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86–337 PDF 2003

S. HRG. 106–1143

IMPACT OF PILOT SHORTAGES ON AIR SERVICE

TO SMALLER AND RURAL MARKETS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, 

SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JULY 25, 2000

Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation

(

(II)

SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona, Chairman 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

CONRAD BURNS, Montana 

SLADE GORTON, Washington 

TRENT LOTT, Mississippi 

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas 

OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine 

JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri 

BILL FRIST, Tennessee 

SPENCER ABRAHAM, Michigan 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina 

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia 

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts 

JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana 

RICHARD H. BRYAN, Nevada 

BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota 

RON WYDEN, Oregon 

MAX CLELAND, Georgia 

MARK BUSE, Republican Staff Director 

ANN CHOINIERE, Republican General Counsel 

KEVIN D. KAYES, Democratic Staff Director 

MOSES BOYD, Democratic Chief Counsel 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION 

SLADE GORTON, Washington, Chairman 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

CONRAD BURNS, Montana 

TRENT LOTT, Mississippi 

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas 

JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri 

BILL FRIST, Tennessee 

OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

SPENCER ABRAHAM, Michigan 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia 

ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina 

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii 

RICHARD H. BRYAN, Nevada 

JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana 

BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota 

RON WYDEN, Oregon 

MAX CLELAND, Georgia 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on July 25, 2000 ............................................................................... 1

Statement of Senator Burns ................................................................................... 60

Statement of Senator Gorton .................................................................................. 1

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 2

Statement of Senator Rockefeller ........................................................................... 3

WITNESSES

Barker, Linda, Vice President, Business Aviation Services ................................. 49

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 52

Emens, Captain Paul, Chairman, Pilots Against Age Discrimination ................ 21

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 24

Inhofe, Hon. James M., U.S. Senator from Oklahoma ......................................... 3

Jacques, Stephen G., In Support of Senate Bill 1855, prepared statement ........ 26

Lacey, Nicholas L., Director, Flight Standards Service, Federal Aviation Administration .......................................................................................................... 12

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 13

McElroy, Deborah C., President, Regional Airline Association ........................... 45

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 47

Murkowski, Hon. Frank H., U.S. Senator from Alaska ....................................... 6

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 10

Wilkening, Robin MD, MPH In Support of Senate Bill 1855, prepared statement ...................................................................................................................... 31

Woerth, Captain Duane E., President, Air Line Pilots Association, International ................................................................................................................. 16

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 18

APPENDIX

McCain, John, U.S. Senator from Arizona, prepared statement ......................... 65

Woolsey, Samuel D., J.D., prepared statement ..................................................... 66

Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Slade Gorton: 

Nicholas L. Lacey ............................................................................................. 73

Deborah McElroy (RAA) ................................................................................... 74

Captain Duane Woerth .................................................................................... 75

(1)

IMPACT OF PILOT SHORTAGES ON AIR 

SERVICE TO SMALLER AND RURAL MARKETS 

TUESDAY, JULY 25, 2000

U.S. SENATE, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION, 

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:15 p.m. in room 

SR–253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Slade Gorton, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SLADE GORTON,

U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON 

Senator GORTON. This hearing will come to order. This hearing 

will address a potentially significant problem affecting air service 

to rural and smaller communities. Although airline deregulation 

has been greatly beneficial for most consumers, there are areas of 

the country that struggle to get quality air service. Such markets 

tend to be fragile, because the airlines serving them operate on 

thin profit margins. Airlines, like most businesses, go where the 

customers are. By definition, small towns and remote communities 

have few potential passengers to offer an air carrier. As a result, 

air service tends to be infrequent and expensive. 

Air travel is no longer the luxury form of transportation it was 

before deregulation. It is a form of mass transport that many have 

grown to depend upon. That dependence seems to be inversely proportional to the size of the market. The smaller the community, the 

more essential air transportation can be. When a marginal market 

is adversely affected by outside factors, it makes the situation all 

the more difficult. Such is the case with pilot shortages. 

When speaking of such shortages, it is important to be clear, 

there are many pilots in the United States, and many more individuals who want to be pilots. The problem arises when an airline 

cannot find qualified and trained pilots. 

Major airlines have almost no difficulty finding such pilots. The 

big air carriers offer salaries, benefits, and career opportunities 

that make recruiting relatively easy. With the domestic economy 

doing well over the past few years, the Nation’s airlines have been 

growing significantly, causing the industry to hire a considerable 

number of pilots. 

The heavy demand for pilots by the major airlines has a significant impact on regional airlines because the majors frequently 

poach the flight crews of the regionals. Although major airlines 

2

have always hired pilots away from small air carriers, the current 

rate of attrition may be greater than ever before. 

There are numerous reports of how pilot attrition among smaller 

carriers has caused canceled flights. That is why Senator Burns 

and others have become deeply concerned. Senator Burns chaired 

a field hearing in Montana last year that began exploring this 

problem. Since that time, it does not appear that the situation has 

changed, except perhaps to get worse. 

Although my State of Washington has remote towns, we are fortunate to have quality air service at major airports in both the 

western and eastern parts of the State. Other States do not have 

that luxury. Potential solutions to this problem are not clear. I 

know that Senator Murkowski has introduced a bill intended to 

ease the situation. He proposes changing the mandatory retirement 

age of pilots from 60 to 65. 

The so-called age 60 rule has been controversial since it was first 

adopted in 1959. The question of how old is too old is not easily 

answered. Any age restriction is going to be arbitrary to some degree. Changing the age 60 rule would undoubtedly expand the pool 

of potential pilots, but we must be careful not to do so if it increases the risk of flying for the public. 

I look forward to hearing more about the problem and potential 

solutions from our witnesses. I thank Senator Burns for requesting 

this hearing. He deserves a great deal of credit for bringing this 

issue to national attention on behalf of his constituents and the 

many others affected by the problem. 

We have two Senators to start us out. Senator Inhofe is here. 

Senator Inhofe is a noted pilot, and he is welcomed now as our 

opening witness. Oh, excuse me. Senator Rockefeller is here, who 

is the Ranking Member of this Subcommittee, and so if I may I will 

defer to him for any statement he may have. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Gorton follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. SLADE GORTON, U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON

This afternoon’s hearing will address a potentially significant problem that is affecting air service to rural and smaller communities. Although airline deregulation 

has been greatly beneficial for most consumers, there are areas of the country that 

struggle to get quality air service. Such markets tend to be fragile because the airlines serving them operate on thin profit margins. Airlines, like most businesses, go 

where the customers are. By definition, small towns and remote communities have 

few potential passengers to offer an air carrier. As a result, air service tends to be 

infrequent and expensive. 

Air travel is no longer the luxury form of transportation that it was before deregulation. It is a form of mass transit that many have grown to depend upon. That dependence seems to be inversely proportional to the size of the market. The smaller 

the community, the more essential air transportation can be. This is especially the 

case in the western United States where small towns can be separated by great distances. When a marginal market is adversely affected by outside factors, it makes 

the situation all the more difficult. Such is the case with pilot shortages. 

When speaking of such shortages, it is important to be clear. There are many pilots in the United States, and many more individuals who want to be pilots. The 

problem arises when an airline cannot find qualified and trained pilots. Major airlines have almost no difficulty finding such pilots. The big air carriers offer salaries, 

benefits, and career opportunities that make recruiting relatively easy. With the domestic economy doing well over the past few years, the nation’s airlines have been 

growing significantly, causing the industry to hire a considerable number of pilots. 

The heavy demand for pilots by the major airlines has a significant impact on regional airlines because the majors frequently ‘‘poach’’ the flight crews of the 

3

regionals. Although major airlines have always hired pilots away from smaller carriers, the current rate of attrition may be greater than ever before. 

There are numerous reports of how pilot attrition among smaller carriers has 

caused canceled flights. That is why Senator Burns and others have become deeply 

concerned. He chaired a field hearing in Montana last year that began exploring 

this problem. Since that time, it does not appear that the situation has changed, 

except perhaps to get worse. Although my home State of Washington has remote 

towns, we are fortunate to have quality air service at major airports in the western 

and eastern parts of the State. Other States do not have that luxury. 

Potential solutions to this problem are not clear. I know that Senator Murkowski, 

who will be speaking in a moment, has introduced a bill intended to ease the situation. He proposes changing the mandatory retirement age for pilots from 60 years 

of age to 65. The so-called Age 60 Rule has been controversial since it was first 

adopted in 1959. The question of how old is too old is not easily answered. Any age 

restriction is going to be arbitrary to some degree. Changing the Age 60 Rule would 

undoubtedly expand the pool of potential pilots, but we must be careful not do so 

if it increases the risk of flying for the public. 

I look forward to hearing more about the problem and possible solutions from our 

witness. Also, I thank Senator Burns for requesting this hearing. He deserves much 

credit for bringing this issue to national attention on behalf of his constituents and 

the many others who are affected by the problem.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER, IV,

U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. I will be very brief. This is important, 

and controversial. I have not yet taken a position on this whole 

question of age 60 or whether to raise it. The issue began in 1959. 

It is controversial. We do know that people are not the same today, 

physically and in other ways, then they were in the late 1950’s 

when the rule was first passed. Medicine has helped to change 

that. I understand the union position. There are tensions within 

the pilot groups. First, we should do no harm, and second we 

should be aware of what is happening in life. 

Senator GORTON. Senator Inhofe. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. INHOFE,

U.S. SENATOR FROM OKLAHOMA 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I think what 

Senator Rockefeller said is right, this is important, it is controversial, and I fail to see sometimes why it is. I know it is important 

because of the shortages and some of the things that I will refer 

to here in a very brief statement. 

I do want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to share 

with you my views on this issue. You know, I do come with some 

degree of, I guess, bias, and I have to admit that I changed my 

views. When this issue first came up to my attention, anyway, it 

was back when I was in the House in 1987. Now, in 1987, let’s see, 

I would have been 52 years old. It happens that I am 65 years old 

now, so my views have changed a little bit. 

There is something else that has changed also that I want to 

share with you in just a minute. 

First of all, the advances in medicines which have essentially 

slowed down the aging process and the fact that in life-threatening 

situations experience is a key to safety. I fail to understand why 

at an arbitrary age a pilot is deemed no longer able to safely fly. 

I am not sure anyone knows when that occurs, but if I had my 

choice I think I would use some of the tests that have been taken 

4

to determine someone’s capability, as opposed to just an arbitrary 

age. Short of that I would go ahead and move it to 65, or maybe 

a little bit higher, with some physical tests along the way. 

I am not alone in my view. James Goodwin, chairman and CEO 

of United Airlines, has noted, and I am quoting now, ‘‘As an industry we are going to have to relook how we source pilots. The factories we have relied on to produce these people are not producing 

them in the same numbers.’’ And then Richard Branson of Virgin 

Atlantic Airlines has said, ‘‘It is an incredible waste of talent and 

training to force these pilots to retire.’’

Now, Mr. Chairman, I chair the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness, and I have to take some note of the comment of Mr. Goodman that ‘‘factories’’ used to produce commercial 

airlines—I assume that we are talking about the factories called 

the Air Force, the Navy, and Marines—are not producing enough. 

I am troubled by his remarks, because we have another problem 

that is unrelated to this but is directly affected by it, and that is 

our shortages of critical MOS’s in the military. 

Right now I contend, and George Tenant, who is the Director of 

Central Intelligence, agrees with me, that we are in the most 

threatened position in America that we have been in as a Nation 

in the history of this country, and one of the reasons is, we are losing a lot of our talented people. 

Right now we have a sad shortage in pilots. The amount of 

money our taxpayers have to pay to train a pilot for the services 

ranges between $5 and $9 million for each one, and yet our retention of pilots in the Navy alone, it is down below 20 percent. 

Now, you know, it is a lot cheaper to retain than it is to retrain, 

so we are going out there where the airlines are going after these 

individuals, and it makes it very difficult from a taxpayer’s perspective in trying to keep the number of pilots, active pilots on 

duty. 

One of the other problems I see is that some airlines I believe 

are lowering some of their requirements. One airline has reduced 

by one-third the minimum flying hours for applicants from 1,500 

hours of which 300 hours had to be in a multiengine plane to 1,000 

hours, of which 200 hours have to be multiengine. 

In other words, each group has been reduced by about a third, 

and while I am not suggesting that safety is necessarily affected by 

these decisions, you have to wonder if safety is enhanced in any 

way, by younger pilots less experienced pilots. Allow me to give a 

personal example, I taught all my kids to fly. They are good pilots, 

and they have more hours right now than a lot of the airline pilots 

have, and yet some of the things that they could come up against, 

they are not experienced enough to handle. 

I would suggest that there is no scientific data to support any 

conclusion to the question of how old is too old for a commercial 

airline, or perhaps more precisely, when does age necessarily mean 

that a person is no longer able to safely pilot a commercial airplane, and while a good question to ask, the fact of the matter is 

that the answer is not the same for everyone. I do not believe that 

I am breaking any new scientific ground by stating that each individual ages differently. 

5

I have a good friend that is the same age that I graduated from 

high school with. He was old in high school, Senator Rockefeller. 

A lot of people are born old, so age itself should not be the determining factor. 

Susan Baker, a professor at Johns Hopkins University School of 

Hygiene and Public Health, who served on the panel of experts appointed by the FAA to look at the age 60 rule and its correlation 

to health, has noted that—and this is a quote—‘‘there are far better 

predictors that age to indicate whether a pilot is likely to be suddenly incapacitated by a heart attack. These include stress tests 

and other noninvasive tests that have been in standard use since 

the 1980’s, as well as more recent tests such as the measurement 

of C-reactive protein.’’ Ms. Baker further states that surprisingly enough the FAA does 

not require any of these types of medical exams for assessment of 

pilots. She concludes that since there are more reliable tests than 

mere age available, the rule has nothing to do with age, and I 

agree. If I had my preference, the life span of a commercial pilot 

on duty should be related to tests more than age alone. However, 

if they are unable to do that I would jump it to 65 in a heart beat. 

I mentioned that I have had a lot of experience. I have over 8,000 

hours and over 45 years in flying. I am an active commercial pilot 

today. I had the occasion to recently fly a small Cessna aircraft 

around the world, where I replicated the flight of Wiley Post and 

ended up going across Senator Murkowski’s State of Alaska, and 

encountered situations that only experience kept me alive. 

One was going over Glacier National Park, going into a cloud 

bank and having to rely totally on the GPS, and I mentioned my 

sons a minute ago. They are good pilots, but I am not sure they 

would have been able to handle that. 

One last experience, and then I will conclude, and since I am not 

in a hurry and I want to hear what Senator Murkowski says, and 

I will stay around for questions if there are any. A year ago last 

month I had an experience, when President Clinton was coming to 

visit damage in Oklahoma after our tornado. I know it comes as 

a shock to these panel members to hear this, but I have not historically been one of the biggest fans of Bill Clinton, and so there was 

some speculation that I would be the only member of the Oklahoma delegation not to show up at Tinker Air Force Base when he 

came. I was not going to let that happen. 

I live on a little grass strip at a lake, and it had rained the night 

before so I could not take my big airplane I would normally take, 

the big twin. I brought my kids’ plane, a little Grumman Tiger. 

I remember taking off and going toward Tinker Air Force Base, 

and I recall so well going over Claremore, the birthplace of Will 

Rogers, the airport there, and hearing some roughness. When you 

get roughness in a reciprocal engine, it is either something wrong 

with your prop in terms of balance, or something chipped off of it, 

or it’s a mag. I did a mag check only to find out it had to be the 

prop. 

Well, normally I would have landed, but I thought, well, they are 

speculating I was not going to show up, and I did not want to be 

the only member of the delegation to snub the President, so I kept 

flying, and 5 miles, 6 miles to the West of Claremore, Oklahoma, 

6

there is an explosion, and not just my prop but the whole front end 

of this airplane came off, and it fell to the ground, 2,500 feet. 

Now, it is a single-engine airplane. You do not have a front end 

to it, and I was by myself, fortunately, and what happens, as you 

folks know since you are on this Committee, there is a thing called 

weight and balance. You take 300 pounds off of the front of an airplane and the tail starts to go down, and the only way to keep flying is to drop the nose down, hold it down, and glide as far as you 

can. 

I was able to do a very radical slip and land safely, although it 

did crash, into Claremore Airport, and it would not have crashed, 

except what I did not know was, when the prop and all that stuff 

came off, it also took the nose wheel off, and so when I landed—

I think that is pretty good landing—I put the nose down, and that 

was the end. 

Now, I would say this, and I say this in all sincerity. That was 

my kids’ plane. I have not flown that plane in a long time, but with 

their level of experience, which is equal in terms of flying hours to 

many, if not most of the commercial airline pilots, I do not think 

my children, flying that plane, would be alive today if they had 

been in it, and I am only because of experience. 

I say this because there is something to be said about years of 

experience. They cannot be made up with tests. They cannot be 

made up with training. It is something that comes just with experience, and so I would think and conclude, Mr. Chairman, that if you 

had a way of determining what a person’s physical capability was, 

and the fact that that person was not going to have a heart attack, 

and you have the tests to do this, which we now have available to 

us today, that age should not be that determinant, and you should 

not be forced to give up the experience that could save lives tomorrow. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator GORTON. Thank you, Senator. Quite a story, isn’t it? 

Senator Murkowski, the sponsor of the bill. 

STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK H. MURKOWSKI,

U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you very much, Senator Gorton, 

Senator Rockefeller. I very much appreciate your willingness to 

hold these hearings, and I am very pleased that I could testify on 

my bill, Senate bill 1855, allowing part 121 pilots to fly up to the 

age of 65. I personally think that there is an inevitability associated with this legislation, but I believe the time is now, not later. 

I certainly want to thank my cosponsors, Senator Inhofe, Senator 

Enzi, Senator Allard, Senator Thomas, Senator Bond, Senator 

Grassley. There were others that were on for a while, but I think 

some of the persuasion of the pilots union caused them to remove 

their names, but nevertheless, that is part of the democratic process, and I certainly understand that, and I want to thank the hundreds of pilots that have called, and particularly Herb Kelleher, 

chairman of Southwest Airlines, Roy Rasavage, president of the 

Helicopter Association International, Richard Haverley, president 

of Florida West, to name a few. 

7

I think, Mr. Chairman, adoption of this legislation would have a 

significant impact on the issue before you, and that is the quality 

and quantity of air service, particularly to America’s rural communities. Quite frankly, as we know, there is a serious pilot shortage 

in America, and its greatest impact is being felt in rural communities, including my home State of Alaska. 

I fly a lot in Alaska, and I can tell you, experience counts, and 

seniority associated with that experience is the name of the game, 

because that is how you get the experience. I grant you, there are 

exceptions, but for the most part when I fly with an older pilot the 

years of experience that that pilot has had, given any situation 

such as Senator Inhofe talked about, where you have something 

suddenly happen, and this individual has experienced that, you do 

not feel good about it, but you feel you are probably in the best 

hands available. 

So I feel strongly that this seniority gained by years of flying 

should not suggest that there is some magic that occurs at 60 to 

terminate the ability of that person, assuming they can pass the 

necessary physical tests to continue to fly and make a contribution, 

if, indeed, they want to. 

What we are talking about here is a simple matter of choice, and 

I have heard from many small Alaska carriers of the difficulty they 

are having keeping pilots, and even finding pilots to hire. One carrier in my home town of Fairbanks has asked that I consider 

changing the HBI visa status of pilots so he can hire pilots from 

Canada. Well, is that what we want to have happen? 

As you all know, pilots are leaving the small carriers, regionals 

and flight schools because they can earn more money flying for the 

major commercial air carriers. This has had a devastating effect on 

service to rural and remote areas because the smaller carriers just 

do not have the financial resources to compete with the offers of 

the major airlines. 

AirB12 Jet News reports that United Airlines is hiring more pilots and fine-tuning their flight schedules to compensate for a continuing shortage of crews that has forced flight cancellations. Well, 

just having bounced in and out of Seattle this last weekend I can 

talk about flight cancellations and spending a night in Denver and 

flying on one of the airlines that I have already mentioned, so I 

think the public is beginning to experience the inconvenience associated with this, and pilot shortage is part of it. 

Let me quote from that article. I quote, pilots are not calling in 

sick and not refusing regular assignments. United was advised 6 

to 9 months ago they were going to be short of pilots, and now it 

is happening, according to James Goodwin, chairman and CEO of 

United Airlines Corporation. In fact, according to Goodwin, quote, 

the age rules will have to be reexamined. Now, that is certainly a 

source. The factories we relied on to produce these people are not 

producing them in the same numbers. 

Mr. Chairman, our military used to be the largest supplier of pilots to commercial airlines, but even the armed forces are experiencing a critical shortage, as you have indicated, Senator. 

Another reason there is a pilot shortage in rural markets is the 

1996 commuter rule, which required age 60 retirement of pilots 

8

who flew scheduled routes in aircraft with a capacity of 10 or more 

seats. 

Well, Mr. Chairman, it has been 41 years sine age 60 was selected as a mandatory retirement age. Why age 60, for heaven’s 

sakes? When is the last time we looked at it? Are things different 

now? The aircraft are certainly different. Ground and air traffic 

control and traffic are entirely different. 

It is one thing to be flying in a DC–4, fighting ice and an engine 

and doing a half-dozen other things, as compared to flying a 737 

at 34,000 feet and you basically have a lot more systems, and a lot 

more dependability than they had back when this 60 age was set. 

Now, according to the FAA it was set because of medical uncertainties concerning pilot health after age 60. There are several 

other theories. While public comments were accepted, and this is 

important, no public hearings were held to debate the issue, ever. 

Despite broad industry and pilot opposition to the mandatory retirement age, the rule went into effect back in 1960. 

Well, I say it is time to change the rule. Since then there have 

been several studies, sponsored by the FAA, but none of the tests 

have produced concrete evidence that pilots over 60 years of age 

are a threat to the flying public. In fact, most of the studies have 

not even studied pilots over 60. However, the FAA has missed several opportunities to get first-hand information and has let other 

opportunities lapse. Let me share a couple of examples with you. 

The 1996 commuter rule made special provisions to allow pilots 

who were then flying to continue to fly for 4 more years, at which 

time the age 60 rule would have become effective. Well, commuter 

airlines were also allowed to continue to hire pilots 60 and older 

for another 15 months. The FAA had 4 solid years to test pilots flying over the age of 60 around this country, get scientific data on 

the skills and reflexes of these pilots. However, the FAA did not 

conduct such studies. Why? 

Second, litigation was brought by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission under the age discrimination Employment Act 

against Boeing, Rockwell International Grumman-Lockheed, and 

McDonnell-Douglas challenging their policies of removing pilots at 

the age of 60. 

All of these companies resolved EEOC litigation by entering into 

consent decrees lifting the age limit. Part of the decree was to keep 

records of pilot health. Where are the records? What was the purpose of keeping the information? Where is the FAA on this question? 

The Hilton study concluded FAA accident reports did not support 

the agency’s requirement that airline pilots retire on their 60th 

birthday. They found no increase in the accident rate for pilots of 

scheduled air service as they neared their 60th birthday. 

Mr. Chairman, the FAA administration believes it lacks scientific 

consensus in favor of changing the age rule of 60. The argument 

exists that there is no test that can determine the medical and psychological fitness of a pilot to fly after 60. Well, I say, come on, get 

off of it. Be realistic. 

According to Dr. Robin Wilkening, who I believe is in the audience, and I apologize if I have mispronounced the name, and Sue 

Baker, both from Johns Hopkins University, advanced psychoVerDate Apr 24 2002 09:27 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 086337 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\86337.TXT SCOM1 PsN: CAROLT
9

logical and neurobehavioral testing methods do exist to test pilots 

of any age. Medical science, as we know, has vastly improved since 

1959, with improvements in medical diagnosis, which include early 

detection and prevention, health awareness, exercise, and diet. All 

of these factors have increased life expectancy, certainly since 1959. 

In fact, 69 pilots organized and underwent extensive medical testing to force the FAA to drop the mandatory retirement. They still 

await a decision to their petition. Why, Mr. Chairman? 

In supporting documents to their petition in 1982 the FAA relaxed its medical requirements to allow airmen to continue flying 

with various medical problems not previously acceptable. For example, pilots with hypertension, diabetes, alcoholism, spinal cord 

injury, defective vision and others. In the area of cardiovascular 

special issuances, the American Medical Association applauded the 

FAA as having demonstrated an understanding of the advances in 

diagnostic treatment and rehabilitation. 

In 1999, the FAA granted medical certificates to 6,072 airline pilots under the age of 60 who had significant medical pathological 

problems, permitting them to operate as airline crewmen. How 

does the FAA derive its medical consensus that it is safe to allow 

those pilots to continue to fly, and it cannot derive the same for pilots who have been flying in this country for 41 years without such 

medical pathology over age 60? 

Mr. Chairman, last year 25 countries belonging to the European 

Joint Aviation Authority raised the mandatory age to 65, joining 

many Asian countries, who increased the age to 63, or 65. I know 

of no evidence that those foreign pilots have a worse safety record 

than American pilots under the age of 60. 

If we do not seriously look at raising retirement age for part 121 

pilots, I can assure you that many rural communities will find that 

their aviation lifeline to the rest of the country will be shut down 

or severely hampered. Residents perhaps of New York City, Los 

Angeles, and Chicago will not notice any change in air service, but 

the pilot shortage will deeply affect the residents of Missoula, Montana, or Ketchikan, Alaska and the other small communities who 

are desperately trying to maintain air service. 

We must make this change, Mr. Chairman. I urge Committee action now. It will come. We all know it. Sooner or later it is inevitable. Let us make it happen now. 

Senator GORTON. Senator Murkowski, just one question for you. 

Senator Inhofe, as he started his remarks, said that his preference 

would be no age limitation at all, simply tests of competence. 

Would that be your favorite solution, and 65 is just simply a compromise, or do you think 65 is the ideal, specific age? 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Well, I personally believe, and I continue to 

fly in private planes with pilots who are in their early eighties, and 

I fly with them in total confidence, based on their experience and 

knowing that they have been able to pass their physical, and if 

they were not able to pass their physical, obviously they would not 

be flying and I would not be flying with them, so while my legislation addresses 65 as the next step, I personally feel very comfortable with both my children, my wife, my grandchildren, with 

certain people who have the experience and the know-how, and I 

have that kind of a relationship with. 

10

I am sure Senator Inhofe has also experienced those occasions, 

and I know most of the airline pilots would feel the same way if 

the circumstances were the same. 

Senator GORTON. Thank you. That means the two of you see eyeto-eye. Do you have anything else you would like to add, Senator 

Inhofe? 

Senator INHOFE. No, I do not. Something that I neglected to mention that Frank did is that if it was something that was good in 

1959, and if we are going to use age, then everything else in our 

society has changed. Our social security, everything has changed 

because the life expectancy is so much higher today than it was at 

that time. Why should this be singled out as the only thing that 

does not change? 

Senator GORTON. Thank you both very much. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you for holding this hearing. 

Senator GORTON. Now we have a panel, five members of the 

panel, if they would come forward, please. It will go Lacey, Woerth, 

Emens, McElroy, Barker, but it does not matter where you sit. 

Thanks to all of you for showing up to help us with this very important challenge, and Mr. Lacey, we will begin with you. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Murkowski follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK H. MURKOWSKI,

U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity 

to appear before you to testify on my bill (S.1855) allowing Pt. 121 pilots to fly up 

to the age of 65. 

Adoption of this legislation would have a significant impact on the issue before 

you—the quality and quantity of air service to rural communities. Quite frankly, 

there is a serious pilot shortage in America and its greatest impact is being felt in 

rural communities, including in my home state of Alaska. 

I have heard from many small Alaskan air carriers on the difficulty they are having keeping pilots and even finding pilots to hire. In fact, one carrier in my hometown of Fairbanks has asked that I consider changing the HB1 visa status of pilots 

so he can hire foreign pilots. 

As you all know, pilots are leaving small carriers, regionals and flight schools because they can earn more money flying for the major commercial air carriers. This 

has a devastating effect on service to rural and remote areas because the smaller 

carriers just do not have the financial resources to compete with the offers of the 

major airlines. 

According to a report in the May 29 issue of Aviation Week, to ease the pilot shortage at U.S. airlines and create business opportunities for Canadian-based flight 

training schools, an informal study is being done by the FAA and Transport Canada 

to establish equivalent pilot certification standards. 

While that may put more pilots in the pipeline, it will not provide the level of 

experience necessary in the cockpit. How will that enhance safety in the industry? 

Airbiz Jet News reports that United Airlines is hiring more pilots and fine-tuning 

their flight schedules to compensate for a continuing shortage of crews that has 

forced flight cancellations. 

‘‘Pilots aren’t calling in sick and not refusing regular assignments. United was advised 6 to 9 months ago that we’re going to be short of pilots and now it is happening. according to James Goodwin, Chairman and CEO of UAL Corp. In fact, according to Goodwin the ‘‘age rules will have to be re-examined. The factories we relied on to produce these people are not producing them in the same numbers.’’

Mr. Chairman, our military used to be the largest supplier of pilots to commercial 

airlines. But even the armed services are experiencing a critical shortage. 

Another reason there is a pilot shortage in rural markets is the 1996 commuter 

rule which required age 60 retirement of pilots who flew scheduled routes in aircraft 

with a capacity of 10 or more seats. 

Mr. Chairman, it has been 41 years since age 60 was selected as the mandatory 

retirement age. Why age 60? 

11

According to the FAA, it was because of ‘‘medical uncertainties concerning pilot 

health after age 60.’’ There are several other theories. While public comments were 

accepted, no public hearing to debate the issue was ever held. Despite broad industry and pilot opposition to the mandatory retirement age, the rule went into effect 

in 1960. 

Since then, there have been several studies sponsored by the FAA. None of the 

tests have produced concrete evidence that pilots over 60 years of age are a threat 

to the flying public. In fact, most of the studies have not even studied pilots over 

60. 

However, the FAA has missed several opportunities to get first hand information 

and has let other opportunities lapse. Let me share some examples with you. 

The 1996 commuter rule made special provisions to allow pilots who were then 

flying to continue to fly for 4 more years at which time the age 60 rule would become effective. Commuter airlines were also allowed to continue to hire pilots 60 

and older for 15 months. 

The FAA had 4 solid years to test pilots flying over the age of 60 around this 

country and get scientific data on the skills and reflexes of these pilots. However, 

the FAA did not conduct such studies. 

Second, litigation was brought by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act against Boeing, Rockwell 

International, Grumman, Lockheed and McDonnell Douglas challenging their policies of removing pilots at age 60. All of those companies resolved EEOC litigation 

by entering into consent decrees lifting the age limit. Part of the decree was to keep 

records of pilot health. Where are the records and what was the purpose of keeping 

the information? 

The Hilton Study concluded FAA accident records did not support the agency’s requirement that airline pilots retire on their 60th birthday. They found no increase 

in the accident rate for pilots of scheduled air service as they neared their 60th 

birthday. 

Mr. Chairman, the FAA Administration believes it lacks scientific consensus in 

favor of changing the age 60 rule. The argument exists that there is no test that 

can determine the medical and psychological fitness of a pilot to fly after 60. 

However, According to Dr. Robin Wilkening, who is in the audience, and Sue 

Baker both from Johns Hopkins University, advanced physiological and 

neurobehavioral testing methods do exist to test pilots of any age. 

Medical science has vastly improved since 1959 with improvements in medical diagnosis which include early detection and prevention, health awareness, exercise, 

and diet. All of these factors have increased life expectancy since 1959. 

In fact, 69 pilots organized and underwent extensive medical testing to force the 

FAA to drop mandatory retirement. They await a decision to their petition. 

In supporting documents to their petition, in 1982 the FAA relaxed its medical 

requirements to allow airmen to continue flying with various medical problems not 

previously acceptable. For example, pilots with hypertension, diabetes, alcoholism, 

spinal cord injury, defective vision and others. In the area of cardiovascular special 

issuances, the American Medical Association applauded the FAA as having demonstrated an understanding of the advances in diagnosis, treatment, and rehabilitation. 

In 1999 the FAA granted medical certificates to 6,072 airline pilots under the age 

of 60 who had significant medical pathology, permitting them to operate as airline 

crewmen. How does the FAA derive its medical consensus that it is safe to allow 

those pilots to continue to fly and it cannot derive the same for pilots who have been 

flying in this country for 41 years without such medical pathology over age 60? 

Mr. Chairman, last year 25 countries belonging to the European Joint Aviation 

Authority raised the mandatory retirement age to 65 joining many Asian countries 

who increased the age to 63 or 65. I know of no evidence that these foreign pilots 

have a worse safety record than American pilots under the age of 60. 

If we don’t seriously look at raising retirement ages for Pt. 121 pilots, I can assure 

you that many rural communities will find that their aviation lifeline to the rest 

of the country will be closed down. Residents in New York City, Los Angeles, and 

Chicago will not notice any changes in air service, but the pilot shortage will deeply 

affect the residents of Missoula Montana, Ketchikan, Alaska and all the other small 

communities who are desperately trying to stay alive. 

We must make this change and I urge quick Committee action.

12

STATEMENT OF L. NICHOLAS LACEY, DIRECTOR, FLIGHT 

STANDARDS SERVICE, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION 

Mr. LACEY. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I 

would like to thank you for the opportunity to appear before you 

today to discuss the impact of pilot shortages on air service in certain markets. I am the Director of FAA’s Flight Standards Service, 

and a former military pilot and airline executive. 

In my 24-year career with Air Force Transport Operations, pilot 

recruitment and retention was a constant and significant challenge. 

I can relate to the concerns of those who believe that a pilot shortage is imminent, and one that could have an adverse impact on 

small and regional air carriers through high turnover rates. While 

there may be good reasons to be concerned about future pilot hiring 

shortages, I would like to reassure the Members of the Subcommittee and the public that we do not anticipate any significant 

reduction in air service in the United States. 

The growth in commercial aviation reflects continued economic 

expansion in both the U.S. and world economies. The U.S. commercial aviation industry ended the 1990’s by recording its sixth consecutive year of traffic growth, while the general aviation industry 

continued its turnaround by recording yet another record year in 

terms of aircraft billings. 

To accommodate this growth, the large air carrier fleet is forecast 

to increase 3.3 percent a year. The regional fleet is predicted to expand at a yearly rate of 3 percent. Will the industry have qualified 

pilots in sufficient numbers to accommodate this growth and to accommodate the growth in every sector? My colleagues from the industry here today are certainly in a better position to provide a 

perspective on how the market will respond. 

We understand that while the major airlines are not having difficulty meeting their pilot hiring goals, there are signs that the regional airlines and those feeding the regionals are starting to see 

higher turnover and pilot applicants with declining pilot experience. This is not surprising, given the fact that the major air carriers can offer significantly better pay and benefits. However, reducing safety standards or carving out exceptions to established 

safety standards, in my view, are not appropriate responses. 

The regional air carrier industry is both the entry level for airline transport rated pilots and an increasingly important source of 

experienced new pilots for major commercial jet operators. We recognize that this is a source of concern for small and rural communities, where some speculate that airline service will suffer as pilots are hired away by larger airlines offering better pay and benefits. 

The most important thing, however, for the regional airline industry and small carriers such as commuters and on-demand operators is that there is a continuous pool of new pilots to draw upon 

for training and development. Certainly, it is appropriate for the 

aviation industry to develop measures to increase its pilot hiring 

pool. However, we do not believe that part of the solution is to alter 

FAA safety standards, namely, the FAA’s age 60 rule, as some 

have suggested. 

The age 60 rule represents the FAA’s best determination of the 

time when a general decline in health-related functions and overall 

13

cognitive and performance capabilities may begin to reach a level 

where a pilot’s judgment and physical ability may begin to decline, 

and therefore jeopardize safety. Our rule means that a pilot who 

reaches age 60 must leave part 121 airline operations, but it does 

not mean that he or she can no longer play an important role in 

aviation. Many pilots continue to work for airlines in the screening, 

recruiting and training of pilot applicants, or fly in non-airline operations, or become flight instructors, or, fortunately for us, work 

as safety inspectors for the FAA. 

Before making any change to a safety rule, the FAA must be satisfied that the regulation will maintain or raise the current level 

of safety. The question for the FAA is one of public safety and determining acceptable risk. At this time, the FAA cannot be assured 

that changing the age 60 rule will maintain or raise the level of 

safety. 

Finally, some have argued that the FAA’s proposed changes to 

the rules governing pilot flight time and rest requirements may 

have an adverse effect on the hiring pool for pilots. The proposed 

rule generated voluminous public comment, and required further 

study and analysis. It is currently being revised by the FAA. 

The proposed rule would establish the maximum number of 

hours that a pilot can be kept on duty each day. It would also require that a pilot be provided minimum rest in every 24-hour period. Admittedly, the net effect of these proposed changes may be 

an increase in the number of pilots required to support today’s airline schedules. How much of an effect is still being debated. We are 

reviewing industry comments and all other comments associated 

with the proposal, as well as the latest science available on human 

fatigue and rest, and are developing our revised rule. 

Mr. Chairman, the FAA will develop regulations in the context 

of what is best for public safety, whether that is setting standards 

to combat pilot fatigue, or determining the best age for retirement 

of commercial pilots. While economic factors are certainly a part of 

that calculation, I am sure the Committee and our colleagues in industry would agree that safety must be the priority. 

That concludes my prepared remarks, and I think the format 

then is to answer questions when we are all done, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lacey follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF L. NICHOLAS LACEY, DIRECTOR, FLIGHT STANDARDS

SERVICE, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I would like to thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss 

the impact of pilot shortages on air service in certain markets. I am a former military pilot and airline executive. As a component of today’s discussion, the Subcommittee requested that I address the Federal Aviation Administration’s (‘‘FAA’’) 

age 60 requirement for retirement of air transportation pilots as well as the FAA’s 

proposed rule on pilot flight time and rest requirements. 

The FAA’s primary mission is ensuring the safety of the National Airspace System (NAS). We work hard to manage a growth oriented aviation system—and the 

constraints on the system that growth imposes—in the most efficient and safe way 

possible. Our ongoing efforts to modernize the air traffic control system will enhance 

both the safety and efficiency of the NAS. The FAA also establishes, through our 

regulations, basic safety standards for aircraft and crewmembers that will ensure 

the safety of our traveling public. We construct our regulations very carefully, taking into account as many factors as we can, but ultimately, always making the decision that will best enhance aviation safety. 

14

In my 24-year career with Air Force transport operations, pilot recruitment and 

retention was a constant and significant challenge, so I can relate to the concerns 

of those who believe that a pilot shortage is imminent, one that could have an adverse impact on small and regional air carriers through high turnover rates. While 

there may be good reasons to be concerned about future pilot hiring shortages, I 

would like to reassure the Members of the Subcommittee and the public that we 

do not anticipate any significant reduction in air service in the United States. 

The growth in commercial aviation reflects the continued economic expansion in 

both the U.S. and most world economies. The U.S. commercial aviation industry 

ended the 1990’s by recording its 6th consecutive year of traffic growth, while the 

general aviation industry continued its turnaround by recording yet another record 

year in terms of aircraft billings. Using a number of variables to measure growth 

trends, the FAA publishes an annual summary of forecasts of aviation activity. Our 

latest forecasts, published in March of this year, show commercial system revenue 

passenger miles increasing an average of 4.6 percent a year through 2011. 

Enplanements are expected to increase at a yearly rate of 3.9 percent, while commercial operations at airports with air traffic control service increase 2.7 percent 

over the 12-year forecast period. Non-commercial activity is forecast to increase an 

average 1.6 percent annually. To accommodate this growth, the large air carrier 

fleet is forecast to increase 3.3 percent a year; the regional fleet is predicted to expand at a yearly rate of 3.0 percent. 

Will the industry have qualified pilots in sufficient numbers to accommodate this 

growth, and to accommodate growth in every sector? My colleagues from the industry here today are certainly in a better position to provide a perspective on how the 

market will respond. However, based on our discussions with industry experts, we 

understand that, while the major airlines are not having difficulty meeting their 

pilot hiring goals, there are signs that the regional airlines and those feeding the 

regionals are starting to see higher turnover and pilot applicants with declining 

prior experience. This is not surprising given the fact that the major air carriers 

can offer significantly better pay and benefits. However, reducing safety standards 

or carving out exceptions to established safety standards, in my view, are not appropriate responses. 

A little background information about what is required by FAA regulations to become a commercial pilot may be helpful to the discussion. The FAA’s job is to set 

and enforce pilot qualification and training standards that will ensure public safety. 

I should note that the commercial aviation industry has an excellent safety record, 

due in large part to the knowledge, skills and abilities of its pilot workforce. To 

qualify to be a pilot for an airline, a person usually transitions from student pilot 

(not allowed to carry passengers), to private pilot (allowed to carry passengers, but 

not for hire), acquires an instrument rating (allowed to fly in minimum weather conditions), upgrades to a multi-engine rating (allowed to fly aircraft with two or more 

engines) to a commercial pilot certificate (allowed to fly passengers for hire). A person who acquires a commercial pilot certificate must have logged at least 250 hours 

of flight time. FAA regulations leading to a commercial certificate, as well as flight 

time acquired by flight instructing, do not require experience in a crew environment. 

The airline transport pilot certificate (ATP) allows a person to act as pilot-in-command of an aircraft in part 121 air carrier operations, which include most commercial passenger and cargo flights for both major and regional airlines. The ATP requires a minimum aeronautical experience of 1,500 hours of flight time as a pilot 

and a minimum age of 23 years. Under current requirements, part 121 air carriers 

may not use a pilot who has reached his or her 60th birthday to act as a pilot in 

part 121 operations. 

At the end of 1999, the number of active (meaning those with valid medical certificates) airline transport pilots totaled 137,642. We forecast the number of airline 

transport pilots to grow at an annual rate of 3.1 percent to a total of 198,100 in 

2011. It is difficult to determine whether this potential rate of growth will ultimately lead to a significant shortage of pilots. At present, many individuals with 

airline transport pilot certificates are not employed by regularly scheduled airlines. 

Some work as general aviation flight instructors while others are not employed as 

pilots. An airline transport pilot certificate is required for a pilot-in-command for 

part 121 operations, but a pilot may act as a co-pilot or first officer with only a commercial pilot certificate in many part 121 operations. Airlines could look to persons 

with commercial pilot certificates (numbering 124,261 at the end of 1999 and projected to increase to 147,300 in 2011) as potential hires. Air carrier equipage, labor 

agreements, routes and future changes in these factors further complicate the analysis. 

In addition, military downsizing will ultimately reduce the importance of ex-military pilots as a source for civilian airlines. From World War II through the midVerDate Apr 24 2002 09:27 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 086337 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\86337.TXT SCOM1 PsN: CAROLT
15

1990s, approximately 80 percent of major airline new hires were military trained. 

This is down to approximately 40 to 45 percent today. According to data from AIR, 

Inc.’s 1997–1998 pilot interview, civilian pilots make up 61 percent of all pilots 

hired. Non-military sources for pilots are persons with commercial pilot certificates, 

general aviation pilots, and the more than 200 colleges and universities that offer 

aviation programs. 

The regional air carrier industry is both the entry level for airline transport rated 

pilots, and an increasingly important source of experienced new pilots for the major 

commercial jet operators. We recognize that this is a source of concern for small and 

rural communities, where some speculate that airline service will suffer as pilots are 

hired away by larger airlines, offering better pay and benefits. The most important 

thing for the regional airline industry and small carriers, such as commuters and 

on demand operators, is that there is a continuous pool of new pilots to draw upon 

for training and development. Regional airlines are increasingly developing ‘‘bridge 

programs’’ with aviation universities that screen and refer graduates who meet the 

participating airlines’ minimum standards for employment. Also, many of the regional airlines are dropping their ‘‘pay for training’’ programs, which had required 

their pilot applicants to pay for their training, and reducing their company’s minimum qualifications for new hires. 

The general aviation industry has taken steps to increase interest in aviation. To 

help sustain the pool of pilots, the ‘‘BE A PILOT’’ program was initiated in 1996 

with a goal of 100,000 new student starts by the year 2000. This program is jointly 

sponsored and supported by more than 100 general aviation organizations. The program started issuing ‘‘introductory flight certificates’’ to interested respondents in May 1997. The certificates can be redeemed for a first flight lesson for a cost of $35. 

To date, over 75,000 certificates have been requested. The program has over 1,600 

participating flight schools. 

Through our regional offices, the FAA in partnership with state transportation officials, offer information and outreach to local communities about careers in aviation. We maintain an Aviation Education Web site at www.faa.gov/education where 

the public may find a host of career and curriculum materials, industry and educational contact listings, and community outreach initiatives. 

Certainly, it is appropriate for the aviation industry to develop measures to increase its pilot hiring pool. However, we do not believe that part of the solution is 

to alter FAA safety standards, namely the FAA’s age 60 rule, as some have suggested. The age 60 rule represents the FAA’s best determination of the time when 

a general decline in health-related functions and overall cognitive and performance 

capabilities may begin and reach a level where a pilot’s judgement and physical 

ability may begin to decline and therefore jeopardize safety. Our rule means that 

a pilot who reaches age 60 must leave part 121 operations, but it does not mean 

that he or she can no longer play an important a role in aviation. Many pilots continue to work for part 121 airlines in the screening, recruitment and training of 

pilot applicants, or fly in non-part 121 operations, or become flight instructors, or, 

fortunately for us, work as safety inspectors for the FAA. 

Since its adoption in 1959, the FAA has reviewed the age 60 rule several times 

to determine whether new and sufficient evidence exists to warrant a reconsideration of the regulation. The last completed review included a 2-day public meeting, 

held during September 1993. FAA, assisted by an independent research company, 

Hilton Systems, reviewed over 4,000 comments, which made assertions and expressed opinions but did not provide the FAA with additional facts or analyses sufficient to support changing the rule. More recently, the Senate Appropriations Committee last year requested the FAA to study and provide data regarding relative accident rates based on pilot age. We are conducting that data review now. 

I must emphasize that before making any change to a safety rule, the FAA must 

be satisfied that the regulation will maintain or raise the current level of safety. 

What is clear to us from reviewing public comments and relevant literature concerning the age 60 rule is that there is no ‘‘right answer.’’ The question for the FAA 

is one of public safety and determining acceptable risk. At this time, the FAA cannot be assured that changing the age 60 rule will maintain or raise the level of safety. 

Finally, some have argued that the FAA’s proposed changes to the rules governing 

pilot flight time and rest requirements, published in a 1995 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), may have an adverse affect on the hiring pool for pilots. The 

NPRM generated voluminous public comment and required further study and analysis, and is currently being revised by the FAA. We believe that the NPRM will not 

decrease the number of qualified pilots. The proposed rule, however, would establish 

the maximum number of hours that a pilot can be kept on duty each day. It would 

also require that a pilot be provided minimum rest period in every 24 hours. AdmitVerDate Apr 24 2002 09:27 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 086337 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\86337.TXT SCOM1 PsN: CAROLT
16

tedly, the net effect of these proposed changes may be an increase in the number 

of pilots required to support today’s airline schedules. 

The FAA estimated that the NPRM would, if implemented, impose increased labor 

costs on the airline industry, but would also result in some cost savings as well. The 

airline industry disagreed with those estimates and commented that cost would be 

much higher and any cost savings would be only a fraction of what the FAA estimated. The principal difference between the FAA and industry estimates is associated with the issue of how many pilots would be needed under the NPRM. We are 

taking into account these and all other comments associated with the proposal, as 

well as the latest science available on human fatigue and rest, in developing our 

revised rule. 

Mr. Chairman, the FAA will develop regulations in the context of what is best 

for public safety, whether that is setting standards to combat pilot fatigue or determining the best age for retirement of commercial pilots. While economic factors are 

certainly a part of that calculation, I am sure the Committee and our colleagues in 

industry would agree that safety must be the priority. 

That concludes my prepared remarks. I would be happy to answer any questions 

the Committee may have.

Senator GORTON. Fine. Thank you. 

Captain Woerth. 

STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN DUANE E. WOERTH, PRESIDENT,

AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL 

Captain WOERTH. Thank you. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. I 

am Duane Woerth, president of the Air Line Pilots Association 

International. ALPA represents the special interest of 55,000 pilots 

who fly for 51 airlines in the United States and Canada, and I appreciate the invitation to appear before the Subcommittee today to 

represent ALPA’s views on the various issues being addressed in 

this hearing. 

These issues are extremely critical to our union, our entire membership, and the safety and convenience of the air-traveling public. 

It is our understanding that the premise of the hearing is that a 

critical shortage of airline pilots in the United States is having an 

adverse effect on air service in rural areas such as Alaska and 

parts of the upper Midwest, and that changes to certain air safety 

regulations and labor-management contractual provisions might alleviate this shortage. 

Now, as a general rule, ALPA is opposed to proposals to relax air 

safety rules for economic purposes, and we are naturally concerned 

about congressional or regulatory interference in legitimate collective bargaining matters. At the outset, however, I would like to 

make a few general comments about the premise of this hearing, 

a pilot shortage. 

I would prefer to characterize the situation as the difficulties 

that some air carriers serving rural areas are having in recruitment and retention of qualified pilots. The question is, what is 

causing this difficulty, and the answer is quite simple. Our Nation 

has been experiencing unprecedented economic growth for the past 

6 years, and the airline industry has been a major beneficiary of 

this prosperity. 

With the growth in air travel has come growth in airline employment, of course, including pilots. Qualified pilot applicants are 

gravitating to those carriers where wages and benefits and current 

opportunities are the most attractive. This is, of course, a natural 

phenomenon in a robust free market economy. 

17

* The information referred to was not available at the time this hearing went to press. 

However, as many airline pilots have personally experienced, the 

converse is also true. When the economy is stagnant or in recession, pilots face layoffs and are forced to seek lower paying jobs 

that are often not flying jobs. Just a couple of years ago, American 

Airlines had 500 pilots on involuntary layoff status. Delta had 700 

pilots on layoff status. US Airways just recently began hiring pilots 

after 9 years of not hiring a single pilot. 

Just a few years ago, some of the small regional airlines were 

able to attract pilots even though entry-level wages were so low 

that they qualified for government financial assistance, and even 

though new hires were required to pay for their own training, costing thousands of dollars. Today, these airlines are not able to attract pilots on those terms, but that does not translate into a pilot 

shortage. 

The bottom line, pilots, like any other employment applicant in 

the current economic environment, have the luxury of being more 

selective in choosing a job. If, as has been suggested, some carriers 

are having difficulty finding qualified pilots to meet this hiring demand, and if this is determined to be a long-term problem, I would 

call your attention to the recommendations contained in the August 

1993 DOT blue ribbon panel entitled, Pilots and Aviation Maintenance Technicians for the 21st Century, an Assessment of Availability and Quality. This was a report that was done, as you are 

quite aware, as a meaningful approach to addressing this concern. 

Incidentally, virtually no action has been taken on any of the 

constructive proposals and recommendations in this report, and 

that is 7 years old. I will provide the Subcommittee with a copy of 

this report if you would like to, sir. 

Senator GORTON. It will be included as part of the record.* 

Captain WOERTH. Thank you, sir. 

Let me now turn to one specific proposal offered as a remedy to 

this alleged pilot shortage. S. 1855, introduced last fall by Senator 

Murkowski, would increase the mandatory retirement age for air 

carrier pilots from 60 to 65. The theory of this legislation is that 

pilots who must now retire at age 60, especially those who fly for 

regional airlines, would be able to continue flying, thereby relieving 

the pilot shortage in Alaska and sparsely populated areas in the 

country. 

While the alleged justification for the legislation is to address the 

perceived regional economic problem, the argument for it challenges the efficacy of the regulation itself as applied to pilots on a 

national basis. ALPA is opposed to this legislation for two basic 

reasons. First, everyone, not just pilots, should be opposed to the 

relaxation of a safety rule for an economic purpose, and second, the 

so-called age 60 rule is justified on its merits as a sound and effective air safety regulation. 

The age 60 rule is based on two fundamental principles of medical science that are indisputable. First, the risk of incapacitation 

and unacceptable decrements in performance increase with age. 

Second, medical science has not developed a regimen of reliable 

and FAA-certified tests that can be administered effectively to 

18

identify those aging pilots who are or will become incapacitated, or 

whose performance will decline to an unacceptable level. 

The issues surrounding the regulation have been studied as thoroughly as any medical matter affecting pilots, and after two decades of comprehensive studies and exhaustive review, these two 

principles are still a valid underlying basis for the rule. Therefore, 

ALPA’s position is firm. The age 60 rule is a well-established safety 

regulation, substantiated by medical science, and reaffirmed repeatedly by the FAA, and worked effectively for over 40 years. 

The justification for the rule is not now, or never has been to enhance the careers of pilots who want to move up the seniority list 

faster, and it should not be changed for the sake of those who want 

to continue flying longer, nor should it be used as a regulator of 

the pilot supply pool for regional economic purposes. 

The age 60 rule is a safety regulation, and should not be changed 

or repealed unless there is sufficient evidence to prove conclusively 

that such action would not have a negative effect on safety. In 

ALPA’s view that case has never been made. 

The Subcommittee has also raised the issue of a possible effect 

of flight time and duty time regulations, particularly the reserve 

rest requirements, on availability of pilots on the regional side of 

the industry. With your permission, I would submit a more comprehensive statement for the record on the topic of pilot fatigue, 

and the critical need for flight and duty time regulations. 

Senator GORTON. We will be happy to have that submission. 

Captain WOERTH. Thank you, Senator Gorton. 

[The prepared statement of Captain Woerth follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN DUANE E. WOERTH,

PRESIDENT, AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL

Good afternoon Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee. I am Duane 

Woerth, President of the Air Line Pilots Association, International (ALPA). ALPA 

represents the professional interests of 55,000 pilots who fly for 51 airlines in the 

United States and Canada. I appreciate the invitation to appear before the Subcommittee today to present ALPA’s views on the various issues being addressed in 

this hearing. These issues are extremely critical to our union and our entire membership, and they are important to the safety and convenience of the air traveling 

public as well. 

It is our understanding that the premise of this hearing is that a ‘‘critical’’ shortage of airline pilots in the United States is having an adverse effect on air service 

in rural areas such as Alaska and parts of the upper Midwest, and that changes 

to certain air safety regulations and labor/management contractual provisions might 

alleviate this shortage. As a general rule, ALPA is opposed to proposals to relax air 

safety rules for economic purposes, and we are naturally concerned about congressional or regulatory interference in legitimate collective bargaining matters. At the 

outset, however, I would like to make a few general comments about the premise 

of this hearing—pilot shortage. 

Without directly challenging the notion that there is a ‘‘critical’’ pilot shortage affecting rural air service, I would prefer to characterize the situation as the difficulty 

that some air carriers serving rural areas are having in the recruitment and retention of qualified pilots. The question is: What is causing this difficulty? The answer 

is quite simple. Our nation has been experiencing unprecedented economic growth 

for the past 6 years, and the airline industry has been a major beneficiary of this 

prosperity. With the growth in air travel, has come growth in airline employment, 

including pilots, and qualified pilot applicants are gravitating to those carriers 

where wages, benefits, and career opportunities are the most attractive. Some of 

them are leaving jobs in the commuter airline industry and accepting higher-paying 

positions with the major carriers. This is a natural phenomenon in a robust free 

market economy. 

19

However, as many airline pilots have personally experienced, the converse is also 

true. When the economy is stagnant or in a recession, pilots face lay-offs and are 

forced to seek lower-paying jobs, often non-flying jobs. Just a few years ago, commuter airlines were able to attract pilots even though entry-level wages were so low 

that they qualified for government financial assistance, and even though new-hires 

were required to pay thousands of dollars to cover their training costs. Today, these 

airlines are not able to attract pilots on those terms, but that doesn’t translate into 

a pilot shortage. The bottom line—pilots, like any other employment applicants in 

the current economic environment, have the luxury of being more selective in choosing a job. 

Recently, Aviation Information Resources, Inc. (AIR Inc), an Atlanta firm that 

studies various trends in the commercial airline industry, projected that there will 

be over 19,000 pilots hired this year. If, as suggested, carriers are having difficulty 

finding qualified pilots to meet this hiring demand, and if this is determined to be 

a long-term problem, I would call your attention to the recommendations contained 

in the August, 1993, DOT Blue Ribbon Panel Report entitled, ‘‘Pilots and Aviation 

Maintenance Technicians for the 21st Century—An Assessment of Availability and 

Quality’’, as a meaningful approach to addressing this concern. As a matter of fact, 

your full Committee Chairman, Senator John McCain, provided the impetus for this 

study back in 1989, as a member of the Manpower and Personnel Subcommittee of 

the Senate Armed Services Committee as well as a Member of this Subcommittee 

on Aviation. I will provide the Subcommittee with a copy of this report for your review. 

Mandatory Retirement Age—Age 60 Rule 

Let me now turn to one specific proposal that has been offered as a remedy for 

this alleged pilot shortage. S.1855, introduced last fall by Senator Frank Murkowski 

(R–AK), would increase the mandatory retirement age for air carrier pilots from 60 

to 65. The theory of this legislation is that pilots who must now retire at age 60, 

especially those who fly for regional airlines, would be able to continue flying, thereby relieving the pilot shortage in Alaska and other sparsely populated areas of the 

country. While the alleged justification for the legislation is to address a perceived 

regional economic problem, the argument for it challenges the efficacy of the regulation itself as it applies to pilots on a national basis. ALPA is opposed to this legislation for two basic reasons. First, everyone—not just pilots—should be opposed to the 

relaxation of a safety rule for an economic purpose. And second, the so-called Age 

60 Rule is justified on its merits as a sound and effective air safety regulation. The 

first reason should be self-explanatory and widely accepted; the second has been the 

subject of considerable debate. 

The Age 60 Rule is based on two fundamental principles of medical science that 

are indisputable. First, the risks of incapacitation and unacceptable decrements in 

performance increase with age. Second, medical science has not developed a regimen 

of reliable tests that can be administered effectively to identify those aging pilots 

who are, or will become, incapacitated, or whose performance will decline to an unacceptable level. The issues surrounding the regulation have been studied as thoroughly as any aeromedical matter affecting pilots, and after two decades of comprehensive studies and exhaustive review, these two principles are still valid as the 

underlying basis for the Rule. 

In late 1979, the House of Representatives rejected a proposal to relax the Rule, 

and directed the National Institutes of Health to conduct a study to determine if 

there was sufficient medical evidence to support it. In August of 1981, the National 

Institute of Aging Review Panel on the Experienced Pilots Study that was responsible for reviewing the study and submitting a report to Congress concluded: ‘‘The 

Panel attaches no special medical significance to age 60 as a mandatory age for retirement of airline pilots. It finds, however, that age-related changes in health and 

performance influence adversely the ability of increasing numbers of individuals to 

perform as pilots with the highest level of safety and, consequently, endanger the 

safety of the aviation system as a whole. Moreover, the Panel could not identify the 

existence of a medical or performance appraisal system that can single out those 

pilots who would pose the greatest hazard because of early or impending deterioration in health or performance.’’

Following completion of the NIA review, the Rule was contested in Federal Court 

and reconsidered by the FAA. In 1989, in response to a directive by the U. S. Court 

of Appeals for the 7th Circuit, the FAA reviewed the evidence and reaffirmed its 

support of the Rule. In the decision, the FAA’s Director of Flight Standards stated: 

‘‘Based upon all of the studies discussed, we conclude that an older pilot’s edge in 

experience does not offset the undetected physical infirmities associated with the 

aging process. Notwithstanding that most pilots who are approaching or have 

20

passed age 60 report that their health is excellent and they do not experience any 

physical or cognitive limitations which would prevent them from continuing their 

flying career, the research of aging indicates that there is often a sharp decline in 

physical and cognitive performance after age 60. . . . There is substantial scientific 

evidence which indicates that the greater experience of the pilots who have reached 

or passed age 60 does not outweigh the increased risk of incapacitation or skill deterioration which accompanies seniority.’’

Since 1994, the FAA itself has sponsored at least five studies on issues related 

to the Rule (see Appendix). The most comprehensive consideration of the Rule by 

the FAA occurred between 1993 and 1995. In late 1990, the FAA initiated a statistical study on the relationship between pilot age and accident rates. Following the 

release of the so-called Hilton Study in March 1993, the FAA convened a public 

meeting in September to solicit comments on the study and the Age 60 Rule in general. Two years later, in December of 1995, the FAA concluded an exhaustive rulemaking proceeding, commonly known as the ‘‘one level of safety’’ review, in which 

the safety regulations governing the commuter airlines (Part 135) were harmonized 

with the major carrier regulations (Part 121). One component of that review and 

subsequent order was a reaffirmation of the Age 60 Rule and the application of it 

to the commuter airlines. Recognizing that this change might pose a hardship for 

some commuter pilots and operators, the FAA granted a 4-year phase-in of the new 

rule. At the time of the order, the FAA estimated that there were approximately 

8,000 pilots in the commuter category, and of those, approximately 200 were over 

60 years of age. The grace period expired on December 20, 1999, at which time those 

pilots who were over 60 years of age were required to retire. During this same time 

frame (1993–1995), the FAA considered and denied a petition for rulemaking to repeal the Rule that was filed by a group of pilots, both active and retired, who have 

been fighting it for years. 

ALPA’s position is firm—the Age 60 Rule is a well-established safety regulation 

that has been substantiated by medical science, has been reaffirmed repeatedly by 

the FAA, and has worked effectively for over 40 years. The justification for the Rule 

is not now and never has been to enhance the careers of pilots who want to move 

up the seniority list faster and it should not be changed for the sake of those who 

want to continue flying longer. Nor should it be used as a regulator of the pilot supply pool for regional economic purposes. The Age 60 Rule is a safety regulation and 

should not be changed or repealed unless there is sufficient evidence to prove conclusively that such action would not have a negative effect on safety. In ALPA’s 

view, that case has never been made. 

Flight and Duty Time Regulations and Reserve Rest Requirements 

The Subcommittee has also raised the issue of the possible effect of flight and 

duty time regulations, particularly the ‘‘reserve rest’’ requirements, on the availability of pilots on the regional side of the industry. With your permission, I will 

submit a more comprehensive statement for the record on the topic of pilot fatigue 

and the critical need for changes in the flight and duty time regulations. I would 

simply add here that, despite the fact that in 1995 the FAA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking to revise these outdated regulations, it has been almost 5 years 

now and we still do not have a final resolution of this important safety issue. Virtually everyone in the industry and in the scientific community, as well as the 

NTSB and NASA, agrees that new regulations are necessary, and we once again 

would implore the FAA to take immediate action. 

On ‘‘reserve rest’’, the FAA last December, began to enforce its rules requiring 

that domestic pilots assigned to reserve duty receive appropriate minimum rest before accepting a flight assignment. It is our understanding that, contrary to the dire 

predictions of the airlines, this rule was implemented without any disruption to 

flight schedules and at minimal cost. ALPA applauds the FAA for this action, but 

it needs to do more. We believe that the flight and duty time regulations must be 

revised to take into consideration modern science and to provide maximum hours 

of service that will ensure that pilots are not pushed to fly beyond demonstrated 

levels of safety. 

Pilot Scope Clauses and Regional Jets 

Finally, some have alleged that scope clauses in our pilots’ collective bargaining 

agreements are impeding the ability of carriers to deploy so-called ‘‘regional jets’’ in 

small, underserved markets. We submit that is clearly not the case. In our view, 

pure economics—not pilot scope clause—is driving where and with what frequency 

these jets are being used, and will be used in the future. Frankly, ALPA believes 

that the term ‘‘regional jet’’ is a misnomer because these airplanes are not being 

operated exclusively in regional markets. We prefer to call them ‘‘small’’ jets because 

21

they are simply smaller gauge, turbine-powered aircraft that are being used by the 

carriers with greater frequency in markets of various sizes to attract more high-end 

business travel, generate profits and benefit the bottom line. 

In January, I participated on a panel on labor and employment issues at the annual ABA Forum on Air and Space Law, and presented a paper on the subject of 

pilot scope clauses and RJ’s. With your permission, I will include a copy of this 

paper with my testimony. I might also mention that the General Accounting Office 

is currently engaged in a study of the ‘‘regional jet’’ phenomenon, and I would encourage the Subcommittee to look forward to GAO’s report as an objective analysis 

of this subject. 

This concludes my statement, and I would be pleased to answer your questions. 

Appendix 

Ramon Miller, James Becker, Peter Lambrou, The Effects of Age and Practice on 

Aviation-Relevant Concurrent Task Performance (1999) (DOT/FAA/AM-99/22); Robert Besco, Satya Sangal, Thomas Nesthus, Stephen Veonneau, A Longevity and Survival Analysis for a Cohort of Retired Airline Pilots (1995) (DOT/FAA/AM-95/5); D.T. 

Hyland, E.J. Kay, J.D. Deimler, E.B. Gurman, Age 60 Study, Part II: Airline Pilot 

Age and Performance—A Review of the Scientific Literature (1994) (DOT/FAA/AM94/21); E.J. Kay, D.J. H.illman, D.T. Hyland, R.S. Voros, R.M. Harris, J.D. Deimler, 

Age 60 Study, Part Ill: Consolidated Database Experiments Final Report(1994) 

(DOT/FAA/AM-94/22); D.T. Hyland, E.J. Kay, J.D. Deimler, Age 60 Study, Part IV: 

Experimental Evaluation of Pilot Performance (1994) (DOT/FAA/AM-94/23). See also

Michael Heil, An Investigation of the Relationship Between Chronological Age and 

Indicators of Job Performance for Incumbent Air Traffic Control Specialists (1999) 

(DOT/FAA/AM-99/ 18).

Senator GORTON. Captain Emens. Emens, is that correct? 

STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN PAUL EMENS, CHAIRMAN,

PILOTS AGAINST AGE DISCRIMINATION 

Captain EMENS. Emens. 

Senator GORTON. Emens. 

Captain EMENS. Close enough, Senator. 

Good afternoon, Senators. My name is Paul Emens, and I am 

chairman of the Pilots Against Age Discrimination, PAAD. seated 

behind me in the audience are Captains Nancy Bruce, Ron 

Richmeyer, and Barry Barrell of PAAD, Captain Steve Jacques of 

ALPA Pilots Against Age 60, APAAS, Captain Ed Moon, from the 

Organization of Black Airline Pilots, who is opposed to the age 60 

rule, and Dr. Robin Wilkening, chief resident of occupational medicine at Johns Hopkins University. We would all welcome any questions that you have at the close of these presentations. 

PAAD represents all pilots who believe that the age 60 rule is 

age discrimination, that the age 60 rule should be changed, and 

that doing so will not only reduce the Nation’s critical shortage of 

pilots, but will dramatically increase experience levels, thus improve safety. 

I am 51 years old. My father flew for Pan American World Airways. I mention my father because he walked these same halls as 

a member and officer of ALPA, trying to overturn the discriminatory and arbitrary age 60 rule just as I am now doing. This was 

30 years ago. Today, ALPA is my opponent. 

The purpose of this hearing is to examine the issue of pilot shortage, and there is a pilot shortage. Not only are there fewer numbers of pilots to fill the needs of air carriers and provide for the 

needs of Alaska and other underserved States, there is a critical 

shortfall in experienced pilots Nation-wide. This hazardous situation is an immediate problem for your constituents, your families, 

and every passenger in every State. 

22

ALPA agrees. In May 1998, ALPA published an article that said 

in part, quote, large numbers of captains will be retiring from most 

U.S. carriers and, indeed, European ones as well, at the turn of the 

century and soon after. This will cause the majors to hire a further 

mass of new pilots in a relatively short period of time. 

The effects on the air transportation system could be disastrous, 

as a sudden surge of poor-caliber pilots is dragged from the bottom 

of the system, perhaps all the way to the majors. The real loses will 

be the air taxi and regional operators that must fly their aircraft 

with the pilots the majors cannot attract. 

In fact, Senators, the real losers are the passengers of your 

States, whose lives are placed at risk by pilot inexperience. Currently, it is not uncommon for pilots to be hired straight out of 

aviation colleges and into the first officer’s seat of a regional airliner. Within a year, these novices can be promoted to captain. Inexperienced pilots make three times as many critical errors as 

more experienced pilots. A pilot with but 1 year of line flying experience, coupled with a co-pilot straight out of flight school, is a recipe for disaster in commercial aviation. 

Some regional carriers have turnover rates as high as 100 percent annually, as pilots move on to fill slots opened by expansion 

and vacated by an increasing volume of age-driven retirements. 

In the mid-1990’s the FAA elected to apply the age 60 rule to regional carrier pilots, who for decades have been transporting the 

citizens of your States without a single age-related incident. Pilots 

who were 60 at the time the one level of safety program went into 

effect were given a grace period. The last of this group of pilots was 

grounded at the age of 71 at the end of 1999, again without a single age-related incident. 

During that period of time, this group of highly skilled and experienced pilots demonstrated beyond question the safety record that 

has been validated in study after study. Older, experienced pilots 

are as safe as or safer than younger pilots. 

The FAA’s own study, bought and paid for by the FAA, known 

as the Hilton study, said, and I quote, accidents decreased with 

age, leveling off for older pilots. Our analysis provided no support 

for the hypothesis that the pilots of scheduled air carriers had increased accident rates as they neared the age of 60. Most of the 

analysis indicated a slight downward trend in accident rates with 

age, end quote. 

The most experienced pilots, those over 60, have been removed 

from the ranks in order to make room for pilots with minimal flight 

time and little other school experience. I ask you, is this the pilot 

you want for your family’s next flight? 

ALPA would like you to believe that the age 60 rule is about 

safety. They would have you believe that anyone 60 and above suffers, as one ALPA letter on Capitol Hill said, quote, unacceptable 

decrements in performance, end quote. This is ridiculous. A pilot is 

not incompetent with the passage of 24 hours, and yet this is precisely the way commercial airline pilots are treated. 

The age 60 rule, rather, is about economics. Pilots want to advance up the seniority and pay ladder as quickly as possible. In the 

late 1970’s, a younger and more junior group of pilots gained control of ALPA. A former ALPA president, Hank Duffy, in court testiVerDate Apr 24 2002 09:27 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 086337 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\86337.TXT SCOM1 PsN: CAROLT
23

mony said, quote, pilots over age 55 comprise only 5 to 6 percent 

of the total membership. The other 95 percent selfishly view the 

forced retirement of older pilots as their guaranteed path and a 

God-given right to their own early promotion, end quote. 

How ironic. It was ALPA that fought for and won the right of 60-

year-old pilots to keep their jobs in 1959, the year the age 60 rule 

came into being. It is now ALPA who champions the discriminatory 

retirement of our Nation’s most experienced pilots. 

Another economic issue concerns a special tax provision that protects a pilot mandated to retire at the age of 60 from taking an onerous pension cut. A summary solution is included in your information packets. This can be fixed. 

Federal air surgeon Dr. Frank Austin knew the truth when he 

wrote, quote, there is no basis for the age 60 rule. I believe this, 

and Admiral Engen, the FAA Administrator at the time, believes 

this. It is an economic issue, end quote. 

ALPA sits here today as a powerful advocate of the age 60 rule. 

Congress can change this. First, recognize that there is, indeed, a 

pilot shortage. It affects every Senator and every Representative 

because it affects every citizen who flies or who has a family member who does so. 

What Senator Murkowski’s bill does is give working commercial 

pilots more years of productive careers. In a perfect world, I would 

say there should not be an age. It should be test-driven. But this 

is not a perfect world, and as 44 other countries have already done, 

already raised the rule to 65, 65 is a good first step. 

Changing the rule, in a time of stress due to shortages of pilot 

numbers and experience, gives us time to address the issue properly, time to initiate and fund pilot-training programs, and time to 

study a group of dedicated, experienced, and highly skilled pilots 

over the age of 60 who are permitted to continue in the work they 

are supremely qualified to do. 

There is no question that the evaluation of this group of older pilots will show what those other 44 industrialized nations already 

know and have put into daily practice. There is no rational or defensible basis for the mandatory retirement of pilots at the age of 

60. 

Senator John McCain said on July 17, 1996, before the Senate 

Commerce, Science, & Transportation Committee the following: 

Quote, this administration has been critical, and rightfully so, 

about the inexperience of flight crews in commercial air carrier 

cockpits. One obvious way to increase the experience levels of cockpit crews would be to increase the discriminatory maximum age for 

pilots which is limited by the age 60 rule. However, when the administration recently issued a notice of proposed rulemaking for 

flight and duty time, the strong lobbying effort of the pilot unions 

kept the age 60 rule intact, a position that reportedly is at odds 

with the FAA Administrator’s own position on whether to change 

the rule. I hope the FAA and DOT will work with Congress to significantly change this way of operating, end quote. 

Senator McCain hit the nail on the head a full 4 years ago. We 

have lost the luxury of getting ahead on this problem. Alaska feels 

its impact today, and every State in this country may feel it in the 

near future. The shortage is here, now, as the most experienced piVerDate Apr 24 2002 09:27 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 086337 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\86337.TXT SCOM1 PsN: CAROLT
24

lots are forced prematurely from their cockpits against their will. 

It is time the FAA listens and acts. Maintaining the status quo because it is awkward for some parties is unacceptable. To provide 

for a more experienced work force, and to end discrimination in the 

commercial airline industry, it is time to address the age 60 rule. 

Let me end with the motto of the Air Force’s 89th Airlift Wing, 

which flies the President and other top government officials on Air 

Force One. Experto Crede—trust one who has experience. Your 

constituents deserve any less. 

[The prepared statement of Captain Emens follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN PAUL EMENS,

CHAIRMAN, PILOTS AGAINST AGE DISCRIMINATION

Good afternoon, Senators. My name is Paul Emens and I am Chairman of the 

group known as Pilots Against Age Discrimination (PAAD). Seated with me are 

Captain Nancy Bruce, Captain Ron Richtsmeier, and Dr. Robin Wilkening. PAAD 

represents all pilots who believe that the Age 60 Rule is age discrimination, that 

the Age 60 Rule should be changed, and that changing it will not only reduce the 

nation’s critical shortage of pilots but will dramatically increase the level of experience brought to commercial aviation. 

I am 51 years old. My father’s career was with Pan American World Airways. 

I mention my father because he walked these same halls, as a member and officer 

of ALPA, trying to overturn—the discriminatory and arbitrary Age 60 Rule . . . just 

as I am now doing. Today, ALPA is my opponent. 

The purpose of this hearing is to examine the issue of pilot shortage. And there 

IS a pilot shortage. Not only are there fewer numbers of pilots to fill the needs of 

air carriers—and provide for the needs of Alaska and other underserved states—

there is a critical shortfall in experienced pilots nationwide. This hazardous situation is an immediate problem for your constituents, your families, and every passenger in every state.

ALPA agrees. In May 1998 ALPA published an article that said, in part:

‘‘. . . Large numbers of Captains will be retiring from most US carriers, 

and indeed European ones as well, at the turn of the century and soon 

after. This will cause the majors to hire a further mass of new pilots in 

a relatively short period of time. The effects on the air transportation 

system could be disastrous as a sudden surge of poor-caliber pilots is 

dragged from the bottom of the system, perhaps all the way to the majors. The real losers will be the air-taxi and regional operators that must 

fly their aircraft with the pilots the majors cannot attract.’’

In fact, Senators, the real losers are the passengers of your state whose lives are 

placed at risk by pilot inexperience. Currently it is not uncommon for pilots to be 

hired straight out of aviation colleges and into the First Officer’s seat of a regional 

airliner. Within a year these novices can be promoted to Captain. Inexperienced pilots make three times as many critical errors as more experienced pilots. A pilot 

with but one year of line-flying experience coupled with a co-pilot straight out of 

flight school is a recipe for disaster in commercial aviation. . Some regional carriers 

have turnover rates as high as 80 percent annually as pilots move on to fill slots 

opened by expansion and vacated by an increasing volume of age-driven retirements. In the mid-1990’s the FAA elected to apply the Age 60 Rule to regional carrier pilots, who for decades had been transporting the citizens of your states without 

a single age-related safety problem. Pilots who were 60 at the time the One Level 

of Safety program went into effect were given a grace period. The last of this group 

of pilots was grounded at age 65 this year, again without a single age-related incident. During that period of time this group of highly-skilled and experienced pilots 

demonstrated beyond question the safety record that has been validated in study 

after study: older, experienced pilots are as safe as or safer than younger pilots.

The FAA’s own study, known as the Hilton Study, ‘‘accidents decreased with 

age, leveling off for older pilots’’ . . . ‘‘Our analyses provided no support for 

the hypotheses that the pilots of scheduled air carriers had increased accident rates as they neared the age of 60. Most of the analyses indicated a 

slight downward trend [in accident rates] with age.’’

25

The most experienced pilots—those over 60—have been removed from the ranks 

in order to make room for pilots with minimal flight time and little other than 

school experience. Is this the pilot you want for your family’s next flight? 

ALPA would like you to believe that the Age 60 Rule is about safety. It isn’t. It’s 

about economics. Pilots want to advance up the seniority and pay ladder . In the 

late 1970’s a younger and more junior group of pilots gained control of ALPA. A 

former ALPA President, Hank Duffy observed, ‘‘Pilots over age 55 comprise only 

5–6 percent of the total membership. The other 95 percent selfishly view 

the forced retirement of older pilots as their guaranteed path and a Godgiven right to their own early promotion.’’ How ironic! It was ALPA who fought 

for and won the right of 60-year-old pilots to keep their jobs in 1959, the year the 

Age 60 Rule came into being. It is now ALPA who champions the discriminatory 

retirement of the nation’s most experienced pilots. 

Another economic issue concerns a special tax provision that protects a pilot mandated to retire at the age of 60 from taking an onerous pension cut. 

Federal Air Surgeon Dr. Frank Austin knew the truth: ‘‘There is no basis for 

the Age 60 Rule. I believe this and Admiral Engen [the FAA Administrator] 

believes this . . . . It’s an economic issue.’’

ALPA sits here today as a powerful advocate of the Age 60 Rule. 

Congress can change all this. 

Recognize that there is indeed a pilot shortage. It affects every Senator and every 

Representative because it affects every citizen who flies. What Senator Murkowski’s 

bill does is give working commercial pilots more years of productive careers. In a 

time of stress due to shortages of pilot numbers and experience, his bill gives us 

time to address the issue properly: time to initiate and fund pilot training programs, 

and time to study a group of dedicated, experienced, and highly-skilled pilots over 

the age of 60 who are permitted to continue in the work they are supremely qualified to do. There is no question that the evaluation of this group of older pilots will 

show what other industrialized nations already know and have put into daily practice: there is no rational or defensible basis for the mandatory retirement of pilots 

at age 60. 

I would like to close with Senator John McCain’s statement of July 17, 1996 given 

before the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee: 

‘‘This administration has been critical, and rightfully so, about the inexperience of flight crews in commercial air carrier cockpits. One obvious 

way to increase the experience levels of cockpit crews would be to increase 

the discriminatory maximum age for pilots, which is limited by the ‘‘age 60 

rule’’. However, when the Administration recently issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for flight and duty time, the strong lobbying effort of 

the pilot unions kept the age 60 rule intact—a position that reportedly is 

at odds with the FAA Administrator’s own position on whether to change 

the rule. I hope the FAA and DOT will work with Congress to significantly 

change this way of operating.’’

Senator McCain hit the nail on the head a full 4 years ago. We have lost the luxury of getting ahead of this problem. Alaska feels its impact today and every state 

in this country will feel it in the near future. The shortage is here, now, as the most 

experienced pilots are forced prematurely from their cockpits against their will. It’s 

time the FAA listens—and acts. Maintaining the status quo because it is awkward 

for some parties is clearly unacceptable. 

To provide for a more experienced workforce and to end age discrimination in the 

commercial airline industry it is time to address the Age 60 Rule. Now. 

Alpa Pilots Against Age Sixty 

APAAS is an organization composed of ALPA pilots, retired ALPA pilots, and associate members, who believe that the ‘‘Age 60 Rule’’ is unfair, and should be 

changed. 

APAAS members believe that there are solutions available that would allow the 

rule to be changed, and satisfy the concerns of the majority of ALPA members. 

APAAS members believe that every pilot should have the right to retire at 60 

(with no degradation of retirement benefits), if he or she so desires. 

APAAS members believe that every pilot should have the right to work BEYOND 

60, if he or she so desires. 

APAAS members believe in the continued quick pace of upgrades for all ALPA 

pilots. 

26

APAAS members believe that if ALPA members work together, there is absolutely no doubt that we can change the ‘‘Age 60 Rule’’ so that the majority’s concerns will be addressed and fulfilled. 

If you would like to join our efforts, or simply would like more information about 

our modest goals, please contact the APAAS member listed below, or visit our web 

site. 

Stephen G. (Steve) Jacques 

UAL 727 Pilot Instructor 

Web site—www.apaas.org

PREPARED STATEMENT OF STEPHEN G. JACQUES IN SUPPORT OF SENATE BILL 1855

Good afternoon, Senators. My name is Stephen Jacques and I am co-founder of 

the group known as Alpa Pilots Against Age Sixty (APAAS). [Although I am not on 

the agenda to speak to you this afternoon,] I thought it imperative to relay important information with regard to a segment of the ALPA membership, and how they 

feel about SB 1855. [Therefore, I have prepared this presentation for you.] 

APAAS is a pure grass roots organization, which has sprung up within the greater ALPA organization. APAAS members currently represent 18 ALPA airlines. The 

ALPA leadership does not recognize APAAS, or our singular goal, which is to overturn FAR 121.383c (age 60 rule). Indeed, this singular goal of ours runs directly contrary to the wishes of the ALPA leadership, and to the ALPA PAC. 

I wear the ALPA pin on my tie today, and every day that I fly because I believe 

in what ALPA stands for and what ALPA has accomplished for aviation. However, 

I wholeheartedly disagree with my Association with regard to the stand that it has 

taken on the age 60 rule. It is my belief, and that of the APAAS membership, that 

ALPA is supporting the age 60 rule for the sole purpose of political expediency, and 

not for safety, as the ALPA leadership has stated time and time again. 

I will not reiterate the examples given by my esteemed colleague, Captain Paul 

Emens, which clearly show that changing the age 60 rule will enhance safety, not 

degrade safety as the ALPA leadership has so strenuously stated time and time 

again. I will not reiterate more examples that indicate a critical pilot shortage is 

already impacting safety in our skies. And I will not quote additional paragraphs 

of the Hilton Study, which clearly show that turning 60 does not make someone a 

‘‘basket case’’. I would, however like to make 3 additional points. 

ALPA does not represent all of its members when it continually flexes its political 

muscle to stop Congress from changing an outmoded rule from the 50’s. ALPA has 

traditionally been an Association for change; a change for safety, a change for the 

better. ALPA is, however ‘‘stuck’’, with its tire spinning in the mud of the past, on 

this issue. It is time for Captain Duane E. Woerth (president of ALPA), and the 

ALPA Board of Directors to extricate the Association from this quagmire, and get 

back on the road to the 21st Century. 

Furthermore ALPA, in my opinion, is a party to blatant age discrimination. I have 

a copy of a letter from Mr. Tony Gallegos, Chairman of the US Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission in 1993, to the Office of the Chief Council of the Federal 

Aviation Administration, dated October 14, 1993. The letter states in part ‘‘In sum, 

the Age 60 rule should be lifted by the FAA. Medical and proficiency tests on an 

individual basis arc effective and non-discriminatory ways to assure that commercial pilots maintain the highest standards of safety at all ages’’. Since ALPA has 

lobbied so hard and spent so many PAC dollars over such a long span of years to 

help the FAA keep the age 60 rule in place, it becomes obvious that ALPA has had 

no respect for Commissioner Gallegos’ official opinion as the top US officer in the 

matter of discrimination, and has placed the good of the few over the good of the 

many in this particular matter. 

Finally, ALPA once championed the cause for change in an age 60-labor dispute. 

In 1959, when American Airlines pilots (once represented by ALPA) were forced to 

retire at 60, ALPA fought and won their return to the pilot’s seat. In a letter dated 

April 14, 1959, to Mr. C. R. Smith (then president of American Airlines) from then 

ALPA president Clarence M. Sayen, it was stated ‘‘These individuals should be returned to active duty in accordance with the same standards of physical fitness and 

technical proficiency as applied to other pilots, irrespective of age’’. One must wonder why if ALPA’s official stand was such in 1959, it has changed? With all the advances in medical health and more than 5 years additional life expectancy now than 

in 1959, why has ALPA changed it’s mind?

27

In closing, I ask the Members of the Committee to consider my points when reflecting on all the information gathered today. Please do not let ‘‘political expediency’’, and the ‘‘good of the few’’, dominate your decisions. 

Respectfully submitted, 

STEPHEN G. JACQUES, 

Co-founder APAAS, 

ALPA member in good standing, 

United Air Lines Pilot Instructor. 

Attachments:

• Letter from Mr. Tony E. Gallegos, EEOC Commissioner, to FAA Office of Chief 

Council, October 14, 1993

• Letter from Mr. Clarence M. Sayen, President of ALPA, to Mr. C. R. Smith, 

President of American Airlines, April 14, 1959

AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION

April 14, 1959

Mr. C. R. Smith, 

President, 

American Airlines, Inc., 

New York, NY.

Dear Mr. Smith:

Thank you for your letter of April 3, received April 6, 1959, in response to my 

correspondence of March 24 concerning the actions of the Company in connection 

with the case involving Messrs. Burns, Cutrell, and Rentz. 

Although I frankly do not understand why there should be any confusion in this 

problem, your letter demonstrates that sone still exists. The following, therefore, is 

an effort to clarify our position completely and bring this matter to a conclusion. 

You are correct that the neutral sitting with the System Board of Adjustment did 

not pass on the question of what constitutes a proper retirement age for air line 

pilots. He did., however, rule that there was no mandatory retirement at age 60 and 

that the Company could not unilaterally and arbitrarily establish such an age, and, 

therefore, the Company had acted wrongfully in attempting to force Messrs. Burns, 

Cutrell, and Rentz to retire at age 60. Our position, therefore, has been. very simple. 

The Company is required to abide by this decision and return these individuals to 

service under the same conditions which existed at the time the company attempted 

to retire them because they had attained age 60. 

In all of our conversations with you on this subject, we have explained, that our 

immediate interest was the Company’s compliance with the System Board of Adjustment decision. If individual pilots should subsequently resign from the Company on 

their own initiative and for whatever reason, this was their prerogative. We have 

noted. that you have made certain offers to these individual pilots in an effort to 

induce them to take such a course of action. This is your prerogative. However, you 

have no right to deny these pilots the rights to which they are entitled under your 

contract with this Association and the System Board award. 

We note with encouragement your decision to now return Captains Burns, 

Cutrell, and Rentz to active flying duty. Insofar as the understandings which you 

have stated are concerned, we do not see any great problem except we believe the 

following should be clearly understood:

1. These individuals should be returned to active duty in accordance with the sane 

standards of physical fitness and technical proficiency as applied. to all other 

pilots, irrespective of age.

2. It is the responsibility of the officials of the Federal Aviation Agency to certify 

as to the physical fitness and technical proficiency of all air line pilots, and we 

have no objection to their doing so in this instance subject to the conditions of 

Number 1 above.

We note your continued interest in the establishment of a mandatory retirement 

age. As indicated to you in our previous conversations, you have a number of alternatives available to you which you are at liberty to exercise if you desire. As we 

see it, they are the following:

1. You may serve a Section 6 notice of intended change in our contractual relations under the Railway Labor Act for the purpose of negotiating on this subject.

28

1 58 Fed. Reg. 21,336 (1993) and 58 Fed. Reg. 33,316 (1993). 

2The Commission’s longstanding interest in the Age 60 rule is demonstrated in public testimony, comments, and statements including: Testimony of Constance L. Dupre, Associate General Counsel, EEOC, Panel on the Experienced Pilots Study, National Institute on Aging, National Institutes of Health, May 27, 1981; EEOC’S Final Interpretations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 49 Fed. Reg. 47,724 (1981); EEOC Comments on the FAA’s 

Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking at 47 Fed. Reg. 29,784 (1982); Testimony of former 

EEOC Chairman Clarence Thomas before the House Select Committee on Aging, October 1985; 

August 12, 1986 letter from former EEOC Chairman Clarence Thomas to former FAA Administrator Donald Engen urging the FAA to grant a petition by 39 pilots for exemptions from the 

Age 60 Rule so they could participate in a controlled study envisioned by the National Institute 

of Aging panel. 

2. You may attempt to persuade the Federal Aviation Agency to establish a rule 

or regulation on this subject.

These are your prerogatives and you may exercise them as you see fit. 

We know that you are aware that the federal government has already established 

standards which must be met by all pilots relative to their physical fitness and their 

proficiency. All individuals must be examined at least every 6 months to determine 

whether such standards are being met. Any individual pilot in your employ must 

meet these standards regardless of his chronological age. 

We are hereby transmitting copies of your letter and this reply to Messrs. Burns, 

Cutrell, and Rentz and requesting that they immediately report once again for service with the Company. In doing so, we are advising them that, in our view, they 

are entitled to all of the benefits flowing from the award of the System Board of 

Adjustment and that they will be expected to meet the normal requirements for pilots in the employ of American Airlines, including federal certification as to physical 

fitness and proficiency as required. by the Civil Air Regulations. 

Sincerely yours, 

CLARENCE M. SAYEN, 

President, 

Air Line Pilots Association. 

cc: 

J. H. Burns 

E.A. Cutrell 

R.J. Rentz 

P.G. Atkins 

J.R. Lyons 

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Washington, DC, October 14, 1993

Federal Aviation Administration, 

Office of Chief Counsel, 

Washington, DC. 

ATTENTION: RULES DOCKET (AGC–10) 

DOCKET NO. 27264

To Whom It May Concern:

As Chairman of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or 

Commission), I am writing in response to notices published in the Federal Register 1

soliciting comments about whether the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 

should initiate rulemaking about its regulation commonly referred to as the Age 60 

Rule, 14 C.F.R. 121.383(c)(1993). The Age 60 Rule bars individuals who have 

reached their 16th birthday from serving as pilots or co-pilots in flight operations 

governed by Part 121 of the FAA’s rules, typically commercial flights. 

The Commission has long been concerned about the impact of the Age 60 Rule 

on pilots and co-pilots.2 The Commission enforces the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended, 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq. (ADEA) and also provides 

leadership and coordination for all federal agencies’ EEO programs under Executive 

Order 12067. The Executive Order requires the FAA to coordinate with EEOC to 

insure that its rules are consistent with the Commission’s interpretation of the 

ADEA. For the reasons set forth below, I urge the FAA to initiate rulemaking about 

its Age 60 Rule and to lift the age 60 limit for commercial pilots and co-pilots. 

The ADEA prohibits employment discrimination against individuals at least 40 

years of age. Under the ADEA, it is unlawful for an employer to have a maximum 

age limitation for its employees unless the employer can establish that the age limiVerDate Apr 24 2002 09:27 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 086337 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\86337.TXT SCOM1 PsN: CAROLT
29

3The EEOC’s standard was cited with approval by the Supreme Court in Western Air Lines, 

Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 416–17 (1985) (affirming a judgment that Western Airline’s mandatory retirement rule for flight engineers did not qualify as a BFOQ). 4Those employers that have resolved EEOC litigation by entering into consent decrees lifting 

age 60 policies are using such additional tests for certain groups of pilots, including but not limited to those over age 60, to develop data about their health. See infra discussion of EEOC litigation. 5See EEOC v. Lockheed Corp., C.A. No. 90–5253 TJH (C.D. Cal.)(consent decree raised age 

limit to 65); EEOC v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., C.A. No. 91–0450 TJH (C.D. Cal.)(consent decree raised age limit to 65 for pilots at Douglas Aircraft Company Division). 6The Commission also entered into a conciliation agreement with McDonnell Douglas Corporation to eliminate pilot age limitations at the company’s McDonnell Aircraft Company Division. During the course of directed investigations, Northrop Corporation, General Dynamics Corporation, United Technologies Corporation, and General Electric eliminated their pilot age limitations. 

tation is a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) ‘‘reasonably necessary to the 

normal operation of the particular business.’’ 29 U.S.C.A. 623 (f) (1) (West 1985). 

An EEOC regulation sets forth what an employer must prove to establish that age 

is a BFOQ:

That (1) the age limit is reasonably necessary to the essence of the business, and 

either (2) that all or substantially all individuals excluded from the job involved 

are in fact disqualified, or (3) that some of the individuals so excluded possess a 

disqualifying trait that cannot be ascertained except by reference to age. If the 

employer’s objective in asserting a BFOQ is the goal of public safety, the employer 

must prove that the challenged practice does indeed effectuate that goal and that 

there is no acceptable alternative which would better advance it or equally advance it with less discriminatory impact.

29 C.F.R. 1625.6(b) (1992).3

The EEOC does not believe that a chronological age limitation for commercial pilots is a BFOQ because pilot skills and health can be assessed accurately on an individual basis, regardless of age. Indeed, the FAA itself relies on individualized testing as a basis for issuing medical certificates to people of all ages, including those 

age 60 and above, who serve as pilots in non-Part 121 flight operations. Moreover, 

in Commission litigation challenging pilot age limits imposed by employers whose 

flight operations are not governed exclusively by Part 121, the EEOC’S experts have 

testified that Class I medical testing is fully sufficient to identify health or performance problems that may surface for pilots regardless of age. These experts also have 

stated that, to the extent further testing may be desirable, cardiac stress tests, enhanced blood work-ups, and neuropsychological screening could be added to the 

standard battery of Class I tests for all pilots.4

As a result of the Commission’s enforcement efforts under the ADEA, pilots over 

the age of 60 who had been restricted by company age limitations now fly in a variety of flight operations not governed by Part 121. Individuals over the age of 60 

serve as pilots of experimental test flights in high performance military aircraft, fly 

jumbo jets both in testing and in certain passenger operations not subject to Part 

121, and pilot corporate jets. 

In litigation brought by the Commission under the ADEA challenging the Boeing 

Company’s policy of removing pilots at age 60 from flight status in non—Part 121 

operations, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the FAA’S Age 

60 Rule did not establish a BFOQ as a matter of law. EEOC v. Boeing, 843 F.2d 

1213 (9th Cir. 1988). This litigation was resolved in 1990 with a consent decree 

under which qualified Boeing pilots are permitted to remain on flight status up to 

their 63rd birthdays. Boeing will reassess this age policy in 1995. Subsequent to the 

entering of a similar consent decree in EEOC v. Rockwell Int’l. Corp., C.A. No. 91—

0760 MRP (C.D. Cal.), the Commission has refused to consider any settlement that 

would involve a pilot age limitation of less than age 65.5 In fact, in the most recent 

consent decree of this type, which was entered in EEOC v. Grumman Corp, C.A. 

No. 92–1034 (E.D.N.Y.), all pilot age limitations were eliminated.6

The report titled ‘‘Age 60 Project, Consolidated Database Experiments, Final Report’’ (Hilton Report), recently prepared for the Civil Aeromedical Institute of the 

FAA, supports the conclusion that the age 60 limit for pilots is not defensible as 

a BFOQ under the ADEA. Based on careful statistical analysis, this report found 

‘‘no hint of an increase in accident rate for pilots of scheduled air carriers as they 

30

7 Hilton Report at 6–2. 8 Id.

9The Commission’s position is that age cannot be a BFOQ for commercial or any other pilots 

because pilot skills and health can be accurately assessed on an individual basis, regardless of 

age. However, as noted earlier, the Commission has settled litigation after the employer agreed 

to increase the pilot age limitation to age 65, thereby allowing the development of data about 

the health and safety record of pilots over age 60. See infra at pages 2–3. 

neared their 60th birthday.’’ 7 This conclusion is especially significant in light of the 

report’s avowedly conservative interpretation of the data.8

In sum, the Age 60 Rule should be lifted by the FAA. Medical and proficiency 

tests on an individual basis are effective and non-discriminatory ways to assure that 

commercial pilots maintain the highest standards of safety at all ages. 

Because the Age 60 Rule has precluded the development of data about pilots in 

Part 121 flight operations who are age 60 and older, raising the age limit for Part 

121 pilots to age 65 for a specific period of time as a transitional measure may be 

a reasonable interim step.9 This would allow commercial pilots to continue flying 

beyond age 60 while the FAA plans a full transition to individualized testing. While 

the Hilton Report cautiously recommends raising the age limit to 63, the data presented does not support an age 63 limitation under the ADEA. Moreover, an age 

limit of 63 would likely bar development of sufficient health and safety data about 

commercial pilots over the age of 60 to assess the need for any pilot age limits at 

all. 

I look forward to working together with the FAA on this important matter in the 

future. 

Sincerely, 

TONY E. GALLEGOS, 

Chairman. 

ORGANIZATION OF BLACK AIRLINE PILOTS

Captain Paul Emens, 

Government Affair Committee, 

Southwest Pilots’ Association, 

Dallas, TX.

Dear Captain Emens:

The Organization of Black Airline Pilots, Inc. opposes § 121.383 (c) of Title 14, 

Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR), commonly referred to as the Age 60 Rule. 

We fear that if a federal agency is able to establish and continue a rule or practice 

that discriminates in contradiction of federal non-discrimination laws respecting 

age, similar unfair and unlawful practices may arise or expand to discrimination on 

the basis of race, gender, ethnicity or national origin. 

We believe the Rule was instituted, and is maintained, for political rather than 

safety reasons, That position is supported by;

• The fact that other countries have abandoned mandatory retirement at age 60.

• The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) allows pilots to fly past 

age 60.

• These pilots are allowed to fly Into U.S. airspace and airports.

• The Directors of the National Institute on Aging of the National Institute of 

Health testified that medical science can adequately protect public safety.

• The Hilton Study (commissioned by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)) 

recommended increasing the retirement age.

• The FAA grants waivers to airmen younger than 60 who have the same and 

other maladies from which the flying public is suppose to be being protected by 

the Age 60 Rule.

• The FAA refuses to grant the waivers necessary to conduct studies of the capabilities of pilots age 60 and older.

• The FAA allows its own pilots to fly past age 60.

31

We support your, and any other efforts, to rescind this arbitrary and egregious 

rule which owes its longevity, in a large part, to political action contributions from 

an organization which does not mention ‘‘safety’’ in its Policy Resolution opposing 

any change. 

Very truly yours, 

CLOVIS JONES, JR, 

President, OBAP. 

The Organization of Black Airline Pilots, Inc On FAR 14 CFR § 121.383(c) 

‘‘The Age 60 Rule is unfairly and unlawfully discriminatory, and if a federal agency is able to establish and continue a rule or practice that discriminates in contradiction of federal non-discrimination laws respecting age, similar unfair and unlawful practices may arise or expand to discrimination on the basis of race, gender, 

ethnicity or national origin.’’

This is the position stated by The Organization of Black Airline Pilots, Inc. in the 

Petition to the U.S. Supreme Court. 

March 27, 2000

Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee, 

United States Senate, 

Washington, DC.

Dear Senators:

The Organization of Black Airline Pilots is opposed to discrimination on any basis, 

including age. Age, as the sole determining factor, is no more accurate in judging 

capability as a pilot, or anything else, than is race or gender. Fortunately, we have 

moved beyond the latter two, let’s do the same for age. 

We support Senator Murkowski’s Bill, S. 1855 because it provides temporary relief to a segment of the population. Along with bringing the U.S. closer to the standards of much of the rest of the world, we see it as moving m the right direction 

of eventually removing age as the sole criteria for judging one’s capability. 

Over 60 airline pilots are flying in the U.S. on a daily basis—but they fly for foreign carriers. Over age 60 FAA pilots are flying daily in the same skies as the airliners. Yet the FAA has not warned the U.S. public about the ‘‘dangers of the over 

60 foreign airline or FAA pilots’’ (i.e. the foreign airport security warnings). 

With the elimination of three pilot airplanes, new pilots are being put in the position of being ‘‘one heartbeat away’’ from Captain in today’s two pilot crews. We feel 

that maintaining the cockpit experience level is the better approach to safety. 

Thank you for your attention. I trust you will move in favor of safety for the public, anti age discrimination for the U.S. pilots, and not be persuaded to succumb to 

the political pressure the major unions and corporations are sure to direct at you. 

Sincerely, 

RAY DOTHARD, 

Chairman, 

Board of Directors, OBAP. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBIN WILKENING, MD, MPH

IN SUPPORT OF SENATE BILL 1855

Mr./Madam Chairman and distinguished Members of the Committee: Thank you 

for allowing me the opportunity to speak on this most timely issue. My name is Dr. 

Robin Wilkening, and I address you today as an Occupational Medicine physician, 

public health professional, and frequent flyer. 

As you are well aware, the Federal Aviation Administration insists that commercial airline pilots who reach their 60th birthday pose an unacceptable safety risk 

to air travelers. For the past 40 years the Age 60 Rule has purposely and systematically excluded highly trained pilots from employment based on age alone, thus exemplifying the very definition of age discrimination, an unacceptable situation in 

our modern society. That our most experienced pilots are forced prematurely from 

positions of command has the frightening potential to render the skies more hazardous for all travelers and thus represents a serious public health concern. 

Historically there have been 3 major hypotheses of interest in the medical arena 

regarding the employment of older pilots.

32

1 Ruppenthal KM. Compulsory Retirement of Air Line Pilots. Industrial and Labor Relations 

Review, 1961;14:528–547. 2Kulak L.L., Wick, Jr. RL, Billings CE. Epidemiological Study of In-flight Airline Pilot Incapacitation. Aerospace Medicine 1971:42(6):670–672. 3 Besco RO, Sangal SP, Nesthus TE. Veronoeau SJH. A Longevity and Survival Analysis for 

a Cohort of Retired Airline Pilots. DOT/FAA/AM–95/5 February 1995. 4 Irvine D, Davies DM. The Mortality of British Airways Pilots, 1966–1989: A Proportional 

Mortality Study. Aviation Space, and Environmental Medicine 1992;63:276–9. 5 Band PR, Le ND, Fang R, Deschamps M, Coldman AJ, Gallagher RP, Moody J. Cohort Study 

of Air Canada Pilots: Mortality, Cancer Incidence, and Leukemia Risk, American Journal of Epidemiology 1996; 143(2): 137–143. 6Kaji M, Tango T, Asukata N, Tajima N, Yamamoto N, Yamamoto Y, Hokari M. Mortality 

Experience of Cockpit Crewmembers from Japan Airlines. Aviation, Space, and Environmental 

Medicine 1993;64:745–750. 7 Castelo-Branco A. Cabral-Sa A, Coelho Borges 3. Comparative Study of Physical and Mental 

Incapacities Among Portugesc Airline Pilots Under and Over Age 60.Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine 1985;56:752–757. 8Salisbury DA. Band PR, Threlfall WJ, Gallagher RI’. Mortality Among British Columbia Pilots. Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine 1991;62:351–352. 9 Chapman PJC. The Consequences of In-flight Incapacitation in Civil Aviation. Aviation, 

Space, and Environmental Medicine 1984:55:497–500. 10Froom P. Benbassat J. Gross M, Ribak J, Lewis B. Air Accidents, Pilot Experience, and Disease-Related Inflight Sudden Incapacitation. Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine

198819:278–281.(*See note below.) 11Shock NW, Greulich RC, Adrus R., Arenberg D, Costa. Jr. PT. Lakatta EG, Tobin ID. Normal Human Aging: The Baltimore Longitudinal Study of Aging. NIH Publication Number 84– 2450 November 1984. 12Stuck, AE, van Gorp WG, Josephson KR, Morgenstern H, Beck JC. Multidemensional Risk 

Assessment versus Age as Criterion for Retirement of Airline Pilots. Journal of the Americal 

Geriatric Society 1992;40:526–532. 

1. Older pilots could have a greater likelihood of experiencing sudden incapacitation (primarily from cardiovascular causes) thus placing the aircraft and passengers at risk.

2. Older pilots could experience subtle incapacitation (decrements in cognitive 

abilities) resulting in dangerous judgment errors that could compromise safety.

3. Medical and psychological testing procedures may not identify older pilots at 

risk for adverse health events.

Sudden incapacitation secondary to underlying cardiac or cerebrovascular disease 

was the stated reason the actual age of 60 was chosen. In the general population 

of the United States in the late 1950’s there were, according to the FAA, higher 

death rates from heart attack and stroke comparing 60–64 year old men with 55– 59 year old men. However, the select subset of the population comprised of airline 

pilots was never specifically evaluated. Moreover, the fact that actively employed pilots were well known, even in the 1950’s, to exceed the national standards for 

health, fitness, and longevity was not acknowledged.1 In other words, it was an 

error then to assume that the characteristics of the general population applied to 

the population of pilots, and it remains incorrect to assume the same today. In fact, 

studies from the United States, England, Canada, Japan, Portugal, and the province 

of British Columbia demonstrate quite convincingly that pilots are not only 

healthier overall than the population from which they come, but enjoy significantly 

lower rates of heart disease, and thus the risk of sudden incapacitation from that 

cause, than do their countrymen. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 Simulator data have estimated the risk 

of incapacitation due specifically to a cardiac complaint as only one event in more 

than 20 million flight hours, with a calculated probability of an accident occurring 

as a result of incapacitation once in every 8,307,082,800 flight hours (or, stated another way, one episode every 400 years) assuming that all incapacitations occur in 

a critical point in the flight.9 Sudden in-flight incapacitation is clearly a far less 

threat to aviation safety than are mishaps due to inexperienced pilot error.10 Forty 

years of medical scrutiny reveal no justification for maintaining the Age 60 Rule 

based on the fear that the pilot-in-command of a multi-crew aircraft will compromise passenger safety due to sudden incapacitation. 

In terms of subtle incapacitation there is little argument that the normal, healthy, 

successful aging process is accompanied by decreases in cognitive function over time 

in all population groups. However, these decreases are rarely manifested prior to 

the age of 70, even in non-pilot populations. 11, 12 In addition, it is well known that 

many truly elderly persons—never mind 60–65 year olds—have outstanding cognitive abilities. There is considerable variation in cognitive functioning within age 

groups; some individuals simply show significantly better mental agility than their 

peers. Pilots demonstrate consistently superior task performance across all age 

33

13Tsang PS, Shaner TL. Age, Attention, Expertise, and Time-Sharing Performance. Psychology and Aging 1998; 13(2):323–47. 14Morrow D, Leirer V, Altieri P, Fitzsimmons C. When Expertise Reduces Age Differences in 

Performance Psychology and Aging 1994;9(1):134–148. 15Mohler SR, Bedell RHS, Ross A, Veregge E.J. Aircraft Accidentsby Older Persons. Aerospace 

Medicine 1969: May:554–6. (*Demonstrations referred to are at the end the prepared statement.) 16Predicting Pilot-Error Incidents of US Airline Pilots Using Logistic Regression. Applied 

Ergonomics 1997; 28(3):209–12. 17 Rebok GW, Grabowski JO, Baker SP. Lamb MW, Willoughby S. Li G. Pilot Age and Performance as Factors in Aviation Crashes. Presented at American Psychological Association meeting, Boston MA. August 1999. (*Demonstrations referred to are at the end the prepared statement.) 18Kay EJ, Hillman DJ, Hyland DT, Voros RS, Harris R.M., Deimler JD. Age 60 Study. October 1994: DOT/FAA/AM–94/22. 19 Report of the National Institute on Aging Panel on the Experienced Pilots Study. National 

Institutes of Health Bethesda MD. August 1981. 20 Bruce PA, Fisher LD. Exercise-Enhanced Risk Factors for Coronary Heart Disease vs. Age 

as Criteria for Mandatory Retirement of Health Pilots. Aviation, Space, and Environmental 

Medicine 1987:58:792–798. 21Taylor JL, O’Hara R., Mumenthaler MS, Yesavage, JA. Relationship of CogScreen—AE to 

flight simulator performance and pilot age. Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine

2000;71(4):373–80. 22Mohler SR. Aircrew Physical Status and Career Longevity. Human Factors Bulletin

1984;31(1):l–8. 1 58 Fed. Reg. 21,336 (1993) and 58 Fed. Reg. 33,316 (1993). 

2The Commission’s longstanding interest in the Age 60 rule is demonstrated in public testimony, comments, and statements including: Testimony of Constance L. Dupre, Associate General Counsel, EEOC, Panel on the Experienced Pilots Study, National Institute on Aging, National Institutes of Health, May 27, 1981; EEOC’S Final Interpretations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 49 Fed. Reg. 47,724 (1981); EEOC Comments on the FAA’s 

Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking at 47 Fed. Reg. 29,784 (1982); Testimony of former 

EEOC Chairman Clarence Thomas before the House Select Committee on Aging, October 1985; 

August 12, 1986 letter from former EEOC Chairman Clarence Thomas to former FAA Administrator Donald Engen urging the FAA to grant a petition by 39 pilots for exemptions from the 

Age 60 Rule so they could participate in a controlled study envisioned by the National Institute 

groups when compared to age-matched non-pilots.13 Simulator studies have shown 

that pilot expertise eliminates age differences in some aviation-related tasks and 

moderates age differences in others.14 Most importantly, actual flight performance 

data, the measure of greatest significance to public safety, demonstrate convincingly 

that older pilots are as safe as, and in some cases safer than, younger pilots, 15, 16, 17, 18 In other words, highly educated and highly trained pilots who have 

successfully passed periodic comprehensive medical examinations and flight evaluations retain the psychomotor skills essential for safe operation of jet aircraft beyond 

the age of 60 years. Most industrialized nations have abolished 60 as a mandatory 

retirement age for commercial pilots, and at least one of these used United States 

data to justify that decision. There remains no scientific rationale for maintaining 

the Age 60 Rule based on the fear of unrecognized subtle incapacitation of the pilotin-command. 

In 1979 the United States Congress authorized funding for the project that was 

to become the 1981 National Institutes of Health/National Institute on Aging Panel 

on the Experienced Pilot Study. This report that concluded that the age 60 limit 

be retained for pilots in command and for first officers, though the report stated 

quite plainly that no special medical significance could be attached to age 60 as a 

mandatory retirement age for airline pilots. The concern of this panel was not the 

presence of known risk in this group of healthy individuals but rather the inability 

of the medical science of the time to identify potentially unsafe pilots at any age.19

In the twenty years since this study, however, significant advances in diagnostic 

technology have rendered the panels concerns moot. Sophisticated yet commonly 

available diagnostic tests can, along with regularly scheduled aviation medical evaluations, adequately identify airmen either at risk for catastrophic events 20 or who 

have subtle decrements in cognitive performance.21 In fact, since the early 1980’s 

medical tests have been used routinely to justify the return to flying of thousands 

of pilots under age 60 who have coronary artery disease. valvular heart disease, hypertension, alcoholism, psychological and neurological impairments, sensory perception deficits, and other conditions.22 Pilots who have had heart attacks, who have 

had heart surgery, and who have had transplants have been returned to unrestricted duty. Despite the common use of these diagnostic measures on behalf of 

unhealthy younger pilots these same standards are not applied to healthy 60 year 

olds. This unethical double standard in medical evaluations based on age alone is 

not defensible! 

Forty years of medical science soundly refute the notion that the age of 60 heralds 

a universal, inevitable, and precipitous decline in commercial airline pilots’ physical 

health and mental proficiency. Still, the FAA clings irrationally to the notion that 

34

age of 60 alone represents an appropriate single standard for the evaluation of older 

pilot fitness. If any one of you were to undergo cardiac surgery or bone marrow 

transplantation tomorrow you would naturally want your life be in the hands of the 

most knowledgeable and skilled doctor, regardless of his or her age. When I fly—

no, when my children fly—I want that very same level of professional ability and 

experience in the Captain. The archaic and discriminatory Age 60 Rule prohibits the 

most experienced pilots from performing the work they know and do better than 

anyone else in the business, thereby compromising your safety, my safety, and the 

safety of all passengers. Thank you. 

*Demonstrations referred to in the footnotes follows:

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(*Note: Referred to in footnote number 10.) 


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TECHNICAL NOTE

Air Accidents, Pilot Experience, and Disease-Related Inflight Sudden Incapacitation 

Paul Froom, M.D., Jochanan Benbassat, M.D., 

Moshe Gross, M.D., Joseph Ribak, M.D., and 

Basil S. Lewis, M.D. 

Israel Air Force Aeromedical Center, Tel Hashomer; Department of Medicine, Hadassah University Hospital, Mt. Scopus, Jerusalem; and the Department of Cardiology, Lady Davis Carmel Hospital, Haifa, Israel

Froom P, Benbassat J, Gross M., Ribak J, Lewis BS. Air accidents, pilot experience, and disease-related inflight sudden incapacitation Aviat. Space Environ. Med. 

1988; 59:278–81.

The epidemiology of sudden death, the etiology of inflight sudden incapacitation, 

and the influence of pilot age and experience on air accident rates are reviewed in 

order to determine the aeromedical emphasis needed to minimize accidents. Sudden 

deaths in men over age 35 are nearly all due to coronary artery disease, whereas 

in those under 35 years they are mostly due to hypertrophic cardiomyopathy. The 

incidence of fatal accidents from human error is, however, far greater than that 

from physical illness. Since inexperienced pilots have a 2–3 times increased incidence of mishaps due to pilot error, the estimated risk of disease related in-flight 

sudden incapacitation should be balanced by consideration of pilot experience. 

Therefore, it may be preferable to grant waivers to experienced pilots with an increased incidence of disease-related inflight sudden incapacitation than to replace 

them with novices. We conclude that overly strict medical criteria may paradoxically 

increase accident rates. 

The major causes of inflight sudden incapacitation in civil and military pilots are 

acute coronary events (18,20,23,27,28), new onset idiopathic epilepsy, and physiological problems including spatial disorientation, hypoxia, and improper G-protection techniques (27,33). Although less than 1 percent of all air accidents are due to 

sudden incapacitation (23,27), pilots receive extensive health risk assessments because, while accidents involving ground transport generally result in minimal damage (19), sudden incapacitation in the air is costly in terms of loss of life and aircraft 

(1,7,18). 

The role of the flight surgeon in detecting latent disease in order to prevent 

inflight sudden incapacitation is controversial. Some authors emphasize the necessity for continued vigilance by the flight surgeon for pilots who may have clinical 

or subclinical coronary artery disease (23), and stress the importance of routine 

medical examination of pilots in order to detect those likely to experience acute coronary events (12). Others believe that ‘‘routine medical examinations are not, and 

presumably never will be, capable of preventing incapacitation on duty’’ (18). 

The flight surgeon faces a dilemma when detecting a cardiovascular abnormality 

(e.g., a run of ventricular tachycardia) in apparently healthy young men on annual 

or biannual testing. The risk of disease-related sudden incapacitation may be minimally increased, whereas further evaluation of an abnormal test result is often expensive and stressful with associated morbidity and mortality. In addition, the effect 

on the accident rate of grounding such asymptomatic pilots is uncertain, especially 

if an experienced pilot is replaced by a novice. In order to define the role of the annual screening physical examination in preventing accidents, we review the epidemiology of sudden death and the etiology of air accidents due to either human error 

or inflight sudden incapacitation. 

Epidemiology of Sudden Death 

The incidence of sudden death in the general population is age-dependent 

(6,11,13); the risk of sudden death in a 40-year-old man is 10 times that of a 20-

year-old (Table I). Other risk factors are much less predictive (6,11). Using a combination of risk factors, Kannel et al. (11) were able to define a group in the Framingham cohort with a risk high profile (3-fold increase in the incidence of sudden 

death), and a group with a low risk profile who had one-fifth the incidence of expected sudden death. These data can be used in conjunction with incidence figures 

(Table I) to determine an estimated incidence for any given individual. For example, 

a 40-year-old man in the high risk group would have an estimated incidence of sudden death of 30 per 1000 men per 10 years (10/1000/10 years x 3). On the other 

41

hand, a 40-year-old man in the low risk group would have an estimated incidence 

of sudden death similar to men in their twenties and thirties (2/1000/10 years).

Table I. Incidence of Sudden Death in the General Population. 

Age 

Sudden deaths 

No/l000/l0 years No/1000/l000 hours 

20–29 1 0.011

30–39 3 0.034

40–49 10 0.11

50–59 20 0.22

60–69 60 0.67

Table II. Etiology of Sudden Death According to Age. 

Disease <35 years old Over 40

CAD* 10–30% over 90%7

Cardiomyopathy 66% rare 

Anomalous LCA 14% rare 

unknown 3–16% rare 

Marfan’s with aortic 

rupture 6% rare 

ICH** 9–17% 2.4%

*CAD = coronary artery disease. 

**ICH = intracranial hemorrhage. 

The cause of sudden death is variable, but age is the most important variable in 

predicting its etiology (3,6,11,13,21,24); coronary disease is the usual cause after age 

35, while hypertrophic cardiomyopathy is the most common cause of sudden death 

in those under 35 years of age (Table II). Coronary artery disease may occur in men 

under age 35 and cause sudden incapacitation (7), but coronary disease is responsible for only 10–30 percent of sudden deaths in that age group (21,24). The low 

incidence of coronary artery disease and associated sudden death in young men limits the importance of risk factors in its prediction. 

Coronary Artery Disease in Pilots 

It may not be possible, however, to extrapolate from studies of sudden death of 

unselected populations to those of air force personnel. For example, uncontrolled 

studies of U.S. Navy and airline transport pilots, have shown that pilots have a 

lower incidence of coronary events than does the general population (12,17). The reported decreased incidence may be due to selection factors resulting in a cohort with 

higher socioeconomic status, higher educational level, and in better physical condition (10), or could be a result of under-reporting (5). Autopsy studies have not shown 

differences in significant coronary artery disease in pilots of both civilian and military aircraft compared to age matched control subjects, with a 10–20 percent prevalence of 50 percent (30,32) or even 75 percent (29) stenosis of one or more coronary 

arteries. Pilots also show the same steep increased incidence of symptomatic coronary artery disease after age 35 (10). It appears safe to assume, therefore, that latent atherosclerosis is prevalent in current fighter pilots (20). 

Extrapolation from studies of the general population to cohorts of pilots may also 

be unwarranted because of the hostile flight environment to which the pilot is subjected. Strenuous activity probably increases the risk of sudden death in people suffering from coronary artery disease (24,25). Pilots are exposed to many flight-induced stresses, including high-sustained G forces, which could lead to myocardial ischemia in men with coronary artery lesions (16). In civilian pilots experiencing 

inflight myocardial infarction, the event was more likely to occur during critical 

stages of the flight such as takeoff or landing, rather than during the cruising phase 

(18,23). Recently, however, it has been shown that aviators with no lesions greater 

than 30 percent and no aggregate of lesions greater than 50 percent can be safely 

returned to flying status (22). The lesions progressed, however, in some of these pilots who were subsequently grounded. Further study in this area is clearly indicated. 

42

Fatal Aircraft Accidents Due to Sudden Incapacitation 

Sudden incapacitation is rarely implicated in fatal aircraft accidents 

(12,15,18,27,28,32,35). Only 13 of 1,404 fatal general aviation accidents (0.93 percent) were reportedly due to inflight incapacitation (23), and sudden incapacitation 

due to disease is equally uncommon in the military (27,28,30). The cause of sudden 

incapacitation leading to fatal accidents differs in the military and civilian pilot populations due to the different ages of the pilot cohorts and the different demands of 

the flight profiles. The civilian pilot population is older, and acute coronary events 

are responsible for nearly all cases of sudden incapacitation (18,20,23), usually occurring in men over age 40. In the military environment the most common causes 

of sudden incapacitation are ‘‘physiologic,’’ including spatial disorientation, hypoxia, 

and improper G-protection techniques (27,33). New-onset epilepsy is the most common disease-related cause of sudden incapacitation (27), while cases due to coronary 

artery disease are rare, occurring almost exclusively in pilots over age 35 (28). The 

incidence of fatal accidents due to inflight sudden incapacitation is about 0.5/1000 

pilots/l000 hours (27), while the incidence due to coronary artery disease is no more 

than 0.01/1000 pilots/l000 hours (28). 

Age, Experience and the Incidence of Error-Related Air Accidents 

The largest single cause of premature mortality in pilots is aircraft accidents 

(l5,35), with human error being responsible for 50–75 percent of these preventable 

deaths in both civil and military flying personnel (1,33). In the British Army Air 

Corps, the helicopter accident rate is 1/13,600 hours and the fatality rate 1/35,000 

hours (33). In the USAF there is one fatal accident per 40,000 hours (28) which is 

equivalent to 25 fatal accidents per 1000 pilots averaging 1000 hours of flight time. 

This is 50 times greater than fatal accidents due to inflight sudden incapacitation 

of all etiologies (27,28). 

The accident rate is effected by both the age and experience of the pilots. The incidence of accidents for fighter pilots is lowest at 30–33 years of age, 3-fold less than 

in pilots under 26 years of age (9). Transition flying may be particularly hazardous 

(2,35). Fighter and attack pilots with less than 300 hours have nearly twice the incidence of mishaps compared to pilots with over 500 hours in the same plane (2). 

Therefore, assuming that human error is responsible for 50 percent of fatal accidents (1,33) and an even age distribution of pilots, replacing a pilot 30–33 years old 

with one under 26 years old would result in an increased accident rate of 12.5 per 

1000 pilots per 1000 hours of flight time [(37.5¥12.5) x 50% = 12.5]. 

Balancing Risks 

Current medical practice in aviation medicine dictates grounding the pilot with 

a medically related increased risk of sudden incapacitation. The influences of age 

and pilot experience, however, are generally not taken into consideration. Most 

flight surgeons, for example, would restrict a 30-year-old fighter pilot with a run of 

ventricular tachycardia (4,8) to non-high-performance aircraft because of a possible, 

but not established, increased risk of subsequent sudden death (14,26), even after 

a normal exercise test, echocardiogram, and coronary arteriogram. Although there 

is justified concern that +Gz forces could lead to worsening of the arrhythmia, since 

complex and repetitive ventricular premature beats (VPBs) are commonly observed 

in asymptomatic centrifuge riders during +Gz stress (31), we are aware of only one 

report of loss of consciousness during +Gz forces associated with ventricular tachycardia, this in a centrifuge rider whose echocardiogram, exercise test, and Holter 

monitoring were normal (34). Studies need to be done in pilots with complex VPBs 

to test their response to +Gz forces. Still, even if there was a 10-fold increased incidence of disease-related inflight sudden incapacitation and sudden death, replacing 

the 30-year-old fighter pilot with a novice would probably result in an increased accident rate (Table III). Fatal accidents due to human error could be estimated to 

increase from 6.25 to 18.75 per 1000 pilots flying an average of 1000 hours (assuming 50 percent of the fatal accidents are due to human error), while the decrease 

in incidence of inflight sudden incapacitation would be only from 5 to 0.5 per 1000 

pilots per 1000 hours, and from all causes of sudden death from 0.34 to 0.01 per 

1000 pilots per 1000 hours. The net result would be an increase in the accident rate 

of 7.7 (18.75¥6.25¥5 + 0.5¥0.34 + 0.01 = 7.7). This net increase may be even 

greater since there is overlap between causes of sudden death and those of inflight 

sudden incapacitation. Secondly, most cases of inflight sudden incapacitation are not 

disease related and may not be affected by the risk factor. Granting a waiver to the 

experienced pilot with 3 consecutive VPBs, therefore, necessitates a shared medical 

and nonmedical command decision. This is contrary to accepted practice where the 

medical establishment often takes unilateral responsibility for its decisions. 

43

In most countries the line commander may overrule medical decisions. Flight surgeons, on the other hand, may take into consideration the importance of experience 

as part of the ‘‘art’ of aeromedical practice. Furthermore, flight surgeons may ignore 

‘‘incidental’’ findings if they believe the increased risk is only minimal. These approaches, however, leave the line commander and flight surgeon at Considerable 

risk of being accused of negligence. Despite the fact that the likelihood of a medically-related air accident is remote, unexplained accidents are common (28). Shared 

responsibility, however, based on a balanced risk assessment would justify such decisions by the line commander and medical establishment. These decisions should 

be made only after the pilot is informed of the increased risk due to his medical 

condition, and agrees to continue flying despite the risk.

Table III. The Effect on the Accident Rate If an Experienced Pilot with a 10-fold Increased Risk 

of Sudden Death or Inflight Sudden Incapacitation Is Replaced by a Younger, More Inexperienced Pilot (Fatal Accidents per 1000 Pilots per 1000 Hours of Flight Time). 

Age of

Pilot Sudden Death In-flightIncapacitation 

Fatal Air Accidents

Due to Human Error* 

20–26 +0.011 +0.5 +18.75

30–33 –0.034 x l0** –0.5 x 10 –6.25

Results** –0.3 –4.5 +12.5 = + 7.7

*Assuming that 50 percent of accidents are due to human error and that data on mishap rates can be extrapolated to fatal air accidents. 

**The net increased risk of accidents caused by replacing a 30–33-year-old pilot, who has a l0x increased risk of sudden death or inflight 

incapacitation, with a younger and more inexperienced pilot. 

The above calculations are based on results derived from both unselected and selected cohorts and should be interpreted with caution. There may be differences in 

the incidence of disease in pilots of different countries, and accidents due to pilot 

error may also vary due to different flight profiles. Experience and age-related mishap rates may not necessarily be extrapolated to rates of fatal accidents. In addition, the effect of age on accident rates has been shown to be aircraft specific. Helicopter pilots, for example, have a steady increase in mishap rates with age (2). Finally, studies on inflight sudden incapacitation were completed over 15 years ago 

and the results may not be applicable to flying conditions today. Still, even if the 

figures vary, the concept that medical decisions should be balanced by consideration 

of pilot age and experience remains valid. 

We conclude that, even in countries where manpower and cost are not limiting 

factors, overly strict medical criteria may result in an increased rather than decreased accident rate. Lamb pointed out that a ‘‘hardnosed attitude’’ may lead pilots 

to conceal symptomatic disease, increasing the accident rate (29). We conclude that 

replacing experienced, asymptomatic fighter pilots found to have an abnormal incidental finding on routine examination may also paradoxically increase the accident 

rate. Furthermore, research in accident prevention is warranted in order to more 

clearly identify those pilots with the lowest accident rates and to provide the proper 

incentives to keep them on active flying duty. These efforts would be more likely 

to have an effect on accident rates than would additional efforts to prevent diseaserelated inflight sudden incapacitation. 

References 

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year study. Aviat. Space Environ. Med. 1984 55:960–5. 

2. Borowsky MS, Wall R. Flight experience and naval aircrafts mishaps. Aviat. 

Space Environ. Med. 1983; 54:440–6. 

3. Burch GE, DePasquale NP. Sudden unexpected natural death. Am. J. Med. Sci. 

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4. Campbell RWF. Ventricular ectopic activity and its relevance to aircrew licensing. Eur. Heart J. 1984; 5(suppl A):95–8. 

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Task Force I: identification ischemic heart disease. Am. J. Cardiol. 1975; 36:573–

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6. Chiang BN, Perlman LV, Fulton M, Ostrander LD, Epstein FH. Predisposing 

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7. De Hart RM. Coronary heart disease: an expensive Air Force problem. Aviat. 

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44

8. Engelberg AL, Gibbons HL, Doege TC. A review of the medical standards for 

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9. Erraud MY, Borowsky MS. Age and pilot performance. Aviat. Space Environ. 

Med. 1985; 56:553–8. 

10. Hoiberg A. Cardiovascular disease among U.S. Navy pilots. Aviat. Space Environ. Med. 1985; 56:397–402. 

11. Kannel WB, Doyle JT. McNamara PM, Quickenton P, Gordon T. Precursors 

of sudden coronary death. Circulation 1975; 51:606–13. 

12. Kelly HB. Coronary artery disease in aviation. J. R. Soc. Med. 1979; 72:374–

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13. Kennedy HL, Whitlock JA. Sudden death in young persons in the St. Louis 

metropolitan area. Circulation 1984; 70(suppl II): 1961. 

14. Kennedy HL, Whitlock JA, Sprague MK, Kennedy LJ, Buckinham TA, Goldberg RJ. Long-term follow-up of asymptomatic healthy subjects with frequent and 

complex ventricular ectopy. N. Engl. J. Med. 1985; 312:193–7. 

15. Kulak L, Wick RL Jr, Billings CE. Epidemiological study of in flight incapacitation in airline pilots. Aerospace Med. 1971; 42:670–6. 

16. Laughlin MH. The effects of +Gz on the coronary circulation: a review. Aviat. 

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17. Lederen LG (moderator). Limits of cardiovascular normality for flying. In: The 

first international symposium in cardiology in aviators. Lamb LE, ed. Brooks Air 

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18. Leighton-White RC. Airline pilot incapacitation in flight. Aerospace Med. 

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19. Levy RL, de la Chapelle CE, Richards DW. Heart disease in drivers of public 

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20. Manning GW. Aviation cardiology in Canada. Am. J. Cardiol.1975; 36:576–83. 

21. Maron BJ, Epstein SE, Roberts WC. Causes of sudden death in competitive 

athletes. J. Am. Coll, Cardiol 1986; 7:204–14. 

22. McGranahan GM, Hickman JR, Uhl GS, Montgomery MA, Triebwasser JH. 

Minimal coronary artery disease and continuation of flying status. Aviat. Space Environ. Med. 1983; 54:548–50. 

23. Mohler SR, Booze CF. U.S. fatal general aviation accidents due to cardiovascular incapacitations: 1974–1975 Aviat. Space Environ. Med. 1978; 49:1225–8. 

24. Moritz AR, Zamcheck N. Sudden and unexpected deaths of young soldiers. 

Arch. Path. 1946; 459–94. 

25. Northcote RJ, Ballantyne D. Sudden cardiac death in sport. Br. Med. J. 1983; 

287:l357–9. 

26. Rabkin SW, Francis AL, Mathewson MD, Tate RB. The relationship of ventricular ectopy in men without apparent heart disease to the occurrence of ischemic 

heart disease. Am. Heart J. 1981; 101:l35–42. 

27. Rayman RB. Sudden incapacitation in flight: Jan 1966–30 Nov. 1971. Aerospace Med. 1973; 44:953–5. 

28. Rayman RB. Myocardial infarction; an in-flight problem. Aerospace Med. 1974; 

45:86–9. 

29. Rigal RD, Lovell FW, Townsend FM. Pathological findings in the cardiovascular systems of military flying personnel. In: The first international symposium 

on cardiology in aviators, La. ed. Brooks Air Force Base, TX: The USAF Aerospace 

Center (ATC), 1959:65–76. 

30. Scheinman HZ. Coronary atherosclerosis in military pilots: I. relationship to 

flying and aviation accidents Aerospace Med.1968; 39:1348–51. 

31. Shubrooks SJ. Changes in cardiac rhythm during sustained high levels of 

Positive (+Gz) acceleration. Aerospace Med. 1972; 43:1200–6. 

32. Underwood Ground KEA. Prevalence of coronary atherosclerosis in healthy 

United Kingdom aviators. Aviat. Space Environ. Med. 1981; 11:696–701. 

33. Vyrnwy-Jones P. A review of Army Air Corps helicopter accidents,1971–1982. 

Aviat. Space Environ. Med. 1985; 56:403–409. 

34. Whinnery JE, Laughlin MH, Uhe GS. Coincident loss of consciousness and 

ventricular tachycardia during +Gz stress. Aviat. Space Environ. Med. 1980; 

51:827–31. 

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45

Tax Issues—Excerpted Opinion of a Consulting Actuary 

(full Issues document available from PAAD) 

There is a very simple method for implementing a mandatory retirement age increase without adversely affecting retirement benefits for any class of pilots. These 

classes include pilots wishing to retire at age 60 regardless of any rules change as 

well as those electing to make use of any relaxation in current rules. Section 415 

of the Internal Revenue Code prescribes limits on benefits or contributions for anyone participating in a tax qualified retirement plan. 

A special provision substitutes a different key date in the case of commercial airline pilots retiring at or after age 60. This is a crucial provision, and I quote: 

‘‘415(b)(9)(A)(ii) if, as of the time of the participant’s retirement, regulations prescribed by the FAA require an individual to separate from service as a commercial 

airline pilot after attaining any age occurring on or after age 60 and before the Social Security retirement age, paragraph (2)(c) . . . shall be applied by substituting 

such age for the Social Security retirement age.’’ If the mandatory retirement age is to be increased without adversely affecting pilots’ retirement benefits, this provision must clearly be changed. 

The Ideal Change 

Under the ideal change, 415(b)(9)(A)(ii) would be amended to read simply ‘‘415(b)(9)(A)(ii) Paragraph (2)(c) shall be applied by substituting age 60 for the Social Security retirement age.

Senator GORTON. Thank you. Ms. McElroy. 

STATEMENT OF DEBORAH C. McELROY, PRESIDENT, 

REGIONAL AIRLINE ASSOCIATION 

Ms. MCELROY. Thank you. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Senator Rockefeller, and Members of the Committee. Thank you for 

providing me the opportunity to address pilot hiring, training, and 

retention as it affects the regional airline industry. 

The regional airline industry is growing at a very impressive 

rate. Last year, regionals carried 78 million passengers, an increase 

of 10 percent over 1998, and more than 50 percent over the last 

decade. Today, one out of every eight domestic passengers flies on 

a regional airline. 

This growth is projected to continue, with passenger 

enplanements expected to reach 104 million by the year 2005. By 

this time regional jets may represent over 50 percent of the regional fleet, and may carry more than 70 percent of our passengers. 

Regional airline growth in the continued integration of regional 

jets offers improved access to the national air transportation system for the small and medium-sized communities. However, such 

growth does not come without challenges, including maintaining 

adequate staffing levels during increased periods of pilot attrition. 

Significant growth by the major and regional airlines last year 

meant pilots were leaving their positions at regional carriers with 

greater frequency than had been projected. As a result, a few regional carriers canceled a number of flights last summer, creating 

a situation that was unacceptable to the management of our member airlines, as well as to the customers we value and endeavor to 

serve. 

Though attrition appears to have decreased this year, pilots continue to progress from regional carriers to major airlines, their natural career path. Pilot attrition is a fact of life for regional airlines. 

We are better managing that attrition to ensure adequate staffing 

to provide the safety and schedule integrity important to our passengers. 

46

There are several reasons for the difficulties experienced by some 

airlines last year. Significant growth for both the major and regional airlines was one factor. Additionally, the FAA’s revised policy on reserve duty caused many major and some regional carriers 

to hire additional pilots not previously planned for, but that is in 

the past. 

Today’s regional airlines have refined their recruiting policies, 

adopted continuous hiring practices, and invested heavily in enhanced training programs designed to provide a constant supply of 

highly trained, qualified pilots to alleviate the strain of increased 

turnover. 

There has been some discussion of pilot shortage, but we would 

disagree. Regional airlines continue to recruit and hire pilots from 

a very qualified pool of applicants from general aviation, corporate 

aviation, and the military. Additionally, several airlines have established relationships with aviation universities and with pilot recruiting firms. These relationships assist airlines in attracting talented pilot candidates who will succeed through the intensive 

training programs our airlines require. 

While such pilot attrition presents a great challenge to some 

smaller airlines, the growth in our industry means all carriers 

must stay ahead of the pilot hiring curve. To do so, we have adopted measures aimed at preventing a recurrence of crew-related 

flight cancelations since last summer, and have taken steps to protect schedule integrity during times of high pilot turnover. 

Regional airlines spend more than $13,000 to train a new hire 

pilot and more than $12,000 to train a new captain. Additionally, 

several carriers have invested millions of dollars in designing educational centers for initial and recurrent training, some of which 

house full-motion flight simulators and advanced training devices. 

We expect these carriers to lead the industry in providing state-ofthe-art tools and technology to enhance training. 

While the regional carriers have taken steps to overcome some 

of these staffing challenges accompanying our industry’s growth, 

the carriers have identified a role for the federal government to 

play as well. The Nation’s flight training structure, including colleges, universities, training academies, and independent flight 

schools are a valuable resource, yet no federal financial aid programs to finance flight training are currently available. 

Because potential pilots are not eligible for federal student loan 

programs for flight training, the interest on loans obtained from 

private sources raises the cost of learning to fly considerably. Expanding eligibility of Federal Student loans to include flight training could help increase the number of pilots available. Likewise, increasing the VA benefits for flight training, which currently pay 

only 60 percent of pilot training costs, might similarly expand the 

pool of available pilots. 

The FAA can play a role as well by revising the existing flight 

training requirements to incorporate more efficient use of simulators and flight training devices. Additionally, with the increased 

number of flight simulators expected to come online this year, FAA 

should prioritize inspection and certification so the new simulators 

can be immediately available to training new hire and captains. 

47

Finally, due to budget constraints, FAA has in some cases limited the travel and therefore the availability of some inspectors to 

conduct pilot qualification checks. Prioritization of these inspections could result in fewer delays in the training process for regional airlines. 

We recognize the crew shortages resulted in some canceled 

flights last year, inconveniencing our customers. That is not a situation that we want to recur. Regional carriers have made significant investments in order to maintain the high level of safety, 

while providing travelers with schedule integrity and reliable air 

service. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I will be glad to answer 

any questions later. 

[The prepared statement of Ms McElroy follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DEBORAH C. MCELROY, PRESIDENT, REGIONAL AIRLINE ASSOCIATION

Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Senator Rockefeller, and distinguished Members of 

the Committee. Thank you for giving me this opportunity to comment on the issue 

of pilot hiring, training, and retention as it affects the regional airline industry. 

Background 

I am President of the Regional Airline Association, a trade association representing 60 regional airlines in the United States. Regional airlines operate short 

and medium-haul scheduled airline service linking smaller communities with larger 

cities and connecting hubs, operating modern and technically advanced turboprop 

and regional jet aircraft. RAA member airlines carried over 97 percent of the regional airline passengers in the United States last year. 

Our industry is growing. Today, regional carriers serve 429 commercial airports 

in the lower 48 states, and at 244 of these airports, regional carriers provide the 

sole source of scheduled air service. In 1999, regional airlines carried 78 million passengers, which means that approximately 1 out of every 8 domestic passengers traveled on a regional carrier. The number of passengers traveling by regional aircraft 

has increased dramatically, up 10 percent from 1998 and up more than 50 percent 

over the last decade. We expect this growth trend to continue, with passenger 

enplanements projected to reach 104 million and revenue passenger miles to grow 

to 31 million by the year 2005. By this time, regional jets may represent over 50 

percent of the regional fleet and may carry 70 percent of our passengers. 

Impact of Growth 

This growth in our industry will mark an improvement in our nation’s air transportation system overall, as small and medium sized communities reap the benefits 

of increased access to the national air transportation network. Likewise, the growth 

will be good for our 60 airline members, for their employees, and for those who take 

advantage of new job openings across the nation, as our industry becomes stronger 

still. Along with this growth, however, our carriers have faced certain challenges. 

One such challenge is maintaining adequate staffing levels to preserve schedule integrity during the increased periods of pilot attrition that inevitably follow industry 

growth in both major and regional airlines. 

The industry’s record growth last year meant pilots were leaving their positions 

with greater frequency than usual. As a result, a few regional carriers had to cancel 

a number of flights last summer, creating a situation that was unacceptable to the 

management of our member airlines as well as to the customers we value and endeavor to serve. As you know, flight cancellations are undesirable. They disrupt 

schedules and impact profitability. In just a moment, I am going to outline several 

steps my carriers are taking to prevent a recurrence of last year’s cancellations. Let 

me first describe the circumstances. Though pilot attrition is down (our carriers reported a 19 percent attrition rate so far this year, compared to 29 percent in 1999), 

pilots continue to progress from regional carriers to major airlines with larger aircraft. This natural career path means that pilot attrition will always be a factor for 

regional airlines; however, we are not experiencing a pilot shortage. 

Last June FAA amended its enforcement policy regarding flight time limitations 

and rest requirements, issuing a Notice of Enforcement Policy. Specifically targeted 

at crewmembers on reserve duty, the new interpretation required operators to proVerDate Apr 24 2002 09:27 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 086337 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\86337.TXT SCOM1 PsN: CAROLT
48

vide a protected rest period, free from a ‘‘present responsibility for work,’’ for reserve 

crewmembers. The impact of this action varied among RAA members, ranging from 

minimal impact to as high as requiring the hiring of an additional 15 percent of 

pilots. Even those carriers reporting minimal impact from the interpretation, however, may have been indirectly affected, as the policy caused the major airlines to 

hire additional pilots and in turn contributed to the higher turnover rate experienced by regional airlines in the last 6 months of 1999. 

I would like to take this time to point out a fact: Regional Airlines continue to 

recruit and hire pilots from a qualified pool of applicants. Just this year, 25 of our 

largest regional airlines hired a total of 2,187 new pilots. We recruit pilots from several sources, including other regional airlines when a pilot makes a progression 

from a smaller regional carrier to a larger regional carrier, from general aviation, 

from corporate aviation, and from the military. Moreover, several airlines have established relationships—including internship programs—with aviation universities, 

such as Embry-Riddle and the University of North Dakota, and with pilot recruiting 

firms. These relationships assist airlines in attracting talented pilot candidates who 

will succeed through the intensive training procedures our airlines require. 

If there is a ‘‘pilot shortage,’’ it is not a lack qualified applicants, but rather a 

period of time that is needed between pilot departures and the length of time required to train replacements. Most pilots move to a major carrier and provide a notice of 2 weeks’ time, yet airlines need at least 4–6 weeks to accommodate the pilot 

training cycle for new pilots and upgrades from first officer to captain. In the past, 

this time differential has created difficulties in staffing some flights. 

Addressing Pilot Turnover 

While such pilot attrition presents a great challenge to smaller airlines, the 

growth in our industry means all carriers must stay ahead of the pilot hiring curve. 

To do so, our members have adopted measures aimed at preventing a recurrence 

of crew-related flight cancellations since last summer, and have taken steps to protect schedule integrity during times of high pilot attrition, while maintaining and 

even enhancing pilot training procedures. While I will paint a more detailed portrait 

of these training procedures momentarily, I would like to mention now that these 

measures have already been met with great success. Through June of 2000, our 

members have seen improvement in schedule integrity. 

To address pilot attrition, airlines have adopted continuous hiring practices. Moreover, our carriers have invested heavily in enhanced training procedures designed 

to provide a constant supply of highly trained, qualified pilots to alleviate the strain 

of increased turnover. While the FAA requires only 250 hours of flight time to earn 

a commercial pilot’s license, regional airlines require new hires to possess between 

1,000 to 1,500 total flying hours or more, with several hundred hours devoted to 

multi-engine aircraft. In addition, 75 percent of our carriers require pilot candidates 

to undergo a flight simulator evaluation as part of the selection process. 

I’ve already alluded to the rigorous training process our pilots undergo as they 

prepare for a job with a regional carrier. Our airlines spend an average of $13,122 

in order to train a new-hire, and an average $12,133 in order to train a new captain. 

Several carriers have also invested millions in designing centers for initial and recurrent training, some of which house full-motion flight simulators and other advanced training devices. We expect these carriers to lead the industry in providing 

state-of-the-art tools and technologies to enhance training. 

In addition to these advanced, in-house training facilities, carriers have additional 

resources available to assist with pilot training and recruiting. For instance, many 

carriers contract outside training facilities, where airlines send new hires and upgrade pilots for intensive training on advanced, full motion aircraft flight simulators. Each carrier tailors course curricula according its own training and aircraft 

specifications, which is then incorporated into a proven contract training program. 

To deal with the increase in pilot attrition, these training facilities have adopted 

adjunct training programs with longer courses; most courses have been lengthened 

by 1–3 simulator sessions, with typically 20–22 hours of simulator time per pilot, 

supplemented by 20–22 hours of additional simulator experience performing nonpilot duties. During a typical course, each crew receives a total of 22–44 hours of 

simulator instruction over 4–6 weeks. In the past, some carriers have had difficulty 

attaining simulator time, especially for training regional jet pilots. We expect this 

situation to improve considerably over the next year, as one training facility will 

have doubled the number of the flight simulators available for regional jet training. 

Solutions 

While the regional airlines have already taken steps to overcome the flight-staffing challenges accompanying our industry’s growth, our carriers have identified a 

49

role for the federal government to play, too. The nation’s flight training structure, 

including colleges, universities, training academies, and independent flight schools, 

are a valuable resource. Yet, no federal financial aid programs to finance flight 

training are currently available. Because potential pilots are not eligible for federal 

student loan programs for flight training, the interest on loans obtained from private sources raises the costs of learning to fly considerably. Expanding eligibility of 

federal student loans to include flight training could help increase the number pilots 

available. Likewise, increasing the VA benefit for flight training, which currently 

pays only 60 percent of pilot training costs, might similarly expand the pool of available pilots. 

The FAA can play a role, as well, by revising the existing flight training requirements to incorporate more efficient use of simulators and flight training devises. Additionally, with the increased number of flight simulators expected to come on line 

this year, FAA should prioritize inspection and certification so the new simulators 

can be immediately available for training new hires and new captains. Finally, the 

FAA field offices that oversee and support the regional airlines continue to limit the 

travel and therefore the availability of inspectors to conduct pilot qualification 

checks. Prioritization of these inspections would result in fewer delays in the training process and help regional airlines address pilot staffing challenges. 

Summary 

We recognize that crew shortages stopped flights last summer, inconvenienced 

customers, and hindered airlines striving to maintain schedule integrity. I have outlined the investments regional airlines have made in enhanced training programs 

and continuous hiring practices in order to maintain the highest level of safety 

while providing travelers with reliable air service. While the pilot attrition rate may 

fluctuate from time to time, our industry will always continue to provide safe, convenient air service. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be glad to respond 

to any questions that you or any Member of the Committee may have.

Senator GORTON. Thank you. Ms. Barker. 

STATEMENT OF LINDA BARKER,

VICE PRESIDENT, BUSINESS AVIATION SERVICES 

Ms. BARKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe, Senator 

Rockefeller. My name is Linda Barker, and I am now serving as 

the chairperson of the National Air Transportation Association, 

which represents 2,000 aviation businesses that operate and service aircraft. You might say our business is at the beginning of the 

pilot supply line. 

I am the owner and vice president of Business Aviation Services, 

a fixed-base operation in Sioux Falls, South Dakota, so I know 

what it is like to run a business in rural South Dakota, and I know 

what it is like to face the pilot shortages on a daily basis, because 

it is our pilots that start out on your typical career path to work 

up, to work in these wonderful places that are represented at the 

table today. 

We have 145 employees, and 53 of those are pilots. Some of them 

serve as certified flight instructors, some of them are air taxi or 

charter operators, and some of them are air cargo pilots, but they 

are all very integral in the operation of our business. 

Typically, you see that young people take flying lessons because 

they have this dream of becoming an airline pilot, but they have 

to spend many long hours learning to fly, getting their pilot and 

private and multiengine, and then certified flight instructors. 

From there, we typically hire them, or other companies such as 

mine, into the air cargo or charter business, which is really critical 

to the economic viability of rural small America. We need these pilots, and we need companies like mine to operate, not only for our 

50

own good and for our own health, but the health and viability of 

our communities. 

Not only do they work for us, but they fly air ambulances, which 

are so critical in getting patients to regional hospitals, and they fly 

organs and these types of things to get to the critical needs in the 

larger facilities, so we see that these people are so critical and so 

important to us that we do not want to be just the training ground 

that continually moves on. 

When I talk to our membership, they say that the historical 

turnover rates for on-demand air charter operators was about 5 to 

10 percent annually. That was up until about 5 years ago. Now we 

are seeing that during the last 2 years the rates of turnover have 

climbed to 50 percent or more. 

In fact, in my own small company, where we have 27 air cargo 

operators, in 1998 24 of those pilots left for other opportunities, 

and you know, I cannot deny them those opportunities. These are 

very good, ambitious young pilots that want to move on. 

Senator GORTON. Ms. Barker, what is your pay scale for pilots? 

Ms. BARKER. It starts anywhere, from the beginning pilots 

around $25,000, our more experienced get around $50,000 to 

$55,000. Our director of flight operations is $55,000, and then we 

try and get the benefits to a retirement plan, those types of things 

as well. 

So we are constantly hiring. In fact, we—I mean, our human relations director, we did not even realize there was such a position 

until a few years ago, and we have a contract person that does 

nothing but search and advertise on web sites and different periodicals and trade journals for pilots, and so we are constantly interviewing and hiring pilots, even if we are up to capacity. If we get 

a good pilot, we will hire that person, because in a week or two 

that position may again be open, or may be needed. 

In fact, our director of flight operations, who we just hired in 

February, who promised to be with us 6 years, we gave him a special benefit package and all kinds of incentives, just resigned last 

week after 6 months on the job because he had a better opportunity, and it is like, we like your company, and you are nice people, but I feel I have to move on, and that is just what is happening 

in the industry. We are in a very healthy economy, but we also 

have to be mindful of these things. 

Now, I know I cannot just go on and tell you all the lows we are 

having. I think you know you are looking for answers or ways that 

Congress can lead, some of the ideas and suggestions. 

Certainly when you talk about the age 60 rule, that does not directly affect our air charter business or our air cargo operation because our pilots do not qualify, but I must say, some of the best 

pilots we employ that fly in all kinds of South Dakota weather, and 

you know what the weather can be like in the northern plains, are 

older pilots that have been experienced and been flying for many, 

many years, and so the whole age discrimination thing I do not 

want to get into, but to me I think 60 is a very arbitrary rule, and 

I certainly hope no one tells me to retire when I am 60, and that 

is only 5 years away, but that is another issue. 

The other thing that I think the Senate and Congress can look 

at are, you know, some of the regulatory issues. I served on the NaVerDate Apr 24 2002 09:27 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 086337 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\86337.TXT SCOM1 PsN: CAROLT
51

tional Civil Aviation Review Commission that was held in 1997, 

and we talked about some of these issues, and I guess I spent most 

of my time as the loan general aviation representative on that commission saying, but we are not the commercial airlines. 

And we are not—you know, our flight and duty time is a total 

different issue than what ALPA and the commercial airlines are 

talking about, and when the FAA or Congress tries to put all of us 

under one category, we always have to stop and say, but look, we 

are an on-demand operator. We have certain issues. We have area 

ambulance programs to run, you have duty times. 

And so we cannot always fall into the same categories, and that 

would be one of the considerations when you talk about the impact 

in rural communities and how Congress or the FAA or the regulators can look at us, that you know, when we say we are different, 

it is because we are. We are not trying to be contrary or arbitrary 

or whiny. It is just a different world out there than what you are 

seeing when you fly a big commercial airlines for one of the large 

commercial carriers. 

So the flight and duty time is a really big issue, and a few years 

ago when the FAA tried to put all of us together, that would have 

meant a 50 percent increase in the number of pilots that on-demand operators would have to have hired. Well, we cannot absorb 

that. There is just no way we can do that without cutting back our 

services and having almost a no-growth mentality, when there is 

more and more demand for our kinds of services. 

As we get gridlock in the air, as the commercial hubs become 

more and more congested, you see that businesses and just everyday people that live in communities like Sioux Falls, South Dakota, 

or Alaska, or Oklahoma, or West Virginia are looking to fractional 

ownerships, and looking at ways of getting around some of these 

issues. 

We want to be able to meet that demand. We want to do it safely, we want to do it economically, and we want to provide the service to our constituents, as you well do, too, so give us this opportunity, and when these certain issues come up, whether it is the 

age of pilots, flight and duty time, there is a whole harmony issue 

of, that we have to train pilots the same as they do in Europe. That 

would close down so many flight schools, where you are getting so 

many of these pilots coming through the ranks right now. 

So I guess I feel very passionately, and I get carried away by 

these things because I see it day-in and day-out. I mean, I am the 

one that has to talk to the pilots as they come through, or their 

exit interviews, and I see what it does to our business, and it is 

expensive. 

The one thing I would like to say on a more positive aspect before I end my testimony is, because we have seen such a turnover 

and such a need for certified flight instructors—that is where you 

bring these high school and college kids into your program—that 

this past year the Business Aviation School of Aeronautics, which 

is the flight school that we operate, had a joint partnership with 

South Dakota State University College of Education, and we joined 

a joint partnership between the university and a private business, 

that the College of Education there would not only grant a degree 

in education, but then we would certify the flight instructors. 

52

So flight instructors are now coming out with a degree in education. They are not just pilots that are moving on up the rank. 

Hopefully we are going to find some young individuals that have 

a passion for teaching and flying, and they can be an impetus to 

teach new people coming out and using educational background as 

well as pilot training in training pilots, and hopefully keeping these 

young people. 

But there again, you know, universities all need money. You 

need to chair or know the chairmanships of these committees, or 

these education programs, and you need financial aid for the students, because it is very expensive to learn how to fly, and when 

you are young individual coming from a farm in rural South Dakota, or a ranch in the western part of the State, and you have a 

passion, and you may have the mechanical abilities, you still need 

the financial aid to get there. 

That may be another area that we can look at for some joint 

partnerships between Congress and our State legislators as well, 

encouraging these young people to go into the profession of aviation, especially flying. 

Thank you so much for your time and for giving me this opportunity. I really appreciate it. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Barker follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LINDA BARKER, VICE PRESIDENT, BUSINESS AVIATION

SERVICES

Mr. Chairman, my name is Linda Barker, and I currently serve as chairperson 

of the National Air Transportation Association (NATA). NATA represents nearly 

2,000 aviation businesses that own, operate and service aircraft. These companies 

provide for the needs of the traveling public by offering services and products to aircraft operators and others such as fuel sales, aircraft maintenance, aircraft parts 

sales, airline servicing, aircraft storage, flight training, Part 135 non-scheduled air 

charter, aircraft rental, and scheduled commuter operations in smaller aircraft. 

NATA members are the vital link in the aviation industry that provides services to 

the general public, airlines, general aviation, and the military. 

I am also an owner and vice president of Business Aviation Services in Sioux 

Falls, South Dakota. We employ 145 people and provide a full complement of general and commercial aviation services at the Sioux Falls Regional Airport. Like 

many of my fellow NATA members, our company is facing an enormous challenge 

in hiring and retaining qualified pilots for our flight school, as well as our air freight 

and passenger air charter operation. 

As members of the Subcommittee may know, there is a typical career path in the 

aviation industry for developing and training pilots. While this may not hold true 

for all, it certainly is the path followed by many pilots. An individual will begin by 

taking flight lessons and after obtaining a pilot’s license build up enough hours to 

become a Certified Flight Instructor (CFI). After working as a CFI and accumulating flight time, the pilot may then seek a position with a regional airline or begin 

flying for an on-demand air charter operator. Subsequently, based on the pilot’s skill 

and total hours, a position with the major airlines may then become available to 

them. Of course, not all pilots want to work for a major airline, but for most this 

is the ultimate goal. It is this ‘‘pilot supply line’’ that has been and is expected to 

continue to be at an all time low. 

Almost 3,000 businesses are certificated by the FAA as Part 135 on-demand air 

charter air carriers. The majority of companies in the industry are small businesses 

providing a vital transportation link for medical services, important cargo needed 

to promote commerce, and personal travel supporting the growth of the economy. 

These companies use smaller aircraft to meet the customized needs of the traveling 

public for greater flexibility in scheduling and access to almost every airport in the 

country. In passenger service, flights are planned according to the customer’s schedule, not the operator’s. Likewise, air charter serves a vital role for commerce across 

the country and the world providing short notice delivery of parts, important documents, supplies and other valuable cargo. On-demand air charter saves lives as air 

53

ambulance operators are ready at a moment’s notice to fly to an accident scene or 

remote area to transport those in need to hospitals that can provide necessary care. 

In addition, on-demand air charter flights transport vital organs for those requiring 

transplants. All of these services are contingent upon the ability to respond quickly 

to the needs of customers. 

Our members tell us that the historical turnover rates for on-demand air charter 

operators was about 5 to 10 percent annually. Each company may experience different rates based on variables such as equipment operated (piston, turbo-prop or 

jet engine), pay and benefits, and hours of operation. During the last 2 years, these 

rates have climbed to 50 percent or higher. One member in particular suffered 70 

percent turnover in their pilots last year. Whatever the actual rate, most of our 

members have reported a doubling in their pilot turnover. 

The national statistics are substantiated by what we see in our operation in Sioux 

Falls. We are continually recruiting, hiring, and training new pilots in all departments. This includes CFIs in our Flight School who traditionally instruct until they 

have enough hours to move into the freight or charter aircraft. More recently, we 

see some students that move from CFIs and go directly to the regional airlines. 

Right now, we are advertising for a new Director of Flight Operations in our Charter operation. 

At Business Aviation, we employ 53 pilots: 17 air charter and air ambulance pilots, 25 freight pilots with positions open for 2 more freight pilots, 9 flight instructors, and 2 aircraft salespeople who are also pilots. Finding pilots for freight operation is our greatest challenge because the flying is generally at night and does not 

have the same appeal as transporting passengers. Over the last 4 years, we experienced the following turnover:

• 1996, 15 of our freight pilots resigned for other positions

• 1997, 19 freight pilots left our company

• 1998, 24 pilots left for other opportunities

• 1999, an additional 15 pilots were replaced

The shortage of pilots has caused our company to constantly advertise and spend 

a great deal of our resources recruiting pilots. Frankly, we even overstaff if qualified 

pilots are interested, knowing that only too soon there will be positions available. 

I participate in an organization known as The Midwest Air Freight Association. 

Based on a recent poll of other air cargo companies, every member of that organization is experiencing pilot shortages. One member related that 5 years ago he would 

receive 50 responses from advertisements placed in industry publications along with 

local advertising. Today, they have almost no responses or maybe two or three for 

the same type of advertisement. The pilot shortage has caused this company to 

change its philosophy on growth and to reduce the number of freight routes. 

This is echoed across the NATA membership. The uncertainty over whether your 

pilots employed today will be there tomorrow is stifling many air charter operators 

from expanding their services to meet the growing demand for air transportation. 

This disproportionately impacts on the less populated areas of the country that receive little airline service. 

The shortage of pilots becomes critical when you consider the need for medical access provided by emergency medical services that may be the only link for smaller 

communities to medical specialists. The shortage threatens the expansion of medical 

services to smaller and rural communities. For example, one of our members regularly flies doctors to areas outside of Denver, Colorado, as the means for smaller 

communities in Colorado, Kansas and Wyoming to get access to specialty health 

care. 

Commerce and the economic viability of communities are likewise dependent upon 

access to air transportation. If qualified pilots are not available for air charter operators, this link is severed. Finally, the high value cargo, mail and express package 

services provided to communities across the country by companies like ours is directly affected by the ability to have pilots able to safely operate our aircraft. 

There are no silver bullets to solve this complex issue, and I do sincerely appreciate the leadership shown by the Commerce Committee for drawing attention to 

this most important national issue. We are just one part of an industry that needs 

qualified, trained professionals. 

While the aviation industry attempts to bring the pilot supply and the demand 

for their services into balance, external factors such as federal government regulatory initiatives can exacerbate the problem. It is important to ensure that FAA 

regulatory initiatives do not hamper or impair the industry. One troubling issue 

54

that continues to concern the Part 135 on-demand air charter community is the 

FAA’s anticipated revisions to flight crewmember flight and duty limits. 

There is a great deal of anxiety that the FAA will attempt to subject Part 135 

on-demand air charter operators to a ‘‘one-size-fits-all’’ flight and duty regulation 

identical to the regulations for the scheduled airlines. This would have devastating 

effects on the industry. An attempt by the FAA in 1995 to do so would have required a minimum of a 50 percent increase in the number of pilots required to continue operating our businesses. Although safety is the highest concern of aviation 

businesses, the design of regulations must be tailored to fit the various operating 

environments to achieve this goal. The Association maintains that Part 135 certificate holders must have versatility to comply with the on-demand nature of unscheduled FAR Part 135 operations. We urge the Subcommittee to encourage the FAA 

to recognize the uniqueness of the Part 135 on-demand air charter operators in its 

oversight of the aviation industry. 

Another area of FAA activity that could adversely affect the industry is the Agency effort to harmonize flight crew licensing with the European standards. The aviation system and pilot supply line in Europe is not like that in the United States. 

The FAA should not take any action that would threaten the affordability and efficiency of pilot training and licensing that has been the hallmark of our country. 

Regulatory changes that impair the ability to train pilots and adversely affect flight 

schools would then ripple across the entire industry. 

Congress should consider whether the current requirement for airline pilots to retire at age 60 is still necessary. As you can imagine, allowing pilots to continue 

working for an airline past 60 would decrease the demand for new pilots. Likewise, 

it would provide for these pilots with thousands of hours of accumulated flight time 

experience to continue serving the traveling public. 

One other idea that is important for the FAA to analyze that could affect the 

availability of pilots is whether certain requirements for pilots contained in Part 135 

are appropriate. There is a petition on file with the FAA requesting a decrease in 

minimum hours of flight time for cargo carrying flights in single-engine aircraft. In 

order to maintain an equivalent level of safety, this petition also requires increased 

pilot training by the operator. If the FAA were to move forward in this area with 

rulemaking, these additional provisions would ensure that a pilot is appropriately 

trained. 

Creative partnerships are important for the industry to respond to the need for 

additional pilots. We ask that the FAA be encouraged to be receptive to ideas developed that may be unique and do not fit the traditional pattern for training. 

As an example, our company has a joint program with our Business Aviation 

School of Aeronautics and South Dakota State University’s College of Education. 

Under this new program, students can receive a Bachelor of Science degree in Career and Technical Education with a specialization in Aviation Education. The impetus for the program stemmed from a growing public interest in general aviation and 

a nationwide shortage of certified flight instructors. Graduates will not only be Certificated Flight Instructors, but also Certified Teachers. By focusing on flight instruction as a career goal, this program encourages those with educational aspirations to consider becoming a professional flight instructor. However, like many other 

educational issues, university programs of this type need funding and scholarship 

programs to provide both staff and financial aid to students. 

As previously stated, the membership of NATA, like my company, is diverse in 

purpose and operation. However, all operations, from those utilizing CFIs to commercial pilots, are affected by the pilot shortage. Despite industry efforts such as 

the Be A Pilot program, whose sole mission is to increase student pilot starts, the 

disparity between supply and demand requires Congressional attention to a growing 

problem plaguing the air transportation industry. The potential resolutions presented can provide some relief, with proper and timely implementation, to small 

business operators I represent on behalf of NATA. 

Thank you for giving me this opportunity to be with you today. I would be pleased 

to respond to any questions related to this important issue.

Senator GORTON. Captain Woerth, perhaps the heart of your testimony is in this sentence: the age 60 rule is safety regulation and 

should not be changed or repealed unless there is sufficient evidence to prove conclusively that such action would not have a negative effect on safety. 

How will such proof ever be adduced if there is not a way to determine on the ground, or in the air, that flying above age 60 is 

55

safe? haven’t you put us in a catch-22 situation—no one above age 

60 can fly, therefore we cannot prove they are safe, therefore we 

cannot change the rule? 

Captain WOERTH. I do not believe so, Senator. I think the studies 

that were exhaustive, once again, not just in 1959 but also in the 

eighties and nineties, the Hilton study which was reviewed by my 

colleague, could not prove conclusively what to do next and, as Senator Rockefeller said at the beginning of the hearing, he said, at 

first do no harm, so if you can make it better, we are interested 

in improving safety, and I do not think anybody, as Nick Lacey 

(from the FAA), said will take a risk with it. 

If we are certain we can improve safety, we should do something, 

but if all we have is that medical evidence says it is inconclusive, 

we should not. 

Senator I would like to also talk about——

Senator GORTON. Well, if we go—now that Europe and many 

other countries have raised the ages to 65, 5 years from now, if 

they do not have any higher accident rate, will your views be different? 

Captain WOERTH. I think we should understand the difference 

between what pilots really do in Europe and what the regulatory 

process about licensure age means. 

Within Europe, the bulk of the airlines—you would recognize 

British Airways, Lufthansa, KLM—most of those pilots retire by 

contract at 55 or 56. Richard Branson hires some of these retired 

pilots for his Virgin Express because he can get them cheaper, but 

that is about economics, it is not about anything else. So to think 

out of the 189 carriers who signed on to ICAO, that 44 nations 

have got an exemption from that rule and allow a licensure age differently, that most pilots in Europe are suddenly over 60, is simply 

not true. 

Even within the United States the average airline pilot in a 

major airline does not make it to age 60. My own airline, which I 

am no longer employed by as president of ALPA, but at Northwest 

we have done an exhaustive study over the last decade, and the average age is only 57. That is when most pilots retire, and 50 percent of those retire for medical reasons. The others say they have 

just had enough; they felt they have lost a step; they mostly are 

just tired. 

This is a very debilitating career. There are extremely long 

hours, especially when you fly internationally, and they just decide 

that they have had enough, in the interest of safety, in the interest 

of their families and their own professional pride, they hang it up. 

So most pilots are not making it to age 60 now. There is some 

conclusive evidence that the real world is demonstrating, and in 

Europe as well, that they have agreed with their companies that 

55 or 56 is a preferred age to step down as a captain. There is some 

real world evidence that we are using, not studies, not hooking up 

to wires in some laboratory. The real world of a pilot understands 

how debilitating, how demanding this job is, and that is why their 

experience has been very different, Senator. 

Senator GORTON. Well, apparently, at least if Captain Emens is 

correct, we had regional airline pilots up to the age of 71 flying 

56

until last December 31. Is there any indication that they were less 

safe than their younger compatriots? 

Captain WOERTH. Well, there were only 200 of them, Senator. 

When they changed the rule, the study I saw, of the 100-some 

thousand pilots in the United States, when the new rule came into 

effect in 1995 and they grandfathered the commuter pilots until 

December 20 of 1999, there were only 200 of them. They attrited 

very slowly. 

So out of 200 pilots I guess if they did not have an accident I’d 

say there was no difference, but I did not see any evidence at this 

hearing that somehow those 200 pilots over a 4-year period affected 

a pilot shortage. The largest group I think was at Comair. 

Senator GORTON. Did they affect pilot safety? 

Captain WOERTH. I do not know how we measure that, just from 

the 200 pilots out of over 100,000 pilots flying. 

Senator GORTON. Mr. Lacey, Captain Emens made a brief reference. Do you have the slightest inclination or information with 

respect to the attitude on this rule of the present FAA Administrator? 

Mr. LACEY. I think the Administrator’s position would be, as I 

have articulated, Senator, that there has to be at least a safety 

equivalency, or preferably a benefit, in order to change the rule. I 

think, as we can see here, that the opinions and anecdotes and 

kinds of things that are offered in the debates that surround these 

kinds of issues do tend to reach a kind of inertia around what is 

there that is darned good. There is an economic cost, so to speak, 

to changing it, and the safety equivalency and benefit is fairly 

vague. There are 2 different arguments along that line. 

In both of these issues, age and fatigue, we are getting into 

human performance areas which we do not have a lot of good 

science on, so you have to go on operational experience and the 

record that is kind of left behind, and continue to probe and look 

at the science to see how that may push the boundaries of it. We 

are committed to doing that. 

Senator GORTON. Since I have a conference committee I am going 

to turn this over to you, Senator Burns. Senator Rockefeller was 

here before you. I think it is his turn to question, but you can finish and adjourn the hearing, if you will, but I think it is Senator 

Rockefeller’s turn at this point. 

Senator BURNS. (presiding) I will give him 5 minutes. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. That is all I ever get from you! 

This is a really interesting subject. Duane and I have talked before about pilot issues. Today, we are talking about the situation 

where we have a shortage of pilots. Linda Barker has made that 

very clear, and I do not think any of us doubt that. 

Senator Inhofe said it in one way. Every time I walk through an 

airport now, the only thing that comes to my mind is 10 years from 

now, when there will be double the number of people, double the 

number of planes waiting at the gates, not even counting UPS and 

FedEx and all the rest of them. You know, FedEx is what, the second biggest airline in the world, I think. We have a shortage of 

many things, and we will need more workers at every level. 

Captain WOERTH. I do not think in terms of certainly pilot employment, but total employment, probably, very large. 

57

Senator ROCKEFELLER. Just the number of airplanes, and you 

just think of the tremendous demand—tremendous demand. So 

clearly we have got to come up with pilots. I mean, you cannot sort 

of bring down the American economy. I do not mean you, but I 

mean, one cannot bring down the American economy. 

Now, I do not take any position on this age cut-off because I do 

not know enough to do that, and it is very difficult for me, because 

on the one hand, when you or the FAA say you cannot prove that 

pilots either get better or get worse at the age of 60, you then have 

to introduce empirical evidence to show averages. 

Now, again, I am not taking any position on this, but I want to 

sort of bring you and others out on this, because this whole question of arbitrary and discriminatory, and the court of appeals decision, et cetera, and technology and drugs, and things that make us 

healthier, and all of that is still—you know, we do not know what 

causes Alzheimer’s. We do not know what causes people to be either healthier or less healthy. 

But when you say average retirement age is 57 years old, of 

course, that means that others stay on, and they stay on until they 

are 60. Then that raises the question in my mind, well, in this 

world we have sort of got to get whatever we can get. I am not taking a position on this. I reiterate that, because I do not know 

enough to, but I do know enough to be scared of what is happening 

in rural West Virginia. 

I want to discuss the scope clause with you in a second. I do 

know enough to know that the people that are going to get the 

short end of the stick are people like us in West Virginia, because 

the pilot food chain works down from there, or down to there. 

What if 55 percent of pilots decided that they wanted to fly beyond 60? Would that make a difference? 

Captain WOERTH. I do not believe so, Senator, and I think what 

we have been focusing on is the wrong end of the equation. If I 

could refer again—when the Congress asked for a DOT study, a 

blue ribbon commission on the shortage of pilots and aviation 

maintenance technicians—they correctly focused it on the other end 

of the equation, on incentivizing young people, on encouraging 

(aviation) schools even tax incentives. 

They primed the pump the correct way we have done with our 

economy in other industries before to encourage people to build the 

pool at the bottom and have a larger pool of trained young people 

to be available to come into the ranks. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. Which I like, but as I hear that I have 

to factor into my mind that in West Virginia our Governor has just 

put a freeze minus 3 percent on all institutions of higher education, 

because even in a good economy, that does not mean that West Virginia participates. Probably Montana is a little bit the same. 

So we have a college that is trying to do that, but I will bet that 

nobody else will, and I will bet they have to cut back their program. 

So I agree with you that you always try to give people incentives 

and then try and get them away from the .com world, which is 

where most people are headed. 

It just seems to me there ought to be some way we can work this 

through. I do not know what difference technology does make. AcVerDate Apr 24 2002 09:27 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 086337 PO 00000 Frm 00061 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\86337.TXT SCOM1 PsN: CAROLT
58

tually, I would be interested in what any of you think about the 

technology, the pharmaceuticals. I am over 60. Conrad is still in 

his late forties, and he does not have to worry about this yet. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. But I mean, there is a burn-out for something which is stressful—and my job is full of stress, and there are 

people that quit the Senate for the same reason, not the same percentage as in the airline industry, but there are people who do not 

quit the Senate, or quit the kind of life that I lead, which nonstop, 

without days of rest, which is another subject which I will not get 

time to discuss. 

But I am just interested in sort of, technology, pharmacology, 

and 60 and 65, what any of you think. 

Captain WOERTH. I would like to give an opinion on that, Senator. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. Sure. 

Captain WOERTH. One of the things I think has been acknowledged, there is a tremendous amount of drugs on the market. Pharmaceuticals, medicine has changed a lot of things, but in aviation 

medicine it has not had its true effect. A great deal of those medicines are prohibited to be used by a pilot while you are flying or 

engaged in aviation. 

In fact, if you look at the back of most drugs, even common drug 

prescriptions, it says ‘‘Do not operate heavy machinery.’’ That 

would be us. So even some over-the-counter medicine you cannot 

use. You are violating your aviation certificate if you take some 

over-the-counter medicine, Contac, anything like that, all sorts of 

pain relievers for example, for back pain, and all sorts of heart 

medicine. It has to be strictly regulated and monitored by an aviation medicine advisor, so there is a whole host of things that your 

average citizen can use and perform his daily function. 

But, a great many of those drugs are prohibited to be used by 

an airline pilot. You lose your certificate, or at least it is suspended 

until you are off that medication, so it has not had the same effect 

and benefit to our profession, because of its medical limitations, 

and rightly so, by the FAA who is concerned, number 1, about safety and taking no chances. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. Any other—yes, sir. 

Captain EMENS. Senator, I think we get a little off-track if we 

start to talk about medication, et cetera. Duane here is exactly 

right on medication and pilots. It does not much mix, but that is 

not needed. I mean, in 40 years, study after study has shown that 

pilots, as is the general population, is a whole lot healthier than 

it was 40 years ago. We are basically caught in a time warp here. 

We are stuck in 1959, and pilots are healthier. They have always 

been healthier than the general population. 

This rule was promulgated based on worries of sudden incapacitation and stroke, and it used the general population of the United 

States, ages 60 and 64, to make that rule. It did not apply to pilots 

who, even in 1959, were healthier than the general population, and 

that is even more so today. 

Now, an Israeli Air Force Medical Center—I think we all agree 

that the Israeli Air Force is top-notch. They say here in a study, 

the incidents of fatal accidents from human error is, however, far 

59

greater than that from physical illness, since inexperienced pilots 

have a 2-to-3 times increased incidence of mishaps due to pilot 

error. The estimated risk of disease related to in-flight sudden incapacitation should be balanced by consideration of pilot experience, 

and we are all agreed we have got a pilot experience problem. 

As far as cognitive problems go, which is what Captain Woerth 

here and the FAA talked of, mental changes occur and we all kind 

of start to lose it as we get older. Well, studies have shown consistently that those decreases rarely manifest themselves before the 

age of 70. We are not talking about anything close to that. 

We are also talking about pilots who are healthier than the general population, so it does not apply to pilots. 

We are also talking about a thing called domain relevance, which 

basically means that if someone does something over and over 

again, like you fly, you work the checklists, you are in the system, 

you function even better even longer. This cognitive decline is a red 

herring. It is not going to affect a pilot age 60 to 64. 

Are the guys bailing out at 57? Yes. I have got good friends that 

are leaving at 57. Their 401(k) and their profit-sharing is fat, and 

they are playing golf. It has nothing to do with health, and they 

are really perky. They are not burned out. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. Well, but they are gone by their own decision. 

Captain EMENS. They are going out because they do not want to 

fly any more, but it is not health, and they are not burned out, and 

I dare say that there are a whole lot of United pilots, et cetera, 

that feel the same, but Captain Moon back here, he does not feel 

that way. He is a United pilot. He is 61. He is flying side-saddle. 

He is back there, and he is not burned out. He is the head of 

OBAP, the Organization of Black Airline Pilots. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. Senator Burns, with your permission can 

I ask one more question, and then I will forever hold my peace for 

this afternoon. 

You mentioned, Mr. Woerth, in your testimony that you do not 

think that scope clauses are necessarily—and I did not hear your 

testimony, but I am looking at it, are not the problems for small 

communities, and you and I have talked about this before, sort of 

privately, and you know I worry about that. You know that aviation in and out of West Virginia is the make-or-break deal for West 

Virginia. It is not highways, it is aviation, and it is not turbo-props, 

it is regional jets. 

I can virtually prove that if I just go back and take notes on conversations that I have had, and I am just kind of wondering, generally speaking, what you do think will happen with the scope 

clause, and if there is any possibility, through negotiations or 

through whatever happens, that West Virginia can have more hope 

for regional jets. I mean, that becomes a big factor now with the 

purported merger, because DC Air is going to put up nothing but 

regional jets, after 2 years, into West Virginia. 

Now, that is like remaking West Virginia’s future and, I suspect, 

Montana’s too, I mean if that were to happen. Can you just guide 

me along that——

Captain WOERTH. Yes, sir, and I believe that—well, first of all 

there are over 500 small jets in service, commonly referred to as 

60

regional jets. I tend to think that is a misnomer, because they have 

a multitude of missions, but let us call them small jets for the purpose of this discussion. You refer to them as RJ’s. 

There are over 500 in service, and there are none of them 

parked, so they are all being flown, so any pilot job security provision or scope clause, certainly is not restrictive. There are no 

parked airplanes, so they are all flying. 

I think as our study that we did and I presented a paper to an 

American Bar Association Seminar—I will submit it, if you would 

like—that paper shows that clearly the marketing departments of 

the airlines decide where they deploy those airplanes, and so far 

they deploy them in fairly big markets. 

Some small communities have gotten a lot of the benefit of them, 

and I understand the reasons for it, Senator, and I would want one, 

too, in my community, but I do not think it is the pilot scope clause 

that has been the limiter, since there are none parked, they are all 

flying. 

And I think what we are seeing is all of the additional deliveries 

that were scheduled, and airlines are taking delivery of them as 

fast as they can be built. And if the recent negotiations by our colleagues at American are any indication, I think the job security 

provisions or scope clauses are evolving and opening up, and I see, 

especially in the 50-seater and below category, the most popular 

model of that small jet, that there will be more and more of them. 

None of them will be parked, and they will all be flying, and I am 

hoping your communities get what they need. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. OK. I am, too. I know they are all flying, 

but I also know there is an enormous demand for a lot more of 

them. I mean, United is stuck behind American. That is their fault, 

but in the order business. This just becomes tremendously important. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator BURNS. Thank you, Senator Rockefeller. 

STATEMENT OF HON. CONRAD BURNS,

U.S. SENATOR FROM MONTANA 

As I listen to this conversation here—and I am a little older than 

he says. I am just circling the drain here, you know, sort of lap 

time—I think we are concentrating on the wrong end of this thing. 

I think if we want to promote aviation and do some things about 

getting some qualified people in the air and alleviate some of Ms. 

Barker’s problems at Sioux Falls—of course, I am not real sure you 

can solve all of your problems at Sioux Falls. 

Ms. BARKER. Oh, we can. We can. 

Senator BURNS. Being as I am from Montana. I think we may be 

looking at the wrong end of things, but I have a question for Mr. 

Lacey. Given the potential significant impact on rural air service, 

when you promulgated some new rules, did you consult with DOT’s 

Essential Air Service Office when it was analyzing the societal cost 

of its proposed rules of pilot flight and duty time? Do you all ever 

talk to those folks? 

Mr. LACEY. Senator, I cannot address that specifically, but I 

would be glad to check. Certainly we are aware of the Essential Air 

Service. We certainly do what I believe is a thorough economic 

61

evaluation and impact on these rules, but specifically on the proposed rule for flight duty, and how we are doing vis-a-vis Essential 

Air Service, I would like to get back to you on that. 

DOT does not have a record showing that the Office of Essential 

Air Service received the 1995 proposed rule on pilot flight and duty 

time for review. DOT’s list of rules that they reviewed goes back 

only to 1996. However, the FAA is currently revising the flight and 

duty time rule and will coordinate with Department once it is 

ready for review. 

Senator BURNS. Well, that would be fine, but I will tell you, what 

just absolutely—I guess it is very disgusting to me whenever I 

come to Washington, which was 11 years ago, and it looks like I 

should get over it by now, but I never do, you cannot get people 

in different agencies to talk to one another. Everybody thinks they 

are king of the hill, and we are going to do it, and that is it, and 

they do not visit with one another, and I really get upset about 

that. 

Tell me about—I got some notes here. The training of new pilots. 

Young men and women that want to become pilots, and they find 

a school. How important would the situation with the student loan 

program—that was financed through Sallie Mae, or whatever we 

use now. Would that alleviate some of the problems of finding and 

training new people? 

Ms. BARKER. Senator, if I could comment. 

Senator BURNS. Yes. 

Ms. BARKER. Just on the limited experience we had, just starting 

this program last year, there was just an incredible interest in students. In fact, without any advertising—we wanted to start slowly—we had 38 students in the program, and I notice that it does 

slow down in the summers, because it would be helpful if they 

could just keep flying and taking their flight instruction throughout 

the summers. 

Most of these students cannot afford it. They have to stop and 

work during the summer. I think any type of student loan program 

or assistance, even as small as it may be, would be a great help, 

because that would turn attention to this problem, too, and it 

would say, you know, here are some programs for students, and it 

would give them some help, at least to start out with. 

Senator BURNS. Give me an idea of the cost to get, say, a young 

person, 21, 22-year-old, a young person to multiple engine and instruments. How long? 

Ms. BARKER. Oh, I think you are talking a couple of years, and 

probably $8,000 to $10,000, and that is very economically, in addition to their other tuition. 

Senator BURNS. Well, you mean—tell me—would it take 2 years 

if they just went to school at this, say academy, or—now, we have 

got a school at Rocky Mountain College in Billings for pilots. 

Ms. BARKER. I think 2 years, 2 to 3 years would be a good——

Senator BURNS. Anybody else want to address that? 

Ms. MCELROY. I would, Senator. A number of the regional carriers have established relationships with aviation universities and 

training facilities. The timeframe is about right, and I think it is 

important, because these individuals are trained as airline pilots 

from the beginning. 

62

They are schooled in crew resource management. They are 

trained in the aviation environment, the air traffic control environment in which they will be operating, and so it is a very intensive, 

high technology approach to pilot training as opposed to some of 

the individuals who are now going through the process, building 

time, and having to have a second job, as Ms. Barker mentioned, 

in order to pay to do this. 

So I think that the loans, whether they are through Sallie Mae 

or another vehicle, would help greatly in this. 

Senator BURNS. Well, I say this from a very greedy standpoint. 

I am concerned about the retirement of pilots out of the military. 

They are leaving the Air Force and the Navy to go in to be commercial pilots, and we are having a terrible time hanging on to all 

kinds of pilots, whether it be helicopter or whatever, through tactical pilots, and I am saying that maybe this is an area where we 

should be making an investment as a government to set up some 

sort of a situation where we can train and make available loans to 

young people who want to go into aviation and maybe do not want 

to go into the service, into military service, but I know we have got 

to address that some way or other. 

On the age of 60 situation, it seems to me that once you get to 

be 60 years old, I mean, just from a common sense standpoint, I 

think your yearly physical maybe should come down to a semiannual, or whatever, and then we can go on from there and probably use some of those people, but I know there is a time in your 

life—and of course you know I come from Montana, and it is pretty 

disgusting to get to the age where you are running triple A kids 

with a AA horse. Some of you folks will figure that out, but it is 

disgusting. 

Yes, sir. Mr. Emens, do you want to comment on that? 

Captain EMENS. Yes. I come from a civilian background, and I 

think your idea of school programs, Sallie Mae programs loans, ginning that up was a wonderful idea, because good quality aviation 

training in a condensed, closed environment, much like the military 

is, is very much lacking. 

There are not very many places in this country that do it, and 

that same ALPA article that I quoted talked about ab initio programs that regional carriers, as she mentioned, provide are also 

very good, but we need to get started on it now, because the lag 

time is 2 to 3 years. Do we have that time, and those are rookies 

that we are turning out. 

Senator BURNS. Well, I just think that we—you know, I do not 

understand why maybe the airlines themselves, American, United, 

Northwest, they should not start looking at scholarship situations. 

Captain EMENS. Southwest Airlines does. 

Ms. MCELROY. Some regionals are doing that as well. 

Senator BURNS. Are they? 

Ms. MCELROY. Yes, sir. 

Senator BURNS. That makes a lot of sense to me, if there are 

promising young people that are willing to fly and want to make 

the—maybe save some of them from working, and a couple of years 

they are going to be on the flight line, so I think maybe that on 

the other end of it, we are paying too much attention to the other 

end of it, and we had better be recruiting some qualified people to 

63

step in and some young people—I have always said that aviation 

is the secret to this thing. 

I think that is about all the questions that I have. I know we had 

a hearing in Montana on this. It is very important to my State, because we rely either on the Essential Air Service for our smaller 

communities, or we depend on general aviation, and I know we are 

very lucky in Montana. I think our commercial air service is very 

good, and we are very lucky because we have got about five different airports that have solid jet service, into five airports in Montana. You just do not have that in a lot of States. 

Look at the State of Washington. They have only got two cities 

that have got that kind of service, but we have, and we are very 

happy about that, but we got a deal with distances in Montana, as 

you well know. 

I get the biggest kick—you can tell people, you know, it is about 

2 hours and—oh, what, 2 hours and 10 minutes from Kalispell to 

Minneapolis on Northwest. Half of that trip is spent in Montana, 

so you know, when you get to the little Missouri River, you are 

half-way to Minneapolis, so we got some distances to deal with. 

Senator do you have any more questions? I want to thank the 

panel this afternoon. I am sorry I was a little late in hearing some 

of the statements, but we will go over this, we will leave the record 

open, and then I think should any of you have any recommendations on what we should be doing legislatively, or what we can do 

administratively to alleviate some of these problems, but I personally come down on the side that we had better get started looking 

at academies and ways to train young people to come into the industry, rather than fiddle around with the other end of this thing 

too much. I mean, you guys can argue 60 and 60-over. That is for 

you guys to argue about. I want to train people. I want to get them 

into the workplace. 

Thank you for coming. 

[Whereupon, at 3:45 p.m., the Subcommittee adjourned.] 

(65)

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN MCCAIN, U.S. SENATOR FROM ARIZONA

For several years I have been concerned about pilot shortages in our armed forces, 

which can affect our combat readiness. Some of the same factors that influence military pilots are now having an impact on certain parts of the private sector. A strong 

economy has lead to record numbers of pilots being hired by the airline industry. 

Just as the generous pay scales and benefits of the major airlines have attracted 

pilots out of the military, smaller carriers are losing flight crews to the big players 

in the industry. 

But the supply of qualified pilots has been negatively affected by the fact that 

there are now fewer ex-military pilots on the market. For decades, the industry has 

been able to take advantage of highly skilled and experienced pilots who came out 

of military service. Airline expansion has been traditionally supported by large numbers of ex-military pilots who became available after major conflicts. Over the next 

five years, however, the pilots who joined the airlines after the Vietnam War are 

set to retire in particularly large numbers because of the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) Age 60 Rule. 

We must remain open minded about proposals to change the Age 60 Rule. They 

have the potential to ease the shortage of civilian pilots and reduce the pressure 

for military pilots to leave the service early. However, we are dealing with a rule 

that has been in effect for many years. Any modifications should not come at the 

expense of safety. 

I recognize that many pilots and others strongly oppose this rule. There are clearly divided opinions among policy makers and within the aviation community. Because the FAA has decided that the Age 60 Rule is an appropriate standard, Congress must be cautious before taking any action that would substitute its views for 

those of the agency responsible for aviation safety. I am aware that there are legitimate views on both sides of this issue, but it is one that tends to fall within the 

authority of the FAA. 

Balancing the needs of smaller and rural communities against safety considerations is difficult at best. Regional airlines and on-demand operators are an essential transportation link for many areas of the country. We must be aware that they 

sometimes have special needs. 

I hope that this hearing and our witnesses will be able to generate workable ideas 

to help us ease the pilot shortage problem. I appreciate Senator Burns efforts on 

this subject, and I thank Chairman Gorton for holding this hearing. It is an issue 

that deserves the careful attention of all aviation policy makers. 

WRIGHT STATE UNIVERSITY

SCHOOL OF MEDICINE

DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY HEALTH

Dayton, Ohio, July 20, 2000

Hon. SLADE GORTON, 

Chairman, 

Subcommittee on Aviation, 

Senate Commerce Committee, 

Washington DC.

Dear Senator Gorton:

This letter is in strong support of S. 1855 that proposes to increase to age 65 the 

present four-decades-old age 60 limit on pilots operating under § 121.383(c) of Title 

14, U.S. Code of Federal Regulations. 

During these past four decades, there have been (1) a substantial increase in the 

U.S. population health and life expectancy; (2) major advances in the health assessments of individual pilots; (3) major advances in the treatment of any developed 

medical condition; (4) advanced flight simulator and onboard flight recording equipVerDate Apr 24 2002 09:27 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 086337 PO 00000 Frm 00069 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\86337.TXT SCOM1 PsN: CAROLT
66

1Woolsey, S.D., Economic Impact of the FAA’s ‘‘Age 60 Rule.’’ 1993. Copy available on request. 

I make no claim to any expertise as an economist. But observing that no such analysis had 

been made by any qualified parties, I set out to apply my personal knowledge of the air carrier 

pilot’s career and eventual retirement to the question. This analysis is the result of that effort. 

ment for individual pilot skill and judgment assessments, and; (5) an across-theboard increase in regular healthy lifestyle practices by pilots. 

Countries in Europe and Asia have recognized that their prior age 60 limit on airline pilots was discarding experienced, healthy, and skilled pilots from the overall 

pilot population. Accordingly, many of these countries have raised the age to 65 and 

have, accordingly, enhanced the overall safety of their airline operations. 

It is now time to enact into law, in the interest of public safety, S.1855. On request, I would be pleased to furnish considerable supporting detailed data. 

Sincerely yours, 

STANLEY R. MOHLER, M.D., 

Director, Aerospace Medicine, 

Professor and Vice Chair, 

Department of Community Health. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SAMUEL D. WOOLSEY, J.D. 

I appreciate these written remarks urging legislative action to repeal the FAA’s 

Age 60 Rule being included in the formal record of the above hearing. I am a former 

military and airline pilot, having flown twenty years for Pan Am, and the last eight 

of a 40-year career as a pilot with United Airlines. After retirement, I entered law 

school, earning my Juris Doctor degree from John F. Kennedy University School of 

Law in 1998. 

In 1990, I began to research the factual history of, the practical effects of, and 

both the logical and legal rationales underlying the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA’s) so-called ‘‘Age 60 Rule,’’ 14 C.F.R 121.383(c) (the Rule). I have an extensive library of materials gathered from the medical community and the legal 

arena, as well as from both the legislative and administrative branches of government. My research (and materials) are available, at no cost, to any who ask. 

The Age 60 Rule states simply that no person may operate an aircraft in U.S. air 

carrier operations as a pilot (or co-pilot), and no U.S. air carrier may employ such 

a person as a pilot (or co-pilot) in its air carrier operations after his or her 60th 

birthday. Without exemption or waiver for its entire 40-year history, it imposes—

a mechanical process that compels—through forced retirements—the replacement of 

senior air carrier pilots with less senior pilots. 

By this mandatory process, the FAA’s Age 60 Rule is the proximate cause of both 

today’s and yesterday’s experienced pilot shortages—shortages that have adversely 

impacted our Nation’s military readiness, and today ration the aviation lifeline to 

our smaller and rural communities, particularly among our Western states and 

Alaska. Moreover, the problems this Committee struggles with today are but a continuation of those it faced in a similar hearing more than a decade ago. (See, Pilot 

Supply and Training, S. Hrg. 101–307, August 3, 1989.) 

The Age 60 Rule Is a Financial Disaster, Unrelated to Either Safety or Medicine 

The Age 60 Rule is not a safety issue, nor a medical certification issue, nor a licensure issue. Neither the airman’s First Class medical certificate, nor his or her 

pilot’s license, nor his or her Airline Transport Pilot’s rating, nor any aircraft type 

ratings are limited or restricted by the Rule. The Age 60 Rule is an ancient albatross limiting the FAA’s ability to remain abreast of both science and economics and 

literally ‘‘gifts’’ a discriminatory financial ‘‘windfall’’ to ALPA’s junior members (at 

the expense of its seniors) while imposing a horrendous economic burden upon the 

air carrier industry as a whole. 

Economics of the Age 60 Rule: 

In 1993 I prepared an analysis of the economic impact of the FAA’s Age 60 Rule 

on one carrier—United Airlines.1 For this endeavor, I am indebted to the Vice President, Flight Operations at United, Captain Hart Langer, for making available to me 

certain information regarding transition training times and costs, age 60 mandated 

retirement schedules, immediate pilot hiring programs, and pilot pension plans. I 

used my own (then) 27 year career as an airline pilot (and personal observations) 

for estimating the other variables considered—transition steps per senior pilot departure, monthly/annual flight times, vacation accrual, sick-leave exposure, and 

67

2See additional discussion under ALPA and Age 60, below, for specific references. 

other contractual issues. Compared to the other published estimations of training 

steps (between 16 and 20),2 my calculations based on only 6–8 are extremely conservative. Nevertheless, the economic impact revealed is dramatic: a total annual 

cost to just one airline of $53.2 Million in 1993, alone. 

To place these findings in context, recall that Julius Maldutis of Salomon Brothers had noted in 1992 that airline industry losses over the prior two years had obliterated all the profits made since the ‘‘Wright brothers spun the first wooden prop,’’

and the Air Transport Association (ATA) was projecting a $1.7 Billion loss for 1992. 

In this difficult economic environment, I felt that the FAA had a positive obligation 

to lessen financially onerous regulatory impacts wherever possible. One such area 

was in flight crew utilization. 

The FAA’s Age 60 Rule, I discovered, imposes a heavy economic burden on the 

entire aviation industry by unnecessarily shortening the productive careers of the 

safest, most experienced, and most expensively trained pilots. Should this Rule be 

altered (preferably eliminated altogether) to permit those healthy and motivated airmen at this airline who choose to remain ‘‘in grade’’ as pilots, rather than being 

forced to retire, or fall back to the lesser flight engineer position on their 60th birthday, and just 30 percent of those eligible did so, United would realize these savings 

in 1993: 

Real Permanent Savings (costs):

Staffing levels: .......................................................................... $2,251,320.00 (savable in 1993) 

Pay differentials: ....................................................................... $16,380,000.00 (savable in 1993) 

Temporarily Deferred Expenditures (costs):

Training costs: ........................................................................... $34,579,124.00 (deferrable in 1993) 

1993 Total Savable/Deferrable: ............................................... $53,210,444.00 (annual cost)

At 5 percent net from receipts, $53.2 Million in savings represents annual revenues of $10.6 Billion. Moreover, for this one carrier alone, these savings will easily 

exceed $250 millions over 5 years, largely through savings in transition training 

costs—which are available to all carriers! 

Altering the Age 60 Rule to permit extended careers for those healthy and capable 

airmen who are so motivated, would provide similar economic benefits to the entire 

aviation industry in a multitude of ways: (i) to the individual airlines through deferral of transition training steps and longer amortization of training costs, (ii) to the 

individual pilots through enhanced career choices, (iii) enhanced safety by extending 

the careers of the industry’s safest airmen, and (iv) reduced costs that can be passed 

on to the consuming public! 

The FAA and Age 60: 

Despite its clear an unequivocal knowledge to the contrary (see Airline Pilots and 

Age 60, below), the FAA has consistently publicized the Rule as being ‘‘in the interest of safety’’ made necessary by ‘‘medical uncertainties’’ that increase, indeed accelerate, with advancing age. But these arguments were/remain nothing more than a 

disingenuous ‘‘cover’’ to hide the Rule’s true beginning—money—as suggested by the 

FAA’s Office of Chief Counsel. (Enacted initially to enable a single Air Carrier 

(American Airlines) to better manage its transition training costs, the Rule is today 

vigorously defended by the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) to protect and enhance the promotional opportunities (thus financial welfare) of its junior members—

who now constitute a voting majority in their union.) 

Even as originally instigated by the CEO of American Airlines (C.R. Smith), it 

was pure economics that was ‘‘justified’’ with operational arguments—neither medical nor safety. Smith wanted to replace his (American’s) original barnstorming era 

Captains with younger, military trained pilots because he was introducing jet powered aircraft (the Boeing 707) into his fleet. Smith’s argument to the FAA’s Administrator (Retired Gen. Elwood Quesada, a long-time, personal friend) was data showing that these younger, ‘‘especially selected; for intelligence’’ pilots required less 

transition training time (i.e., less cost), into these new-fangled aircraft than did the 

older line pilots. (Source: ‘‘Dear Pete’’ note to ‘‘General Elwood Quesada, Washington, D.C.,’’ dtd. 30 Apr, 1959, three pages, with notation ‘‘Mail to home address:’’), and that he (Smith) had just lost both a labor grievance and a bruising, 

20 day pilots strike on the issue, thus needed a federal regulation to save his skin. 

68

3This letter from C.R. Smith (and the ‘‘memo’’ referenced immediately above) were retained 

in the files of Dr. Homer Reighard, a major participant in the preparation of the Rule, and later 

Federal Air Surgeon. When Dr. Reighard retired in 1984, he was permitted to take these letters, 

and other materials related to the Rule, its formation and history with him. During a civil suit 

under the Freedom of Information Act, Civ. Action No. 85–1943, (D.C., D.C., 1985), the court 

found that this release had abrogated agency privilege with respect to these materials, and ordered them released. 

Other materials similarly released by this order and referenced in this statement are identified as ‘‘From Reighard files.’’

. . . It appears obvious that there must be some suitable agre [sic] for retirement. It appears equally obvious that as men become older the result of the 

usual physical examination becomes less conclusive. 

(Source: Letter, Smith to Quesada, Smith’s personal letterhead, dtd. 5 February, 

1959) 3

Within days, Quesada had ordered that two proposals be prepared: (1) maximum 

age of 55 for transition into jet aircraft, and (2) mandatory retirement at age 60. 

Smith’s ‘‘transition time’’ data was fashioned into ‘‘charts,’’ and a hand-picked panel 

of medical experts was convened to lend ‘‘authority’’ to the effort. Shown Smith’s data/charts,these experts refused to endorse the first proposal—limit transition into 

the new aircraft to age 55—but did endorse a temporary maximum age of 60. (FAA 

Staff Memorandum, Acting Civil Air Surgeon to Administrator, Medical Resume of 

the Advisory Panel on Aging Meeting, June 8, 1959. From Reighard files.) 

Four months later, the same data/charts were presented to the FAA’s General 

Counsel’s office for their review. Their legal conclusion was that the data would not 

support even the age 60 limitation. The lawyers then recommended that the charts 

be abandoned, and future presentation, if any must be made, should focus on ‘‘such 

medical data as is available concerning deteriorations in specific functions such as 

a reaction time, glare tolerance, night visual acuity, learning times, accuracy of 

learning, etc.’’ (FAA Staff Memorandum, Chief, Medical Standards Division to Civil 

Air Surgeon, Review of Aging Charts by the Staff of the General Counsel’s Office,

Oct. 9, 1959. Emphasis added. From Reighard files.) 

FAA published the Rule on December 5, 1959, just ten months (to the day) following Smith’s ex parte request, falsely (some would say fraudulently) bundled with 

‘‘medical trappings’’—not in the interest of either medicine or safety, but ‘‘on advice 

of counsel.’’ One year later, Quesada left the FAA and immediately became a Director on Smith’s (American’s) BOD. (Ruppenthal, K.M., Compulsory Retirement of Air 

Line Pilots, 14 Indus. & Lab. Rel . . . Rev. 528, (1961) 

Airline Pilots and Age 60: 

Even the FAA asserts, voluntarily, after decades of its own research, that airline 

pilots, as a group, are essentially purged of the pathologies that contributes to higher rates of medical disqualifications than the general population. Yet, it was by reference only to ‘‘generally understood’’ information that the Rule was proposed, and 

eventually enacted. 

. . . Despite the fact that knowledge of the aging process specifically related to 

piloting aircraft is incomplete, certain applicable observations have been made 

and generally understood.

Physical deterioration with age can, for the most part, be attributed to a progressive degenerative process termed arteriosclerosis, a condition affecting blood 

vessels in a manner quite compatible to the progressive accumulation of scale 

and rust in water pipes. 

24 Federal Register 5247, June 27, 1959. 

Since that inauspicious beginning, the medical community has studied the health 

and fitness of airline pilots ad infinitum. And found consistently, as did the National 

Institutes of Health (NIH), the National Institute on Aging (NIA), and the Institute 

of Medicine (IOM) in August, 1981, that ‘‘there is no convincing medical evidence

to support age 60, or any other specific age, for mandatory pilot retirement.’’ (Report 

of the National Institute in Aging Panel of the Experienced Pilots Study, Department 

of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, National Institutes of Health, 

National Institute on Aging, August, 1981. At 2, emphasis added, underlining in the 

original.) See also Besco, R.O., A Longevity and Survival Analysis for a Cohort of 

Retired Airline Pilots, FAA Contract No. 92–P–13371, 1994; MacIntyre, N.R., et al,

Longevity in Military Pilots: 37-Year Followup of the Navy’s ‘‘1000 Aviators,’’ Aviat., 

Space & Environ. Med., September 1978, 49(9):1120–1122; 

In 1961, just one year after the Age 60 Rule had been instituted, a prestigious 

aeromedical research institute in Albuquerque, NM (The Lovelace Foundation) received funding from the NIH for a long-term study of ‘‘normal human aging.’’ IgnorVerDate Apr 24 2002 09:27 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 086337 PO 00000 Frm 00072 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\86337.TXT SCOM1 PsN: CAROLT
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ing the ‘‘generally understood’’ principles referenced by the FAA when preparing the 

Rule, Lovelace restricted its study population to civilian test pilots, military pilots, 

and air carrier pilots because they considered this cohort to consist of 

a highly select group [being] more free of serious pathology that a sample of 

the general population of similar age . . . . Furthermore, pilots are subjected 

routinely to periodic re-examination which provides a basis for followup and extended longitudinal studies. 

House Report No. 2080, Better Management Needed of Medical Research on Aging,

Committee on Government Operations, 89th Congress, 2d. Sess., September 26, 

1966, at 19. 

The NIH added that ‘‘air transport pilots represent less of an attrition of dropout problem in a protracted study than almost any other adult group in the normal 

population with a comparably wide age range.’’ (Id., at. 23.) 

Lovelace’s initial tests of this group revealed that these individuals were physiologically much younger than their chronological ages, suggesting that the FAA’s age 

60 rationale was invalid on its face. When this became known, FAA’s Federal Air 

Surgeon first sought to convince the Foundation to abandon its study of older pilots, 

and concentrate on younger ones, instead. (Letter, P. V. Siegel, M.D., Federal Air 

Surgeon to A. H. Schwichtenberg, M.D., Head, Dept. of Aerospace Medicine and Bioastronautics, The Lovelace Foundation, dtd. January 12, 1967. From Reighard files.) 

When Lovelace refused, and seeing strong legal challenges to his Rule forthcoming 

(Internal FAA Memo, Gordon K. Norwood, AM–200 to AM–1 [Dr. Siegel], dtd. 30 

July, 1969, from Reighard files), Dr. Siegel engineered a ‘‘hatchet job’’ on the 

Lovelace study by a personal friend (Letter, C. I. Barron, M.D., Medical Director of 

Lockheed-California Company (a personal friend of Dr. Siegel’s) to Peter V. Siegel, 

M.D., Federal Air Surgeon, dtd. May 1, 1969, from Reighard files), leaked this ‘‘report’’ to NIH (Letter, John P. Sherman, Ph. D., Deputy Director, NIH to Peter V. 

Siegel, M.D., Federal Air Surgeon, dtd. Jan. 27, 1970, from Reighard files), whereupon NIH terminated its funding for the Lovelace study. (Ibid.) 

With the threatened legal challenge looming (later to become O’Donnell v Shaffer,

491 F.2d 59 (D.C. Cir., 1974)), FAA asked NIH for a copy of the ‘‘Site Review Committee Report,’’ the basis for NIH terminating the Lovelace study funding. Citing 

the confidentiality of its internal records and peer review program, NIH refused—

observing that it believed the FAA was well aware of the contents of the site review 

report (from FAA’s own earlier analysis), and wanted a hard copy only for use in 

its defense of a court challenge to the Age 60 Rule. (Ibid.) Unable to secure this useful report from NIH, FAA ‘‘lost’’ the entire 1959 ‘‘docket’’ on which the Rule had 

been based, instead. (FAA Memorandum, Louise Coomes, AGC–24 to Associate General Counsel, Regulations and Codification Division, Subject: Missing Regulatory 

Dockets 40, 41 and 42, dtd., July 11, 1973.) 

Over the next two decades, however, (1971 through 1988) the FAA came to agree 

with Lovelace (but without admitting the relationship) on the health of air carrier 

pilots after studying their airman medical certification (and disqualification) data. 

(c.f., Booze, C.F., Characteristics of Medically Disqualified Airmen Applicants During Calendar Year 1971, FAA Office of Aviation Medicine, AM–74–5, May 1974; 

Dark, S.J., Medically Disqualified Airline Pilots, FAA Office of Aviation Medicine, 

AM–84–9, August 1984; Downey, L.E., Dark, S.J., Medically Disqualified Airline Pilots in Calendar Year 1987 and 1988, FAA Office of Aviation Medicine, AM–90–5, 

June 1990.) In each paper, the FAA’s Civil Aeromedical Institute researchers declared that: 

prescreening by airline companies before employment [as air carrier pilots] and 

FAA requirements for the issuance of a first-class medical certificate result in 

[airline pilots] being essentially purged of disease prevalence that contributes to 

higher rates [of medical disqualifications than] other groups. (e.g., Dark, 1984, 

at 2, emphasis added)

ALPA and Age 60: 

Today, the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) is (aside from the FAA) the only 

major support for retaining the Rule unchanged. ALPA’s public position, simply 

stated is that raising (or eliminating) the fixed retirement age would compromise 

‘‘the public interest in ensuring the highest degree of safety.’’ Nothing could be further from the truth. Neither the statement that raising the age to 65 would compromise ‘‘safety in the public interest’’ nor that ALPA’s opposition to S. 1855 is 

based on that premise. 

70

4The actual number depends, primarily, upon the fleet mix of aircraft flown by that particular 

air carrier. The more different types of aircraft, the more promotional steps opened up as pilots 

move up from smaller to larger (higher paying) aircraft, and through the various cockpit seats 

(Second Officer to First Officer to Captain). 

A more thorough explanation of this process, estimating 16 promotional steps resulting from 

the premature retirement of a single senior pilot at American Airlines in 1992, appears in: 

McCall, N.J., et al, A Survey of Blood Lipid Levels of Airline Pilot Applicants, Aviat., Space & 

Environ. Med., June 1992, 63(6):533–537. 

The author in Kasperzak , R.M., Mandatory Retirement of Airline Pilots: An Analysis of the 

FAA’s Age 60 Retirement Rule, 33 Hastings L. J. 241, (1981) cites to other estimates as high 

as 20 promotional steps per senior Captain retirement. 5 ALPA v Quesada, 182 F.Supp. 595 (S.D., N.Y., 1960), Chew v Quesada, 182 F.Supp. 231 

(Dist. C., D.C., 1960), ALPA v Quesada, 286 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1961), O’Donnell v Shaffer, 491 

F.2d 59 (D.C. Cir., 1974), Starr v FAA, 589 F.2d 307 (7th Cir., 1978), Rombough v FAA, 594 

F.2d 893 (2d Cir., 1979), Keating v FAA, 610 F.2d 611 (9th Cir., 1979), and Gray v FAA, 594 

F.2d 793 (10th Cir., 1979). 

By imposing a ‘‘date certain’’ retirement upon its senior members,. the Age 60 

Rule guarantees somewhere between 6 or 8 and 20 promotional advancements for 

a given air carriers less senior pilots.4

In 1959–60, ALPA membership included only Captains and Co-Pilots (First Officers). And historically, Captains had always dominated union administration and 

policy. Needless to say—the senior Captains’ desires for career longevity prevailed, 

and the union vigorously fought imposition of this now 40 year-old Rule. Between 

1960 and 1979, ALPA initiated and/or supported no fewer than eight (8) major lawsuits seeking to bar the enforcement of, overturn, and/or secure exemptions from the 

Rule.5

But in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s, ALPA ‘‘raided’’ the membership of the 

Flight Engineers International Association (FEIA), the flight engineer’s (Second Officer’s) union—the third ‘‘seat’’ in the cockpit of large commercial airliners. Although 

sanctioned for this action under the Fair Labor Standards laws, ALPA prevailed as 

the jet era brought new-hire pilots into that position, displacing the original aircraft 

mechanics as flight engineers. This move, alone, swelled the non-Captain membership of ALPA, forever altering its political dynamic. The new ALPA goal became career advancement for its younger members, rather than career longevity for its seniors. 

In 1982, for example, TWA voluntarily began allowing its senior Captains approaching age 60 to ‘‘fall back’’ as Second Officers (flight engineers). In a hard 

fought contract negotiation, the new ALPA coerced TWA into retracting this policy. 

The affected pilots sued both TWA and their union and prevailed, winning the right 

to fall-back, with ALPA found to be in violation of its duty of fair representation, 

and a restraining order was issued against the union. (ALPA v TWA, 713 F.2d 940 

(2d Cir., 1983), affirmed, TWA v Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1985).) 

This ‘‘new’’ ALPA support for ‘‘age 60’’ is not difficult to understand. With the 

‘‘step-ladder’’ seniority system in place at virtually all of the nation’s air carriers, 

the guaranteed date-certain departure of a single senior Captain guarantees a multitude of promotional steps among the junior membership. (See above—estimates of 

between 6–8 and 20.) 

During a 1979 legislative attempt to raise the age limit (H.R. 3948), ALPA was 

still ostensibly opposing the Rule, but covertly pulling every string it could to sustain it. Calling out its ‘‘big guns’’ (AFL–CIO), ALPA flooded the halls of Congress 

with an army of lobbyists when the Bill came to the floor for a vote and successfully 

reduced the legislative outcome to a mere ‘‘study.’’ Former Congresswoman Pat 

Schroeder (Colo), is said to have declared it one of the heaviest-handed muscle jobs 

she had witnessed. 

Testifying before the House Committee on Public Works & Transportation in 

1979, ALPA’s then President, J.J. O’Donnell declared that ALPA’s devotion to the 

status quo was economic, they feared the imposition of a more strict medical examination (that would ‘‘unfairly’’ catch medically unfit younger pilots), and no vote of 

the membership had been taken prior to the adoption of this position, and none 

would be taken ‘cause polls can be made to say anything you want. (At pp. 343–

348.) One decade later, ALPA again proclaimed its support for the Rule, unchanged, 

and its rationale therefor, also unchanged. 

Testifying ten years later (1989) before this Committee’s earlier hearings on Pilot 

Supply and Training (S. Hrg. 101–307), ALPA’s then President, Henry Duffy, reiterated Mr. O’Donnell’s negative argument almost verbatim. Moreover, Mr. Duffy did 

so with the additional declaration that his union cared not a whit that their position 

frustrated the (even then) admitted ‘‘increasing demand for commercial airline pilots,’’ that this shortage had (even then) ‘‘hit the regional airlines hard,’’ and that 

71

‘‘recent accidents [had] demonstrated the importance of pilot experience levels.’’ (S. 

Hrg. 101–307 at 23.) 

But even more egregiously, Mr. Duffy also declared ALPA’s refusal to even consider a minimal, temporary relaxation of the Rule after listening to, Ms. Karen 

Keesling, Asst. Secty. for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, U.S. Air Force, testify that 

the military was the single largest producer of pilots in the United States, yet was 

losing (primarily to the air carriers) ‘‘1,000 more pilots per year than they train[ed]’’; 

that this pilot drain cost the military ‘‘in the billions of dollars,’’ and posed the ‘‘potential to greatly affect our [military] readiness posture.’’ (At p. 7.) 

When his turn came before the Committee, Senator McCain asked Mr. Duffy if 

ALPA would 

. . . [j]ust explore with me the possibility of some kind of a ‘test pilot’ program, 

of taking a number of pilots that would be interested in remaining an extra couple of years and placing them under a special set of conditions concerning physical examinations, et cetera. 

Would you be willing to at least explore something like that with me and the 

other members of the Committee? (At p. 50.) 

Mr. Duffy’s reply was—No.

. . . the additional physical requirements that are going to have to come with 

[change in the Rule], starting at age 55, or whenever—at age 50—and the inaccuracy of the predictive nature of these tests, are going to expose pilots [under 

age 60] to being eliminated prior to age 60 and I am not sure that we are going 

to get a net gain out of the whole thing. (At p. 50.) 

Read again Mr. Duffy’s reply to Senator McCain. To paraphrase: 

No. ALPA refuses to place at risk its under-age-60 pilots, some of whom we 

know are medically unfit, so that an equal number of over-age-60 pilots who 

have greater experience and will be proven to be medically fit may continue in 

their careers—even though doing so would alleviate a critical nation-wide shortage of experienced commercial airline pilots, ease the greater burden on the regional carriers, contribute to the safety of the traveling public, ease a billiondollar expense item in the military budget, contribute to this Nation’s military 

readiness posture, and be in the interest of ‘‘this Nation’s national security.’’

Senator McCain was left to lamely plead as a final comment: ‘‘But I would like 

to explore it with you some more and the organization, because I think given the 

criticality of the situation [Ed: recall—this is in 1989, not 2000], at least it is worth 

looking at again.’’ (At 50.) 

At the end of yet another decade, the same 1989 issues still trouble us. And 

ALPA’s intractable, arrogant and incredibly selfish 20-year support for mandatory 

retirement at age 60 dictates blind disregard for the plight of Alaska, Wyoming, and 

other sparsely populated areas. Its opposition to S. 1855 threatens, again, to exacerbate a chronic shortage of experienced air carrier pilots, compromise safety, and cost 

the Nation billions—if not continue to negatively impact our Nation’s security interests. 

ALPA’s disingenuous argument opposing change to the Age 60 Rule, advanced on 

its supposed ‘‘risk of incapacitation,’’ ‘‘unacceptable decrements in performance’’ occurring ‘‘at an accelerating rate’’ among demonstrably fit and highly experienced pilots over age 60, while protecting even from examination its potentially un-fit members under age 60 should be accorded the consideration it so richly deserves. None. 

Operational Regulations, Training, and Procedures Have Solved Any Pilot 

Psychophysiological Deficiencies, If Such Ever Existed 

The Age 60 Rule is an operational limitation, buried in the operational regulations 

promulgated by the FAA. Moreover, it has been the operational studies, tests, and 

experiments that have devised solutions to the unique operational questions regarding pilot incapacitations that may have once existed. 

Age, per se, and Aircraft Accidents: 

In the entire history of American commercial aviation, only two air carrier aircraft 

have crashed with incapacitated pilots. Both occurred after, not before the Age 60 

rule was adopted—one in 1962, the other in 1966. Both pilots expired from heart 

attacks, but there the similarity ends. One pilot was 38, with no medical history, 

the other 58, having hidden from the FAA for 3–4 years a heart problem. The 38-

year old pilot died on short final, during a VFR approach. The 58-year oldster died 

at altitude, before beginning an IFR (weather) approach. The only common factor—

and actual cause of both accidents—was that both co-pilots were unqualified and incompetent. The FAA soon amended its performance (operational) standards for copilots, and no pilot-incapacitation induced accidents or incidents have since ocVerDate Apr 24 2002 09:27 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 086337 PO 00000 Frm 00075 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\86337.TXT SCOM1 PsN: CAROLT
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curred—despite a multitude of in-flight pilot incapacitations, including deaths, even 

during the ‘‘critical phases’’ of flight. 

Procedures, Training, and Risk: 

In 1969–70, ALPA’s Flight Safety Chairman (Capt. Harry Orlady) collaborated 

with the Medical and Flight Training departments at United Airlines in a series of 

simulator exercises to address the pilot incapacitation problem—both sudden and 

subtle. During these exercises, United developed operational procedures to preclude 

accidents from occurring should a pilot become incapacitated (suddenly or subtly) 

at any time during flight. (Harper, C.R., et al, Study of Simulated Airline Pilot Incapacitation: Phase I—Obvious and Maximal Loss of Function, Aerospace Medicine,

October 1970, 41(10):1139–1142; Harper, C.R., et al, Study of Simulated Airline 

Pilot Incapacitation: Phase II, Subtle or Partial Loss of Function, Aerospace Medicine, September 1971, 42(9):946–948.) The operational procedures developed and 

tested during this series of studies have been incorporated into the FARs, and are 

now industry standards. No pilot-incapacitation induced accidents have been recorded since. 

The Report of the President’s Task Force on Crew Compliment, July 2, 1981, recognized the above when finding: ‘‘[P]ilot incapacitation is an ever-present possibility 

in the cockpit, but success in dealing with it depends more on pilot training and 

procedures than [other factors].’’ (p. 57, emphasis added.) This review of the 2-pilot 

vs 3-pilot cockpit controversy was ordered by President Reagan more than 20 years 

after the FAA had certified the first 2-pilot aircraft with minimal examination, and 

in the face of a federal arbitrator’s ruling that the third pilot would contribute to 

safety, at least ‘‘during the aircraft’s introductory period.’’ (Appendix E.) No pilotincapacitation induced accidents have been recorded since. 

In 1984, a major review of IFALPA (International Federation of Air Line Pilots 

Associations) experience in actual, in-flight incapacitations, together with extensive 

simulator flight segments with ‘‘surprise’’ pilot incapacitations determined that, 

with 35,000 thousand pilots flying some 20.8 million flight hours annually, the 

whole of the international community would experience, statistically, 400 years between pilot incapacitation induced accidents. (Chapman, J.C., The Consequences of 

In-Flight Incapacitation in Civil Aviation, Aviat., Space & Environ. Med., June 

1984, 55(6):497–500.) Chapman was compelled to use simulator exercises to develop 

his ‘‘incapacitation accident’’ rates because none had been reported during his 

study’s 13-year window. Moreover, the ‘‘actual’’ time-between-accidents should be 

considerably greater, because Chapman had very conservatively considered: (1) that 

all reported ‘‘actual’’ pilot incapacitations had been sustained by the pilot-flying; and 

(2) that they had occurred at the ‘‘critical point’’ in the flight (i.e., on takeoff or landing) used in his simulator experiments. No pilot-incapacitation induced accidents 

have been recorded by IFALPA since Chapman’s study was published. 

Quite simply, the Age 60 Rule is an operational issue—and, of course, blatant age 

discrimination—but not one of medicine or safety—that has been made superfluous, 

if ever it was relevant, by operational procedures and training. 

Advanced Simulation: 

The first recorded instance (of which I am ware) in which a ‘‘medical’’ assessment 

of the ‘‘pilot age’’ question was begun in 1953 or 1954, some 5 years before the Age 

60 Rule was contemplated. A ‘‘panel’’ of medical experts was appointed by the Aerospace Medical Association in response to a gratuitous suggestion contained in a 

1952 Presidentially directed study of airports and their surrounding communities. 

This panel’s first interim report (no others can be located):

expressed great interest in the possibility of using the Dehmel Flight Simulator 

as a possible method of checking the abilities of pilots in the older age range 

. . . . These electronic devices are designed so that any flight problem can be 

simulated under very realistic conditions. These trainers reproduce the exact 

cockpit instrumentation and include motion and sound effects. It is obvious that 

any procedure which can be developed to appraise pilot ability on a more objective basis . . . will contribute to flight safety and to a more precise appraisal 

of changes involved in the ageing [sic] process.

Report of the Committee on Pilot Ageing [sic] and Allied Problems, March 30, 

1954, at 3. 

Despite the (accurate) praise given here, the Dehmel simulator, certainly by today’s standards, was an incredibly archaic device. Modern simulators are nothing 

less than state-of-the-art virtual reality—simulating not only motion and sound, but 

the more subtle senses of momentum, coordination, equilibrium, spatial orientation 

in a visual recreation of the ‘‘real world,’’ etc. You can take a B–747 off of New 

73

York’s Kennedy airport, and fly ‘‘between’’ the twin towers of the World Trade Center! From San Francisco you can fly ‘‘under’’ the Golden Gate Bridge. When United’s Flight 232 lost all hydraulic power and landed at Sioux City, Iowa, one of United 

DC–10 simulators was immediately configured to replicate, and did replicate the 

handling characteristics of the real aircraft. When, 25–30 years ago, the industry 

began to recognize ‘‘microburst’’ phenomena (severe up and down drafts near airport 

landing flight path as causing several fatal takeoff and landing crashes), simulators 

were programmed to first develop protective techniques, then train pilots in these 

avoidance procedures. 

Twenty years ago (1980), the FAA approved total transition training for air carrier pilots using ‘‘advanced simulators. (44 Fed. Reg. 65550–57 (Nov. 13, 1979) 

NPRM, Plan to Permit Additional Flightcrew Training in Advanced Flight Training 

Simulators; 45 Fed. Reg. 44176–86 (Jun. 20, 1980) Final Rule, Advanced Simulation.) In some 18 pages of 3-column, fine print discussion extolling the virtues of 

advanced simulator flight training of air carrier flight crews, two comments stand 

out: 

Safety. In the past few years significant developments in simulator technology 

have made it possible to realistically simulate a specific airplane and its ground 

and flight environment. By taking advantage of the developments in state-ofthe-art of airplane simulators, flightcrew training could be upgraded from a 

strictly maneuver and procedures-oriented program to a program where crewmembers can also gain experience in dealing with abnormal flight system and 

environmental situations. 

45 Fed. Reg. 44177, June 30, 1980 (Italics in the original.) 

and:

15. [Public] Comment—. . . One important factor has been overlooked in the 

study contained in the NPRM: . . . . An atmosphere of complacency is prevalent while operating a simulator irrespective of its sophistication . . . because 

of the knowledge that, regardless of what mistakes are committed . . . a simulator cannot crash.

[FAA] Response—In point of fact, almost the exact opposite is true. Pilots do not 

fly airplanes out of a sense of fear . . . . If a pilot makes a tragic mistake in 

a simulator, the simulator will dramatically simulate a crash and there is no 

doubt as to who made the mistake. The pilot’s self esteem, peer pressure, and 

the pressure of being observed by one’s employer and possibly the FAA can exceed the psychological pressure of flying the airplane.

45 Fed. Reg. 44182, June 30, 1980

What this means is that the FAA considers its advanced simulators to be so complete and realistic that when an air carrier pilot ‘‘transitions’’ into a new aircraft 

(one in which he has never before flown), all of his training flights are conducted 

in these ‘‘advanced’’ simulators. Then, the first flight, the very first time this pilot 

flies the real aircraft (wings, engines, tires, bolts, etc.) the FAA considers the training to be so complete and adequate that he (or she) is permitted to do so on a revenue 

flight with paying passengers on board!

Conclusion 

There is no rational basis for retaining any vestige of the FAA’s Age 60 Rule, and 

much harm flows from it. The Rule is an economic disaster. It is founded upon myth 

and deception. It is currently supported by raw greed. It is discriminatory. It has 

adversely impacted the national security. It rations the lifeline service available to 

rural and isolated communities as exist in Alaska, Wyoming, and other States in 

our Nation’s far West. 

The Age 60 Rule should be legislated out of existence—because the FAA either 

can not, or will not face reality and do so on its own authority. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. SLADE GORTON TO

NICHOLAS L. LACEY

Question 1. Until 1996, the FAA allowed pilots at smaller carriers to fly past the 

age of 60. Were there ever any indications that pilots over that age suffered incapacities or had an unacceptable decline in performance? 

Answer. In 1995, the FAA issued a final rule (effective March 1996) which transferred some air carrier operations from part 135 to part 121 of the FAA’s safety regulations. Scheduled passenger-carrying operations that used propeller airplanes 

with a passenger seat configuration of 10 to 30 seats or that used jet airplanes with 

a passenger seat configuration of 1 to 30 seats have moved out of part 135 and into 

74

part 121. Part 121 generally governs air carrier operations of larger aircraft. Because the accident rate for part 121 operations was smaller than the overall accident rate for part 135 operations, it was concluded that safety would be increased 

by moving certain scheduled passenger carrying operations from part 135 coverage 

to the more demanding standards found in part 121. One of the long-standing rules 

in part 121 is the Age 60 rule. Although the FAA has no data that indicates that 

pilots of smaller aircraft over age 60 suffered incapacities in flight or had declines 

in performance in flight, there are many scientific studies that establish that people 

are more susceptible to incapacitating medical events as they age and that cognitive 

functioning declines with age. Also, as people age, their ability to react to situations 

in a timely fashion diminishes. 

Question 2. Are there any age restrictions in other modes of commercial transportation, such as for bus or truck drivers, train engineers, or captains of cruise ships? 

Answer. We are unaware of any mandatory retirement age restrictions imposed 

by governmental regulations in other modes of transportation. 

Question 3. Why have other countries determined that pilots can fly over age 60? 

Is flying overseas less safe because pilots over 60 may be in command? Should the 

FAA recommend that U.S. citizens not fly overseas because some foreign airlines 

use older pilots? 

Answer. Acceptance of age 65 by other countries (e.g. the Joint Aviation Authority 

(JAA), which governs European aviation matters) may be due to the submission of 

Dr. Ken Edgington of the United Kingdom (U.K.), at a hearing back in 1993 on the 

age 60 study, known as the Hilton study. He discussed risks in association with several medical conditions and mortality rates with to respect cardiovascular disease. 

It also discussed risk amelioration by having a second pilot on board. Dr. Edgington 

concluded that (statistically speaking), allowing one pilot to fly to age 65, so long 

as the other pilot is under age 60, has allowed the U.K. to meet its safety objectives, 

provided that no more than 10 percent of pilots are age 60 or over or are already 

flying on a medical waiver. 

It appears that JAA followed the U.K. philosophy when it adopted the age 65 approach. On the other hand, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) did 

a survey several years ago and decided to retain age 60 or over as the rule on the 

basis of replies from member states (over 50 percent ‘‘voted’’ to retain the rule). 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. SLADE GORTON TO

DEBORAH MCELROY (RAA) 

Question 1. What impact, if any, as been documented by your members regarding 

the change in pilot reserve rest requirements that you mentioned in your testimony? 

Were flight schedules significantly disrupted? 

Answer. The interpretive change in FAA policy on rest for reserve pilots meant 

that pilots on reserve began to accrue duty time for those days, shrinking their 

availability dramatically. Under the new interpretation, some carriers now have pilots who fly only 6 or 7 days in a month, yet accrue 15 or more duty days because 

of reserve time. 

The impact of this interpretation varies among regional carriers, and correlates 

to reserve time management practices rather than size. Some carriers reported no 

impact, ostensibly because these carriers called reserve pilots for duty more frequently than those airlines reporting an impact. Among those impacted, staffing 

needs increased by about 12 percent. Flight schedule disruptions attributable to the 

new requirements have been minimal, as impacted carriers have staffed up rather 

than allow disruptions. 

Question 2. Have regional airlines been lowering their flight time requirements 

in reaction to the high pilot attrition rate? 

Answer. Some airlines have indeed reduced the minimum number of hours required for in response to changing market conditions. All such reductions have been 

accompanied by enhancements in both the pilot selection process and airline training requirements. 

Question 3. In your testimony, you mention the investments being made by regional airlines in enhanced training programs. When will these investments pay off? 

How common are they among your members? 

Answer. The investments made by carriers in our industry have already begun 

to pay off. The enhanced programs provide a more efficient and productive training 

environment, which allows airlines to incorporate high tech training methods needed for the technically advanced cockpits of the new aircraft many carriers are incorporating into their fleets. 

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RAA is aware of at least five regionals that have made such investments. Additionally, many others have partnered with flight training companies such as Flight 

Safety Academy and Pan Am to take advantage of the significant investments in 

flight simulators and computer based training that these companies have made. 

Question 4. Are you aware of any routes that have been canceled because of pilot 

attrition? 

Answer. Yes. Several carriers have had to cancel routes to accommodate the additional time requirements for pilot recruiting, selection, and training. 

Question 5. Have regional airlines had to forgo expansion plans as a result of pilot 

attrition? 

Answer. RAA does not have specific information attributable to any particular 

carrier, however, we know of several that have not been able to increase frequency 

or add new markets, due to increased pilot attrition. Others have cited no impact. 

Question 6. Your testimony states that your airlines spend an average of $13,122 

in order to train a new hire, and an average of $12,133 in order to train a new captain. Do your airlines get enough return on their investment before the pilots make 

moves to major airlines? 

Answer. Regional airlines have always been one step in the natural career path 

of a pilot. Our paramount concern, when making such investments in training, is 

safety. Such training expenditures are necessary in order to ensure very qualified, 

proficient pilots for the safety of our passengers and crew regardless of the amount 

of time these pilots spend working for regionals. Nonetheless, training costs have 

increased exponentially, placing an added cost burden on regional airlines, especially among smaller carriers. 

Question 7. Is there any consensus among your members with respect to proposals 

to change the Age 60 Rule? 

Answer. No. RAA has member airlines with strong feelings on both sides of the 

rule. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. SLADE GORTON TO

CAPTAIN DUANE WOERTH

Question 1. In your prepared statement, you state that, as a general rule, ALPA 

is opposed to relaxing air safety rules for economic purposes. Under what specific 

circumstances has ALPA gone against its general rule and supported changing a 

safety rule for economic purposes? 

Answer. There is not an instance that comes to mind when ALPA has knowingly 

supported relaxation of a safety rule for economic purposes. Of course, the FAA is 

charged with promoting rules that are cost-effective and an economic analysis is 

part of any rulemaking. But the ALPA motto is ‘‘Schedule with Safety’’ and our general position is to argue for the safety benefit. We believe that our membership and 

the traveling public demand such vigilance for safety. 

Question 2. ALPA used to fight for changing the Age 60 Rule. If it has always 

been a safety issue, was ALPA just wrong before? Why the change of heart? 

Answer. It is true that ALPA fought the Age 60 Rule over forty years ago, during 

the period immediately after the Rule went into effect. But in fairness, ALPA’s actions have to be put into the proper context. The Rule was proposed in the middle 

of 1959, and it went into effect less than a year later, in March 1960. With that 

limited warning, some ALPA members found their aviation careers ended, and others found their career plans changed dramatically. As a labor organization charged 

with protecting its members’ career expectations, ALPA understandably challenged 

the Rule. 

But ALPA’s mission has always encompassed more than just the economic welfare 

of its members. After ALPA began the process of negotiating revisions to collective 

bargaining agreements to adjust to the Age 60 Rule (primarily by giving up immediate income in exchange for deferred income, in the form of pension benefits), 

ALPA’s members were able to view the Rule at a distance from the initial shock 

it imposed. From that distance, the safety implications of the Rule became clear, 

and ALPA’s governing bodies changed their opposition to support. 

The simple answer to this question is that the Age 60 Rule ‘‘has always been a 

safety issue,’’ and ALPA changed its position on the Rule when its members were 

able to recognize the safety implications of the Rule, apart from its economic impact. 

Question 3. Many counties in Europe and Asia have increased the mandatory retirement age for pilots well above the age of 60. I presume that many if not all of 

these pilots are represented by unions. Did pilots’ unions in those countries oppose 

changing the retirement age? If so, do pilots refuse to fly after the age of 60 because 

it is unsafe? If those unions did not oppose the change, why are they wrong on this 

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issue? Is ALPA advocating that Americans not fly in foreign countries because there 

may be older pilots older than 60 in command? 

Answer. The International Federation of Air Line Pilots’ Associations, which has 

over 90 individual country pilot unions as members, has a long-standing policy that 

a pilot should not fly in air transport operations past age 60. The only pilot unions 

that did not ratify this policy were Chile, Hong Kong, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Poland, 

Trinidad, Tobago and the United Kingdom. We presume that all other countries 

that ratified the policy opposed changes in their individual countries. 

ALPA has no information whether foreign pilots refuse to fly past age 60 because 

it is unsafe. ALPA has taken no position regarding U.S. pilots flying in countries 

where pilots older than 60 may be in command and U.S. pilots do fly in those countries. 

Question 4. Would ALPA be opposed to a carefully designed study that allowed 

a few U.S. pilots to fly after the age of 60 to test whether or not cognitive and performance capabilities drop off after that age? 

Answer. ALPA would not support such a study. The question is not whether cognitive and performance capabilities drop off after age 60. It is well accepted and 

demonstrated that cognitive and performance capabilities decline with age. The significant issues are the rate of decline and when the diminished capabilities become 

a flight safety issue. At the present time, there are not any testing protocols that 

can address successfully those issues. 

Any study that would propose to change the requirement for retirement at age 

60 must address all relevant issues. In addition to the cognitive and performance 

capabilities mentioned in your question, there are medical changes that occur as a 

part of the aging process. These medical changes must also be studied and a medical 

appraisal system must be available to identify and evaluate pertinent age-related 

medical changes.

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