FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20463

STATEMENT OF REASONS OF 

COMMISSIONERS SHANA M. BROUSSARD AND ELLEN L. WEINTRAUB

The “Russian government engaged in an aggressive, multi-faceted effort to influence, or 

attempt to influence, the outcome of the 2016 presidential election,” concluded the bipartisan U.S. 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in its five-volume report, Russian Active Measures 

Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election.

1 The Complaints in these matters alleged 

that such interference amounted to impermissible campaign contributions from foreign nationals. 

The facts before the Commission – set forth in the Senate Intelligence Committee Report, the 

Department of Justice Special Counsel’s Report On the Investigation Into Russian Interference In 

The 2016 Presidential Election, federal indictments and trial transcripts, and other findings issued 

by the U.S. Intelligence Community – overwhelmingly supported the conclusion that the Russian 

Federation and the Internet Research Agency (“IRA”), a Russian troll farm tied to Russian 

intelligence, made, and that Donald Trump and his presidential committee (“Trump Committee”) 

knowingly solicited or accepted, prohibited foreign national contributions in violation of the Federal 

Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended (“FECA” or the “Act”). We voted accordingly, 

consistent with the recommendations from our General Counsel’s Office.2

Russia’s 2016 Election Interference

Five months before the 2016 presidential election, the American public learned that Russian 

military intelligence hacked the computer system of the Democratic Party’s national committee.3 A 

month later and on the eve of the Democratic convention, WikiLeaks published a tranche of stolen 

1 U.S. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, RUSSIAN ACTIVE MEASURES CAMPAIGNS AND INTERFERENCE IN THE 

2016 U.S. ELECTION (“Senate Intelligence Committee Report”), VOLUME 5: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE THREATS AND 

VULNERABILITIES (Aug. 18, 2020), at v. 2 See Certification in MURs 7207, 7268, 7274 and 7623 (Russian Federation, et al.), dated April 22, 2021 (“Cert”). 3 See First Gen. Counsel’s Rpt. in MURs 7207, 7268, 7274 and 7623 (Russian Federation, et al.) (“FGCR”) at 2 (citing 

David E. Sanger and Nick Corasaniti, D.N.C. Says Russian Hackers Penetrated its Files, Including Dossier on Donald 

Trump, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2016). 

BEFORE THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

In the Matters of

Russian Federation; Donald J. Trump for 

President, Inc. and Bradley T. Crate in his 

official capacity as treasurer; Donald J. Trump; 

H. Russell Taub; Cambridge Analytica, LLC; 

Internet Research Agency; and Paul Manafort 

)

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 ) 

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 ) 

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 MURs 7207, 7268, 7274, and 7623 

 

 

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Statement of Commissioners Shana M. Broussard and Ellen L. Weintraub

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documents.4 Shortly thereafter Donald Trump implored, “Russia, if you’re listening, I hope you’re 

able to find the 30,000 emails that are missing,” which purportedly belonged to his opponent.5

Nearly five hours after Trump made this statement, the GRU, a Russian military intelligence 

agency, began spearphishing attacks targeting emails associated with presidential candidate Hillary 

Clinton’s personal office.6 Separate from those efforts, the GRU had successfully accessed the 

emails of Clinton campaign officials and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee. The 

GRU stole “thousands of documents, including emails, strategy memos, analyses of congressional 

races, fundraising information, and opposition research.”7 The hack-and-release operation 

culminated in WikiLeaks publishing documents stolen from the Chair of the Clinton campaign in 

the weeks before the election.8

At the same time, Russian troll farms perpetrated a mass disinformation campaign against 

the American public in support of Trump’s candidacy. The IRA operated as a quasi-governmental 

entity “at the direction of the Kremlin”9 in conducting what it referred to as “information warfare 

against the United States of America.”10 The IRA was not a small operation. It had “more than 

eighty”11 employees tasked with U.S.-related operations. The IRA operated accounts on U.S. social 

media platforms masquerading as U.S. citizens and grassroots organizations designed to influence 

public opinion by promoting Trump and disparaging Clinton.12 It operated approximately 3,800 

Twitter accounts, 470 Facebook accounts, and 170 Instagram accounts.13 Amassed among these 

accounts were hundreds of thousands of followers.14 Through its many fake profiles, the IRA 

planned and organized dozens of political rallies in U.S. cities, allowing hostile foreign operatives 

to participate directly in American democracy.15 

The Trump Campaign’s Role in Russia’s Interference Efforts

Russian interference coincided with a series of communications between apparent agents of 

the Trump campaign and individuals with ties to the Russian government. The available 

information before the Commission reflects that Roger Stone, a Trump Committee official until 

4 See id. (citing Joe Uchill, WikiLeaks Posts 20,000 DNC Emails, THE HILL, July 22, 2016). 5 See id. at 23 (citing C-SPAN, Donald Trump on Russian & Missing Hillary Clinton Emails, YOUTUBE (July 27, 2016), 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3kxG8uJUsWU). 6 See id. at 24 (citing SPECIAL COUNSEL ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE

INVESTIGATION INTO RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (“Special Counsel’s Report”) at 49 

(Mar. 22, 2019); Senate Intelligence Committee Report Vol. 5 at 232; Indictment, United States v. Netyksho, et al., 

1:18-cr-00215 (D.D.C. July 13, 2018) (“GRU Indictment”) ¶ 22). 7 Id. at 18-19 (citing, inter alia, Special Counsel’s Report at 38, 40, 43; GRU Indictment ¶ 28(a)). 8 See id. at 2 (citing Ellen Nakashima, U.S. Government Officially Accuses Russia of Hacking Campaign to Interfere 

with Elections, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 2016). 9 Id. at 9 (citing, inter alia, Senate Intelligence Committee Report Vol. 2 at 32). 10Id. (citing Superseding Indictment, United States v. Internet Research Agency, et al., 1:18-cr-00032 (D.D.C. Nov. 8, 

2019) (“IRA Indictment”) ¶ 10(c)). 

11 Id. at 10 (citing, inter alia, IRA Indictment ¶ 10(d)). 12 See id. at 11 (citing, inter alia, Special Counsel’s Report at 19, 27). 13 See id. at 12 (citing Open Hearing: Social Media Influence in the 2016 U.S. Election Before the S. Select Comm. on 

Intelligence, 115th Cong. (Nov. 1, 2017); Open Hearing on Foreign Influence Operations’ Use of Social Media 

Platforms (Company Witnesses) Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 115th Cong. (Sept. 5, 2018); Twitter, 

Update on Twitter’s Review of the 2016 Election (Jan. 19, 2018) (updated Jan. 31, 2018); Special Counsel’s Report at 

15; Senate Intelligence Committee Report Vol. 2 at 50, 76-77). 14 See id. (citing Special Counsel’s Report at 14-15). 15 See id. at 16 (citing Special Counsel’s Report at 29). 

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August 2015 who remained in regular contact with the Trump campaign thereafter, conveyed nonpublic information to the campaign about the release of hacked emails.16 Notably, Stone appears to 

have told senior campaign officials and Trump himself that WikiLeaks would release emails 

damaging to Clinton before that information became public.17 The WikiLeaks Twitter account also 

had multiple contacts with Donald Trump, Jr., who wrote to WikiLeaks to ask for information about 

a potential “leak.”18 And there is extensive evidence in the public record regarding former Trump 

campaign manager Paul Manafort’s role in sharing Trump Committee polling data with Konstantin 

Kilimnik, a Russian intelligence officer with possible connections to the GRU’s hack-and-release 

operation.19 

Trump’s own “Russia, if you’re listening” solicitation must be understood in the context of 

the many reported contacts between Russian operatives and Trump campaign officials. It was no 

“offhand remark,” as claimed by the Trump Committee.20 Trump made the statement seeking 

Clinton’s emails at a press conference with television cameras rolling, at a time when numerous 

sources were reporting that Russia was aiding his campaign.21 This occurred on July 27, 2016, five 

days after WikiLeaks released the DNC documents, and approximately one week after Stone 

reportedly discussed WikiLeaks with Trump himself.22 Russia, apparently, was listening. 

H. Russell Taub

 The GRU’s efforts were not confined to the presidential race. On August 15, 2016, 

“Guccifer 2.0,” the online persona controlled by the GRU as part of its larger hack-and-release 

operation, received a request for stolen documents from a candidate running for U.S. Congress.23

Guccifer 2.0 in return sent the candidate stolen documents related to his opponent. The 

Commission, not knowing the identity of the candidate, found reason to believe that an unknown 

congressional candidate solicited, accepted, or received a foreign national contribution and 

authorized our attorneys to seek the identity of the unknown candidate.24

The Office of General Counsel determined that the unknown candidate was H. Russell Taub, 

a 2016 candidate for Rhode Island’s 1st Congressional District. The Commission obtained records 

of a Twitter message exchange from August 2016 in which Taub asked an account operated by 

Guccifer 2.0 for a list of Republican donors in order to defeat his opponent, explaining “if I had the 

resources I can win.”25 Guccifer 2.0 replied, informing Taub that it had a dossier on Taub’s 

16 See id. at 25-33 and internal sources. 17 See id. at 25 and internal sources. 18 See id. at 33-34 and internal sources. Trump Jr.’s June 9, 2016 meeting with a Kremlin-linked lawyer regarding 

potential opposition research is the subject of another Matter Under Review. We voted to find reason to believe that 

Trump and Trump Jr. knowingly solicited a contribution from a foreign national in the context of that meeting. Our 

Republican colleagues disagreed. See Certification in MURs 7265 and 7266 (Make America Great Again f/k/a Donald 

J. Trump for President, Inc.), dated March 9, 2021.

19 See FGCR at 35-39 and internal citations; id. at 83 (citing, inter alia, Special Counsel’s Report at 129-31, 135-36, 

140). 

20 Trump Committee Resp. at 5, MUR 7207. 21 See FGCR at 65 and internal citations. 22 See id. at 65, 26 (citing Senate Intelligence Committee Report Vol. 5 at 229-30 (citing interview of Michael Cohen)). 23 See id. at 22 (citing GRU Indictment ¶ 43(a); Special Counsel’s Report at 43). 24 See Cert. We had the requisite four votes to find reason to believe, despite two Commissioners voting against our 

attorneys’ recommendation.

25 See MUR 7207 (Taub), Factual and Legal Analysis at 5.

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opponent and offering to send the dossier.26 After Taub responded with his email address, Guccifer 

2.0 sent Taub ten documents related to Taub’s opponent, including professionally-produced reports 

and polling data, apparently stolen from GRU’s election-related hacking targets.27 

This was a clear-cut solicitation and receipt of a foreign national contribution by a federal 

candidate. Taub first asked Guccifer 2.0 for a donor list, a valuable campaign asset. In return, he 

received a trove of materials akin to opposition research – materials which typically come with a 

high price tag. Recognizing this, the Commission pursued the allegations against Taub and 

ultimately entered into a conciliation agreement.28 The public finally knows that the “unknown 

congressional candidate” is H. Russell Taub. 

Alleged FECA Violations

This statement only scratches the surface on the breadth of Russian attacks on our 

democracy in the 2016 election. We will not repeat the extensive factual record presented by the 

General Counsel’s Office. There is no doubt that Russia interfered in the 2016 election and spent 

substantial sums to do so. Our Intelligence Community, the Special Counsel, and the bipartisan U.S. 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence have all reported ample evidence of such interference. The 

Federal Election Commission should have had no hesitation about joining in the condemnation in 

response to the Complaints before us alleging that Russia’s efforts amounted to impermissible 

campaign contributions. 

The Act and Commission regulations prohibit any foreign national from “directly or 

indirectly” making a “contribution or donation of money or other thing of value,” “an express or 

implied promise to make a contribution or donation,” or “an expenditure, independent expenditure, 

or disbursement for an electioneering communication” in connection with a federal, state, or local 

election.29 A contribution is “any gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money or anything 

of value made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office.”30 The 

Act similarly defines “expenditure” as “any purchase, payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, 

or gift of money or anything of value, made by any person for the purpose of influencing an 

election.”31 The Russian Federation paid substantial sums in a long-running campaign to influence a 

U.S. election. 

As a threshold matter, we agreed with our nonpartisan Office of General Counsel that the 

Commission has jurisdiction over the Russian Federation.32 And with clear and extensive evidence 

of Russia’s efforts to influence the 2016 U.S. election, we voted, inter alia, to support their 

recommendations to find reason to believe that: 1) the Russian Federation and the IRA made 

prohibited foreign national expenditures and independent expenditures in connection with the 

influence campaign targeting the 2016 presidential election; 2) (not surprisingly) the Russian 

26 See id. 27 See id. at 6. 28 Although the agreement does not require Taub to pay a civil penalty because Taub demonstrated an inability to pay a 

fine, the value lies in the American public knowing the identity of the U.S. candidate who solicited a contribution from 

a foreign adversary to benefit himself and his campaign. 29 52 U.S.C. § 30121(a)(1); 11 C.F.R. § 110.20(b), (c), (e), (f). 30 52 U.S.C. § 30101(8)(A)(i). 31 Id. § 30101(9)(A)(i). 32 See FGCR at 43-49.

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Federation and IRA failed to report those expenditures; 3) the Russian Federation made a prohibited 

in-kind contribution by expending resources to hack Clinton-related servers in response to Trump’s 

“Russia, if you’re listening” comment; and 4) the Russian Federation made prohibited in-kind 

foreign national contributions. 

It is likewise illegal to knowingly solicit contributions from foreign nationals.33 Under 

Commission regulations, “to solicit” means “to ask, request, or recommend, explicitly or implicitly, 

that another person make a contribution, donation, transfer of funds, or otherwise provide anything 

of value.”34 Thus, we voted to find reason to believe that: 1) Trump and the Trump Committee 

knowingly solicited, accepted, or received an in-kind contribution from the Russian Federation in 

connection with Trump’s “if you’re listening” comment; 2) the Trump Committee knowingly 

solicited an in-kind contribution from WikiLeaks; 3) an Unknown Congressional Candidate (Taub) 

knowingly solicited, accepted, or received a prohibited in-kind foreign national contribution; and 4) 

Paul Manafort and the Trump Committee knowingly solicited a prohibited in-kind foreign national 

contribution and transferred a campaign committee asset without charge. 

In addition to supporting our attorneys’ recommendations to find reason to believe against 

the Russian Federation and the IRA, we supported their recommendation to then take no further 

action against those Respondents.35 The Commission’s Office of General Counsel concluded there 

was no realistic prospect that the Russian Federation or the IRA would cooperate and voluntarily 

enter into conciliation with the Commission. The likelihood of success in obtaining a collectible 

judgment through litigation was low. Our vote to find reason to believe they violated the Act as 

described above but to take no further action was influenced by the knowledge that other parts of 

the government were better situated to address these serious attacks on our national sovereignty and 

were taking steps to do so. In April of last year, for example, the U.S. Department of the Treasury 

announced new sanctions against the Russian government’s attempts to influence U.S. elections in 

2020.36 Several of Treasury’s targets were involved in the 2016 disinformation campaign, including 

Yevgeniy Prigozhin, the financier of the IRA, and Konstantin Kilimnik, the Russian agent who 

provided the Russian Intelligence Service with sensitive information on polling and Trump’s 

campaign strategy.37 The FBI is currently seeking the arrest of Prigozhin for conspiracy to defraud 

the United States, and the arrest of Kilimnik for obstruction of justice and conspiracy to obstruct 

justice.38 Those sanctions follow earlier penalties imposed by the Treasury Department during the 

Trump administration.39

No similar factors militated against pursuing the non-State actor respondents. Thus, we 

supported our attorneys’ recommendation to conciliate with Trump, the Trump Committee, and 

33 52 U.S.C. § 30121(a)(2). 34 11 C.F.R. §§ 110.20(a)(6), 300.2(m). 35 See FGCR at 61-62; Cert. 36 See U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury Escalates Sanctions Against the Russian Government’s Attempts to 

Influence U.S. Elections (April 15, 2021), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0126. 37 See id. 38 See Federal Bureau of Investigation, Most Wanted, https://www fbi.gov/wanted/counterintelligence/yevgeniyviktorovich-prigozhin, https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/counterintelligence/konstantin-viktorovich-kilimnik (last visited 

February 10, 2022). 

39 See Nathan Layne, U.S. Imposes fresh Russia sanctions for election meddling, REUTERS (Dec. 19, 2018), 

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-russia-sanctions-treasury/u-s-imposes-fresh-russia-sanctions-for-electionmeddling-idUSKCN1OI27F. 

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