FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

Washington, D.C. 20463 

BEFORE THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

In the Matter of )

IRL PAC and Ed Torgas, in his 

 official capacity as treasurer 

 (terminated) 

South Florida First PAC 

 (f/k/a Ros-Lehtinen for Congress 

 and Antonio Argiz, in his official 

 capacity as treasurer (terminated)

 Illeana Ros-Lehtinen

)

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

MUR 7657 

STATEMENT OF REASONS OF VICE CHAIR STEVEN T. WALTHER, 

COMMISSIONER SHANA M. BROUSSARD, 

AND COMMISSIONER ELLEN L. WEINTRAUB

The Complaint in this matter alleges that former U.S. Representative Illeana RosLehtinen converted funds contributed to her principal campaign committee and later transferred 

to her leadership PAC, IRL PAC, to personal use in violation of the Federal Election Campaign 

Act of 1971, as amended (the “Act”).1

 We voted to approve the Office of General Counsel’s 

(“OGC’s”) recommendation to find reason to believe that Respondents violated the Act’s 

personal use restrictions.2 However, the Commission was unable to garner the four votes 

necessary to approve the recommendation.3

 

We write to address what appears to be the main reason three of our colleagues declined 

to support OGC’s recommendations. They claim that IRL PAC’s spending, as a matter of law, is 

not subject to the personal use restrictions on grounds that the restrictions only apply to 

authorized candidate committees, not leadership PACs.4

 As explained below, the personal use 

restrictions firmly apply to IRL’s PAC’s spending based on a long line of Commission 

precedents, and neither the Act nor Commission regulations limit the restrictions to authorized 

candidate committees. 

1

 See Compl. ¶¶ 1-2 (Oct. 28, 2019). 2

 Commission Certification ¶ 2, MUR 7657 (IRL PAC, et al.) (Apr. 6, 2021). 3

 Id. We also voted against the motion to find no reason to believe that Respondents violated the Act. Id. 4

 See Statement of Reasons of Chairman Allen Dickerson and Commissioners Sean J. Cooksey and James E. 

“Trey” Trainor, III, March 22, 2022.

MUR765700098
MUR 7657 (IRL PAC, et al.) 

Statement of Reasons

Page 2 of 7 

Background 

Ros-Lehtinen represented Florida’s 27th District in the U.S. House of Representatives 

from 1989 until 2019, during which time her authorized campaign committee was Ros-Lehtinen 

for Congress (“Ros-Lehtinen Committee”).5 In April 2017, Ros-Lehtinen announced that she 

would not seek re-election in 2018.6 On October 25, 2017, the Ros-Lehtinen Committee 

converted to a multicandidate committee named South Florida First PAC (“SFF PAC”) and 

affiliated with Ros-Lehtinen’s leadership PAC, IRL PAC.7 Less than a week later, on October 

31, 2017, SFF PAC transferred its entire $177,445 cash balance to IRL PAC and then 

terminated.8 At the time of the transfer, IRL PAC had $5,967.39 in cash-on-hand.9 RosLehtinen left office on January 3, 2019.10

Between December 2017 and December 2018, IRL PAC made $74,673 in disbursements 

for theme park admissions, food, lodging, facility rentals, catering, and gift cards.11 The 

Complaint alleges that these disbursements appeared to be for personal use.12 According to the 

Complaint, the disbursements appeared to have no connection to Ros-Lehtinen’s candidacy or 

duties as an officeholder.13 Respondents argue that the challenged disbursements were for 

legitimate events related to the business of Ros-Lehtinen’s principal campaign committee or IRL 

PAC.14 Notably, they do not argue that IRL PAC’s spending was not subject to the personal use 

prohibition.15 

Legal Analysis

 Under 52 U.S.C. § 30114(a) of the Act, “a contribution accepted by a candidate, and any 

other donation received by an individual as support for activities of the individual as a holder of 

federal office, may be used by the candidate or individual” for, inter alia, “authorized 

expenditures in connection with the campaign for Federal office of the candidate” or “ordinary 

and necessary expenses incurred in connection with duties of the individual as a holder of 

Federal office.”16 Subsection (b) provides that “[a] contribution or donation described in 

subsection (a) shall not be converted by any person to personal use.”17 “Personal use” means 

any use of funds in a campaign account of a present or former candidate to fulfill a commitment, 

5

 First Gen. Counsel’s Rpt. at 2. 6

 Compl. ¶ 4. 7

 Id. ¶ 6 (citing SFF PAC’s Amended Statement of Organization (Oct. 25, 2017)). SFF PAC raised no 

additional contributions after its conversion to a multicandidate committee. See First Gen. Counsel’s Rpt. at 2 & 

n.6.

8

 First Gen. Counsel’s Rpt. at 3. The termination was approved on November 8, 2017. Id. at 3 & n.7. 9

 Id. at 3. 10 Id. On July 3, 2019, IRL PAC filed for termination, which was approved. Id. 11 First Gen. Counsel’s Rpt. at 3. 12 See Compl. ¶¶ 9-11, 18, 20-21. 13 Id. ¶¶ 6-7. 14 Response of IRL PAC at 1-3 (Nov. 22, 2019). Ros-Lehtinen and SFF PAC adopted IRL PAC’s response as 

their own, on December 3 and 5, 2019, respectively. 

15 See id. 16 52 U.S.C. § 30114(a). 17 Id. § 30114(b)(1).

MUR765700099
MUR 7657 (IRL PAC, et al.) 

Statement of Reasons

Page 3 of 7 

obligation, or expense of any person that would exist irrespective of the candidate’s campaign or 

duties as a Federal officeholder.18 

In a long line of advisory opinions, the Commission has interpreted the Act and 

Commission regulations to permit principal campaign committees to convert to nonconnected 

committees or transfer their funds to such committees or other entities with the proviso that the 

personal use prohibition continues to apply to any contributions received while the committee 

was a principal campaign committee.19 For instance, in Advisory Opinion 1993-22 (Robert 

Roe), a federal officeholder, after announcing that he would not seek reelection, created a 

multicandidate committee and transferred all of the funds from his principal campaign committee 

to this new committee and terminated the campaign committee.20 Notably, all of the funds of the 

multicandidate committee were provided only by his principal campaign committee.21 The 

advisory opinion request sought guidance from the Commission on the proposed use of funds by 

the multicandidate committee. While the Commission noted that certain of the proposed uses of 

the funds were permissible under the predecessor personal use statute, the Commission expressly 

stated that the retiring office holder would have to ensure that the remaining funds transferred to 

the multicandidate committee were not “expended for [his] personal use.”22

The Commission reached a similar conclusion in Advisory Opinion 2004-03 (Dooley for 

the Valley) and Advisory Opinion 2012-06 (RickPerry.org). In Advisory Opinion 2004-03 

(Dooley for the Valley), the officeholder announced his decision to retire, and subsequently, his 

campaign committee amended its Statement of Organization to reflect its status as a 

multicandidate committee.23 When the committee transitioned from a multicandidate committee, 

it had a large amount of cash-on-hand.24 These funds, the Commission explained, remained 

subject to the personal use restrictions because the “the Act’s restrictions on the use of campaign 

funds apply expressly ‘to contribution[s] accepted by a candidate.’”25 In Advisory Opinion 

2012-06 (RickPerry.org), the Commission permitted then-Governor Perry’s principal campaign 

committee for the 2012 presidential election to convert to a nonconnected committee and to fund 

the nonconnected committee’s activities using its remaining primary election funds, to the extent 

the funds were not used for personal use.26 

The Commission’s reasoning in these advisory opinions apply to IRL PAC’s spending. 

All but approximately 3% of IRL PAC’s cash-on-hand came from funds that were originally 

contributed to Ros-Lehtinen’s principal campaign committee.27 In particular, SSF PAC 

transferred $177,445 to IRL PAC on October 31, 2017, and six days before that transfer, Ros18 Id. § 30114(b)(2); 11 C.F.R. § 113.1(g); Explanation and Justification on Expenditures; Reports by Political 

Committees; Personal Use of Campaign Funds, 60 Fed. Reg. 7,862, 7,863 (Feb. 9, 1995). 

19 See, e.g., Advisory Op. 2012-06 (RickPerry.org); Advisory Op. 2004-03 at 2-4 (Dooley for the Valley); 

Advisory Op. 1993-22 at 2-3 (Robert Roe); Advisory Op. 1994-31 (Gallo); Advisory Op. 1986-05 (Barnes for 

Congress Committee).

20 Advisory Op. 1993-22 at 2-3 (Robert Roe). 21 Id. at 2-3. 22 Id. at 3. 23 Advisory Op. 2004-03 at 1 (Dooley for Valley). 24 Id. at 2. 25 Id. at 2 (quoting 2 U.S.C. 439a(a)). 26 See Advisory Op. 2012-06 at 2-4 (RickPerry.org). 27 First Gen. Counsel’s Rpt. at 7.

MUR765700100
MUR 7657 (IRL PAC, et al.) 

Statement of Reasons

Page 4 of 7 

Lehtinen for Congress converted from a principal campaign committee to the multicandidate 

committee, SFF PAC.28 Based on the foregoing advisory opinions interpreting the Act and 

Commission regulations, the personal use prohibition applies to the funds that were transferred to 

and spent by IRL PAC regardless of its status as a leadership PAC. And for the reasons set out 

in the First General Counsel’s Report, the available information at this stage indicated that 

Respondents may have converted campaign funds to personal use in connection with certain of 

IRL PAC’s disbursements.29 

Our three colleagues who voted against OGC’s reason-to-believe recommendation 

argued that the personal use prohibition does not apply to IRL PAC’s spending due to its status 

as a leadership PAC. In their view, the funds IRL PAC spent were not in “in a campaign 

account.” In other words, they appear to believe that the personal use prohibition only applies to 

authorized candidate committees and their affiliates.

30 As an initial matter, as discussed above, 

this argument runs contrary to decades of Commission precedent. In this and many other matters, 

our colleagues have a disturbing habit of discarding well-established precedent the Commission 

has adopted by majority vote. Furthermore, a contextual examination of the Act and Commission 

regulations does not compel their rigid interpretation that the personal use prohibition applies 

solely to authorized candidate committees.

As previously stated, the Act prohibits a “contribution accepted by a candidate” and “any 

other donation received by an individual as support for activities of the individual as a holder of 

Federal office” from being “converted by any person to personal use.”31 A leadership PAC is 

typically, as it was here, a committee that is “established, financed, maintained, or controlled by 

a candidate”32 and it thus follows that a contribution to a leadership PAC is a “contribution 

accepted by a candidate” for purposes of the Act’s personal use prohibition. The plain language 

of the Act indicates that the prohibition attaches at the time the contribution is accepted by a 

candidate. 

Leadership PACs, moreover, exist to provide a mechanism for officeholders to support 

other members of their caucus in order to aid the officeholder’s quest to achieve leadership 

positions (hence the name).33 Donations to leadership PACs thus fall squarely within the 

category of donations received “by an individual as support for activities of the individual as a 

28 Id. 29 Id. at 7-18. See Statement of Policy Regarding Commission Action in Matters at the Initial Stage in the 

Enforcement Process, 72 Fed. Reg. 12,545 (Mar. 16, 2007) (stating that the Commission will find reason to believe 

“in cases where the available evidence in the matter is at least sufficient to warrant conducting an investigation, and 

where the seriousness of the alleged violation warrants either further investigation or immediate conciliation”).

30 See Statement of Reasons of Chairman Allen Dickerson and Commissioners Sean J. Cooksey and James E. 

“Trey” Trainor, III, March 22, 2022 at 2. These arguments were also previously made in an interpretative statement 

Commissioner Cooksey previously issued. See Interpretative Statement of Commissioner Sean J. Cooksey, May 6, 

2021, https://www.fec.gov/resources/cms-content/documents/2021-05-

06_Interpretive_Statement_of_Cmsr_Cooksey.pdf (“Interpretative Statement”).

31 52 U.S.C. § 30114(a). 32 Specifically, Commission regulations define a leadership PAC as a “committee that is directly or indirectly 

established, financed, maintained, or controlled by a candidate for Federal office or an individual holding Federal 

office but which is not an authorized committee of the candidate or individual and which is not affiliated with an 

authorized committee of the candidate or individual.” 11 C.F.R. § 100.5(e)(6).

33 See Explanation and Justification on Leadership PACs, 68 Fed. Reg. 67,013, 67,014 (Dec. 1, 2003). 

MUR765700101
MUR 7657 (IRL PAC, et al.) 

Statement of Reasons

Page 5 of 7 

holder of Federal office.”34 The Act subjects two categories of funds to the personal use 

restrictions. Both categories – contributions accepted by a candidate and donations received as 

support for activities of an individual as a holder of federal office – describe leadership PACs. 

Any way one looks at it, they may not be converted to personal use. 

The regulation’s definition that personal use means the “use of funds in a campaign 

account” does not foreclose applying the prohibition to IRL PAC categorically. “The Supreme 

Court has stressed time and time again that ‘in expounding a statute, [courts] must not be guided 

by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law.’”35 

Although “campaign account” is not defined in the Act or regulations, other sections of the Act 

and Commission regulations are informative and indicate that “campaign account” has been 

understood to include accounts of other committees. For instance, the Act and Commission 

regulations subject all political committees to the same requirements that they designate at least 

one “campaign depository” and provide the Commission with notification of the depository.36 In 

setting out these requirements, section 103.1-103.3’s use of the word “campaign” to describe 

depository is not limited to authorized candidate committees except in one instance. Subsection 

103.4, unlike the first three subsections, explicitly refers to a principal campaign committee’s 

campaign depository.37 This key distinction supports the conclusion that “campaign depository” 

as a general matter includes the campaign account of any committee, and where the regulation 

discusses it in connection with a candidate committee only, it explicitly states as such. While it 

is true that the agency’s regulations do not always evince the desired level of clarity, “ideal 

clarity is not the standard.”38 Use of “campaign depository” in the only section of the Act and 

Commission regulations that require all committees to establish at least one account bolsters the 

conclusion that the personal use prohibition does not necessarily have the narrow interpretation 

our colleagues appear to advance, and it is certainly not an interpretation required by the Act and 

Commission regulations. 

To be clear, our three colleagues did not have to find that contributions received by 

leadership PACs are per se subject to the personal use prohibition to conclude that IRL PAC’s 

spending in this matter was subject to the prohibition. Whether contributions received by a 

leadership PAC are subject to the personal use prohibition is not the precise question facing the 

34 52 U.S.C. § 30114(a). 35 Del. Dep’t of Nat. Res. & Envl. Control v. EPA, 895 F.3d 90, 97 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (quoting U.S. Nat. Bank 

of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 455 (1993)). See United States v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 

801 F.3d 477,485 (5th Cir. 2015) (“Regulations, like statutes, must be ‘construed so that effect is given to all [their] 

provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.’” (alteration in original) (quoting 

Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009))). 36 The Act states that “each political committee shall designate one or more . . . depository institutions . . . as 

its campaign depository” and must “maintain at least one checking account and such other accounts as the 

committee determines.” 52 U.S.C. § 30102(h) (emphasis added). Similarly, Part 103 of Commission regulations, 

11 C.F.R. § 103.1-103.4, which has the heading, “Campaign Depositories,” implements the statute, and subsection 

103.1 provides that “[e]ach committee shall notify the Commission of the campaign depository(ies) it has 

designated.” 11 C.F.R. § 103.1. Subsection 103.3 then sets out the requirements that treasurers must follow in 

depositing receipts into a “campaign depository.” See 11 C.F.R. § 103.1-103.3. 37 11 C.F.R. § 103.4 (“Any campaign depository designated by the principal campaign committee of a 

political party’s candidate for President shall be the campaign depository for that political party’s candidate for the 

office of Vice President.”). 

38 CREW v. FEC, 316 F. Supp. 3d 349, 411 n.48 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting Van Hollen, Jr. v. FEC, 811 F.3d 

486, 497 (D.C. Cir. 2016)).

MUR765700102
MUR 7657 (IRL PAC, et al.) 

Statement of Reasons

Page 6 of 7 

Commission in this matter. Here, it is undisputed that IRL PAC’s funds originated from 

contributions made to a principal campaign committee, and consistent with the Commission’s 

prior guidance on this issue, as reflected in its advisory opinions, the funds remained subject to 

the personal use prohibition after they were transferred to the leadership PAC. 

In his Interpretative Statement, Commissioner Cooksey cites Advisory Opinion 2008-17 

(KITPAC) for the proposition that the “Commission’s established legal rule is that leadership 

PACs are not subject to the Act’s personal-use restriction because they are neither authorized 

candidate committees nor affiliated with them.”39 A single advisory opinion, issued on facts 

materially different from this matter, can hardly be read, as Commissioner Cooksey claims, as 

reflecting an established agency rule that leadership PACs are, as a matter of law, not subject to 

the personal use restriction. In Advisory Opinion 2008-17 (KITPAC), the leadership PAC of a 

sitting U.S. Senator sought guidance on whether the Act and Commission regulations permitted 

it to compensate the Senator’s co-author $25,000 for the co-author’s work on a manuscript.40 

The request explained that the Senator wanted to “publish the book purely to advance the ideas 

and philosophies important to his campaign and leadership PAC, and not to benefit himself 

personally.”41 There was no information before the Commission suggesting that the leadership 

PAC’s funding came from contributions originally received by the Senator’s principal campaign 

committee.42 Of note, two of the Commissioners who cited Advisory Opinion 2008-17 

(KITPAC) as support for their argument that the personal use prohibition only applies to funds 

raised by authorized candidate committees, not leadership PACs, also voted to support the 

Commission’s unanimous Advisory Opinion 2012-06 (RickPerry.org),43 which relied on the 

established agency principle that the personal use prohibition continues to apply to contributions 

that were received by a principal campaign committee even after the funds are transferred to 

another committee or if the principal campaign committee converts to another committee.44 

39 Interpretative Statement at 2; see also Concurring Statement of Chairman Lee E. Goodman and 

Commissioners Matthew S. Petersen and Caroline C. Hunter 5, Advisory Op. 2014-06 (Ryan for Congress) (citing 

Advisory Op. 2008-17 (KITPAC) for the same proposition). 40 Advisory Op. 2008-17 at 2 (KITPAC). 41 Id. 42 For the same reason, the instant matter is distinguishable from Advisory Opinion 2014-06 (Ryan for 

Congress) and MUR 7477 (Steve Chabot), which Commissioner Cooksey also discusses in his Interpretative 

Statement. See Interpretative Statement at 3. 43 Compare Commission Certification, Advisory Op. 2012-06 (RickPerry.org) (Commissioners Bauerly, 

Hunter, McGahn II, Petersen, Walther, and Weintraub voted affirmatively for the decision), with Commission 

Certification, Advisory Op. 2014-06 (Ryan for Congress) and Concurring Statement of Chairman Lee Goodman and 

Commissioners Matthew S. Petersen and Caroline Hunter (noting that the personal use restrictions do not apply to 

leadership PACs). 

44 Commissioner Cooksey also cites four sets of legislative recommendations approved by the Commission as 

support for his argument. Interpretative Statement at 2 & n.6. Those recommendations stated that the Act makes “it 

illegal for an individual to use contributions accepted by a candidate or a candidate’s committee for his or her own 

personal use” but “no corresponding provision covers individuals who convert contributions received by party 

committees, separate segregated funds, leadership PACs, and other political committees to their own personal use. 

See, e.g., Legislative Recommendations of the Federal Election Commission 2013 at 12 (Dec. 17, 2013) (emphasis 

added). Thus, those recommendations did not concern the fact pattern presented here. Moreover, the description 

quoted by Commissioner Cooksey has not been the position of the Commission since 2013. The item regarding 

“Conversion of Campaign Funds” was deleted from the Commission's 2014 legislative recommendations to 

Congress. When the Commission voted to restore that item in 2016, the recommendation made no mention of 

leadership PACs. This version has carried through to the Commission’s most recent legislative recommendations, 

adopted May 6, 2021 by the Commission’s current lineup of commissioners.

MUR765700103
MUR 7657 (IRL PAC, et al.) 

Statement of Reasons

Page 7 of 7 

Moreover, Advisory Opinion 2008-17 (KITPAC) has not been cited favorably, or at all, by any 

other advisory opinion since it was issued. 

Conclusion 

In the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, Congress proudly adopted the anti-corruption measure 

of barring retiring officeholders from pocketing their leftover campaign funds.45 Enforcing the 

personal use prohibition in this matter would have furthered Congress’ goal. Instead, our 

colleagues’ novel legal theory frustrates this goal and creates precedent that is contrary to 

longstanding Commission interpretation. Retiring members of Congress can now sidestep the 

personal use prohibition by merely reorganizing their principal campaign committees – a simple 

matter of checking a new box on a form – and/or transferring their principal campaign committee 

funds to their leadership PACs. It used to be the case that the Commission avoided interpreting 

the law in a manner that would allow circumvention of the Act’s prohibitions and limitations.46

Our job is to administer the law that Congress passed, not eviscerate it. 

Accordingly, for all of these reasons and for the reasons provided in the First General 

Counsel’s Report, we supported OGC’s recommendation to find reason to believe that 

Respondents violated 52 U.S.C. § 30114(b) by converting campaign funds to personal use.

____________________________ 

Steven T. Walther 

Vice Chair

____________________________ 

Shana M. Broussard 

Commissioner

____________________ ____________________________ 

Date Ellen L. Weintraub 

Commissioner

45 See Explanation and Justification on Expenditures; Reports by Political Committees; Personal Use of 

Campaign Funds, 60 Fed. Reg. 7,862, 7,862-63 (Feb. 9, 1995) (noting that when Congress first enacted the personal 

use prohibition in 1979, it included a grandfather provision that exempted Senators and Representatives in Congress 

on January 8, 1980 from the personal use prohibition but later repealed this grandfather provision and subjected 

anyone serving in Congress after January 1993 to the personal use prohibition).

46 See, e.g., First Gen. Counsel’s Rpt. at 24-34, Commission Certification at 1-2, MURs 3087/3204 (Nat’l 

Republican Senatorial Comm.) (May 21, 1991) (rejecting the argument that the unlimited transfer provision allowed 

a national party committee to transfer funds to a state party committee that used the funds to support a federal 

candidate in excess of the coordinated party expenditure limits); Commission Certification at 1-2, MURs 3087/3204 

(Nat’l Republican Senatorial Comm.) (Aug. 2, 1994) (ratifying earlier reason-to-believe findings).

____________________ March 24, 2022

Date

March 24, 2022

____________________ March 24, 2022

Date

MUR765700104