COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Coleman, Bumgardner and Lemons 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

TROY DONAHUE BARKSDALE 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 1184-98-3 JUDGE SAM W. COLEMAN III 

 MARCH 2, 1999 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF MARTINSVILLE 

Charles M. Stone, Judge 

 J. Grady Monday (Monday & Monday, on brief), 

for appellant. 

 Steven A. Witmer, Assistant Attorney General 

(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief), 

for appellee. 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010, 

this opinion is not designated for publication.

 

 Troy Donahue Barksdale was convicted in a bench trial of 

grand larceny of a firearm, possession of a firearm by a 

convicted felon, and statutory burglary. On appeal, Barksdale 

contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the 

larceny and burglary convictions. 

 "'Possession of property recently stolen is prima facie

evidence of guilt of the crime of larceny, and throws upon the 

accused the burden of accounting for that possession.'" Hope v. 

Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 381, 385, 392 S.E.2d 830, 833 (1990) 

(en banc) (quoting Fout v. Commonwealth, 199 Va. 184, 190, 98 

S.E.2d 817, 821 (1957)). Furthermore: 

 "[W]hen evidence has been introduced, which, 

if believed, establishes that a house has 

been broken and entered and goods stolen 
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therefrom, and warrants an inference beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the breaking and 

entering and the larceny of the goods were 

committed at the same time, by the same 

person or persons, as a part of the same 

transaction, upon principal and authority the 

exclusive possession of the stolen goods 

shortly thereafter, unexplained or falsely 

denied, has the same efficiency to give rise 

to an inference that the possessor is guilty 

of the breaking and entering as to an 

inference that he is guilty of the larceny." 

Fout, 199 Va. at 190-91, 98 S.E.2d at 822 (quoting Drinkard v. 

Commonwealth, 163 Va. 1074, 1083, 178 S.E. 25, 28 (1935)). 

 Barksdale does not deny that he was in possession of 

recently stolen property, nor does he deny that the evidence 

supports an inference that the breaking and entering and the 

larceny were committed at the same time. 

 When confronted, Barksdale lied about his name, fled from 

the arrest and ultimately issued two conflicting exculpatory 

statements explaining how he came into possession of the gun. 

However, "[t]he fact finder need not believe the accused's 

explanation and may infer that he is trying to conceal his 

guilt." Black v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 838, 842, 284 S.E.2d 608, 

610 (1981); Speight v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 83, 88, 354 

S.E.2d 95, 98 (1987) (en banc). Additionally, Barksdale's false 

statement of material fact and his decision to flee entitled the 

fact finder to draw inferences supporting guilt. See Welch v. 

Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 518, 525, 425 S.E.2d 101, 106 (1992). 

 Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, and 

granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible 
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therefrom, Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 352, 218 

S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975), the evidence was sufficient to support 

the larceny and burglary convictions. Accordingly, the judgment 

of the trial court is affirmed. 

 Affirmed.