1 

## In The

**Court of Appeals**

**Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo**

No. 07

- 2 1

- 00 194

- CR

CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL ANDRADE , APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS , APPELLEE

On Appeal from the 181st District Court

Randall County, Texas,

Trial Court No. 28888B

, Honorable Titiana Frausto , Presiding



### February 2 , 202 3

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and DOSS, JJ.

A jury convicted Christopher Michael Andrade of indecency with a child by sexual

contact and assessed him a twenty

- year prison sentence. He now challenges his

conviction and sentence through five issues. We affirm

.

**Issues One**  **and Two** 

Through his first two issues, a ppellant complains of the trial court’s failure to hold

hearings before admitting two categories of evidence. The first wa s evidence of

extraneous sexual offenses against the child victim, and the hearing was purportedly2 required by article 38.37, § 2- a(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. T EX

. C ODE C RIM

.

P ROC

. A NN . a rt. 38.37, § 2- a(a) (stating that b efore evidence described under art icle

38.37(b) may admitted

, the trial judge must conduct a hearin g to decide if the supporting

evidence is enough to illustrate whether the defendant committed the extraneous offense

beyond reasonable doubt). Appellant did not object to the lack of a hearing.

The second concern ed the admission of outcry testimony, which may be received

subject to the trial court ’s finding the statement is reliable after conducting a hearing. Id.

art

. 38.072, § 2(b)(2). The purported outcry testimony in question is that of the victim’s

father. Again, appellant did not object to the lack of a hearing. Indeed, he did not even

obje ct to the testimony as hearsay or unauthorized outcry.

Having failed to object to the missing art icle 38.37, § 2- a(2) hearing, appellant

waived that complain t. See Corporon v. State

, 586 S.W.3d 550, 560 (Tex. App.

— Austin

2019

, no pet. ) (holding that the defendant waived his complaint about the lack of an art icle

38.37 hearing by failing to object); Carmichael v. State

, 505 S.W.3d 95, 103 (Tex. App.

—

San Antonio 2016, pet. ref’d) (involving art icle 38.37 and holding the same)

. And, though

objecti ng to improper outcry as hearsay may suffice to preserve a complaint about an

omitted art icle 38.072, § 2(b)(2) hearing, see Laredo v. State , 194 S.W.3d 637, 640 (Tex.

App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d)

, one must still object to the testimony

. Id. at

640

– 41; accord Citizen v. State

, No. 13

- 14

- 003 79- CR, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 1203 , at

*21 (Tex. App.

— Corpus Christi Feb

. 5, 2015

, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for

publication) (stating that a “ complaint regarding the failure to hold a reliability hearing

under article 38.072 is forfeited if it is not raised at trial and if there is no objection to the

outcry testimony ”). Appellant did neither and

, consequently, waived this complaint, too.3 **Issues Three**  **and Four** 

Appellant’s next two issues also involve the admission of outcry. The testimony in

question is that of the forensic interviewer whom the State designated as its outcry

witness. Allegedly, the trial court erred in admitting it because the interviewer was not the

first person over eighteen to which the child victim revealed the assault; allegedly, her

father was. Furthermore, according to appellant, the court again failed to hold the

requisite hearing before allowing the examiner to impart outcry testimony

. We overrule

the issues.

We begin with the allegation about the omitted hearing. The record illustrates that

appellant objected to the interviewer’s testimony as hearsay. Assuming arguendo this

preserved his complaint, the trial court afforded the parties opportunity to argu e t heir

respective positions

. So too did it recess the proceeding to read legal authority cited by

the State

, reconvene the proceeding

, and thereafter overrule appellant’s objection. This

mode of action was tantamount to a bench conference, which has been held to satisfy

the need for a hearing. See Zarco v. State

, 210 S.W.3d 816

, 831 (Tex. App.

— Houston

[14 th Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (and cases cited therein).

As for the other aspect of his complaint, appellant believe d the victim’s father was

the true outcry witness, not the interviewer. This wa s so because he was the first person

to whom the victim disclosed the assault, or as argued below, the first person to whom

she said appellant “rape d” her. Again, the State designated the forensic interviewer as

its outcry witness and made the trial court aware of that during its hearing. So too did it

explain that the appropriate outcry witness is the individual to whom the victim said the

“why, wh en, and where” of the incident, that is, to whom the victim detailed the incident.4 On the other hand, the child told her father that appellant “raped” her, according to

appellant. Nothing is said within appellant’s brief of t he child ’s relating to her fath er any

details of the “rape.” Nor did appellant so argue at the hearing.

The State correctly contends that the outcry witness is the first person to whom the

victim detailed the offense in some discernible way. Maturino

- Rodriguez v. State

, No. 07

-

21

- 00289

- CR, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 7338

, at *6 –7 (Tex. App.

— Amarillo Sept

. 28, 2022,

no pet.) (mem. op.

, not d esignated for publication ). The disclosure must be more than

words providing a general allusion that something in the area of child abuse h appened

.

Lopez v. State

, 343 S.W.3d 137

, 140 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).

Here, a ppellant does not deny that the child told the forensic interviewer of the

details underlying what she (the child) called rape. 1 Though a general allegation of being

“raped” may carry greater connotation than something like “he touched me, ” the details

remain within the listener’s imag ination. They are not imparted by the speaker. At the

very least, such an interpretation of the word’s use would be reasonably debatable. And,

t hat is all which is needed to insulate the trial court’s decision from attack, given the

standard of review. It is one of abused discretion. Vidrio v. State

, No. 07

- 19

- 00369

- CR

,

2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 6490

, at *5 –6 (Tex. App.

—Amarillo Aug

. 14, 2020, no pet.) (mem.

op.

, not designated for publication ). Moreover, d iscretion is not abuse d so long as the

decision f alls within the zone of reasonable disagreement as does the one at bar. See

id

.

1 As the child said: “I, like, kind of knew what the word raped meant, but as far as I knew it was like

forced sexual contact, and that ’ s what it was, so that ’ s, like, my best way of putting it at that point.”5 **Issue Five** 

Lastly, a ppellant contends that the prosecutor engaged in multiple instances of

improper jury argument

, rendering infirm the punishment levied. We overrule the issue.

We were informed of several examples of the alleged improper argument. Yet,

appellant objected to none of them below

. According to t he Court of Criminal Appeals

,

“ [e] ven an inflammatory jury argument is forfeited if the defendant does not pursue his

objection to an adverse ruling. ” Hernandez v. State

, 538 S.W.3d 619, 622

– 23 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2018)

. That is, preservation of the complaint includes uttering an objection and

obtaining an adverse ruling. Because appellant failed to do so, he waived his fifth issue.

Having overruled each issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Brian Quinn

Chief Justice

Do not publish.