.0%

Latinx 

1/2.0%

SEX (N=51) AGE (N=51) RACE (N=51)

* Percentages may not add up exactly to 100 because of rounding.
Data Analysis 13

Table 2. Grade level of current students plotting averted incidents of school violence (n=39)

Grade level AVS plotters currently affiliated with target schools (N)

Grade 10 7

Grade 11 7

Grade 8 6

Grade 12 6

Unknown 6

Grade 9 4

Undergraduate 2

Grade 7 1

Figure 8. School affiliation of plotters of averted incidents of school violence (n=51)

Suburban 

25.5%

39 76.5%*

7 13.7%*

5 9.8%*

Current student

Former student

Other affiliation

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40

Number of incidents (n=51)
A Preliminary Report on the Police 

14 Foundation’s Averted School Violence Database

Event information

Considerable data were gathered about each event, 

including the event narrative and the plotter’s plans 

for the attack. The plotter’s pre-attack behavior was 

assessed, as was information about how the plot 

was discovered and how it was foiled. We also 

assessed the types of weapons the plotter intended 

to use and how he or she acquired or planned to 

acquire them. 

Time between plot discovery and arrest

In most cases we know the date on which the plot 

was discovered and the arrest date of the plotter(s). 

The actual arrest day was unknown in 25 (49%) of 

the cases. However, of the remaining 26 cases, most 

(16, 61.5%) plotters were arrested the same day the 

plot was discovered. 

Who discovered the plot

As shown in figure 9, a variety of people discovered 

the school violence plots. Most commonly, peers discovered and reported the plot (29, 56.9%). In four 

cases, the plot was discovered by other law enforcement officials (other than SROs; no plots were discovered by SROs), and school teachers discovered 

three plots. Two plots each were found by the following individuals: school counselors, school administrators, parents of the plotter, and parents of other 

students. Other school faculty and staff (a school 

bookkeeper) discovered one plot, and one plot was 

discovered by a neighbor of a plotter. Finally, one plot 

was discovered by a drug store employee (who 

developed photos of the plotter’s arsenal), one by a 

gun store owner, and one by an unknown social 

media follower. 

Figure 9. Who discovered the plot for averted incidents of school violence (n=45)

29 64.4%*

8 17.8%*

6 13.3%*

2 4.4%*

2 4.4%*

4 8.9%*

Peer

School personnel

Other

Other 

law enforcement 

(not SRO)

Parent of 

other student

Parent of 

suspect

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40

Number of people who discovered the plot (n=45)

The person that discovered the plot was unknown in six of 51 cases. For the cases in which this information was 

known (n=45), sometimes multiple people discovered a single plot.

* Percentages may not add up exactly to 100 because of rounding.
Data Analysis 15

Plot discovery

Plots were discovered in numerous ways. Most

commonly, the plotter told somebody who reported 

the information to authorities, which occurred in 17 

cases.4 In 10 cases, the plotter made his or her intentions known on social media, and in five cases, 

somebody overheard the plotter talking about his or 

her plans. In four cases each, the plotter wrote about 

the plans and somebody found a note, and the person was seen carrying weapons on school property. 

In two cases, parents discovered that their son had 

stolen firearms from their house, and in two cases the 

would-be attacker was seen acting suspiciously. One 

plot was discovered when the perpetrator began 

shooting on school property (specifically, he fired 

rounds into the school gym floor). One each of the 

following led to the discovery of plots: 

 Parents found bomb-making supplies their son 

had ordered online. 

 The plotter took photos of his arsenal and a concerned photo developer called police.

 The plotter displayed erratic behavior and violated 

a prohibition against being on school grounds.

 Police searched a stolen vehicle and found weapons and directions to a college campus.

 The plotter pulled into the school parking lot and 

said concerning things to school staff in the parking lot, and they saw weapons in his car.

 The plotter took a classroom hostage.

 The plotter was heard detonating pipe bombs.

 The plotter was heard loading a firearm in the 

school bathroom.

 The plotter called 911 on himself.

4. In the “plot discovery” and “how the attack was averted” sections, we do not provide percentages, because many plots were 

discovered or averted in multiple ways by multiple people. Plot discovery was unknown in six cases.

How the attack was averted

We asked about how the planned attack was averted. 

In 19 cases violent threats were reported, and in nine 

cases social media posts were reported. In six cases, 

the plotter was tackled or physically restrained, and 

five plotters were talked out of the attacks. In addition, the “Other” category was selected for 15 cases, 

and responses were entered to describe the circumstances surrounding the averting of the plot. The following were reported: 

 The plotter was arrested after parents reported evidence of impending attack.

 Photos raised concerns.

 The plotter was arrested for other crimes.

 The plotter was arrested after being questioned by 

police about an unrelated offense.

 School officials heard rumors about plans for violence and reported them to police.

 The plotter had written plans that were reported.

 A teacher reported a student to police after reading 

a journal.

 The plotter was arrested before he could do any 

harm (3 students told teacher about the gun, 

teacher told principal, principal searched locker 

and found gun).

 The plotter was arrested before he could get

on campus.

 The plotter was arrested by police (two cases).

 The plotter was taken into the school office for a 

meeting with his parents and two law enforcement 

officers, who found the guns.
A Preliminary Report on the Police 

16 Foundation’s Averted School Violence Database

Weapons

We assessed the types of weapons the plotters had 

planned to use. These included firearms, knives, 

bombs and explosive devices, fire, and other. The 

most common intended weapons were firearms (45, 

88.2%). Twenty-three plotters (45.1%) had planned 

to use more than one type of weapon. Other weapons that were to be used in the attack included 

bombs or other explosive devices (16, 31.4%), knives 

(7, 13.7%), fire (1, 2.2%), and other (5, 9.8%). This 

last category of weapons, “Other,” included propane 

tanks and gasoline attached to the plotter’s truck, a 

machete, scissors, and a sword, and one plotter 

planned to use both a chainsaw and a sword. 

Because many plotters planned to use

multiple weapons, figure 10 presents planned weapons by plotter. 

Figure 10. Weapons intended to be used by plotters of averted incidents of school violence (n=51)

Firearms

Bombs/other 

explosives

Knives

Other

Fire/arson

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45

Number of plans involving each weapon

45 88.2%*

16 31.4%*

7 13.7%*

2 1 2.2%*

5 9.8%*

* Percentages may not add up because many plotters planned to use more than one type of weapon.
17

Findings

ACROSS THE 51 CASES, a number of findings were identified. In this section, we categorize these by constituent: students, parents, school personnel, and the police. 

Students 

Findings regarding students were identified for 31 cases, as shown in table 3. 

 The main lesson learned about students is that most school attacks are averted because 

students report their concerns about another student’s threat, plot, or other concerning 

behavior. 

 Second, the primary reason students gave for not reporting their concerns about another 

student was that they did not take the threat seriously. 

 Two plotters reported that their plot/threat was (1) a joke or (2) a work of fiction. Students 

should not joke or write about killing others. 

 Student responses to the attacks were appropriate. When students heard shots fired they 

ran for cover. In a classroom captive-taking event, students remained calm, thereby not 

escalating the captive-taker’s emotions. Students should not try to subdue an active 

shooter. 

 One plotter reported that he had been bullied by other students. 

Table 3. Findings—students (n=21)

Finding

Number of cases* 

(% of cases)

1. Student reports concern 21 (67.7%)

2. No student reports concern 4 (12.9%)

3. Plotter minimizes the threat 2 (6.4%)

4. Student responds to attack 2 (6.4%)

* The totals represented sum to 32 because in one lesson learned 

about students, an initial group of students did not report the threats, 

and later another student did. 
 In several cases the primary plotter attempted to 

recruit others to aid in the attack. When one or 

more recruits reported this to another, it was 

included in the first lesson learned (most school 

attacks are averted because students speak up). 

In one case, it was only reported that others were 

recruited. When a student attempts to recruit one 

or more additional students to help with the attack, 

these prospective recruits must report the overture 

to a trusted adult. 

 There were an additional two lessons learned, 

each revealed in one case. (1) The plotter alleged 

that he was bullied, although others denied this; 

and (2) the plotter attempted to recruit others (see 

previous bullet point). 

Parents 

Findings related to parents were identified in 28 

cases. Of these, 21 cases accounted for the four 

main lessons learned, as shown in table 4. 

Table 4. Findings—parents

Finding 

Number of cases 

(% of cases) 

1. Other parents report 8 (28.6%) 

2. Plotter’s parents report 7 (25.0%) 

3. Plotter’s parents were unaware 4 (14.3%) 

4. Plotter stole parent’s gun 2 (7.1%) 

 Several attacks were averted because parents 

of other students reported or encouraged their 

children to report a threat, plot, or concerning 

behavior. 

 In seven cases, the plotter’s parents reported their 

concerns to authorities. When parents discover 

their child’s threat, plot, or concerning behavior, 

they must notify the authorities and seek help for 

their child. 

 In four cases, parents of the plotters were unaware 

of the plot, threat, or concerning behavior. In one of 

these, the mother bought her son chemicals to 

make bombs because he told her he was going to 

build a rocket. 

 In two cases, the plotters stole one or more guns 

from parents or other family members. 

There were an additional six lessons identified, each 

only once: (1) The plotters were thought to come 

from neglectful homes; (2) parents were attempting 

to get help for their troubled daughter; (3) parents 

were upset that following the interruption of an attack 

the school did not immediately notify them; (4) the 

plotter attempted to steal his mother’s gun but was 

unable to do so because it was locked in a safe; (5) it 

was unknown if the plotter got his guns from home; 

and (6) the plotter’s parents refused to cooperate with 

the police investigation. 

Schools 

Findings that pertain to schools were identified in 37 

cases. The most common lessons learned were 

identified in 33 cases, as shown in table 5. 

Table 5. Findings—schools

Number of cases 

Lesson learned (% of cases) 

1. Immediate response 13 (35.1%) 

2. Alert personnel, 

take threats seriously 7 (18.9%) 

3. Bullying 4 (10.8%) 

4. Communications 3 (8.1%) 

5. Relationships 2 (5.4%) 

6. Training 2 (5.4%) 

7. Remaining calm 2 (5.4%) 

A Preliminary Report on the Police 

Foundation’s Averted School Violence Database 18 
Findings 19

 The most common lesson learned was that when 

school personnel became aware of a threat or situation, they acted immediately. 

 Several attacks were averted because alert school 

personnel took rumors seriously and then acted

on them.

 In four cases, there was reportedly bullying at the 

school. When bullying is brought to the attention

of school personnel, they must act immediately 

and effectively. 

 In three cases communications were described. In 

two, the schools had a well-functioning communications system. In the third, the school failed to 

dispel rumors about another potential plotter. 

Schools must have clear and effective communications plans and follow them. 

 In two cases, it was stressed that administrators 

and counselors should develop trusting relationships with students so they will report rumors

or concerns. 

 Training for crises, including active shooters, 

helped to avert two attacks. 

 In two captive-taking incidents, the teacher and 

administrator remained calm so as not to escalate 

the situation. 

There were an additional five lessons learned, each 

occurring once. (1) Cooperation between the school 

and the police; (2) one plotter was tackled by a 

teacher and held until police arrived; (3) the plotter 

had been using the school’s computer to shop for a 

rifle; (4) schools may come under attack from outside 

of the building, such as in a parking lot; and (5) in one 

case there was a disconnect between the school’s 

behavioral intervention team and staff. 

Police

Police findings were identified in 37 cases. Of these, 

34 cases accounted for the four main lessons 

learned, as shown in table 6.

Table 6. Findings—police

Lesson learned

Number of cases 

(% of cases)

1. Immediate response 24 (64.9%)

2. Taking threat seriously 4 (10.8%)

3. Coordination with others 3 (8.1%)

4. Conducted an investigation 3 (8.1%)

 Most frequently, when police became aware of the 

threat they acted immediately. 

 Police, including SROs, took rumors seriously. 

 In several instances, there were multiple jurisdictions involved, or others with specialties were 

called. Police may need to coordinate with other 

local, state, or federal agencies. 

 When details were not clear, the police conducted 

a thorough investigation before making arrests. In 

one case, they had been investigating small bomb 

explosions for months, which turned out to be the 

plotter’s bomb-making trial and error. 

In addition, one each of five other findings were identified: (1) Interviewed the plotter; (2) removed the plotter from the school and transported him for a 

psychiatric evaluation; (3) alert police officers noticed 

unusual behavior; (4) during a classroom barricaded 

captive-taking, the police escorted a third-party intermediary to the classroom; and (5) when the plotter 

was not found, police issued a warrant for his arrest. 

21

Recommendations

BETWEEN THE CASE STUDY AND THE STATISTICAL ANALYSES, the following recommendations for police officers, law enforcement administrators, and school administrator 

are offered. 

Preparation

In research and interviews with law enforcement, preparation for possible school-based 

crises is essential to averted and mitigating violence. Law enforcement preparation includes 

working closely with the school system and having plans in place for school emergencies. 

Preparation also includes procedures for police involvement, such as the command struck 

when first responders arrive and the roles and responsibilities of school administrators and 

reunification protocols. 

Develop relationships

Relationships need to be established between law enforcement and school personnel, including “silent staff” such as custodians and cafeteria employees. Relationship building should 

include ongoing engagement and training to prepare for emergency response situations. 

In addition to relationships among professionals, it is also important for school personnel 

and specifically school-based police officers to establish positive relationships with students, creating a positive school climate with trust and respect so students will feel comfortable reporting concerns about a possible threat. 

Recommendations for improved school safety

 Preparation

 Develop relationships

among staff, law enforcement,

and students

 Break the “code of silence”

 Know your school’s culture

 Know the physical facilities

of your school

 Take all reports seriously

 Assume nothing about

a student or event

 There is no clear profile

of a school shooter
A Preliminary Report on the Police 

22 Foundation’s Averted School Violence Database

Break the “code of silence”

An important factor in breaking the code of silence is 

to develop trusting relationships with all students. 

This relationship building can be facilitated when 

schools develop a culture of respect wherein students are treated with dignity by school personnel 

and learn to treat others in the same manner. Students who feel comfortable with a trusted adult are 

more likely to report their concerns to that adult when 

they become aware of threats or rumors. 

Know the school’s culture

School faculty, staff, and administrators need to be 

aware of the culture of their school and notice when 

any student is being singled out for teasing or bullying 

from his or her peers. It is imperative that when school 

personnel become aware of mistreatment, they act 

appropriately, using best practices for intervening in 

bullying and other incidents. If a school’s culture is 

not positive, the school must take steps to change it. 

Know the physical facilities

This recommendation is for law enforcement and 

emergency managers. Preparation and training must 

include familiarity with the layout of all schools in the 

agency’s jurisdiction. Hardware such as cameras and 

policies such as controlled access during school 

hours should be maintained and updated with collaboration from school administration. In addition, law 

enforcement should work with schools on safety 

measures such as visitor access; parking rules for 

staff, students, and family members; and procedures 

for after-school events like dances and sports events. 

Take all reports seriously

Every report of a threat or potential for harm must be 

acted upon as if it is a serious and credible threat. 

There may be some false negatives (acting as if a 

threat is credible when it is not). However, these 

should not deter school personnel and law enforcement from acting on every threat. As the police chief 

in the case study reported earlier noted, “err on the 

side of caution.” 

Assume nothing

Lethal school violence is not just an inner-city problem. Never assume that a school attack won’t occur 

in your small, tight-knit community. As shown by the 

data in this report, attacks can be planned and carried out at any type of school, for any school level, 

and in any location.

There is no profile

Perpetrator demographics of school shooters 

(O’Toole 2000; Vossekuil et al. 2004) show that there 

is no one type of school shooter. Although the majority are young White men, school shooters have been 

female and members of various ethnic minority populations. Likewise, the demographics presented in 

the “Plotter information” section on page 11 reveal 

that there is no profile of a potential school shooter. 

Therefore, do not discredit any threat because the 

student does not fit a stereotypical mold. 
23

Conclusion

THE POLICE FOUNDATION’S AVERTED SCHOOL VIOLENCE DATABASE is the first 

nationwide repository of its kind. The desired outcome of the database is that eventually 

every averted and completed school attack will be entered by an individual (or individuals) 

who was involved with the attack prevention or response. These individuals can include law 

enforcement officers, SROs, school personnel, mental health professionals, and other relevant persons. As the database expands and is populated with greater detail than what can 

be gathered primarily from open sources, future research can better point to methods that 

work in averting deadly attacks. 

25

References

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D. Barnes. 2009. “School Violence and the 

Culture of Honor.” Psychological Science 20(11): 

1400–1405. 

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j.1467-9280.2009.02456.x. 

Daniels, Jeffrey A., Mary C. Bradley, Daniel P. 

Cramer, Amy J. Winkler, Kisha Kinebrew, and 

Deleska Crockett. 2007. “The Successful 

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in Schools: A Qualitative Analysis.” Psychology 

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Daniels, Jeffrey A., Ilene Buck, Susan Croxall, 

Julia Gruber, Peter Kime, and Heidi Govert. 2007. 

“A Content Analysis of News Reports of Averted 

School Rampages.” Journal of School Violence

6(1): 83–99. 

https://doi.org/10.1300/J202v06n01_06.

Daniels, Jeffrey A., Adam Volungis, Erin Pshenishny, 

Punita Gandhi, Amy Winkler, Daniel P. Cramer, 

and Mary C. Bradley. 2010. “A Qualitative Investigation of Averted School Shooting Rampages.” 

The Counseling Psychologist 38(1): 69–95. 

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0011000009344774.

Flores de Apodaca, R., Lauren M. Brighton, Ashley 

N. Perkins, Kiana N. Jackson, and Jessica R. 

Steege. 2012. “Characteristics of Schools in 

which Fatal Shootings Occur.” Psychological 

Reports 110(2): 363–377. 

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13.16.PR0.110.2.363-377.

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A Typology.” Aggression and Violent Behavior

14(1): 79–86. 

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Thorsten Seeger, Peter Sitzer, and Wilhelm 

Heitmeyer (eds.), School Shootings: International 

Research, Case Studies, and Concepts for 

Prevention, 131–156. New York: Springer. 

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Madfis, Eric. 2014. “Averting School Rampage: 

Student Intervention amid a Persistent Code of 

Silence.” Youth Violence and Juvenile Justice

12(3): 229–249. 

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1541204013497768.

Newman, Katherine S., Cybelle Fox, David J. 

Harding, Jal Mehta, and Wendy Roth. 2004. 

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preventingattacksreport.pdf. 
27

About the Police Foundation

The Police Foundation is a national, nonpartisan, 

nonprofit organization dedicated to advancing innovation and science in policing. As the country’s oldest 

police research organization, the Police Foundation 

has learned that police practices should be based on 

scientific evidence about what works best, the paradigm of evidence-based policing. 

Established in 1970, the foundation has conducted 

seminal research in police behavior, policy, and procedure and works to transfer to local agencies the 

best new information about practices for dealing 

effectively with a range of important police operational and administrative concerns. Motivating all of 

the foundation’s efforts is the goal of efficient, humane 

policing that operates within the framework of democratic principles and the highest ideals of the nation.

To learn more, visit the Police Foundation online at 

www.policefoundation.org.
28

About the COPS Office

The Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) is the component of the U.S. 

Department of Justice responsible for advancing the 

practice of community policing by the nation’s state, 

local, territorial, and tribal law enforcement agencies 

through information and grant resources.

Community policing begins with a commitment to 

building trust and mutual respect between police and 

communities. It supports public safety by encouraging all stakeholders to work together to address our 

nation’s crime challenges. When police and communities collaborate, they more effectively address 

underlying issues, change negative behavioral patterns, and allocate resources. 

Rather than simply responding to crime, community 

policing focuses on preventing it through strategic 

problem-solving approaches based on collaboration. 

The COPS Office awards grants to hire community 

policing officers and support the development and 

testing of innovative policing strategies. COPS Office 

funding also provides training and technical assistance to community members and local government 

leaders, as well as all levels of law enforcement. 

Since 1994, the COPS Office has invested more than 

$14 billion to add community policing officers to the 

nation’s streets, enhance crime fighting technology, 

support crime prevention initiatives, and provide 

training and technical assistance to help advance 

community policing. Other achievements include the 

following:

 To date, the COPS Office has funded the hiring of 

approximately 130,000 additional officers by more 

than 13,000 of the nation’s 18,000 law enforcement agencies in both small and large jurisdictions.

 Nearly 700,000 law enforcement personnel, community members, and government leaders have 

been trained through COPS Office–funded training 

organizations.

 To date, the COPS Office has distributed more 

than eight million topic-specific publications, training curricula, white papers, and resource CDs and 

flash drives.

 The COPS Office also sponsors conferences, 

round tables, and other forums focused on issues 

critical to law enforcement.

COPS Office information resources, covering a wide 

range of community policing topics such as school 

and campus safety, violent crime, and officer safety 

and wellness, can be downloaded via the COPS 

Office’s home page, www.cops.usdoj.gov. This website is also the grant application portal, providing 

access to online application forms.

The Police Foundation, in collaboration with the COPS Office, implemented the Averted 

School Violence (ASV) database to provide a platform for sharing information about averted 

incidents of violence in institutions of elementary, secondary, and higher education. The ASV 

project defines an incident of averted school violence as a violent attack planned with or 

without the use of a firearm that was prevented before any injury or loss of life occurred. This 

preliminary report analyzes 51 averted incidents of school violence selected from the ASV 

database to begin to improve our understanding of averted school attacks. The report begins 

with a case study of one averted attack and then details findings on the 51 averted incidents 

in the study. It concludes with recommendations for law enforcement and school administration to improve school safety. A companion report (Langman and Straub 2018) compares 

these 51 averted attacks with 51 completed attacks and presents findings on the similarities 

and differences.

U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services

145 N Street NE

Washington, DC 20530

To obtain details on COPS Office programs, call 

the COPS Office Response Center at 800-421-6770.

Visit the COPS Office online at www.cops.usdoj.gov

Police Foundation

1201 Connecticut Ave NW

Suite 200

Washington, DC 20036

Visit the Police Foundation online 

at www.policefoundation.org

e071803885a

Published 2019