97-417

No. 97-417

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

1998 MT 24

JAMES ANDERSON,

Defendant-Appellant,

v.

KEENAN ENGELKE, WILBER-ELLIS

COMPANY, and MINOT CASH SALES,

Plaintiffs-Respondents.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fifteenth Judicial District,

In and for the County of Roosevelt,

The Honorable David J. Cybulski, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

Reid Peyton Chambers, Kyle T. Nayback, Sonosky, Chambers, Sachse &

Endreson, Washington, D.C.; Mary L. Zemyan, Wolf Point, Montana

For Respondent:

Laura Christoffersen, Christoffersen & Knierim, Wolf Point, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: December 18, 1997

Decided: February 10, 1998

Filed:

__________________________________________

Clerk

Justice James C. Nelson delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 This is an appeal from the District Courtþs findings of fact, conclusions of law and

judgment issued March 24, 1997, in two separate causes of action filed in the Fifteenth

Judicial District Court, Roosevelt County. The appeals of the courtþs decisions were

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consolidated for purposes of our review. We reverse and remand for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

 

 BACKGROUND

¶2 The two cases filed in District Court are procedurally and factually similar. 

Plaintiffs in Cause No. 96-DV-11026 are Wilber-Ellis Company and Minot Cash Sales. 

The plaintiff in Cause No. 96-DV-11027 is Keenan Engelke. All of these parties are

hereinafter referred to collectively as plaintiffs. Plaintiffs are non-Indian residents of

Roosevelt County; they obtained separate judgments against defendant James Anderson

(Anderson) in the Fort Peck Tribal Court on July 9, 1996. Anderson is an enrolled

member of the Fort Peck Tribes living within the exterior boundaries of the Fort Peck

Reservation. 

¶3 Plaintiffs Wilbur-Ellis Company and Minot Cash Sales obtained a judgment for

$5,460 plus costs for Andersonþs purchase of cattle feed supplement. Plaintiff Engelke

obtained a judgment in the amount of $6,543 plus costs for dirt work which Engelke

performed in developing water sources in Andersonþs pastures. The underlying

transactions in each case arose within the Reservation boundaries.

¶4 Having obtained judgments in the Fort Peck Tribal Court, plaintiffs then brought

suit in the Montana Fifteenth Judicial District Court against Anderson pursuant to the

Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, codified at Title 25, Chapter 9, part

6, MCA (1995) (the Recognition Act). Plaintiffs requested that the District Court enter

its order recognizing the Tribal Court judgments and granting full faith and credit to said

judgments with rights of full enforcement pursuant to Montana law. Anderson entered

a special appearance in each state court suit and moved to dismiss, claiming that the

District Court had neither personal nor subject matter jurisdiction.

¶5 Following briefing and a hearing, the District Court entered its findings of fact,

conclusions of law and judgment. The court ruled that the Fort Peck Tribal Court

judgments must be recognized under the provisions of the Recognition Act because the

Tribes fall within the definition of "foreign state" set out at § 25-9-602(2), MCA (1995). 

Additionally, the court concluded that even if the provisions of the Recognition Act do

not apply to tribal court judgments, § 25-9-608, MCA (1995), does not prevent the

recognition of a foreign judgment in situations not covered by the Act, and that, in this

case, the District Court was required to recognize the Tribal Court judgments under the

doctrine of comity and our decision in Wippert v. Blackfeet Tribe (1982), 201 Mont.

299, 654 P.2d 512.

¶6 Anderson then filed a timely motion for new trial and/or amendment of judgment. 

The Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes of the Fort Peck Reservation appeared amicus curiae

in his support. The court did not rule on this motion, and, accordingly, it was ultimately

deemed denied pursuant to Rule 59(d), M.R.Civ.P. 

¶7 In the meantime, a state writ of execution was issued in each case commanding the

Sheriff of Roosevelt County to satisfy the state court judgments through seizure of

Anderson's assets. Plaintiffs did not seek enforcement of the Tribal Court judgments

through the Fort Peck Tribal Court. A nominal off-Reservation bank account balance

was seized, but the main focus of the state execution proceedings was and is against

Anderson's on-Reservation assets. Anderson timely appealed.

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 ISSUE

¶8 The question which we must answer in this appeal is whether a state court can

enforce a tribal court judgment within the exterior boundaries of an Indian reservation via

state law and state execution proceedings. We answer this question in the negative.

 DISCUSSION

¶9 Whether a state court has the power to utilize state law and execution procedures

to enforce a tribal court judgment within the exterior boundaries of an Indian reservation

is a question of law. We review legal questions de novo. We determine simply whether

the courtþs interpretation of the law is correct. Agri West v. Koyama Farms, Inc. (1997),

281 Mont. 167, 170, 933 P.2d 808, 810; Day v. Child Support Enforcement Div. (1995),

272 Mont. 170, 175, 900 P.2d 296, 299.

¶10 Anderson argues that the District Court has no power to enforce the two Tribal

Court judgments within the exterior boundaries of the Fort Peck Reservation. He

contends that, since he is an enrolled member of the Fort Peck Tribes, the state court

does not have personal jurisdiction over him. Anderson also argues that since the subject

matter of the Tribal Court suits both involve transactions arising on the Reservation, the

state court does not have subject matter jurisdiction either. Anderson maintains that the

Fort Peck Tribal Court is the only court with authority to enforce judgments against

Tribal members on the Reservation. He points out that the Tribal Court is open to nonIndian judgment creditors. He also emphasizes that the procedures for enforcement of

judgments under Montana law contain numerous differences from the Tribal execution

procedures and exemptions contained in the Fort Peck Comprehensive Code of Justice,

and that the latter are generally more favorable to the judgment debtor. 

¶11 Anderson also maintains that the District Court erred when it used the Recognition

Act as a basis for its decision. He argues that, even assuming the Recognition Act

applies, a state court recognizing a judgment under that statute still needs jurisdiction over

the subject matter and over the parties to proceed with an enforcement action. 

¶12 Furthermore, Anderson contends that the District Court erred in relying on our

decision in Wippert. He points out that all parties in that case, including the Indian

parties, had requested the state court to determine the validity of the judgment at issue. 

To the contrary, in the case at bar, Anderson does not consent, and, in fact, actively

resists imposition of jurisdiction by the state court. 

¶13 Finally, Anderson contends that even if the District Court did have jurisdiction,

our decision in Agri West requires a district court to abstain in favor of enforcement of

judgments in tribal court. (Since we have resolved this case on the basis of Andersonþs

other arguments, we do not address this contention.)

¶14 Plaintiffs, on the other hand, maintain that under Wippert a judgment creditor may

bring a suit in state district court to enforce a judgment of a tribal court. Plaintiffs

contend that state courts, including Montana, generally have adopted the doctrine of

comity in determining whether to enforce the judgments of foreign states, including tribal

court judgments, and that the doctrine of comity is essentially codified in the provisions

of the Recognition Act. Moreover, plaintiffs contend that recognition or enforcement of

a foreign judgment, or in this case the Tribal Court judgments, does not rely upon

personal jurisdiction over the defendant or subject matter jurisdiction over the underlying

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claim. Plaintiffs maintain that Anderson attempts to confuse jurisdiction in the original

proceeding with jurisdiction to enforce the judgment rendered in a competent court.

¶15 With these arguments and the District Courtþs decision in mind, we turn to the

case law. þIndian law is uniquely federal in nature, having been drawn from the

Constitution, treaties, legislation and an þintricate web of judicially made Indian law.þþ

Wilson v. Marchington (9th Cir. 1997), 127 F.3d 805, 813 (quoting Oliphant v.

Suquamish Indian Tribe (1978), 435 U.S. 191, 206, 98 S.Ct. 1011, 1020, 55 L.Ed.2d

209). Accordingly, recognition of tribal judgments, by necessity, requires that the

ultimate decision governing the recognition and enforcement of a tribal judgment be

founded upon federal law. Wilson, 127 F.3d at 813 (citations omitted).

¶16 It is well-settled that, absent the consent of all Indian parties, the state courts of

Montana lack jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes arising from transactions within the

exterior boundaries of an Indian reservation and involving tribal members. In Williams

v. Lee (1959), 358 U.S. 217, 223, 79 S.Ct. 269, 272, 3 L.Ed.2d 251, 255-56, the

Supreme Court declared tribal jurisdiction exclusive over a lawsuit arising out of onreservation sales transacted between a non-Indian plaintiff and an Indian defendant. 

Accord Kennerly v. District Court (1971), 400 U.S. 423, 91 S.Ct. 480, 27 L.Ed.2d 507.

¶17 This Court has, likewise, confirmed that Montanaþs courts have no subject matter

jurisdiction over an action arising on an Indian reservation brought by a non-Indian

plaintiff against an enrolled member of the tribe residing on the reservation. See for

example, Security State Bank v. Pierre (1973), 162 Mont. 299, 511 P.2d 325; Milbank

Mut. Ins. Co. v. Eagleman (1985), 218 Mont. 58, 705 P.2d 1117; and Geiger v. Pierce

(1988), 233 Mont. 18, 758 P.2d 279.

¶18 The issue in the case at bar, however, is not whether the underlying transactions

between plaintiffs and Anderson were subject to the jurisdiction of the state courts of

Montana. Clearly, they were not. Here, the question involves the extent to which, if at

all, a state court, using state law and by state execution procedures, can enforce a tribal

court judgment within the exterior boundaries of an Indian reservation. To answer this

question, we, again, turn to federal case law.

¶19 It is axiomatic that a court has the power to enforce its judgments within its own

jurisdiction. However,

 [n]o legal judgment has any effect, of its own force, beyond the limits of

 the sovereignty from which its authority is derived. Because states and

 Indian tribes coexist as sovereign governments, they have no direct power

 to enforce their judgments in each otherþs jurisdictions.

Wilson, 127 F.3d at 807. This rule follows the rationale of the Supreme Court in Williams.

¶20 In Williams, the Supreme Court pointed out that þ[e]ssentially, absent governing

Acts of Congress, the question has always been whether the state action infringed on the

right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.þ Williams,

358 U.S. at 220. In the case at bar, it is clear that the Tribal Court had exclusive

jurisdiction over plaintiffsþ underlying actions against Anderson. Furthermore, the record

is clear that the Fort Peck Tribes have established procedures, exemptions and other

standards for enforcement and execution of Tribal Court judgments under Title IV,

Chapter 3 of the Fort Peck Comprehensive Code of Justice. These procedures,

exemptions and other standards, codify the Tribeþs policies on how judgments of the

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tribal court shall be executed. By and large, these procedures, exemptions and standards

are more favorable to debtors than the procedures, exemptions and standards under

Montana state law.

¶21 Where, as here, the Tribe has adopted a comprehensive body of law for enforcing

the judgments of its courts, allowing Montana state courts to enforce Tribal Court

judgments within the exterior boundaries of the Indian Reservation would run afoul of the

Supreme Courtþs decision in Williams, not to mention our decisions in Geiger, Milbank

Mutual and Pierre. If, on the Reservation, a state court were to enforce a Tribal Court

judgment utilizing the state's own execution procedures and laws, the state would

effectively replace the Tribeþs enforcement procedures with its own, and, thus, would

plainly "undermine the authority of the tribal courts over Reservation affairs" and

"infringe on the right of the Indians to govern themselves." Williams, 358 U.S. at 223. 

The result would be a substantial intrusion on Tribal governmental authority.

¶22 With that basic principle in mind, we also conclude that state courts may not

enforce tribal court judgments within the exterior boundaries of an Indian reservation via

the Recognition Act. The Recognition Act requires state courts to enforce foreign

judgments in the same manner as the judgment of a sister state that is entitled to full faith

and credit. Section 25-9-604, MCA (1995). A "foreign judgment" is "any judgment of

a foreign state granting or denying recovery of a sum of money, other than a judgment

for taxes, a fine or other penalty, or a judgment for support in matrimonial or family

matters." Section 25-9-602(1), MCA (1995). A "foreign state" is "any governmental

unit other than the United States or any state, district, commonwealth, territory, or

insular possession thereof or the Panama Canal Zone, the Trust Territory of the Pacific

Islands, or the Ryukyu Islands." Section 25-9-602(2), MCA (1995).

¶23 In Day, we expressly reserved the question of whether the Recognition Act is

applicable to Indian tribal court orders, judgments and decrees that do not involve child

support. We also expressly declined to render any opinion with regard to the interplay

between the Recognition Act, the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (Title

25, Chapter 9, part 5, MCA) and our decision in Wippert as regards such orders,

judgments and decrees which do not involve child support. Day, 900 P.2d at 300-01. 

Moreover, our further research has revealed no federal nor any state case authority under

which an Indian tribal court judgment has been enforced, either on the reservation or off

the reservation via the Recognition Act. We do not need to resolve this point one way

or the other, however.

¶24 Even assuming, without deciding, that the Recognition Act may, under appropriate

circumstances, be applicable to enforce a tribal court judgment, we cannot agree that this

Act would be applicable in the case at bar. Here, plaintiffs seek to use the Recognition

Act to enforce judgments originally entered by the Tribal Court. Plaintiffs seek to

enforce such judgments, not within the jurisdiction of the state court, i.e., offReservation, but, rather, within the jurisdiction of the rendering court itself.

¶25 An example serves to illustrate this misapplication of the Recognition Act. 

Assume that a Montana creditor obtained a money judgment against a Canadian debtor

in a Canadian court. Under the Recognition Act, Montana would be required to

recognize and enforce the Canadian judgment in Montana in the same manner as the

judgment of a sister state that is entitled to full faith and credit. The point to be made,

however, is that while Montana courts would have authority under the Recognition Act

to enforce the Canadian judgment in Montana using Montana law and execution

procedures, this stateþs courts would have no jurisdiction to enforce the state judgment

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issued under the Recognition Act in Canada. Obviously, if the Montana creditor wished

to enforce his judgment in Canada, then he would be required to comply with the

execution procedures mandated by Canadian law and the Canadian courts.

¶26 In the same manner, and again assuming, without deciding, that a tribal court

judgment is a "foreign judgment" from a "foreign state," Montana state courts would

have jurisdiction to enforce a tribal judgment via the Recognition Act within the

jurisdiction of Montana's courts, but not within the jurisdiction of the tribal court

rendering the judgment in the first place nor within the jurisdiction of some other

competent court. Montana courts have no power via the Recognition Act or otherwise

to enforce a tribal court judgment within the exterior boundaries of an Indian reservation

any more than they have the power to enforce a Canadian judgment in Canada or, for that

matter, a Wyoming judgment in Wyoming. In short, to enforce a judgment within the

jurisdiction of the court rendering it or within the jurisdiction of some other competent

court, it is incumbent upon the person seeking to enforce the judgment that he or she

comply with and utilize the procedures and law of the government and the court within

whose jurisdiction enforcement is sought.

¶27 Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court erred in determining that the

tribal court judgments at issue in this case could be enforced within the exterior

boundaries of the Fort Peck Reservation via the Recognition Act. We leave for another

day our decision on the question of whether the Recognition Act may be utilized to

enforce Indian tribal court judgments, orders and decrees, not involving child support,

off the Reservation. In this regard, however, we note that there already exist procedures

outside the Recognition Act allowing state courts to enforce tribal court judgments offreservation. See Wippert, 654 P.2d 512; Day, 900 P.2d 296. Thus, we are not inclined

to reach the applicability of the Recognition Act to tribal court judgments on the facts

presented here.

¶28 Finally, we also conclude that the District Courtþs reliance on our decision in

Wippert is misplaced. In Wippert we held that the orders, judgments and decrees of an

Indian tribal court are not entitled to full faith and credit, but are, nevertheless, to be

treated with the same deference shown the decisions of foreign nations as a matter of

comity. Wippert, 654 P.2d at 515. In Wippert, however, all parties to the underlying

lawsuit in the tribal court thereafter, and without opposition, participated in the state court

proceedings involving enforcement of the judgment. Wippert, 654 P.2d at 514-15. More

importantly, Wippert did not directly address the precise issue presented in this appeal,

and, thus, cannot be read for the proposition that a state court may enforce a tribal court

judgment within the exterior boundaries of an Indian reservation using state law and state

execution procedures where the Indian debtor actively resists imposition of the state

courtþs jurisdiction. While under Wippert, a state court may enforce a tribal court

judgment outside of the exterior boundaries of the reservation on the basis of comity, see

Wippert, 654 P.2d at 515; Day, 900 P.2d at 301, Wippert has no application to the

enforcement by state courts of tribal judgments within the exterior boundaries of an

Indian reservation where the tribal litigant resists state court jurisdiction.

¶29 To summarize, then, where the judgment debtor is a tribal member residing within

the exterior boundaries of the reservation, tribal courts have exclusive jurisdiction to

enforce tribal court judgments against assets owned by the tribal member and located

within the exterior boundaries of the reservation. State courts may enforce tribal court

judgments against tribal members living outside of the exterior boundaries of the

reservation and against off-reservation assets owned by tribal members on the basis of

comity, assuming that the holder of the judgment brings an action or special proceeding

in district court. Wippert, 654 P.2d at 515. If the tribal court judgment involves child

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support, the simplified registration procedures of the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign

Judgments Act and other state enforcement remedies are also available. Day, 900 P.2d

at 301.

¶30 This cause is reversed and remanded to the District Court for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion. Specifically, the District Court may give deference to the

Fort Peck Tribal Court judgments by entering a state court judgment in favor of the

plaintiffs and against Anderson on the basis of comity and upon the filing of an action or

special proceeding in the District Court to enforce the Tribal Court judgments on that

basis. The state court judgment may be enforced against any off-reservation assets owned

by Anderson. The Fort Peck Tribal Court, however, retains exclusive jurisdiction to

enforce its judgments against Andersonþs on-reservation assets within the exterior

boundaries of the Fort Peck Reservation.

¶31 Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 /S/ JAMES C. NELSON

 

We Concur:

/S/ J. A. TURNAGE

/S/ KARLA M. GRAY

/S/ JIM REGNIER 

/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART

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