Filed 12/23/20 P. v. Traylor CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

v.

TONY TRAYLOR, 

 Defendant and Appellant.

2d Crim. No. B301345

(Super. Ct. No. YA099964)

(Los Angeles County)

In May 2019, appellant Tony Traylor was charged with a 

single count of possession for sale of a controlled substance 

(Health & Saf. Code § 11378) with a prior strike conviction (Pen. 

Code §§ 667, subd. (d), 1170.12, subd. (b)).1 Appellant pled no 

contest to the charge and the trial court suspended imposition of 

sentence and placed him on formal probation for three years. 

The court ordered him to serve 240 days in county jail. Among 

other things, the probation conditions require that appellant 

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code

unless otherwise stated.
2

“[o]bey all laws, rules, regulations and orders of the court and of 

the probation department.” (All caps. and emphasis omitted.) 

Two months later, the trial court revoked probation after 

being notified of a possible probation violation. Appellant 

admitted the violation and probation was reinstated. The 

following month, the District Attorney sought revocation based 

on a possible domestic violence incident. Following a hearing, the 

court found appellant had violated his probation terms, 

terminated probation and imposed the midterm of two years in 

state prison. We affirm. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Appellant and the victim have a child together. On August 

2, 2019, appellant tried to enter the victim’s house. The victim 

stood in the doorway, blocking his entry. At some point, the two 

of them fell to the floor and the victim sustained an injury to her 

thumb. 

The police were called. The victim reported that appellant 

had barged into her house and attacked her. She said her “whole 

body” was injured. 

At the hearing, the victim testified that appellant did not 

attack her and that she lied to the police to get appellant to leave. 

The victim denied that appellant grabbed her, threw her to the 

ground and told her he was going to kill her. The victim wanted 

appellant to leave the house because he was under the influence 

and behaving in a rude and obnoxious manner. She admitted 

they did “shak[e] each other around.” 

The trial court found sufficient evidence of a probation 

violation. The court revoked and terminated probation. 

DISCUSSION

“[S]ection 1203.2, subdivision (a) authorizes a trial court to 

revoke probation ‘if the interests of justice so require and the 
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court, in its judgment, has reason to believe from the report of the 

probation officer or otherwise that the person has violated any of 

the conditions of his or her probation . . . .’” (People v. Jackson

(2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 929, 935.) “‘As the language of section 

1203.2 would suggest, the determination whether to . . . revoke 

probation is largely discretionary.’ [Citation.] ‘[T]he facts 

supporting revocation of probation may be proven by a 

preponderance of the evidence.’ [Citation.] However, the 

evidence must support a conclusion the probationer's conduct 

constituted a willful violation of the terms and conditions of 

probation.” (People v. Galvan (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 978, 981-

982.)

We review a probation revocation decision under the 

substantial evidence standard and give great deference to the 

trial court’s decision, bearing in mind that “‘[p]robation is not a 

matter of right but an act of clemency, the granting and 

revocation of which are entirely within the sound discretion of the 

trial court. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] [¶] ‘The discretion of the 

court to revoke probation is analogous to its power to grant the 

probation, and the court’s discretion will not be disturbed in the 

absence of a showing of abusive or arbitrary action. [Citations.]’ 

[Citation.] ‘Many times circumstances not warranting a 

conviction may fully justify a court in revoking probation granted 

on a prior offense. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘“[O]nly in a very 

extreme case should an appellate court interfere with the 

discretion of the trial court in the matter of denying or revoking 

probation. . . .”’ [Citation.] And the burden of demonstrating an 

abuse of the trial court’s discretion rests squarely on the 

defendant.” (People v. Urke (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 766, 773.) 

“When the record reveals that a defendant’s violation of the 

terms of probation was the result of irresponsible or willful 
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behavior, termination of probation and imposition of a prison 

sentence is no abuse of discretion.” (People v. Kingston (2019) 41

Cal.App.5th 272, 278.)

The revocation petition charged appellant with violating 

probation by failing to report to probation and by inflicting 

corporal injury upon the mother of his child which resulted in a 

traumatic condition (§ 273.5, subd. (a)). “A traumatic condition is 

a wound or other bodily injury, whether minor or serious, caused 

by the direct application of physical force.” (CALCRIM No. 840, 

italics omitted.) 

Appellant does not dispute that he and the victim had some 

type of altercation. He contends the evidence does not support 

the trial court’s determination that he willfully violated the terms 

of his probation. Admittedly, the victim was recalcitrant and 

recanted many of the statements made to the police at the time of 

the incident. After viewing a video recording of those statements, 

the victim conceded that appellant had “got on top of” her while 

she was holding him and that they fell to the floor, causing her to 

injure her thumb. She was “not sure” why she had told the police 

that appellant barged into her house, attacked her and 

threatened to kill her. Her only explanation was that appellant 

was under the influence and behaving badly, and that she 

wanted him to leave. 

It was well within the trial court’s discretion to believe the 

victim’s recorded statements, which were admissible as prior 

inconsistent statements offered for the truth of the matters 

asserted. (People v. Green (1971) 3 Cal.3d 981, 985.) Those 

statements were admissible both for impeachment and “to prove 

their substance.” (People v. Hawthorne (1992) 4 Cal.4th 43, 55, 

fn. 4; Evid. Code, §§ 770, 1235.) 
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DISPOSITION

The judgment (order revoking probation) is affirmed. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

PERREN, J.

We concur:

YEGAN, Acting P.J.

TANGEMAN, J. 
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Hector M. Guzman, Judge

Superior Court County of Los Angeles

______________________________

Jared G. Coleman, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. 

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, Paul M. Roadarmel, Jr., Supervising 

Deputy Attorney General, and John Yang, Deputy Attorney 

General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.