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" COMMITTEE PRINT ! 108th Congress 

1st Session 

S. PRT. 

2003

108–34

U.S. TAX SHELTER INDUSTRY: 

THE ROLE OF ACCOUNTANTS, LAWYERS, 

AND FINANCIAL PROFESSIONALS

FOUR KPMG CASE STUDIES: 

FLIP, OPIS, BLIPS, AND SC2

R E P O R T

PREPARED BY THE

MINORITY STAFF 

OF THE

PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE

RELEASED IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE 

PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS’ HEARINGS ON 

NOVEMBER 18 & 20, 2003

Printed for the use of the Committee on Governmental Affairs 


congress.#13
(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine, Chairman 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah 

PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois 

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire 

RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK DAYTON, Minnesota 

FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas

MICHAEL D. BOPP, Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

JOYCE RECHTSCHAFFEN, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

AMY B. NEWHOUSE, Chief Clerk

PERMANENT COMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota, Chairman 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah 

PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois 

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire 

RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK DAYTON, Minnesota 

FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas

RAYMOND V. SHEPHERD, III, Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

LELAND ERICKSON, Counsel 

ELISE J. BEAN, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

ROBERT ROACH, Counsel and Chief Investigator to the Minority 

LAURA STUBER, Minority Counsel 

BRIAN PLESSER, Minority Counsel 

JULIE ZELMAN DAVIS, Minority Professional Staff Member 

CHRIS KRAMER, Minority Professional Staff Member 

BETH MERILLAT-BIANCHI, IRS Detailee 

JAMES PITTRIZZI, GAO Detailee 

FRANK MINORE, GAO Detailee 

JESSILYN CAMERON, Brookings Fellow 

MARY D. ROBERTSON, Chief Clerk 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 1

II. FINDINGS ......................................................................................................... 3

III. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .............................................................................. 5

A. Developing New Tax Products ................................................................ 7

B. Mass Marketing Tax Products ................................................................ 8

C. Implementing Tax Products .................................................................... 9

D. Avoiding Detection ................................................................................... 13

E. Disregarding Professional Ethics ............................................................ 15

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................. 16

V. OVERVIEW OF U.S. TAX SHELTER INDUSTRY ..................................... 18

A. Summary of Current Law on Tax Shelters ............................................ 18

B. U.S. Tax Shelter Industry and Professional Organizations ................. 20

VI. FOUR KPMG CASE HISTORIES ................................................................ 22

A. KPMG In General .................................................................................... 22

B. KPMG’s Tax Shelter Activities ............................................................... 24

(1) Developing New Tax Products ............................................................ 28

(2) Mass Marketing Tax Products ............................................................ 44

(3) Implementing Tax Products ................................................................ 62

a. KPMG’s Implementation Role ........................................................ 62

b. Role of Third Parties in Implementing KPMG Tax Products ...... 71

(4) Avoiding Detection ............................................................................... 91

(5) Disregarding Professional Ethics ....................................................... 101

APPENDIX A 

CASE STUDY OF BOND LINKED ISSUE PREMIUM STRUCTURE 

(BLIPS) .......................................................................................................... 111

APPENDIX B 

CASE STUDY OF S-CORPORATION CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTION 

STRATEGY (SC2) ......................................................................................... 122

APPENDIX C 

OTHER KPMG INVESTIGATIONS OR ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS ....... 126

(1)

U.S. TAX SHELTER INDUSTRY: 

THE ROLE OF ACCOUNTANTS, LAWYERS, 

AND FINANCIAL PROFESSIONALS 

FOUR KPMG CASE STUDIES: FLIP, OPIS, BLIPS, AND SC2

I. Introduction 

In 2002, the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, at the direction 

of Senator Carl Levin, then its Chairman, initiated an in-depth investigation into the development, marketing, and implementation 

of abusive tax shelters by professional organizations such as accounting firms, banks, investment advisors, and law firms. The information in this Report is based upon the ensuing bipartisan investigation conducted jointly by the Subcommittee’s Democratic 

and Republican staffs, with the support of Subcommittee Chairman 

Norm Coleman. 

During the course of its investigation, the Subcommittee issued 

numerous subpoenas and document requests, and the Subcommittee staff reviewed over 235 boxes, and several electronic 

compact disks, containing hundreds of thousands of pages of documents, including tax product descriptions, marketing material, 

transactional documents, manuals, memoranda, correspondence, 

and electronic mail. The Subcommittee staff also conducted numerous, lengthy interviews with representatives of accounting firms, 

banks, investment advisory firms, and law firms. In addition, the 

Subcommittee staff reviewed numerous statutes, regulations, legal 

pleadings, reports, and legislation, dealing with federal tax shelter 

law. The staff consulted with federal and state agencies and various accounting, tax and financial experts, including the U.S. Department of the Treasury, U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS), 

Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), California 

Franchise Tax Board, tax experts on the staffs of the Joint Commission on Taxation, Senate Committee on Finance, and House 

Committee on Ways and Means, various tax professionals, and academic experts, and other persons with relevant information. 

The evidence reviewed by the Subcommittee establishes that the 

development and sale of potentially abusive and illegal tax shelters 

have become a lucrative business in the United States, and professional organizations like major accounting firms, banks, investment 

advisory firms, and law firms have become major developers and 

promoters. The evidence also shows that respected professional 

firms are spending substantial resources, forming alliances, and developing the internal and external infrastructure necessary to design, market, and implement hundreds of complex tax shelters, 

2

some of which are illegal and improperly deny the U.S. Treasury 

of billions of dollars in tax revenues. 

The term ‘‘tax shelter’’ has come to be used in a variety of ways 

depending upon the context. In the broadest sense, a tax shelter is 

a device used to reduce or eliminate the tax liability of the tax shelter user. Some tax shelters are specific tax benefits explicitly enacted by Congress to advance a legitimate endeavor, such as the 

low income housing tax credit. Those types of legitimate tax shelters are not the focus of this Report. The tax shelters under investigation by the Subcommittee are complex transactions used by 

corporations or individuals to obtain significant tax benefits in a 

manner never intended by the tax code. These transactions have no 

economic substance or business purpose other than to reduce or 

eliminate a person’s tax liability. These abusive tax shelters can be 

custom-designed for a single user or prepared as a generic ‘‘tax 

product’’ available for sale to multiple clients. The Subcommittee 

investigation focuses on the abusive tax shelters sold as generic tax 

products available to multiple clients. 

Under current law, generic tax shelters are not illegal per se; 

they are potentially illegal depending upon how purchasers actually use them and calculate their tax liability on their tax returns. 

Over the last 5 years, the IRS has begun publishing notices identifying certain generic tax shelters as ‘‘potentially abusive’’ and 

warning taxpayers that use of such ‘‘listed transactions’’ may lead 

to an audit and assessment of back taxes, interest, and penalties 

for using an illegal tax shelter. As used in this Report, ‘‘potentially 

abusive’’ tax shelters are those that come within the scope of an 

IRS ‘‘listed transaction,’’ while ‘‘illegal’’ tax shelters are those with 

respect to which the IRS has taken actual enforcement action 

against taxpayers for violating federal tax law. 

The Subcommittee investigation perceives an important difference between selling a potentially abusive or illegal tax shelter 

and providing routine tax planning services. None of the transactions examined by the Subcommittee derived from a request by 

a specific corporation or individual for tax planning advice on how 

to structure a specific business transaction in a tax-efficient way; 

rather all of the transactions examined by the Subcommittee involved generic tax products that had been affirmatively developed 

by a firm and then vigorously marketed to numerous, in some 

cases thousands, of potential buyers. There is a bright line difference between responding to a single client’s tax inquiry and aggressively developing and marketing a generic tax shelter product. 

While the tax shelter industry of today may have sprung from the 

former, it is now clearly driven by the latter. 

In order to gain a deeper understanding of the issues, the Subcommittee conducted four in-depth case studies examining tax 

products sold by a leading accounting firm, KPMG, to individuals 

or corporations to help them reduce or eliminate their U.S. taxes. 

KPMG is one of the largest accounting firms in the world, and it 

had built a reputation as a respected auditor and expert tax advisor. KPMG vigorously denies being a tax shelter promoter, but the 

evidence obtained as a result of the Subcommittee investigation is 

overwhelming in demonstrating KPMG’s active and, at times, aggressive role in promoting and profiting from generic tax products 

3

1Letter dated 9/12/03, from KPMG’s legal counsel, Wilkie Farr & Gallagher, to the Subcommittee, at 2. According to KPMG information provided to the Subcommittee in this letter 

and a letter dated 8/8/03, FLIP was sold to 80 persons, in 63 transactions, and produced total 

gross revenues for the firm of about $17 million over a 4-year period, 1996–1999. OPIS was sold 

to 111 persons in 79 transactions, and produced about $28 million over a 2-year period, 1998–

1999. BLIPS, the largest revenue generator, was sold to 186 persons in 186 transactions, and 

produced about $53 million over a 1-year period from about October 1999 to about October 2000. 

SC2 was sold to 58 S corporations in 58 transactions, and produced about $26 million over an 

18-month period from about March 2000 to about September 2001. Other information presented 

to the Subcommittee suggests these revenue figures may be understated and that, for example, 

BLIPS generated closer to $80 million in fees for the firm, OPIS generated over $50 million, 

and SC2 over $30 million. 2 United States v. KPMG, Case No. 1:02MS00295 (D.D.C. 7/9/02), ‘‘Declaration of Michael A. 

Halpert,’’ Internal Revenue Agent, at ¶ 37. 

sold to individuals and corporations, including tax products later 

determined by the IRS to be potentially abusive or illegal tax shelters. 

Earlier this year, KPMG informed the Subcommittee that it 

maintained an inventory of over 500 ‘‘active tax products’’ designed 

to be offered to multiple clients for a fee. The four KPMG case 

studies featured in this Report are the Bond Linked Issue Premium 

Structure (BLIPS), Foreign Leveraged Investment Program (FLIP), 

Offshore Portfolio Investment Strategy (OPIS), and the S-Corporation Charitable Contribution Strategy (SC2). KPMG sold these four 

tax products to more than 350 individuals from 1997 to 2001. All 

four generated significant fees for the firm, producing total revenues in excess of $124 million.1 The IRS later determined that 

three of the products, BLIPS, FLIP, and OPIS, were potentially 

abusive or illegal tax shelters, while the fourth, SC2, is still under 

review. As of June 2002, an IRS analysis of just some of the tax 

returns associated with BLIPS, FLIP, and OPIS had identified 186 

people who had used BLIPS to claim losses on their tax returns totaling $4.4 billion, and 57 people who had used FLIP or OPIS to 

claim tax losses of $1.4 billion, for a grand total of $5.8 billion.2

Evidence made available to the Subcommittee suggests that lost 

tax revenues are also significant, including documents which show 

that, for 169 out of 186 BLIPS participants for which information 

was recorded, federal tax revenues were reduced by $1.4 billion. 

Some members of the U.S. tax profession are apparently claiming 

that the worst tax shelter abuses are already over, so there is no 

need for investigations, reforms, or stronger laws. The Subcommittee investigation, however, indicates just the opposite: while 

a few tax shelter promoters have ended their activities, the tax 

shelter industry as a whole remains active, developing new products, marketing dubious tax shelters to numerous individuals and 

corporations, and continuing to wrongfully deny the U.S. Treasury 

billions of dollars in revenues, leaving average U.S. taxpayers to 

make up the difference. 

II. Findings 

Based upon its investigation to date, the Subcommittee Minority 

staff recommends that the Subcommittee make the following findings of fact. 

(1) The sale of potentially abusive and illegal tax shelters 

has become a lucrative business in the United States, 

and some professional firms such as accounting firms, 

banks, investment advisory firms, and law firms are 

4

major participants in the mass marketing of generic 

‘‘tax products’’ to multiple clients.

(2) Although KPMG denies being a tax shelter promoter, 

the evidence establishes that KPMG has devoted substantial resources to, and obtained significant fees 

from, developing, marketing, and implementing potentially abusive and illegal tax shelters that U.S. taxpayers might otherwise have been unable, unlikely or 

unwilling to employ, costing the Treasury billions of 

dollars in lost tax revenues.

(3) KPMG devotes substantial resources and maintains 

an extensive infrastructure to produce a continuing 

supply of generic tax products to sell to multiple clients, using a process which pressures its tax professionals to generate new ideas, move them quickly 

through the development process, and approve, at 

times, potentially abusive or illegal tax shelters.

(4) KPMG uses aggressive marketing tactics to sell its generic tax products, including by turning tax professionals into tax product salespersons, pressuring its 

tax professionals to meet revenue targets, using telemarketing to find clients, using confidential client tax 

data to identify potential buyers, targeting its own 

audit clients for sales pitches, and using tax opinion 

letters and insurance policies as marketing tools.

(5) KPMG is actively involved in implementing the tax 

shelters which it sells to its clients, including by enlisting participation from banks, investment advisory 

firms, and tax exempt organizations; preparing transactional documents; arranging purported loans; 

issuing and arranging opinion letters; providing administrative services; and preparing tax returns.

(6) Some major banks and investment advisory firms 

have provided critical lending or investment services 

or participated as essential counter parties in potentially abusive or illegal tax shelters sold by KPMG, in 

return for substantial fees or profits.

(7) Some law firms have provided legal services that facilitated KPMG’s development and sale of potentially 

abusive or illegal tax shelters, including by providing 

design assistance or collaborating on allegedly ‘‘independent’’ opinion letters representing to clients that a 

tax product would withstand an IRS challenge, in return for substantial fees.

(8) Some charitable organizations have participated as 

essential counter parties in a highly questionable tax 

shelter developed and sold by KPMG, in return for donations or the promise of future donations.

(9) KPMG has taken steps to conceal its tax shelter activities from tax authorities and the public, including 

by refusing to register potentially abusive tax shelters 

5

3See, e.g., document dated 5/18/01, ‘‘PFP Practice Reorganization Innovative Strategies Business Plan—DRAFT,’’ authored by Jeffrey Eischeid, Bates KPMG 0050620–23, at 1. 4 Id. See also document dated 7/21/99, entitled ‘‘Action Required,’’ authored by Jeffrey 

Eischeid, Bates KPMG 0006664 (In the case of BLIPS, ‘‘a key objective is for the tax loss associated with the investment structure to offset/shelter the taxpayer’s other, unrelated, economic 

profits.’’). 5See Appendix A for a more detailed explanation of BLIPS. 

with the IRS, restricting file documentation, and 

using improper tax return reporting techniques. 

III. Executive Summary 

The Subcommittee’s investigation into the role of professional organizations in the tax shelter industry has identified two fundamental, relatively recent changes in how the industry operates. 

First, the investigation has found that the tax shelter industry 

is no longer focused primarily on providing individualized tax advice to persons who initiate contact with a tax advisor. Instead, the 

industry focus has expanded to developing a steady supply of generic ‘‘tax products’’ that can be aggressively marketed to multiple 

clients. In short, the tax shelter industry has moved from providing 

one-on-one tax advice in response to tax inquiries to also initiating, 

designing, and mass marketing tax shelter products. 

Secondly, the investigation has found that numerous respected 

members of the American business community are now heavily involved in the development, marketing, and implementation of generic tax products whose objective is not to achieve a business or 

economic purpose, but to reduce or eliminate a client’s U.S. tax liability. Dubious tax shelter sales are no longer the province of 

shady, fly-by-night companies with limited resources. They are now 

big business, assigned to talented professionals at the top of their 

fields and able to draw upon the vast resources and reputations of 

the country’s largest accounting firms, law firms, investment advisory firms, and banks. 

The four case studies featured in this Report examine tax products developed by KPMG, a respected auditor and tax expert and 

one of the top four accounting firms in the United States. In the 

latter half of the 1990’s, according to KPMG employees interviewed 

by Subcommittee staff, KPMG’s Tax Services Practice underwent a 

fundamental change in direction by embracing the development of 

generic tax products and pressing its tax professionals to sell them. 

KPMG now maintains an inventory of more than 500 active tax 

products and routinely presses its tax professionals to participate 

in tax product marketing campaigns. 

Three of the tax products examined by the Subcommittee, FLIP, 

OPIS, and BLIPS, are similar in nature. In fact, BLIPS was developed as a replacement for OPIS which was developed as a replacement for FLIP.3 All three tax products function as ‘‘loss generators,’’ meaning they generate large paper losses that the purchaser 

of the product then uses to offset other income, and shelter it from 

taxation.4 All three products have generated hundreds of millions 

of dollars in phony paper losses for taxpayers, using a series of 

complex, orchestrated transactions involving shell corporations, 

structured finance, purported multi-million dollar loans, and deliberately obscure investments.5 All three also generated substantial 

fees for KPMG, with BLIPS and OPIS winning slots among 

6

6FLIP and OPIS are covered by IRS Notice 2001–45 (2001–33 IRB 129) (8/13/01); while 

BLIPS is covered by IRS Notice 2000–44 (2000–36 IRB 255) (9/5/00). See also United States v. 

KPMG, Case No. 1:02MS00295 (D.D.C. 9/6/02). 7See, e.g., Jacoboni v. KPMG, Case No. 6:02–CV–510 (M.D. Fla. 4/29/02) (OPIS); Swartz v. 

KPMG, Case No. C03–1252 (W.D. Wash. 6/6/03) (BLIPS); Thorpe v. KPMG, Case No. 5–030CV–

68 (E.D.N.C. 1/27/03) (FLIP/OPIS). 8The formal title of the tax product is the S-Corporation Charitable Contribution Strategy. 

9See Appendix B for a more detailed explanation of SC2. 

10 Email dated 3/24/00, from Mark Springer to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘RE: S-corp 

Product,’’ Bates KPMG 0016515. See also email dated 3/24/00, from Mark Springer to multiple 

KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘Re: S-corp Product,’’ Bates 0016524 (suggesting replacing ‘‘all SCAEPS references with something much more benign’’). 11See email dated 4/10/02, from US-Tax Innovation Center to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘IRS Summons Information Request for SC2,’’ Bates XX 001433 (‘‘The IRS has requested certain information from the Firm related to SC2.’’); undated KPMG document entitled, 

‘‘April 18 IRS Summons Response.’’

KPMG’s top ten revenue producers in 1999 and 2000, before sales 

were discontinued. All three tax products are also covered by the 

‘‘listed transactions’’ that the IRS has published and declared to be 

potentially abusive tax shelters.6 In all three cases, the IRS has already begun requiring taxpayers who used these products to pay 

back taxes, interest, and penalties. Over a dozen taxpayers penalized by the IRS for using these tax products have subsequently 

filed suit against KPMG for selling them an illegal tax shelter.7

The fourth tax product, SC2, is described by KPMG as a ‘‘charitable contribution strategy.’’ 8 It is directed at individuals who own 

profitable corporations organized under Chapter S of the tax code 

(hereinafter ‘‘S corporations’’), which means that the corporation’s 

income is attributed directly to the corporate owners and taxable 

as personal income. SC2 is intended to generate a tax deductible 

charitable donation for the corporate owner and, more importantly, 

to defer and reduce taxation of a substantial portion of the income 

produced by the S corporation, essentially by ‘‘allocating’’ but not 

actually distributing that income to a tax exempt charity holding 

the corporation’s stock. Like BLIPS, FLIP, and OPIS, SC2 requires 

a series of complex, orchestrated transactions to obtain the promised tax benefits. Among other measures, these transactions involve the issuance of non-voting stock and warrants, a corporate 

non-distribution resolution, and a stock redemption agreement; a 

temporary donation of the non-voting stock to a charity; and various steps to ‘‘allocate’’ but not distribute corporate income to the 

tax exempt charity.9 Early in its development, KPMG tax professionals referred to SC2 as ‘‘S-CAEPS,’’ pronounced ‘‘escapes.’’ The 

name was changed after a senior tax official pointed out: ‘‘I think 

the last thing we or a client would want is a letter in the files regarding a tax planning strategy for which the acronym when pronounced sounds like we are saying ‘escapes.’ ’’ 10 In 2000 and 2001, 

SC2 was one of KPMG’s top ten revenue producers. SC2 is not covered by one of the ‘‘listed transactions’’ issued by the IRS, but is 

currently undergoing IRS review.11

Together, these four case histories, BLIPS, FLIP, OPIS, and SC2, 

provide an in-depth portrait of how a professional organization like 

KPMG, and the professional organizations it allies itself with, end 

up developing, marketing, and implementing highly questionable or 

illegal tax products. The evidence also sheds light on the critical 

roles played by other professional organizations to make suspect 

tax products work. 

7

A. Developing New Tax Products 

The Subcommittee investigation has found that the tax product 

development and approval process used at KPMG was deeply 

flawed and led, at times, to the approval of tax products that the 

firm knew were potentially abusive or illegal. Among other problems, the evidence shows that the KPMG approval process has 

been driven by market considerations, such as consideration of a 

product’s revenue potential and ‘‘speed to market,’’ as well as by intense pressure that KPMG supervisors have placed on subordinates 

to ‘‘sign-off’’ on the technical merits of a proposed product even in 

the face of serious questions about its compliance with the law. 

The case of BLIPS illustrates the problems. Evidence obtained by 

the Subcommittee discloses an extended, unresolved debate among 

KPMG tax professionals over whether BLIPS met the technical requirements of federal tax law. In 1999, the key KPMG technical reviewer resisted approving BLIPS for months, despite repeated expressions of dismay from superiors. He finally agreed to withdraw 

his objections to the product in this email sent to his supervisor: 

‘‘I don’t like this product and would prefer not to be associated with 

it [but] I can reluctantly live with a more-likely-than-not opinion 

being issued for the product.’’ This assessment is not exactly the 

solid endorsement that might be expected for a tax product sold by 

a major accounting firm. 

The most senior officials in KPMG’s Tax Services Practice exchanged emails which frankly acknowledged the problems and 

reputational risks associated with BLIPS, but nevertheless supported putting it on the market for sale to clients. One senior tax 

professional summed up the pending issues with two questions:

‘‘(1) Have we drafted the opinion with the appropriate limiting bells and whistles . . . and (2) Are we being paid 

enough to offset the risks of potential litigation resulting 

from the transaction? . . . My own recommendation is that 

we should be paid a lot of money here for our opinion since 

the transaction is clearly one that the IRS would view as 

falling squarely within the tax shelter orbit.’’

No one challenged the analysis that the risky nature of the product justified the firm’s charging ‘‘a lot of money’’ for a tax opinion 

letter predicting it was more likely than not that BLIPS would 

withstand an IRS challenge. When the same KPMG official observed, ‘‘I do believe the time has come to shit and get off the pot,’’ 

the second in command at the Tax Services Practice responded, ‘‘I 

believe the expression is shit OR get off the pot, and I vote for 

shit.’’

BLIPS, like its predecessors OPIS and FLIP, was sold by KPMG 

to numerous clients before the IRS issued notices declaring them 

potentially abusive tax shelters that did not meet the requirements 

of federal tax law. Other professional firms have also sold potentially abusive or illegal tax products such as the Currency Options 

Brings Reward Alternatives (COBRA) and Contingent Deferred 

Swap (CDS) sold by Ernst & Young, the FLIP tax product and 

Bond and Option Sales Strategy (BOSS) sold by 

PricewaterhouseCoopers, the Customized Adjustable Rate Debt Facility (CARDS) sold by Deutsche Bank, the FLIP tax product sold 

8

12Slapshot is an abusive tax shelter that was examined in a Subcommittee hearing last year. 

See ‘‘Fishtail, Bacchus, Sundance, and Slapshot: Four Enron Transactions Funded and Facilitated by U.S. Financial Institutions,’’ S. Prt. 107–82 (107th Congress 1/2/03). 

by Wachovia Bank, and the Slapshot tax product sold by J.P. Morgan Chase.12 The sale of these abusive tax shelters by other firms 

clearly demonstrates that flawed approval procedures are not confined to a single firm or a single profession. Many other professional firms are also developing and selling dubious tax products. 

B. Mass Marketing Tax Products 

A second striking aspect of the Subcommittee investigation was 

the discovery of the substantial effort KPMG has expended to market its tax products to potential buyers. The investigation found 

that KPMG maintains an extensive marketing infrastructure to 

sell its tax products, including a market research department, a 

Sales Opportunity Center that works on tax product ‘‘marketing 

strategies,’’ and even a full-fledged telemarketing center staffed 

with people trained to make cold calls to find buyers for specific tax 

products. When investigating SC2, the Subcommittee discovered 

that KPMG used its telemarketing center in Fort Wayne, Indiana, 

to contact literally thousands of S corporations across the country 

and help elevate SC2 to one of KPMG’s top ten revenue-producing 

tax products. 

The evidence also uncovered a corporate culture in KPMG’s Tax 

Services Practice that condoned placing intense pressure on the 

firm’s tax professionals—CPAs and lawyers included—to sell the 

firm’s generic tax products. Numerous internal emails by senior 

KPMG tax professionals exhorted colleagues to increase their sales 

efforts. One email thanked KPMG tax professionals for a team effort in developing SC2 and then instructed these professionals to 

‘‘SELL, SELL, SELL!!’’ Another email warned KPMG partners: 

‘‘Look at the last partner scorecard. Unlike golf, a low number is 

not a good thing. . . . A lot of us need to put more revenue on the 

board.’’ A third email asked all partners in KPMG’s premier technical tax group, Washington National Tax (WNT), to ‘‘temporarily 

defer non-revenue producing activities’’ and concentrate for the 

‘‘next 5 months’’ on meeting WNT’s revenue goals for the year. The 

email stated: ‘‘Listed below are the tax products identified by the 

functional teams as having significant revenue potential over the 

next few months. . . . Thanks for help in this critically important 

matter. As [the Tax Services Practice second in command] said, ‘We 

are dealing with ruthless execution—hand to hand combat—blocking and tackling.’ Whatever the mixed metaphor, let’s just do it.’’

The four case studies featured in this Report provide detailed 

evidence of how KPMG pushed its tax professionals to meet revenue targets, closely monitored their sales efforts, and even, at 

times, advised them to use questionable sales techniques. For example, in the case of SC2, KPMG tax professionals were directed 

to contact existing clients about the product, including KPMG’s 

own audit clients. In a written document offering sales advice on 

SC2, KPMG advised its employees, in some cases, to make misleading statements to potential buyers, such as claiming that SC2 

was no longer available for sale, even though it was, apparently 

hoping that reverse psychology would then cause the client to want 

9

to buy the product. KPMG also utilized confidential and sensitive 

client data in an internal database containing information used by 

KPMG to prepare client tax returns in order to identify potential 

targets for its tax products. 

KPMG also used opinion letters and insurance policies as selling 

points to try to convince uncertain buyers to purchase a tax product. For example, KPMG tax professionals were instructed to tell 

potential buyers that opinion letters provided by KPMG and Sidley 

Austin Brown & Wood would protect the buyer from certain IRS 

penalties, if the IRS were later to invalidate the tax product. In the 

case of SC2, KPMG tax professionals were instructed to tell buyers 

that, ‘‘for a small premium,’’ they could buy an insurance policy 

from AIG, Hartford Insurance, or another firm that would reimburse the buyer for any back taxes or penalties actually assessed 

by the IRS for using the tax product. These selling points suggest 

KPMG was trying to present its tax products as a risk free gambit 

for its clients. They also suggest that KPMG was pitching its tax 

products to persons with limited interest in the products and who 

likely would not have used them to avoid paying their taxes, absent 

urging by KPMG to do so. 

C. Implementing Tax Products 

Developing and selling a tax product to a client did not, in many 

cases, end KPMG’s involvement with the product, since the product 

often required the purchaser to carry out complex financial and investment activities in order to realize the promised tax benefits. In 

the four cases examined by the Subcommittee, KPMG enlisted a 

bevy of other professionals, including lawyers, bankers, investment 

advisors and others, to carry out the required transactions. In the 

case of SC2, KPMG actively found and convinced various charitable 

organizations to participate. Charities told the Subcommittee staff 

that KPMG had contacted the organizations ‘‘out of the blue,’’ convinced them to participate in SC2, facilitated interactions with the 

SC2 ‘‘donors,’’ and supplied drafts of the transactional documents. 

The Subcommittee investigation found that BLIPS, OPIS, FLIP, 

and SC2 could not have been executed without the active and willing participation of the law firms, banks, investment advisory 

firms, and charitable organizations that made these products work. 

In the case of BLIPS, OPIS, and FLIP, law firms and investment 

advisory firms helped draft complex transactional documents. 

Major banks, such as Deutsche Bank, HVB, UBS, and NatWest, 

provided purported loans for tens of millions of dollars essential to 

the orchestrated transactions. Wachovia Bank initially provided client referrals to KPMG for FLIP sales, then later began its own efforts to sell FLIP to clients. Two investment advisory firms, Quellos 

Group LLC (‘‘Quellos’’) and Presidio Advisory Services (‘‘Presidio’’), 

participated directly in the FLIP, OPIS, or BLIPS transactions, 

even entering into partnerships with the clients. In the case of 

SC2, several pension funds agreed to accept corporate stock donations and sign redemption agreements to ‘‘sell’’ back the stock to 

the corporation after a specified period of time. In all four cases, 

Sidley Austin Brown & Wood agreed to provide a legal opinion letter attesting to the validity of the relevant tax product. Other law 

firms, such as Sherman and Sterling, prepared transactional docuVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:56 Dec 11, 2003 Jkt 090655 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\90655.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN
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13 26 U.S.C. 6701. 

ments and helped carry out specific transactions. In return, each 

of the professional firms was paid lucrative fees. 

In the case of BLIPS, documents and interviews showed that 

banks and investment advisory firms knew the BLIPS transactions 

and ‘‘loans’’ were structured in an unusual way, had no reasonable 

potential for profit, and were designed instead to achieve specific 

tax aims for KPMG clients. For example, the BLIPS transactions 

required the bank to lend, on a non-recourse basis, tens of millions 

of dollars to a shell corporation with few assets and no ongoing 

business, to give the same shell corporation an unusual ‘‘loan premium’’ providing additional tens of millions of dollars, and to enter 

into interest rate swaps that, in effect, reduced the ‘‘loan’s’’ abovemarket interest rate to a much lower floating market rate. 

Documents and interviews also disclosed that the funds ‘‘loaned’’ 

by the banks were never really put at risk. The so-called loan proceeds were instead deemed ‘‘collateral’’ for the ‘‘loan’’ itself under 

an ‘‘overcollateralization’’ provision that required the ‘‘borrower’’ to 

place 101% of the loan proceeds on deposit with the bank. The loan 

proceeds serving as cash collateral were then subject to severe investment restrictions and closely monitored by the bank. The end 

result was that only a small portion of the funds in each BLIPS 

transaction was ever placed at risk in true investments. Moreover, 

the banks were empowered to unilaterally terminate a BLIPS 

‘‘loan’’ under a variety of circumstances including, for example, if 

the cash collateral were to fall below the 101% requirement. The 

banks and investment advisory firms knew that the BLIPS loan 

structure and investment restrictions made little economic sense 

apart from the client’s tax objectives, which consisted primarily of 

generating huge paper losses for KPMG clients who then used 

those losses to offset other income and shelter it from taxation. 

Documents and interviews showed that the same circumstances 

existed for the FLIP and OPIS transactions—banks and investment 

advisory firms financed and participated in structured and tightly 

controlled financial transactions and ‘‘loans’’ primarily designed to 

generate tax losses on paper for clients, while protecting bank assets. 

A professional organization that knowingly participates in an 

abusive tax shelter with no real economic substance violates the 

tax code’s prohibition against aiding or abetting tax evasion.13 A related issue is whether and to what extent lawyers, bankers, investment advisors, tax exempt organizations, and others have an obligation to evaluate the transactions they are asked to carry out and 

refrain from participating in potentially abusive or illegal tax shelters. Another issue is whether professional organizations that participate in these types of transactions qualify as tax shelter promoters and, if so, are obliged under U.S. law to register the relevant transactions as tax shelters and maintain client lists. 

These issues are particularly pressing for several professional 

firms involved in the KPMG transactions that may be tax shelter 

promoters in their own right. For example, Sidley Austin Brown & 

Wood is under investigation by the IRS for issuing more than 600 

legal opinion letters supporting 13 questionable tax products, inVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:56 Dec 11, 2003 Jkt 090655 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\90655.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN
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14See ‘‘Declaration of Richard E. Bosch,’’ IRS Revenue Agent, In re John Doe Summons to 

Sidley Austin Brown & Wood (N.D. Ill. 10/16/03). 15 Email dated 4/3/02, from Viktoria Antoniades to Brian McGuire and other Deutsche Bank 

personnel, ‘‘US GROUP 1 Pres,’’ DB BLIPS 6329–52, attaching a presentation dated 11/15/99, 

entitled ‘‘Structured Transactions Group North America,’’ at 6336. 16 Id. at 6345–46. 17 In the case of SC2, KPMG also arranged for Bryan Cave to issue a legal opinion supporting 

the tax product, but it is unclear whether Bryan Cave ever issued one. 

cluding BLIPS, FLIP, and OPIS.14 Deutsche Bank has sponsored a 

Structured Transactions Group that, in 1999, offered an array of 

tax products to U.S. and European clients seeking to ‘‘execute tax 

driven deals’’ or ‘‘gain mitigation’’ strategies.15 Internal bank documents indicate that Deutsche Bank was aggressively marketing its 

tax products to large U.S. corporations and individuals, and 

planned to close billions of dollars worth of transactions.16 At least 

two of the tax products being pushed by Deutsche Bank, BLIPS 

and the Customized Adjustable Rate Debt Facility (CARDS), were 

later determined by the IRS to be potentially abusive tax shelters. 

Another set of issues arising from KPMG’s enlistment of other 

professionals to implement its tax products involves the role played 

by tax opinion letters. A tax opinion letter, sometimes called a legal 

opinion letter when issued by a law firm, is intended to provide 

written advice to a client on whether a particular tax product is 

permissible under the law and, if challenged by the IRS, how likely 

it would be that the challenged product would survive court scrutiny. Traditionally, such opinion letters were supplied by an independent tax expert with no financial stake in the transaction being 

evaluated, and an individualized letter was sent to a single client. 

The mass marketing of tax products to multiple clients, however, 

has been followed by the mass production of opinion letters by a 

professional firm that, for each letter sent to a client, is paid a 

handsome fee. The attractive profits available from such an arrangement have placed new pressure on the independence of the 

tax opinion letter provider. 

In the four case histories featured in this Report, the Subcommittee investigation uncovered disturbing evidence related to 

how tax opinion letters were being developed and used in connection with KPMG’s tax products. In each of the four case histories, 

the Subcommittee investigation found that KPMG had drafted its 

own prototype tax opinion letter supporting the product and used 

this prototype as a template for the letters it actually sent to its 

clients. In addition, in all four case histories, KPMG arranged for 

an outside law firm to provide a second favorable opinion letter. 

Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, for example, issued hundreds of 

opinion letters supporting BLIPS, FLIP, and OPIS.17 The evidence 

indicates that KPMG either directed its clients to Sidley Austin 

Brown & Wood to obtain the second opinion letter, or KPMG itself 

obtained the client’s opinion letter from the law firm and delivered 

it to the client, apparently without the client’s actually speaking to 

any of the lawyers at the firm. 

The evidence raises serious questions about the independent status of Sidley Austin Brown & Wood in issuing the legal opinion letters supporting the KPMG tax products. The evidence indicates, for 

example, that KPMG collaborated with the law firm ahead of time 

to ensure it would supply a favorable opinion letter. In the case of 

12

BLIPS, KPMG and Sidley Austin Brown & Wood actually exchanged copies of their drafts, eventually issuing two, allegedly 

independent opinion letters that contain numerous, virtually identical paragraphs. Moreover, Sidley Austin Brown & Wood provided 

FLIP, OPIS, and BLIPS clients with nearly identical opinion letters 

that included no individualized legal advice. In many cases, the law 

firm apparently issued its letter without ever speaking with the client to whom the tax advice was directed. By routinely directing its 

clients to Sidley Austin Brown & Wood to obtain a second opinion 

letter, KPMG produced a steady stream of income for the law firm, 

further undermining its independent status. One document even 

indicates that Sidley Austin Brown & Wood was paid a fee in every 

case in which a client was told during a FLIP sales pitch about the 

availability of a second opinion letter from an outside law firm, 

whether or not the client actually purchased the letter. This type 

of close, ongoing, and lucrative collaboration raises serious questions about the independence of both parties and the value of their 

opinion letters in light of the financial stake that both firms had 

in the sale of the tax product being analyzed. 

A second set of issues related to the tax opinion letters involves 

the accuracy and reliability of their factual representations. The 

tax opinion letters prepared by KPMG and Sidley Austin Brown & 

Wood in BLIPS, FLIP, and OPIS typically included a set of factual 

representations made by the client, KPMG, the participating investment advisory firm, and the participating bank. These representations were critical to the accounting firm’s analysis upholding the validity of the tax product. In all three cases, the Subcommittee investigation discovered that KPMG had itself drafted 

the factual representations attributed to other parties. The evidence shows that prior to attributing factual representations to 

other professional firms involved in the transactions, KPMG presented draft statements to the parties beforehand and negotiated 

the wording. But in the case of the factual representations attributed to its client, the evidence indicates KPMG did not consult 

with the client beforehand and, in some cases, even refused, despite client objections, to allow the client to alter the KPMG-drafted representations. 

Equally disturbing is that some of the key factual representations that KPMG made or attributed to its clients appear to contain false or misleading statements. For example, KPMG wrote in 

the prototype BLIPS opinion letter that the client ‘‘has represented 

to KPMG . . . [that the client] independently reviewed the economics underlying the [BLIPS] Investment Fund before entering into 

the program and believed there was a reasonable opportunity to 

earn a reasonable pre-tax profit from the transactions.’’ In fact, it 

is doubtful that many BLIPS clients ‘‘independently reviewed’’ or 

understood the complicated BLIPS transactions or the ‘‘economics’’ 

underlying them. In addition, KPMG knew there was only a remote 

possibility—not a reasonable possibility—of a client’s earning a pretax profit in BLIPS. Nevertheless, since the existence of a reasonable opportunity to earn a reasonable profit was central to BLIPS’ 

having economic substance and complying with federal tax law, 

KPMG included the client representation in its BLIPS tax opinion 

letter. 

13

D. Avoiding Detection 

In addition to the many development, marketing, and implementation problems just described, the Subcommittee investigation uncovered disturbing evidence of measures taken by KPMG to hide 

its tax product activities from the IRS and the public. Despite its 

500 active tax product inventory, KPMG has never registered, and 

thereby disclosed to the IRS the existence of, a single one of its tax 

products. KPMG has explained this failure by claiming that it is 

not a tax promoter and does not sell any tax products that have 

to be registered under the law. The evidence suggests, however, 

that KPMG’s failure to register may not be attributable to a good 

faith analysis of the technical merits of the tax products. 

Five years ago, in 1998, a senior KPMG tax professional advocated in very explicit terms that, for business reasons, KPMG 

ought to ignore federal tax shelter requirements and not register 

the OPIS tax product with the IRS, even if required by law. In an 

email sent to several senior colleagues, this KPMG tax professional 

explained his reasoning. In that email, he assumed that OPIS 

qualified as a tax shelter, and then explained why the firm should 

not, even in this case, register it with the IRS as required by law. 

Among other reasons, he observed that the IRS was not vigorously 

enforcing the registration requirement, the penalties for noncompliance were much less than the potential profits from selling the tax 

product, and ‘‘industry norms’’ were not to register any tax products at all. The KPMG tax professional coldly calculated the penalties for noncompliance compared to potential fees from selling 

OPIS: ‘‘Based upon our analysis of the applicable penalty sections, 

we conclude that the penalties would be no greater than $14,000 

per $100,000 in KPMG fees. . . . For example, our average [OPIS] 

deal would result in KPMG fees of $360,000 with a maximum penalty exposure of only $31,000.’’ The senior tax professional also 

warned that if KPMG were to comply with the tax shelter registration requirement, this action would place the firm at such a competitive disadvantage in its sales that KPMG would ‘‘not be able to 

compete in the tax advantaged products market.’’ In short, he 

urged KPMG to knowingly, purposefully, and willfully violate the 

federal tax shelter law. 

The evidence obtained by the Subcommittee indicates that, over 

the following 5 years, KPMG rejected several internal recommendations by tax professionals to register a tax product as a tax shelter 

with the IRS. For example, the Subcommittee investigation learned 

that, on at least two occasions, the head of KPMG’s Department of 

Professional Practice, a very senior tax official, had recommended 

that BLIPS and OPIS be registered as tax shelters, only to be overruled each time by the head of the entire Tax Services Practice. 

Instead of registering tax products with the IRS, KPMG instead 

apparently devoted resources to devising rationales for not registering them. For example, a fiscal year 2002 draft business plan 

for a KPMG tax group described two tax products that were under 

development, but not yet approved, in part due to tax shelter registration issues. With respect to the first product, POPS, the business plan stated: ‘‘We have completed the solution’s technical review and have almost finalized the rationale for not registering 

POPS as a tax shelter.’’ With respect to the second product, deVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:56 Dec 11, 2003 Jkt 090655 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\90655.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN
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scribed as a ‘‘conversion transaction . . . that halves the taxpayer’s 

effective tax rate by effectively converting ordinary income to long 

term capital gain,’’ the business plan states: ‘‘The most significant 

open issue is tax shelter registration and the impact registration 

will have on the solution.’’

KPMG’s concealment efforts did not stop with its years-long refusal to register any tax shelter with the IRS. KPMG also appears 

to have used improper reporting techniques on client tax returns 

to minimize the return information that could alert the IRS to the 

existence of its tax products. For example, in the case of OPIS and 

BLIPS, some KPMG tax professionals advised their clients to participate in the transactions through ‘‘grantor trusts’’ and then file 

tax returns in which all of the capital gains and losses from the 

transactions were ‘‘netted’’ at the grantor trust level, instead of 

each gain or loss being reported individually on the return. The intended result was that only a single, small net capital gain or loss 

would appear on the client’s personal income tax return. 

A key KPMG tax expert objected to this netting approach when 

it was first suggested within the firm in 1998, writing to his colleagues in one email: ‘‘When you put the OPIS transaction together 

with this ‘stealth’ reporting approach, the whole thing stinks.’’ He 

wrote in a separate email: ‘‘You should all know that I do not agree 

with the conclusion . . . that capital gains can be netted at the 

trust level. I believe we are filing misleading, and perhaps false, returns by taking this reporting position.’’ Despite these strongly 

worded emails from the KPMG tax professional with authority over 

this tax return issue, several KPMG tax professionals apparently 

went ahead and prepared client tax returns using grantor trust 

netting. In September 2000, in the same notice that declared 

BLIPS to be a potentially abusive tax shelter, the IRS explicitly 

warned against grantor trust netting: ‘‘In addition to other penalties, any person who willfully conceals the amount of capital 

gains and losses in this manner, or who willfully counsels or advises such concealment, may be guilty of a criminal offense.’’ In response, KPMG apparently contacted some OPIS or BLIPS clients 

and advised them to re-file their returns. 

KPMG used a variety of tax return reporting techniques in addition to grantor trust netting to avoid detection of its activities by 

the IRS. In addition, in the four cases examined by the Subcommittee, KPMG required some potential purchasers of the tax 

products to sign ‘‘nondisclosure agreements’’ and severely limited 

the paperwork used to explain the tax products. Client presentations were done on chalkboards or erasable whiteboards, and 

written materials were retrieved from clients before leaving a 

meeting. Another measure taken by senior KPMG tax professionals 

was to counsel staff not to keep certain revealing documentation in 

their files or to clean out their files, again, to limit detection of firm 

activity. Still another tactic discussed in several KPMG documents 

was explicitly using attorney-client or other legal privileges to limit 

disclosure of KPMG documents. For example, one handwritten document by a KPMG tax professional discussing OPIS issues states 

under the heading, ‘‘Brown & Wood’’: ‘‘Privilege B&W can play a 

big role at providing protection in this area.’’ None of these actions 

15

to conceal its activities seems consistent with what should be the 

practices of a leading public accounting firm. 

E. Disregarding Professional Ethics 

In addition to all the other problems identified in the Subcommittee investigation, troubling evidence emerged regarding how 

KPMG handled certain professional ethics issues, including issues 

related to fees and auditor independence. The fees charged to 

KPMG clients raise several concerns. Some appear to be ‘‘contingency fees,’’ meaning fees which are paid only if a client obtains 

specified results from the services offered, such as achieving specified tax savings. More than 20 states prohibit the payment of contingency fees to accountants, and SEC, AICPA, and other rules constrain their use in various ways. Internal KPMG documents suggest that, in at least some cases, KPMG deliberately manipulated 

the way it handled certain tax products to circumvent contingency 

fee prohibitions. A document discussing OPIS fees, for instance, 

identifies the states that prohibit contingency fees and, then, rather than prohibit OPIS transactions in those states or require an alternative fee structure, directs KPMG tax professionals to make 

sure the OPIS engagement letter is signed, the engagement is 

managed, and the bulk of services is performed ‘‘in a jurisdiction 

that does not prohibit contingency fees.’’

In the case of BLIPS, clients were charged a single fee equal to 

7% of the ‘‘tax losses’’ to be generated by the BLIPS transactions. 

The client fee was typically paid to Presidio, an investment advisory firm, which then apportioned the fee amount among various 

firms according to certain factors. The fee recipients typically included KPMG, Presidio, a participating bank, and Sidley Austin 

Brown & Wood. This fee splitting arrangement may violate restrictions on contingency fees, client referral fees, and fees paid jointly 

to lawyers and non-lawyers. 

KPMG’s tax products also raise auditor independence issues. 

Three of the banks involved in BLIPS, FLIP, and OPIS (Deutsche 

Bank, HVB, and Wachovia Bank), employ KPMG to audit their financial statements. SEC rules state that auditor independence is 

impaired when an auditor has a direct or material indirect business relationship with an audit client. KPMG apparently attempted to address the auditor independence issue by giving its clients a choice of banks to use in the transactions, including at least 

one bank that was not a KPMG audit client. It is unclear, however, 

whether individuals actually could choose what bank to use. Moreover, it is unclear how providing clients with a choice of banks alleviated KPMG’s conflict of interest, since it still had a direct or material, indirect business relationship with a bank whose financial 

statements were certified by KPMG auditors. 

A second set of auditor independence issues involves KPMG’s decision to market tax products to its own audit clients. By engaging 

in this marketing tactic, KPMG not only took advantage of its auditor-client relationship, but also created a conflict of interest in 

those cases where it successfully sold a tax product to an audit client. The conflict of interest arises when the KPMG auditor reviewing the client’s financial statements is required, as part of that review, to examine the client’s tax return and its use of unusual tax 

16

strategies. In such situations, KPMG is, in effect, auditing its own 

work. 

A third set of professional ethics issues involves conflict of interest concerns related to the legal representation of clients who, after 

purchasing a tax product from KPMG, have come under IRS scrutiny. The issues include whether KPMG should be referring these 

clients to a law firm that represents KPMG itself on unrelated 

matters, and whether a law firm that has a longstanding, close, 

and ongoing relationship with KPMG, representing it on unrelated 

matters, should also represent KPMG clients. While KPMG and 

the client have an immediate joint interest in defending the tax 

product that KPMG sold and the client purchased, their interests 

could quickly diverge if the suspect tax product is found to be in 

violation of federal tax law. This divergence in interests has been 

demonstrated repeatedly since 2002, as growing numbers of KPMG 

clients have filed suit against KPMG seeking a refund of past fees 

they paid to the firm and additional damages for KPMG’s selling 

them an illegal tax shelter. 

The following pages provide more detailed information about 

these and other problems uncovered during the Subcommittee investigation into the role of professional firms in the tax shelter industry. 

The tax products featured in this Report were developed, marketed, and executed by highly skilled professionals in the fields of 

accounting, law, and finance. Historically, such professionals have 

been distinguished by their obligation to meet a higher standard of 

conduct in business than ordinary occupations. When it came to decisions by these professionals on whether to approve a questionable 

tax product, employ telemarketers to sell tax services, or omit required information from a tax return, one might have expected a 

thoughtful discussion or analysis of the firm’s fiduciary duties, its 

ethical and professional obligations, or what should be done to 

protect the firm’s good name. Unfortunately, evidence of those 

thoughtful discussions was virtually non-existent, and considerations of professionalism seem to have had little, if any, effect on 

KPMG’s mass marketing of its tax products. 

IV. Recommendations 

Based upon its investigation to date and the above findings, the 

Subcommittee Minority staff recommends that the Subcommittee 

make the following policy recommendations.

(1) Congress should enact legislation to increase penalties 

on promoters of potentially abusive and illegal tax 

shelters, clarify and strengthen the economic substance 

doctrine, and bar auditors from providing tax shelter 

services to their audit clients.

(2) Congress should increase funding of IRS enforcement 

efforts to stop potentially abusive and illegal tax shelters, and the IRS should dramatically increase its enforcement efforts against tax shelter promoters.

(3) The IRS and PCAOB should conduct a joint review of 

tax shelter activities by accounting firms, and take 

steps to clarify and strengthen federal and private secVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:56 Dec 11, 2003 Jkt 090655 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\90655.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN
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tor procedures and prohibitions to prevent accounting 

firms from aiding or abetting tax evasion, promoting 

potentially abusive or illegal tax shelters, or engaging 

in related unethical or illegal conduct. The PCAOB 

should consider banning public accounting firms from 

providing tax shelter services to their audit clients and 

others.

(4) The IRS and federal bank regulators should conduct a 

joint review of tax shelter activities at major banks, 

clarify and strengthen bank procedures and prohibitions to prevent banks from aiding or abetting tax evasion, promoting potentially abusive or illegal tax shelters, or engaging in related unethical or illegal conduct.

(5) The U.S. Department of Justice and IRS should conduct a joint review of tax shelter activities at major 

law firms, and take steps to clarify and strengthen federal and private sector rules to prevent law firms from 

aiding or abetting tax evasion, promoting potentially 

abusive or illegal tax shelters, or engaging in related 

unethical or illegal conduct. The U.S. Treasury Department should clarify and strengthen professional standards of conduct and opinion letter requirements in Circular 230 and explicitly address tax shelter issues.

(6) Federal and private sector regulators should clarify 

and strengthen federal and private sector rules related 

to opinion letters advising on tax products, including 

setting standards for letters related to mass marketed 

tax products, requiring fair and accurate factual representations, and barring collaboration between a tax 

product promoter and a firm preparing an allegedly 

independent opinion letter.

(7) The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 

(AICPA), American Bar Association, and American 

Bankers Association should establish standards of conduct and procedures to prevent members of their professions from aiding or abetting tax evasion, promoting 

abusive or illegal tax shelters, or engaging in related 

unethical or illegal conduct, including by requiring a 

due diligence review of any tax-related transaction in 

which a member is asked to participate. Tax exempt 

organizations should adopt similar standards of conduct and procedures.

(8) The AICPA, American Bar Association, and American 

Bankers Association should strengthen professional 

standards of conduct and ethics requirements to stop 

the development and mass marketing of tax products 

designed to reduce or eliminate a client’s tax liability, 

and should prohibit their members from using aggressive sales tactics to market tax products, including by 

prohibiting use of cold calls and telemarketing, explicit 

18

18See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 461(i)(3) (defining tax shelter for certain tax accounting rules); 

6111(a), (c) and (d) (defining tax shelter for certain registration and disclosure requirements); 

and 6662(d)(2)(C)(iii) (defining tax shelter for application of understatement penalty). 19 ‘‘Challenges Remain in Combating Abusive Tax Shelters,’’ testimony by Michael Brostek, Director, Tax Issues, GAO, before the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, No. GAO–04–104T (10/

21/03) (hereinafter ‘‘GAO Testimony’’) at 1. 20 26 U.S.C. § 6700. 21 26 U.S.C. § 6701. 22See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 6011 (taxpayer must disclose reportable transactions); 6111 (organizers and promoters must register potentially illegal tax shelters with IRS), 6112 (promoters 

must maintain lists of clients who purchase potentially illegal tax shelters and, upon request, 

disclose such client lists to the IRS). 23See, e.g., Treas. Reg. Sec. 301.6112–1 and Sec. 1.6011–4, which took effect on 2/28/03. 

revenue goals, and fees contingent on projected tax 

savings.

(9) The AICPA and American Bar Association should 

strengthen professional standards of conduct and ethics requirements to prohibit the issuance of an opinion 

letter on a tax product when the independence of the 

author has been compromised by providing accounting, 

legal, design, sales, or implementation assistance related to the product, by having a financial stake in the 

tax product, or by having a financial stake in a related 

or similar tax product. 

V. Overview of U.S. Tax Shelter Industry 

A. Summary of Current Law on Tax Shelters 

The definition of an abusive tax shelter has changed and expanded over time to encompass a wide variety of illegal or potentially illegal tax evasion schemes. Existing legal definitions are 

complex and appear in multiple sections of the tax code.18 These 

tax shelter definitions refer to transactions, partnerships, entities, 

investments, plans, or arrangements which have been devised, in 

whole or significant part, to enable taxpayers to eliminate or understate their tax liability. The General Accounting Office (GAO) 

recently summarized these definitions by describing ‘‘abusive shelters’’ as ‘‘very complicated transactions promoted to corporations 

and wealthy individuals to exploit tax loopholes and provide large, 

unintended tax benefits.’’ 19

Over the past 10 years, Federal statutes and regulations prohibiting illegal tax shelters have undergone repeated revision to clarify 

and strengthen them. Today, key tax code provisions not only prohibit tax evasion by taxpayers, but also penalize persons who 

knowingly organize or promote illegal tax shelters 20 or who knowingly aid or abet the filing of tax return information that understates a taxpayer’s tax liability.21 Additional tax code provisions 

now require taxpayers and promoters to disclose to the IRS information about certain potentially illegal tax shelters.22

Recently, the IRS issued regulations to clarify and strengthen 

the law’s definition of a tax shelter promoter and the law’s requirements for tax shelter disclosure.23 For example, these regulations 

now make it clear that tax shelter promoters include ‘‘persons principally responsible for organizing a tax shelter as well as persons 

who participate in the organization, management or sale of a tax 

shelter’’ and any person who is a ‘‘material advisor’’ on a tax shelVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:56 Dec 11, 2003 Jkt 090655 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\90655.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN
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24Petition dated 10/14/03, ‘‘United States’ Ex Parte Petition for Leave to Serve IRS ‘John Doe’ 

Summons on Sidley Austin Brown & Wood,’’ (D.N.D. Ill.), at ¶ 8. 25 Id. at ¶ 11. See also ‘‘Background and Present Law Relating to Tax Shelters,’’ Joint Committee on Taxation (JCX–19–02), 3/19/02 (hereinafter ‘‘Joint Committee on Taxation report’’), at 

33; GAO Testimony at 7. The other five categories of transactions subject to disclosure are transactions offered under conditions of confidentiality, including contractual protections to the ‘‘investor’’, resulting in specific amounts of tax losses, generating a tax benefit when the underlying 

asset is held only briefly, or generating differences between financial accounts and tax accounts 

greater than $10 million. GAO Testimony at 7. 26Petition dated 10/14/03, ‘‘United States’ Ex Parte Petition for Leave to Serve IRS ‘John Doe’ 

Summons on Sidley Austin Brown & Wood,’’ (D.N.D. Ill.), at ¶¶ 11–12. 27 Id. at ¶ 16. 28See, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935); ACM Partnership v. Commissioner, 157 

F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied 526 U.S. 1017 (1999); Bail Bonds by Marvin Nelson, Inc. 

v. Commissioner, 820 F.2d 1543, 1549 (9th Cir. 1987) (‘‘The economic substance factor involves 

a broader examination of . . . whether from an objective standpoint the transaction was likely 

to produce economic benefits aside from a tax deduction.’’). 29See, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935); Commissioner v. Transport Trading & 

Terminal Corp., 176 F.2d 570, 572 (2nd Cir. 1949), cert. denied 339 U.S. 916 (1949) (Judge 

Learned Hand) (‘‘The doctrine of Gregory v. Helvering . . . means that in construing words of 

a tax statute which describe commercial or industrial transactions we are to understand them 

to refer to transactions entered upon for commercial or industrial purposes and not to include 

transactions entered upon for no other motive but to escape taxation.’’) 30See, e.g., Weiss v. Stearn, 265 U.S. 242, 254 (1924) (‘‘Questions of taxation must be determined by viewing what was actually done, rather than the declared purpose of the participants; 

and when applying the provisions of the Sixteenth Amendment and income laws . . . we must 

regard matters of substance and not mere form.’’) 31See, e.g., Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945) (‘‘The transaction 

must be viewed as a whole, and each step, from the commencement of negotiations to the consummation of the sale, is relevant. A sale by one person cannot be transformed for tax purposes 

into a sale by another using the latter as a conduit through which to pass title.’’); Palmer v. 

Commissioner, 62 T.C. 684, 692 (1974). 32See, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935); Rice’s Toyota World v. Commissioner,

752 F.2d 89, 91–92 (4th Cir. 1985); United Parcel Service of America, Inc. v. Commissioner, 78 

T.C.M. 262 at n. 29 (1999), rev’d 254 F.3d 1014 (11th Cir. 2001) (‘‘Courts have recognized two 

basic types of sham transactions. Shams in fact are transactions that never occur. In such 

shams, taxpayers claim deductions for transactions that have been created on paper but which 

never took place. Shams in substance are transactions that actually occurred but which lack the 

substance their form represents.’’). 

ter transaction.24 Disclosure obligations, which apply to both taxpayers and tax shelter promoters, require disclosure to the IRS, 

under certain circumstances, of information related to six categories of potentially illegal tax shelter transactions. Among others, 

these disclosures include any transaction that is the same or similar to a ‘‘listed transaction,’’ which is a transaction that the IRS 

has formally determined, through regulation, notice, or other published guidance, ‘‘as having a potential for tax avoidance or evasion’’ and is subject to the law’s registration and client list maintenance requirements.25 The IRS has stated in court that it ‘‘considers a ‘listed transaction’ and all substantially similar transactions to have been structured for a significant tax avoidance purpose’’ and refers to them as ‘‘potentially abusive tax shelters.’’ 26

The IRS has also stated in court that ‘‘the IRS has concluded that 

taxpayers who engaged in such [listed] transactions have failed or 

may fail to comply with the internal revenue laws.’’ 27 As of October 

2003, the IRS had published 27 listed transactions. 

In addition to statutory and regulatory requirements and prohibitions, federal courts have developed over the years a number of 

common law doctrines to identify and invalidate illegal tax shelters, including the economic substance,28 business purpose,29 substance-over-form,30 step transaction,31 and sham transaction 32 doctrines. A study by the Joint Committee on Taxation concludes that 

20

33 Joint Committee on Taxation report at 7. 34See, e.g., S. 476, the CARE Act of 2003 (108th Congress, first session), section 701 et seq. 35GAO Testimony at 12. 36 Id. at 11. 37 Id. at 10. 38 Id. at 11. 39 Id. at 16. 40Testimony of Mark Everson, IRS Commissioner, before the Senate Committee on Finance, 

‘‘Tax Shelters: Who’s Buying, Who’s Selling and What’s the Government Doing About It?’’ (10/

21/03), at 7. 

‘‘[t]hese doctrines are not entirely distinguishable’’ and have been 

applied by courts in inconsistent ways.33

Bipartisan legislation to clarify and strengthen the economic substance and business purpose doctrines, as well as other aspects of 

federal tax shelter law, has been developed by the Senate Finance 

Committee. This legislation has been twice approved by the Senate 

during the 108th Congress, but has yet to become law.34

B. U.S. Tax Shelter Industry and Professional Organizations

Finding: The sale of potentially abusive and illegal 

tax shelters has become a lucrative business in the 

United States, and some professional firms such as 

accounting firms, banks, investment advisory 

firms, and law firms are major participants in the 

mass marketing of generic ‘‘tax products’’ to multiple clients.

Illegal tax shelters sold to corporations and wealthy individuals 

drain the U.S. Treasury of billions of dollars in lost tax revenues 

each year. According to GAO, a recent IRS consultant estimated 

that for the 6-year period, 1993–1999, the IRS lost on average between $11 and $15 billion each year from abusive tax shelters.35 In 

actual cases closed between October 1, 2001, and May 6, 2003, involving just 42 large corporations, GAO reports that the IRS proposed abusive shelter-related adjustments for tax years, 1992 to 

2000, totaling more than $10.5 billion.36 GAO reports that an IRS 

database tracking unresolved, abusive tax shelter cases over a 

number of years estimates potential tax losses of about $33 billion 

from listed transactions and another $52 billion from nonlisted 

abusive transactions, for a combined total of $85 billion.37

GAO has also reported that IRS data provided in October 2003, 

identified about 6,400 individuals and corporations that had bought 

abusive tax shelters and other abusive tax planning products, as 

well as almost 300 firms that appear to have promoted them.38 According to GAO, as of June 2003, the IRS had approved investigations of 98 tax shelter promoters, including some directed at accounting or law firms.39

IRS Commissioner Mark Everson testified at a recent Senate Finance Committee hearing that: ‘‘A significant priority in the Service’s efforts to curb abusive transactions is our focus on promoters.’’ 40 He stated, ‘‘The IRS has focused its attention in the 

area of tax shelters on accounting and law firms, among others. 

The IRS has focused on these firms because it believes that, in the 

instances in which the IRS has acted, these firms were acting as 

promoters of tax shelters, and not simply as tax or legal advisers.’’

21

41 Id. at 2. 42 Id. at 3. 43 Id. at 8. 44 Id. at 16.

Mr. Everson also described the latest generation of abusive tax 

shelters as complex, difficult-to-detect transactions developed by 

extremely sophisticated people:

‘‘The latest generation of abusive tax transactions has been 

facilitated by the growth of financial products and structures whose own complexity and non-transparency have 

provided additional tools to allow those willing to design 

transactions intended to generate unwarranted tax benefits. . . . [A]busive transactions that are used by corporations and individuals present formidable administrative 

challenges. The transactions themselves can be creative, 

complex and difficult to detect. Their creators are often extremely sophisticated, as are many of their users, who are 

often financially prepared and motivated to contest the 

Service’s challenges.’’ 41

The Commissioner stated that due to the ‘‘growth in the volume 

of abusive transactions’’ and ‘‘a disturbing decline in corporate conduct and governance,’’ among other factors, the IRS has enhanced 

its response to abusive transactions in general, and abusive tax 

shelters in particular.42 He said that the Office of Tax Shelter 

Analysis (OTSA), first established in February 2000 within the 

Large and Mid-Size Business Division, is continuing to lead IRS 

tax shelter efforts. He stated that, ‘‘OTSA plans, centralizes and coordinates LMSB’s tax shelter operations and collects, analyzes, and 

distributes within the IRS information about potentially abusive 

tax shelter activity.’’ 43 Mr. Everson described a number of ongoing 

IRS tax shelter initiatives including efforts to increase enforcement 

resources, conduct promoter audits, enforce IRS document requests 

against accounting and law firms, implement global settlements for 

persons who used certain illegal tax shelters, develop proposed regulations to improve tax opinion letters and ethics rules for tax professionals appearing before the IRS, and issue additional notices to 

identify illegal tax shelters. 

The Commissioner warned:

‘‘[A]busive transactions can and will continue to pose a 

threat to the integrity of our tax administration system. 

We cannot afford to tolerate those who willfully promote or 

participate in abusive transactions. The stakes are too 

high and the effects of an insufficient response are too corrosive.’’ 44

Professional organizations like accounting firms, banks, investment advisers, and law firms are now key participants in the tax 

shelter industry. These firms specialize in producing tax shelters 

that utilize complex structured finance transactions, multi-million 

dollar loans, novel tax code interpretations, and expensive professional services requiring highly skilled professionals. These firms 

routinely enlist assistance from other respected professional firms 

22

45The general information about KPMG is drawn from KPMG documents produced in connection with the Subcommittee investigation; Internet websites maintained by KPMG LLP and 

KPMG International; and a legal complaint filed by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in SEC v. KPMG LLP, Civil Action No. 03–CV–0671 (D.S.D.N.Y. 1/29/03), alleging 

fraudulent conduct by KPMG and certain KPMG audit partners in connection with audits of 

certain Xerox Corporation financial statements. 46The 15 Management Committee members are the Chairman, Deputy Chairman, Chief Financial Officer, General Counsel, head of the Department of Professional Practice, head of the 

Department of Marketing and Communications, head of the Department of Human Resources, 

the two most senior officials in the Tax Services Practice, the two most senior officials in the 

Assurance Practice, and the most senior official in each of four industry-related ‘‘lines of business,’’ such as telecommunications and energy. Subcommittee interview of Jeffrey Stein (10/31/

03). 

and financial institutions to provide the accounting, investment, financing or legal services needed for the tax shelters to work. 

During the past 10 years, professional firms active in the tax 

shelter industry have expanded their role, moving from selling individualized tax shelters to specific clients, to developing generic 

tax products and mass marketing them to existing and potential 

clients. No longer content with responding to client inquiries, these 

firms are employing the same tactics employed by disreputable, tax 

shelter hucksters: churning out a continuing supply of new and 

abusive tax products, marketing them with hard sell techniques 

and cold calls; and taking deliberate measures to hide their activities from the IRS. 

VI. Four KPMG Case Histories 

A. KPMG In General 

KPMG International is one of the largest public accounting firms 

in the world, with over 700 offices in 152 countries.45 In 2002, it 

employed over 100,000 people and had worldwide revenues of $10.7 

billion. KPMG International is organized as a Swiss ‘‘non-operating 

association,’’ functions as a federation of partnerships around the 

globe, and maintains its headquarters in Amsterdam. 

KPMG LLP (hereinafter ‘‘KPMG’’) is a U.S. limited liability partnership and a member of KPMG International. KPMG is the third 

largest accounting firm in the United States, and generates more 

than $4 billion in annual revenues. KPMG was formed in 1987, 

from the merger of two long-standing accounting firms, Peat 

Marwick and Klynveld Main Goerdeler, along with their individual 

member firms. KPMG maintains its headquarters in New York and 

numerous offices in the United States and other countries. KPMG 

is run by a ‘‘Management Committee’’ made up of 15 individuals 

drawn from the firm’s senior management and major divisions.46

KPMG’s Chairman and CEO is Eugene O’Kelly, who joined KPMG 

in 1972, became partner in 1982, and was appointed Chairman in 

2002. KPMG’s Deputy Chairman is Jeffrey M. Stein, who was also 

appointed in 2002. From 2000 until 2002, Mr. Stein was the Vice 

Chairman for Tax heading KPMG’s Tax Services Practice, and 

prior to that he served as head of operations, or second in command, of the Tax Services Practice. 

KPMG’s Tax Services Practice is a major division of KPMG. It 

provides tax compliance, tax planning, and tax return preparation 

services. The Tax Services Practice employs more than 10,300 tax 

professionals and generates approximately $1.2 billion in annual 

revenues for the firm. These revenues have been increasing rapidly 

23

47 Internal KPMG presentation dated 7/19/01, by Rick Rosenthal and Marsha Peters, entitled 

‘‘Innovative Tax Solutions,’’ Bates XX 001340–50. A chart included in this presentation tracks 

increases in the Tax Service’s gross revenues from 1998 until 2001, showing a cumulative increase of more than 45% over the 4-year period, from 1998 gross revenues of $830 million to 

2001 gross revenues of $1.24 billion. 48Minutes dated 11/30/00, Monetization Solutions Task Force Teleconference, Bates KPMG 

0050624–29, at 50625. 49Document dated 5/18/01, ‘‘PFP Practice Reorganization Innovative Strategies Business 

Plan—DRAFT,’’ Bates KPMG 0050620–23, at 1. 50Stratecon appears to have been very active until its dissolution. See, e.g., email dated 4/

8/02, from Larry Manth to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘Stratecon Final Results for March 

2002,’’ Bates XX 001732 (depicting Stratecon’s March 2002 revenues and operating expenses). 51For information about this tax product, see Appendix C, ‘‘Sham Mutual Fund Investigation.’’

in recent years, including a 45% cumulative increase over 4 years, 

from 1998 to 2001.47 The Tax Services Practice is headquartered in 

New York, has 122 U.S. offices, and maintains additional offices 

around the world. The current head of the Tax Service is Vice 

Chairman for Tax, Richard Smith. 

The Tax Services Practice has over two dozen subdivisions, offices, ‘‘practices’’ or ‘‘groups’’ which over the years have changed 

missions and personnel. Many have played key roles in developing, 

marketing, or implementing KPMG’s generic tax products, including the four products featured in this Report. One key group is the 

Washington National Tax Practice (WNT) which provides technical 

tax expertise to the entire KPMG firm. A WNT subgroup, The Tax 

Innovation Center, leads KPMG’s efforts to develop new generic tax 

products. Another key group is the Department of Professional 

Practice (DPP) for Tax, which, among other tasks, reviews and approves all new KPMG tax products for sale to clients. KPMG’s Federal Tax Practice addresses federal tax compliance and planning 

issues. KPMG’s Personal Financial Planning (PFP) Practice focuses 

on selling ‘‘tax-advantaged’’ products to high net worth individuals 

and large corporations.48 Through a subdivision known as the Capital Transaction Services (CaTS) Practice, later renamed the Innovative Strategies (IS) Practice, PFP led KPMG’s efforts on FLIP, 

OPIS, and BLIPS.49 KPMG’s Stratecon Practice, which focuses on 

‘‘business based’’ tax planning and tax products, led the firm’s efforts on SC2. Innovative Strategies and Stratecon were disbanded 

in 2002, and their tax professionals assigned to other groups.50

Several senior KPMG tax professionals interviewed by the Subcommittee staff, when asked to describe KPMG’s overall approach 

to tax services, indicated that the firm made a significant change 

in direction in the late 1990’s, when it made a formal decision to 

begin devoting substantial resources to developing and marketing 

tax products that could be sold to multiple clients. The Subcommittee staff was told that KPMG made this decision, in part, 

due to the success other accounting firms were experiencing in selling tax products; in part, due to the large revenues earned by the 

firm from selling a particular tax product to banks; 51 and, in part, 

due to new tax leadership that was enthusiastic about increasing 

tax product sales. Among other actions to carry out this decision, 

the firm established the Tax Innovation Center which was dedicated to generating new generic tax products. One senior KPMG 

tax professional told the Subcommittee staff that some KPMG partners considered it ‘‘important’’ for the firm to become an industry 

leader in producing generic tax products. He said that, of the many 

new products KPMG developed, some were ‘‘relatively plain vaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:56 Dec 11, 2003 Jkt 090655 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\90655.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN
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52KPMG’s policy is included in the KPMG Tax Services Manual—U.S., May 2002, KPMG 

Accounting & Reporting Publication, (hereinafter ‘‘KPMG Tax Services Manual’’), § 24.5.2, at 24–

3. 53 Brief summaries of some of these matters are included in Appendix C. 54See United States v. KPMG, Case No. 1:02MS00295 (D.D.C. 9/6/02), ‘‘Answer to Petition to 

Enforce Internal Revenue Summonses,’’ at ¶ 1 (‘‘KPMG asserts that it is not a tax shelter organizer, but a professional firm whose tax professionals provide advice and counseling on a oneon-one basis to clients and prospective clients concerning the clients’ tax situations.’’) 

nilla,’’ while others were ‘‘aggressive.’’ He said that the firm’s policy 

was to offer only tax products which met a ‘‘more likely than not’’ 

standard, meaning the product had a greater than 50 percent probability of withstanding a challenge by the IRS, and that KPMG deliberately chose a higher standard than required by the AICPA, 

which permits firms to offer tax products with a ‘‘realistic possibility of success,’’ or a one-in-three chance of withstanding an IRS 

challenge.52

In recent years, KPMG has become the subject of IRS, SEC, and 

state investigations and enforcement actions in the areas of tax, accounting fraud, and auditor independence.53 These enforcement actions include ongoing litigation by the IRS to enforce tax shelter related document requests and a tax promoter audit of the firm; 

SEC, California, and New York investigations into a potentially 

abusive tax shelter involving at least 10 banks that are allegedly 

using sham mutual funds established on KPMG’s advice; SEC and 

Missouri investigations or enforcement actions related to alleged 

KPMG involvement in accounting fraud at Xerox Corporation or 

General American Mutual Holding Co.; and auditor independence 

concerns leading to an SEC censure of KPMG for investing in AIM 

mutual funds while AIM was an audit client, and to an ongoing 

SEC investigation of tax product client referrals from Wachovia 

Bank to KPMG while Wachovia was a KPMG audit client. In addition, a number of taxpayers have filed suit against KPMG for allegedly selling them an illegal tax shelter or improperly involving 

them in work on illegal tax shelters. 

B. KPMG’s Tax Shelter Activities 

Finding: Although KPMG denies being a tax shelter promoter, the evidence establishes that KPMG 

has devoted substantial resources to, and obtained 

significant fees from, developing, marketing, and 

implementing potentially abusive and illegal tax 

shelters that U.S. taxpayers might otherwise have 

been unable, unlikely or unwilling to employ, costing the Treasury billions of dollars in lost tax revenues.

KPMG has repeatedly denied being a tax shelter promoter. 

KPMG has denied it in court when opposing IRS document requests for information related to tax shelters,54 and denied it in response to Subcommittee questions. KPMG has never registered any 

tax product with the IRS as a potentially abusive tax shelter. 

KPMG does not refer to any of its tax products as ‘‘tax shelters’’ 

and objects to using that term to describe its tax products. Instead, 

KPMG refers to its tax products as ‘‘tax solutions’’ or ‘‘tax strategies.’’ The KPMG Tax Services Manual defines a ‘‘tax solution’’ as 

‘‘a tax planning idea, structure, or service that potentially is appliVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:56 Dec 11, 2003 Jkt 090655 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\90655.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN
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55KPMG Tax Services Manual, § 24.1.1, at 24–1. 56 Untitled document, produced by KPMG on 2/10/03, Bates KPMG 0000009–91. 57See chart entitled, ‘‘Good Faith Estimate of Top Revenue-Generating Strategies,’’ attached 

to letter dated 4/22/03, from KPMG’s legal counsel to the Subcommittee, Bates KPMG 0001801 

(‘‘[B]ecause each tax strategy is tailored to a client’s particular circumstances, the firm does not 

maintain any systematic, reliable method of recording revenues by tax product on a national 

basis, and therefore is unable to provide any definitive list or quantification of revenues for a 

‘top ten tax products’, as requested by the Subcommittee.’’). 58 Id. 59 Compare 19 tax products listed in the chart produced by KPMG on 8/8/03, Bates KPMG 

0001801, to the tax products identified in United States v. KPMG, Case No. 1:02MS00295 

(D.D.C. 7/9/02), ‘‘Petition to Enforce Internal Revenue Service Summonses.’’ 60These tax products included OTHELLO, TEMPEST, RIPSS, and California REIT. 61 United States v. KPMG, Case No. 1:02MS00295 (D.D.C. 7/9/02), ‘‘Petition to Enforce Internal 

Revenue Service Summonses.’’ 62 Id.

cable to more than one client situation and that is reasonable to 

believe will be the subject of leveraged deployment,’’ meaning sales 

to multiple clients.55

In response to a Subcommittee inquiry, KPMG provided the Subcommittee with a list of over 500 ‘‘active tax products’’ designed to 

be offered to multiple clients for a fee.56 When the Subcommittee 

asked KPMG to identify the ten tax products that produced the 

most revenue for the firm in 2000, 2001, and 2002, KPMG denied 

having the ability to reliably track revenues associated with individual tax products and thus to identify with certainty its top revenue producers.57 To respond to the Subcommittee’s request, 

KPMG indicated that it had ‘‘undertaken a good faith, reasonable 

effort to estimate the tax strategies that were likely among those 

generating the most revenues in the years requested.’’ 58 KPMG 

identified a total of 19 tax products that were top revenue-producers for the firm over the 3-year period. 

The Subcommittee staff’s preliminary review of these 19 top revenue-producing tax products determined that six, OPIS, BLIPS, 

401(k)ACCEL, CARDS, CLAS, and CAMPUS, are either within the 

scope of ‘‘listed transactions’’ already determined by the IRS to be 

potentially abusive tax shelters or within the scope of IRS document requests in an ongoing IRS review of KPMG’s tax shelter activities.59 The Subcommittee determined that many, if not all, of 

the 19 tax products were designed to reduce the tax liability of corporations or individuals, and employed features such as structured 

transactions, complex accounting methods, and novel tax law interpretations, often found in illegal tax shelters. The Subcommittee 

staff briefly reviewed a number of other KPMG tax products as 

well 60 and found that they, too, carried indicia of a potentially abusive tax shelter. 

KPMG insists that all of its tax products are the result of legitimate tax planning services. In legal pleadings seeking KPMG documents, however, the IRS has stated that a number of KPMG’s tax 

products appear to be ‘‘tax shelters’’ and requested related documentation to determine whether the firm is complying with federal 

tax shelter laws.61 The IRS specifically identified as ‘‘tax shelters’’ 

FLIP, OPIS, BLIPS, TRACT, IDV, 401(k) ACCEL, Contested Liabilities, Economic Liability Transfer, CLAS, CAMPUS, MIDCO, 

certain ‘‘Tax Treaty’’ transactions, PICO, and FOCUS.62 The IRS 

also alleged that, according to information from a confidential 

source, ‘‘KPMG continues to hide from the IRS information about 

tax shelters it is now developing and marketing’’ and ‘‘KPMG conVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:56 Dec 11, 2003 Jkt 090655 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\90655.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN
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63 United States v. KPMG, Case No. 1:02MS00295 (D.D.C. 7/9/02), ‘‘Declaration of Michael A. 

Halpert,’’ Internal Revenue Agent, at ¶ 38. 64See, e.g., Jacoboni v. KPMG, Case No. 6:02–CV–510 (M.D. Fla. 4/29/02) (OPIS); Swartz v. 

KPMG, Case No. C03–1252 (W.D. Wash. 6/6/03) (BLIPS); Thorpe v. KPMG, Case No. 5–030CV–

68 (E.D.N.C. 1/27/03) (FLIP/OPIS). In addition, a KPMG tax professional has sued KPMG for 

defamation in ‘‘retaliation for the Plaintiff’s refusal to endorse or participate in [KPMG’s] illegal 

activities and for his cooperation with government investigators.’’ Hamersley v. KPMG, Case No. 

BC297905 (Los Angeles Superior Court 6/23/03). 65Memorandum dated 5/26/98, from Gregg Ritchie to Jeffrey Stein, then head of operations 

in the Tax Services Practice, ‘‘OPIS Tax Shelter Registration,’’ Bates KPMG 0012031–33. Emphasis in original. 

tinues to develop and aggressively market dozens of possibly abusive tax shelters.’’ 63

The Subcommittee staff selected three of KPMG’s 19 top revenue 

producing tax products for more intensive study, OPIS, BLIPS and 

SC2, as well as an earlier tax product, FLIP, which KPMG had 

stopped selling after 1999, but which was the precursor to OPIS 

and BLIPS, and the subject of lawsuits filed in 2002 and 2003, by 

persons claiming KPMG had sold them an illegal tax shelter. All 

four of these tax products were explicitly designed to reduce or 

eliminate the tax liability of corporations or individuals. Three, 

FLIP, OPIS, and BLIPS, have already been determined by the IRS 

to be illegal or potentially abusive tax shelters, and the IRS has penalized taxpayers for using them. A number of these taxpayers 

have, in turn, sued KPMG for selling them illegal tax shelters.64 It 

is these four products that are featured in this Report. 

The dispute over whether KPMG sells benign ‘‘tax solutions’’ or 

illegal ‘‘tax shelters’’ is more than a linguistic difference; it goes to 

the heart of whether respected institutions like this one have 

crossed the line of acceptable conduct. Shedding light is a memorandum prepared 5 years ago, in 1998, by a KPMG tax professional 

advising the firm not to register what was then a new tax product, 

OPIS, as a ‘‘tax shelter’’ with the IRS.65 Here is the advice this tax 

professional gave to the second most senior Tax Services Practice 

official at KPMG: 

‘‘For purposes of this discussion, I will assume that we will 

conclude that the OPIS product meets the definition of a 

tax shelter under IRC section 6111(c). 

‘‘Based on this assumption, the following are my conclusions and recommendations as to why KPMG should make 

the business/strategic decision not to register the OPIS 

product as a tax shelter. My conclusions and resulting recommendation [are] based upon the immediate negative impact on the Firm’s strategic initiative to develop a sustainable tax products practice and the long-term implications 

of establishing . . . a precedent in registering such a product. 

‘‘First, the financial exposure to the Firm is minimal.

Based upon our analysis of the applicable penalty sections, 

we conclude that the penalties would be no greater than 

$14,000 per $100,000 in KPMG fees. . . . For example, our 

average deal would result in KPMG fees of $360,000 with 

a maximum penalty exposure of only $31,000. 

‘‘This further assumes that KPMG would bear 100 percent 

of the penalty. In fact . . . the penalty is joint and several

27

with respect to anyone involved in the product who was required to register. Given that, at a minimum, Presidio 

would also be required to register, our share of the penalties could be viewed as being only one-half of the 

amounts noted above. If other OPIS participants (e.g., 

Deut[s]che Bank, Brown & Wood, etc.) were also found to 

be promoters subject to the registration requirements, 

KPMG’s exposure would be further minimized. Finally, 

any ultimate exposure to the penalties are abatable if it 

can be shown that we had reasonable cause. . . . 

‘‘To my knowledge, the Firm has never registered a product under section 6111. . . . 

‘‘Third, the tax community at large continues to 

avoid registration of all products. Based upon my 

knowledge, the representations made by Presidio and 

Quadra, and Larry DeLap’s discussions with his counterparts at other Big 6 firms, there are no tax products marketed to individuals by our competitors which are registered. This includes income conversion strategies, loss 

generation techniques, and other related strategies. 

‘‘Should KPMG decide to begin to register its tax products, 

I believe that it will position us with a severe competitive 

disadvantage in light of industry norms to such degree 

that we will not be able to compete in the tax advantaged 

products market. 

‘‘Fourth, there has been (and, apparently, continues 

to be) a lack of enthusiasm on the part of the Service to enforce section 6111. In speaking with KPMG individuals who were at the Service . . . the Service has apparently purposefully ignored enforcement efforts related 

to section 6111. In informal discussions with individuals 

currently at the Service, WNT has confirmed that there 

are not many registration applications submitted and they 

do not have the resources to dedicate to this area. 

‘‘Finally, the guidance from Congress, the Treasury, 

and the Service is minimal, unclear, and extremely 

difficult to interpret when attempting to apply it to 

‘tax planning’ products. . . . 

‘‘I believe the rewards of a successful marketing of the 

OPIS product . . . far exceed the financial exposure to 

penalties that may arise. Once you have had an opportunity to review this information, I request that we have 

a conference with the persons on the distribution list . . . 

to come to a conclusion with respect to my recommendation. As you know, we must immediately deal with this 

issue in order to proceed with the OPIS product.’’

This memorandum assumes that OPIS qualifies as a tax shelter 

under federal law and then advocates that KPMG not register it 

with the IRS as required by law. The memorandum advises KPMG 

to knowingly violate the law requiring tax shelter registration, 

because the IRS is not vigorously enforcing the registration reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:56 Dec 11, 2003 Jkt 090655 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\90655.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN
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66See, e.g., email dated 5/26/98, from Mark Springer to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘Re: 

OPIS Tax Shelter Registration,’’ Bates KPMG 0034971 (‘‘I would still concur with Gregg’s recommendation. . . . I don’t think we want to create a competitive DISADVANTAGE, nor do we 

want to lead with our chin.’’ Emphasis in original.) 67Lawrence DeLap, then DPP head, told the Subcommittee he had advised the firm to register 

OPIS as a tax shelter. Subcommittee interview of Lawrence DeLap (10/30/03). 68See email dated 11/1/98, from Larry DeLap to William Albaugh and other KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘OPIS,’’ Bates KPMG 0035702. 

quirement, the penalties for noncompliance are much less than the 

potential profits from the tax product, and ‘‘industry norms’’ are 

not to register any tax products at all. The memorandum warns 

that if KPMG were to comply with the tax shelter registration requirement, this action would place the firm at such a competitive 

disadvantage that KPMG would ‘‘not be able to compete in the tax 

advantaged products market.’’

The Subcommittee has learned that some KPMG tax professionals agreed with this analysis,66 while other senior KPMG tax 

professionals provided the opposite advice to the firm.67 but the 

head of the Tax Services Practice, the Vice Chairman for Tax, ultimately decided not to register the tax product as a tax shelter. 

KPMG authorized the sale of OPIS in the fall of 1998.68 Over the 

next 2 years, KPMG sold OPIS to more than 111 individuals. It 

earned fees in excess of $28 million, making OPIS one of KPMG’s 

top ten tax revenue producers in 2000. KPMG never registered 

OPIS as a tax shelter with the IRS. In 2001, the IRS issued Notice 

2001–45 declaring tax products like OPIS to be potentially abusive 

tax shelters. 

The following sections of this Report describe the systems, procedures, and corporate culture behind KPMG’s efforts to develop, 

market, and implement its tax products, as well as steps KPMG 

has taken to avoid detection of its activities by tax authorities and 

others. Each of these sections includes specific evidence drawn from 

the BLIPS, SC2, OPIS, and FLIP case histories. Appendices A and 

B provide more detailed descriptions of how BLIPS and SC2 

worked. 

(1) Developing New Tax Products 

Finding: KPMG devotes substantial resources and 

maintains an extensive infrastructure to produce 

a continuing supply of generic tax products to sell 

to multiple clients, using a process which pressures its tax professionals to generate new ideas, 

move them quickly through the development process, and approve, at times, potentially abusive or 

illegal tax shelters.

KPMG prefers to describe itself as a tax advisor that responds 

to client inquiries seeking tax planning services to structure legitimate business transactions in a tax efficient way. The Subcommittee investigation has determined, however, that KPMG has 

also developed and supports an extensive internal infrastructure of 

offices, programs, and procedures designed to churn out a continuing supply of new tax products unsolicited by a specific client 

and ready for mass marketing. 

Drive to Produce New Tax Products. In 1997, KPMG established the Tax Innovation Center, whose sole mission is to push the 

29

69 ‘‘Tax Innovation Center Overview,’’ Solution Development Process Manual (4/7/01), prepared 

by the KPMG Tax Innovation Center (hereinafter ‘‘TIC Manual’’), at i. 70 ‘‘TIC Solution Development Process,’’ TIC Manual at 6. 71KPMG presentation dated 5/30/01, ‘‘Tax Innovation Center Solution and Idea Development—Year-End Results,’’ Bates XX 001755–56, at 4. 

development of new KPMG tax products. Located within the Washington National Tax (WNT) Practice, the Center is staffed with 

about a dozen full-time employees and assisted by others who work 

for the Center on a rotating basis. A 2001 KPMG overview of the 

Center states that ‘‘[t]ax [s]olution development is one of the four 

priority activities of WNT’’ and ‘‘a significant percentage of WNT 

resources are dedicated to [t]ax [s]olution development at any given 

time.’’ 69

Essentially, the Tax Innovation Center works to get KPMG tax 

professionals to propose new tax product ideas and then provides 

administrative support to develop the proposals into approved tax 

products and move them successfully into the marketing stage. As 

part of this effort, the Center maintains a ‘‘Tax Services Idea 

Bank’’ which it uses to drive and track new tax product ideas. The 

Center asks KPMG tax professionals to submit new ideas for tax 

products on ‘‘Idea Submission Forms’’ or ‘‘Tax Knowledge Sharing’’ 

forms with specified information on how the proposed tax product 

would work and who would be interested in buying it.70 The Idea 

Submission Form asks the submitter to explain, for example, ‘‘how 

client savings are achieved,’’ ‘‘the tax, business, and financial statement benefits of the idea,’’ and ‘‘the revenue potential of this idea,’’ 

including ‘‘key target markets,’’ ‘‘the typical buyer,’’ and an estimated ‘‘average tax fee per engagement.’’ 

In recent years, the Center has established a firm-wide, numerical goal for new tax idea submissions and applied ongoing pressure on KPMG tax professionals to meet this goal. For example, in 

2001, the Center established this overall objective: ‘‘Goal: Deposit 

150 New Ideas in Tax Services Idea Bank.’’ 71 On May 30, 2001, the 

Center reported on the Tax Services’ progress in meeting this goal 

as part of a larger power-point presentation on ‘‘year-end results’’ 

in new tax solutions and ideas development. For each of 12 KPMG 

‘‘Functional Groups’’ within the Tax Services Practice, a one-page 

chart shows the precise number of ‘‘Deposits,’’ ‘‘Expected Deposits,’’ 

and ‘‘In the Pipeline’’ ideas which each group had contributed or 

were expected to contribute to the Tax Services Idea Bank. For example, the chart reports the total number of new ideas contributed 

by the e-Tax Group, Insurance Group, Passthrough Group, Personal Financial Planning Group, State and Local Tax (SALT) 

Group, Stratecon, and others. It shows that SALT had contributed 

the most ideas at 32, while e-Tax had contributed the least, having 

deposited only one new idea. It shows that, altogether, the groups 

had deposited 122 new ideas in the idea bank, with 38 more expected, and 171 ‘‘in the pipeline.’’ 

In addition to reporting on the number of new ideas generated 

during the year, the Center reported on its efforts to measure and 

improve the profitability of the tax product development process. 

The year-end presentation reported, for example, on the Tax Innovation Center’s progress in meeting its goal to ‘‘Measure Solution 

Profitability,’’ noting that the Center had developed software sysVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:56 Dec 11, 2003 Jkt 090655 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\90655.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN
30

72KPMG Tax Services Manual, Chapter 24, pages 24–1 to 24–7. 73TIC Manual at 5. 74The TIC Manual states that a Tax Lab is supposed to evaluate ‘‘the technical viability of 

the idea, the idea’s revenue generation potential above the Solution Revenue threshold, and a 

business case for developing the solution, including initial target list, marketing considerations, 

and preliminary technical analysis.’’ TIC Manual at 5. 75 In an earlier version of KPMG’s tax product review and approval procedure, WNT did not 

have a formal role in the development and approval process, according to senior tax professionals interviewed by the Subcommittee. This prior version of the process, which was apparently the first, firm-wide procedure established to approve new generic tax products, was established in 1997, and operated until mid 1998. In it, a three-person Tax Advantaged Product Review Board, whose members were appointed by and included the head of DPP-Tax, conducted 

the technical review of new proposals. In 1998, when this responsibility was assigned to the 

WNT, the Board was disbanded. The earlier process was used to approve the sale of FLIP and 

OPIS, while the existing procedure was used to approve the sale of BLIPS and SC2. Subcommittee interview of Lawrence DeLap (10/30/03). 76KPMG Tax Services Manual, § 24.4.1, at 24–2. 

tems that ‘‘captured solution development costs and revenue’’ and 

‘‘[p]repared quarterly Solution Profitability reports.’’ It also discussed progress in meeting a goal to ‘‘Increase Revenue from Tax 

Services Idea Bank.’’ Among other measures, the Center proposed 

to ‘‘[s]et deployment team revenue goals for all solutions.’’ 

Development and Approval Process. Once ideas are deposited into the Tax Services Idea Bank, KPMG has devoted substantial resources to transforming the more promising ideas into generic tax products that could be sold to multiple clients. 

KPMG’s development and approval process for new tax products 

is described in its Tax Services Manual and Tax Innovations Center Manual.72 Essentially, the process consists of three stages, each 

of which may overlap with another. In the first stage, the new tax 

idea undergoes an initial screening ‘‘for technical and revenue potential.’’ 73 This initial analysis is supposed to be provided by a 

‘‘Tax Lab’’ which is a formal meeting, arranged by the Tax Innovations Center, of six or more KPMG tax experts specializing in the 

tax issues or industry affected by the proposed product.74 Promising proposals are also assigned one or more persons, sometimes 

referred to as ‘‘National Development Champions’’ or ‘‘Development 

Leaders,’’ to assist in the proposal’s initial analysis and, if warranted, shepherd the proposal through the full KPMG approval 

process. For example, the lead tax professional who moved BLIPS 

through the development and approval process was Jeffrey 

Eischeid, assisted by Randall Bickham, while for SC2, the lead tax 

professional was Lawrence Manth, assisted by and later succeeded 

by Andrew Atkin. 

If a proposal survives the initial screening, in the second stage, 

it must undergo a thorough review by the Washington National 

Tax Practice (‘‘WNT review’’), which is responsible for determining 

whether the product meets the technical requirements of existing 

tax law.75 WNT personnel often spend significant time identifying 

and searching for ways to resolve problems with how the proposed 

product is structured or is intended to be implemented. The WNT 

review must also include analysis of the product by the WNT Tax 

Controversy Services group ‘‘to address tax shelter regulations 

issues.’’ 76 WNT must ‘‘sign-off’’ on the technical merits of the proposal for it to be approved for sale to clients. 

In the third and final stage, the product must undergo review 

and approval by the Department of Practice and Professionalism 

(‘‘DPP review’’). The DPP review must determine that the product 

31

77 Id., § 24.5.2, at 24–3. 78Subcommittee interview of Lawrence DeLap (10/30/03). The Subcommittee staff was told 

that, since 1997, DPP-Tax has had very limited resources to conduct its new product reviews. 

Until 2002, for example, DPP-Tax had a total of less than ten employees; in 2003, the number 

increased to around or just above 20. In contrast, DPP-Assurance, which oversees professional 

practice issues for KPMG audit activity, has well over 100 employees. 79KPMG Tax Services Manual, § 24.5.2, at 24–3. 80 Id., § 41.19.1, at 41–10. 81 Id., § 24.4.2, at 24–2. See also TIC Manual at 10. 

not only complies with the law, but also meets KPMG’s standards 

for ‘‘risk management and professional practice.’’ 77 This latter review includes consideration of such matters as the substantive content of KPMG tax opinion and client engagement letters, disclosures to clients of risks associated with a tax product, the need for 

any confidentiality or marketing restrictions, how KPMG fees are 

to be structured, whether auditor independence issues need to be 

addressed, and the potential impact of a proposed tax product on 

the firm’s reputation.78

Each of the three stages takes time, and the entire development 

and approval process can consume 6 months or longer. The process 

is labor-intensive, since it requires tax professionals to examine the 

suggested product, which is often quite complex, identify various 

tax issues, and suggest solutions to problems. The process often includes consultations with outside professionals, not only on tax 

issues, but also on legal, investment, accounting, and finance 

issues, since many of the products require layers of corporations, 

trusts, and special purpose entities; complex financial and securities transactions using arcane financial instruments; and multimillion-dollar lending transactions, all of which necessitate expert 

guidance, detailed paperwork, and logistical support. 

The KPMG development and approval process is intended to encourage vigorous analysis and debate by the firm’s tax experts over 

the merits of a proposed tax product and to produce a determination that the product complies with current law and does not impose excessive financial or reputational risk for the firm. All KPMG 

personnel interviewed by the Subcommittee indicated that the final 

approval that permitted a new tax product to go to market was 

provided by the head of the DPP. KPMG’s Tax Services Manual 

states that the DPP ‘‘generally will not approve a solution unless 

the appropriate WNT partner(s)/principal(s) conclude that it is at 

least more likely than not that the desired tax consequences of the 

solution will be upheld if challenged by the appropriate taxing authority.’’ 79 KPMG defines ‘‘more likely than not’’ as a ‘‘greater than 

50 percent probability of success if [a tax product is] challenged by 

the IRS.’’ 80 KPMG personnel told the Subcommittee that the 

WNT’s final sign-off on the technical issues had to come before the 

DPP would provide its final sign-off allowing a new tax product to 

go to market. 

Once approved, KPMG procedures required a new tax product to 

be accompanied by a number of documents before its release for 

sale to clients, including an abstract summarizing the product; a 

standard engagement letter for clients purchasing the product; an 

electronic powerpoint presentation to introduce the product to other 

KPMG tax professionals; and a ‘‘whitepaper’’ summarizing the 

technical tax issues and their resolution.81 In addition, to ‘‘launch’’ 

32

82TIC Manual at 10. 83KPMG Tax Services Manual, § 41.17.1, at 41–8. 84 Id., § 41.15.1, at 41–8. A KPMG tax opinion often addresses all of the legal issues related 

to a new tax product and provides an overall assessment of the tax consequences of the new 

product. See, e.g., KPMG tax opinion on BLIPS. Other KPMG tax opinions address only a limited number of issues related to a new tax product and may provide different levels of assurance 

on the tax consequences of various aspects of the same tax product. See, e.g., KPMG tax opinions related to SC2. 

the new product within KPMG, the Tax Innovation Center is supposed to prepare a ‘‘Tax Solution Alert’’ which serves ‘‘as the official 

notification’’ that the tax product is available for sale to clients.82

This Alert is supposed to include a ‘‘digest’’ summarizing the product, a list of the KPMG ‘‘deployment team’’ members responsible 

for ‘‘delivering’’ the product to market, pricing information, and 

marketing information such as a ‘‘Solution Profile’’ of clients who 

would benefit from the tax product and ‘‘Optimal Target Characteristics’’ and the expected ‘‘Typical Buyer’’ of the product. The four 

case histories demonstrated that KPMG personnel sometimes, but 

not always, complied with the paperwork required by its procedures. For example, while SC2 was the subject of a ‘‘Tax Solution 

Alert,’’ BLIPS was not. 

In addition to or in lieu of the required ‘‘whitepaper’’ explaining 

KPMG’s position on key technical issues, KPMG often prepared a 

‘‘prototype’’ tax opinion letter laying out the firm’s analysis and 

conclusions regarding the tax consequences of the new tax product.83 KPMG defines a ‘‘tax opinion’’ as ‘‘any written advice on the 

tax consequences of a particular issue, transaction or series of 

transactions that is based upon specific facts and/or representations of the client and that is furnished to the client or another 

party in a letter, a whitepaper, a memorandum, an electronic or 

facsimile communication, or other form.’’ 84 The tax opinion letter 

includes, at a minimum under KPMG policy, a statement of the 

firm’s determination that, if challenged by the IRS, it was ‘‘more 

likely than not’’ that the desired tax consequences of the new tax 

product would be upheld in court. The prototype tax opinion letter 

is intended to serve as a template for the tax opinion letters actually sent by KPMG to specific clients for a fee. 

In addition to preparing its own tax opinion letter, in some cases 

KPMG seeks an opinion letter from an outside party, such as a law 

firm, to provide an ‘‘independent’’ second opinion on the validity of 

the tax product. KPMG made arrangements to obtain favorable 

legal opinion letters from an outside law firm in each of the case 

studies examined by the Subcommittee. 

The tax product development and approval process just described 

is the key internal procedure at KPMG today to determine whether 

the firm markets benign tax solutions that comply with the law or 

abusive tax shelters that do not. The investigation conducted by 

the Subcommittee found that, in the case of FLIP, OPIS, BLIPS, 

and SC2, KPMG tax professionals were under pressure not only to 

develop the new products quickly, but also to approve products that 

the firm’s tax experts knew were potentially illegal tax shelters. In 

several of these cases, top KPMG tax experts participating in the 

review process expressed repeated concerns about the legitimacy of 

the relevant tax product. Despite these concerns, all four products 

were approved for sale to clients. 

33

85See Appendix A for more information about BLIPS. 86 IRS Notice 2000–44 (2000–36 IRB 255) (9/5/00). 87 Email dated 2/9/99, from Jeffrey Eischeid to John Lanning, Doug Ammerman, Mark Watson 

and Larry DeLap, ‘‘BLIPS,’’ Bates MTW 0001. 88 Email dated 2/10/99, from John Lanning to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘RE: BLIPS,’’ 

Bates MTW 0001. See also memorandum dated 2/11/99, from Jeffrey Zysik of TIC to ‘‘Distribution List,’’ Bates MTW 0002 (‘‘As each of you is by now aware, a product with a very high profile 

with the tax leadership recently was submitted to WNT/Tax Innovation Center. We are charged 

with shepherding this product through the WNT ‘productization’ and review process as rapidly 

as possible.’’) 89 Email dated 2/15/99, from Mark Watson to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘BLIPS 

Progress Report,’’ Bates MTW 0004. 

BLIPS Development and Approval Process. The development and approval process resulting in the marketing of the BLIPS 

tax product to 186 individuals illustrates how the KPMG process 

works.85 BLIPS was first proposed as a KPMG tax idea in late 

1998, and the generic tax product was initially approved for sale 

in May 1999. The product was finally approved for sale in August 

1999, after the transactional documentation required by the BLIPS 

transactions was completed. One year later, in September 2000, the 

IRS issued Notice 2000–44, determining that BLIPS and other, 

similar tax products were potentially abusive tax shelters and taxpayers who used them would be subject to enforcement action.86

After this notice was issued, KPMG discontinued sales of the product. 

Internal KPMG emails disclose an extended, unresolved debate 

among WNT and DPP tax professionals over whether BLIPS met 

the technical requirements of federal tax law, a debate which continued even after BLIPS was approved for sale. Several outside 

firms were also involved in BLIPS’ development including Sidley 

Austin Brown & Wood, a law firm, and Presidio Advisory Services, 

an investment advisory firm run by two former KPMG tax partners. Key documents at the beginning and during a key 2-week period of the BLIPS approval process are instructive. 

BLIPS was first proposed in late 1998, as a replacement product 

for OPIS, which had earned KPMG substantial fees. From the beginning, senior tax leadership put pressure on KPMG tax professionals to quickly approve the new product for sale to clients. For 

example, after being told that a draft tax opinion on BLIPS had 

been sent to WNT for review and ‘‘we can reasonably anticipate 

‘approval’ in another month or so,’’ 87 the head of the entire Tax 

Services Practice wrote: 

‘‘Given the marketplace potential of BLIPS, I think a 

month is far too long—especially in the spirit of ‘first to 

market’. I’d like for all of you, within the bounds of good 

professional judgement, to dramatically accelerate this 

timeline. . . . I’d like to know how quickly we can get this 

product to market.’’ 88

Five days later, the WNT technical expert in charge of Personal 

Financial Planning (PFP) tax products—who had been assigned responsibility for moving the BLIPS product through the WNT review process and was under instruction to keep the head of the Tax 

Services Practice informed of BLIPS’ status—wrote to several colleagues asking for a ‘‘progress report.’’ He added a postcript: ‘‘P.S. 

I don’t like this pressure any more than you do.’’ 89

34

90 ‘‘Meeting Summary’’ for meeting held on 2/19/99, Bates MTW 0009. 91Subcommittee interview of Mark Watson (11/4/03). 

A few days later, on February 19, 1999, almost a dozen WNT tax 

experts held an initial meeting to discuss the technical issues involved in BLIPS.90 Six major issues were identified, the first two 

of which posed such significant technical hurdles that, according to 

the WNT PFP technical reviewer, most participants, including himself, left the meeting thinking the product was ‘‘dead.’’ 91 Some of 

the most difficult technical questions, including whether the BLIPS 

transactions had economic substance, were assigned to two of 

WNT’s most senior tax partners who, despite the difficulty, took 

just 2 weeks to determine, on March 5, that their technical concerns had been resolved. The WNT PFP technical reviewer continued to work on other technical issues related to the project. Almost 

2 months later, on April 27, 1999, he sent an email to the head of 

DPP stating that, with respect to the technical issues assigned to 

him, he would be comfortable with WNT’s issuing a more-likelythan-not opinion on BLIPS. 

Three days later, at meetings held on April 30 and May 1, a 

number of KPMG tax professionals working on BLIPS attended a 

meeting with Presidio to discuss how the investments called for by 

the product would actually be carried out. The WNT PFP technical 

reviewer told the Subcommittee staff that, at these meetings, the 

Presidio representative made a number of troubling comments that 

led him to conclude that the review team had not been provided all 

of the relevant information about how the BLIPS transactions 

would operate, and re-opened concerns about the technical merits 

of the product. For example, he told the Subcommittee staff that 

a Presidio representative had commented that ‘‘the probability of 

actually making a profit from this transaction is remote’’ and the 

bank would have a ‘‘veto’’ over how the loan proceeds used to finance the BLIPS deal would be invested. In his opinion, these 

statements, if true, meant the investment program at the heart of 

the BLIPS product lacked economic substance and business purpose as required by law. 

On May 4, 1999, the WNT PFP technical reviewer wrote to the 

head of the DPP expressing doubts about approving BLIPS:

‘‘Larry, while I am comfortable that WNT did its job reviewing and analyzing the technical issues associated with 

BLIPS, based on the BLIPS meeting I attended on April 

30 and May 1, I am not comfortable issuing a more-likelythan-not opinion letter [with respect to] this product for 

the following reasons: 

‘‘. . . [T]he probability of actually making a profit from 

this transaction is remote (possible, but remote); 

‘‘The bank will control how the ‘loan’ proceeds are invested via a veto power over Presidio’s investment 

choices; and 

‘‘It appears that the bank wants the ‘loan’ repaid within 

approximately 60 days. . . . 

35

92 Email dated 5/4/99, from Mark Watson to Larry DeLap, Bates KPMG 0011916. 93 Email dated 5/5/99, from Larry DeLap to Mark Watson, Bates KPMG 0011916. 94 Email dated 5/5/99, from Mark Watson to Larry DeLap, Bates KPMG 0011915–16. Mr. Watson was not the only KPMG tax professional expressing serious concerns about BLIPS. See, e.g., 

email dated 4/6/99, from Steven Rosenthal to Larry DeLap, ‘‘RE: BLIPS,’’ Bates MTW 0024; 

email dated 4/26/99, from Steven Rosenthal to Larry DeLap, ‘‘RE: BLIPS Analysis,’’ Bates MTW 

0026; email dated 5/7/99, from Steven Rosenthal to multiple KPMG professionals, ‘‘Who Is the 

Borrower in the BLIPS transaction,’’ Bates MTW 0028; email dated 8/19/99, from Steven Rosenthal to Mark Watson, Bates SMR 0045. 95 Email dated 5/7/99, from Larry Delap to three KPMG tax professionals, with copies to John 

Lanning, Vice Chairman of the Tax Services Practice, and Jeffrey Stein, second in command of 

the Tax Services Practice, Bates KPMG 0011905. In the same email he noted that another technical expert, whom he had asked to review critical aspects of the project, had ‘‘informed me on 

Tuesday afternoon that he had substantial concern with the ‘who is the borrower’ issuer [sic].’’ 

Later that same day, May 7, the two WNT technical reviewers expressing technical concerns 

about BLIPS met with the two senior WNT partners who had earlier signed off on the economic 

substance issue, to discuss the issues. 96 Email dated 5/8/99, from John Lanning to four KPMG tax professionals, Bates KPMG 

0011905. 

‘‘Thus, I think it is questionable whether a client’s representation [in a tax opinion letter] that he or she believed 

there was a reasonable opportunity to make a profit is a 

reasonable representation. Even more concerning, however, is whether a loan was actually made. If the bank controls how the loan proceeds are used and when they are 

repaid, has the bank actually made a bona fide loan? 

‘‘I will no doubt catch hell for sending you this message. 

However, until the above issues are resolved satisfactorily, 

I am not comfortable with this product.’’ 92

The DPP head responded: ‘‘It is not clear to me how this comports with your April 27 message [expressing comfort with BLIPS], 

but because this is a PFP product and you are the chief PFP technical resource, the product should not be approved if you are uncomfortable.’’ 93 The WNT PFP technical reviewer responded that 

he had learned new information about how the BLIPS investments 

would occur, and it was this subsequent information that had 

caused him to reverse his position on issuing a tax opinion letter 

supporting the product.94

On May 7, 1999 the head of DPP forwarded the WNT PFP technical expert’s email to the leadership of the tax group and noted: 

‘‘I don’t believe a PFP product should be approved when the top 

PFP technical partner in WNT believes it should not be approved.’’ 95

On May 8, 1999, the head of KPMG’s Tax Services Practice 

wrote: ‘‘I must say that I am amazed that at this late date (must 

now be six months into this process) our chief WNT PFP technical 

expert has reached this conclusion. I would have thought that 

Mark would have been involved in the ground floor of this process, 

especially on an issue as critical as profit motive. What gives? This 

appears to be the antithesis of ‘speed to market.’ Is there any 

chance of ever getting this product off the launching pad, or should 

we simply give up???’’ 96

On May 9, one of the senior WNT partners supporting BLIPS 

sent an email to one of the WNT technical reviewers objecting to 

BLIPS and asked him: ‘‘Based on your analysis . . . do you conclude that the tax results sought by the investor are NOT ‘more 

36

97 Email exchange dated 5/9/99, between Richard Smith and Steven Rosenthal, Bates SMR 

0025 and SMR 0027. 98 Email dated 5/10/99, from Philip Wiesner to multiple WNT tax professionals, Bates MTW 

0031.

likely than not’ to be realized?’’ The technical reviewer responded: 

‘‘Yes.’’ 97

On May 10, the head of the WNT sent an email to five WNT tax 

professionals:

‘‘Gentlemen: Please help me on this. Over the weekend 

while thinking about WNT involvement in BLIPS I was 

under the impression that we had sent the transaction forward to DPP Tax on the basis that everyone had signed 

off on their respective technical issues(s) and that I had 

signed off on the overall more likely than not opinion. If 

this impression is correct, why are we revisiting the opinion other than to beef up the technical discussion and further refine the representations on which the conclusions 

are based. I am very troubled that at this late date the 

issue is apparently being revisited and if I understand correctly, a prior decision changed on this technical issue?! 

Richard, in particular, jog my memory on this matter since 

I based my overall opinion on the fact that everyone had 

signed off on their respective areas.?’’ 98

A few hours later, the head of WNT sent eight senior KPMG tax 

professionals, including the Tax Services Practice head, DPP head, 

and the WNT PFP technical reviewer, a long email message urging 

final approval of BLIPS. He wrote in part:

‘‘Many people have worked long and hard to craft a tax 

opinion in the BLIPS transaction that satisfies the more 

likely than not standard. I believed that we in WNT had 

completed our work a month ago when we forwarded the 

[draft] opinion to Larry. . . .

‘‘[T]his is a classic transaction where we can labor over the 

technical concerns, but the ultimate resolution—if challenged by the IRS—will be based on the facts (or lack 

thereof). In short, our opinion is only as good as the factual 

representations that it is based upon. . . . The real ‘rubber 

meets the road’ will happen when the transaction is sold 

to investors, what the investors’ actual motive for investing the transaction is and how the transaction actually 

unfolds. . . . Third, our reputation will be used to market 

the transaction. This is a given in these types of deals. 

Thus, we need to be concerned about who we are getting 

in bed with here. In particular, do we believe that Presidio 

has the integrity to sell the deal on the facts and representations that we have written our opinion on?! . . . 

‘‘Having said all the above, I do believe the time has come 

to shit and get off the pot. The business decisions to me 

are primarily two: (1) Have we drafted the opinion with 

the appropriate limiting bells and whistles . . . and (2) 

Are we being paid enough to offset the risks of potential 

litigation resulting from the transaction? . . . My own recVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:56 Dec 11, 2003 Jkt 090655 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\90655.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN
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99 Email dated 5/10/99, from Philip Wiesner to John Lanning and eight other KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘RE: BLIPS,’’ Bates KPMG 0011904. See also email response dated 5/10/99, from 

John Lanning to Philip Wiesner and other KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘RE: BLIPS,’’ Bates MTW 

0036 (‘‘you’ve framed the issues well’’). 100 Email dated 5/10/99, from Jeffrey Stein to Philip Weisner and others, Bates KPMG 

0011903. 101 Email dated 5/10/99, from Mark Watson to John Lanning and others, ‘‘FW: BLIPS,’’ Bates 

MTW 0039 (Emphasis in original.). 102 Email dated 5/10/99, from Philip Wiesner to multiple KPMG tax professionals, Bates 

KPMG 0009344.

ommendation is that we should be paid a lot of money here 

for our opinion since the transaction is clearly one that the 

IRS would view as falling squarely within the tax shelter 

orbit. . . .’’ 99

Later the same day, the Tax Services operations head wrote in 

response to the email from the WNT head: ‘‘I think it’s shit OR get 

off the pot. I vote for shit.’’ 100

The same day, the WNT PFP technical reviewer wrote to the 

head of the Tax Services Practice: ‘‘John, in my defense, my change 

in heart about BLIPS was based on information Presidio disclosed 

to me at a meeting on May 1. This information raised serious concerns in my mind about the viability of the transaction, and indicated that WNT had not been given complete information about 

how the transaction would be structured. . . . I want to make 

money as much as you do, but I cannot ignore information that 

raises questions as to whether the subject strategy even works. 

Nonetheless, I have sent Randy Bickham four representations that 

I think need to be added to our opinion letter. Assuming these representations are made, I am prepared to move forward with the 

strategy.’’ 101

A meeting was held on May 10, to determine how to proceed. The 

WNT head, the senior WNT partner, and the two WNT technical 

reviewers decided to move forward on BLIPS, and the WNT head 

asked the technical reviewers to draft some representations that, 

when relied upon, would enable the tax opinion writers to reach a 

more likely than not opinion. The WNT head reported the outcome 

of the meeting in an email:

‘‘The group of Wiesner, R Smith, Watson and Rosenthal 

met this afternoon to bring closure to the remaining technical tax issues concerning the BLIPS transaction. After a 

thorough discussion of the profit motive and who is the 

borrower issue, recommendations for additional representations were made (Mark Watson to follow up on with Jeff 

Eischeid) and the decision by WNT to proceed on a more 

likely than not basis affirmed. Concern was again expressed that the critical juncture will be at the time of the 

first real tax opinion when the investor, bank and Presidio 

will be asked to sign the appropriate representations. Finally, it should be noted that Steve Rosenthal expressed 

his dissent on the who is the investor issue, to wit, ‘although reasonable people could reach an opposite result, 

he could not reach a more likely than not opinion on that 

issue’.’’ 102

After receiving this email, the DPP head sent an email to the 

WNT PFP technical reviewer asking whether he would be comVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:56 Dec 11, 2003 Jkt 090655 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\90655.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN
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103 Email dated 5/11/99, from Mark Watson, WNT, to Lawrence DeLap, Bates KPMG 0011911. 104Subcommittee interview of Lawrence DeLap (10/30/03). 105 Id. 106Subcommittee interview of Mark Watson (11/4/03). 

fortable with KPMG’s issuing a tax opinion supporting BLIPS. The 

WNT PFP technical reviewer wrote: ‘‘Larry, I don’t like this product and would prefer not to be associated with it. However, if the 

additional representations I sent to Randy on May 9 and 10 are in 

fact made, based on Phil Wiesner’s and Richard Smith’s input, I 

can reluctantly live with a more-likely-than-not opinion being 

issued for the product.’’ 103

The DPP head indicated to the Subcommittee staff that he did 

not consider this tepid endorsement sufficient for him to sign off on 

the product. He indicated that he then met in person with his superior, the head of the Tax Services Practice, and told the Tax 

Services Practice head that he was not prepared to approve BLIPS 

for sale. He told the Subcommittee staff that the Tax Services Practice head was ‘‘not pleased’’ and instructed him to speak again with 

the technical reviewer.104

The DPP head told the Subcommittee staff that he then went 

back to the WNT PFP technical reviewer and telephoned him to 

discuss the product. The DPP head told the Subcommittee staff 

that, during this telephone conversation, the technical reviewer 

made a much clearer, oral statement of support for the product, 

and it was only after obtaining this statement from the technical 

reviewer that, on May 19, 1999, the DPP head approved BLIPS for 

sale to clients.105 The WNT PFP technical reviewer, however, told 

the Subcommittee staff that he did not remember receiving this 

telephone call from the DPP head. According to him, he never, at 

any time after the May 1 meeting, expressed clear support for 

BLIPS’ approval. He also stated that an oral sign-off on this product contradicted the DPP head’s normal practice of requiring written product approvals.106

Over the course of the next year, KPMG sold BLIPS to 186 individuals and obtained more than $50 million in fees, making BLIPS 

one of its highest revenue-producing tax products to date. 

The events and communications leading to BLIPS’ approval for 

sale are troubling and revealing for a number of reasons. First, 

they show that senior KPMG tax professionals knew the proposed 

tax product, BLIPS, was ‘‘clearly one that the IRS would view as 

falling squarely within the tax shelter orbit.’’ Second, they show 

how important ‘‘speed to market’’ was as a factor in the review and 

approval process. Third, they show the interpersonal dynamics 

that, in this case, led KPMG’s key technical tax expert to reluctantly agree to approve a tax product that he did not support or 

want to be associated with, in response to the pressure exerted by 

senior Tax Services professionals to approve the product for sale. 

The email exchange immediately preceding BLIPS’ approval for 

sale also indicates a high level of impatience by KPMG tax professionals in dealing with new, troubling information about how the 

BLIPS investments would actually be implemented by the outside 

investment advisory firm, Presidio. Questions about this outside 

firm’s ‘‘integrity’’ and how it would perform were characterized as 

questions of risk to KPMG that could be resolved with a pricing apVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:56 Dec 11, 2003 Jkt 090655 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\90655.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN
39

107 Email dated 7/22/99, from Mark Watson to Richard Smith and Phil Wiesner, Bates MTW 

0078. 108 Email dated 8/4/99, from Mark Watson to David Brockway, Mark Springer, and Doug 

Ammerman, Bates SMR 0039.

proach that provided sufficient funds ‘‘to offset the risks of potential litigation.’’ Finally, the email exchange shows that the participants in the approval process—all senior KPMG tax professionals—knew they were voting for a dubious tax product that 

would be sold in part by relying on KPMG’s ‘‘reputation.’’ No one 

challenged the analysis that the risky nature of the product justified the firm’s charging ‘‘a lot of money’’ for a tax opinion letter predicting it was more likely than not that BLIPS would withstand an 

IRS challenge. 

Later documents show that key KPMG tax professionals continued to express serious concerns about the technical validity of 

BLIPS. For example, in July, 2 months after the DPP gave his approval to sell BLIPS, one of the WNT technical reviewers, objecting 

to the tax product, sent an email to his superiors in WNT noting 

that the loan documentation contemplated very conservative instruments for the loan proceeds and it seemed unlikely the rate of 

return on the investments would equal or exceed the loan and fees 

incurred by the borrower. He indicated that his calculations 

showed the planned foreign currency transactions would ‘‘have to 

generate a 240% annual rate of return’’ to break even. He also 

pointed out that, ‘‘Although the loan is structured as a 7-year loan, 

the client has a tremendous economic incentive to get out of loan 

as soon as possible due to the large negative spread.’’ He wrote: 

‘‘Before I submit our non-economic substance comments on the loan 

documents to Presidio, I want to confirm that you are still comfortable with the economic substance of this transaction.’’ 107 His 

superiors indicated that they were. 

A month later, in August, after completing a review of the BLIPS 

transactional documents, the WNT PFP technical reviewer again 

expressed concerns to his superiors in WNT:

‘‘However before engagement letters are signed and revenue is collected, I feel it is important to again note that 

I and several other WNT partners remain skeptical that 

the tax results purportedly generated by a BLIPS transaction would actually be sustained by a court if challenged 

by the IRS. We are particularly concerned about the economic substance of the BLIPS transaction, and our review 

of the BLIPS loan documents has increased our level of 

concern. 

‘‘Nonetheless, since Richard Smith and Phil Wiesner—the 

WNT partners assigned with the responsibility of addressing the economic substance issues associated with 

BLIPS—have concluded they think BLIPS is a ‘‘more-likely-than-not’’ strategy, I am prepared to release the strategy once we complete our second review of the loan documents and LLC agreement and our comments thereon (if 

any) have been incorporated.’’ 108

The other technical reviewer objecting to BLIPS wrote:

40

109 Email dated 8/4/99, from Steven Rosenthal to Mark Watson and others, Bates SMR 0039. 110Senior KPMG tax professionals, again, put pressure on its tax experts to quickly approve 

the BLIPS 2000 product. See, e.g., email dated 1/17/00, from Jeff Stein to Steven Rosenthal and 

others, ‘‘BLIPS 2000,’’ Bates SMR 0050 (technical expert is urged to analyze new product ‘‘so 

we can take this to market. Your attention over the next few days would be most appreciated.’’). 111 Email dated 3/6/00, from Steven Rosenthal to David Brockway, ‘‘Blips I, Grandfathered 

Blips, and Blips 2000,’’ Bates SMR 0056. See also memorandum dated 3/28/00, to David 

Brockway, ‘‘Talking points on significant tax issues for BLIPS 2000,’’ Bates SMR 0117–21 (identifying numerous problems with BLIPS). 112Subcommittee interview of Lawrence DeLap (10/30/03). 113Power point presentation dated June 1999, by Carol Warley, Personal Financial Planning 

group, ‘‘BLIPS AND TRACT,’’ Bates KPMG 0049639–45, at 496340. Repeated capitalizations in 

original text not included. 

‘‘I share your concerns. We are almost finished with our 

technical review of the documents that you gave us, and 

we recommend some clarifications to address these technical concerns. We are not, however, assessing the economic substance of the transaction (ie., is there a debt? 

Who is the borrower? What is the amount of the liability? 

Is there a reasonable expectation of profit?) I continue to 

be seriously troubled by these issues, but I defer to Phil 

Wiesner and Richard Smith to assess them.’’ 109

The senior partners in WNT chose to go forward with BLIPS.

About 6 months after BLIPS tax products had begun to be sold 

to clients, an effort was begun within KPMG to design a modified 

‘‘BLIPS 2000.’’ 110 One of the WNT technical reviewers who had objected to the original BLIPS again expressed his concerns: 

‘‘I am writing to communicate my views on the economic 

substance of the Blips, Grandfathered Blips, and Blips 

2000 strategies. Throughout this process, I have been troubled by the application of economic substance doctrines 

. . . and have raised my concerns repeatedly in internal 

meetings. The facts as I now know them and the law that 

has developed, has not reduced my level of concern.

‘‘In short, in my view, I do not believe that KPMG can reasonably issue a more-likely-than-not opinion on these 

issues.’’ 111

When asked by Subcommittee staff whether he had ever personally concluded that BLIPS met the technical requirements of the 

federal tax code, the DPP head declined to say that he had. Instead, he said that, in 1999, he approved BLIPS for sale after determining that WNT had ‘‘completed’’ the technical approval process.112 A BLIPS power point presentation produced by the Personal 

Financial Planning group in June, a few weeks after BLIPS’ approval for sale, advised KPMG tax professionals to make sure that 

potential clients were ‘‘willing to take an aggressive position with 

a more likely than not opinion letter.’’ The presentation characterized BLIPS as having ‘‘about a 10 risk on [a] scale of 1–10.’’ 113

In September 2000, the IRS identified BLIPS as a potentially 

abusive tax shelter. The IRS notice characterized BLIPS as a product that was ‘‘being marketed to taxpayers for the purpose of generating artificial tax losses. . . . [A] loss is allowable as a deduction 

. . . only if it is bona fide and reflects actual economic consequences. An artificial loss lacking economic substance is not alVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:56 Dec 11, 2003 Jkt 090655 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\90655.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN
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114 IRS Notice 2000–44 (2000–36 IRB 255) (9/5/00) at 255. 115See document dated 5/18/01, ‘‘PFP Practice Reorganization Innovative Strategies Business 

Plan—DRAFT,’’ Bates KPMG 0050620–23, at 1. 116Memorandum dated 2/23/98, from Robert Simon to Gregg Ritchie, Randy Bickham, and 

John Harris, concerning OPIS, Bates KPMG 0010729. 

lowable.’’ 114 The IRS’ disallowance of BLIPS has not yet been tested in court. Rather than defend BLIPS in court, KPMG and many 

BLIPS purchasers appear to be engaged in settlement negotiations 

with the IRS to reduce penalty assessments. 

OPIS and FLIP Development and Approval Process. OPIS 

and FLIP were the predecessors to BLIPS. Like BLIPS, both of 

these products were ‘‘loss generators’’ intended to generate paper 

losses that taxpayers could use to offset and shelter other income 

from taxation,115 but both used different mechanisms than BLIPS 

to achieve this end. Because they were developed a number of 

years ago, the Subcommittee has more limited documentation on 

how OPIS and FLIP were developed. However, even this limited 

documentation establishes KPMG’s awareness of serious technical 

flaws in both tax products. 

For example, in the case of OPIS, which was developed during 

1998, a senior KPMG tax professional wrote a 7-page memorandum 

filled with criticisms of the proposed tax product.116 The memorandum states: ‘‘In OPIS, the use of debt has apparently been jettisoned. If we can not structure a deal without at least some debt, 

it strikes me that all the investment banker’s economic justification 

for the deal is smoke and mirrors.’’ At a later point, it states: ‘‘The 

only thing that really distinguishes OPIS (from FLIPS) from a tax 

perspective is the use of an instrument that is purported to be a 

swap. . . . However, the instrument described in the opinion is not

a swap under I.R.C. § 446. . . . [A] fairly strong argument could be 

made that the U.S. investor has nothing more than a disguised 

partnership interest.’’ 

The memorandum goes on:

‘‘If, upon audit, the IRS were to challenge the transaction, 

the burden of proof will be on the investor. The investor 

will have to demonstrate, among other things, that the 

transaction was not consummated pursuant to a firm and 

fixed plan. Think about the prospect of having your client 

on the stand having to defend against such an argument. 

The client would have a difficult burden to overcome. . . . 

The failure to use an independent 3rd party in any of the 

transactions indicates that the deal is pre-wired.’’

It also states: ‘‘If the risk of loss concepts of Notice 98–5 were applied to OPIS, I doubt that the investor’s ownership interest would 

pass muster.’’ And: ‘‘As it stands now, the Cayman company remains extremely vulnerable to an argument that it is a sham.’’ 

And: ‘‘No further attempt has been made to quantify why I.R.C. 

§ 165 should not apply to deny the loss. Instead, the argument is 

again made that because the law is uncertain, we win.’’ The memorandum observes: ‘‘We are the firm writing the [tax] opinions. Ultimately, if these deals fail in a technical sense, it is KPMG which 

will shoulder the blame.’’

This memorandum was written in February 1998. OPIS was approved for sale to clients around September 1998. KPMG sold OPIS 

42

117 Email dated 3/14/98, from Jeff Stein to Robert Wells, John Lanning, Larry DeLap, Gregg 

Ritchie, and others, ‘‘Simon Says,’’ concerning FLIP, Bates 638010, filed by the IRS on June 16, 

2003, as an attachment to Respondent’s Requests for Admission, Schneider Interests v. Commissioner, U.S. Tax Court, Docket No. 200–02. 118 IRS Notice 2001–45 (2001–33 IRB 129) (8/13/01). 119See ‘‘Settlement Initiative for Section 302/318 Basis-Shifting Transactions,’’ IRS Announcement 2002–97 (2002–43 IRB 757) (10/28/02). 120See Appendix B for more detailed information on SC2. 

to 111 individuals, conducting 79 OPIS transactions on their behalf 

in 1998 and 1999. 

In the case of FLIP, an email written in March 1998, by the Tax 

Services Practice’s second in command, identifies a host of significant technical flaws in FLIP, doing so in the course of discussing 

which of two tax offices in KPMG deserved credit for developing its 

replacement, OPIS.117 The email states that efforts to find a FLIP 

alternative ‘‘took on an air of urgency when [DPP head] Larry 

DeLap determined that KPMG should discontinue marketing the 

existing product.’’ The email indicates that, for about 6 weeks, a 

senior KPMG tax professional and a former KPMG tax professional 

employed at Presidio worked ‘‘to tweak or redesign’’ FLIP and ‘‘determined that whatever the new product, it needed a greater economic risk attached to it’’ to meet the requirements of federal tax 

law. 

Among other criticisms of FLIP, the email states: ‘‘Simon was the 

one who pointed out the weakness in having the U.S. investor purchase a warrant for a ridiculously high amount of money. . . . It 

was clear, we needed the option to be treated as an option for Section 302 purposes, and yet in truth the option [used in FLIP] was 

really illusory and stood out more like a sore thumb since no one 

in his right mind would pay such an exorbitant price for such a 

warrant.’’ The email states: ‘‘In kicking the tires on FLIP (perhaps 

too hard for the likes of certain people) Simon discovered that there 

was a delayed settlement of the loan which then raised the issue 

of whether the shares could even be deemed to be issued to the 

Cayman company. Naturally, without the shares being issued, they 

could not later be redeemed.’’ The email also observes: ‘‘[I]t was 

Greg who stated in writing to I believe Bob Simon that the ‘the 

OPIS product was developed in response to your and DPP tax’s 

concerns over the FLIP strategy. We listened to your input regarding technical concerns with respect to the FLIP product and attempt to work solutions into the new product. . . .’ ’’

This email was written in March 1998, after the bulk of FLIP 

sales, but it shows that the firm had been aware for some time of 

the product’s technical problems. After the email was written, 

KPMG sold FLIP to ten more customers in 1998 and 1999, earning 

more than $3 million in fees for doing so. In August 2001, the IRS 

issued a notice finding both FLIP and OPIS to be potentially abusive tax shelters.118 The IRS has since audited and penalized numerous taxpayers for using these illegal tax shelters.119

SC2 Development and Approval Process. The Subcommittee 

investigation also obtained documentation establishing KPMG’s 

awareness of flaws in the technical merits of SC2.120

Documents proceeding the April 2000 decision by KPMG to approve SC2 for sale reflect vigorous analysis and discussion of the 

product’s risks if challenged by the IRS. The documents also reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:56 Dec 11, 2003 Jkt 090655 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\90655.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN
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121 Email dated 3/13/00, from Phillip Galbreath to Richard Bailine, ‘‘FW: S-CAEPS,’’ Bates 

KPMG 0046889. 122 Email dated 4/11/00, from Larry DeLap to Tax Professional Practice Partners, ‘‘S-Corporation Charitable Contribution Strategy (SC2),’’ Bates KPMG 0052581–82. One of the KPMG tax 

partners to whom this email was forwarded wrote in response: ‘‘Please do not forward this to 

anyone.’’ Email dated 4/25/00, from Steven Messing to Lawrence Silver, ‘‘S-Corporation Charitable Contribution Strategy (SC2),’’ Bates KPMG 0052581. 123 Undated KPMG document entitled, ‘‘S Corporation Charitable Contribution Strategy[:] 

Summary of Certain Risks,’’ marked ‘‘PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL,’’ Bates KPMG 0049987–

88.

flect, as in the BLIPS case, pressure to move the product to market 

quickly. For example, one month before SC2’s final approval, an 

email from a KPMG professional in the Tax Innovation Center 

stated: ‘‘As I was telling you, this Tax Solution is getting some very 

high level (Stein/Rosenthal) attention. Please review the whitepaper as soon as possible. . . .’’ 121

On April 11, 2000, in the same email announcing SC2’s approval 

for sale, the head of the DPP wrote:

‘‘This is a relatively high risk strategy. You will note that 

the heading to the preapproved engagement letter states 

that limitation of liability and indemnification provisions 

are not to be waived. . . . You will also note that the engagement letter includes the following statement: You acknowledge receipt of a memorandum discussing certain 

risks associated with the strategy. . . . It is essential that 

such risk discussion memorandum (attached) be provided 

to each client contemplating entering into an SC2 engagement.’’ 122

The referenced memorandum, required to be given to all SC2 clients, identifies a number of risks associated with the tax product, 

most related to ways in which the IRS might successfully challenge 

the product’s legal validity. The memorandum states in part:

‘‘The [IRS] or a state taxing authority could assert that 

some or all of the income allocated to the tax-exempt organization should be reallocated to the other shareholders of 

the corporation. . . . The IRS or a state taxing authority 

could assert that some or all of the charitable contribution 

deduction should be disallowed, on the basis that the taxexempt organization did not acquire equitable ownership 

of the stock or that the valuation of the contributed stock 

was overstated. . . . The IRS or a state taxing authority 

could assert that the strategy creates a second class of 

stock. Under the [tax code], subchapter S corporations are 

not permitted to have a second class of stock. . . . The IRS 

or a court might discount an opinion provided by the promoter of a strategy. Accordingly, it may be advisable to 

consider requesting a concurring opinion from an independent tax advisor.’’ 123

Internally, KPMG tax professionals had identified even more 

technical problems with SC2 than were discussed in the memorandum given to clients. For example, KPMG tax professionals discussed problems with identifying a business purpose to explain the 

structure of the transaction—why a donor who wanted to make a 

cash donation to a charity would first donate stock to the charity 

44

124See, e.g., email dated 3/13/00, from Richard Bailene to Phillip Galbreath, ‘‘S-CAEPS,’’ Bates 

KPMG 0015744. 125See, e.g., email dated 3/13/00, from Richard Bailene to Phillip Galbreath, ‘‘S-CAEPS,’’ Bates 

KPMG 0015745; KPMG document dated 3/13/00, ‘‘S-Corporation Charitable Contribution Strategy—Variation #1,’’ Bates KPMG 0047895 (beneficial ownership is ‘‘probably our weakest link 

in the chain on SC2.’’); memorandum dated 3/2/00, from William Kelliher to multiple KPMG tax 

professionals, ‘‘Comments on S-CAEPS ‘White Paper,’ ’’ Bates KPMG 0016853–61. 126See, e.g., email dated 3/13/00, from Richard Bailene to Phillip Galbreath, ‘‘S-CAEPS,’’ Bates 

KPMG 0015746, and email from Mark Watson, ‘‘S-CAEPS,’’ Bates KPMG 0013790–93 (raising 

assignment of income concerns); emails dated 3/21/00 and 3/22/00, from Larry DeLap and Lawrence Manth, Bates KPMG 0015739–40 (raising tax indifferent party concerns); various emails 

between 7/28/00 and 10/25/00, among KPMG tax professionals, Bates KPMG 0015011–14 (raising tax indifferent party concerns); and memorandum dated 2/14/00, from William Kelliher to 

Richard Rosenthal, ‘‘S-Corp Charitable and Estate Planning Strategy (‘S-CAEPS’),’’ Bates KPMG 

0047693–95 (raising valuation concerns). 127 Email dated 12/20/01, from William Kelliher to David Brockway, ‘‘FW: SC2,’’ Bates KPMG 

0012723.

and then buy it back, instead of simply providing a straightforward 

cash contribution.124 They also identified problems with establishing the charity’s ‘‘beneficial ownership’’ of the donated stock, 

since the stock was provided on the clear understanding that the 

charity would sell the stock back to the donor within a specified period of time.125 KPMG tax professionals identified other technical 

problems as well involving assignment of income, reliance on tax 

indifferent parties, and valuation issues.126

More than a year later, in December 2001, another KPMG tax 

professional expressed concern about the widespread marketing of 

SC2 because, if the IRS ‘‘gets wind of it,’’ the agency would likely 

mount a vigorous and ‘‘at least partially successful’’ challenge to 

the product:

‘‘Going way back to Feb. 2000, when SC2 first reared its 

head, my recollection is that SC2 was intended to be limited to a relatively small number of large S corps. That 

plan made sense because, in my opinion, there was (and 

is) a strong risk of a successful IRS attack on SC2 if the 

IRS gets wind of it. . . . Call me paranoid, but I think that 

such a widespread marketing campaign is likely to bring 

KPMG and SC2 unwelcome attention from the IRS. If so, 

I suspect a vigorous (and at least partially successful) challenge would result.’’ 127

Together, the BLIPS, OPIS, FLIP, and SC2 evidence demonstrates that the KPMG development process led to the approval 

of tax products that senior KPMG tax professionals knew had significant technical flaws and were potentially illegal tax shelters. 

Even when senior KPMG professionals expressed forceful objections to proposed products, highly questionable tax products received technical and reputational risk sign-offs and made their way 

to market. 

(2) Mass Marketing Tax Products 

Finding: KPMG uses aggressive marketing tactics 

to sell its generic tax products, including by turning tax professionals into tax product salespersons, pressuring its tax professionals to meet 

revenue targets, using telemarketing to find clients, using confidential client tax data to identify 

potential buyers, targeting its own audit clients 

45

128KPMG Tax Services Manual, § 2.21.1, at 2–14. 129 Id.

for sales pitches, and using tax opinion letters and 

insurance policies as marketing tools.

Until recently, accounting firms were seen as traditional, professional firms that waited for clients to come to them with concerns, 

rather than affirmatively targeting potential clients for sales 

pitches on tax products. One of the more striking aspects of the 

Subcommittee investigation was discovery of the substantial efforts 

KPMG has expended to market its tax products, including extensive efforts to target clients and, at times, use high-pressure sales 

tactics. Evidence in the four case studies shows that KPMG compiled and scoured prospective client lists, pushed its personnel to 

meet sales targets, closely monitored their sales efforts, advised its 

professionals to use questionable sales techniques, and even used 

cold calls to drum up business. The evidence also shows that, at 

times, KPMG marketed tax shelters to persons who appeared to 

have little interest in them or did not understand what they were 

being sold, and likely would not have used them to reduce their 

taxes without being approached by KPMG. 

Extensive Marketing Infrastructure. As indicated in the 

prior section, KPMG’s marketing efforts for new tax products normally began long before a product was approved for sale. Potential 

‘‘revenue analysis’’ was part of the earliest screening efforts for new 

products. In addition, when a new tax product is launched within 

the firm, the ‘‘Tax Solution Alert’’ is supposed to include key marketing information such as potential client profiles, ‘‘optimal target 

characteristics’’ of buyers, and the expected ‘‘typical buyer’’ of the 

product. 

KPMG typically designates one or more persons to lead the marketing effort for a new tax product. These persons are referred to 

as the product’s ‘‘National Deployment Champions,’’ ‘‘National 

Product Champions,’’ or ‘‘Deployment Leaders.’’ In the four case 

studies investigated by the Subcommittee, the National Deployment Champion was the same person who served as the product’s 

National Development Champion and shepherded the product 

through the KPMG approval process. For example, the tax professional who led the marketing effort for BLIPS was, again, Jeffrey 

Eischeid, assisted by Randall Bickham, while for SC2 it was, again, 

Larry Manth, assisted and succeeded by Andrew Atkin. 

National Deployment Champions have been given significant institutional support to market their assigned tax product. For example, KPMG maintains a national marketing office that includes 

marketing professionals and resources ‘‘dedicated to tax.’’ 128 Champions can draw on this resource for ‘‘market planning and execution assistance,’’ and to assemble a marketing team with a ‘‘National Marketing Director’’ and designated ‘‘area champions’’ to 

lead marketing efforts in various regions of the United States.129

These individuals become members of the product’s official ‘‘deployment team.’’

Champions can also draw on a Tax Services group skilled in 

marketing research to identify prospective clients and develop target client lists. This group is known as the Tax Services Marketing 

46

130See, e.g., SC2 script dated 6/19 (no year provided, but likely 2000) developed for telemarketer calls to identify individuals interested in obtaining more information, Bates KPMG 

0050370–71. A telemarketing script was also developed for BLIPS, but it is possible that no 

BLIPS telemarketing calls were made. BLIPS script dated 7/8/99, Bates KPMG 0025670. 

and Research Support group. Champions can also make use of a 

KPMG ‘‘cold call center’’ in Indiana. This center is staffed with telemarketers trained to make cold calls to prospective clients and set 

up a phone call or meeting with specified KPMG tax or accounting 

professionals to discuss services or products offered by the firm. 

These telemarketers can and, at times, have made cold calls to sell 

specific tax shelters such as SC2.130

In addition to a cadre of expert marketing support personnel, National Deployment Champions are supported by powerful software 

systems that help them identify prospective clients and track 

KPMG sales efforts across the country. The Opportunity Management System (OMS), for example, is a software system that KPMG 

tax professionals have used to monitor with precision who has been 

contacted about a particular tax product, who made the contact on 

behalf of KPMG, the potential sales revenue associated with the 

sales contact, and the current status of each sales effort. 

An email sent in 2000, by the Tax Services operations and Federal Tax Practice heads to 15 KPMG tax professionals paints a 

broad picture of what KPMG’s National Deployment Champions 

were expected to accomplish:

‘‘As National Deployment Champions we are counting on 

you to drive significant market activity. We are committed 

to providing you with the tools that you need to support 

you in your efforts. A few reminders in this regard. 

‘‘The Tax Services Marketing and Research Support is prepared to help you refine your existing and/or create additional [client] target lists. . . . Working closely with your 

National Marketing Directors you should develop the relevant prospect profile. Based on the criteria you specify 

the marketing and research teams can scour primary and 

secondary sources to compile a target list. This will help 

you go to market more effectively and efficiently.

‘‘Many of you have also tapped into the Practice Development Coordinator resource. Our team of telemarketers is 

particularly helpful . . . to further qualify prospects [redaction by KPMG] [and] to set up phone appointments for 

you and your deployment team. . . . 

‘‘Finally tracking reports generated from OMS are critical 

to measuring your results. If you don’t analyze the outcome of your efforts you will not be in a position to judge 

what is working and what is not. Toward that end you 

must enter data in OMS. We will generate reports once a 

month from OMS and share them with you, your team, 

Service Line leaders and the [Area Managing Partners]. 

These will be the focal point of our discussion with you 

when we revisit your solution on the Monday night call. 

You should also be using them on your bi-weekly team 

calls. . . . 

47

131 Email dated 8/6/00 from Jeff Stein and Rick Rosenthal to 15 National Deployment Champions, Bates KPMG 050016. 132 Email dated 3/14/02, from Rick Rosenthal and other KPMG professionals, to ‘‘US Management Group,’’ Bates XX 000141 (Emphasis in original.). 

‘‘Thanks again for assuming the responsibilities of a National Deployment Champion. We are counting on you to 

make the difference in achieving our financial goals.’’ 131

In 2002, KPMG opened a ‘‘Sales Opportunity Center’’ to make it 

easier for its personnel to make use of the firm’s extensive marketing resources. An email announcing this Center stated the following:

‘‘The current environment is changing at breakneck speed, 

and we must be prepared to respond aggressively to every 

opportunity.

‘‘We have created a Sales Opportunity Center to be the 

‘eye of the needle’—a single place where you can get access 

to the resources you need to move quickly, knowledgeably, 

and effectively.

‘‘This initiative reflects the efforts of Assurance (Sales, 

Marketing, and the Assurance & Advisory Services Center) 

and Tax (Marketing and the Tax Innovation Center), and 

is intended to serve as our ‘situation room’ during these 

fast-moving times. . . .

‘‘The Sales Opportunity Center is a powerful demonstration of the Firm’s commitment to giving you what you need 

to meet the challenges of these momentous times. We urge 

you to take advantage of this resource as you pursue marketplace opportunities.’’ 132

Corporate Culture: Sell, Sell, Sell. After a new tax product 

has been ‘‘launched’’ within KPMG, one of the primary tasks of a 

National Deployment Champion is to educate KPMG tax professionals about the new product and motivate them to sell it. 

Champions use a wide variety of tools to make KPMG tax professionals aware of a new tax product. For example, they include 

product information in KPMG internal newsletters and email 

alerts, and organize conference calls and video conferences with 

KPMG tax offices across the country. Champions have also gone on 

‘‘road shows’’ to KPMG field offices to make a personal presentation 

on a particular product. These presentations include how the product works, what clients to target, and how to respond to particular 

concerns. On some occasions, a presentation is videotaped and included in an office’s ‘‘video library’’ to enable KPMG personnel to 

view the presentation at a later date. 

Documentation obtained by the Subcommittee shows that National Deployment Champions and senior KPMG tax officials expend significant effort to convince KPMG personnel to devote time 

and resources to selling new products. Senior tax professionals use 

general exhortations as well as specific instructions directed to specific field offices to increase their sales efforts. For example, after 

SC2 was launched, the head of KPMG’s Federal Practice sent the 

following an email to the SC2 ‘‘area champions’’ around the country:

48

133 Email dated 2/18/00, from Richard Rosenthal to multiple KPMG tax professionals, Bates 

KPMG 0049236. 134 Email dated 4/21/00, from Michael Terracina, KPMG office in Houston, to Gary Choate, 

KPMG office in Dallas, Bates KPMG 0048191.

‘‘I want to personally thank everyone for their efforts during the approval process of this strategy. It was completed 

very quickly and everyone demonstrated true teamwork. 

Thank you! Now let[’]s SELL, SELL, SELL!!’’ 133

The Federal Tax head also called specific KPMG offices to urge 

them to increase their SC2 sales. This type of instruction from a 

senior KPMG tax official apparently sent a strong message to subordinates about the need to sell the identified tax product. For example, a tax professional in a KPMG field office in Houston wrote 

the following after participating in a conference call on SC2 in 

which the Federal Tax head and the SC2 National Deployment 

Champion urged the office to improve its SC2 sales record:

‘‘I don’t know if you were on Larry Manth’s call today, but 

Rosenthal led the initial discussion. There have been several successes. . . . We are behind.

‘‘This is THE STRATEGY that they expect significant 

value added fees by June 30.

‘‘The heat is on. . . .’’ 134

In the SC2 case study examined by the Subcommittee, National 

Deployment Champions did not end their efforts with phone calls 

and visits urging KPMG tax professionals to sell their tax product, 

they also produced detailed marketing plans, implemented them 

with the assistance of the ‘‘deployment team,’’ and pressured their 

colleagues to increase SC2 sales. For example, one email circulated 

among two members of the SC2 deployment team and two senior 

KPMG tax professionals demonstrates the measures used to push 

sales:

‘‘To memorialize our discussion, we agreed the following:

‘‘*Over the next two weeks, Manth [SC2 National Deployment Champion] will deploy [Andrew] Atkin [on 

the SC2 deployment team] to call each of the SC2 area 

solution champions.

‘‘*Andrew will work with the champion to establish a 

specific action plan for each opportunity. To be at all 

effective, the plans should [be] very specific as to who 

is going to do what when. . . . There should be agreement as to when Andrew will next follow-up with them 

to create a real sense of urgency and accountability.

‘‘*Andrew will involve Manth where he is not getting a 

response within 24 hours or receiving inappropriate 

‘pushback.’ Manth will enlist [David] Jones or Rick 

[Rosenthal, senior KPMG tax officials,] to help facilitate responsiveness where necessary given the urgency 

of the opportunity. . . .

‘‘*Manth believes inadequate resources are currently deployed to exploit the Midwest SCorp client and target 

49

135 Email dated 1/30/01, from David Jones to Larry Manth, Richard Rosenthal, and Wendy 

Klein, ‘‘SC2—Follow-up to 1/29 Revisit,’’ Bates KPMG 0050389. 136 Email dated 12/2/00, from Lawrence Manth to multiple tax professionals, Bates XX 000021. 137 Email dated 2/22/01, from Councill Leak to multiple tax professionals, Bates KPMG 

0050822–23. 138 Email dated 3/13/01, from Larry Manth to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘Friday’s 

Stratecon Call,’’ Bates XX 001439. 

population. Craig Pichette has not yet been able to 

dedicate enough time to this solution. . . . John 

Schrier (NE Stratecon) or Councill Leak (SE 

Stratecon) could be effective. . . .

‘‘*Resource[s] will be assigned to adequately address the 

market opportunity in Florida. . . . Goals must be explicit . . . including a percentage weighting based on 

expected time commitment. . . .

‘‘Manth will explore with Rick the opportunity to form alliances with other accounting firms to drive distribution.’’ 135

Senior KPMG tax officials also set overall revenue goals for various tax groups and urged them to increase their sales of designated tax products to meet those goals. For example, in an email 

alerting nearly 40 tax professionals in the ‘‘Stratecon West’’ group 

to a conference call on a ‘‘Kick Off Plan For ’01,’’ a senior Stratecon 

professional, who was also the SC2 National Deployment Champion, wrote:

‘‘Hello everyone. We will be having a conference call to 

kick-off our Stratecon marketing efforts to aggressively 

pursue closed deals by 6/30/01. The main purpose of the 

call is to discuss our marketing and targeting strategy and 

to get everyone acquainted with a number of Stratecon’s 

high-end solutions. If you have clients, at least one of 

these strategies should be applicable to your client base. 

As you all know, to reach plan in the West, we must aggressively pursue these high-end strategies.’’ 136

Two months later, a member of the SC2 deployment team, who 

also worked for Stratecon, sent an email to an even larger group 

of 60 tax professionals, urging them to try a new, more appealing 

version of SC2. In a paragraph subtitled, ‘‘Why Should You Care?’’ 

he wrote:

‘‘In the last 12 months the original SC2 structure has produced $1.25 million in signed engagements for the SE 

[Southeast]. . . . Look at the last partner scorecard. Unlike golf, a low number is not a good thing. . . . A lot of 

us need to put more revenue on the board before June 30. 

SC2 can do it for you. Think about targets in your area 

and call me.’’ 137

The steady push for tax product sales continued. For example, 

three weeks later, the Stratecon tax professional sent an email to 

his colleagues stating, ‘‘Due to the significant push for year-end 

revenue, all West Region Federal tax partners have been invited to 

join us on this [conference] call and we will discuss our ‘Quick Hit’ 

strategies and targeting criteria.’’ 138 Six weeks after that, the same 

Stratecon official announced another conference call urging 

50

139 Email dated 4/25/01, from Larry Manth to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘Friday’s 

Stratecon Call,’’ Bates XX 001438. 140 Email dated 2/3/00, from Philip Wiesner to US-WNT Tax Partners, Bates KPMG 0050888–

90.141Presentation entitled, ‘‘KMatch Push Feature Campaign,’’ undated, prepared by Marsha 

Peters of the Tax Innovation Center, Bates XX 001511. 142See, e.g., email dated 3/6/01, from US-GoSystem Administration to Andrew Atkin of KPMG, 

‘‘RE: Florida S corporation search,’’ Bates KPMG 0050826; Subcommittee interview of Councill 

Leak (10/22/03). 143 Id.

Stratecon professionals to discuss two ‘‘tax minimization opportunities for individuals’’ which will ‘‘have a quick revenue hit for us.’’ 139

Stratecon was not alone in the push for sales. For example, in 

2000, the former head of KPMG’s Washington National Tax Practice sent an email to all ‘‘US-WNT Tax Partners’’ urging them to 

‘‘temporarily defer non-revenue producing activities’’ and concentrate for the ‘‘next 5 months’’ on meeting WNT’s revenue goals 

for the year.140 The email states in part: 

‘‘Listed below are the tax products identified by the functional teams as having significant revenue potential over 

the next few months. . . . [T]he functional teams will need 

. . . WNT champions to work with the National Product 

champions to maximize the revenue generated from the respective products. . . . Thanks for help in this critically 

important matter. As Jeff said, ‘We are dealing with ruthless execution—hand to hand combat—blocking and tackling.’ Whatever the mixed metaphor, let’s just do it.’’

The evidence is clear that selling tax products was an important 

part of every tax professional’s job at KPMG. 

Targeting Clients. KPMG’s marketing efforts included substantial efforts to identify prospective purchasers for its tax products. 

KPMG developed prospective client lists by reviewing both its own 

client base and seeking new clients through referrals and cold calls. 

To review its own client base, KPMG has used software systems, 

including ones known as KMatch and RIA-GoSystem, to identify 

former or existing clients who might be interested in a particular 

tax product. KMatch is ‘‘[a]n interactive software program that 

asks a user a series of questions about a client’s business and tax 

situation,’’ uses the information to construct a ‘‘client profile,’’ and 

then uses the profile to identify KPMG tax products that could assist the client to avoid taxation.141 KPMG’s Tax Innovation Center 

conducted a specific campaign requiring KPMG tax professionals to 

enter client data into the KMatch database so that, when subsequent tax products were launched, the resulting client profiles 

could be searched electronically to identify which clients would be 

eligible for and interested in the new product. RIA-GoSystem is a 

separate internal KPMG database which contains confidential client data provided to KPMG to assist the firm in preparing client 

tax returns.142 This database of confidential client tax information 

can also be searched electronically to identify prospective clients for 

new tax products and was actually used for that purpose in the 

case of SC2.143

The evidence indicates that KPMG also uses its assurance professionals—persons who provide auditing and related services to individuals and corporations—to identify existing KPMG audit cliVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:56 Dec 11, 2003 Jkt 090655 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\90655.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN
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144Presentation dated 7/17/00, ‘‘Targeting Parameters: Intellectual Property—Assurance and 

Tax,’’ with attachment dated September 2000, entitled ‘‘Intellectual Property Services,’’ at page 

1 of the presentation, Bates XX 001567–93. 145Presentation dated 10/30/00, ‘‘Intellectual Property Services (IPS),’’ by Dut LeBlanc of 

Shreveport and Joe Zier of Silicon Valley, Bates XX 001580–93. 146Presentation dated 7/17/00, ‘‘Targeting Parameters: Intellectual Property—Assurance and 

Tax,’’ with attachment dated September 2000, entitled ‘‘Intellectual Property Services,’’ at page 

1 of the attachment, Bates XX 001567–93. 147Presentation dated 10/30/00, ‘‘Intellectual Property Services (IPS),’’ by Dut LeBlanc of 

Shreveport and Joe Zier of Silicon Valley, Bates XX 001580–93. 148Presentation dated 7/17/00, ‘‘Targeting Parameters: Intellectual Property—Assurance and 

Tax,’’ with attachment dated September 2000, entitled ‘‘Intellectual Property Services,’’ at page 

1 of the attachment, Bates XX 001567–93. 149See WNT presentation dated 9/19/02, entitled ‘‘Innovative Tax Solutions,’’ which, at 18–26, 

includes a presentation by Tom Hopkins of Silicon Valley, ‘‘New Enterprises Tax Suite,’’ Tax 

Solution Alert 00–31, Bates XX 001636–1706. The Hopkins presentation states that the new 

product is intended to be used to ‘‘[l]everage existing client base (pull-through),’’ ‘‘[d]evelop and 

use client selection filters to refine our bets and reach higher market success,’’ and ‘‘[e]nhance 

relationships with client decisionmakers.’’ As part of a ‘‘Deployment Action Plan,’’ the presentation states that KPMG ‘‘[p]artners with revenue goals are given subscriptions to Venture Wire

for daily lead generation’’ and that ‘‘[t]argeting is supplemented by daily lead generation from 

Fort Wayne’’ where KPMG’s telemarketing center is located. 

ents who might be interested in new tax products. Among other 

documents evidencing the role of KPMG assurance professionals is 

the development and marketing of tax products that require the 

combined participation of both KPMG tax and assurance professionals. In 2000, for example, KPMG issued what it called its ‘‘first 

joint solution’’ requiring KPMG tax and assurance professionals to 

work together to sell and implement the product.144 The tax product is described as a ‘‘[c]ollection of assurance and tax services designed to assist companies in . . . realizing value from their intellectual property . . . [d]elivered by joint team of KPMG assurance 

and tax professionals.’’ 145 Internal KPMG documentation states 

that the purpose of the new product is ‘‘[t]o increase KPMG’s market penetration of key clients and targets by enhancing the linkage 

between Assurance and Tax professionals.’’ 146 Another KPMG document states: ‘‘Teaming with Assurance expands tax team’s knowledge of client and industry[.] Demonstrates unified team approach 

that separates KPMG from competitors.’’ 147 Another KPMG document shows that KPMG used both its internal tax and assurance 

client lists to target clients for a sales pitch on the new product: 

‘‘The second tab of this file contains the draft target list [of 

companies]. This list was compiled from two sources an assurance and tax list. . . . [W]e selected the companies 

which are assurance or tax clients, which resulted in the 

45 companies on the next sheet. . . . What should you do? 

Review the suspects with your assurance or tax deployment counterpart. . . . Prioritize your area targets, and 

plan how to approach them.’’ 148

Additional tax products which relied in part on KPMG audit 

partners followed. In 2002, for example, KPMG launched a ‘‘New 

Enterprises Tax Suite’’ product 149 which it described internally as 

‘‘a cross-functional element of the Tax Practice that efficiently 

mines opportunities in the start-up and middle-market, highgrowth, high-tech space.’’ A presentation on this new product states 

that KPMG tax professionals are ‘‘[t]eaming with Assurance . . . 

52

150Presentation dated 3/6/00, ‘‘Post-Transaction Integration Service (PTIS)—Tax,’’ by Stan 

Wiseberg and Michele Zinn of Washington, D.C., Bates XX 001597–1611 (‘‘Global collaborative 

service brought to market by tax and assurance . . . May be appropriate to initially unbundle 

the serves (‘tax only,’ or ‘assurance only’) to capture an engagement’’). 151 Email dated 8/14/01, from Jeff Stein and Walter Duer to ‘‘KPMG LLP Partners, Managers 

and Staff,’’ ‘‘Stratecon Middle Market Initiative,’’ Bates KPMG 0050369. 152 Email dated 2/9/01, from Ty Jordan to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘SC2 revisit of 

stale leads,’’ Bates KPMG 0050814. 153Subcommittee interview of Wachovia Bank representatives (3/25/03). 

[and] fostering cross-selling among assurance and tax professionals.’’ 150

Other tax products explicitly called on KPMG tax professionals 

to ask their audit counterparts for help in identifying potential clients. For example, a ‘‘Middle Market Initiative’’ launched in 2001, 

identified seven tax products to be marketed to mid-sized corporations, including SC2. It explicitly called upon KPMG tax professionals to contact KPMG audit partners to identify appropriate 

mid-sized corporations, and directed these tax professionals to pitch 

one or more of the seven KPMG tax products to KPMG audit clients. ‘‘In order to maximize marketplace opportunities . . . national and area champions will coordinate with and involve assurance partners and managers in their respective areas.’’ 151

In addition to electronic searches, National Deployment Champions regularly exhorted KPMG field personnel to review their client lists personally to identify those that might be interested in a 

new product. In the case of SC2, deployment team members asked 

KPMG tax professionals to review their client lists, not once, but 

twice:

‘‘Attached above is a listing of all potential SC2 engagements that did not fly over the past year. In an effort to 

ensure we have not overlooked any potential engagement 

during the revenue push for the last half of [fiscal year] 

2001, please review the list which is sorted by estimated 

potential fees. I’d like to revisit each of these potential engagements, and gather comments from each of you regarding the following. . . . Would further communication/dialogue with any listed potential engagement be welcome? 

What were the reasons for the potential client’s declining 

the strategy?’’ 152

In addition to reviewing its own client base, KPMG worked with 

outside parties, such as banks, law firms, and other accounting 

firms, to identify outside client prospects. One example is the arrangement KPMG entered into with First Union National Bank, 

now part of Wachovia Bank, in which Wachovia referred clients to 

KPMG in connection with FLIP. In this case, Wachovia told 

wealthy clients about the existence of the tax product and allowed 

KPMG to set up appointments at the bank or elsewhere to make 

client presentations on FLIP.153 KPMG apparently did not pay 

Wachovia a direct referral fee for these clients, but if a client eventually agreed to purchase FLIP, a portion of the fees paid by the 

client to Quellos, a investment advisory firm handling the FLIP 

transactions, was forwarded by Quellos to Wachovia. KPMG also 

made arrangements for Wachovia client referrals related to BLIPS 

and SC2, again using First Union National Bank, but it is unclear 

whether the bank actually made any referrals for these tax prodVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:56 Dec 11, 2003 Jkt 090655 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\90655.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN
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154See, e.g., email dated 8/30/99, from Tom Newman to multiple First Union professionals, 

‘‘next strategy,’’ Bates SEN 014622 (BLIPS ‘‘[f]ees to First Union will be 50 basis points if the 

investor is not a KPMG client, 25 bps if they are a KPMG client.’’); email dated 11/30/01, from 

Councill Leak to Larry Manth, ‘‘FW: First Union Customer Services,’’ Bates KPMG 0050842–

44 (‘‘I provide my comments on how we are bringing SC2 into certain First Union customers.’’). 

Because KPMG is also Wachovia’s auditor, questions have arisen as to whether their client referral arrangements violate SEC’s auditor independence rules. See Section VI(B)(5) of this Report for more information on the auditor independence issue. 155See, e.g., email dated 1/30/01, from David Jones to Larry Manth, Richard Rosenthal, and 

Wendy Klein, ‘‘SC2—Follow-up to 1/29 Revisit,’’ Bates KPMG 0050389 (working to form accounting firm alliances). 156Memorandum dated 2/16/01, from Andrew Atkin to SC2 Marketing Group, ‘‘Agenda from 

Feb 16th call and goals for next two weeks,’’ Bates KPMG 0051135. 157See, e.g., email dated 8/14/00, from Postmaster-US to unknown recipients, ‘‘Action Required: Channel Conflict for SC2,’’ Bates KPMG 0049125 (S corporation list purchased from Dun 

& Bradstreet); memorandum dated 2/16/01, from Andrew Atkin to SC2 Marketing Group, ‘‘Agenda from Feb 16th call and goals for next two weeks,’’ Bates KPMG 0051135 (Texas S corporation 

list); email dated 3/7/01, from Councill Leak to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘South Florida 

SC2 Year End Push,’’ Bates KPMG 0050834 (Florida S corporation list); email dated 3/26/01, 

from Leonard Ronnie III, to Gary Crew, ‘‘RE: S-Corp Carolinas,’’ Bates KPMG 0050818 (North 

and South Carolina S corporation list); email dated 4/22/01, from Thomas Crawford to John 

Schrier, ‘‘RE: SC2 target list,’’ Bates KPMG 0050029 (New York S corporation list). 158 Email dated 3/6/01, from US-GoSystem Administration to Andrew Atkin of KPMG, ‘‘RE: 

Florida S corporation search,’’ Bates KPMG 0050826. Subcommittee interview of Councill Leak 

(10/22/03). 159 Email dated 11/17/00, from Jonathan Pullano to US-Southwest Tax Services Partners and 

others, ‘‘FW: SW SC2 Channel Conflict,’’ Bates KPMG 0048309. 160See, e.g., email dated 6/27/00, from Wendy Klein to Mark Springer and Larry Manth, ‘‘SC2: 

Practice Development Coordinators Involvement,’’ Bates KPMG 0049116; email dated 11/15/00, 

from Douglas Duncan to Michael Terracina and Gary Choat, ‘‘FW: SW SC2 Progress,’’ Bates 

KPMG 0048315–17. 161See email dated 4/22/01, from John Schrier to Thomas Crawford, ‘‘RE: SC2 target list,’’ 

Bates KPMG 0050029. 

ucts.154 In the case of SC2, KPMG also worked with a variety of 

other outside parties, such as mid-sized accounting firms and automobile dealers, to locate and refer potential clients.155 A large law 

firm headquartered in St. Louis expressed willingness not only to 

issue a confirming tax opinion for the SC2 transaction, but also to 

introduce KPMG ‘‘to some of their midwestern clients.’’ 156

In addition to reviewing its own client base and seeking client referrals, KPMG used a variety of other means to identify prospective 

clients. In the case of SC2, for example, as part of its marketing 

efforts, KPMG obtained lists of S corporations in the states of 

Texas, North and South Carolina, New York, and Florida.157 It obtained these lists from either state government, commercial firms, 

or its own databases. The Florida list, for example, was compiled 

using KPMG’s internal RIA-GoSystem containing confidential client data extracted from certain tax returns prepared by KPMG.158

Some of the lists had large blocks of S corporations associated with 

automobile or truck dealers, real estate firms, home builders, or architects.159 In some instances, KPMG tax professionals instructed 

KPMG telemarketers to contact the corporations to gauge interest 

in SC2.160 In other cases, KPMG tax professionals contacted the 

corporations personally. 

The lists compiled by KPMG produced literally thousands of potential SC2 clients, and through telemarketing and other calls, 

KPMG personnel made uncounted contacts across the country 

searching for buyers of SC2. In April 2001, the DPP apparently 

sent word to SC2 marketing teams to stop using telemarketing 

calls to find SC2 buyers,161 but almost as soon as the no-call policy 

was announced, some KPMG tax professionals were attempting to 

circumvent the ban asking, for example, if telemarketers could 

question S corporations about their eligibility and suitability to buy 

54

162 Email dated 4/23/01, from John Schrier to Thomas Crawford, ‘‘RE: SC2 target list,’’ Bates 

KPMG 0050029. 163 Email dated 12/20/01, from William Kelliher to David Brockway, WNT head, Bates KPMG 

0013311. A responsive email from Mr. Brockway on the same document states, ‘‘It looks like 

they have already tried over 2/3rds of possible candidates already, if I am reading the spread 

sheet correctly.’’ 164Subcommittee briefing by Jeffrey Eischeid and Timothy Speiss (9/12/03). 165Subcommittee interview of Councill Leak (10/22/03). 166 ‘‘SC2—Meeting Agenda’’ and attachments, dated 6/19/00, Bates KPMG 0013375–96.

SC2, without scheduling future telephone contacts.162 In December 

2001, after being sent a list of over 3,100 S corporations targeted 

for telephone calls, a senior KPMG tax professional sent an email 

to the head of WNT complaining that the list appeared to indicate 

‘‘the firm is intent on marketing the SC2 strategy to virtually every 

S corp with a pulse.’’ 163

When KPMG representatives were first asked about KPMG’s use 

of telemarketers, they initially told the Subcommittee staff that 

telemarketing calls were against firm policy.164 When asked about 

the Indiana cold call center which KPMG has been operating for 

years, the KPMG representatives said that the center’s telemarketers sought to introduce new clients to KPMG in a general 

way and did little more than arrange an appointment so that 

KPMG could explain to a potential client in person all of the services KPMG offers. When confronted with evidence of telemarketing 

calls for SC2, the KPMG representatives acknowledged that a few 

calls on tax products might have been made by telemarketers at 

the cold call center, but implied such calls were few in number and 

rarely led to sales. In a separate interview, when shown documents 

indicating that, in the case of SC2, KPMG telemarketers made 

calls to thousands of S corporations across the country, the KPMG 

tax professional being interviewed admitted these calls had taken 

place.165

Sales Advice. To encourage sales, KPMG would, at times, provide written advice to its tax professionals on how to answer questions about a tax product, respond to objections, or convince a client to buy a product. 

For example, in the case of SC2, KPMG sponsored a meeting for 

KPMG ‘‘SC2 Team Members’’ across the country and emailed documents providing information about the tax product as well as ‘‘Appropriate Answers for Frequently Asked Shareholder Questions’’ 

and ‘‘Suggested Solutions’’ to ‘‘Sticking Points and Problems.’’ 166

The ‘‘Sticking Points’’ document provided the following advice to 

KPMG tax professionals trying to sell SC2 to prospective clients: 

‘‘1) ‘Too Good to be true.’ Some people believe that if it 

sounds too good to be true, it’s a sham. Some suggestions 

for this response are the following:

‘‘a) This transaction has been through KPMG’s WNT 

practice and reviewed by at least 5 specialty groups. . . . 

Many of the specialists are ex-IRS employees.

‘‘b) Many sophisticated clients have implemented the 

strategy in conjunction with their outside counsel.

‘‘c) At least one outside law firm will give a co-opinion 

on the transactions. . . .

55

‘‘e) Absolutely last resort—At least 3 insurance companies have stated that they will insure the tax benefits of 

the transaction for a small premium. This should never 

be mentioned in an initial meeting and Larry Manth 

should be consulted for all insurance conversations to 

ensure consistency and independence on the transaction.

‘‘2) ‘I Need to Think About it.’ . . . We obviously do not 

want to seem too desperate but at the same time we need 

to keep this moving along. Some suggestions:

‘‘a) ‘Get Even’ Approach. Perhaps a good time to revisit 

the strategy is at or near estimated tax payment time 

when the shareholder is making or has made a large estimated tax payment and is extremely irritated for having done so. . . .

‘‘b) Beenie Baby Approach. . . . We call the client and 

say that the firm has decided to cap the strategy . . . 

and the cap is quickly filling up. ‘Should I put you on 

the list as a potential?’ This is obviously a more aggressive approach, but will tell you if the client is serious 

about the deal.

‘‘c) ‘Break-up’ Approach. This is a risky approach and 

should only be used in a limited number of cases. This 

approach entails us calling the client and conveying to 

them that they should no longer consider SC2 for a reason solely related to KPMG, such as the cap has been 

reached with respect to our city or region or . . . the demand has been so great that the firm is shutting it 

down. This approach is used as a psychological tool to 

elicit an immediate response from the client. . . .

‘‘5) John F. Brown Syndrome. This is named after an infamous attorney who could not get comfortable with anything about the strategy. We have had a number of clients 

with stubborn outside counsel with respect to the strategy 

itself, the engagement letter, or other aspects of the transaction. Here are some approaches:

‘‘a. If we . . . know he will not approve of the transaction we should tell this to the client and either walk 

or convince the client not to use the attorney or law firm 

for this deal. . . .

‘‘c. If the fee is substantial . . . the last resort is to summarize a transaction with all the possible bells and 

whistles to make the deal as risk-free as possible. For 

example: The client does SC2 with the following elements: 1) option to reacquire stock from [tax exempt organization], 2) insurance covering the tax benefits plus 

penalties . . ., and 3) outside opinion from an independent law firm. If the attorney is still uncomfortable, 

we need to convey this to the client and they can decide.’’

This document is hardly the work product of a disinterested tax 

adviser. In fact, it goes so far as to recommend that KPMG tax proVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:56 Dec 11, 2003 Jkt 090655 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\90655.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN
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167 ‘‘SC2—Meeting Agenda’’ and attachments, dated June 19, 2000, at Bates KPMG 0013394. 168 Id. Another document identified Bryan Cave, a law firm with over 600 professionals and 

offices in St. Louis, New York, and elsewhere, as willing ‘‘to issue a confirming tax opinion for 

the SC2 transaction.’’ Memorandum dated 2/16/01, from Andrew Atkin to SC2 Marketing Group, 

‘‘Agenda from Feb 16th call and goals for the next two weeks,’’ Bates KPMG 0051135. See also 

email dated 7/19/00, from Robert Coplan of Ernst & Young to ‘‘Dickensg@aol.com,’’ Bates 

2003EY011939 (‘‘As you know, we go to great lengths to line up a law firm to issue an opinion 

pursuant to a separate engagement letter from the client that is meant to make the law firm 

independent from us.’’) 169 ‘‘SC2—Appropriate Answers for Frequently Asked Shareholder Questions,’’ included in an 

SC2 information packet dated 7/19/00, Bates KPMG 0013393. 

fessionals employ such hard-sell tactics as making misleading 

statements to their clients—claims that SC2 will be sold to only a 

limited number of people or that it is no longer being sold at all 

in order to ‘‘elicit an immediate response from the client.’’ The document also depicts attorneys raising technical concerns about SC2 

as ‘‘stubborn’’ naysayers who need to be circumvented, rather than 

satisfied. In short, rather than present KPMG as a disinterested 

tax adviser, this type of sales advice is evidence of a company intent on convincing an uninterested or hesitant client to buy a product that the client would apparently be otherwise unlikely to purchase or use. 

Using Tax Opinions and Insurance as Marketing Tools.

Several documents obtained during the investigation demonstrate 

that KPMG deliberately traded on its reputation as a respected accounting firm and tax expert in selling questionable tax products 

to corporations and individuals. As described in the prior section on 

designing new tax products, the former WNT head acknowledged 

that KPMG’s ‘‘reputation will be used to market the [BLIPS] transaction. This is a given in these types of deals.’’ In the SC2 ‘‘Sticking 

Points’’ document, KPMG instructed its tax professionals to respond to client concerns about the product by pointing out that SC2 

had been reviewed and approved by five KPMG tax specialty 

groups and by specialists who are former employees of the IRS.167

KPMG also used opinion letters as a marketing tool. Tax opinion 

letters are intended to provide written advice explaining whether 

a particular tax product is permissible under the law and, if challenged by the IRS, the likelihood that the tax product would survive court scrutiny. A tax opinion letter provided by a person with 

a financial stake in the tax product being analyzed has traditionally been accorded much less deference than an opinion letter supplied by a disinterested expert. As shown in the SC2 ‘‘Sticking 

Points’’ document just cited, if a client raised concerns about purchasing the product, KPMG instructed its tax professionals to respond that, ‘‘At least one outside law firm will give a co-opinion on 

the transactions.’’ 168 In another SC2 document, KPMG advises its 

tax professionals to tell clients worried about IRS penalties: ‘‘The 

opinion letters that we issue should get you out of any penalties. 

However, the Service could try to argue that KPMG is the promoter of the strategy and therefore the opinions are biased and try 

and assert penalties. We believe there is very low risk of this result. If you desire additional assurance, there is at least one outside law firm in NYC that will issue a co-opinion. The cost ranges 

between $25k–$40k.’’ 169

KPMG was apparently so convinced that an outside legal opinion 

increased the marketability of its tax products, that in the case of 

57

170 ‘‘Declaration of Richard E. Bosch,’’ IRS Revenue Agent, In re John Doe Summons to Sidley 

Austin Brown & Wood (N.D. Ill. 10/16/03) at ¶ 18, citing an email dated 10/1/97, from Gregg 

Ritchie to Randall Hamilton. (Capitalizations in original omitted.) 171 ‘‘SC2—Meeting Agenda’’ and attachments, dated June 19, 2000, Bates KPMG 0013375–96. 172See, e.g., Subcommittee interview of Lawrence Manth (11/6/03). 173 Id. 174 Email dated 2/9/01, from Ty Jordan to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘SC2 revisit of 

stale leads,’’ Bates KPMG 0050814. 175Subcommittee briefing by Jeffrey Eischeid (9/12/03); Subcommittee interview of Jeffrey 

Stein (10/31/03). 

FLIP, it agreed to pay Sidley Austin Brown & Wood a fee in any 

sale where a prospective buyer was told that the law firm would 

provide a favorable tax opinion letter, regardless of whether the 

opinion was actually provided. A KPMG tax professional explained 

in an email: ‘‘Our deal with Brown and Wood is that if their name 

is used in selling the strategy they will get a fee. We have decided 

as a firm that B&W opinion should be given in all deals.’’ 170 This 

guaranteed fee arrangement also provided an incentive for Sidley 

Austin Brown & Wood to refer clients to KPMG. 

On occasion, KPMG also used insurance as a marketing tool to 

convince reluctant buyers to purchase a KPMG tax product. In the 

case of SC2, the ‘‘Sticking Points’’ document advised KPMG tax 

professionals to tell clients about the existence of an insurance policy that, for a ‘‘small premium,’’ could guarantee SC2’s promised 

‘‘tax benefits’’:

‘‘At least 3 insurance companies have stated that they will 

insure the tax benefits of the transaction for a small premium. This should never be mentioned in an initial meeting and Larry Manth should be consulted for all insurance 

conversations to ensure consistency and independence on 

the transaction.’’ 171

According to KPMG tax professionals interviewed by Subcommittee staff, the insurance companies offering this insurance 

included AIG and Hartford.172 KPMG apparently possessed sample 

insurance policies that promised to reimburse the policy holder for 

a range of items, including penalties or fines assessed by the IRS 

for using SC2, essentially insuring the policy holder against being 

penalized for tax evasion.173 Once these policies were available, 

KPMG tax professionals were asked to re-visit potential clients 

who had declined the tax product and try again: 

‘‘Attached above is a listing of all potential SC2 engagements that did not fly over the past year. . . . We now 

have a number of Insurance companies which would like 

to underwrite the tax risk inherent in the transaction. We 

may want to revisit those potential clients that declined 

because of audit risk.’’ 174

Evidence obtained by the Subcommittee indicates that at least half 

a dozen SC2 purchasers also purchased SC2 insurance. 

Tracking Sales and Revenue. KPMG repeatedly told the Subcommittee staff that it did not have the technical capability to 

track the sales or revenues associated with particular tax products.175 However, evidence gathered by the Subcommittee indicates 

that KPMG could and did obtain specific revenue tracking information. 

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176 Internal KPMG presentation, dated 6/18/01, by Andrew Atkin and Bob Huber, entitled ‘‘SCorporation Charitable Contribution Strategy (SC2) Update,’’ Bates XX 001553. 177 Another document provided to the Subcommittee by parties other than KPMG carefully 

traces the increase in the Tax Services Practice’s ‘‘gross revenue.’’ It shows a ‘‘45.5% Cumulative 

Growth’’ in gross revenue over a 4-year period, with $829 million in FY98, $1.001 million in 

FY99, $1.184 million in FY00, and $1.239 million in FY01. See chart entitled, ‘‘Tax Practice 

Growth Gross Revenue,’’ included in a presentation dated 7/19/01, entitled, ‘‘Innovative Tax Solutions,’’ by Marsha Peters of Washington National Tax, Bates XX 001340. 178 Email dated 8/6/00 from Jeffrey Stein to15 National Deployment Champions, Bates KPMG 

050016. 179 Internal KPMG presentation, dated 5/30/01, by the Tax Innovation Center, entitled ‘‘Tax 

Innovation Center Solution and Idea Development—Year-End Results,’’ Bates XX 001490–1502. 

The Subcommittee learned, for example, that once a tax product 

was sold to a client and the client signed an engagement letter, 

KPMG assigned the transaction an ‘‘engagement number,’’ and recorded in an electronic database all revenues resulting from that 

engagement. This engagement data could then be searched and 

manipulated to provide revenue information and totals for individual tax products. 

Specific evidence that revenue information was collected for tax 

products was obtained by the Subcommittee during the investigation from parties other than KPMG. For example, an SC2 ‘‘update’’ 

prepared in mid-2001, includes detailed revenue information, including total nationwide revenues produced by the tax product 

since it was launched, total nationwide revenues produced during 

the 2001 fiscal year, and FY01 revenues broken down by each of 

six regions in the United States: 176

‘‘Revenue since solution was launched: 

$20,700,000

‘‘Revenue this fiscal year only: 

$10,700,000

‘‘Revenue by Region this Fiscal Year

* West $7,250,000

* Southeast $1,300,000

* Southwest $850,000

* Mid-Atlantic $550,000

* Midwest $425,000

* Northeast $300,000

KPMG never produced this document to the Subcommittee.177

However, one email related to SC2 that KPMG did produce states 

that monthly OMS ‘‘tracking reports’’ were used to measure sales 

results for specific tax products, and these reports were regularly 

shared with National Deployment Champions, Tax Service Line 

leaders, and Area Managing Partners.178

Moreover, KPMG’s Tax Innovation Center reported in 2001, that 

it had developed new software that ‘‘captured solution development 

costs and revenue’’ and that it had begun ‘‘[p]repar[ing] quarterly 

Solution Profitability reports.’’ 179 This information suggests that 

KPMG was refining its revenue tracking capabilities to be able to 

track not only gross revenues produced by a tax product, but also 

net revenues, and that it had begun collecting and monitoring this 

information on a regular basis. KPMG’s statement, ‘‘the firm does 

not maintain any systematic, reliable method of recording revenues 

59

180Letter from KPMG to Subcommittee, dated 4/22/03, attached one-page chart entitled, ‘‘Good 

Faith Estimate of Top Revenue-Generating Strategies,’’ n.1. 181 Email dated 8/14/01, from Jeff Stein and Walter Duer to ‘‘KPMG LLP Partners, Managers 

and Staff,’’ ‘‘Stratecon Middle Market Initiative,’’ Bates KPMG 0050369.

by tax product on a national basis,’’ 180 was contradicted by the evidence. 

No Industry Slow-Down. Some members of the U.S. tax profession have asserted that professional firms are beginning to turn 

away from marketing illegal tax shelters, so there is no need for 

investigations, reforms, or stronger laws in this area. KPMG has 

claimed that it is no longer marketing aggressive tax products designed to be sold to multiple clients. The Subcommittee investigation, however, found that, while a few professional firms have reduced or stopped selling generic tax products in the last 2 years, 

KPMG and other professional firms appear to be committed to continuing and deepening their efforts to develop and market generic, 

potentially abusive, tax products to multiple clients. 

Evidence of KPMG’s commitment to ongoing tax product sales 

appears throughout this Report. For example, KPMG provided the 

Subcommittee with a 2003 list of more than 500 ‘‘active tax products’’ it intends to offer to multiple clients for a fee. Just last year, 

in 2002, KPMG established a ‘‘Sales Opportunity Center’’ which the 

firm itself has characterized as ‘‘a powerful demonstration of the 

Firm’s commitment to giving’’ KPMG professionals ready access to 

marketing tools to sell products and services to multiple clients. 

Also in 2002, the Tax Innovation Center helped develop new software to enable KPMG to track tax product development costs and 

net revenues, and issue quarterly tax product profitability reports. 

In 2003, KPMG’s telemarketing center in Indiana continued to be 

staffed and ready for tax product marketing assistance. 

Evidence of marketing campaigns shows KPMG sought to expand 

its tax product sales by targeting new market segments. In August 

2001, for example, KPMG launched a ‘‘Middle Market Initiative’’ to 

increase its tax product sales to mid-sized corporations:

‘‘Consistent with several other firm initiatives . . . we are 

launching a major initiative in Tax to focus certain of our 

resources on the Middle Market. A major step in this initiative is driving certain Stratecon high-end solutions to 

these companies . . . through a structured, proactive program. . . . National and area champions of this initiative 

will meet with leadership . . . to discuss solutions, agree 

on appropriate targets, and develop an area strategy. . . . 

In order to maximize marketplace opportunities . . . national and area champions will coordinate with and involve 

assurance partners and managers in their respective 

areas. . . . [C]hampions will also coordinate with the tax 

practice’s proposed strategic alliance with mid-tier accounting firms. The goal for Stratecon is to close and implement engagements totaling $15 M in revenues over the 

next 15 month period (FY ending 9/02).’’ 181

The Middle Market Initiative identified seven KPMG tax products 

to be marketed to mid-sized corporations, including SC2. It explicitly called upon KPMG tax professionals to contact KPMG audit 

60

182Subcommittee interview of Jeffrey Stein (10/31/03). 183 Email dated 12/12/01, from Dale Affonso to ‘‘Tax Personnel—LA & PSW,’’ Bates XX 001733. 184KPMG chart entitled, ‘‘Good Faith Estimate of Top Revenue-Generating Strategies,’’ attached to letter dated 4/22/03, from KPMG’s legal counsel to the Subcommittee, Bates KPMG 

0001801. 185 Id. 186KPMG chart entitled ‘‘StrateconWest/FSG Solutions and Solution WIP—As of January 1, 

2002,’’ Bates XX 001009–25. 187 Id. at 2. 188 Id. at 2 and 4. 189See undated document provided by KPMG to the Subcommittee on 2/10/03, ‘‘describing all 

active tax products included in Tax Products Alerts, Tax Solutions Alerts and Tax Service 

Ideas,’’ Bates KPMG 0000089–90. 

partners to identify appropriate mid-sized corporations, and then to 

pitch one or more of the seven KPMG tax products to KPMG audit 

clients. It is the Subcommittee staff’s understanding that this marketing campaign is ongoing and successfully increasing KPMG tax 

product sales to mid-sized corporations across the United States.182

In December 2001, KPMG held a ‘‘FY02 Tax Strategy Meeting,’’ 

to discuss ‘‘taking market leadership’’ in 2002. One email described 

the meeting as follows:

‘‘Thank you for attending the FY02 Tax Strategy Meeting. 

It’s now time to take action. As you enter the marketplace 

armed with the knowledge of ‘Taking Market Leadership,’ 

please remember to share your thoughts and experiences 

with us so we can better leverage the three key market pillars—Market Share, Client Centricity, and Market-Driven 

Solutions. . . .

‘‘[W]e want to hear more about:

* Teaming with Assurance; . . . 

* How clients are responding to our services and solutions; 

* Ideas for new services and solutions; and 

* Best practices.’’ 183

Additional evidence of KPMG’s continued involvement in the 

marketing of generic tax products comes from the chart prepared 

by KPMG, at the Subcommittee’s request, listing its top ten revenue producing tax products in 2000, 2001, and 2002.184 The list 

of ten tax products for 2002 includes, among others, the ‘‘Tax-Efficient Minority Preferred Equity Sale Transaction’’ (TEMPEST) and 

the ‘‘Optional Tax-Deductible Hybrid Equity while Limiting Local 

Obligation’’ (OTHELLO).185 Another KPMG chart, listing 

Strat econ’s tax products as of January 1, 2002, describes TEMPEST as a product that ‘‘creates capital loss,’’ 186 while OTHELLO 

‘‘[c]reates a basis step-up in built-in gain asset and potential for 

double benefit of built-in losses.’’ 187 The minimum fee KPMG intends to charge clients for each of these products, TEMPEST and 

OTHELLO, is $1 million.188 KPMG has also indicated that each of 

the tax products listed on the Stratecon chart remained an ‘‘active 

tax product’’ as of February 10, 2003.189

A final example of evidence of KPMG’s ongoing commitment to 

selling generic tax products is a draft business plan for fiscal year 

2002, prepared for the Personal Financial Planning (PFP) tax pracVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:56 Dec 11, 2003 Jkt 090655 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\90655.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN
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190Document dated 5/18/01, ‘‘PFP Practice Reorganization Innovative Strategies Business 

Plan—DRAFT,’’ Bates KPMG 0050620–23, at 1. This document was authored by Jeffrey 

Eischeid, according to Mr. Eischeid. Subcommittee interview of Jeffrey Eischeid (11/3/03). 191 Id. at 3. 192 Id. But see minutes dated 11/30/00, Monetization Solutions Task Force Teleconference, 

Bates KPMG 0050624–29, at 50627 (advocating KPMG design and implementation of ‘‘sophisticated entity structures that have elements of both financial product technology and tax technology,’’ including ‘‘monetization solutions that have been traditionally offered by the investment 

banks’’ such as ‘‘prepaid forwards, puts and calls, short sales, synthetic OID conveyances, and 

other derivative structures.’’) 193Document dated 5/18/01, ‘‘PFP Practice Reorganization Innovative Strategies Business 

Plan—DRAFT,’’ Bates KPMG 0050620–23, at 2.

tice’s Innovative Strategies (IS) group.190 This business plan indicates that, while the IS group’s marketing efforts had decreased 

after IRS issuance of new tax shelter notices, it had done all the 

preparatory work needed to resume vigorous marketing of new, potentially abusive tax shelters in 2002. The IS business plan first recounts the group’s past work on FLIP, OPIS, and BLIPS, noting 

that the millions of dollars in revenue produced from sales of these 

tax products had enabled IS to exceed its annual revenue goals in 

each year from 1998 until 2000. The business plan then states: 

‘‘The fiscal [2001] IS revenue goal was $38 million and the 

practice has delivered $16 million through period 10. The 

shortfall from plan is primarily attributable to the August 

2000 issuance [by the IRS] of Notice 2000–44. This Notice 

specifically described both the retired BLIPS strategy and 

the then current [replacement, the Short Option Strategy 

or] SOS strategy. Accordingly, we made the business decisions to stop the implementation of ‘sold’ SOS transactions 

and to stay out of the ‘loss generator’ business for an appropriate period of time.’’

The business plan then identified six tax products which had 

been approved for sale or were awaiting approval, and which were 

‘‘expected to generate $27 million of revenue in fiscal ’02.’’ 191 Two 

of these strategies, called ‘‘Leveraged Private Split Dollar’’ and 

‘‘Monetization Tax Advisory Services,’’ were not explained, but were 

projected to generate $5 million in 2002 fees each.192 Another tax 

product, under development and projected to generate $12 million 

in 2002 fees, is described as: 

‘‘a gain mitigation solution, POPS. Judging from the 

Firm’s historic success in generating revenue from this 

type of solution, a significant market opportunity obviously 

exists. We have completed the solution’s technical review 

and have almost finalized the rationale for not registering 

POPS as a tax shelter.’’ 193

Still another tax product, under development and projected to generate $5 million in 2002 fees, is described as a ‘‘conversion transaction . . . that halves the taxpayer’s effective tax rate by effectively converting ordinary income to long term capital gain. . . . 

The most significant open issue is tax shelter registration and the 

impact registration will have on the solution.’’ The business plan 

estimates that, if the projected sales occur, ‘‘the planned revenue 

per [IS] partner would be $3 million and the planned contribution 

per partner would equal or exceed $1.5 million.’’ 

The business plan provides this analysis:

62

194 Id. at 2.

‘‘[T]here has been a significant increase in the regulation 

of ‘tax shelters.’ Not only is this regulatory activity dampening market appetite, it is changing the structural nature 

of the underlying strategies. Specifically, taxpayers are 

having to put more money at risk for a longer period of 

time in order to improve the business purpose economic 

substance arguments. All things considered, it is more difficult today to close tax advantaged transactions. Nevertheless, we believe that the Innovative Strategies practice 

is a sustainable business opportunity with significant 

growth opportunity.’’ 194

This and other evidence obtained by the Subcommittee during the 

past year indicate an ongoing, internal effort within KPMG to continue the development and sale of generic tax products to multiple 

clients. 

(3) Implementing Tax Products 

(a) KPMG’s Implementation Role 

Finding: KPMG is actively involved in implementing the tax shelters which it sells to its clients, including by enlisting participation from 

banks, investment advisory firms, and tax exempt 

organizations; preparing transactional documents; 

arranging purported loans; issuing and arranging 

opinion letters; providing administrative services; 

and preparing tax returns.

In many cases, KPMG’s involvement with a tax product sold to 

a client does not end with the sale itself. Many KPMG tax products, including the four examined by the Subcommittee, require the 

purchaser to carry out complex financial and investment activities 

in order to realize promised tax benefits. KPMG typically provided 

such clients with significant implementation assistance to ensure 

they realized the promised tax benefits on their tax returns. KPMG 

was also interested in successful implementation of its tax products, because the track record that built up over time for a particular product affected how KPMG could, in good faith, characterize that product to new clients. Implementation problems have 

also, at times, caused KPMG to adjust how a tax product is structured and even spurred development of a new product. 

Executing FLIP, OPIS, and BLIPS. FLIP, OPIS, and BLIPS 

required the purchaser to establish a shell corporation, join a partnership, obtain a multi-million dollar loan, and engage in a series 

of complex financial and investment transactions that had to be 

carried out in a certain order and in a certain way to realize tax 

benefits. The evidence collected by the Subcommittee shows that 

KPMG was heavily involved in making sure the client transactions 

were completed properly. 

As a first step, KPMG enlisted the participation of professional 

organizations to help design its products and carry them out. In 

the case of FLIP, which was the first of the four tax products to 

be developed, KPMG sought the assistance of investment experts 

63

195Quellos was then known and doing business as Quadra Capital Management LLP or QA 

Investments, LLC. 196KPMG actually did business with First Union National Bank, which subsequently merged 

with Wachovia Bank. 197Subcommittee interview of First Union National Bank representatives (3/25/03). 198KPMG actually worked with Brown & Wood, a large New York law firm which subsequently merged with Sidley & Austin. 199The two former KPMG tax professionals are John Larson and Robert Pfaff. They also 

formed numerous other companies, many of them shells, to participate in business dealings including, in some cases, OPIS and BLIPS transactions. These related companies include Presidio 

Advisors, Presidio Growth, Presidio Resources, Presidio Volatility Management, Presidio Financial Group, Hayes Street Management, Holland Park, Prevad, Inc., and Norwood Holdings (collectively referred to as ‘‘Presidio’’). 200Subcommittee interview of John Larson (10/21/03); email dated 7/29/97, from Larry DeLap 

to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘Revised Memorandum,’’ Bates KPMG JAC 331160, forwarding memorandum dated 7/29/97, from Bob Pfaff to John Lanning, Jeff Stein and others, 

‘‘My Thoughts Concerning KPMG’s Tax Advantaged Transaction Practice, Presidio’s Relationship with KPMG, Transition Issues.’’

at a small firm called Quellos to design the complex series of financial transactions called for by the product.195 Quellos, using contacts it had established in other business dealings, helped KPMG 

convince a major bank, UBS AG, to provide financing and participate in the FLIP transactions. Quellos worked with UBS to finetune the financial transactions, helped KPMG make client presentations about FLIP and, for those who purchased the product, 

helped complete the paperwork and transactions, using Quellos securities brokers. KPMG also enlisted help from Wachovia Bank, 

convincing the bank to refer bank clients who might be interested 

in the FLIP tax product.196 In some cases, the bank permitted 

KPMG and Quellos to make FLIP presentations to its clients in the 

bank’s offices.197 KPMG also enlisted Sidley Austin Brown & Wood 

to issue a favorable legal opinion letter on the FLIP tax product.198

In the case of OPIS and BLIPS, KPMG, again, enlisted the help 

of Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, but used a different investment 

advisory firm. Instead of Quellos, KPMG obtained investment advice from Presidio Advisory Services. Presidio was formed in 1997, 

by two former KPMG tax professionals, one of whom was a key 

participant in the development and marketing of FLIP.199 These 

two tax professionals left the accounting firm, because they wanted 

to focus on the investment side of the generic tax products being 

developed by KPMG.200 Unlike Quellos, which had substantial investment projects aside from FLIP, virtually all of Presidio’s work 

over the following 5 years derived from KPMG tax products. Presidio’s principals worked closely with KPMG tax professionals to 

design OPIS and BLIPS. Presidio’s principals also helped KPMG 

obtain lending and securities services from three major banks, 

Deutsche Bank, HVB, and NatWest, to complete OPIS and BLIPS 

transactions. 

In addition to enlisting the participation of legal, investment, 

and financial professionals, KPMG provided significant administrative support for the FLIP, OPIS, and BLIPS transactions, using 

KPMG personnel to help draft and prepare transactional documents, and assist the investment advisory firms and the banks 

with paperwork. For example, when a number of loans were due 

to be closed in certain BLIPS transactions, two KPMG staffers 

were stationed at HVB to assist the bank with closing and booking 

64

201 Credit Request dated 9/26/99, Bates HVB 001166; Subcommittee interview of HVB representatives (10/29/03). 202Subcommittee interview of Jeffrey Eischeid (10/8/03). 203See, e.g., memorandum dated 8/5/98, from Doug Ammerman to ‘‘PFP Partners,’’ ‘‘OPIS and 

Other Innovative Strategies,’’ Bates KPMG 0026141–43 at 2; email dated 5/13/99, sent by Barbara Mcconnachie but attributed to Doug Ammerman, to John Lanning and other KPMG tax 

professionals, ‘‘FW: BLIPS,’’ Bates KPMG 0011903 (‘‘Jeff Eischeid will be attending a meeting 

. . . to address the issue of expanding capacity at Deutsche Bank given our expectation regarding the substantial volume expected from this product.’’) It is unclear whether this meeting actually took place. 204 Attachment entitled, ‘‘Tax Exempt Organizations,’’ included in an SC2 information packet 

dated 7/19/00, ‘‘SC2—Meeting Agenda,’’ Bates KPMG 0013387.

issues.201 Other KPMG employees were assigned to Presidio to assist in expediting BLIPS transactions and paperwork. KPMG also 

worked with Quellos, Presidio, and the relevant banks to ensure 

that the banks established large enough credit lines, with hundreds 

of millions of dollars, to allow a substantial number of individuals 

to carry out FLIP, OPIS, and BLIPS transactions. 

When asked about KPMG’s communications with the banks, the 

OPIS and BLIPS National Deployment Champion initially denied 

ever contacting bank personnel directly, claiming instead to have 

relied on Quellos and Presidio personnel to work directly with the 

bank personnel.202 When confronted with documentary evidence of 

direct contacts, however, the Deployment Champion reluctantly admitted communicating on rare occasions with bank personnel. Evidence obtained by the Subcommittee, however, shows that KPMG 

communications with bank personnel were not rare. KPMG negotiated intensively with the banks over the factual representations 

that would be attributed to the banks in the KPMG opinion letters. 

On occasion, KPMG stationed its personnel at the banks to facilitate transactions and paperwork. The BLIPS National Deployment 

Champion met with NatWest personnel regarding the BLIPS 

transactions. In one instance in 2000, documents indicate that, 

when clients had exhausted the available credit at Deutsche Bank 

to conduct OPIS transactions, the Deployment Champion planned 

to meet with senior Deutsche Bank officials about increasing the 

credit lines so that more OPIS products could be sold.203

Executing SC2. In the case of SC2, the tax product could not 

be executed at all without a charitable organization willing to participate in the required transactions. KPMG took on the task of locating and convincing appropriate charities to participate in SC2 

transactions. The difficulty of this task was evident in several 

KPMG documents. For example, one SC2 document warned KPMG 

personnel not to look for a specific charity to participate in a specific SC2 transaction until after an engagement letter was signed 

with a client because: ‘‘It is difficult to find qualifying tax exempts. 

. . . [O]f those that qualify only a few end up being interested and 

only a few of those will accept donations. . . . We need to be able 

to go to the tax-exempt with what we are going to give them to get 

them interested.’’ 204 In another email, the SC2 National Deployment Champion wrote: 

‘‘Currently we have five or six tax exempts that have reviewed the transaction, are comfortable they are not subject to UBIT [unrelated business income tax] and are eager 

to receive gifts of S Corp stock. These organizations are 

well established, solid organizations, but generally aren’t 

65

205 Email dated 2/22/01, from Councill Leak to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘SC2 Solution—New Development,’’ Bates KPMG 0050822. 206Subcommittee interviews with Los Angeles Department of Fire & Police Pension System 

(10/22/03) and the Austin Fire Relief and Retirement Fund (10/14/03). 207 Id. 208 ‘‘SC2 Implementation Process,’’ included in an SC2 information packet dated 7/19/00, Bates 

KPMG 0013385–86. 209Subcommittee interview of Lawrence Manth (11/6/03). 210Subcommittee interview of William Stefka, Austin Fire Relief and Retirement Fund (10/

14/03). 

organizations our clients and targets have made gifts to in 

the past. This point hit painfully home when, just before 

signing our engagement letter for an SC2 transaction with 

a $3 million fee, an Atlanta target got cold feet.’’ 205

KPMG refused to identify to the Subcommittee any of the charities it contacted about SC2 or any of the handful of charities that 

actually participated in SC2 stock donations, claiming this was ‘‘tax 

return information’’ that it could not disclose. The Subcommittee 

was nevertheless able to identify and interview two charitable organizations which, between them, participated in more than half of 

the 58 SC2 transactions KPMG arranged.206

Both charities interviewed by Subcommittee staff indicated that 

they first learned of SC2 when contacted by KPMG personnel. Both 

used the same phrase, that KPMG had contacted them ‘‘out of the 

blue.’’ 207 Both charities indicated that KPMG personnel explained 

SC2 to them, convinced them to participate, introduced the potential SC2 donors to the charity, and supplied draft transactional documents. Both charities indicated that, with KPMG acting as a liaison, they then accepted S corporation stock donations from out-ofstate residents whom they never met and with whom they had 

never had any prior contact. 

KPMG also distributed to its personnel a document entitled, 

‘‘SC2 Implementation Process,’’ listing a host of implementation 

tasks they should complete in each transaction. These tasks included technical, administrative, and logistical chores. For example, KPMG personnel were told they should evaluate the S corporation’s ownership structure and incorporation documentation; work 

with an outside valuation firm to determine the corporation’s enterprise value and the value of the corporate stock and warrants; and 

physically deliver the appropriate stock certificates to the charity 

accepting the client’s stock donation.208

Both charities said that KPMG often acted as a go-between for 

the charity and the corporate donor, shuttling documents back and 

forth and answering inquiries on both sides. KPMG apparently also 

drafted and supplied draft transactional documents to the S corporations and corporate owners.209 One of the pension funds informed the Subcommittee staff that, when one corporate donor 

needed to re-take possession of the corporate stock due to an unrelated business opportunity that required use of the stock, KPMG 

assisted in the mechanics of selling the stock back to the donor.210

The documentation shows that KPMG tax professionals also expended significant effort developing a ‘‘back-end deal’’ for SC2 donors, meaning a tax transaction that could be used by the S corporation owner to further reduce or eliminate their tax liability 

when they retake control of the S corporation and distribute some 

66

211 Email dated 12/27/01, from Larry Manth to Andrew Atkin and other KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘SC2,’’ Bates KPMG 0048773. See also email dated 8/18/01, from Larry Manth to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘RE: New Solutions—WNT,’’ Bates KPMG 0026894.

or all of the income that built up within the company while the 

charity was a shareholder. The SC2 National Deployment Champion wrote to more than 20 of his colleagues working on SC2 the 

following:

‘‘Our estimate is that by 12/31/02, there will be approximately $1 billion of income generated by S-corps that have 

implemented this strategy, and our goal is to maintain the 

confidentiality of the strategy for as long as possible to 

protect these clients (and new clients). . . .

‘‘We have had our first redemption from the LAPD. Particular thanks to [a KPMG tax professional] and his outstanding relationship with the LAPD fund administrators, 

the redemption went smooth. [Three KPMG tax professionals] all worked together on structuring the back-end 

deal allowing for the shareholder to recognize a significant 

benefit, as well as getting KPMG a fee of approx. $1 million, double the original SC2 fee!!

‘‘[Another KPMG tax professional] is in the process of 

working on a back-end solution to be approved by WNT 

that will provide S-corp shareholders additional basis in 

their stock which will allow for the cash build-up inside of 

the S-corporation to be distributed tax-free to the shareholders. This should provide us with an additional revenue 

stream and a captive audience. Our estimate is that if 50% 

of the SC2 clients implement the back-end solution, potential fees will approximate $25 million.’’ 211

This email communication shows that the key KPMG tax professionals involved with SC2 viewed the strategy as a way to defer 

and reduce taxes on substantial corporate income that was always 

intended to be returned to the control of the stock donor. It also 

shows that KPMG’s implementation efforts on SC2 continued long 

past the sale of the tax product to a client. 

Preparing KPMG Opinion Letters. In addition to helping clients complete the transactions called for in FLIP, OPIS, BLIPS, 

and SC2, when it came time for clients to submit tax returns at 

the end of the year or in subsequent years, KPMG was available 

to help its clients prepare their returns. In addition, whether a client’s tax return was prepared by KPMG or someone else, KPMG 

supplied the client with a tax opinion letter explaining the tax benefits that the product provided and could be reflected in the client’s 

tax return. In three of the cases examined by the Subcommittee, 

KPMG also arranged for its clients to obtain a second favorable 

opinion letter from an outside law firm. In the fourth case, SC2, 

KPMG knew of law firms willing to issue a second opinion letter, 

but it is unclear whether any were actually issued. 

A tax opinion letter, sometimes called a legal opinion letter when 

issued by a law firm, is intended to provide written advice to a client on whether a particular tax product is permissible under the 

law and, if challenged by the IRS, how likely it would be that the 

67

212Treas. Reg. § 1.6664–4(c)(1)(ii). 213Prototype BLIPS tax opinion letter prepared by KPMG, (12/31/99), Bates KPMG 0000405–

417, at 1. 

challenged product would survive court scrutiny. The Subcommittee investigation uncovered disturbing evidence related to 

how opinion letters were being developed and used in connection 

with KPMG’s tax products. 

The first issue involves the accuracy and reliability of the factual 

representations that were included in the opinion letters supporting KPMG’s tax products. In the four case histories, KPMG tax 

professionals expended extensive effort drafting a prototype tax 

opinion letter to serve as a template for the opinion letters actually 

sent by KPMG to its clients. One key step in the drafting process 

was the drafting of factual representations attributed to parties 

participating in the relevant transactions. Such factual representations play a critical role in the opinion letter by laying a factual 

foundation for its analysis and conclusions. Treasury regulations 

state:

‘‘The advice [in an opinion letter] must not be based on unreasonable factual or legal assumptions (including assumptions as to future events) and must not unreasonably rely 

on the representations, statements, findings, or agreements of the taxpayer or any other person. For example, 

the advice must not be based upon a representation or assumption which the taxpayer knows, or has reason to 

know, is unlikely to be true, such as an inaccurate representation or assumption as to the taxpayer’s purposes 

for entering into a transaction or for structuring a transaction in a particular manner.’’ 212

KPMG stated in its opinion letters that its analysis relied on the 

factual representations provided by the client and other key parties. In the BLIPS prototype tax opinion, for example, KPMG stated that its ‘‘opinion and supporting analysis are based upon the following description of the facts and representations associated with 

the investment transactions undertaken by Investor.’’ 213 The Subcommittee was told that Sidley Austin Brown & Wood relied on the 

same factual representations to compose the legal opinion letters 

that it drafted. 

Virtually all of the FLIP, OPIS, and BLIPS opinion letters contained boilerplate repetitions of the factual representations attributed to the participating parties. For example, virtually all the 

KPMG FLIP clients made the same factual representations, worded 

in the same way. The same was true for KPMG’s OPIS clients and 

for KPMG’s BLIPS clients. Each of the banks that participated in 

BLIPS made factual representations that varied slightly from bank 

to bank, but did not vary at all for a particular bank. In other 

words, Deutsche Bank and HVB attested to slightly different 

versions of the factual representations attributed to the bank participating in the BLIPS transactions, but every BLIPS opinion letter that, for example, referred to Deutsche Bank, contained the 

exact same boilerplate language to which Deutsche Bank had 

agreed to attest. 

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214See, e.g., email dated 3/27/00, from Jeffrey Eischeid to Richard Smith, ‘‘Bank representation,’’ and email dated 3/28/00, from Jeffrey Eischeid to Mark Watson, ‘‘Bank representation,’’ 

Bates KPMG 0025753 (depicting negotiations between KPMG and Deutsche Bank over factual 

representations to be included in opinion letter). 215Jacoboni v. KPMG, Case No. 6:02–CV–510 (M.D. Fla. 4/29/02) Complaint at ¶¶ 16–17 (‘‘[I]t 

seemed ridiculous to ask Mr. Jacoboni to sign the Representation Letter, which neither he [Mr. 

Jacoboni’s legal counsel] nor Mr. Jacoboni understood. Moreover, Mr. Jacoboni had no personal 

knowledge of the factual representations in the letter and could not verify the facts as KPMG 

requested.’’ Emphasis in original.); Subcommittee interview of Mr. Jacoboni’s legal counsel (4/

4/03). 216 Id. at ¶¶ 18–19. Mr. Jacaboni also alleges that, despite finally signing the letter, he never 

received the promised tax opinion letter from KPMG. 217Prototype BLIPS tax opinion letter prepared by KPMG, (12/31/99), Bates KPMG 0000405–

417, at 9. 

The evidence is clear that KPMG took the lead in drafting the 

factual representations attributed to other parties, including the 

client or ‘‘investor’’ who purchased the tax product, the investment 

advisory firm that participated in the transactions, and the bank 

that provided the financing. In the case of the factual representations attributed to the investment advisory firm or bank, the evidence indicates that KPMG presented its draft language to the relevant party and then engaged in detailed negotiations over the 

final wording.214 In the case of the factual representations attributed to a client, however, the evidence indicates KPMG did not 

consult with its client beforehand, even for representations purporting to describe, in a factual way, the client’s intentions, motivations, or understanding of the tax product. KPMG alone, apparently without any client input, wrote the client’s representations 

and then demanded that each client attest to them by returning a 

signed letter to the accounting firm. 

The evidence indicates that KPMG not only failed to consult with 

its clients before attributing factual representations to them, it also 

refused to allow its clients to deviate from the KPMG-drafted representations, even when clients disagreed with the statements 

being attributed to them. For example, according to a court complaint filed by one KPMG client, Joseph Jacoboni, he initially refused to attest to the factual representations sent to him by KPMG 

about a FLIP transaction, because he had no first hand knowledge 

of the ‘‘facts’’ and did not understand the FLIP transaction.215 According to Mr. Jacoboni, KPMG would not alter the client representations in any way and would not supply him with any opinion letter until he attested to the specific factual representations attributed to him by KPMG. After a standoff lasting nearly 2 months, 

with the deadline for his tax return fast approaching, Mr. Jacoboni 

finally signed the representation letter attesting to the statements 

KPMG had drafted.216

Equally disturbing is that some of the key factual representations KPMG attributed to its clients appear to contain false or misleading statements. For example, in the BLIPS prototype letter, 

KPMG wrote: ‘‘Investor has represented to KPMG . . . [that the] 

Investor independently reviewed the economics underlying the 

[BLIPS] Investment Fund before entering into the program and believed there was a reasonable opportunity to earn a reasonable pretax profit from the transactions.’’ 217 The existence of a client profit 

motive and the existence of a reasonable opportunity to earn a reasonable pre-tax profit are central factors in determining whether a 

tax product like BLIPS has a business purpose and economic subVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:56 Dec 11, 2003 Jkt 090655 PO 00000 Frm 00072 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\90655.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN
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218See email dated 5/4/99, from Mark Watson, WNT, to Larry DeLap, DPP, Bates KPMG 

0011916 (Quoting Presidio investment experts who set up the BLIPS transactions, KPMG tax 

expert states: ‘‘the probability of actually making a profit from this transaction is remote (possible, but remote).’’). 219KPMG required the investment advisory firm, Presidio, to make this same factual representation, even though Presidio had informed KPMG personnel that ‘‘the probability of actually making a profit from this transaction is remote (possible, but remote).’’ The evidence indicates that both KPMG and Presidio knew there was only a remote possibility—not a reasonable 

possibility—of a client’s earning a profit in the BLIPS transaction, yet both continued to issue 

and stand behind an opinion letter attesting to what both knew was an inaccurate factual representation. 220 Email dated 4/14/99, from Larry DeLap to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘RE: BLIPS,’’ 

Bates KPMG 0017578–79. 

stance apart from its tax benefits. It is the Subcommittee’s understanding that this client representation was repeated substantially 

verbatim in every BLIPS tax opinion letter KPMG issued. 

The first stumbling block is the notion that every client who purchased BLIPS ‘‘independently’’ reviewed its ‘‘economics’’ beforehand, and ‘‘believed’’ there was a reasonable opportunity to make 

a reasonable profit. BLIPS was an enormously complicated transaction, with layers of structured finance, a complex loan, and intricate foreign currency trades. A technical analysis of its ‘‘economics’’ 

was likely beyond the capability of most of the BLIPS purchasers. 

In addition, KPMG knew there was only a remote possibility—not 

a reasonable possibility—of a client’s earning a profit in BLIPS.218

Nevertheless, since the existence of a reasonable opportunity to 

earn a reasonable profit was critical to BLIPS’ having economic 

substance, KPMG included that questionable client representation 

in its BLIPS tax opinion letter.219

BLIPS was constructed so that the potential for client profit from 

the BLIPS transactions increased significantly if the client participated in all three phases of the BLIPS loan, which required a full 

7 years to finish. The head of DPP-Tax observed that KPMG had 

drafted a factual representation for inclusion in the prototype 

BLIPS tax opinion letter stating that, ‘‘The original intent of the 

parties was to participate in all three investment stages of the Investment Program.’’ He cautioned against including this factual 

representation in the opinion letter: ‘‘It seems to me that this [is] 

a critical element of the entire analysis and should not be blithely 

assumed as a ‘fact.’ . . . I would caution that if there were, say, 

50 separate investors and all 50 bailed out at the completion of 

Stage I, such a representation would not seem credible.’’ 220

The proposed representation was not included in the final 

version of the BLIPS prototype opinion letter, and the actual 

BLIPS track record supported the cautionary words of the DPP 

head. In 2000, the KPMG tax partner in charge of WNT wrote:

‘‘Lastly, an issue that I am somewhat reluctant to raise 

but I believe is very important going forward concerns the 

representations that we are relying on in order to render 

our tax opinion in BLIPS I. In each of the 66 or more deals 

that were done at last year, our clients represented that 

they ‘independently’ reviewed the economics of the transaction and had a reasonable opportunity to earn a pretax 

profit. . . . As I understand the facts, all 66 closed out by 

year-end and triggered the tax loss. Thus, while I continue 

to believe that we can issue the tax opinions on the BLIPS 

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221 Email dated 2/24/00, from Philip Wiesner to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘RE: BLIPS/

OPIS,’’ Bates KPMG 0011789. 222 Email dated 5/4/99, from Mark Watson, WNT, to Larry DeLap, DPP, Bates KPMG 

0011916. See also document dated 5/18/01, ‘‘PFP Practice Reorganization Innovative Strategies 

Business Plan—DRAFT,’’ authored by Jeffrey Eischeid, Bates KPMG 0050620–23, at 1–2 (referring to BLIPS and its predecessors, FLIP and OPIS, as a ‘‘capital loss strategy,’’ ‘‘loss generator’’ 

or ‘‘gain mitigation solution’’). 223See, e.g., email dated 12/29/01, from Larry DeLap to multiple KPMG tax professionals, 

‘‘FW: SC2,’’ Bates KPMG 0050562 (discontinuing SC2); email dated 10/1/99, from Larry DeLap 

to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘BLIPS,’’ Bates KPMG 0011716 (discontinuing BLIPS); 

email dated 12/7/98, from Larry DeLap to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘OPIS,’’ Bates 

KPMG 0025730 (discontinuing OPIS). 224Subcommittee interview of Lawrence DeLap (10/30/03). 225 Id. 226See Section VI(B)(4) of this Report on ‘‘Avoiding Detection.’’

I deals, the issue going forward is can we continue to rely 

on the representations in any subsequent deals if we go 

down that road? . . . My recommendation is that we deliver the tax opinions in BLIPS I and close the book on 

BLIPS and spend our best efforts on alternative transactions.’’ 221

This email and other documentation indicate that KPMG was 

well aware that the BLIPS transactions were of limited duration 

and uniformly produced substantial tax losses that ‘‘investors’’ used 

to offset and shelter other income from taxation.222 This growing 

factual record, showing that BLIPS investors invariably lost 

money, made it increasingly difficult for KPMG to rely on an alleged client representation about BLIPS’ having a reasonable profit 

potential. KPMG nevertheless continued to sell the product and to 

issue tax opinion letters relying on a critical client representation 

that KPMG had drafted without client input and attributed to its 

clients, but which KPMG knew or had reason to know, was unsupported by the facts. 

Discontinuing Sales. Still another KPMG implementation issue 

involves decisions by KPMG to stop selling particular tax products. 

In all four of the case studies examined by the Subcommittee, 

KPMG stopped marketing the tax product within 1 or 2 years of 

its first sale.223 The decision was made in each case by the head 

of DPP-Tax, after consultation with the product’s Deployment 

Champion and other senior tax professionals. 

When asked to explain why sales were discontinued, the DPP 

head offered several reasons for pulling a tax product off the market.224 The DPP head stated that he sometimes ended the marketing of a tax product out of concern that a judge would invalidate 

the tax product ‘‘as a step transaction,’’ using evidence that a number of persons who purchased the product engaged in a series of 

similar transactions.225 Limiting the number of tax products sold 

limited the evidence that each resulted in a similar set of transactions orchestrated by KPMG. Limiting the number of tax products sold also limited information about them to a small circle and 

made it more difficult for the IRS to detect the activity.226

Evidence in the four case studies shows that internal KPMG directives to stop sales of a particular tax product were, at times, ignored or circumvented by KPMG tax professionals marketing the 

products. For example, the DPP head announced an end to BLIPS 

sales in the fall of 1999, but allowed KPMG tax professionals to 

complete numerous BLIPS sales in 1999 and 2000, to persons who 

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227See, e.g., email dated 10/13/99, from Carl Hasting to Dale Baumann, ‘‘RE: Year 2000 Blips 

Transactions,’’ Bates KPMG 0006485 (‘‘I thought we were told to quit marketing 200[0] BLIPS 

transactions.’’); email dated 10/13/99, from Dale Baumann to Carl Hasting and others, ‘‘RE: Year 

2000 Blips Transactions,’’ Bates KPMG 0006485 (‘‘No marketing to clients who were not on the 

BLIPS 2000 list. The BLIPS 2000 list were for those individuals who we approached before 

Larry told us to stop marketing the strategy. . . .’’). 228See, e.g., two emails dated 10/1/99, from Larry DeLap to multiple KPMG tax professionals, 

‘‘BLIPS,’’ Bates KPMG 0011714. 229Subcommittee interview of Lawrence DeLap (10/30/03). 230See, e.g., email dated 6/20/00, from William Boyle of Deutsche Bank to other Deutsche 

Bank personnel, ‘‘Updated Presidio/KPMG trades,’’ Bates DB BLIPS 03280 (‘‘Presidio and 

KPMG are developing an expanded version of BLIP’s which it will execute on a limited basis 

for its wealthy clientele. They anticipate executing approximately 10–15 deals of significant size 

(i.e. in the $100–300m. Range).’’). 231See Section VI(B)(2) of this Report on ‘‘Mass Marketing Tax Products.’’ See also, e.g., email 

dated 4/23/01, from John Schrier to Thomas Crawford, ‘‘RE: SC2 target list,’’ Bates KPMG 

0050029; email dated 12/20/01, from William Kelliher to David Brockway, ‘‘FW: SC2,’’ Bates 

KPMG 0013311; and email response dated 12/29/01, from Larry DeLap to William Kelliher, 

David Brockway, and others, ‘‘FW: SC2,’’ Bates KPMG 0013311. 232See, e.g., email dated 9/30/99, from Jeffrey Eischeid to Wolfgang Stolz and others, ‘‘OPIS,’’ 

Bates QL S004593. 233Subcommittee interview of Lawrence DeLap (10/30/03). 

had been approached before the marketing ban was announced.227

These purchasers were referred to internally at KPMG as ‘‘grandfathered BLIPS’’ clients.228 A handful of additional sales took place 

in 2000, over the objection of the DPP head, after his objection was 

overruled by head of the Tax Services Practice.229 Also in 2000, 

some KPMG tax professionals attempted to restart BLIPS sales by 

developing a modified BLIPS product that would be sold to only extremely wealthy individuals.230 This effort was ultimately unsuccessful in restarting BLIPS sales. 

In the case of SC2, KPMG tax professionals simply did not comply with announced limits on the total number of SC2 products 

that could be sold or limits on the use of telemarketing calls to 

market the product.231 In the case of FLIP and OPIS, additional 

sales, again, took place after the DPP head had announced an end 

to the marketing of the products.232 The DPP head told Subcommittee staff that when he discontinued BLIPS sales in 1999, he 

was pressed by the BLIPS National Deployment Champion and 

others for an alternative product.233 The DPP head indicated that, 

because of this pressure, he relented and allowed KPMG tax professionals to resume sales of OPIS, which he had halted a year earlier. 

(b) Role of Third Parties in Implementing KPMG Tax 

Products 

FLIP, OPIS, BLIPS, and SC2 could not have been executed without the active and willing participation of the banks, investment 

advisors, lawyers, and charitable organizations that made these 

products work. The roll call of respected professional firms with direct and extensive involvement in the four KPMG case studies includes Deutsche Bank, HVB, NatWest, UBS, Wachovia Bank, and 

Sidley Austin, Brown & Wood. Smaller professional firms such as 

Quellos, and charitable organizations such as the Los Angeles Department of Fire & Police Pensions and the Austin Fire Fighters 

Relief and Retirement Fund, while less well known nationally, are 

nevertheless respected institutions who played critical roles in the 

execution of at least one of the four tax products. 

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234See, e.g., email dated 6/20/00, from William Boyle of Deutsche Bank to other Deutsche 

Bank personnel, ‘‘Updated Presidio/KPMG trades,’’ Bates DB BLIPS 03280; chart entitled, ‘‘Presidio Advisory Services. Deal List 1999,’’ Bates HVB000875 (BLIPS transactions for 1999); chart 

entitled, ‘‘Presidio Advisory Services. Deal List 2000,’’ Bates HVCD00018–19 (BLIPS transactions for 2000). 235See, e.g., memorandum dated 8/19/03 (this date is likely in error), from Ted Wolf and Sylvie 

DeMetrio to Christopher Thorpe and others, ‘‘Presidio,’’ Bates HVCD 00001; chart entitled, ‘‘Presidio Advisory Services. Deal List 1999,’’ Bates HVB000875 (BLIPS transactions for 1999); chart 

entitled, ‘‘Presidio Advisory Services. Deal List 2000,’’ Bates HVCD00018–19 (BLIPS transactions for 2000). See also credit request dated 1/6/00, Bates HVB 003320–30 (seeking approval 

of $1.5 billion credit line for 2000, and noting that, in 1999, the bank ‘‘booked USD 950 million 

(out of USD 1.03 billion approved) . . . all cash collateralized.’’) 236See, e.g., email dated 6/20/00, from William Boyle of Deutsche Bank to other Deutsche 

Bank personnel, ‘‘Updated Presidio/KPMG trades,’’ Bates DB BLIPS 03280. 237See, e.g., UBS memorandum dated 12/21/99, from Teri Kemmerer Sallwasser to Gail 

Fagan, ‘‘Boss Strategy Meetings . . .,’’ Bates SEN–018253–57; Subcommittee interview of UBS 

representatives (4/4/03). 238See, e.g., email dated 3/14/98, from Jeff Stein to Robert Wells, John Lanning, Larry DeLap, 

Gregg Ritchie, and others, ‘‘Simon Says,’’ Bates 638010, filed by the IRS on June 16, 2003, as 

an attachment to Respondent’s Requests for Admission, Schneider Interests v. Commissioner,

U.S. Tax Court, Docket No. 200–02, (describing the role of Presidio principal, Robert Pfaff, in 

the development of OPIS); Subcommittee interviews of John Larson (10/3/03 and 10/21/03). 239Subcommittee interviews of John Larson (10/3/03 and 10/21/03). Presidio discussed completing a BLIPS transaction on its own behalf with the assistance of HVB, but ultimately completed the transaction elsewhere. See, e.g., ‘‘Corporate Banking Division—Credit Request’’ dated 

9/14/99, Bates HVB 000147–64; ‘‘Corporate Banking Division—Credit Request’’ dated 4/28/00, 

Bates HVB 004148–51; memorandum dated 9/14/99, from Robert Pfaff of Presidio to Dom 

DiGiorgio of HVB, ‘‘BLIPS loan test case,’’ Bates HVB 000202; chart dated 9/14/99 entitled, 

‘‘Presidio Ownership Structure,’’ Bates HVB 000215; undated document entitled, ‘‘Structural Differences in the Transaction for Presidio Principals,’’ Bates HVCD 00007; undated diagrams depicting BLIPS loans to Presidio principals, Bates HVB 004272–75. 

Finding: Some major banks and investment advisory firms have provided critical lending or investment services or participated as essential counter 

parties in potentially abusive or illegal tax shelters sold by KPMG, in return for substantial fees 

or profits. 

The Role of the Banks. Five major banks participated in 

BLIPS, FLIP, and OPIS. Deutsche Bank participated in more than 

50 BLIPS transactions in 1999 and 2000, providing credit lines 

that totaled as much as $2.8 billion.234 Deutsche Bank also participated in about 60 OPIS transactions in 1998 and 1999. HVB participated in more than 30 BLIPS transactions in 1999 and 2000, 

providing BLIPS credit lines that apparently totaled nearly $2.5 

billion.235 NatWest apparently also participated in a significant 

number of BLIPS transactions in 1999 and 2000, providing credit 

lines totaling more than $1 billion.236 UBS AG participated in 100–

150 FLIP and OPIS transactions in 1997 and 1998, providing credit lines which, in the aggregate, were in the range of several billion 

Swiss francs.237

Two investment advisory firms also participated in the development, marketing and implementation of BLIPS, FLIP, and OPIS. 

Quellos participated in the development, marketing, and execution 

of FLIP. It participated in over 80 FLIP transactions with KPMG, 

as well as similar number of these transactions with 

PricewaterhouseCoopers and Wachovia Bank. It also executed some 

OPIS transactions for KPMG. Presidio participated in the development, marketing, and implementation of OPIS and BLIPS transactions, including the 186 BLIPS transactions related to 186 

KPMG clients.238 The Presidio principals even conducted a BLIPS 

transaction on their own behalf.239

73

240See undated document entitled, ‘‘New Product Committee Overview Memo: BLIPS Transaction,’’ Bates DB BLIPS 01959; email dated 4/28/99, from Francesco Piovanetti to Nancy 

Donohue, ‘‘presidio—w. revisions, I will call u in 1 min.,’’ Bates DB BLIPS 6911. 241See HVB credit request dated 1/6/00, Bates HVB 003320–30 (HVB ‘‘earned USD 4.45 million’’ from BLIPS loan fees and ‘‘approximately USD 1 million’’ from related foreign exchange 

activities for BLIPS transactions completed from October to December 1999); HVB document 

dated 8/6/00, from Thorpe, marked ‘‘DRAFT,’’ Bates HVB 001805. 242 Email dated 7/30/99, from Ivor Dunbar of Deustche Bank, DMG UK, to multiple Deutsche 

Bank professionals, ‘‘Re: Risk & Resources Committee Paper—BLIPS,’’ unreadable Bates number. See also email dated 7/29/99 from Mick Wood to Francesco Piovanetti and other Deutsche 

bank personnel, ‘‘Re: Risk & Resources Committee Paper—BLIPS,’’ Bates DB BLIPS 6556 

(paper prepared for the Risk & Resources Committee ‘‘skirts around the basic issue rather than 

addressing it head on (the tax reputational risk).’’).

The banks and investment advisory firms interviewed by the 

Subcommittee staff acknowledged obtaining lucrative fees for their 

participation in FLIP, OPIS, or BLIPS. Deutsche Bank internal 

documents state that the bank earned more than $33 million from 

OPIS and expected to earn more than $30 million for BLIPS.240

HVB earned over $5.45 million for the BLIPS transactions it completed in less than 3 months in 1999, and won approval of increased BLIPS transactions throughout 2000, ‘‘based on successful 

execution of previous transactions, low credit risk and excellent 

profitability.’’ 241

The Subcommittee interviewed four of the five banks, most of 

which cooperated with the inquiry and were generally open and 

candid about their interactions with KPMG, their understanding of 

FLIP, OPIS, and BLIPS, and their respective roles in these tax 

products. Evidence obtained by the Subcommittee shows that the 

banks knew they were participating in transactions whose primary 

purpose was to provide tax benefits to persons who had purchased 

tax products from KPMG. Some of the documentation also make it 

plain that the bank was aware that the tax product was potentially 

abusive and carried a risk to the reputation of any bank choosing 

to participate in it. 

For example, a number of Deutsche Bank documents make it 

clear that the bank knew BLIPS was a tax related transaction and 

posed a reputational risk to the bank if the bank chose to participate in it. One Deutsche Bank official working to obtain bank approval to participate in BLIPS wrote:

‘‘In this transaction, reputation risk is tax related and we 

have been asked by the Tax Department not to create an 

audit trail in respect of the Bank’s tax affaires. The Tax 

department assumes prime responsibility for controlling 

tax related risks (including reputation risk) and will brief 

senior management accordingly. We are therefore not asking R&R [Reputation & Risk] Committee to approve reputation risk on BLIPS. This will be dealt with directly by 

the Tax Department and [Deutsche Bank Chief Executive 

Officer] John Ross.’’ 242

Another Deutsche Bank memorandum, prepared for the ‘‘New 

Product Committee’’ to use in reviewing BLIPS, included the following statements explaining the transaction:

‘‘BLIPS will be marketed to High Net Worth Individual 

Clients of KPMG. . . . Loan conditions will be such as to 

enable DB to, in effect, force (p)repayment after 60 days at 

its option. . . . For tax and accounting purposes, repaying 

74

243 Undated document entitled, ‘‘New Product Committee Overview Memo: BLIPS Transaction,’’ Bates DB BLIPS 01959–63. 244 Email dated 7/1/99 from Francesco Piovanetti to Ivor Dunbar, ‘‘ ‘Hugo’ BLIPS Paper,’’ with 

attachment entitled, ‘‘Bond Linked Indexed Premium Strategy ‘BLIPS,’ ’’ Bates DB BLIPS 6585–

87 at 6587. 245See email dated 10/13/99, from Peter Sturzinger to Ken Tarr and other Deutsche Bank personnel, ‘‘Re: BLIPS,’’ attaching minutes dated 8/4/99, from a ‘‘Deutsche Bank Private Banking, 

Management Committee Meeting’’ that discussed BLIPS, Bates DB BLIPS 6520–6521. 246 Id. at 6520.

the [loan] premium amount will ‘count’ ’’ like a loss for tax 

and accounting purposes. . . . At all times, the loan will 

maintain collateral of at least 101% to the loan + premium 

amount. . . . It is imperative that the transaction be 

wound up after 45–60 days and the loan repaid due to the 

fact that the HNW individual will not receive his/her capital loss (or tax benefit) until the transaction is wound up 

and the loan repaid. . . . At no time will DB Private Bank 

provide any tax advice to any individuals involved in the 

transactions. This will be further buttressed by signed disclaimers designed to protect and ‘hold harmless’ DB. . . . 

DB has received a legal opinion from Shearman & Sterling 

which validates our envisaged role in the transaction and 

sees little or no risk to DB in the trade. Furthermore opinions have been issued from KPMG Central Tax department and Brown & Wood attesting to the soundness of the 

transactions from a tax perspective.’’ 243

Still another Deutsche Bank document states: ‘‘For tax and accounting purposes, the [loan] premium amount will be treated as 

a loss for tax purposes.’’ 244

Bank documentation indicates that a number of internal bank 

departments, including the tax, accounting, and legal departments, 

were asked to and did approve the bank’s participation in BLIPS. 

BLIPS was also brought to the attention of the bank’s Chief Executive Officer John Ross who made the final decision on the bank’s 

participation.245 Minutes describing the meeting in which Mr. Ross 

approved the bank’s participation in BLIPS state: 

‘‘[A] meeting with John Ross was held on August 3, 1999 

in order to discuss the BLIPS product. [A bank representative] represented [Private Banking] Management’s views 

on reputational risk and client suitability. John Ross approved the product, however insisted that any customer 

found to be in litigation be excluded from the product, the 

product be limited to 25 customers and that a low profile 

be kept on these transactions. . . . John Ross also requested to be kept informed of future transactions of a 

similar nature.’’ 246

Given the extensive and high level attention provided by the Bank 

regarding its participation in BLIPS, it seems clear that the bank 

had evaluated BLIPS carefully and knew what it was getting into. 

Other evidence shows that Deutsche Bank was aware that the 

BLIPS loans were not run-of-the-mill commercial loans, but had 

unusual features. Deutsche Bank refused, for example, to sign a 

letter representing that the BLIPS loan structure, which included 

an unusual multi-million dollar ‘‘loan premium’’ credited to a borVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:56 Dec 11, 2003 Jkt 090655 PO 00000 Frm 00078 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\90655.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN
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247See Appendix A. 248 Email dated 3/20/00, from Jeffrey Eischeid to Mark Watson, ‘‘Bank representation,’’ Bates 

KPMG 0025754. 249 Email dated 3/27/00, from Jeffrey Eischeid to Richard Smith, ‘‘Bank representation,’’ Bates 

KPMG 0025753. 250 Email dated 3/28/00, from Jeffrey Eischeid to Mark Watson, ‘‘Bank representation,’’ Bates 

KPMG 0025753. 251KPMG prototype tax opinion letter on BLIPS, dated 12/31/99, at 11. 252 Email dated 6/20/00, from William Boyle to multiple Deutsche Bank professionals, ‘‘Updated Presidio/KPMG trades,’’ Bates DB BLIPS 03280.

rower’s account at the start of the loan,247 was consistent with ‘‘industry standards.’’ The BLIPS National Deployment Champion had 

asked the bank to make this representation to provide ‘‘comfort 

that the loan was being made in line with conventional lending 

practices.’’ 248 When the bank declined to make the requested representation, the BLIPS National Deployment Champion tried a second time, only to report to his colleagues: ‘‘The bank has pushed 

back again and said they simply will not represent that the large 

premium loan is consistent with industry standards.’’ 249 He tried 

a third time and reported: ‘‘I’ve pushed really hard for our original 

language. To say they are resisting is an understatement.’’ 250 The 

final tax opinion letter issued by KPMG contained compromise language which said little more than the loan complied with the 

bank’s own procedures: ‘‘The loan . . . was approved by the competent authorities within [the Bank] as consistent, in the light of 

all the circumstances such authorities consider relevant, with [the 

Bank’s] credit and documentation standards.’’ 251

A year after Deutsche Bank began executing BLIPS transactions, 

a key bank official handling these transactions wrote an email 

which acknowledged the ‘‘tax benefits’’ associated with BLIPS and 

noted, again, the reputational risk these transactions posed to the 

bank:

‘‘During 1999, we executed $2.8b. of loan premium deals as 

part of the BLIP’s approval process. At that time, NatWest 

and [HVB] had executed approximately $0.5 b. of loan premium deals. I understand that we based our limitations on 

concerns regarding reputational risk which were heightened, in part, on the proportion of deals we have executed 

relative to the other banks. Since that time, [HVB], and to 

a certain extent NatWest, have participated in approximately an additional $1.0–1.5 b. of grandfathered BLIP’s 

deals. . . . [HVB] does not have the same sensitivity to 

and market exposure as DB does with respect to the 

reputational risk from making the high-coupon loan to the 

client. . . . As you are aware, the tax benefits from the 

transaction potentially arise from a contribution to the 

partnership subject to the high-coupon note and not from 

the execution of FX positions in the partnership, activities 

which we perform in the ordinary course of our business.’’ 252

This document shows that Deutsche Bank was fully aware of and 

had a sophisticated understanding of the tax aspects of BLIPS. To 

address the issue of reputational risk, the email went on to propose 

that, because HVB had a limited capacity to issue more BLIPS 

loans, and Deutsche Bank did not want to expose itself to increased 

76

253 Email dated 4/3/02, from Viktoria Antoniades to Brian McGuire and other Deutsche Bank 

personnel, ‘‘US GROUP 1 Pres,’’ DB BLIPS 6329–52, attaching a presentation dated 11/15/99, 

entitled ‘‘Structured Transactions Group North America,’’ at 6336, 6346. 254 Id. at 6337. 255 Id. at 6346. 256 Email dated 7/19/99, involving multiple Deutsche Bank employees, ‘‘Update NY Issues,’’ 

Bates DB BLIPS 6775. 257 Email dated 4/3/02, from Viktoria Antoniades to Brian McGuire and other Deutsche Bank 

personnel, ‘‘US GROUP 1 Pres,’’ DB BLIPS 6329–52, attaching a presentation dated 11/15/99, 

entitled ‘‘Structured Transactions Group North America,’’ at 6336. See also undated document 

entitled, ‘‘Update on the Private Exchange Fund,’’ Bates DB BLIPS 6433 (describing the packaging of another tax product offered by the Structured Transactions Group). 258 Id. at 6345–46. 259See ‘‘Report of Investigation of Enron Corporation and Related Entities Regarding Federal 

Tax and Compensation Issues, and Policy Recommendations,’’ Joint Committee on Taxation 

Staff (Report No. JCS–3–03, February 2003). 

reputational risk by making additional direct loans to BLIPS clients, ‘‘we would like to lend an amount of money to [HVB] equal 

to the amount of money [HVB] lends to the client. . . . We would 

like tax department approval to participate in the aforementioned 

more complex trades by executing the underlying transactions and 

making loans to [HVB].’’ In other words, Deutsche Bank wanted to 

be the bank behind HVB, financing more BLIPS loans in exchange 

for fees and other profits. 

Other Deutsche Bank documents suggest that the bank may 

have been helping KPMG find clients or otherwise marketing the 

BLIPS tax products. A November 1999 presentation by the bank’s 

‘‘Structured Finance Group,’’ for example, listed BLIPS as one of 

several tax products the group was offering to U.S. and European 

clients seeking ‘‘gain mitigation.’’ 253 The presentation listed as the 

bank’s ‘‘strengths’’ its ability to lend funds in connection with 

BLIPS and its ‘‘relationships with [the] ‘promoters’ ’’ 254 later named 

as Presidio and KPMG.255 An internal bank email a few months 

earlier asked: ‘‘What is the status of the BLIPS. Are you still actively marketing this product[?]’’ 256

The same document suggests that Deutsche Bank may have been 

a tax shelter promoter in its own right. For example, the document 

indicates that, in 1999, the Structured Transactions Group was offering over a dozen sophisticated tax products to U.S. and European clients seeking to ‘‘execute tax driven deals’’ or ‘‘gain mitigation’’ strategies.257 The document indicates that Deutsche Bank 

was aggressively marketing these tax products to large U.S. corporations and individuals, and planning to close billions of dollars 

worth of transactions.258 At least two of the tax products listed by 

Deutsche Bank, BLIPS and the Customized Adjustable Rate Debt 

Facility (CARDS), were later determined by the IRS to be potentially abusive tax shelters. During the late 1990’s and early 2000, 

Deutsche Bank was also involved, either directly or through Bankers Trust (which Deutsche Bank acquired in June 1999), in a number of tax-driven transactions with Enron Corporation, including 

Project Steele, Project Cochise, Project Tomas, and Project Valhalla.259

Despite the bank’s involvement in and sophisticated knowledge 

of generic tax products, when asked about BLIPS during a Subcommittee interview, the Deutsche Bank representative insisted 

that BLIPS was an investment strategy which, like all investment 

products, had tax implications. The bank representative also indicated that, despite handling BLIPS transactions for the bank, he 

77

260Subcommittee interview of Deutsche Bank, (11/10/03). 261 Credit request dated 9/26/99, Bates HVB 001166. 262 Undated one-page, handwritten document outlining BLIPS structure entitled, ‘‘Presidio,’’ 

which Alex Nouvakhov of HVB acknowledged during his Subcommittee interview had been written by him, Bates HVB 000204. 263Memorandum dated 8/16/00, from Dom DeGiorgio and Richard Pankuch to Christopher 

Thorpe and others, ‘‘Presidio BLIPS Transactions,’’ Bates HVB 003346. 

did not understand the details of the BLIPS transactions, and 

downplayed any reputational risk that BLIPS might have posed to 

the bank.260

In contrast to Deutsche Bank’s stance, in which its representative’s oral information repeatedly contradicted its internal documentation, HVB representatives provided oral information that 

was fully consistent with the bank’s internal documentation. HVB’s 

representative acknowledged, for example, that HVB knew BLIPS 

had been designed and was intended to provide tax benefits to 

KPMG clients. The bank indicated that, at the time it became involved, it felt it had no obligation to refrain from participating in 

BLIPS, since KPMG had provided the bank with an opinion stating 

that BLIPS complied with federal tax law. For example, in one document seeking approval to provide a significant line of credit to finance BLIPS loans, HVB wrote this about the tax risks associated 

with BLIPS: ‘‘Disallowance of tax attributes. A review by the IRS 

could potentially result in a ruling that would disallow the [BLIPS] 

structure. . . . We are confident that none of the foregoing would 

affect the bank or its position in any meaningful way for the following reasons. . . . KPMG has issued an opinion that the structure will most likely be upheld, even if challenged by the IRS.’’ 261

A handwritten document prepared by HVB personnel is even more 

direct. It characterizes the 7% fee charged to KPMG clients for 

BLIPS as ‘‘paid by investor for tax sheltering.’’ 262 This document 

also states that the bank ‘‘amortizes premium over the life of loan 

for tax purposes.’’ 

When it became clear that the IRS would list BLIPS as an abusive tax shelter, an internal HVB memorandum again acknowledged that BLIPS was a tax transaction and ordered a halt to financing the product, while disavowing any liability for the bank’s 

role in carrying out the BLIPS transactions:

‘‘[I]t is clear that the tax benefits for individuals who have 

participated in the [BLIPS] transaction will not be grandfathered because Treasury believe that their actions were 

contrary to current law. . . . It is not likely that KPMG/

Presidio will go forward with additional transactions. . . . 

As we have stated previously, we anticipate no adverse 

consequences for the HVB since we have not promoted the 

transaction. We have simply been a lender and nothing in 

the notice implies a threat to our position.

‘‘In view of the tone of the notice we will not book any new 

transactions and will cancel our existing unused [credit] 

lines prior to the end of this month.’’ 263

HVB’s representative explained to the Subcommittee staff that 

the apparent bank risk in lending substantial sums to a shell corporation had been mitigated by the terms of the BLIPS loan which 

gave the bank virtually total control over the BLIPS loan proceeds 

78

264Subcommittee interview of HVB representative (10/29/03). 265See, e.g., email dated 10/29/99, from Richard Pankuch to Erwin Volt, ‘‘KWG I capital treatment for our Presidio Transaction,’’ Bates HVB 000352 (‘‘Our structure calls for all collateral 

to be placed in a collateral account pledged to the bank.’’); email dated 9/24/99, from Richard 

Pankuch to Christopher Thorpe and other HVB professionals, ‘‘Re: Presidio,’’ Bates HVB 000682 

(‘‘all collateral is in our own hands and subject to the Permitted Investment requirement’’). Compare undated Deutsche Bank document, likely prepared in 1999, ‘‘New Product Committee Overview Memo: BLIPS Transaction,’’ Bates DB BLIPS 01959–63, at 1961 (‘‘At all times, the loan 

will maintain collateral of at least 101% to the loan + loan premium amount. If the amount 

goes below this limit, the loan will be unwound and the principal + premium repaid.’’); email 

dated 7/1/99, from Francesco Piovanetti to Ivor Dunbar, ‘‘ ‘Hugo’ BLIPS Paper,’’ with attachment 

entitled, ‘‘Bond Linked Indexed Premium Strategy ‘BLIPS’,’’ Bates HVB DB BLIPS 6885–87 

(‘‘The loan proceeds (par and premium) will be held in custody at DB in cash or money market 

deposits. . . . Loan conditions will be such as to enable DB to, in effect, force prepayment after 

sixty days at its option.’’). 266 BLIPS credit request dated 9/14/99, Bates HVB 000155. See also Memorandum dated 7/

29/99, from William Boyle to Mick Wood and other Deutsche Bank personnel, ‘‘GCI Risk and 

Resources Committee—BLIPS Transaction,’’ Bates DB BLIPS 06566, at 3 (The BLIPS loan ‘‘will 

be overcollateralized and should the value of the collateral drop below a 1.0125:1.0 ratio, DB 

may liquidate the collateral immediately and apply the proceeds to repay amounts due under 

the Note and swap agreements.’’) 267 BLIPS credit request dated 9/14/99, Bates HVB 000155. 268Document dated 3/4/99, ‘‘BLIPS—transaction description and checklist,’’ Bates KPMG 

0003933–35. 269See Section VI(2) of this Report for discussion of Wachovia’s client referral activities.

and enabled the bank to ensure the loan and loan premium would 

be repaid.264 The bank explained, for example, that from the start 

of the loan, the borrower was required to maintain collateral equal 

to 101% of the loan proceeds and loan premium and could place 

these funds only in a narrow range of bank-approved investments.265 That meant the bank treated not only all of the loan proceeds and loan premium as collateral, but also additional funds 

supplied by the KPMG client to meet the 101% collateral requirement. HVB wrote: ‘‘We are protected in our documentation through 

a minimum overcollateralization ratio of 1.0125 to 1 at all times. 

Violation of this ratio triggers immediate acceleration under the 

loan agreements without notice.’’ 266 HVB also wrote: ‘‘The Permitted Investments . . . are either extremely conservative in nature . . . or have no collateral value for margin purposes.’’ 267

KPMG put it this way: ‘‘Lender holds all cash as collateral in addition to being custodian and clearing agent for Partnership. . . . All 

Partnership trades can only be executed through Lender or an affiliate. . . . Lender must authorize trades before execution.’’ 268

Deutsche Bank and HVB were not the only banks involved in 

executing KPMG tax products. Another was Wachovia Bank, acting 

through First Union National Bank, which not only referred bank 

clients to KPMG to purchase FLIP, but also directly sold FLIP to 

many of its clients, and considered becoming involved with BLIPS 

and SC2 as well.269 A 1999 Wachovia internal email demonstrates 

that the bank was fully aware that it was being asked to facilitate 

transactions designed to reduce or eliminate tax liability for KPMG 

clients: 

‘‘[A] KPMG investment/tax strategy . . . was voted and 

approved by the due diligence subcommittee last week. 

This means that the Risk Oversight Committee will have 

this particular strategy on its agenda at its Wednesday 

meeting. . . . The strategy will service to offset either ordinary income or capital gains ($20 million minimum).

‘‘There are several critical points that should be noted with 

respect to this strategy if we get it approved. Many of 

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270 Email dated 8/30/99, from Tom Newman to multiple First Union professionals, ‘‘next strategy,’’ Bates SEN–014622. 271Memorandum dated 12/21/99, from Teri Kemmerer Sallwasser to Gail Fagan, ‘‘Boss Strategy Meetings . . .’’ Bates SEN–018253–57.

these points related to Sandy Spitz’ concern (and KPMG’s 

concern) that First Union has a very high profile across 

our franchise for being associated with ‘tax’ strategies: 

namely, FLIP and BOSS. Sandy does not want this kind 

of high profile to be associated with this new strategy.

‘‘In order to address some of Sandy’s concerns and lower 

our profile . . .

‘‘* The strategy has an KPMG acronym which will not be 

shared with the general First Union community. We 

will probably assign a generic name. . . .

‘‘* No one-pager will be distributed to our referral 

sources describing the strategy. . . .

‘‘* Fees to First Union will be 50 basis points if the investor is not a KPMG client, 25 bps if they are a 

KPMG client. . . .

‘‘I have written up a technical summary of the tax opinion 

since Sandy will only allow us to read a draft copy of the 

opinion in his office without making a copy.’’ 270

Clearly, First Union was well aware that it was handling products 

intended to help clients reduce or eliminate their taxes and was 

worried about its own high profile from being ‘‘associated with ‘tax’ 

strategies’’ like FLIP. 

In addition to its participation in KPMG-developed tax products, 

First Union helped develop and market the BOSS tax product sold 

by PricewaterhouseCoopers (‘‘PWC’’), which was later determined 

by the IRS to be a potentially abusive tax shelter. First Union had 

in its files the following document advocating the bank’s involvement with BOSS:

‘‘The proposed transaction takes advantage of an anomaly 

in current tax law which we expect will be closed down by 

legislation as soon as Congress finds out about it. We 

make this investment available only to select clients in 

order to limit the number of people who know about it. We 

hope that will delay the time Congress finds out about it, 

but at some point, it is likely that they will find out and 

enact legislation to shut it down. First Union acts as sales 

agent for PwC with respect to this transaction, since the 

bankers are in a very good position to know when a client 

has entered into a significant transaction which might 

have generated significant taxable income. PricewaterhouseCoopers would provide a Tax Opinion Letter which 

would say that if the entity were examined by the IRS, the 

transaction would ‘more likely than not’ be successfully 

upheld.’’ 271

This document provides additional, unmistakable evidence that 

First Union knew it was participating in transactions whose primary purpose was to reduce or eliminate clients’ taxes. 

80

272 UBS internal document dated 3/1/99, ‘‘Equities Large/Heavily Structured Transaction Approval,’’ with attachment entitled, ‘‘U.S. Capital Loss Scheme—UBS ‘redemption trades,’ ’’ Bates 

UBS 000009–15. 273 Id. at UBS 000010. 274 UBS internal document dated 11/13/97, ‘‘Description of the UBS ‘Redemption’ Structure,’’ 

Bates UBS 000031. 

Still another bank that handled KPMG tax products is UBS AG, 

now one of the largest banks in the world. UBS was convinced by 

Quellos and KPMG to participate in numerous FLIP and OPIS 

transactions in 1997 and 1998, referred to collectively by UBS as 

‘‘redemption transactions.’’

UBS documentation clearly and repeatedly describes these transactions as tax-related. For example, one UBS document explaining 

the transactions is entitled: ‘‘U.S. Capital Loss Scheme—UBS ‘redemption trades.’ ’’ It states:

‘‘The essence of the UBS redemption trade is the creation 

of a capital loss for U.S. tax purposes which may be used 

by a U.S. tax resident to off-set any capital gains tax liability to which it would otherwise be subject. The tax 

structure was originally devised by KPMG. . . . In October 

1996, UBS was approached jointly by Quadra . . . and 

KPMG with a view to it seeking UBS’ participation in a 

scheme that implemented the tax loss structure developed 

by KPMG. The role sought of UBS was one purely of execution counterparty. . . . It was clear from the outset—

and has been continually emphasised since—that UBS 

made no endorsement of the scheme and that its connection with the structure should not imply any implicit confirmation by UBS that the desired tax consequences will 

be recognized by the U.S. tax authorities. . . . UBS undertook a thorough investigation into the propriety of its proposed involvement in these transactions. The following 

steps were undertaken: [redacted by UBS as ‘privileged 

material’].’’ 272

At another point, the UBS document explains the ‘‘Economic Rationale’’ for redemption transactions to be: ‘‘Tax benefit for client,’’ 273 while still another UBS document states: ‘‘The motivation 

for this structure is tax optimisation for U.S. tax residents who are 

enjoying capital gains that are subject to U.S. tax. The structure 

creates a capital loss from a U.S. tax point of view (but not from 

an economic point of view) which may be offset against existing 

capital gains.’’ 274

In February 1998, an unidentified UBS ‘‘insider’’ sent a letter to 

UBS management in London ‘‘to let you know that [UBS unit] 

Global Equity [D]erivatives is currently offering an illegal capital 

gains tax evasion scheme to US tax payers,’’ meaning the redemption transactions. The letter continued:

‘‘This scheme is costing the US Internal Revenue [S]ervice 

several hundred million dollars a year. I am concerned 

that once IRS comes to know about this scheme they will 

levy huge financial/criminal penalties on UBS for offering 

tax evasion schemes. . . . In 1997 several billion dollars of 

this scheme was sold to high networth US tax payers, I am 

81

275Letter dated 2/12/98, addressed to SBC Warburg Dillon Read in London, Bates UBS 

000038. 276See email dated 3/27/98, from Chris Donegan of UBS to Norm Bontje of Quadra and others, 

‘‘Re: Redemption Trade,’’ UBS 000039 (‘‘Wolfgang and I are presently unable to execute any redemption transactions on UBS stock. The main reason for this seems to be a concern within 

UBS that this trade should be registered as a tax shelter with the IRS.’’). 277Subcommittee interview with UBS representative (10/28/03). 

told that in 1998 the plan is continu[ing] to market this 

scheme and to offer several new US tax avoidance schemes 

involving swaps.

‘‘My sole objective is to let you know about this scheme, so 

that you can take some concrete steps to minimise the financial and reputational damage to UBS. . . .

‘‘P.S. I am sorry I cannot disclose my identity at this time 

because I don’t know whether this action of mine will be 

rewarded or punished.’’ 275

In response to the letter, UBS halted all redemption trades for several months.276 UBS apparently examined the nature of the transactions as well as whether they should be registered in the United 

States as tax shelters. UBS later resumed selling the products, 

stopping only after KPMG discontinued the sales.277

The UBS documents show that the bank was well aware that 

FLIP and OPIS were designed and sold to KPMG clients as ways 

to reduce or eliminate their U.S. tax liability. The bank apparently 

justified its participation in the transactions by reasoning that its 

participation did not signify its endorsement of the transactions 

and did not constitute aiding or abetting tax evasion. The bank 

then proceeded to provide the financing that made these tax products possible. 

The Role of the Investment Advisors. Bank personnel were 

not the only financial professionals assisting KPMG with BLIPS, 

FLIP, and OPIS. Investment experts also played key roles in designing, marketing, and implementing the three tax products, 

working closely with KPMG tax professionals throughout the process. For example, the investment experts involved with BLIPS, 

FLIP, and OPIS helped KPMG with designing the specific financial 

transactions, making client presentations, obtaining financing from 

the banks, preparing the transactional documents, establishing the 

required shell corporations and partnerships, and facilitating the 

completion of individual client transactions. In the case of FLIP, investment experts at Quellos, then known as Quadra, provided 

these services. In the case of OPIS, both Quellos and Presidio provided these services. In the case of BLIPS, these services were generally provided by Presidio. 

A memorandum sent by a Quellos investment expert to a banker 

at UBS explained the investment company’s role in FLIP and the 

nature of the tax product itself as follows:

‘‘KPMG approached us as to whether we could affect the 

security trades necessary to achieve the desired tax results. I indicated that I felt we could and they are currently not looking elsewhere for assistance in executing 

the transaction.

82

278Memorandum dated 8/12/96, from Jeff Greenstein of Quellos to Wolfgang Stolz of UBS, 

Bates UBS 000002. 279See, e.g., email dated 12/10/99, from Douglas Ammerman to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘Innovative Strategy Development,’’ Bates KPMG 0036736 (discusses KPMG working 

with Quellos on two products that Quellos had developed, called FORTS, a ‘‘loss generating 

strategy,’’ and WEST, a ‘‘conversion strategy.’’). 

‘‘The tax opportunity created is extremely complex, and is 

really based more on the structuring of the entities involved in the securities transactions rather than the securities transactions themselves. KPMG has assured me that 

prior to spending much time, beyond just conceptually seeing if we can do it, they would provide Quadra and any 

counterparty (UBS) with the necessary legal opinions and 

representatives letters as to why they are recommending 

this transaction to their clients. Assuming their tax analysis is complete, our challenge is to design a series of securities/derivatives trades that meet the required objectives.

‘‘In summary, this tax motivated transaction is designed 

for U.S. companies requiring a tax loss. The way this loss 

is generated is through the U.S. company exercising a series of options to acquire majority ownership in a Foreign 

investment (Fund). The tax benefits are created for U.S. 

Co. based on the types of securities transactions done in 

the foreign investment Fund and shifting the cost basis to 

the parent U.S. Company. . . .

‘‘If a U.S. company/individual has a $100 million dollar 

capital gain they owe taxes, depending on their tax position, ranging from $28 million to $35 million. As a result, 

they are more than willing to pay $2 to $4 million to generate a tax loss to offset the capital gain and corresponding 

taxes. . . .

‘‘I have told KPMG that we should be able to execute the 

transaction once they have a commitment from a potential 

client. KPMG has already had a number of preliminary 

meetings with potential clients and one of their challenges 

was to identify a party that can manage the Fund level 

and facilitate the transactions with Foreign Co. Given your 

ability to act as Foreign Co., and facilitate the securities 

trades, I have told them to stop looking. Once they have 

a firm client, then we can map out the various details to 

execute the transaction.’’ 278

This document leaves no doubt that Quellos was fully aware that 

FLIP was a ‘‘tax motivated transaction’’ designed for companies or 

individuals ‘‘requiring a tax loss.’’

Quellos was successful in convincing UBS to participate in not 

only FLIP, but also OPIS transactions throughout 1997 and 1998, 

as described earlier. Quellos may also have been a tax shelter promoter in its own right. For example, in addition to its dealings with 

KPMG on FLIP and OPIS, Quellos teamed up with First Union 

National Bank and PWC to execute about 80 FLIP transactions for 

them. In addition, Quellos held discussions with KPMG regarding 

at least two tax products that Quellos itself had developed, but it 

is unclear whether sales of these products actually took place.279 A 

83

280 Undated UBS internal document, ‘‘Memorandum on USB’ involvement in U.S. Capital Loss 

Generation Scheme (the ‘CLG Scheme’),’’ Bates UBS 000006. 281See , e.g., memorandum dated 3/13/98, from Robert Simon to Jeff Stein and Sandy Smith, 

all of KPMG, ‘‘OPIS,’’ Bates KPMG 0010262 (‘‘The attached went to the entire working group 

(Pfaff, Ritchie, R.J. Ruble of Brown & Wood, Bickham, and Larson).’’); email dated 3/14/98 from 

Jeff Stein to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘Simon Says,’’ Bates 638010, filed by the IRS 

on June 16, 2003, as an attachment to Respondent’s Requests for Admission, Schneider Interests 

v. Commissioner, U.S. Tax Court, Docket No. 200–02 (‘‘By the way—anybody who does not have 

a copy of the Pfaff letter, let me know and I will fax it over to you. In addition in case you 

want a copy of the November 6, 1997 memo detailing the proposed LLC structure written by 

Simon to ‘The Working Group’ which included Ritchie, Pfaff, Larson, Bickahm [sic] and R.J. 

Ruble of the law firm of Brown & Wood let me know and I will fax it over to you as well.’’). 

Robert Pfaff and John Larson are the former KPMG tax professionals who left the firm to open 

Presidio. 282See, e.g., email dated 5/10/99, from Mark Watson to John Lanning and others, ‘‘FW: 

BLIPS,’’ Bates MTW 0039; email dated 5/5/99, from Mark Watson to Larry DeLap, Bates KPMG 

0011915–16. See also, e.g., memorandum dated 4/20/99, from Amir Makov of Presidio to John 

Rolfes of Deutsche Bank, ‘‘BLIPS friction costs,’’ Bates DB BLIPS 01977 (showing Presidio’s role 

in planning the BLIPS transactions; includes statement: ‘‘On day 60, Investor exits partnership 

and unwinds all trades in partnership.’’) 283See Section VI(B)(1) of this Report discussing the BLIPS development and approval process; email dated 5/10/99, from Mark Watson to John Lanning and others, ‘‘FW: BLIPS,’’ Bates 

MTW 0039. 

UBS document states that Quellos’ ‘‘specialty is providing tax efficient investment schemes for high net worth U.S. individuals and 

their investment vehicles.’’ 280

Presidio played a similar role in the design, marketing, and implementation of OPIS and BLIPS. Two of Presidio’s principals are 

former KPMG tax professionals who knew the KPMG tax professionals working on OPIS and BLIPS. These Presidio principals 

were repeatedly identified by KPMG as members of ‘‘the working 

group’’ developing OPIS and were described as having contributed 

to the design and implementation of OPIS.281 Moreover, Presidio 

initially brought the idea for BLIPS to KPMG, and was thoroughly 

involved in the development, marketing, and implementation of the 

product. On May 1, 1999, prior to the final approval of BLIPS, Presidio representatives made a detailed presentation to KPMG tax 

professionals on how the company was planning to implement the 

BLIPS transactions.282 During the presentation, among other 

points, Presidio representatives disclosed that there was only a ‘‘remote’’ possibility that any investor would actually profit from the 

contemplated foreign currency transactions, and that the banks 

providing the financing planned to retain, under the terms of the 

contemplated BLIPS ‘‘loans,’’ an effective ‘‘veto’’ over how the ‘‘loan 

proceeds’’ could be invested. These statements, among others, 

caused KPMG’s key technical reviewer in the Washington National 

Tax group to reconsider his approval of the BLIPS product, in part 

because he felt he had ‘‘not been given complete information about 

how the transaction would be structured.’’ 283

When BLIPS was eventually approved over the objections of the 

WNT technical reviewer, Presidio played a key role in making client presentations to sell the product and in executing the actual 

BLIPS transactions. One of the most important roles Presidio 

played in BLIPS was, in each BLIPS transaction, to direct two of 

the companies it controlled, Presidio Growth and Presidio Resources, to enter into a ‘‘Strategic Investment Fund’’ partnership 

with the relevant BLIPS client. This partnership was central to the 

entire BLIPS transaction, since it was this partnership that assumed and repaid the purported ‘‘loan’’ that gave rise to the BLIPS 

client’s ‘‘tax loss.’’ In each BLIPS transaction, a Presidio company 

84

284 Email dated 5/13/99, from Barbara Mcconnachie to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘FW: 

BLIPS,’’ Bates MTW 0045 (‘‘Presidio has 2 individuals permanently housed at Sherman & Sterling to assist in the necessary documentation.’’). Sherman & Sterling prepared many of the key 

transactional documents for BLIPS transactions involving Deutsche Bank. 285 Email dated 12/28/99, from Kerry Bratton of Presidio to Alexandre Nouvakhov and Amy 

McCarthy of HVB, ‘‘FX Confirmations,’’ Bates HVB 002035. 286See, e.g., memorandum dated 12/23/99, from Kerry Bratton of Presidio to Amy McCarthy 

of HVB, ‘‘Transfer Instructions,’’ Bates HVB 001699; memorandum dated 1/19/00, from Steven 

Buss at Presidio to Alex Nouvakhov at HVB, ‘‘FX Instructions—Mobile Ventures LLC,’’ Bates 

HVB 001603; email dated 1/19/00, from Alex Nouvakhov at HVB to Matt Dunn at HVB, ‘‘Presidio,’’ Bates HVB 001601 (‘‘We need to sell Euros for another Presidio account and credit their 

[U.S. dollar] DDA account. It is the same deal as the one for Roanoke you did earlier today.’’); 

email dated 1/19/00, from Alex Nouvakhov at HVB to Steven Buss at Presidio, ‘‘Re: mobile,’’ 

Bates HVB 001602; memorandum dated 1/19/00, from Steven Buss at Presidio to Timothy 

Schifter at KPMG, ‘‘Sale Confirmation,’’ Bates HVB 001600. 287Subcommittee interview of HVB bank representatives (10/29/03). 288Subcommittee interview of John Larson (6/20/03).

acted as the managing partner for the partnership and contributed 

a small portion of the funds used in the BLIPS transactions. Presidio also performed administrative tasks that, while more mundane, were critical to the success of the the tax product. For example, when BLIPS was just starting to get underway, Presidio took 

several steps to facilitate the transactions, including stationing personnel at one of the law firms preparing the transactional documents.284

When a problem arose indicating that currency conversions in 

two BLIPS transactions had been timed in such a way that they 

would create negative tax consequences for the BLIPS clients, Presidio apparently took the lead in correcting the ‘‘errors.’’ An email 

sent by Presidio to HVB states:

‘‘I know that Steven has talked to you regarding the error 

for Roanoke Ventures. I have also noted an error for Mobil 

Ventures. None of the Euro’s should have been converted 

to [U.S. dollars] in 1999. Due to the tax consequences that 

result from these sales, it is critical that these transactions 

be reversed and made to look as though they did not occur 

at all.’’ 285

Other documents suggest that, as Presidio requested, the referenced 1999 currency trades were somehow ‘‘reversed’’ and then 

executed the next month in early 2000.286 HVB told Subcommittee 

staffers that they had been unaware of this matter and would have 

to research the transactions to determine whether, in fact, trades 

or paperwork had been altered.287

Presidio has worked with KPMG on a number of tax products in 

addition to the four examined in this Report. A Presidio representative told the Subcommittee staff that 95% of the company’s revenue came from its work with KPMG.288

Finding: Some law firms have provided legal services that facilitated KPMG’s development and sale 

of potentially abusive or illegal tax shelters, including by providing design assistance or collaborating on allegedly ‘‘independent’’ opinion letters 

representing to clients that a tax product would 

withstand an IRS challenge, in return for substantial fees. 

85

289 ‘‘Declaration of Richard E. Bosch,’’ IRS Revenue Agent, In re John Doe Summons to Sidley 

Austin Brown & Wood (N.D. Ill. 10/16/03) at ¶ 5. 290 Id. ¶¶ 9, 10, 12. 291 Id. at ¶ 14. 292 Id. at ¶ 27(a). 293 Id. at ¶ 15, citing an email dated 12/15/97, from R.J. Ruble. This email also references a 

meeting to be set up between KPMG and two partners at Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, Paul 

Pringle and Eric Haueter. See also email dated 12/24/97, from R.J. Ruble to Randall Brickham 

at KPMG, ‘‘Confidential Matters,’’ Bates KPMG 0047356 (‘‘Thanks again . . . for spending time 

with Paul and Eric. Their meeting you all helps me immensely with the politics here.’’). 294Memorandum dated 12/19/97, from Randall Bickham to Gregg Ritchie, ‘‘Business Model—

Brown & Wood Strategic Alliance,’’ Bates KPMG 0047228. 

The Role of the Law Firms. The evidence obtained by the Subcommittee during the course of the investigation determined that 

one law firm, Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, played a significant 

and ongoing role in the development, marketing, and implementation of the four KPMG tax products featured in this Report. 

Sidley Austin Brown & Wood is currently being audited by the 

IRS to evaluate the firm’s ‘‘role . . . in the organization and sale 

of tax shelters’’ and compliance with federal tax shelter requirements.289 In court pleadings, the IRS has alleged the following: 

‘‘[I]t appears that [Sidley Austin Brown & Wood] was involved in the organization and sale of transactions which 

were or later became ‘listed transactions,’ or that may be 

other ‘potentially abusive tax shelters.’ The organization 

and sale of these transactions appears to have been coordinated by [primarily] . . . Raymond J. Ruble. . . . During 

the investigation, I learned that [Sidley Austin Brown & 

Wood] issued approximately 600 opinions with respect to 

certain listed transactions promoted (or co-promoted) by, 

among others, KPMG, Arthur Andersen, BDO Seidman, 

Diversified Group, Inc., and Ernst & Young. . . . The IRS 

has identified transactions for which [Sidley Austin Brown 

& Wood] provided opinions, . . . FLIPS, OPIS, COBRA, 

BLIPS and CARDS, as ‘listed transactions.’ ’’290

The IRS also alleges that, in response to a December 2001 disclosure initiative in which taxpayers obtained penalty waivers in exchange for identifying their tax shelter promoters, 80 disclosure 

statements named Sidley Austin Brown & Wood as ‘‘promoting, soliciting, or recommending their participation in certain tax shelters.’’ 291 The IRS also alleges that the law firm provided approximately 600 opinions for at least 13 tax products, including FLIP, 

OPIS, and BLIPS.292

Information obtained by the Subcommittee indicates that Sidley 

Austin Brown & Wood, through the efforts of Mr. Ruble, did more 

than simply draft opinion letters supporting KPMG tax products; 

the law firm formed an alliance with KPMG to develop and market 

these tax products. IRS court pleadings, for example, quote a December 1997 email in which Mr. Ruble states: ‘‘This morning my 

managing partner, Tom Smith, approved Brown & Wood LLP 

working with the newly conformed tax products group at KPMG on 

a joint basis in which we would jointly develop and market tax 

products and jointly share in the fees.’’ 293 An internal KPMG 

memorandum around the same time states: ‘‘[W]e need to consummate a formal strategic allicance with Brown & Wood.’’ 294

86

295Memorandum dated 3/2/98, from Randall Bickham to Gregg Ritchie, ‘‘B&W Meeting,’’ Bates 

KPMG 0047225–27. 296See , e.g., memorandum dated 3/13/98, from Robert Simon to Jeff Stein and Sandy Smith, 

all of KPMG, ‘‘OPIS,’’ Bates KPMG 0010262 (‘‘The attached went to the entire working group 

(Pfaff, Ritchie, R.J. Ruble of Brown & Wood, Bickham, and Larson).’’); email dated 3/14/98 from 

Jeff Stein to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘Simon Says,’’ Bates 638010, filed by the IRS 

on June 16, 2003, as an attachment to Respondent’s Requests for Admission, Schneider Interests 

v. Commissioner, U.S. Tax Court, Docket No. 200–02 (‘‘By the way—anybody who does not have 

a copy of the Pfaff letter, let me know and I will fax it over to you. In addition in case you 

want a copy of the November 6, 1997 memo detailing the proposed LLC structure written by 

Simon to ‘‘The Working Group’’ which included Ritchie, Pfaff, Larson, Bickahm [sic] and R.J. 

Ruble of the law firm of Brown & Wood let me know and I will fax it over to you as well.’’). 297See ‘‘Declaration of Richard E. Bosch,’’ IRS Revenue Agent, In re John Doe Summons to 

Sidley Austin Brown & Wood (N.D. Ill. 10/16/03) at ¶ 18, citing an email by KPMG tax professional Gregg Ritchie. 298Subcommittee interview of Lawrence Manth (11/6/03). 299See memorandum dated 2/16/01, from Andrew Atkin to SC2 Marketing Group, ‘‘Agenda 

from Feb 16th call and goals for next two weeks,’’ Bates KPMG 0051135. 300See 26 U.S.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C)(i); Treas.Reg. §§ 1.6662–4(g)(4)(ii) and 1.6664–4(c)(1). 

Three months later, an internal KPMG memorandum discussing 

an upcoming meeting between KPMG and Brown & Wood states 

that KPMG tax professionals intended to discuss ‘‘how to institutionalize the KPMG/B&W relationship.’’ 295 Among other items, 

KPMG planned to discuss ‘‘the key profit-drivers for our joint practice,’’ citing in particular KPMG’s ‘‘Customer list’’ and ‘‘Financial 

commitment’’ and Brown & Wood’s ‘‘Institutional relationships 

within the investment banking community.’’ The memorandum 

states that KPMG also planned to discuss ‘‘[w]hat should be the 

profit-split between KPMG, B&W and the tax products group/

implementor for jointly-developed products,’’ and suggesting that in 

‘‘a 7% deal’’ KPMG, B&W and the ‘‘Implementor’’ should split the 

net profits evenly, after awarding a ‘‘finder’s allocation’’ to the 

party who found the tax product purchaser. Still other documents 

indicate that Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, through Mr. Ruble, became a member of a working group that jointly developed OPIS.296

Evidence obtained by the Subcommittee also indicates that Sidley 

Austin Brown & Wood, through Mr. Ruble, was an active participant in the development of BLIPS, expending significant time 

working with KPMG tax professionals to author their respective 

opinion letters. 

In the case histories examined by the Subcommittee, once the design of a KPMG tax product was complete and KPMG began selling 

the product to clients, Sidley Austin Brown & Wood’s primary implementation role became one of issuing legal opinion letters to the 

persons who had purchased the products. Sidley Austin Brown & 

Wood, through Mr. Ruble, wrote literally hundreds of legal opinions 

supporting FLIP, OPIS, and BLIPS.297 In the case of SC2, KPMG 

had apparently made arrangements for clients to obtain a second 

opinion from either Sidley Austin Brown & Wood 298 or Bryan Cave, 

another major law firm,299 but it is unclear how many SC2 buyers, 

if any, took advantage of these arrangements and bought a second 

opinion. 

Traditionally, second opinion letters are supplied by a disinterested tax expert with no financial stake in the transaction being 

evaluated, and this expert sends an individualized letter to a single 

client. Certain IRS penalties, in fact, can be waived if a taxpayer 

relies ‘‘in good faith’’ on expert tax advice.300 The mass marketing 

of tax products to multiple clients, however, has been followed by 

the mass production of opinion letters that, for each letter sent to 

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301Facsimile cover sheet dated 2/26/97, from R.J. Ruble to David Lippman and John Larson 

at KPMG, Bates XX 001440. 302 Email dated 9/24/99, from R.J. Ruble of Brown & Wood, to Jeffrey Eischeid and Rick 

Bickham of KPMG, Bates KPMG 0033497; followed by other emails exchanged between Brown 

& Wood and KPMG personnel, from 9/25/99 to 10/29/99, Bates KPMG 0033496–97. 303See, e.g., KPMG document dated 6/19/00, entitled ‘‘SC2—Meeting Agenda,’’ Bates KPMG 

0013375–96, at 13393; see also Section VI(B)(2) of this Report on using tax opinion letters as 

a marketing tool. 304Jacoboni v. KPMG, Case No. 02–CV–510 (D.M.D. Fla. 4/29/02), at ¶ 19 (‘‘Mr. Jacoboni later 

received a copy of a ‘concurring opinion’ dated August 31, 1998, from the law firm Brown & 

Wood, LLP, which was requested by Dale Baumann of KPMG. The Brown & Wood concurring 

Continued

a client, earns its author a handsome fee. Since there are few costs 

associated with producing new opinion letters, once a prototype 

opinion letter has been completed for the generic tax product, the 

mass production of largely boilerplate opinion letters has become a 

lucrative business for firms like Sidley Austin Brown & Wood. The 

attractive profits available from these letters have also created new 

incentives for law firms to team up with tax product promoters to 

become the preferred source for a second opinion letter. This profit 

motive undermines an arms-length relationship between the two 

opinion writers. 

Actions taken by Sidley Austin Brown & Wood and KPMG to collaborate on their respective opinion letters raises additional questions about the law firm’s independent status. The evidence indicates that the law firm collaborated extensively with KPMG in the 

drafting of the BLIPS, FLIP, and OPIS opinion letters. This collaboration included joint identification, research, and analysis of 

key legal and tax issues; discussions about the best way to organize 

and present the reasoning used in their respective letters; and joint 

efforts to identify necessary factual representations by the participating parties in the transactions being analyzed. In the case of 

FLIP, Mr. Ruble faxed a copy of his draft opinion letter to KPMG 

before issuing it.301 In the case of BLIPS, Sidley Austin Brown & 

Wood and KPMG actually exchanged copies of their respective 

draft opinion letters and conducted a detailed ‘‘side-by-side’’ review 

‘‘to make sure we each cover everything the other has.’’ 302 The result was two, allegedly independent opinion letters containing numerous, virtually identical paragraphs. 

KPMG used the availability of a second opinion letter from 

Sidley Austin Brown & Wood as a marketing tool to increase sales 

of its tax products, telling clients that having this second letter 

would help protect them from accuracy-related penalties if the IRS 

were to later invalidate a tax product.303 Many clients were apparently swayed by this advice and sought an opinion letter from the 

law firm. Evidence obtained by the Subcommittee indicates that 

the opinion letters provided by the law firm were, like KPMG’s 

opinion letters, virtually identical in content and reflected little, if 

any, individualized client interaction or legal advice. In some cases, 

KPMG arranged to obtain a client’s opinion letter directly from the 

law firm and delivered it to the client, apparently without the client’s ever speaking to any Sidley Austin Brown & Wood lawyer. 

One individual told the Subcommittee staff that after KPMG sold 

him FLIP, KPMG arranged for him to obtain a favorable opinion 

letter from Sidley Austin Brown & Wood without his ever contacting the law firm or directly speaking with a lawyer.304 An indiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:56 Dec 11, 2003 Jkt 090655 PO 00000 Frm 00091 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\90655.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN
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opinion was mailed from New York to Mr. Jacoboni in Florida.’’); Subcommittee interview of 

legal counsel to Joseph Jacoboni (4/4/03). 305See testimony of Henry Camferdam regarding his purchase of COBRA, Senate Finance 

Committee hearing, ‘‘Tax Shelters: Who’s Buying, Who’s Selling, and What’s the Government 

Doing About It?’’ (10/21/03) (Camferdam: ‘‘I never talked to anyone at Brown & Wood. In fact, 

all of their documents were sent to us via [Ernst & Young]—not directly to us.’’). 306 Email dated 2/11/00, from Alexander Eckman to David G. Johnson and others, subject line 

redacted, Bates 2003EY011640.

vidual testifying at a recent Senate Finance Committee hearing 

testified that he had received a Sidley Austin Brown & Wood opinion letter for COBRA, a tax product he had purchased from Ernst 

& Young, by picking up the letter from the accounting firm’s office. 

He testified that he never communicated with anyone at the law 

firm.305 This type of evidence suggests that the law firm’s focus was 

not on providing individualized legal advice to clients, but on 

churning out boilerplate opinion letters for a fee. 

By routinely directing clients to Sidley Austin Brown & Wood to 

obtain a second opinion letter, KPMG produced a steady stream of 

income for the law firm. In the case of BLIPS, FLIP, and OPIS, 

Sidley Austin Brown & Wood was apparently paid at least $50,000 

per opinion. One document indicates that Sidley Austin Brown & 

Wood was paid this fee in every case where its name was mentioned during a sales pitch for BLIPS, whether or not the client actually purchased the law firm’s opinion letter. Other evidence indicates that in some BLIPS transactions expected to produce a very 

large ‘‘tax loss’’ for the client, Sidley Austin Brown & Wood was 

paid more than $50,000 for its opinion letter. 

Sidley Austin Brown & Wood provided opinion letters not only to 

KPMG, but also to other firms selling similar tax products. For example, the law firm also issued favorable opinion letters for 

COBRA, a tax product similar to OPIS, but sold by Ernst & Young. 

An email seems to suggest that when a client sought a tax opinion 

letter for a product from Ernst & Young and was turned down, 

Sidley Austin Brown & Wood may have advised the client to try 

KPMG instead. The internal Ernst & Young email states:

‘‘[Redacted name] told me that during the January meeting, Richard Shapiro gave him the name of R.J. Rubell 

[sic] at Brown and Wood and said that they could contact 

him directly regarding the tax opinion and other issues. 

He did that. Rubell said that Brown and Wood stands by 

the deal and is willing to issue the same opinion letter as 

before. They and others do not see the risk that E&Y sees. 

Apparently, B&W is also working with Diversified and 

KPMG and Rubell steered them in that direction.’’ 306

It is unclear exactly what problem is being addressed, but this 

email raises concerns about opinion letter shopping and about the 

propriety of the law firm’s steering clients away from Ernst & 

Young, apparently because that firm refused to issue a requested 

letter, and toward KPMG. 

In short, in exchange for substantial fees, Sidley Austin Brown 

& Wood provided legal services that facilitated KPMG’s development and sale of potentially abusive or illegal tax shelters such as 

FLIP, OPIS, and BLIPS, including by providing design assistance 

and collaborating on allegedly ‘‘independent’’ opinion letters repVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:56 Dec 11, 2003 Jkt 090655 PO 00000 Frm 00092 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\90655.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN
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resenting to clients that the KPMG tax products would withstand 

an IRS challenge. 

Finding: Some charitable organizations have participated as essential counter parties in a highly 

questionable tax shelter developed and sold by 

KPMG, in return for donations or the promise of 

future donations. 

The Role of the Charitable Organizations. SC2 transactions 

could not have taken place at all without the willing participation 

of a charitable organization. To participate in SC2 transactions, a 

charity had to undertake a number of non-routine and potentially 

expensive, time-consuming tasks. For example, the charity had to 

agree to accept an S corporation stock donation, which for many 

charities is, in itself, unusual; make sure it is exempt from the unrelated business income tax (hereinafter ‘‘UBIT’’) and would not be 

taxed for any corporate income earned during the time when the 

charity was a shareholder; sign a redemption agreement; determine 

how to treat the stock donation on its financial statements; and 

then hold the stock for several years before receiving any cash donation for its efforts. Moreover, relatively few charities are exempt 

from the UBIT, and those that are—like pension funds—do not 

normally receive large contributions from private donors. 

KPMG approved SC2 for sale to clients in March 2000, and discontinued all sales 18 months later, around September 2001, after 

selling the tax product to about 58 S corporations. The SC2 sales 

produced fees exceeding $26 million for KPMG, making SC2 one of 

KPMG’s top ten revenue producers in 2000 and 2001. Although 

KPMG refused to identify the charities that participated in the SC2 

transactions, the Subcommittee was able to identify and interview 

two which, between them, participated in more than half of the 

SC2 transactions KPMG arranged. 

The two charities interviewed by the Subcommittee staff indicated that they would not have participated in the SC2 transactions absent being approached, convinced, and assisted by 

KPMG. The Los Angeles Department of Fire & Police Pensions 

System is a $10 billion pension fund that serves the police and fire 

departments in the city of Los Angeles in California. The Austin 

Fire Fighters Relief and Retirement Fund is a much smaller pension fund serving the fire departments in Austin, Texas. 

Based upon information provided to the Subcommittee, it appears that, out of the about 58 SC2 tax products sold by KPMG in 

2000 and 2001, the Los Angeles pension fund participated in 29 of 

the SC2 transactions, while the Austin pension fund participated 

in five. The Los Angeles pension fund indicated that, as a result 

of the SC2 transactions, it is currently holding stock valued at 

about $7.3 million from 16 S corporations, and has sold back donated stock to 13 corporations in exchange for cash payments totaling about $5.5 million. Both pension funds told the Subcommittee 

that the SC2 stock donors and their corporations had generally 

been from out-of-state. The Los Angeles pension fund indicated 

that it had received stock from S corporations in Arizona, Georgia, 

Hawaii, Missouri, and North Carolina. The Austin pension fund indicated that it had received stock from S corporations in California, 

90

307Letter dated 12/30/99, from Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson to the Los Angeles 

pension fund, at 3. 308 Id. The letter states: ‘‘You have asked us to advise you concerning the ability of the L.A. 

Fire & Police Pension System (the ‘Plan’) to accept a contribution from an unrelated third party 

in the form of nonvoting stock of a closely held California S corporation. . . . It should be noted 

that, from a procedural and due-diligence standpoint, (1) we have not been asked to conduct, 

and we have not conducted, any investigation into the company and/or the individual involved, 

(2) we have not yet reviewed any of the underlying documentation in connection with the donation or the possible future redemption of the stock, and offer no opinion on such agreements 

or their impact on any of the views expressed in this letter, (3) we have not examined, or opined 

in any way about, the impact of the transaction on the ‘donor’ from a tax or other standpoint, 

and (4) we have not checked the investment against any investment policy guidelines that may 

have been adopted by the Board.’’

Mississippi, New Jersey, and New York. Both pension funds indicated that they had not met any of the SC2 donors until KPMG 

introduced them to the charities. 

Both charities indicated to the Subcommittee staff that, in determining whether to participate in the SC2 transactions, they relied 

on KPMG’s representation that the transactions complied with federal tax law. The Los Angeles pension fund also obtained from an 

outside law firm a legal opinion letter on the narrow issue of 

whether the charity had the legal authority to accept a donation of 

S corporation stock. In analyzing this issue, the law firm notes first 

in the legal opinion letter that all of the facts recited about the 

transaction had been provided to the law firm by a KPMG tax professional.307 The letter concludes that the pension fund may accept 

an S corporation stock donation from an unrelated third party: ‘‘Although this is a very unusual transaction, and there is almost no 

statutory, regulatory or other authority addressing the issue, we 

believe the Plan is permitted to accept a contribution.’’ The letter 

also states, however, that the law firm had not been asked to provide any legal advice about the substance of the SC2 transaction 

itself, that it had not been given any documentation to review, and 

that it was not offering any opinion on ‘‘the impact of the transaction on the ‘donor’ from a tax or other standpoint.’’ 308

Apparently, neither charity obtained a legal or tax opinion letter 

or other written legal advice, from KPMG or any other firm, on 

whether the SC2 tax product and related transactions complied 

with federal tax law or whether the charity’s participation in SC2 

transactions could be viewed as aiding or abetting tax evasion. The 

two pension funds told the Subcommittee that they simply relied 

on KPMG’s reputation as a reputable firm in assuming the donation strategy was within the law. 

Both pension funds told the Subcommittee that, in every SC2 

transaction, it was their expectation that they would not retain 

ownership of the donated stock, but would sell it back to the stock 

donor after the expiration of the period of time indicated in the redemption agreement. They also indicated that they did not expect 

to obtain significant amounts of money from the S corporation during the period in which the charity was a stockholder but expected, 

instead, to obtain a large cash payment at the time the charity sold 

the stock back to the donor. Moreover, the charities told the Subcommittee staff that their expectations have, in fact, been met, and 

the SC2 transactions have been carried out as planned by KPMG, 

the donors, and the charities. These facts and expectations raise serious questions about whether the SC2 transactions ever truly 

passed ownership of the stock to the charity or acted merely as an 

91

309See Section VI(B) of this Report. 310 Handwritten notes dated 3/4/98, author not indicated, regarding ‘‘Brown & Wood’’ and 

‘‘OPIS,’’ Bates KPMG 0047317. Emphasis in original. ‘‘B&W’’ refers to Brown & Wood, the law 

firm that worked with KPMG on OPIS. Presidio is an investment firm that worked with KPMG 

on OPIS. 311Subcommittee interview of Lawrence DeLap (10/30/03). 

assignment of income for a specified period time to the charitable 

organization. 

In the case of BLIPS, FLIP, OPIS, and SC2, major banks, investment advisory firms, law firms, and charitable organizations provided critical services or acted as essential counterparties in the 

transactions called for by the tax products. Each obtained lucrative 

fees, often totaling in the millions of dollars, for their participation. 

Despite the complexity, frequency, and size of the transactions and 

their clear connection to tax avoidance schemes, none of the participating organizations presented to the Subcommittee a reasoned, 

contemporaneous analysis of the tax shelter, reputational risk, ethical, or professional issues justifying the organization’s role in facilitating these highly questionable and abusive tax transactions. 

(4) Avoiding Detection 

Finding: KPMG has taken steps to conceal its tax 

shelter activities from tax authorities and the public, including by refusing to register potentially 

abusive tax shelters with the IRS, restricting file 

documentation, and using improper tax return reporting techniques.

Evidence obtained by the Subcommittee in the four KPMG case 

studies shows that KPMG has taken a number of steps to conceal 

its tax shelter activities from IRS, law enforcement, and the public. 

In the first instance, it has simply denied being a tax shelter promoter and claimed that tax shelter information requests do not 

apply to its products. Second, evidence in the FLIP, OPIS, BLIPS, 

and SC2 case histories indicate that KPMG took a number of precautions in the way it designed, marketed, and implemented these 

tax products to avoid or minimize detection of its activities. 

No Tax Shelter Disclosure. KPMG’s public position is that it 

does not develop, sell or promote tax shelters, as explained earlier 

in this Report. As a consequence, KPMG has not voluntarily registered, and thereby disclosed to the IRS, a single one of its tax 

products. A memorandum quoted at length earlier in this Report 309

establishes that, in 1998, a KPMG tax professional advised the 

firm not to register the OPIS tax product with the IRS, even if 

OPIS qualified as a tax shelter under the law, citing competitive 

pressures and a perceived lack of enforcement or effective penalties 

for noncompliance with the registration requirement. Another document discussing registration of OPIS had this to say: ‘‘Must register the product. B&W concerns—risk is too high. Confirm w/Presidio that they will register.’’ 310 The head of DPP-Tax told the Subcommittee staff that he had recommended registering not only 

OPIS, but also BLIPS, but was overruled in each instance by the 

top official in charge of the Tax Services Practice.311

Other documents show that consideration of tax shelter registration issues was a required step in the tax product approval process, 

92

312KPMG Tax Services Manual, § 24.4.1, at 24–2. 313 Email dated 5/11/98, from Jeffrey Zysik to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘Registration,’’ 

Bates KPMG 0034805–06. See also email dated 5/12/98, from Jeffrey Zysik to multiple KPMG 

tax professionals, ‘‘Registration requirements.,’’ Bates KPMG 0034807–11 (reasonable cause exception, tax shelter definitions, number of registrations required); email dated 5/20/98, from Jeffrey Zysik to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘Misc. Tax Reg. issues,’’ Bates KPMG 0034832–

33 (‘‘reasonable cause exception for not registering’’; application of regulatory ‘‘tax shelter ratio’’ 

to identify tax shelters; ‘‘establishing a separate entity to act as the entity registering ALL tax 

products. . . . Otherwise we must submit our name as the tax shelter organizer.’’). 314Document dated 5/18/01, ‘‘PFP Practice Reorganization Innovative Strategies Business 

Plan—DRAFT,’’ Bates KPMG 0050620–23, at 2. 315See United States v. KPMG, Case No. 1:02MS00295 (D.D.C. 9/6/02). 

but rather than resulting in IRS registrations, KPMG appears to 

have devoted resources to devising rationales for not registering a 

product with the IRS. KPMG’s Tax Services Manual states that 

every new tax product must be analyzed by the WNT Tax Controversy Services group ‘‘to address tax shelter regulations 

issues.’’ 312 For example, one internal document analyzing tax shelter registration issues discusses the ‘‘policy argument’’ that 

KPMG’s tax ‘‘advice . . . does not meet the paradigm of 6111(c) 

registration’’ and identifies other flaws with the legal definition of 

‘‘tax shelter’’ that may excuse registration. The email also suggests 

possibly creating a separate entity to act as the registrant for 

KPMG tax products: 

‘‘If we decide we will be registering in the future, thought 

should be given to establishing a separate entity that 

meets the definition of an organizer for all of our products 

with registration potential. This entity, rather than 

KPMG, would then be available through agreement to act 

as the registering organizer. . . . If such an entity is established, KPMG can avoid submitting its name as the organizer of a tax shelter on Form(s) 8264 to be filed in the 

future.’’ 313

Another KPMG document, a fiscal year 2002 draft business plan 

for the Personal Financial Planning Practice, describes two tax 

products under development, but not yet approved, due in part to 

pending tax shelter registration issues.314 The first, referred to as 

POPS, is described as ‘‘a gain mitigation solution.’’ The business 

plan states: ‘‘We have completed the solution’s technical review and 

have almost finalized the rationale for not registering POPS as a 

tax shelter.’’ The second product is described as a ‘‘conversion 

transaction . . . that halves the taxpayer’s effective tax rate by effectively converting ordinary income to long term capital gain.’’ The 

business plan notes: ‘‘The most significant open issue is tax shelter 

registration and the impact registration will have on the solution.’’

The IRS has issued ‘‘listed transactions’’ that explicitly identify 

FLIP, OPIS, and BLIPS as potentially abusive tax shelters. Due to 

these tax products and others, the IRS is investigating KPMG to 

determine whether it is a tax shelter promoter and is complying 

with the tax shelter requirements in Federal law.315 KPMG continues flatly to deny that it is a tax shelter promoter and has continued to resist registering any of its tax products with the IRS. 

A second consequence of KPMG’s public denial that it is a tax 

shelter promoter has been its refusal fully to comply with the document requests made by the IRS for lists of clients who purchased 

tax shelters from the firm. In a recent hearing before the Senate 

93

316Testimony of Eileen J. O’Connor, Assistant Attorney General for the Tax Division, U.S. Department of Justice, before the Senate Committee on Finance, ‘‘Tax Shelters: Who’s Buying, 

Who’s Selling and What’s the Government Doing About It?’’ (10/21/03), at 3. 317Testimony of B. John Williams, Jr. former IRS chief counsel, before the Senate Committee 

on Finance, ‘‘Tax Shelters: Who’s Buying, Who’s Selling and What’s the Government Doing 

About It?’’ (10/21/03), at 4–5. 318Testimony of Mark W. Everson, IRS Commissioner, before the Senate Committee on Finance, ‘‘Tax Shelters: Who’s Buying, Who’s Selling and What’s the Government Doing About It?’’ 

(10/21/03), at 11. 319 Email dated 4/9/02, from Deke Carbo to Jeffrey Eischeid, ‘‘Larry’s Message,’’ Bates KPMG 

0024467. See also email dated 4/19/02, from Ken JOnes to multiple KPMG tax professionals, 

‘‘TCS Weekly Update,’’ Bates KPMG 0050430–31 (‘‘We have just hand-carried the lists of investors over to the IRS, for the following deals: . . . SC2. . . . Note that not all cilents names were 

Continued

Finance Committee, the U.S. Department of Justice stated that, although the client-list maintenance requirement enacted by Congress ‘‘clearly precludes any claim of identity privilege for tax shelter customers regardless of whether the promoters happen to be accountants or lawyers, the issue continues to be the subject of vigorous litigation.’’ 316 The Department pointed out that one circuit 

court of appeals and four district courts had already ruled that accounting firms, law firms, and a bank must divulge client information requested by the IRS under the tax shelter laws, but certain 

accounting firms were continuing to contest IRS document requests. At the same hearing, the former IRS chief counsel characterized the refusal to disclose client names by invoking either attorney-client privilege or Section 7525 of the tax code as ‘‘frivolous,’’ 

while also noting that one effect of the ensuing litigation battles 

‘‘was to delay [promoter] audits to the point of losing one or more 

tax years to the statute of limitations.’’ 317

IRS Commissioner, Mark Everson, testified at the same hearing 

that the IRS had filed suit against KPMG in July 2002, ‘‘to compel 

the public accounting firm to disclose information to the IRS about 

all tax shelters it has marketed since 1998.’’ 318 He stated, ‘‘Although KPMG has produced many documents to the IRS, it has 

also withheld a substantial number.’’ 

Some of the documents obtained by the Subcommittee during its 

investigation illustrate the debate within KPMG over responding to 

the IRS requests for client names and other information. In April 

2002, one KPMG tax professional wrote:

‘‘I have two clients who are about to file [tax returns] for 

2001. We have discussed with each of them what is happening between KPMG and IRS and both do not plan to 

disclose at this time. Since Larry’s message indicated the 

information requested was to respond to an IRS summons, 

I am concerned we are about to turn over a new list of 

names for transactions I believe IRS has no prior knowledge of. I need to know immediately if that is what is happening. It will obviously have a material effect on their 

evaluation of whether they wish to disclose and what positions they wish to take on their 2001 returns. Since April 

15th is Monday, I need a response. . . . [I]f we are responding to what appears to be an IRS fishing expedition, 

it is going to reflect very badly on KPMG. Several clients 

have seriously questioned whether we are doing everything we can to protect their interests.’’ 319

94

turned over for each of these Solutions . . . so if you need to find out if a company or individual 

was on the list . . . call or email me.’’). 320 ‘‘Grantor Trust Reporting Requirements for Capital Transactions,’’ KPMG WNT internal 

memorandum (2/98). 321 Email dated 9/2/98, from Mark Watson to John Gardner, Jeffrey Eischeid, and others; 

‘‘RE:FW: Grantor trust memo,’’ Bates KPMG 0035807. See also email dated 9/3/98, from Mark 

Watson to Jeffrey Eischeid and John Gardner, ‘‘RE:FW: Grantor trust memo,’’ Bates KPMG 

0023331–32 (explaining objections to netting at the grantor trust level). 322 Email dated 1/21/99, from Mark Watson to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘RE: Grantor 

trust reporting,’’ Bates KPMG 0010066. 

Tax Return Reporting. KPMG also took a number of questionable steps to minimize the amount of information reported in tax 

returns about the transactions involved in its tax products in order 

to limit IRS detection. 

Perhaps the most disturbing of these actions was first taken in 

tax returns reporting transactions related to OPIS. To minimize information on the relevant tax returns and avoid alerting the IRS 

to the OPIS tax product, some KPMG tax professionals advised 

their OPIS clients to participate in the transactions through 

‘‘grantor trusts.’’ These KPMG tax professionals also advised their 

clients to file tax returns in which all of the losses from the OPIS 

transactions were ‘‘netted’’ with the capital gains realized by the 

taxpayer at the grantor trust level, instead of reporting each individual gain or loss, so that only a single, small net capital gain or 

loss would appear on the client’s personal income tax return. This 

netting approach, advocated in an internally-distributed KPMG 

memorandum,320 elicited intense debate within the firm. KPMG’s 

top WNT technical tax expert on the issue of grantor trusts wrote 

the following in two emails over the span of 4 months: 

‘‘I don’t think netting at the grantor trust level is a proper 

reporting position. Further, we have never prepared grantor trust returns in this manner. What will our explanation 

be when the Service and/or courts ask why we suddenly 

changed the way we prepared grantor trust returns/statements only for certain clients? When you put the OPIS 

transaction together with this ‘stealth’ reporting approach, 

the whole thing stinks.’’ 321

‘‘You should all know that I do not agree with the conclusion reached in the attached memo that capital gains can 

be netted at the trust level. I believe we are filing misleading, and perhaps false, returns by taking this reporting position.’’ 322

One of the tax professionals selling OPIS wrote:

‘‘This ‘debate’ . . . [over grantor trust netting] affects me 

in a significant way in that a number of my deals were 

sold giving the client the option of netting. . . . Therefore, 

if they ask me to net, I feel obligated to do so. These sales 

were before Watson went on record with his position and 

after the memo had been outstanding for some time.

‘‘What is our position as a group? Watson told me he believes it is a hazardous professional practice issue. Given 

95

323 Email dated 1/21/99, from Carl Hasting to Jeffrey Eischeid, ‘‘FW: Grantor trust reporting,’’ 

Bates KPMG 0010066. 324 Email dated 1/22/99, from Jeffrey Eischeid to Carl Hasting, ‘‘FW: Grantor trust reporting,’’ 

Bates KPMG 0010066. Other OPIS tax return reporting issues are discussed in other KPMG 

documentation including, for example, memorandum dated 12/21/98, from Bob Simon/Margaret 

Lukes to Robin Paule, ‘‘Certain U.S. International Tax Reporting Requirements re: OPIS,’’ Bates 

KPMG 0050630–40. 325Subcommittee interview of Mark Watson (11/4/03). 326 IRS Notice 2000–44 (2000–36 IRB 255) (9/5/00) at 256.

that none of us wants to face such an issue, I need some 

guidance.’’ 323

The OPIS National Deployment Champion responded: ‘‘[W]e concluded that each partner must review the WNT memo and decide 

for themselves what position to take on their returns—after discussing the various pros and cons with their clients.’’ 324

The technical reviewer who opposed grantor trust netting told 

the Subcommittee staff that it was his understanding that, as the 

top WNT technical expert, his technical judgment on the matter 

should have stopped KPMG tax professionals from using or advocating the use of this technique and thought he had done so, before 

leaving for a KPMG post outside the United States. He told the 

Subcommittee staff he learned later, however, that the OPIS National Deployment Champion had convened a conference call without informing him and told the participating KPMG tax professionals that they could use the netting technique if they wished. He 

indicated that he also learned that some KPMG tax professionals 

were apparently advising BLIPS clients to use grantor trust netting to avoid alerting the IRS to their BLIPS transactions.325

In September 2000, the IRS issued Notice 2000–44, invalidating 

the BLIPS tax product. This Notice included a strong warning 

against grantor trust netting:

‘‘[T]he Service and the Treasury have learned that certain 

persons who have promoted participation in transactions 

described in this notice have encouraged individual taxpayers to participate in such transactions in a manner designed to avoid the reporting of large capital gains from 

unrelated transactions on their individual income tax returns (Form 1040). Certain promoters have recommended 

that taxpayers participate in these transactions through 

grantor trusts and . . . advised that the capital gains and 

losses from these transactions may be netted, so that only 

a small net capital gain or loss is reported on the taxpayer’s individual income tax return. In addition to other 

penalties, any person who willfully conceals the amount of 

capital gains and losses in this manner, or who willfully 

counsels or advises such concealment, may be guilty of a 

criminal offense. . . .’’ 326

The technical reviewer who had opposed using grantor trust netting told the Subcommittee that, soon after this Notice was published, he had received a telephone call from his WNT replacement 

informing him of the development and seeking his advice. He indiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:56 Dec 11, 2003 Jkt 090655 PO 00000 Frm 00099 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\90655.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN
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327Subcommittee interview of Mark Watson (11/4/03). See also Memorandum of Telephone 

Call, dated 5/24/00, from Kevin Pace regarding a telephone conversation with Carl Hastings, 

Bates KPMG 0036353 (‘‘[T]here is quite a bit of activity in the trust area . . . because they have 

figured out that trusts are a common element in some of these shelter deals. So our best intelligence is that you are increasing your odds of being audited, not decreasing your odds by filing 

that Grantor Trust return. So we have discontinued doing that.’’) 328 Email dated 2/15/00, from Robert Jordan to Jeffrey Eischeid, ‘‘Tax reporting for BLIPS,’’ 

Bates KPMG 0006537. 329 Email dated 3/28/00, from Jean Monahan to Jeffrey Eischeid and other KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘presidio K–1s,’’ Bates KPMG 0024451. See also email dated 3/22/00, unidentified sender and recipients, ‘‘Nondisclosure,’’ Bates KPMG 0025704.

cated that it was his understanding that a number of client calls 

were later made by KPMG tax professionals.327

Other tax return reporting concerns also arose in connection with 

BLIPS. In an email with the subject line, ‘‘Tax reporting for 

BLIPS,’’ a KPMG tax professional sent the following message to 

the BLIPS National Deployment Champion: ‘‘I don’t know if I 

missed this on a conference call or if there’s a memo floating 

around somewhere, but could we get specific guidance on the reporting of the BLIPS transaction. . . . I have ‘IRS matching’ concerns.’’ The email later continues:

‘‘One concern I have is the IRS trying to match the Deutsche dividend income which contains the Borrower LLC’s 

FEIN [Federal Employer Identification Number][.] (I understand they’re not too efficient on matching K–1’s but 

the dividends come through on a 1099 which they do attempt to match). I wouldn’t like to draw any scrutiny from 

the Service whatsoever. If we don’t file anything for Borrower LLC we could get a notice which would force us to 

explain where the dividends ultimately were reported. Not 

fatal but it is scrutiny nonetheless.’’ 328

About a month later, another KPMG tax professional wrote to 

the BLIPS National Deployment Champion:

‘‘We spoke to Steven Buss about the possibility of reissuing the Presidio K–1s in the EIN of the member of the 

single member [limited liability corporations used in 

BLIPS]. He said that you guys hashed it out on Friday 

3/24 and in a nutshell, Presidio is not going to re-issue

K–1s.

‘‘David was wondering what the rationale was since the instructions and PPC say that single member LLCs are disregarded entities so 1099s, K–1s should use the EIN of the 

single member.’’ 329

She received the following response:

‘‘It was discussed on the national conference call today. 

Tracey Stone has been working with Mark Ely on the 

issue. Ely has indicated that while the IRS may have the 

capability to match ID numbers for partnerships, they 

probably lack the resources to do so. While technically the 

K–1’s should have the social security number of the owner 

on them, it is my understanding that Mark has suggested 

that we not file a partnership for the single member LLC 

and that Presidio not file amended K–1s. . . . Tracey indicated that Mark did not like the idea of having us prepare 

97

330 Email dated 3/27/00, unidentified sender and recipients, ‘‘presidio K–1s,’’ Bates KPMG 

0024451. 331See, e.g., emails dated 4/1/00–4/3/00 among Mark Ely, David Rivkin and other KPMG tax 

professionals, ‘‘RE: Blips and tax filing issues,’’ Bates KPMG 0006481–82; emails dated 3/23/00, 

between Mark Watson, Jeffrey Eischeid, David Rivkin and other KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘RE: 

Blips and tax filing issues,’’ Bates KPMG 0006480. See also email dated 7/27/99, from Deke 

Carbo to Randall Bickham, Jeffrey Eischeid, and Shannon Liston, ‘‘Grouping BLIPS Investors,’’ 

KPMG Bates 0023350 (suggests ‘‘grouping’’ multiple, unrelated BLIPS investors in a single 

Deutsche Bank account, possibly styled as a joint venture account, which might not qualify as 

a partnership required to file a K–1 tax return); email response dated 7/27/99, unidentified sender and recipients, ‘‘Grouping BLIPS Investors,’’ KPMG Bates 0023350 (promises followup on 

suggestion which may ‘‘[solve] our grouping problem’’). 332See email dated 3/11/98 from Gregg Ritchie to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘Potential 

FLIP Reporting Strategy,’’ Bates KPMG 0034372–75. See also internal KPMG memorandum 

dated 3/31/98, by Robin Paule, Los Angeles/Warner Center, ‘‘Form 5471 Filing Issues,’’ Bates 

KPMG 0011952–53; and internal KPMG memorandum dated 3/6/98, by Bob Simon and Margaret Lukes, ‘‘Potential FLIP Reporting Strategy,’’ Bates KPMG 0050644–45. 333 ‘‘SC2—Meeting Agenda’’ and attachments, dated 6/19/00, Bates KPMG 0013375–96, at 

13394. 334 ‘‘Fishtail, Bacchus, Sundance, and Slapshot: Four Enron Transactions Funded and Facilitated by U.S. Financial Institutions,’’ Report prepared by the U.S. Senate Permanent SubContinued

partnership returns this year because then the IRS would 

be looking for them in future years.’’ 330

Additional emails sent among various KPMG tax professionals discuss whether BLIPS participants should extend or amend their tax 

returns, or file certain other tax forms, again with repeated references to minimizing IRS scrutiny of client return information.331

In the case of FLIP, KPMG tax professionals devised a different 

approach to avoiding IRS detection.332 Again, the focus was on tax 

return reporting. The idea was to arrange for the offshore corporation involved in FLIP transactions to designate a fiscal year that 

ended in some month other than December in order to extend the 

year in which the corporation would have to report FLIP gains or 

losses on its tax return. For example, if the offshore corporation 

were to use a fiscal year ending in June, FLIP transactions which 

took place in August 1997, would not have to be reported on the 

corporation’s tax return until after June 1998. Meanwhile, the individual taxpayer involved with the same FLIP transactions would 

have reported the gains or losses in his or her tax return for 1997. 

The point of arranging matters so that the FLIP transactions 

would be reported by the corporation and individual in tax returns 

for different years was simply to make it more difficult for the IRS 

to detect a link between the two participants in the FLIP transactions. 

In the case of SC2, KPMG advised its tax professionals to tell potential buyers worried about being audited:

‘‘[T]his transaction is very stealth. We are not generating 

losses or other highly visible items on the S-corp return. 

All income of the S-corp is allocated to the shareholders, 

it just so happens that one shareholder [the charity] will 

not pay tax.’’ 333

No Roadmaps. A Subcommittee hearing held in December 2002, 

on an abusive tax shelter sold by J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. to 

Enron presented evidence that the bank and the company explicitly 

designed that tax shelter to avoid providing a ‘‘roadmap’’ to tax authorities.334 KPMG appears to have taken similar precautions in 

FLIP, OPIS, BLIPS, and SC2. 

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committee on Investigations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, S. Prt. 107–82 (1/2/03), 

at 32. 335 Email dated 3/25/00, from Larry Manth to Larry DeLap, Phillip Galbreath, Mark Springer, 

and Richard Smith, ‘‘RE: S-corp Product,’’ Bates KPMG 0016986–87. 336 Email dated 3/27/00, from Larry DeLap to Larry Manth, Phillip Galbreath, Mark Springer 

and Richard Smith, ‘‘RE: S-Corp Product,’’ Bates KPMG 0016986. 337 Handwritten notes dated 3/4/98, author not indicated, regarding ‘‘Brown & Wood’’ and 

‘‘OPIS,’’ Bates KPMG 0047317. 338 Email dated 7/29/99, from Mick Wood to Francesco Piovanetti and other Deutsche Bank 

professionals, ‘‘Re: Risk & Resources Committee Paper—BLIPS,’’ Bates DB BLIPS 6556.

In the case of SC2, in an exchange of emails among senior 

KPMG tax professionals discussing whether to send clients a letter 

explicitly identifying SC2 as a high-risk strategy and outlining certain specific risks, the SC2 National Deployment Champion wrote:

‘‘[D]o we need to disclose the risk in the engagement letter? . . . Could we have an addendum that discloses the 

risks? If so, could the Service have access to that? Obviously the last thing we want to do is provide the Service 

with a road map.’’ 335

The DPP head responded:

‘‘. . . If the risk has been disclosed and the IRS is successful in a challenge, the client can’t maintain he was bushwhacked because he wasn’t informed of the risk. . . . We 

could have a statement in the engagement letter that the 

client acknowledges receipt of a memorandum concerning 

risks associated with the strategy, then cover the double 

taxation risk and penalty risks (and other relevant risks) 

in that separate memorandum. Depending on how one interprets section 7525(b), such a memorandum arguably 

qualifies for the federal confidential communications privilege under section 7525(a).’’ 336

This was not the only KPMG document that discussed using attorney-client or other legal privileges to limit disclosure of KPMG 

documents and activities related to its tax products. For example, 

a 1998 document containing handwritten notes from a KPMG tax 

professional about a number of issues related to OPIS states, under 

the heading ‘‘Brown & Wood’’: ‘‘Privilege[:] B&W can play a big role 

at providing protection in this area.’’ 337

Other parties who participated in the KPMG tax products also 

discussed using attorney-client privilege to conceal their activities. 

One was Deutsche Bank, which participated in both OPIS and 

BLIPS. In an internal email, one Deutsche Bank employee wrote 

to another regarding BLIPS: ‘‘I would have thought you could still 

ensure that . . . the papers are prepared, and all discussion held, 

in a way which makes them legally privileged. (. . . you may remember that was one of my original suggestions).’’ 338 Earlier, when 

considering whether to participate in BLIPS initially, the bank decided to limit its discussion of BLIPS on paper and not to obtain 

the approval of the bank committee that normally evaluates the 

risk that a transaction poses to the reputation of the bank, in order 

not to leave ‘‘an audit trail’’: 

‘‘1. STRUCTURE: A diagramatic representation of the deal 

may help the Committee’s understanding—we can prepare 

this.

99

339 Email dated 7/30/99, from Ivor Dunbar to multiple Deutsche Bank professionals, ‘‘Re: Risk 

& Resources Committee Paper—BLIPS,’’ unreadable Bates DB BLIPS number. 340 Email dated 8/30/99, from Tom Newman to multiple First Union professionals, ‘‘next strategy,’’ Bates SEN–014622. 341 Email dated 1/3/00, from Dale Baumann to ‘‘Jeff,’’ ‘‘988 election memo,’’ Bates KPMG 

0026345. 342 Email dated 9/16/98, from Bob to unknown recipients, ‘‘Documentation,’’ Bates KPMG 

0025729. Documents related to other KPMG tax products, such as TEMPEST and OTHELLO, 

contain similar information. See, e.g., message from Bob McCahill and Ken Jones, attached to 

Continued

‘‘2. PRIVILEDGE [sic]: This is not easy to achieve and 

therefore a more detailed description of the tax issues is 

not advisable.

‘‘3. REPUTATION RISK: In this transaction, reputation 

risk is tax related and we have been asked by the Tax Department not to create an audit trail in respect of the 

Bank’s tax affaires. The Tax department assumes prime 

responsibility for controlling tax related risks (including 

reputation risk) and will brief senior management accordingly. We are therefore not asking R&R Committee to approve reputation risk on BLIPS. This will be dealt with directly by the Tax Department and John Ross.’’ 339

Another bank that took precautions against placing tax product 

information on paper was Wachovia Bank’s First Union National 

Bank. A First Union employee sent the following instructions to a 

number of his colleagues apparently in connection with the bank’s 

approving sales of a new KPMG tax product:

‘‘In order to . . . lower our profile on this particular strategy, the following points should be noted: The strategy has 

an KPMG acronym which will not be shared with the general First Union community. . . . Our traditional sources 

of client referrals inside First Union should not be informed of which Big 5 accounting firm we will choose to 

bring in on a strategy meeting with a client. . . . No onepager will be distributed to our referral sources describing 

the strategy.’’ 340

Other documents obtained by the Subcommittee include instructions by senior KPMG tax professionals to their staff not to keep 

certain revealing documentation in their files or to clean out their 

files, again to avoid or limit detection of firm activity. For example, 

in the case of BLIPS, a KPMG tax professional sent an email to 

multiple colleagues stating: ‘‘You may want to remind everyone on 

Monday NOT to put a copy of Angie’s email on the 988 elections 

in their BLIPS file. It is a road map for the taxing authorities to 

all the other listed transactions. I continue to find faxes from 

Quadra in the files . . . in the two 1996 deals here which are 

under CA audit which reference multiple transactions—not good if 

we would have to turn them over to California.’’ 341 In the case of 

OPIS, a KPMG tax professional wrote: ‘‘I have quite a few documents/papers/notes related to the OPIS transaction. . . . Purging 

unnecessary information now pursuant to an established standard 

is probably ok. If the Service asks for information down the road 

(and we have it) we’ll have to give it to them I suspect. Input from 

(gulp) DPP may be appropriate.’’ 342

100

an email dated 3/1/02, from Walter Duer to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘RE: TCS Review 

of TEMPEST and OTHELLO,’’ Bates KPMG 0032378–80 (‘‘There is current IRS audit activity 

with respect to two early TEMPEST engagements. One situation is under fairly intense scrutiny 

by IRS Financial Institutions and Products specialists. . . . Although KPMG has yet to receive 

a subpoena or any other request for documents, client lists, etc. we believe it is likely that such 

a request(s) is inevitable. Since TEMPEST is a National Stratecon solution for which Bob McCahill and Bill Reilly were the Co-Champions . . . it is most efficient to have all file reviews and 

‘‘clean-ups’’ (electronic or hard copy) performed in one location, namely the FS NYC office. This 

effort will be performed by selected NE Stratecon professionals . . . with ultimate review and 

final decision making by Ken Jones. . . . [W]e want the same approach to be followed for 

OTHELLO as outlined above for TEMPEST. Senior tax leadership, Jeff Stein and Rick Rosenthal concur with this approach.’’) 343See, e.g., memorandum dated 8/5/98, from Doug Ammerman to PFP Partners, ‘‘OPIS and 

Other Innovative Strategies,’’ Bates KPMG 0026141–43, at 2–3 (‘‘subject to their signing a confidentiality agreement’’); Jacoboni v. KPMG, Case No. 6:02–CV–510 (District Court for the Middle District of Florida) Complaint (filed 4/29/02), at ¶ 9 (‘‘KPMG executives told [Mr. Jacoboni] 

he could not involve any other professionals because the investment ‘strategy’ [FLIP] was ‘confidential.’ ’’ Emphasis in original.); Subcommittee interview of legal counsel of Mr. Jacoboni (4/

4/03). 344 Email dated 5/5/99, from Jeffrey Eischeid to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘Marketing 

BLIPS,’’ Bates KPMG 0006106. 345Subcommittee interview of Wachovia Bank representatives (3/25/03); Subcommittee interview of legal counsel of Theodore C. Swartz (9/16/03). 346 Email dated 5/5/99, from Jeffrey Eischeid to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘Marketing 

BLIPS,’’ Bates KPMG 0006106. 347 Email dated 4/11/00, from Larry DeLap to Tax Professional Practice Partners, ‘‘S-Corporation Charitable Contribution Strategy (SC2),’’ Bates KPMG 0052582. 348 Email dated 5/5/99, from Jeffrey Eischeid to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘Marketing 

BLIPS,’’ Bates KPMG 0006106.

Marketing Restrictions. KPMG also took precautions against 

detection of its activities during the marketing of the four products 

studied by the Subcommittee. FLIP and OPIS were explained only 

after potential clients signed a confidentiality agreement promising 

not to disclose the information to anyone else.343 In the case of 

BLIPS, KMPG tax professionals were instructed to obtain ‘‘[s]igned 

nondisclosure agreements . . . before any meetings can be scheduled.’’ 344 KPMG also limited the paperwork used to explain the 

products to clients. Client presentations were done on chalkboards 

or erasable whiteboards, and written materials were retrieved from 

clients before leaving a meeting.345 KPMG determined as well that 

‘‘[p]roviding a copy of a draft opinion letter will no longer be done 

to assist clients in their due diligence.’’ 346 In SC2, the DPP head 

instructed KPMG tax professionals not to provide any ‘‘sample documents’’ directly to a client.347

KPMG also attempted to place marketing restrictions on the 

number of products sold so that word of them would be restricted 

to a small circle. In the case of BLIPS, the DPP initially authorized 

only 50 to be sold.348 In the case of SC2, a senior tax professional 

warned against mass marketing the product to prevent the IRS 

from getting ‘‘wind of it’’: 

‘‘I was copied on the message below, which appears to indicate that the firm is intent on marketing the SC2 strategy 

to virtually every S corp with a pulse (if S corps had 

pulses). Going way back to Feb. 2000, when SC2 first 

reared its head, my recollection is that SC2 was intended 

to be limited to a relatively small number of large S corps. 

That plan made sense because, in my opinion, there was 

(and is) a strong risk of a successful IRS attack on SC2 if 

the IRS gets wind of it. . . . [T]he intimate group of S 

corps potentially targeted for SC2 marketing has now expanded to 3,184 corporations. Call me paranoid, but I 

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349 Email dated 12/20/01, from William Kelliher to WNT head David Brockway, ‘‘FW: SC2,’’ 

Bates KPMG 0013311. 350 Email dated 12/29/01, from Larry DeLap to Larry Manth, David Brockway, William 

Kelliher and others, ‘‘FW: SC2,’’ Bates KPMG 0013311. 351See, e.g., email dated 3/14/98, from Jeff Stein to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘Simon 

Says,’’ Bates 638010, filed by the IRS on June 16, 2003, as an attachment to Respondent’s Requests for Admission, Schneider Interests v. Commissioner, U.S. Tax Court, Docket No. 200–02 

(addressing a dispute over which of two tax groups, Personal Financial Planning and International, should get credit for revenues generated by OPIS). 352KPMG Tax Services Manual, § 31.11.1 at 31–6. 353See AICPA Code of Professional Conduct, Rule 302 (‘‘[A] contingent fee is a fee established 

for the performance of any service pursuant to an arrangement in which no fee will be charged 

unless a specified finding or result is attained, or in which the amount of the fee is otherwise 

dependent upon the finding or result of such service.’’) 354See, e.g., AICPA Rule 302; 17 C.F.R. § 210.2–01(c)(5) (SEC contingent fee prohibition: ‘‘An 

accountant is not independent if, any point during the audit and professional engagement period, the accountant provides any service or product to an audit client for a contingent fee.’’); 

KPMG Tax Services Manual, § 32.4 on contingent fees in general and § 31.10.3 at 31–5 (DPP 

head determines whether specific KPMG fees comply with various rules on contingent fees.) 

think that such a widespread marketing campaign is likely 

to bring KPMG and SC2 unwelcome attention from the 

IRS. . . . I realize the fees are attractive, but does the 

firm’s tax leadership really think that his is an appropriate strategy to mass market?’’ 349

The DPP head responded: ‘‘We had a verbal agreement following 

a conference call with Rick Rosenthal earlier this year that SC2 

would not be mass marketed. In any case, the time has come to formally cease all marketing of SC2. Please so notify your deployment 

team and the marketing directors.’’ 350

(5) Disregarding Professional Ethics 

In addition to all the other problems identified in the Subcommittee investigation, troubling evidence emerged regarding how 

KPMG handled certain professional ethics issues, including issues 

related to fees, auditor independence, and conflicts of interest in 

legal representation. 

Contingent, Excessive, and Joint Fees. The fees charged by 

KPMG in connection with its tax products raise several concerns. 

It is clear that the lucrative nature of the fees drove the marketing 

efforts and helped convince other parties to participate.351 KPMG 

made more than $124 million from just the four tax products featured in this Report. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood made millions 

from issuing concurring legal opinions on the validity of the four 

tax products. Deutsche Bank made more than $30 million in fees 

and other profits from BLIPS. 

Traditionally, accounting firms charged flat fees or hourly fees 

for tax services. In the 1990’s, however, accounting firms began 

charging ‘‘value added’’ fees based on ‘‘the value of the services provided, as opposed to the time required to perform the services.’’ 352

In addition, some firms began charging ‘‘contingent fees’’ that were 

paid only if a client obtained specified results from the services offered, such as achieving specified tax savings.353 Many states prohibit accounting firms from charging contingent fees due to the improper incentives they create, and a number of SEC, IRS, state, 

and AICPA rules allow their use in only limited circumstances.354

Within KPMG, the head of DPP-Tax took the position that fees 

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355Subcommittee interview of Lawrence DeLap (10/30/03); memorandum dated 7/14/98, from 

Gregg Ritchie to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘Rule 302 and Contingency Fees—CONFIDENTIAL,’’ Bates KPMG 0026557–58. 356Memorandum dated 7/14/98, from Gregg Ritchie to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘Rule 

302 and Contingency Fees—CONFIDENTIAL,’’ Bates KPMG 0026555–59. 357 ‘‘CaTS’’ stands for KPMG’s Capital Transaction Services Group which was then in existence 

and charged with selling tax products to high net worth individuals. 358 If a client objected to the requested fee, KPMG would, on occasion, negotiate a lower, final 

amount. 359Document dated 7/21/99, entitled ‘‘Action Required,’’ authored by Jeffrey Eischeid, Bates 

KPMG 0040502. See also, e.g., memorandum dated 8/5/98, from Doug Ammerman to ‘‘PFP Partners,’’ ‘‘OPIS and Other Innovative Strategies,’’ Bates KPMG 0026141–43 at 2 (‘‘In the past 

KPMG’s fee related to OPIS has been paid by Presidio. According to DPP-Assurance, this fee 

structure may constitute a contingent fee and, as a result, may be a prohibited arrangement. 

. . . KPMG’s fee must be a fixed amount and be paid directly by the client/target.’’ Emphasis 

in original.)

ited by AICPA Rule 302.355 Other KPMG tax professionals disagreed, complained about the DPP interpretation, and pushed hard 

for fees based on projected tax savings. For example, one memorandum objecting to the DPP interpretation of Rule 302 warned 

that it ‘‘threatens the value to KPMG of a number of product development efforts,’’ ‘‘hampers our ability to price the solution on a 

value added basis,’’ and will cost the firm millions of dollars.356 The 

memorandum also objected strongly to applying the contingent fee 

prohibition to, not only the firm’s audit clients, but also to any individual who ‘‘exerts significant influence over’’ an audit client, such 

as a company director or officer, as required by the DPP. The 

memorandum stated this expansive reading of the prohibition was 

problematic, because ‘‘many, if not most, of our CaTS targets are 

officers/directors/shareholders of our assurance clients.’’ 357 The 

memorandum states: ‘‘At the present time, we do not know if DPP’s 

interpretation of Rule 302 has been adopted with the full awareness of the firm’s leadership. . . . However, it is our impression 

that no one other than DPP has fully considered the issue and its 

impact on the tax practice.’’ 

In the four case studies examined by the Subcommittee, the fees 

charged by KPMG for BLIPS, OPIS, and FLIP were clearly based 

upon the client’s projected tax savings.358 In the case of BLIPS, for 

example, the BLIPS National Deployment Champion wrote the following description of the tax product and recommended that fees 

be set at 7% of the generated ‘‘tax loss’’ that clients would achieve 

on paper from the BLIPS transactions and could use to offset and 

shelter other income from taxation: 

‘‘BLIPS . . . [A] key objective is for the tax loss associated 

with the investment structure to offset/shelter the taxpayer’s other, unrelated, economic profits. . . . The all-in 

cost of the program, assuming a complete loss of investment principal, is 7% of the targeted tax loss (pre-tax). The 

tax benefit of the investment program, which ranges from 

20% to 45% of the targeted tax loss, will depend on the 

taxpayer’s effective tax rates.

‘‘FEE: BLIPS is priced on a fixed fee basis which should 

approximate 1.25% of the tax loss. Note that this fee is included in the 7% described above.’’ 359

Another document, an email sent from Presidio to KPMG, provides additional detail on the 7% fee charged to BLIPS clients, ascribing ‘‘basis points’’ or portions of the 7% fee to be paid to various 

103

360 Email dated 5/24/00, from Kerry Bratton of Presidio to Angie Napier of KPMG, ‘‘RE: 

BLIPS—7 percent,’’ Bates KPMG 0002557. 361Tax Solution Alert for S-Corporation Charitable Contribution Strategy, FY00–28, revised 

as of 12/7/01, at 2. See also email dated 12/27/01, from Larry Manth to Andrew Atkin and other 

KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘SC2,’’ Bates KPMG 0048773 (describing SC2 fees as dependent upon 

client tax savings). 362 Id. 363Memorandum dated 7/1/98, from Gregg Ritchie and Jeffrey Zysik to ‘‘CaTS Team Members,’’ ‘‘OPIS Engagements—Prohibited States,’’ Bates KPMG 0011954. 

participants for various expenses. All of these basis points, in turn, 

depended upon the size of the client’s expected tax loss to determine their amount. The email states:

‘‘The breakout for a typical deal is as follows: 

Bank Fees 125

Mgmt Fees 275

Gu[aran]teed Pymt. 8

Net Int. Exp. 6

Trading Loss 70

KPMG 125

Net return to Class A 91’’ 360

Virtually all BLIPS clients were charged this 7% fee. 

In the case of SC2, which was constructed to shelter certain S 

corporation income otherwise attributable and taxable to the corporate owner, KPMG described SC2 fees as ‘‘fixed’’ at the beginning 

of the engagement at an amount that ‘‘generally . . . approximated 

10 percent of the expected average taxable income of the S Corporation for the 2 years following implementation.’’ 361 SC2 fees 

were set at a minimum of $500,000, and went as high as $2 million 

per client.362

The documents suggest that, at least in some cases, KPMG deliberately manipulated the way it handled certain tax products to circumvent state prohibitions on contingent fees. For example, a document related to OPIS identifies the states that prohibit contingent 

fees. Then, rather than prohibit OPIS transactions in those states 

or require an alternative fee structure, the memorandum directs 

KPMG tax professionals to make sure the OPIS engagement letter 

is signed, the engagement is managed, and the bulk of services is 

performed ‘‘in a jurisdiction that does not prohibit contingency 

fees.’’ 363

Another set of fee issues related to the fees paid to the key law 

firm that issued concurring legal opinions supporting the four 

KPMG tax products, Sidley Austin Brown & Wood. This law firm 

was paid $50,000 for each legal opinion it provided in connection 

with BLIPS, FLIP, and OPIS. Documents and interview evidence 

obtained by the Subcommittee indicate that the law firm was paid 

even more in transactions intended to provide clients with large 

tax losses, and that the amount paid to the law firm may have 

been linked directly to the size of the client’s expected tax loss. For 

example, one email describing the fee amounts to be paid to Sidley 

Austin Brown & Wood in BLIPS and OPIS deals appears to assign 

to the law firm ‘‘basis points’’ or percentages of the client’s expected 

tax loss:

‘‘Brown & Wood fees: 

Quadra OPIS98—30 bpts 

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364 Email dated 5/15/00, from Angie Napier to Jeffrey Eischied and others, ‘‘B&W fees and generic FLIP rep letter,’’ Bates KPMG 0036342. 365See ‘‘Declaration of Richard E. Bosch,’’ IRS Revenue Agent, In re John Doe Summons to 

Sidley Austin Brown & Wood (N.D. Ill. 10/16/03) at ¶ 18, citing an email dated 10/1/97, from 

Gregg Ritchie to Randall Hamilton, ‘‘Flip Tax Opinion.’’ 366See ABA Model Rule 5.4, ‘‘A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a non-lawyer.’’ Reasons provided for this rule include ‘‘protect[ing] the lawyer’s professional independence 

of judgment.’’ 

Quadra OPIS99—30 bpts 

Presidio OPIS98—25 bpts 

Presidio OPIS99—25 bpts 

BLIPS—30 bpts’’ 364

American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rule 1.5 states that ‘‘[a] 

lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee,’’ and cites as the factors to consider when setting 

a fee amount ‘‘the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform 

the legal service properly.’’ Sidley Austin Brown & Wood charged 

substantially the same fee for each legal opinion it issued to a 

FLIPS, OPIS, or BLIPS client, even when opinions drafted after 

the initial prototype opinion contained no new facts or legal analysis, were virtually identical to the prototype except for client 

names, and in many cases required no client consultation. As mentioned earlier, in BLIPS, Sidley Austin Brown & Wood was also 

paid a fee in any sale where a prospective buyer was told that the 

law firm would provide a favorable tax opinion letter if asked, regardless of whether the opinion was later requested or provided.365

These fees, with few costs after the prototype opinion was drafted, 

raise questions about the firm’s compliance with ABA Model Rule 

1.5. 

Still another issue involves joint fees. In the case of BLIPS, clients were charged a single fee equal to 7% of the tax losses to be 

generated by the BLIPS transactions. The client typically paid this 

fee to Presidio, an investment advisory firm, which then apportioned the fee amount among various firms according to certain factors. The fee recipients typically included KPMG, Presidio, participating banks, and Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, and one of the factors determining the fee apportionment was who had brought the 

client to the table. This fee splitting arrangement may violate restrictions on contingency and client referral fees, as well as an 

American Bar Association prohibition against law firms sharing 

legal fees with non-lawyers.366

Auditor Independence. Another professional ethics issue involves auditor independence. Deutsche Bank, HVB, and Wachovia 

Bank are all audit clients of KPMG, and at various times all three 

have played roles in marketing or implementing KPMG tax products. Deutsche Bank and HVB provided literally billions of dollars 

in financing to make OPIS and BLIPS transactions possible. 

Wachovia, through First Union National Bank, referred clients to 

KPMG and was paid or promised a fee for each client who actually 

purchased a tax product. For example, one internal First Union 

email on fees stated: ‘‘Fees to First Union will be 50 basis points 

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367 Email dated 8/30/99, from Tom Newman to multiple First Union employees, ‘‘next strategy,’’ Bates SEN–014622. 368KPMG Tax Services Manual, § 52.1.3 at 52–1. 369 Id., § 52.1.1 at 52–1. 370Minutes dated 9/28/98, of KPMG ‘‘Assurance/Tax Professional Practice Meeting’’ in New 

York, ‘‘Summary of Conclusions and Action Steps,’’ Bates XX 001369–74, at 1373. 371KPMG Tax Services Manual, § 52.5.2 at 52–6 (Emphasis in original.). The SEC ‘‘Business 

Relationships’’ regulation states: ‘‘An accountant is not independent if, at any point during the 

audit and professional engagement period, the accounting firm or any covered person in the firm 

has any direct or material indirect business relationship with an audit client, or with persons 

associated with the audit client in a decision-making capacity, such as an audit client’s officers, 

directors, or substantial stockholders.’’ 17 C.F.R. § 210.2–01(c)(3). 372 Undated document prepared by Deutsche Bank in 1999, ‘‘New Product Committee Overview Memo: BLIPS Transaction,’’ Bates DB BLIPS 6906–10, at 6909–10. 373See, e.g., memorandum dated 8/5/98, from Doug Ammerman to ‘‘PFP Partners,’’ ‘‘OPIS and 

Other Innovative Strategies,’’ Bates KPMG 0026141–43 (‘‘Currently, the only institution participating in the transaction is a KPMG audit client. . . . As a result, DPP-Assurance feels there 

may be an independence problem associated with our participation in OPIS . . .’’); email dated 

2/11/99, from Larry DeLap to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘RE: BLIPS,’’ Bates KPMG 

0037992 (‘‘The opinion letter refers to transactions with Deutsche Bank. If the transactions will 

always involve Deutsche Bank, we could have an independence issue.’’); email dated 4/20/99, 

from Larry DeLap to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘BLIPS,’’ Bates KPMG 0011737–38 

(Deutsche Bank, a KPMG audit client, is conducting BLIPS transactions); email dated 11/30/

01, from Councill Leak to Larry Manth, ‘‘FW: First Union Customer Services,’’ Bates KPMG 

0050842 (lengthy discussion of auditor independence concerns and First Union). 374See, e.g., email dated 4/20/99, from Larry DeLap to multiple KPMG tax professionals, 

‘‘BLIPS,’’ Bates KPMG 0011737–38 (discussing using Deutsche Bank, a KPMG audit client, in 

BLIPS transactions). 

if the investor is not a KPMG client, and 25 bps if they are a 

KPMG client.’’ 367

KPMG Tax Services Manual states: ‘‘Due to independence considerations, the firm does not enter into alliances with SEC audit clients.’’ 368 KPMG defines an ‘‘alliance’’ as ‘‘a business relationship 

between KPMG and an outside firm in which the parties intend to 

work together for more than a single transaction.’’ 369 KPMG policy 

is that ‘‘[a]n oral business relationship that has the effect of creating an alliance should be treated as an alliance.’’ 370 Another provision in KPMG’s Tax Services Manual states: ‘‘The SEC considers 

independence to be impaired when the firm has a direct or material 

indirect business relationship with an SEC audit client.’’ 371

Despite the SEC prohibition and the prohibitions and warnings 

in its own Tax Services Manual, KPMG worked with audit clients, 

Deutsche Bank, HVB, and Wachovia, on multiple BLIPS, FLIP, 

and OPIS transactions. In fact, at Deutsche Bank, the KPMG partner in charge of Deutsche Bank audits in the United States expressly approved the bank’s accounting of the loans for the BLIPS 

transactions.372 KPMG tax professionals were aware that doing 

business with an audit client raised auditor independence concerns.373 KPMG apparently attempted to resolve the auditor independence issue by giving clients a choice of banks to use in the 

OPIS and BLIPS transactions, including at least one bank that was 

not a KPMG audit client.374 It is unclear, however, whether individuals actually could choose what bank to use. It is also unclear 

how providing clients with a choice of banks alleviated KPMG’s 

conflict of interest, since it still had a direct or material, indirect 

business relationship with banks whose financial statements were 

certified by KPMG auditors. 

In 2003, the SEC opened an informal inquiry into whether the 

client referral arrangements between KPMG and Wachovia violated the SEC’s auditor independence rules. In its second quarter 

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375See, e.g., Presentation dated 7/17/00, ‘‘Targeting Parameters: Intellectual Property—Assurance and Tax,’’ with attachment dated September 2000, entitled ‘‘Intellectual Property Services,’’ 

at page 1 of the attachment, Bates XX 001567–93. 376Presentation dated 3/6/00, ‘‘Post-Transaction Integration Service (PTIS)—Tax,’’ by Stan 

Wiseberg and Michele Zinn of Washington, D.C., Bates XX 001597–1611. 377 Email dated 8/14/01, from Jeff Stein and Walter Duer to ‘‘KPMG LLP Partners, Managers 

and Staff,’’ ‘‘Stratecon Middle Market Initiative,’’ Bates KPMG 0050369. 378Memorandum dated 7/14/98, from Gregg Ritchie to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘Rule 

302 and Contingency Fees—CONFIDENTIAL,’’ Bates KPMG 0026555–59. CaTS stands for the 

Capital Transaction Services Group which was then in existence and charged with selling tax 

products to high net worth individuals. 

filing with the SEC in August 2003, Wachovia provides the following description of the ongoing SEC inquiry:

‘‘On June 19, 2003, the Securities and Exchange Commission informally requested Wachovia to produce certain documents concerning any agreements or understandings by 

which Wachovia referred clients to KPMG LLP during the 

period January 1, 1997 to the present. Wachovia is cooperating with the SEC in its inquiry. Wachovia believes the 

SEC’s inquiry relates to certain tax services offered to 

Wachovia customers by KPMG LLP during the period from 

1997 to early 2002, and whether these activities might 

have caused KPMG LLP not to be ‘independent’ from 

Wachovia, as defined by applicable accounting and SEC 

regulations requiring auditors of an SEC-reporting company to be independent of the company. Wachovia and/or 

KPMG LLP received fees in connection with a small number of personal financial consulting transactions related to 

these services. During all periods covered by the SEC’s inquiry, including the present, KPMG LLP has confirmed to 

Wachovia that KPMG LLP was and is ‘independent’ from 

Wachovia under applicable accounting and SEC regulations.’’

In its third quarter filing with the SEC, Wachovia stated that, on 

October 21, 2003, the SEC issued a ‘‘formal order of investigation’’ 

into this matter, and the bank is continuing to cooperate with the 

inquiry. 

A second set of auditor independence issues involves KPMG’s decision to market tax products to its own audit clients. Evidence appears throughout this Report of KPMG’s efforts to sell tax products 

to its audit clients or the officers, directors, or shareholders of its 

audit clients. This evidence includes instances in which KPMG 

mined its audit client data to develop a list of potential clients for 

a particular tax product; 375 tax products that were designed and 

explicitly called for ‘‘fostering cross-selling among assurance and 

tax professionals’’; 376 and marketing initiatives that explicitly 

called upon KPMG tax professionals to contact their audit partner 

counterparts and work with them to identify appropriate clients 

and pitch KPMG tax products to those audit clients.377 A KPMG 

memorandum cited earlier in this Report observed that ‘‘many, if 

not most, of our CaTS targets are officers/directors/shareholders of 

our assurance clients.’’ 378

By using its audit partners to identify potential clients and targeting its audit clients for tax product sales pitches, KPMG not 

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379Minutes dated 9/28/98, of KPMG ‘‘Assurance/Tax Professional Practice Meeting’’ in New 

York, ‘‘Summary of Conclusions and Action Steps,’’ Bates XX 001369–74. (Capitalization in original omitted.) 380 Id. at Bates XX 001369. (Emphasis in original.) 381Minutes dated 9/28/98, of KPMG ‘‘Assurance/Tax Professional Practice Meeting’’ in New 

York, ‘‘Summary of Conclusions and Action Steps,’’ Bates XX 001369–74. 382 Id. at Bates XX 001370. (Emphasis in original.) 

ated a conflict of interest in those cases where it successfully sold 

a tax product to an audit client. This conflict of interest arises 

when the KPMG auditor reviewing the client’s financial statements 

is required, as part of that review, to examine the client’s tax return and its use of the tax product to reduce its tax liability and 

increase its income. In such situations, KPMG is, in effect, auditing 

its own work. 

The inherent conflict of interest is apparent in the minutes of a 

1998 meeting held in New York between KPMG top tax and assurance professionals to address topics of concern to both divisions of 

KPMG.379 A written summary of this meeting includes as its first 

topic: ‘‘Accounting Considerations of New Tax Products.’’ The section makes a single point: ‘‘Some tax products have pre-tax accounting implications. DPP-Assurance’s role should be to review the 

accounting treatment, not to determine it.’’ 380 This characterization 

of the issue implies not only a tension between KPMG’s top auditing and tax professionals, but also an effort to diminish the authority of the top assurance professionals and make it clear that they 

may not ‘‘determine’’ the accounting treatment for new tax products. 

The next topic in the meeting summary is: ‘‘Financial Statement 

Treatment of Aggressive Tax Positions.’’ 381 Again, the section discloses an ongoing tension between KPMG’s top auditing and tax 

professionals on how to account for aggressive tax products in an 

audit client’s financial statements. The section notes that discussions had taken place and further discussions were planned ‘‘to determine whether modifications may be made’’ to KPMG’s policies 

on how ‘‘aggressive tax positions’’ should be treated in an audit client’s financial statements. An accompanying issue list implies that 

the focus of the discussions will be on weakening rather than 

strengthening the existing policies. For example, among the policies to be re-examined were KPMG’s policies that, ‘‘[n]o financial 

statement tax benefit should be provided unless it is probable the 

position will be allowed,’’ 382 and that the ‘‘probable of allowance’’ 

test had to be based solely on technical merits and could not consider the ‘‘probability’’ that a client might win a negotiated settlement with the IRS. The list also asked, in effect, whether the 

standard for including a financial statement tax benefit in a financial statement could be lowered to include, not only tax products 

that ‘‘should’’ survive an IRS challenge, which KPMG interprets as 

having a 70% or higher probability, but also tax products that are 

‘‘more-likely-than-not’’ to withstand an IRS challenge, meaning a 

better than 50% probability. 

Conflicts of Interest in Legal Representation. A third set of 

professional ethics issues involves legal representation of clients 

who, after purchasing a tax product from KPMG, have come under 

the scrutiny of the IRS for buying an illegal tax shelter and understating their tax liability on their tax returns. The mass marketing 

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383 Email dated 4/9/02, from Erin Collins to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘FLIPS/OPIS/

BLIPS Attorney Referrals,’’ Bates KPMG 0050113. See also email dated 11/4/02, from Ken Jones 

to multiple KPMG tax professionals, ‘‘RE: Script,’’ Bates KPMG 0050130 (‘‘Attached is a list of 

law firms that are handling FLIP/OPIS cases. Note that there are easily another 15 or so law 

firms . . . but these are firms that we have dealt with in the past. Note that we are not making 

a recommendation, although if someone wants to talk about the various strengths/weaknesses 

of one firm vs. another . . . we can do that.’’). 384 Engagement letter between Sutherland Asbill & Brennan LLP and the client, dated 7/23/

02, at 1, Bates SA 001964.

of tax products has led to mass enforcement efforts by the IRS 

after a tax product has been found to be abusive and the IRS obtains the lists of clients who purchased the product. In response, 

certain law firms have begun representing multiple clients undergoing IRS audit for purchasing similar tax shelters. 

One key issue involves KPMG’s role in referring its tax shelter 

clients to specific law firms. In 2002, KPMG assembled a list of 

‘‘friendly’’ attorneys and began steering its clients to them for legal 

representation. For example, an internal KPMG email providing 

guidance on ‘‘FLIPS/OPIS/BLIPS Attorney Referrals’’ states: ‘‘This 

is a list that our group put together. All of the attorneys are part 

of the coalition and friendly to the firm. Feel free to forward to a 

client if they would like a referral.’’ 383 The ‘‘coalition’’ referred to 

in the email is a group of attorneys who had begun working together to address IRS enforcement actions taken against taxpayers 

who had used the FLIP, OPIS, or BLIPS tax products. 

One concern with the KPMG referral list is that at least some 

of the clients being steered to ‘‘friendly’’ law firms might want to 

sue KPMG itself for selling them an illegal tax shelter. In one instance examined by the Subcommittee, for example, a KPMG client 

under audit by the IRS for using BLIPS was referred by KPMG to 

a law firm, Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, with which KPMG had 

a longstanding relationship but with which the client had no prior 

contact. In this particular instance, the law firm did not even have 

offices in the client’s state. The client was also one of more than 

two dozen clients that KPMG had steered to this law firm. While 

KPMG did not obtain a fee for making those client referrals, the 

firm likely gained favorable attention from the law firm for sending 

it multiple clients with similar cases. These facts suggest that 

Sutherland Asbill would owe a duty of loyalty to KPMG, not only 

as a longstanding and important client, but also as a welcome 

source of client referrals. 

The engagement letter signed by the KPMG client, in which he 

agreed to pay Sutherland Asbill to represent him before the IRS in 

connection with BLIPS, contained this disclosure:

‘‘In the event you desire to pursue claims against the parties who advised you to enter into the transaction, we 

would not be able to represent you in any such claims because of the broad malpractice defense practice of our litigation team (representing all of the Big Five accounting 

firms, for example).’’ 384

The KPMG client told the Subcommittee that he had not understood at the time that this disclosure meant that Sutherland Asbill 

was already representing KPMG in other ‘‘malpractice defense’’ 

matters and therefore could not represent him if he decided to sue 

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385Memorandum dated 11/14/03, by Jack Maskell, Legislative Attorney, American Law Division, Congressional Research Service, ‘‘Attorneys and Potential Conflicts of Interest Between 

New Clients and Existing Clients.’’

KPMG for selling him an illegal shelter. The client signed the engagement letter on July 24, 2002. 

On September 8, 2002, Sutherland Asbill ‘‘engaged KPMG’’ itself 

to assist the law firm in its representation of KPMG’s former client, including with respect to ‘‘investigation of facts, review of tax 

issues, and other such matters as Counsel may direct.’’ This engagement meant that KPMG, as Sutherland Asbill’s agent, would 

have access to confidential information related to its client’s legal 

representation, and that KPMG itself would be providing key information and analysis in the case. It also meant that the KPMG client would be paying for the services provided by the same accounting firm that had sold him the tax shelter. When a short while 

later, the client asked Sutherland Asbill about the merits of suing 

KPMG, he was told that the firm could not represent him in such 

a legal action, and he switched to new legal counsel. 

The conflict of interest issues here involve, not only whether 

KPMG should be referring its clients to a ‘‘friendly’’ law firm, but 

also whether the law firm itself should be accepting these clients, 

in light of the firm’s longstanding and close relationship with 

KPMG. While both KPMG and the client have an immediate joint 

interest in defending the validity of the tax product that KPMG 

sold and the client purchased, their interests could quickly diverge 

if the suspect tax product is found to be in violation of federal tax 

law. This divergence in interests has been demonstrated repeatedly 

since 2002, as growing numbers of KPMG clients have filed suit 

against KPMG seeking a refund of past fees paid to the firm and 

additional damages for KPMG’s selling them an illegal tax shelter. 

The preamble to the American Bar Association (ABA) Model 

Rules states that ‘‘a lawyer, as a member of the legal profession, 

is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a 

public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice. 

. . . As (an) advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client’s position under the rules of the adversary system.’’ The problem here 

is the conflict of interest that arises when a law firm attempts to 

represent an accounting firm’s client at the same time it is representing the accounting firm itself, and the issue in controversy is 

a tax product that the accounting firm sold and the client purchased. In such a case, the attorney cannot zealously represent the 

interests of both clients due to conflicting loyalties. A related issue 

is whether the law firm can ethically use the accounting firm as 

the tax expert in the client’s case, given the accounting firm’s self 

interest in the case outcome. 

At the request of the Subcommittee, the Congressional Research 

Service’s American Law Division analyzed the possible conflict of 

interest issues.385 The CRS analysis concluded that, under American Bar Association Model Rule 1.7, a law firm should decline to 

represent an accounting firm client in a tax shelter case if the law 

firm already represents the accounting firm itself on other matters. 

The CRS analysis identified ‘‘two possible, and interconnected, conflicts of interest’’ that should lead the law firm to decline the engagement. The first is a ‘‘current conflict of interest’’ at the time 

110

of engagement, which arises from ‘‘a ‘substantial risk’ that the attorney . . . would be ‘materially limited’ by his responsibilities to 

another client’’ in ‘‘pursuing certain relevant and proper courses of 

action on behalf of the new client’’ such as filing suit against the 

firm’s existing client, the accounting firm. The second is a ‘‘potential conflict of interest whereby the attorney may not represent the 

new client in litigation . . . against an existing, current client. 

That particular, potential conflict of interest could not be waived.’’ 

The CRS analysis also recommends that the law firm fully inform a potential client about the two conflicts of interest prior to 

any engagement, so that the client can make a meaningful decision 

on whether he or she is willing to be represented by a law firm 

that already represents the accounting firm that sold the client the 

tax product at issue. According to ABA Model Rule 1.7, informed 

consent must be in writing, but ‘‘[t]he requirement of a writing 

does not supplant the need in most cases for the lawyer to talk 

with the client, to explain the risks and advantages, if any, of 

representation burdened with a conflict of interest, as well as reasonably available alternatives, and to afford the client a reasonable 

opportunity to consider the risks and alternatives and to raise 

questions and concerns.’’ The CRS analysis opines that a ‘‘blanket 

disclosure’’ provided by a law firm in an engagement letter is insufficient, without additional information, to ensure the client fully 

understands and consents to the conflicts of interest inherent in 

the law firm’s dual representation of the client and the accounting 

firm. 

(111)

386See, e.g., document dated 5/18/01, ‘‘PFP Practice Reorganization Innovative Strategies 

Business Plan—DRAFT,’’ authored by Jeffrey Eischeid, Bates KPMG 0050620–23, at 1. 387 BLIPS is covered by IRS Notice 2000–44 (2000–36 IRB 255) (9/5/00). 388 A detailed explanation of these charts is included in the opening statement of Senator Carl 

Levin at the hearing before the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, ‘‘U.S. Tax 

Shelter Industry: The Role of Accountants, Lawyers, and Financial Professionals’’ (11/18/03).

APPENDICES 

APPENDIX A

CASE STUDY OF BOND LINKED ISSUE 

PREMIUM STRUCTURE (BLIPS) 

KPMG approved the Bond Linked Issue Premium Structure 

(BLIPS) for sale to multiple clients in 1999. KPMG marketed 

BLIPS for about 1 year, from about October 1999 to about October 

2000. KPMG sold BLIPS to 186 individuals, in 186 transactions, 

and obtained more than $53 million in revenues, making BLIPS 

one of KPMG’s top revenue producers in the years it was sold and 

the highest revenue-producer of the four case studies examined by 

the Subcommittee. 

BLIPS was developed by KPMG primarily as a replacement for 

earlier KPMG tax products, FLIP and OPIS, each of which KPMG 

has characterized as a ‘‘loss generator’’ or ‘‘gain mitigation strategy.’’ 386 In 2000, the IRS issued a notice declaring transactions like 

BLIPS to be potentially abusive tax shelters.387

BLIPS is so complex that a full explanation of it would take more 

space that this Report allows, but it can be summarized as follows. 

Charts depicting a typical BLIPS transaction are also provided.388

1) The Gain. Individual has ordinary or capital gains income 

(e.g., $20 million).

2) The Sales Pitch. Individual is approached with a ‘‘tax advantaged investment strategy’’ by KPMG and Presidio, an investment 

advisory firm, to generate an artificial ‘‘loss’’ sufficient to offset the 

income and shelter it from taxation. Individual is told that, for a 

fee, Presidio will arrange the required investments and bank financing, and KPMG and a law firm will provide separate opinion 

letters stating it is ‘‘more likely than not’’ the tax loss generated 

by the investments will withstand an IRS challenge.

3) The Shell Corporation. Pursuant to the strategy, Individual 

forms a single-member limited liability corporation (‘‘LLC’’) and 

contributes cash equal to 7% ($1.4 million) of the tax loss ($20 million) to be generated by the strategy.

4) The ‘‘Loan.’’ LLC obtains from a bank, for a fee, a non-recourse ‘‘loan’’ (e.g., $50 million) with an ostensible 7-year term at 

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market interest rate, LLC also obtains from the bank a large cash 

amount up-front (e.g., $20 million) referred to as a ‘‘loan premium.’’ 

The ‘‘premium’’ equals the net present value of the portion of the 

‘‘loan’’ interest payments that exceed the market rate and that LLC 

is required to pay during the full 7-year ‘‘loan.’’ The ‘‘loan premium’’ also equals the tax loss to be generated by the strategy. 

LLC thus receives two cash amounts from the bank ($50 million 

plus $20 million totaling $70 million).

5) The ‘‘Loan’’ Restrictions. LLC agrees to severe restrictions 

on the ‘‘loan’’ to make it a very low credit risk. Most importantly, 

LLC agrees to maintain ‘‘collateral’’ in cash or liquid securities 

equal to 101% of the ‘‘loan’’ amount, including the ‘‘loan premium’’ 

(e.g., $70.8 million). LLC also agrees to severe limits on how the 

‘‘loan proceeds’’ may be invested and gives the bank unilateral authority to terminate the ‘‘loan’’ if the ‘‘collateral’’ amount drops 

below 101% of the ‘‘loan’’ amount.

6) The Partnership. LLC and two Presidio affiliates form a 

partnership called a Strategic Investment Fund (‘‘Fund’’) in which 

LLC has a 90% partnership interest, one Presidio affiliate holds a 

9% interest, and the second Presidio affiliate has a 1% interest. 

The 1% Presidio affiliate is the managing partner.

7) The Assets. The Fund is capitalized with the following assets. 

The LLC contributes all of its assets, consisting of the ‘‘loan’’ ($50 

million), ‘‘loan premium’’ ($20 million), and the Individual’s cash 

contribution ($1.4 million). Presidio’s two affiliates contribute cash 

equal to 10% of the LLC’s total assets ($155,000). The Fund’s capital is a total of these contributions ($71.6 million).

8) The Loan Transfer. LLC assigns the ‘‘loan’’ to the Fund 

which assumes LLC’s obligation to repay it. This obligation includes repayment of the ‘‘loan’’ and ‘‘loan premium,’’ since the ‘‘premium’’ consists of a portion of the interest payments owed on the 

‘‘loan’’ principal.

9) The Swap. At the same time, the Fund enters into a swap 

transaction with the bank on the ‘‘loan’’ interest rate. In effect, the 

Fund agrees to pay a floating market rate on an amount equal to 

the ‘‘loan’’ and ‘‘loan premium’’ (about 8% on $70 million), while the 

bank agrees to pay the 16% fixed rate on the face amount of the 

‘‘loan’’ (16% on $50 million). The effect of this swap is to reduce the 

‘‘loan’’ interest rate to a market-based rate.

10) The Foreign Currency Investment ‘‘Program.’’ The 

Fund converts most of its U.S. dollars into euros with a contract 

to convert the funds back into U.S. dollars in 30–60 days. This 

amount includes most or all of the loan and loan premium amount. 

Any funds not converted into euros remain in the Fund account. 

The euros are placed in an account at the bank. The Fund engages 

in limited transactions which involve the ‘‘shorting’’ of certain lowrisk foreign currencies and which are monitored by the bank to ensure that only a limited amount of funds are ever placed at risk 

and that the funds deemed as 101% ‘‘collateral’’ for the bank ‘‘loan’’ 

are protected.

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11) The Unwind. After 60 to 180 days, LLC withdraws from the 

partnership. The partnership unwinds, converts all cash into U.S. 

dollars, and uses that cash to repay the ‘‘loan’’ plus a ‘‘prepayment 

penalty’’ equal to the unamortized amount of the ‘‘loan premium,’’ 

so that the ‘‘loan’’ and ‘‘loan premium’’ are paid in full. Any remaining partnership assets are apportioned and distributed to the LLC 

and Presidio partners, either in cash or securities. LLC sells any 

securities at fair market value.

12) Tax Claim for Cost Basis. For tax purposes, the LLC’s income or loss passes to its owner, the Individual. According to the 

opinion letters, the Individual can attempt to claim, for tax purposes, that he or she retained a cost basis in the partnership equal 

to the LLC’s contributions of cash ($1.4 million) and the ‘‘loan premium’’ ($20 million), even though the partnership later assumed 

the LLC’s ‘‘loan’’ obligation and repaid the ‘‘loan’’ in full, including 

the ‘‘premium amount.’’ According to the opinion letters, the individual can attempt to claim a tax loss equal to the cost basis ($21.4 

million), adjusted for any gain or loss from the currency trades, and 

use that tax loss to offset ordinary or capital gains income.

13) IRS Action. In 2000, the IRS issued a notice declaring that 

the ‘‘purported losses’’ arising from these types of transactions, 

which use an ‘‘artificially high basis,’’ ‘‘do not represent bona fide 

losses reflecting actual economic consequences’’ and ‘‘are not allowable as deductions for federal income tax purposes.’’ IRS Notice 

2000–44 listed this transaction as a potentially abusive tax shelter.

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389 A detailed explanation of this chart is included in the opening statement of Senator Carl 

Levin at the hearing before the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, ‘‘U.S. Tax 

Shelter Industry: The Role of Accountants, Lawyers, and Financial Professionals’’ (11/18/03).

APPENDIX B

CASE STUDY OF S-CORPORATION 

CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTION STRATEGY (SC2) 

KPMG approved the S-Corporation Charitable Contribution 

Strategy (SC2) for sale to multiple clients in 2000. KPMG marketed SC2 for about 18 months, from about March 2000 to about 

September 2001. KPMG sold SC2 to 58 S-corporations, in 58 transactions, and obtained more than $26 million in revenues, making 

SC2 one of KPMG’s top ten revenue producers in 2000 and 2001. 

SC2 is not covered by a ‘‘listed transaction’’ issued by the IRS, but 

is currently under IRS review. 

SC2 can be summarized as follows. A chart depicting a typical 

SC2 transaction is also provided.389

1) The Income. Individual owns 100% of S-corporation which earns net income (e.g., $3 million annually).

2) The Sales Pitch. Individual is approached by KPMG with a 

‘‘charitable donation strategy’’ to shelter a significant portion (often 

90%) of the S-corporation’s income from taxation by ‘‘allocating,’’ 

with little or no distribution, the income to a charitable organization. Individual is told that, for a fee, KPMG will arrange a temporary ‘‘donation’’ of corporate non-voting stock to the charity and 

will provide an opinion letter stating it is ‘‘more likely than not’’ 

that nonpayment of tax on the income ‘‘allocated’’ to the charity 

while it ‘‘owns’’ the stock will withstand an IRS challenge, even if 

the allocated income is not actually distributed to the charity and 

the individual regains control of the income. The individual is told 

he can also take a personal tax deduction for the ‘‘donation.’’

3) Setting Up The Transaction. The S-corporation issues nonvoting shares of stock that, typically, equal 9 times the total number of outstanding shares (e.g., corporation with 100 voting shares 

issues 900 non-voting shares). Corporation gives the non-voting 

shares to the existing individual-shareholder. Corporation also 

issues to the individual-shareholder warrants to purchase a substantial number of company shares (e.g., 7,000 warrants). Corporation issues a resolution limiting or suspending income distributions 

to all shareholders for a specified period of time (e.g., generally the 

period of time in which the charity is intended to be a shareholder, 

typically 2 or 3 years). Prior to issuing this resolution, corporation 

may distribute cash to the existing individual-shareholder.

4) The Charity. A ‘‘qualifying’’ charity (one which is exempt 

from federal tax on unrelated business income) agrees to accept Scorporation stock donation. KPMG actively seeks out qualified 

charities and identifies them for the individual.

5) The ‘‘Donation.’’ S-corporation employs an independent valuation firm to analyze and provide a valuation of its non-voting 

shares. Due to the non-voting character of the shares and the existence of a large number of warrants, the non-voting shares have a 

123

very low fair market value (e.g., $100,000). Individual ‘‘donates’’ 

non-voting shares to the selected charity, making the charity the 

temporary owner of 90% of the corporation’s shares. Individual 

claims a charitable deduction for this ‘‘donation.’’ At the same time, 

the corporation and charity enter into a redemption agreement allowing the charity, after a specified period of time (generally 2 or 

3 years), to require the corporation to buy back the shares at fair 

market value. The individual also pledges to donate an additional 

amount to the charity to ensure it obtains the shares’ original fair 

market value in the event that the shares’ value decreases. The 

charity does not receive any cash payment at this time.

6) The ‘‘Allocation.’’ During the period in which the charity 

owns the non-voting shares, the S-corporation ‘‘allocates’’ its annual 

net income to the charity and original individual-shareholder in 

proportion to the percentage of overall shares each holds (e.g., 

90:10 ratio). However, pursuant to the corporate resolution adopted 

before the non-voting shares were issued and donated to the charity, little or no income ‘‘allocated’’ to the charity is actually distributed. The corporation retains or reinvests the non-distributed income.

7) The Redemption. After the specified period in the redemption agreement, the charity sells back the non-voting shares to the 

S-corporation for fair market value (e.g., $100,000). The charity obtains a cash payment from the corporation for the shares at this 

time. Should the charity not resell the stock, the individual-shareholder can exercise the warrants, obtain additional corporate 

shares, and substantially dilute the value of the charity’s shares. 

Once the non-voting shares are repurchased by the corporation, the 

corporation distributes to the individual-shareholder, who now 

owns 100% of the corporation’s outstanding shares, all of the undistributed cash from previously earned income.

8) Taxpayer’s Claim. Due to its tax exempt status, the charity 

pays no tax on the corporate income ‘‘allocated’’ or distributed to 

it. According to the KPMG opinion letter, for tax purposes, the individual can claim a charitable deduction for the ‘‘donated’’ shares 

in the year in which the ‘‘donation’’ took place. During the years 

in which the charity ‘‘owned’’ most of the corporate shares, individual will pay taxes on only that portion of the corporate income 

that was ‘‘allocated’’ to him or her. KPMG also advised that all income ‘‘allocated’’ to the charity is then treated as previously taxed, 

even after the corporation buys back the non-voting stock and the 

individual regains control of the corporation. KPMG also advised 

the individual that, when the previously ‘‘allocated’’ income was 

later distributed to the individual, the individual could treat some 

or all as long-term capital gains rather than ordinary income, taxable at the lower capital gains rate. The end result is that the individual owner of the S-corporation was told by KPMG that he or she 

could defer and reduce the rate of the taxes paid on income earned 

by the S-corporation.

9) IRS Action. This transaction is under review by the IRS.

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390 ‘‘Zions Among Banks Accused of Scheme,’’ Desert News (8/8/03). 

APPENDIX C

OTHER KPMG INVESTIGATIONS OR 

ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 

In recent years, KPMG has become the subject of IRS, SEC, and 

state investigations and enforcement actions in the areas of tax, 

accounting fraud, and auditor independence. These enforcement actions include ongoing litigation by the IRS to enforce tax shelter related document requests and a tax promoter audit of the firm, 

which are described in the text of the Report. They also include 

SEC, California, and New York investigations examining a potentially abusive tax shelter involving at least ten banks that are allegedly using sham mutual funds established on KPMG’s advice; 

SEC and Missouri enforcement actions related to alleged KPMG involvement in accounting fraud at Xerox and General American Mutual Holding Co.; an SEC censure of KPMG for violating auditor 

independence restrictions by investing in AIM mutual funds while 

AIM was a KPMG audit client; and a bankruptcy examiner report 

on misleading accounting at Polaroid while KPMG was Polaroid’s 

auditor. 

SHAM MUTUAL FUND INVESTIGATION 

KPMG is currently under investigation by the SEC and tax authorities in California and New York for advising at least ten 

banks to shift as much as $17 billion of bank assets into shell regulated investment companies, allegedly to shelter more than $750 

million in income from taxation. 

A regulated investment company (RIC), popularly known as a 

mutual fund, is designed to pool funds from at least 100 investors 

to purchase securities. RIC investors, also known as mutual fund 

shareholders, are normally taxed on the income they receive as 

dividends from their shares, while the RIC itself is tax exempt. In 

this instance, KPMG allegedly advised each bank to set up one or 

more RICs as a bank subsidiary, to transfer some portfolio of bank 

assets to the RIC, and then to declare any income as dividends 

payable to the bank. Citing KPMG tax advice, the banks allegedly 

claimed that they did not have to pay taxes on the dividend income 

due to state laws exempting from taxation money transferred between a subsidiary and its corporate parent. Zions Bancorp., for example, has stated to the press: ‘‘These registered investment companies were established upon our receiving tax and accounting 

guidance from KPMG and the securities law counsel from the 

Washington, D.C. firm of Ropes & Grey.’’ 390

The RICs established by the banks are allegedly sham mutual 

funds whose primary purpose was not to establish an investment 

pool, but to shelter bank income from taxation. The evidence allegedly suggests that the funds really had one investor—the parent 

bank—rather than 100 investors as required by the SEC. Press reports state, for example, that some of the RICs had apparently sold 

all 100 shares to the employees of the parent bank. Also according 

to press reports, the existence of this tax avoidance scheme was 

discovered after a bank was approached by KPMG, declined to parVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:56 Dec 11, 2003 Jkt 090655 PO 00000 Frm 00130 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\90655.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN
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391 ‘‘Banks Shifted Billions Into Funds Sheltering Income From Taxes,’’ Wall Street Journal

(8/7/03). 392SEC v. KPMG, Case No. 03–CV–0671 (D.S.D.N.Y. 1/29/03). 

ticipate, and asked its legal counsel to alert California officials to 

what the bank saw as an improper tax shelter. When asked about 

this matter, California Controller Steve Westly has been quoted as 

saying, ‘‘We do not believe this is appropriate.’’ 391 RICs established 

by the ten banks participating in this tax shelter have since been 

voluntarily de-registered, according to press reports, with the last 

removed from SEC records in 2002. 

KPMG ACCOUNTING FRAUD AT XEROX 

On January 29, 2003, the SEC filed suit in federal district court 

charging KPMG and four KPMG partners with accounting fraud 

for knowingly allowing Xerox to file 4 years of false financial statements which distorted Xerox’s filings by billions of dollars.392 The 

prior year, in 2002, without admitting or denying guilt, Xerox paid 

the SEC a $10 million civil penalty, then the highest penalty ever 

paid to the SEC for accounting fraud, and agreed to restate its financial results for the years 1997 through 2000. In July 2003, six 

former Xerox senior executives paid the SEC civil penalties totaling 

over $22 million in connection with the false financial statements. 

KPMG is contesting the SEC civil suit and denies any liability 

for the accounting fraud. Two of the named KPMG partners remain 

employed by the firm. The SEC complaint includes the following 

statements:

‘‘KPMG and certain KPMG partners permitted Xerox to 

manipulate its accounting practices and fill a $3-billion 

‘gap’ between actual operating results and results reported 

to the investing public from 1997 through 2000. The fraudulent scheme allowed Xerox to claim it met performance 

expectations of Wall Street analysts, to mislead investors 

and, consequently, to boost the company’s stock price. The 

KPMG defendants were not the watch dogs on behalf of 

shareholders and the public that the securities laws and 

the rules of the auditing profession required them to be. 

Instead of putting a stop to Xerox’s fraudulent conduct, the 

KPMG defendants themselves engaged in fraud by falsely 

representing to the public that they had applied professional auditing standards to their review of Xerox’s accounting, that Xerox’s financial reporting was consistent 

with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles and that 

Xerox’s reported results fairly represented the financial 

condition of the company. . . .

‘‘In the course of auditing Xerox for the years 1997 

through 2000, defendants KPMG [and the four KPMG 

partners] knew, or were reckless in not knowing, for each 

year in which they were responsible for the Xerox audit, 

that Xerox was preparing and filing quarterly and annual 

financial statements and other reports which likely contained material misrepresentations and omissions in violation of the antifraud provisions of the federal securities 

laws. . . .

128

393Lakin v. KPMG, (MO Cir. 12/10/02). 

‘‘In the summer or early fall of 1999, Xerox complained to 

KPMG’s chairman, Stephen Butler, about the performance 

of [one of the defendant KPMG audit partners], who questioned Xerox management about several of the topside 

accounting devices that formed the fraudulent scheme. Although KPMG policy was to review assignments of an 

engagement partner after five years, and [the KPMG partner] had been assigned to Xerox less than two years, Butler responded to Xerox’s complaints by offering [the KPMG 

partner] a new assignment in Finland. After [the KPMG 

partner] declined the new assignment, KPMG replaced 

[him] as the worldwide lead engagement partner with [another of the defendant KPMG partners] for the 2000 audit. 

This was the second time in six years in which KPMG removed the senior engagement partner early in his tenure 

at Xerox’s request.’’

KPMG was Xerox’s auditor for approximately 40 years, through the 2000 audit. KPMG was paid $26 million for auditing Xerox’s 

financial results for fiscal years 1997 through 2000. It was paid $56 

million for non-audit services during that period. When Xerox finally restated its financial results for 1997–2000, it restated $6.1 

billion in equipment revenues and $1.9 billion in pre-tax earnings—the largest restatement in U.S. history to that time. 

MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE V. KPMG 

On December 10, 2002, the Director of the Missouri Department 

of Insurance, acting as the liquidator for an insurance firm, General American Mutual Holding Company (‘‘General American’’), 

sued KPMG alleging that: (1) KPMG, acting in conflicting roles as 

consultant and auditor, misrepresented the financial statements of 

its client, General American, and (2) KPMG failed to disclose substantial risks associated with an investment product called Stable 

Value which, with KPMG’s knowledge and assistance, was sold by 

General American during the 1990’s.393

Stable Value was an investment product that, in essence, allowed 

General American to borrow money from investors and reinvest it 

in high-risk securities to obtain a greater return. In the event General American was downgraded by a ratings agency, however, the 

terms of the Stable Value product allowed investors to withdraw 

their funds. In 1999, General American, in fact, suffered a ratings 

downgrade, and hundreds of Stable Value holders redeemed their 

shares, forcing General American to go into receivership and subjecting its investors to huge losses. KPMG is alleged to have never 

disclosed the risks of the Stable Value product to General American and, according to the Missouri Department of Insurance, actively attempted to conceal this risk. 

The following excerpts are taken from a complaint filed by the 

Director of the Missouri Department of Insurance against KPMG 

in the Jackson County Circuit Court:

‘‘In the 1990’s, with KPMG knowledge, and assistance, 

General American management developed and grew to obVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:56 Dec 11, 2003 Jkt 090655 PO 00000 Frm 00132 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\90655.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN
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394Press Release by the SEC, ‘‘SEC Censures KPMG for Auditor Independence Violation,’’ (No. 

2002–4 1/14/02), available at www.sec.gov/news/press/2002–4.txt.

scene proportions a high-risk product known as Stable 

Value. In essence, certain General American management, 

with KPMG’s help, bet the very existence of General 

American on its Stable Value business segment and lost. 

. . . With KPMG’s knowledge, General American management forced an otherwise conservative company to engage 

in an ever-increasing extremely volatile product. When 

this scheme failed, it was General American’s innocent 

members who were harmed. . . .

‘‘KPMG consciously chose to: (a) misrepresent General 

American’s financial position; (b) not require the mandated 

disclosures regarding the magnitude and risks associated 

with the Stable Value product; and (c) conceal from and 

misrepresent to the Missouri Department of Insurance and 

General American’s members and outside Board of Directors, the true nature of the Stable Value product. And during this same time, when KPMG was setting up General 

American’s innocent members for huge financial losses, 

KPMG kept scooping up as much money in fees as possible. . . . KPMG abandoned and breached its professional 

obligations owed to General American, General American’s 

members and the Missouri Department of Insurance. 

KPMG’s failures include a lack of independence, conflicts 

of interest, breaches of ethical standards, and other gross 

departures from the most basic of auditing and other professional obligations. . . .

‘‘To further the cover-up of its wrongful acts, KPMG engaged in a continued pattern of deceit during the Missouri 

Department of Insurance’s investigation into General 

American’s liquidity crisis. The record is replete with 

KPMG witnesses giving false testimony, evasive answers 

and just ‘playing dumb’ in an apparent hope to avoid State 

of Missouri regulatory scrutiny and the filing of this Petition. What KPMG wanted to hide from the regulators was 

its misrepresentations, gross breaches of its professional 

obligations and numerous failures regarding full and fair 

financial reporting for General American.’’ 

SEC CENSURES KPMG 

On January 14, 2002, the SEC censured KPMG for engaging in 

improper professional conduct in violation of the SEC’s rules on 

auditor independence and in violation of Generally Accepted Auditing Standards. KPMG consented to the SEC’s order but did not 

admit or deny the SEC’s findings. 

The following is taken from the SEC’s press release announcing 

the censure of KPMG: 394

‘‘The SEC found that, from May through December 2000, 

KPMG held a substantial investment in the Short-Term 

Investments Trust (STIT), a money market fund within 

the AIM family of funds. According to the SEC’s order, 

130

395See, e.g., ‘‘KPMG Defends Audit Work for Polaroid,’’ Wall Street Journal (8/25/03). 396 ‘‘Polaroid Hit with Lawsuit After Report,’’ Boston Globe (8/27/03). 

KPMG opened the money market account with an initial 

deposit of $25 million on May 5, 2000, and at one point the 

account balance constituted approximately 15% of the 

fund’s net assets. In the order, the SEC found that KPMG 

audited the financial statements of STIT at a time when 

the firm’s independence was impaired, and that STIT included KPMG’s audit report in 16 separate filings it made 

with the SEC on November 9, 2000. The SEC further 

found that KPMG repeatedly confirmed its putative independence from the AIM funds it audited, including STIT, 

during the period in which KPMG was invested in STIT.

‘‘ ‘This case illustrates the dangers that flow from a failure 

to implement adequate polices and procedures designed to 

detect and prevent auditor independence violations,’ said 

Paul R. Berger, Associate Director of Enforcement.’’

In addition to censuring the firm, the SEC ordered KPMG to undertake certain remedies designed to prevent and detect future 

independence violations caused by financial relationships with, and 

investments in, the firm’s audit clients. 

POLAROID AND KPMG 

Polaroid Corporation filed for bankruptcy protection in October 

2001. In February 2003, a federal bankruptcy court named Perry 

Mandarino, a tax expert, as an independent examiner for Polaroid. 

In August 2003, the bankruptcy examiner issued a report stating 

that Polaroid and its accounting firm, KPMG, had engaged in improper accounting procedures and failed to warn investors of Polaroid’s impending bankruptcy. KPMG attempted to keep the report 

sealed, but the court made the report available to the public. Since 

the issuance of the examiner’s report, shareholders have filed a 

class action lawsuit against Polaroid and KPMG alleging violations 

of the Securities and Exchange Act for filing false financial statements. 

Both the report and the lawsuit allege that KPMG and Polaroid 

engaged in a series of fraudulent accounting transactions, including 

overstating the value of assets and issuing financial statements 

that made the company appear healthier than it was. The examiner determined that KPMG should have provided a qualified opinion on the corporation’s financial statements and included a warning about its status as a ‘‘going concern.’’ The examiner found that 

KPMG had been considering such a warning, but decided against 

issuing it after a telephone call was made by Polaroid’s chief executive to KPMG’s chairman.395 KPMG has charged that the report is 

‘‘unfounded’’ and ‘‘incorrect.’’ 396

Æ