Writ Granted and Opinion Filed March 21, 2022 

# S

In The 

### Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-20-01068-CV IN RE LA’KEISHA T. HILBURN, Relator Original Proceeding from the 256th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DF-11-12951 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Schenck, Partida-Kipness, and Nowell Opinion by Justice Partida-Kipness In this original proceeding, relator La ’Keisha T. Hilburn seeks habeas relief from orders finding her in contempt and or dering her confined for violating certain possession provisions of a 2012 Order in Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship. We granted Hilburn’s requ est for temporary relief and ordered her released from custody if she posted a good a nd sufficient cash or surety bond in the sum of $500. Hilburn thereafter file d a “Second Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.” We requested a res ponse to the second amended petition. No response was filed. After reviewing the second amended petition and the record, we conclude Hilburn is entitled to the relief requested, and we grant the writ of habeas
corpus.–2– BACKGROUND Hilburn shares custody of her son with Jared Daniel Harvey, the child’s father. On August 1, 2012, the trial court signed the Order in Suit Affecting the ParentChild Relationship (2012 Order), under whic h Hilburn and Harvey were appointed joint managing conservators of their son. The 2012 Order designated Hilburn as the parent with the right to designate the child’s primary residence. The 2012 Order included the Standard Possession Order. At issue in this case is the interpretation and application of the terms of Harvey’s weekend and Thursday night possession periods during the school year when the ch ild attends school virtually due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The 2012 Order provides Harvey weekend possession of the child “during the regular school term” 1 three weekends a month. We ekend possession begins “at the time the child’s school is regularly dismi ssed” on designated Fri days and ends “at the time the child’s school resumes after the weekend.” 2 The 2012 Order further provides Harvey with Thursday-night po ssession of the child “during the regular school term,” from the time school is regul arly dismissed on Thursday to the time

1 Hilburn’s alleged violations occurre d on dates in which the child’s school was in session. They, therefore, occurred “during the regular school term” as set out in the 2012 Order.
2 The 2012 Order specifically provides: “On weekends that occur during the regular school term, beginning at the time the child’s school is regularly dismissed, on the first, third, and fifth Friday of each month and ending at the time the child’s school resumes after the weekend. On weekends that do not occur during the regular sc hool term, beginning at 6:00 p.m., on the first, third, and fifth Friday of each month and ending at 6:00 p.m. on the following Sunday.”–3– school resumes on Friday. 3 When a possession period “begins at the time the child’s school is regularly dismissed,” the 2012 Orde r provides that Hilburn is to surrender the child to Harvey “at the beginning of each such period of possession at the school in which the child is enrolled.” If a possession period occurs when “the child is not in school,” the 2012 Order provides that H ilburn is to surrender the child at 6:00 p.m. “at the residence of” Hilburn. 4
The 2012 Order defines “school” as “the primary or secondary school in which the child is enrolled or, if the child is not enrolled in a primary or secondary school, the public school district in which the child primarily resides.” The 2012 Order provided that Hilburn’s residenc e address was on Oak Meadows Drive in Dallas, Texas. That address is also the a ddress of Hilburn’s fa ther. Although Hilburn owns a home in Wilmer, Texas, she conti nued to use her fath er’s address on Oak Meadows Drive as her reside ntial address for purposes of the 2012 Order and court filings.

3 Paragraph three of the 2012 Order provides: “On Thursday of each week during the regular school term, beginning at the time the child’s school is regularlydismissed and ending at the time the child’s school resumes on Friday.”
4 The 2012 Order includes these provisions concerning Hilburn’s surrender of the child to Harvey: 1. Surrender of Child by LaKeisha T. Hilburn - LaKeisha T. Hilburn is ORDERED to surrender the child to Jared Daniel Harvey, Sr. at the beginni ng of each period of Jared Daniel Harvey, Sr.’s possession at the residence of LaKeisha T. Hilburn. If a period of possession by Jared Daniel Harvey, Sr. begins at the time the child’s school is regularly dismissed, LaKeisha T. Hilburn is ORDERED to surrender the child to Jared Daniel Harvey, Sr. at the beginning of each such period of possession at the school in which the child is enrolled. If the child is not in school, Jared Dani el Harvey, Sr. shall pick up the child at the residence of LaKeisha T. Hilburn at 6:00 p.m., and LaKeisha T. Hilburn is ORDERED to surrender the child to Jared Daniel Harvey, Sr. at the resi dence of LaKeisha T. Hilburn at 6:00 p.m. under these circumstances.–4– Hilburn and Harvey appear to have operated under the possession schedule without need for court intervention for near ly eight years. That changed in 2020 when schools moved to virtual learning because of the COVID-19 pandemic. At first, Hilburn and Harvey operated amicably despite th e pandemic. For example, Harvey agreed to pick up the child at the maternal grandmother’s house where he engaged in virtual school rather than at the school building or Hilburn’s residence. But when school began again in August 2020, Harvey refused to pick up the child where he was engaging in virtual school. H ilburn enrolled the child in the virtual learning option for the start of the 2020-2021 school year and scheduled the child to participate in virtual school from her father’s home on Oak Meadows Drive, which is the same address designate d as Hilburn’s residential address in the 2012 Order. Events during the 2020-2021 school year fo rm the basis of the underlying orders.
I. Harvey refuses to pick the child up at the location of virtual learning School began on August 6, 2020. Hilburn e-mailed Harvey to provide information concerning the child’s remote learning for school. She informed Harvey that the child would be participating in the school’s distance learning from her father’s house, provided her fa ther’s address, and stated that Harvey “may pick him up from this address ‘when school is dismisse d,’ and return him to this address ‘when school resumes’ after your period of possessi on.” Hilburn also provided Harvey with information about the school’s remote learning platform. She reminded Harvey that she had already forwarded the information for the school’s Virtual Meet the Teacher–5– and stated she hoped he was ab le to attend one of the se ssions so he could have an “understanding of what remote learning will look like.” Hilburn also explained that the school was using the distance learning pl atform Class Dojo and asked if he was connected with the child’s t eachers on that platform. Harvey did not respond to Hilburn’s in quiry concerning his understanding of the distance learning platform. He did, howev er, state that “per the agreement” he would be picking up the child from Hilburn’s residence at 6:00 p.m. and returning the child to Hilburn’s residence on Sunday at 6:00 p.m. Hilburn asked Harvey to “please adjust” to the remote -learning situation and pick the child up at the address she provided, which was where the childwas doing his remote learning:

Harvey responded that he would “follow th e Court ordered agr eement,” which “only list[s] two places for me to pick up our son. That’s the school if it is in session or your residence.” Rather than pick the ch ild up where he was engaging in virtual school at the time of dismissal, however, Ha rvey attempted to pick up the child at 6:00 p.m. at a home owned by Hilburn in Wilmer, Texas. Hilburn had not provided–6– that address to Harvey. He found the addr ess by searching the on-line database of Dallas County tax records. 5 Then, on August 7, Harvey attempted to pick up the child at Hilburn’s grandmother’s home, rather than where he was engaging in virtual school. Harvey took similar actions the follo wing week. An e-mail string on August 13, 2020, shows Harvey again refused to pi ck up the child at the location in which the child was attending virtual school. He fi rst insisted on picking up the child at 6:00 p.m. at Hilburn’s reside nce. But he then changed t ack and decided to drive to the child’s school building at 3:45 p.m. for pick–up. Harvey went to the school even though the school was closed and the child was attending school virtually from the child’s grandfather’s home:

5 Hilburn testified that she owns three homes and, at the time of the contempt hearing, lived with the child at the residence in Wilmer, Texas that Harvey foun d by searching tax records. Hilburn insisted that her official residence is the address in the 2012 Order and is the address she gave to Harvey for where to pick up the child. But Harvey refused to go to that address.–7––8– On Thursday, September 3, 2020, Frid ay, September 4, 2020, and Thursday, September 10, 2020, Harvey again drove to the child’s school building for pick–up at 4:00 p.m. even though he knew his child was not there. He told the trial court that he chose that option on advice of counsel. On those dates he also went to Hilburn’s residence in Wilmer, Texas, at 6:00 p.m. “to make sure that [he] had all bases covered in the order.” The child transf erred to a new elementary school on September 14, 2020, and he c ontinued to attend school virtually at his grandfather’s house.
II. The enforcement action and contempt order On July 30, 2020, Harvey filed a Mo tion for Enforcement of Possession or Access, which he then amended twice. On September 17, 2020, th e trial court held–9– a hearing on Harvey’s August 17, 2020 S econd Amended Motion for Enforcement of Possession or Access (the enforcemen t motion). In the enforcement motion, Harvey alleged Hilburn violated the 2012 Order on twenty-five occasions between January 17, 2020, and Septem ber 10, 2020. After heari ng testimony from Harvey, Harvey’s counsel, and Hilburn, the trial c ourt signed a contempt order in which it found Hilburn failed to comply with th e 2012 Order nine times between August 6, 2020, and Septembe r 10, 2020, by: Failing to surrender the child at 6:00 p.m. “at the child’s residence” on Thursday, August 6, 2020, and Frida y, August 7, 2020 (Violations 2 and 3); Failing to surrender the child “at the time the child’s school is regularly dismissed at the child’s school . . . a nd/or . . . at 6:00 p.m. at the child’s residence” on August 13, 20, 21, 27, 2020, and September 3, 4, and 10, 2020 (Violations 4 through 10). 6 The trial court found Hilburn had the ab ility to comply with the 2012 Order and found her in contempt for Violations 2 th rough 10. The trial cour t assessed fees and costs of $7,412.76 against Hilburn “as child support,” and ordered Hilburn to pay those attorney’s fees in monthly inst allments of $500 beginning October 1, 2020, until paid in full. The trial court further ordered Harvey be given make-up possession periods on the following six Wednesday overnight periods and the “next three second and fourth weekend periods of possession.”

6 The August 21, 2020, and September 4, 2020, viola tions occurred on Fridays. The others occurred on Thursdays.–10– In addition, the trial court held Hil burn in criminal contempt and civil contempt. As punishment for the criminal c ontempt, the trial court assessed a fine of $500 per violation and confinement in the county jail for a period of 179 days per confinement, with confinement periods to run concurrently. As punishment for the civil contempt, the trial court ordered furthe r confinement “for a period not to exceed eighteen months including time served fo r criminal contempt” or until Hilburn allowed Harvey the additi onal make-up possession peri ods, paid the $7,412.76 in attorney’s fees and costs, and paid $500 “tax ed as a fine.” The trial court suspended commitment for twenty-four months provi ded Hilburn allowed Harvey to have possession of the child during the make-up peri ods ordered, paid the attorney’s fees ordered, and paid the $500 fine. Finally , the trial court set out the following “clarification” of the 2012 Order: This Court clarifies that if the child is attending school virtually due to the Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemi c on a date of [Harvey’s] possession, [Harvey’s] period of posse ssion shall begin at the time the child’s school is dismissed and [Harvey] shall pick up the child at [Hilburn’s] residence at the begi nning of [Harvey’s] period of possession. The contempt order did not specify which address the court considered to be the address of Hilburn’s “residence.” After obtaining the contempt order, Harv ey continued his refusal to pick-up and drop-off the child at the place of his remote learning, whic h was also Hilburn’s residence under the 2012 Order. Instead, he in sisted that drop-off and pick-up occur at Hilburn’s house in Wilmer, Texas, regardless of whether Hilburn would be there–11– to receive the child or whet her the child would be at that residence at the time for pick-up. The parties’ e- mail exchanges on Wednesday , September 30, 2020, and Thursday, October 1, 2020, concerning Harvey ’s return of the child to Hilburn on October 1st illustrated this attitude. In those e-mails, Hilburn asked Harvey to “please return” the child to her father’s house on Thursday morning “at the time that school resumes” and not to her Wilmer, Texas address because she would already be on the way to her place of employment at the drop-off time and would not be at the Wilmer, Texas addre ss to receive the child. 7 Harvey disregarded Hilburn’s request that he return the child to his re mote learning location and, instead, drove the child to Hilburn’s Wilmer, Texas address. When he found Hilburn was not at home, Harvey took the child back to his own residence. Harvey did the same on October 15, 2020, October 16, 2020, and October 18, 2020, despite Hilburn’s explanations and pleas to drop the child off at her fa ther’s house. According to e-mails between Harvey and Hilburn, Harvey’s actions caused the child to log in to school late on multiple days and miss instructional time.
III. The motion to revoke su spension of commitment Harvey filed a motion to revoke susp ension of commitment on September 24, 2020. He alleged that Hilburn failed to co mply with the enforcement order by failing to surrender the child on Wednesday, Septem ber 23, 2020, at 3:00 p.m. at the child’s

7 Hilburn is an educator and does not work at her ch ild’s current elementary school. She testified that she works from 7:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. Monday through Frid ay. Because of that schedule, she cannot be at the Wilmer, Texas home when the child’s school begins or when it releases for the day.–12– residence. He further alle ged that he “anticipates” that Hilburn would fail to surrender the child as ordered for the re maining Wednesday a nd weekend make-up dates. Harvey filed his First Amended Motion to Revoke Suspension of Commitment on November 12, 2020. In that motion, Harv ey alleged that Hilburn violated the enforcement order by (1) faili ng to surrender the child at 3:00 p.m. at the child’s residence in Wilmer , Texas on four make-up posse ssion dates and three standard possession dates, a nd (2) failing to make monthl y attorney’s fee payments of $500 on October 1, 2020, and November 1, 2020. The amended revocation motion acknowledges that Hilburn released the childto Harvey between 5:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. on five of the seven date s on which Harvey complained.
IV. Hilburn’s motion to set as ide the enforcement order Hilburn filed a motion to set aside th e enforcement order and later amended that motion. Hilburn argued first that she had not violated the 2012 Order because she surrendered the child at the location wh ere he was virtually attending school and at the time virtual school dismissed for th e day. Hilburn also maintained that compliance with the 2012 Order was uncle ar and impossible because neither the 2012 Order nor the Texas Supreme Court’s emergency orders addressed where to surrender the child when he was engaging in virtual school remotely and was not attending school in the school building. Hilburn also maintained that she could not comply with the contempt order because sh e could not leave work early to transport–13– the child to the physical school building or her Wilmer, Texas re sidence. She asked the trial court to vacate the contempt orde r, grant a new trial, and render a new order setting out a location for exchange of th e child at a location where Hilburn can comply.
V. The revocation order The trial court heard the parties’ motions on December 4, 2020. After hearing the testimony of Harvey, his counsel, and Hil burn, the trial court found that Hilburn failed to comply with the terms and c onditions of suspension set out in the enforcement order. Specifically, the trial court found that Hilbur n failed to surrender the child “between 3:00 and 3:10 p.m. (w hich is the time the child’s school is dismissed) at the child’s residence” on September 18, 23, 24, 25, 30, October 28, and November 5. The trial court also found that Hilburn failed to make the October and November attorney’s fee payments. The trial court revoked the suspension of commitment and sentenced Hilburn to ten days in jail beginning December 7, 2020, at 9:00 a. m. The court further ordered that Hilburn’s confinement continue unt il she pays the $1,500 in fees owed for October, November, and Dece mber. The court also awar ded Harvey fees of $7,435 as additional child support. Hilburn was placed in custody on December 7, 2020. This original proceeding followed.–14– STANDARD OF REVIEW A commitment order may be collaterally att acked in an original habeas corpus proceeding. In re Henry , 154 S.W.3d 594, 596 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding). The purpose of a writ of habeas corpus is not to determine the guilt of the contemnor, but only to determine whether the contem nor has been unlawfully confined. Ex parte Gordon , 584 S.W.2d 686, 688 (Tex. 1979) (orig. proceeding). When a relator, after being sentenced to jail, is “released on bond pending review by habeas corpus, there is sufficient restraint of liberty to just ify issuance of [a] writ of habeas corpus.” In re Vaughn , No. 12-09-00143-CV, 2009 WL 3288301, at*2 (Tex. App.—Tyler Oct. 14, 2009, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (citing Ex parte Williams , 690 S.W.2d 243, 244 (Tex. 1985)); see also Ex parte Brister , 801 S.W.2d 833, 835 (Tex. 1990). A court will issue a writ of habeas corpus if the order underl ying the contempt is void, or if the contempt order itself is void. In re Luther , 620 S.W.3d 715, 721–22 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding); Ex parte Shaffer , 649 S.W.2d 300, 301–02 (Tex. 1983) (“[O]ne may not be he ld guilty of contempt for refusing to obey a void order.”). An order is void if it is beyond the power of the court to enter it, or if it deprives the relator of liberty without due process of law. Ex parte Barnett , 600 S.W.2d 252, 254 (Tex. 1980) (orig. proceeding); In re Stein , 331 S.W.3d 538, 540 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, orig . proceeding) (per curiam). “Contempt of court is broadly defined as disobedience to or disrespect of a court by acting in opposition to its authority.” Ex parte Chambers , 898 S.W.2d 257, 259 (Tex. 1995).–15– “Contempt is strong medicine—the allege d contemnor’s very liberty is often at stake—and so it should be used only as a last resort.” In re Reece , 341 S.W.3d 360, 364 (Tex. 2011) (quoting Ex parte Pink , 746 S.W.2d 758, 762 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (cleaned up)).
ANALYSIS Hilburn asserts that both the contempt order and revocation order are void. We agree and address each order below.
I. The Contempt Order The trial court found Hilburn in cont empt of the 2012 Order for failing to surrender the child to Harvey as follows: Failing to surrender the child “at 6:00 p.m. at the child’s residence” on Thursday, August 6, 2020 and Friday, August 7, 2020 (Violations 2 and 3); and Failing to surrender the child “at the time the child’s school is regularly dismissed at the child’s school . . . and/or . . . at 6:00 p.m. at the child’s residence” on August 13, 20, 21, 27, 2020, and September 3, 4, and 10, 2020 (Violations 4 through 10). But the 2012 Order did not require Hilburn to surrender the child at “the child’s residence.” Rather, the 2012 Order required Hilburn to surrender the child at Hilburn’s residence (“the residence of LaKe isha T. Hilburn”), which was designated in the 2012 Order as the Oak Meadows Drive address. The 2012 Order designates no address as “the child’s residence.” Because no underlying order required Hilburn to surrender the child at “the child’s resi dence,” Hilburn should not be the subject of contempt proceedings for faili ng to surrender the child athis residence. Thus, the–16– portions of the contempt order holding Hil burn in contempt for failing to surrender the child at “the chil d’s residence” are void. See In re Broussard , 112 S.W.3d 827, 831 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Di st.] 2003, orig. proceeding) (portion of contempt order holding relator in contempt for fa iling to make $300.00 payments on the 15th of the month was void because the underlying order did not require payments be made on the 15th of the month). Further, the record established that Violations 2 through 10 occurred “during the regular school term” and school dismisse d at 3:50 p.m. on those dates. Under the 2012 Order, Harvey’s possession on those date s began “at the time the child’s school is regularly dismissed,” and required Hilb urn to surrender possession of the child “at the beginning of each such period of posse ssion at the school in which the child is enrolled,” not at 6:00 p.m. Because no underlying order required Hilburn to surrender the child on those dates at 6:00 p. m., Hilburn should not be the subject of contempt proceedings for failing to surr ender the child at 6:00 p.m. Thus, the portions of the contempt order holding Hil burn in contempt for failing to surrender the child at 6:00 p.m. are void. See In re Broussard , 112 S.W.3d at 831. The portions of the contempt order holdi ng Hilburn in contempt for failing to surrender the child at his school are also void because the provisions of the 2012 Order providing for a transfer of cust ody based on school a ttendance was rendered ambiguous by the COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting closure of schools and move to virtual learning. When Violations 2 through 10 occurred, the child’s school–17– was closed to in-person instruction. The ch ild, in turn, participated in virtual school from his grandfather’s home, which was also the home designated as Hilburn’s residence in the 2012 Order. While Hilburn contends the child’s location for virtual school constitutes “the school in which the child is enro lled,” Harvey insists the actual school building remains “the school in which the child is enrolled” for purposes of the possession schedule. To support a judgment of contempt, whethe r it be civil or criminal, Texas law requires that the underlying decree set fo rth the terms of compliance in clear, specific, and unambiguous terms so that th e person charged with obeying the decree will readily know exactly what duties and obligations are imposed on him. In re Johnson , 996 S.W.2d 430, 433–34 (T ex. App.—Beaumont 1999, orig. proceeding) (first citing Ex parte Chambers , 898 S.W.2d 257, 260 (Tex. 1995), and then citing Ex parte Acker , 949 S.W.2d 314, 317 (Tex. 1997)). A decree is ambiguous when its meaning is uncertain and doubtful or it is reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning. In re C.H.C. , 396 S.W.3d 33, 49 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, orig. proceeding) (first citing Coker v. Coker , 650 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1983), and then citing United Protective Servs., Inc. v. W. Vill. Ltd. P’ship , 180 S.W.3d 430, 432 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.)). Here, the requirement that Hilburn surre nder the child “at the school in which the child is enrolled” became reasonably su sceptible to more than one meaning when the child’s physical school closed, and the child moved to a virtual learning–18– environment at his grandfather’s house. A lthough the child was enrolled at a public elementary school, he did not attend the phys ical school building nor was he enrolled in classes held at the school itself. Hil burn’s view that the physical location where the child is engaging in school constitute s the place of enrollment is, thus, one reasonable interpretation of the terms of the 2012 Order as applied to a virtual learning environment. Harvey’s view thatschool means the physical school building is also a reasonable interpretation of the plain language of the 2012 Order. His interpretation, however, disregards the rea lities of moving to virtual learning and the logistical difficulties that change places on a custodial parent who works outside of the home. Regardless, we c onclude the move to virtua l school caused by the COVID19 pandemic created an ambiguity in th e 2012 Order concerning where Hilburn was required to surrender the child to Harvey for his possession times during the school year. The COVID-19 pandemic and conti nuation of virtual school, therefore, rendered the terms of the 2012 Order setting out where to surrender possession too indefinite and not “certain enough to support a finding of contempt.” Luther , 620 S.W.3d at 722 (quoting Ex parte Hodges , 625 S.W.2d 304, 306 (Tex. 1981)). Harvey asked the trial court to take judicial notice of the Texas Supreme Court’s emergency orders regarding the C OVID-19 state of disaster when making its decision concerning the enforcement motion. The Twelfth Emergency Order Regarding COVID-19 State of Disast er provided in pertinent part:–19– 6. In determining a person’s right to possession of and access to a child under a court-ordered possession sc hedule in a Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship, the existing trial court order shall control in all instances . Possession of and access to a child shall not be affected by any shelter-in-place order or other order restricting movement issued by a governmental entity that arises from the pandemic. The original published school schedule shall also control, and possession and access shall not be affected by the school’s closure that arises from the pandemic. Nothing herein prevents parties from altering a possession schedule by agreement if allo wed by their court order(s), or courts from modifying their orders on an emergency basis or otherwise. Twelfth Emergency Order Regarding COVI D-19 State of Disaster, 629 S.W.3d 144, 145 (Tex. 2020) (emphasis added). The language from the Twelfth Emergency Order was then carried forward in all re levant emergency orders going forward (seventeenth, eighteenth, twen ty-second, twenty-sixth, and twenty-ninth emergency orders). This is the formulation of the orde r in place when the violations took place. Those emergency orders, however, provi ded no additional clarity regarding where Hilburn was required to transfer the child to Harvey when school was occurring virtually; the physical school building or the location of virtual learning. Rather, the applicable emergency orders simply confirm that parents and courts should continue to follow the possession sc hedules set out in the controlling SAPCR order in conjunction with the child’s published school schedule regardless of any COVID-19 restrictions put in place by local, state, or national authorities. In other words, the pandemic may not prevent parent s from seeing their children as scheduled in an applicable SAPCR order. The em ergency orders, therefore, cover the when of possession and access by requiring that the schedules for possession and access set–20– out in the SAPCR order should continue to be followed. Thos e emergency orders say nothing regarding where possession should be transferre d if the child is attending school virtually and the SAPCR order requir es surrendering the child at his school. The emergency orders, thus, provide no clear, specific, and unambiguous guidance as to where Hilburn was required to transf er the child to Harvey when school was occurring virtually. We conclude the underlying order, even when construed with the emergency orders, does not “set forth the terms of compliance in clear, specific, and unambiguous terms so that the person char ged with obeying the decree will readily know exactly what duties and ob ligations are imposed on him.” See Acker , 949 S.W.2d at 317. The change to virtual sc hool caused the 2012 Order to become too vague to be enforced by civil or criminal contempt and does no t afford Hilburn her due process rights. Indeed, in light of thatambiguity, there is an absence of proof that Hilburn violated the order and did so with willful intent. See Luther , 620 S.W.3d
at 721. Tellingly, the contempt order itself illu strates the ambiguity created when virtual school began. The cont empt order describes the viol ations as either failing to deliver the child to Harvey at the time sc hool was dismissed at the school “and/or” at 6:00 p.m. at the child’s residence. That the trial court found it necessary to include an “and/or” for when the violation occurre d shows it was not clear where the child was to be transferred during a period of vi rtual schooling. Moreove r, the trial court–21– found it necessary to clarify what happens “if the child is attending school virtually due to the coronavirus (COVID-19) pande mic on a date of Movant’s possession” and included a “clarification” in the cont empt order. This alone acknowledges that the shift to virtual learning re ndered the custody order ambiguous. A trial court that holds a party in contempt for violating a void order necessarily abuses its discretion. See In re Garza , 126 S.W.3d 268, 272 (Tex. App.— San Antonio 2003, orig. proceeding) (citing Ex parte Shaffer , 649 S.W.2d 300, 301– 02 (Tex. 1983)). Here, the tria l court held Hilburn in contempt for violating a void order. As such, the trial court abused its discretion, and the contempt order must be vacated. Further, because we have found th e order void, it will not support the award of attorney’s fees or the imposition of fines. See In re Corcoran , 343 S.W.3d 268, 269 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, orig. proceeding) (first citing Ex parte Sealy , 870 S.W.2d 663, 667 (Tex. App.—H ouston [1st Dist.] 1994, orig. proceeding), and then citing Keene Corp. v. Gardner , 837 S.W.2d 224, 232 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, writ denied)). We, therefor e, grant the writ of habeas corpus and vacate the contempt order.
II. The Revocation Order An order that is predicated on an erroneous or void order is also void. See Ex parte Abell , 613 S.W.2d 255, 257 (Tex. 1981) (contem pt judgment predicated on the violation of an erroneous discovery orde r is void). “Any attorney’s fees based upon a void order must also be void.” In re Harrison , No. 14-15-00370-CV, 2015 WL–22– 5935816, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Di st.] Oct. 13, 2015, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (quoting Ex parte Fernandez , 645 S.W.2d 636, 639 (T ex. App.—El Paso 1983, no writ)); In re McCray , No. 05-13-01195-CV, 2013 WL 5969581, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 7, 2013, orig. pr oceeding) (mem. op.) (“Because the commitment order must be set aside, the tria l court’s finding as to the attorney’s fees in the amount of $10,500 is void.”). In the revocation order, the trial court fo und that Hilburn had failed to comply with the terms of the contempt order, revoked the suspension of commitment, ordered her committed to jail, and awar ded Harvey additional attorney’s fees. Because the revocation order is predicated on the void contempt order, it is also void and should be vacated. In re Stein , 331 S.W.3d 538, 540 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dis.] 2011, orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (awrit of habeas corpus will issue if the order underlying the contempt , or the contempt order itself, is void.). Indeed, because the contempt order is void, no enforceable order remains under which the trial court could revoke the suspension of commitment included in the contempt order. See, e.g. , Adams v. State , No. 12-08-00331-CR, 2010 WL 1987516, at *1 (Tex. App.—Tyler May 19, 201 0, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“If the trial court’s order imposing commun ity supervision was void, then the trial court would have no authority to revoke community supervision, si nce, with no order imposing community supervision (because it is a nullity), there is nothing to revoke.”).–23– Because we conclude the 2012 Order was rendered void for ambiguity, and the contempt order and revocation order are void, it is unnecessary to address Hilburn’s remaining issues. See In re Johnson , 996 S.W.2d 430, 435 (Tex. App.— Beaumont 1999, orig. proceeding).
CONCLUSION Because the enforcement order and the revocation order are void, we grant habeas corpus relief and vacate the Sept ember 18, 2020 “Order of Enforcement,” December 4, 2020 “Order Revoking Susp ension and for Commitment to County Jail,” and December 7, 2020 “Amende d Order Revoking Suspension and for Commitment to County Jail,” signed by the 256th Judicial District Court of Dallas County, Texas, in cause number DF-11-12951. We order th at relator La’Keisha T. Hilburn be unconditionally released and disc harged from the custody of the Sheriff of Dallas County under the same orders. We further discharge the bond paid by relator in accordance with this Court’s order of December 9, 2020.

201068F.P05 /Robbie Partida-Kipness / ROBBIE PARTIDA-KIPNESS JUSTICE