D U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

OFFICE OF HEARINGS 

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION FEB 1 8 2015 

HEARING DOCKET 

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 

Complainant, 

vs. 

AIRBORNE MAINTENANCE AND 

ENGINEERING SERVICES, 

Respondent. 

Docket No. FAA-2013-0291 

FAA Case No. 2011S0290032 

Judge Sullivan 

FAA's RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT 

On January 30, 2015, Respondent served a Motion for Summary Judgment in this case. 

Respondent begins its Motion by asking the Judge to weigh evidence, ends its Motion by asking 

the Judge to make credibility determinations, and in between asks the Judge to reach conclusions 

about aircraft maintenance relying exclusively and extensively on the personal opinions of an 

individual who does not even hold a mechanic certificate. Respondent's motion is wholly 

without merit, and should be denied. 

I. Becker Is Not A Mechanic, And Not An Expert On Aircraft Maintenance 

Of particular note in examining everything asserted by Respondent in its brief is that 

(when it relies on any evidence at all) it extensively and exclusively relies on the deposition 

testimony of John Becker for opinions as to subjects such as the nature and cause of damage to 

an aircraft, whether damage affects the airworthiness of an aircraft, how a mechanic can tell if a 

flying door is misrigged, and how to change the tire on a B727. As a result, it is important to 

emphasize that Becker is not a mechanic and is not competent to offer opinions on aviation 

I 
maintenance. Exhibit B at 9. He has never perfonned maintenance on an aircraft, nor could he 

legally do so. This ignorance is best exemplified by his explanation of how the tubular bearing 

on the right-hand flying door ofN287SC might have fallen out during a tire change because the 

mechanic used a short cut. See Respondent's Motion at 20-21. Not only is Becker's explanation 

based on a game of telephone - literally that he knows a guy who knows a guy who says that 

some other guys might change tires in some incorrect way - but the supposed "short cut" 

described by Becker would in reality be much more time-consuming than the proper way of 

changing the tire. See Exhibit JJ ,-r 36. The particular issues with Becker's testimony, and the 

particular places where Respondent relies on it, will be discussed in more detail below. However, 

it is worth noting up front that Respondent's entire Motion is founded on the opinions of an 

individual who simply is not competent to provide expert testimony on the subject matter of this 

case. 

Additionally, the Judge recently denied the FAA's motion to exclude Becker serving as 

an expert witness1 on the basis that Becker was only identified as an expert witness in order to 

rebut the testimony of FAA expert witness Michael Christensen and the Judge had granted 

Respondent's motion to exclude Christensen's testimony. Accordingly, the undersigned can only 

presume that the Judge will not consider any "expert" opinion from Becker, inasmuch as it 

would be outside the identified scope of Becker's "expert" testimony (that scope being purely the 

rebuttal of Christensen's expert opinions). 

II. Circumstantial Nature of the Evidence 

As Respondent notes, in this case - as in almost every maintenance case ever brought by 

the FAA - the FAA must rely on circumstantial evidence that a Respondent improperly 

1 The motion was based only on the late disclosure of Becker as an "expert" witness, and neither the motion nor 

ruling on that motion related to Becker's lack of qualification to serve as an expert. 

2 
performed maintenance because FAA inspectors are not typically present when a particular 

maintenance action was being performed? See Respondent's Motion at 2, 8-11. As such, it is 

puzzling that Respondent spends so much time reminding the Judge that the FAA inspectors in 

this case only inspected the aircraft 2-93 months after Respondent performed maintenance -

when, as even the cases Respondent cites emphasize - this state of affairs is routine. See 

Respondent's Motion at 8-11. 

The effect of the passage of time is, when at issue, a question of expert testimony. If the 

effect of the passage of time is one that is both material and subject to genuine dispute, then this 

would be an issue for hearing. Indeed, the primary case that the Respondent relies on, Florida 

Propeller, is a case that went to hearing and where the FAA lost only because it had failed to 

actually present an expert on the causes of the condition of the aircraft. Respondent's suggestion 

that this question might support judgment in its favor is baseless. 

However, at this point in this case the effects of the passage of time present neither a 

genuine nor a material dispute, because Respondent has so far presented no evidence to rebut the 

2 In those situations where an FAA inspector is actually present when a certificate holder is improperly performing 

maintenance, the inspector would generally point out the improper maintenance to the certificate holder, ensuring 

that the certificate holder corrected the problems before approving the work for return to service, and thus 

preventing any violation from occurring in the first place. 3 For the duration of this case, Respondent has characterized the gap between the maintenance and the May 2010 

inspections as being from 2-9 months. See Respondent's Motion at 10 n.5. Indeed, when Inspector Lipinski sent 

Respondent the letter of investigation about this case using the dates of July 31, 2009 and September 29, 2009 as the 

maintenance dates for N899AA and N898AA, Respondent's response to that letter of investigation sought to correct 

the inspector as to the dates, noting that the aircraft were not approved for return to service by Respondent until 

August 26, 2009 and October 24, 2009. Compare Exhibit GG with Exhibit HH. The distinction between the two sets 

of dates is that on the earlier date Respondent signed off on the individual maintenance task card, while it was on the 

later date that Respondent approved the aircraft for return to service. Respondent, wishing to make the amount of 

time between the maintenance and the May 2010 inspections seems as long as possible, has now decided for the first 

to use the earlier of the two dates as a reference point, insisting that "2 to 1 0" months of aircraft operations had 

passed since the maintenance. See Respondent's Motion at 3, 13-14. This semantic gamesmanship is pointless- the 

aircraft was not operating until after Respondent had approved it for return to service, and the temporal distance 

between the two dates represents time that the aircraft was sitting at Respondent's facility, not time during which it 

was conducting operations in the supposedly "hostile environment" of"the slipstream." It is unclear why 

Respondent would knowingly represent to the court that N898AA and N899AA were "operated" for 8 or 10 months 

after maintenance, see Respondent's Motion at 13-14, when Respondent is well aware that the aircraft were not 

operating duting the first month, see Exhibit HH at 1. 

3 
FAA's proffered testimony. Respondent has presented no evidence to rebut the repeated 

contemporaneous documentation by its own personnel that Respondent had improperly installed 

the landing gear and flying doors. Respondent provides no explanation for why the time elapsed 

since its maintenance actions would affect the determinations made by the FAA inspectors (and 

CCIA and Respondent's own personnel at the time). See Respondent's Motion at 10. Respondent 

presents no explanation, much less evidence, of how the damage observed and documented 

could be "wear and tear," rather than the result of improper installation. Respondent asserts that 

it is necessary to see the aircraft with the flying doors closed to determine whether they were 

properly rigged, but this assertion is simply wrong - and Respondent supports it only with the 

statement of Becker, who is not a mechanic and is not qualified to offer such an expert opinion. 

See Respondent's Motion at 10. Respondent asserts that Becker "personally inspected" each of 

the aircraft in May 2010, but fails to mention that Becker has no recollection of the condition of 

the aircraft at that time. Compare Respondent's Motion at 17 with Exhibit B at 76. Respondent 

notes that Becker has personal knowledge of the "AMES investigation" into the discrepancies 

with the aircraft, but fails to mention that the investigation in question concluded that 

Respondent had performed improper maintenance on all three aircraft. Compare Respondent's 

Motion at 10-11 with Exhibit HH. The sole source of Becker's opinions is his review of 

Respondent's maintenance records, yet Respondent relies on his testimony is disregarding its 

own maintenance records as inaccurate. Compare Exhibit B at 76 with Respondent's Motion at 

17. 

Given Respondent's lack of evidence or explanation on this subject, judgment in favor of 

the FAA would be appropriate at this time. Even if Respondent later presents admissible 

4 
evidence on the subject, that could do no more than create an issue of material fact. Respondent's 

Motion on this point should be denied. 

III. The Missing Tubular Bearing on N287SC 

In its motion, Respondent acknowledges that when N287SC was inspected less than a 

month after Respondent approved it for return to service, there was a missing tubular bearing in 

the right-hand flying door assembly. Respondent does not dispute that this tubular bearing was a 

component that needed to be installed as part of its installation of the flying doors. Rather, 

Respondent asserts that the bearing must have been missing due to a tire change that occurred 

three days after Respondent installed the main landing gear. Respondent's Motion at 20-21. This 

argument fails for several reasons, most notably because Respondent's argument is based on a 

misunderstanding of what part of the aircraft was missing - the improper procedure that 

Respondent speculates may have occurred would have no effect whatsoever on the tubular 

bearing. 

As evidence in support of this belief, Respondent cites to Becker's deposition testimony. 

See Respondent's Motion at 20-21. However, there are several severe issues with this. First, 

Becker's testimony is not as forceful as Respondent makes it out to be - Respondent cites 

Becker's testimony in support of its contention that the tubular bearing "likely" fell out due to 

the tire change, when Becker only asserted that it "could have happened" and that it was a 

"possibility." Compare Respondent's Motion at 20 with Exhibit KK4 at 47, 124. When Becker 

expresses "confidence" that Respondent installed the bearing was, this was based not on any 

knowledge of the situation, but rather was based on his belief that CCIA would have 

4 Excerpts from Becker's deposition were included as Exhibit B to the FAA's Motion for Summary Judgment. This 

Response refers to portions of Becker's deposition that were not included among those excerpts. For the 

convenience of the Court, Exhibit KK attached to this Response contains any cited portion of Becker's deposition 

transcript, whether it was contained in Exhibit B or not. 

5 
"immediately" detected a problem if the bearing was missing. Exhibit KK at 126. However, this 

belief is baseless. As Respondent notes, the tire change in question took place three days after 

Respondent had reinstalled the flying door (on March 25, 2010). See Respondent's Motion at 20. 

But the vibration incident did not occur until April 16, 2010. If the missing tubular bearing 

would have immediately caused a problem if Respondent left it out on March 22, 2010, then 

likewise it would have immediately caused a problem if it somehow fell off of the airplane on 

March25, 2010. But there was no incident until April16, 2010. Since even Respondent agrees 

that the tubular bearing was missing by no later than March 25, 2010, the fact that there was no 

vibration incident until April 16, 2010, conclusively demonstrates the inaccuracy of Becker's 

belief that the missing bearing would immediately cause a problem. 

Second, Becker's testimony in this regard is meaningless. As discussed above, Becker is 

not a mechanic and is not qualified to present opinions on the subject. Becker's belief that it is 

"possible" for the tubular bearing to fall out because of a tire change is because Becker talked to 

Mike Ebert, who had talked to Mark Summers (or some other unknown mechanic), who 

indicated that some other mechanics sometimes "remove the bolt that contains the tubular 

bearing and hold up the flying door out of the way as they change the wheel." Exhibit KK at 

124-25. As Becker notes, this procedure is not one that is listed in the AMM, and there is a 

warning in the AMM that mechanics should not remove the actuation rod attachment bolt 

because lifting the flying door up too high may damage a hinge cover. Exhibit KK at 124-25. 

Respondent asserts that the mechanic on March 25, 2010 must have taken this "short cut." 

Respondent's Motion at 20. However, the procedure Becker describes would actually be more 

difficult and time-consuming than the proper procedure. Exhibit JJ ~ 36 No mechanic would 

6 
take a "shortcut" that was more work than the proper procedure. Additionally, as discussed 

below, Becker does not even understand which component of the aircraft is at issue. 

Third, and most significantly, the improper procedure that Becker describes doesn't have 

anything to do with the tubular bearing that was missing. The proper procedure for changing the 

tire is to remove two bolts that run through the actuating rod for this exact purpose, shift the 

flying door up a few inches, and then put the two bolts back in. Exhibit JJ '1[36; see also Exhibits 

LL, MM. The bolt that Becker was referring to - the actuation rod attachment bolt - can be seen 

in AMM 32-12-11. Exhibit D, Page 403, Figure 401 Sheet 1. As can be seen in the central 

image, the actuation rod attachment bolt goes through a "hollow pin," with both running through 

the actuation rod and the door fitting. Exhibit D, Page 403, Figure 401 Sheet I; Exhibit C, Page 

402, 'If AL(7), (8), (9); see Exhibit JJ '1[37. And as Becker says, there is a warning in the AMM 

that a mechanic changing a wheel should not remove that attachment bolt. See Exhibit LL. 

However, the missing tubular bearing was not the hollow pin that is used as part of the 

attachment of the actuation rod to the flying door. The missing tubular bearing was from the 

fitting where the actuation rod attaches to the landing gear (specifically to the drag strut). Exhibit 

AA; Exhibit BB at 1. This tubular bearing can be seen in AMM 32-11-00, Page 404, which 

highlights the actuation rod drag strut attachment. Exhibit C, Page 404, Figure 401; see also 

Exhibit C, Page 422, 'If AL(10), (11); Exhibit JJ '1[38. In order for the tubular bearing to somehow 

fall off, it would require detaching the actuation rod entirely from the landing gear. Even 

removing and replacing the wing door itself does not require detaching the actuation rod from 

the landing gear. See generally Exhibit D. The improper procedure for a tire change that Becker 

described - removing the actuation rod attachment bolt - has nothing to do with the tubular 

bearing that was missing from N287SC. 

7 
Fourth, Respondent relies on a statement by Becker that "the mechanic that performed 

the work specifically said in his statement, I recall putting the tubular bearing back in." 

Respondent's Motion at 20; Exhibit KK at 125. However, this statement by Becker must be read 

in the context of Becker's statement at deposition that, when Respondent investigated these 

matters, none of the mechanics had independent recollections of the original work, but were 

simply relying on their maintenance sign-offs. Exhibit rae at 40-41. The mechanic's purported 

statement that he recalled putting the tubular bearing back on the aircraft is simply a statement 

that he has reviewed his maintenance sign-off, that the procedure signed off required putting the 

bearing back in, and therefore he must have put the bearing back in. The renders the proffered 

statement almost meaningless, as it is undisputed that Respondent signed off the work as being 

completed. Additionally, even if the mechanic had some personal recollection of having installed 

the tubular bearing, that recollection is demonstrably false, as there is no other way that the 

tubular bearing could be missing on April 16, 2010 other than it not having been installed on 

March 22, 2010. 

Respondent was required to install the tubular bearing on N287SC when it removed and 

replaced the main landing gear on that aircraft. Less than a month later, that tubular bearing was 

directly observed by CCIA personnel as missing from the aircraft, and it was determined that this 

was because Respondent had failed to install the bearing in the first place. Respondent's 

argument that it probably fell off during a tire change is nonsensical and without any evidentiary 

foundation. Indeed, given that it is undisputed that the tubular bearing was missing, and given 

that Respondent's alternative explanation is demonstrably nonsensical, judgment against 

Respondent on this point is appropriate. Not only should Respondent's Motion on this point be 

denied, but judgment should be granted in favor of the FAA. 

8 
IV. Shims 

Respondent argues that there is no evidence of missing and misplaced shimming washers. 

See Respondent's Motion at 22-24. This assertion, as with most in Respondent's Motion, is 

(when it is based on anything) based only on the personal opinions of Becker based on his 

review of the corrective maintenance actions taken by Respondent, and simply ignores the other 

evidence in the case. Regardless, Respondent's own maintenance documents reflect several 

instances of improperly configured shims. 

Inspector Lipinski personally observed improperly configured shimming washers. 

Exhibit I at I. CCIA documented improper rigging in its discrepancy notices to Respondent with 

regards to N898AA and N287SC, and Respondent did not dispute this finding. Exhibits U, V, 

EE. CCIA documented improper hardware stackups in its response to the FAA. Exhibit Gat 2. 

Respondent referred the FAA to these documents when it responded to the FAA. While 

Respondent asserts that the case against it must be dismissed if its own maintenance documents 

do not specifically reference missing and misplaced shimming washers, see Respondent's 

Motion at 19, this is not the case. While explicit references in the Respondent's own 

documentation can, and do, conclusively demonstrate that it improperly installed the main 

landing gear, the fact that Respondent did not write down a particular discrepancy with 

shimming washers does not somehow negate the personal observations that they were not 

properly configured. 

Further, even when Respondent's own maintenance records explicitly document 

improper configuration of the shimming washers, Respondent seeks to convince the Judge that 

this should be ignored. Respondent's Motion at 22. On N899AA, Respondent explicitly wrote up 

all four main flying door hinges as having improper hardware stack ups (improperly configured 

9 
shimming washers). Exhibit Nat 2-7. For all four hinges, the proscribed corrective action was to 

remove and replace the hardware in question. Exhibit N at 2-7. For all four hinges, the 

maintenance documents reflect that the flying door was removed and that the hardware was 

"verified." Exhibit N at 2-7. Respondent (supported again only by Becker's personal opinion) 

take this to mean that there were no problems with the stack up, contrary to the initial write-up. 

See Respondent's Motion at 22. However, the maintenance documents say no such thing. If a 

mechanic, upon performing the work, had determined that the original discrepancy was in error, 

then the mechanic's write-up would reflect this. This can be seen most easily several times in the 

e-mail between CCIA and Becker, where several maintenance discrepancies were noted as being 

found to be invalid, but no mention was made of these discrepancies. See Exhibit N at 5 ~~5-6, 

8-9. Each of the four non-routine cards at issue was generated on May 28, 2010, when the 

aircraft arrived at Respondent's facility. Exhibit N at 2-4, 6. The aircraft doors were then 

removed entirely to enable Respondent to work on the aircraft from May 28, 2010 through May 

31, 2010. See Exhibit N. As part of that initial removal, all of the shimming washers that were 

installed on the hinges would have been removed. Exhibit D ~ 3(e). When the flying doors were 

put back on the aircraft several days later, new shimming washers were used in accordance with 

the service bulletin reference in the maintenance documents. Exhibit N at 2-4, 6 (calling for the 

washers to be replaced). There is nothing in the maintenance write-ups to indicate that 

Respondent performed some sort of additional inspection of the original shimming washers after 

they had been uninstalled but before they were discarded (indeed, it is unclear how Respondent 

could have conducted such an inspection after the hinge assembly had been disassembled to 

remove the flying doors). Rather, the verification, listed after the removal and before the reinstallation, would be a verification of which washers complied with the provisions of the cited 

10 
service bulletin, and which needed to be discarded. Becker's personal opinion as to what he 

wishes the mechanic meant to say does not negate what the inspector actually did write down 

based on his direct observations. 

There were also additional problems with shimming washers that Respondent does not 

appear to recognize in its review of the documents. For example, on N899AA, Respondent 

documents that the gear fittings on the left- and right-hand flying doors were both loose and 

needed new hardware. Exhibit N at 8-11. Like the forward and aft flying door hinges, the gear 

fitting requires the use of shimming washers to keep the fitting tight enough. Exhibit C at 404 

(diagram of gear fitting), 422(AL)(10(c) (directing the use shimming washers to limit a gap). 

Both of the gear fittings on N899AA were loose, indicating that they had not been properly 

shimmed, and the maintenance records for those repairs both specifically reference reshimming 

the fitting. Exhibit Nat 8-11; Exhibit JJ -,r-,r 22, 27. But Respondent does not even address this in 

its Motion. 

Respondent asks that the Judge grant judgment in its favor on the question of whether 

there were any improperly installed shimming washers. However, Respondent's own 

maintenance documents reflect multiple instances of improperly installed shimming washers, 

and the totality of Respondent's evidence on this point consists of Becker suggesting that 

Respondent's inspector's own maintenance write-ups were inaccurate. Not only should 

Respondent's Motion on this point be denied, but judgment should be granted in favor of the 

FAA. 

V. Hydraulic Lines and Clamps 

In its Motion, Respondent acknowledges that there are references in the record to 

improperly placed clamps. See Respondent's Motion at 24. Respondent acknowledges that there 

11 
were problems with the placement of the clamps but asserts (again, based solely on Becker's 

testimony5

) that it was not responsible for these improper placements. There is no genuine issue 

of material fact on this issue - but, contrary to Respondent's belief, the facts demonstrate that 

Respondent improperly perfonned two of the installations. 

There were two problems with hydraulic lines and clamps reflected in the corrective 

actions taken by Respondent in May 2010. First, on N899AA, Respondent wrote up a 

discrepancy for chafing on the left-hand flying door caused by incorrectly positioned hydraulic 

line clamps, which was addressed by repositioning those swivel clamps. Exhibit N at I, 13-14. 

Second, on N898AA, Respondent wrote up a discrepancy for the swivel clamps on the left-hand 

main landing gear being installed incorrectly, which was also addressed by repositioning the 

clamps. Exhibit T at 26. 

Respondent's own documentation reflects that these clamps were improperly positioned 

when they were installed. Respondent's sole argument on this point is that it was a vendor who 

had done the actual work of positioning these clamps, not the Respondent. See Respondent's 

Motion at 24. Unfortunately for the Respondent, regardless of whether or not some other vender 

did some amount of preliminary work on these components, it was the Respondent who 

performed this maintenance. 

For both of these landing gear and flying doors (as with all six at issue in this case), the 

Respondent signed off having completed a removal and replacement of the main landing gear in 

accordance with AMM 32-ll-00, including having performed Required Inspection Item (RII) 

inspections. Exhibit G at 1 (approving left-hand MLG of N899AA for return to service after 

5 Respondent has not produced an airworthiness release or other approval for return to service by the vendor that 

Respondent asserts actually did the work on the hydraulic lines and clamps. However, even if there was a prior 

airworthiness release, this would not change the fact that Respondent performed the installation, including the 

placement of the hydraulic lines and clamps. 

12 
replacement in accordance with 32-11-00); Exhibit R at I (approving left-hand MLG of 

N898AA for return to service after replacement in accordance with 32-11-00). Because AMM 

32-11-00 includes the arrangement and installation of the hydraulic lines and clamps, including 

the installation of the trunnion swivel, hydraulic lines, and clamps in accordance with a diagram 

in 32-11-00, Respondent therefore performed the installation ofthe hydraulic lines and clamps. 

AMM 32-11-00 section covers the placement of hydraulic lines and clamps in two places. 

First, the manual instructs the mechanic to prepare the landing gear assembly for installation, that 

assembly including hydraulic lines and clamps. Exhibit C at 416 ~ S(A). Second, the manual 

instructs the mechanic to install the trunnion swivel complete with hydraulic lines, as shown in 

Figure 404. Exhibit C at 407 (Figure 404), 422 ~ 5(AH). Figure 404 depicts the trunnion swivel, 

the hydraulic lines, and clamping for those lines. See Exhibit C at 407. Because it was 

Respondent signed off on the maintenance and approved the newly-installed landing gear and 

flying doors for return to service, it was Respondent who performed the maintenance. This is 

true whether Respondent directly did the work regarding the hydraulic lines and clamps or 

whether Respondent relied on another vendor for that work. Regardless of whether some other 

vendor did some preliminary build-up, it was Respondent who performed the complete 

installation, including the preparation and installation of the hydraulic line clamps. And, as 

Respondent's own documentation shows, that installation was improperly performed. 

Respondent's Motion, based on the incorrect belief that (because another vendor was also 

involved6

) it did not perform maintenance that it signed off is mistaken. Respondent performed, 

signed off, and approved for return to service these landing gear and flying doors as having 

completed a replacement pursuant to AMM 32-11-00, and that manual section includes the 

6 Respondent has only presented Becker's testimony that Respondent relied on a vendor to perform the work 

13 
proper routing and clamping of the hydraulic lines. Respondent's Motion on this point is not only 

due to be denied, but judgment should be granted in favor of the FAA. 

VI. "Wear and Tear" 

Respondent asserts that the extensive damage observed to the components of the flying 

door assemblies and adjacent structures is wear and tear. However, Respondent fails to present 

any evidence to support the conclusion that this damage was "wear and tear," or even could be 

"wear and tear." 

As an initial matter, it should be noted that- contrary to Respondent's assertion- it is not 

the case that "there can be no denying that flying doors, representing large structures that are 

raised and lowered in the slipstream, operate in a hostile environment and are subject to 

significant wear and tear." See Respondent's Motion at 3. Respondent provides no factual 

support whatsoever for any aspect of this contention. On the contrary, a flying door- if properly 

installed and rigged- is a part of the aircraft that almost never develops issues between C checks 

(when the door will be removed, reinstalled, andre-rigged). Exhibit JJ ~ 14. 

Rather, for the notion that the damage to the aircraft was "wear and tear," Respondent 

relies exclusively on the opinions of Becker - who is not a mechanic - and in particular on the 

Becker's interpretation of maintenance records. See Respondent's Motion at 19, 22-24. 

Respondent cannot rely on the documents themselves because they contain repeated explicit 

references to improperly installed components, as well as repeated references to cracked and 

gouged components. Instead, Becker simply asserts, without explanation or expertise, that the 

damage was "wear and tear." And Respondent cannot rely on the personal observations of 

Becker- while Respondent seeks to buttress Becker's testimony by asserting that he was present 

on "a daily basis" when the aircraft were returned to the AMES facility, see Respondent's 

14 
Motion at 17, Respondent fails to mention that Becker does not have any actual recollection of 

the condition of the aircraft at that time: 

Q: And what, if anything, do you remember observing about the condition of 

those aircraft? 

A: ... I do recall that my inspectors were asked to inspect the flying doors and the 

areas with a fine tooth comb. They wanted us to write up every nick, every minor 

flaw .... 

Q: Sure. Do you have any personal recollection of what, if any, nicks or flaws 

were on these aircraft? 

A: Um,no. 

Exhibit B at 76. This is especially noteworthy when Becker is used to support the notion that 

some of AMES's own maintenance entries are inaccurate. See Respondent's Motion at 17.It is 

unclear what basis Becker could have for concluding that the documents are inaccurate when he 

has no independent recollection of the status of the aircraft and is relying solely on those same 

documents. 

Respondent's assertion that the damage at issue (described in detail in the FAA's Motion 

for Summary Judgment) was "wear and tear" makes little sense. The entire purpose of rigging 

the flying doors is that, when properly rigged, the flying doors and associated structures have 

ample clearance between them, and components like the hinges are not put into unduly forceful 

contact. But the damage at issue in this case specifically included multiple instances of damage 

caused when these components were scraping and binding against each other. This is very 

distinct from "wear and tear"- which is why a trained mechanic, such as Inspector Lipinski, who 

looks at the aircraft can tell the difference between the two. As Inspector Lipinski noted at his 

deposition, there was very minor wear and tear on the aircraft - out that the damage at issue in 

15 
this case is not wear and tear. See Exhibit NN at 49-50; see also Exhibit JJ ~~ 14, 24, 27, 30, 33, 

42. 

It is also why, contrary to Becker's belief, see Respondent's Motion at 16-17, it is not 

always necessary to perform a gear swing to determine that a flying door is out of rig. When the 

flying door and associated structures are exhibiting damage from the components scraping and 

binding against each other, it can be determined that the door is out of rig. Exhibit JJ ~ 15. 

In sum, the damage to the aircraft from flying door and associated structures scraping and 

binding is not consistent with wear and tear, but is rather exactly the sort of damage one might 

expect when the flying door is improperly rigged. Respondent provides no explanation for its 

contention that the damage is just wear and tear, and no meaningful evidence. Respondent's 

Motion on this point is not only due to be denied, but judgment should be granted in favor of the 

FAA. 

VII. Applicability of Maintenance Concepts Beyond AMM 32-11-00 and 32-12-11/501 

In its Motion, Respondent argues that Inspector Lipinski erred in asserting that 

Respondent should have taken into account AMM section 32-12-11/401 and following pages. 

See Respondent's Motion at 4, 24-28. Respondent is incorrect in asserting that its personnel 

should conduct maintenance in ignorance of any information outside the four comers of a 

particular AMM section. 

Respondent's argument raises the question of to what extent a mechanic or repair station 

is responsible for awareness of maintenance documents and concepts beyond the four comers of 

the AMM section it cites in its sign off. In performing maintenance, is a repair station expected 

to know the manufacturer's standard practices provisions? Is it expected to have knowledge of 

advisory circulars on acceptable maintenance techniques, or know industry standards on how 

16 
maintenance tasks are to be performed? When performing maintenance on a larger assembly that 

includes removal and reinstallation of many sub-components, is it expected to have knowledge 

of the information in the parts catalog, or the more detailed diagrams, routing information, and 

installation instructions in other parts of the AMM? Does it matter when the work being signed 

off by the repair station is a Required Inspection Item (RII)? 

Respondent asserts that- at least as to some of these questions -it is under no obligation 

to have knowledge of or take into account these other documents and concepts, including the 

detailed diagram in AMM 32-12-11/401 showing the proper configuration of the shimming 

washers for the forward and aft flying door hinges. See Respondent's Motion at 4, 24-28. As 

Respondent notes, it is undisputed that AMM 32-12-11/401 is not explicitly called out in AMM 

32-11-00. But the fact that a document is not explicitly called out in AMM 32-11-00 does not 

mean that a mechanic is under no obligation to be aware of the contents of that documents. The 

B727 AMM presumes that a mechanic either knows the full manual, or knows when to go look 

for more detailed information. See Exhibit JJ ~ 12. The procedure for reinstalling the landing 

gear and flying doors contains multiple instructions that, in a vacuum, lack detail on how to 

perform the action in question. The manual instructs the mechanic to install the flap track fairing, 

but doesn't explain how to do that. Exhibit C, Page 422, ~ AK. The instructions say to hang the 

door, but don't explain how to hang the door or how to support the door before the hinges and 

actuation rod have been attached. Exhibit C, Page 422, ~ AL(3). The instructions call for the 

mechanic to tighten bolts and install cotter pins, without saying how tight the bolts need to be or 

where exactly the cotter pins go. Exhibit C, Page 422, ~~ AL(5)(9). Much of this information is 

in AMM 43-12-11/401. Similarly, when AMM 32-11-00 instructs the mechanic to insert washers 

on the forward hinges of the flying doors to provide clearance between the lugs of the aft hinges, 

17 
it does not say exactly where those washers should go or how much clearance is necessary. 

Exhibit C, Page 422, ~ AL(2). It is by looking at the diagrams in AMM 32-12-11/401 that the 

mechanic can learn the particulars of where the washers (and cotter pins) are to be located. See 

Exhibit D. 

By contrast, Respondent provides no evidentiary support for the notion that a mechanic 

can properly perform maintenance while remaining willfully ignorant of the full contents of the 

AMM he is using. Respondent's motion on this point is due to be denied. 

VIII. Respondent's Claims of Inspector Bias 

Although it has no bearing in a snmmary judgment motion, Respondent again reiterates 

its baseless allegations of bias against Aviation Safety Inspector Lipinski. Respondent's Motion 

at 5, 28-30. Respondent's claim that the FAA's case should be dismissed based on allegations of 

bias is frivolous - this exactly the sort of credibility determination that a court cannot make on 

summary judgment. Further, Respondent has only been able to identify one supposed effect of 

this supposed bias- and, as discussed below, Respondent's own manager inadvertently admitted 

that the supposed exaggeration by Inspector Lipinski was actually an appropriate statement. 

Finally, as exemplified by the FAA's Motion for Summary Judgment, a finding of violation is 

supported against the Respondent even if the evidence considered consists solely of the 

documentation created by Respondent and CCIA. 

As an initial matter, Respondent's motion on this point is inappropriate. The court does 

not evaluate credibility in snmmary judgment proceedings. Steven Baicker-McKee, et.al, 

Federal Civil Rules Handbook, 1125 (West Publishing 2012). Even if the Respondent had laid 

out a convincing case that the Inspector was biased, and that this has some sort of effect on the 

case - which it has not - a motion for summary judgment is not the place for credibility 

18 
determinations. Indeed, Respondent asks the court to make a double credibility determination -

to credit its management officials over Inspector Lipinski when the two disagree about Inspector 

Lipinski's statements, and then based on that credibility determination make a broader credibility 

determination about the supposed bias of Inspector Lipinski. Respondent asks the Judge to do 

this even though Inspector Lipinski has no reason whatsoever to present false information, but 

Respondent faces tens of thousands of dollars in direct penalties and the possibility of having the 

European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) rescind Respondent's authorization to approve 

aircraft components for return to service under EASA regulations. 

It should also be noted that the supposed bias asserted by Respondent is hardly 

demonstrated by the allegations it makes. Respondent's allegations come in two parts. First, that 

the Inspector was "biased" in favor of another repair station. See Respondent's Motion at 28-29. 

It appears that the Inspector, the other members of the certificate management team, and 

everyone at CCIA shared this opinion - the other repair station had extensive experience with 

B727 aircraft, Respondent had no experience with them, and the move was made only because 

Respondent and CCIA shared a corporate parent. See Respondent's Motion at 28, Exhibit JJ ~ 9; 

Exhibit 00 at 88 (D' Arcy deposition). An FAA maintenance inspector holding opinions about 

the skill and safety level of various certificate holders is hardly noteworthy - indeed, it would 

seem quite noteworthy if an inspector managed to avoid forming any opinions. See Exhibit JJ ~ 9 

Regardless, Inspector Lipinski did not "steer" CCIA towards any particular maintenance 

provider. See Exhibit JJ ~ 9. 

Second, Respondent references two meeting of the Capital managers and the certificate 

management team. See Respondent's Motion at 29. At one of these meetings, Inspector Lipinski 

allegedly made a number "intemperate remarks" about how he was going to "war" with 

19 
Respondent and would "take no prisoners" and that the "shit is going to start." Respondent's 

Motion at 29. What Respondent does not mention in its Motion is that this meeting took place in 

March 2012, when the Notice of Proposed Civil Penalty in this case had been issued in August 

2011 7 See Respondent's Motion Exhibit 15. As a general matter, the possibility that an FAA 

inspector lost his temper during a meeting is a vast distance away from the inspector bringing 

false charges against a Respondent. More particularly, it is unclear how a statement in March of 

2012 that the Inspector was going to "war" and that "shit is going to start" could possibly be 

referring to a case that the Inspector had completed a year before, was already in the 

undersigned's office, and would have already gone through coordination with FAA headquarters. 

See FAA Order 2150.3B, Chapter 6 ~ 3(b)(3) (requiring coordination with headquarters for all 

civil penalties over $100,000, such as the one against CCIA). Nor is it clear how Inspector 

Lipinski could offer a quid pro quo about how the FAA would handle a "potential" enforcement 

action against CCIA when the only existing enforcement action against CCIA had already been 

referred to legal, and there were no future enforcement actions initiated against CCIA. See 

Exhibit JJ ~ 9. 

Further, it is unclear what the supposed effect of Inspector Lipinski's supposed bias is 

supposed to be. Respondent's only allegation in this regard concerns a claim that Inspector 

Lipinski is exaggerating the damage he observed on the aircraft. See Respondent's Motion at 16 

n.7, 21-22. However, with one exception, Respondent has failed to identify what the supposed 

exaggerations were. See Respondent's Motion at 16 n. 7. And that one supposed exaggeration 

was in fact an accurate statement, as Becker inadvertently admitted at his deposition. 

7 The undersigned's office received the companion case against CCIA in March 2011, a year prior to the meetings 

discussed by Respondent. 

20 
That one particular "exaggeration" is the condition of the anti-skid conduit on the righthand main landing gear on N287SC. See Respondent's Motion at 21. Inspector Lipinski 

described the conduit as "crushed," while Respondent believes that it is better described as 

"pinched." Exhibit KK at 55. Although this appears to be a rather superficial semantic distinction 

to base a charge of bias on, Respondent asserts that the word "crushed" was improper because it 

"would suggest" that the wires inside the conduit were damaged. See Respondent's Motion at 21 

n.11. However, at his deposition, Becker testified that the word "crushed" would have the 

"connotation" that the conduit was beyond use. Exhibit KK at 56. But the conduit in question 

here was beyond use and, as Becker admitted later in his deposition, did have to be replaced. 

Exhibit KK at 99, 149; see also Exhibit DD at 6 (Respondent's maintenance write-up that 

"conduit found unserviceable & needs replaced"). So, even according to Becker's own 

description of what it would mean for the conduit to be crushed, the conduit was crushed - it 

could not be used, and had to be replaced. 

Finally, even if it was somehow appropriate for the court to make credibility 

determinations on summary judgment, and even if Respondent had actually presented evidence 

of bias on the part of Inspector Lipinski, that would not mean that any sort of judgment in 

Respondent's favor would be appropriate. Respondent asserts that the case against it should be 

dismissed simply because of the Inspector's supposed bias. However, Respondent does not - and 

cannot - provide any citation to any principle of law that would require or even permit such a 

result. As an initial matter, the Respondent appears to have difficulty distinguishing between "the 

FAA" and "Inspector Lipinski." See generally Respondent's Motion. Similarly, Respondent fails 

to acknowledge any source of evidence against it but Inspector Lipinski - even though the 

observations of another FAA Inspector, CCIA mechanics, Respondent's mechanics, and 

21 
numerous documents all implicate Respondent in this case. Even if it was appropriate for the 

Court to make a credibility determination against Inspector Linpinski, and even if it was 

appropriate to make that determination on summary judgment, the other evidence in the case -

including Respondent's own documentation - demonstrates that Respondent improperly 

performed the insallations. 

Respondent's Motion on this point is inappropriate, and due to be denied. 

IX. Other Factual Matters 

In addition to the lengthier topics addressed above, Respondent's Motion includes a pair 

of additional factual misrepresentations that are worth correcting. 

First, Respondent claims that "[f]rom the outset" it responded to the FAA's Letter of 

Investigation by asserting that "whatever discrepancies were identified ... were the product of 

'normal wear and tear' and not evidence of the failure to properly rig the flying doors." 

Respondent's Motion at 2. This assertion is false. As discussed in detail in the FAA's Motion, 

Respondent originally agreed, in writing, that it had improperly installed the flying doors. See 

Exhibit HH. Respondent only changed its mind later, at some point after it had received the 

Notice of Proposed Civil Penalty. 

Second, Respondent asserts that the damage observed on the aircraft here was "minor" 

and therefore had no relation to airworthiness. Respondent's Motion at 16. As an initial matter, 

this topic does not warrant extensive discussion because it is immaterial - whether the damage 

observed was sufficient to render the aircraft unairworthy is not at issue in this case because the 

FAA has not charged Respondent with operating an unairworthy aircraft8 Substantively, 

Respondent's connection between "minor" and airworthiness here is inapt. Respondent correctly 

8 The aircraft were in an unairworthy condition, but allegations regarding operating an aircraft in an unairworthy 

condition were properly brought against the air carrier, not the repair station. 

22 
notes that, during his deposition, Becker asserted that some of its repairs were minor and did not 

affect airworthiness. See Exhibit KK. at I 02. However, Becker (perhaps not adequately 

understanding the concept of airworthiness) contradicted that contention in the deposition when 

he specifically identified several repairs that performed by Respondent that, even in his opinion, 

were necessary and required. See Exhibit KK. at 99 (anti-skid conduit had to be replaced), 100 

(nut plate had to be replaced), 101 (new hinge covers had to be installed), 115-17 (gimbals 

needed to be repaired), 118/130 (damaged angle needed to be replaced), 135 (bushings were 

beyond limits), 143 (gouges had to be repaired), 146 (incorrectly positioned clamps had to be 

moved), 148 (cracked fairing stiffener had to be repaired). Respondent's own maintenance writeups include several explicit references to the status of components being "beyond limits." See 

Exhibit Nat 17; Exhibit Tat 1-7, 43. Indeed, even though Becker asserted that a "blend and 

treat" was a "minor" repair that did not affect airworthiness, Exhibit KK at I 02, he later 

indicated that damage warranting a "blend and treat" was something that had to be repaired once 

detected, id. at 101. But if damage to an aircraft means that component has to be repaired or 

replaced under the AMM or applicable maintenance program, this means that the aircraft is 

unairworthy if that maintenance action is not taken. See In re Whitley; FAA Order 2009-4. 

Accordingly, while the issue of whether the aircraft were unairworthy by reason of the various 

maintenance problems observed in May 2010 is immaterial, Respondent's assertion that the 

aircraft were airworthy is mistaken, and is directly contradicted by its own witness's testimony. 

Conclusion 

As discussed above, Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment is baseless. It asks the 

judge to make credibility determinations and weigh competing evidence and reach conclusions 

that are not only incorrect substantively, but inappropriate procedurally. And almost all of the 

23 
competing evidence it does present consists of the un-expert personal opm10ns of a nonmechanic on issues of aviation maintenance. On the contrary, the actual evidence in the case 

demonstrates that judgment in favor of the FAA is appropriate on many of the points raised by 

Respondent- Respondent failed to install the tubular bearing on the right-hand side ofN287SC, 

Respondent failed to properly shim the hinges or gear fittings on N899AA, Respondent 

performed the maintenance that included the improperly installed hydraulic line clamps on 

N898AA and N899AA, and the improper installations resulted in damage to the aircraft that 

cannot be dismissed as "normal wear and tear." 

WHEREFORE, the FAA requests that Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment be 

denied and, as laid out in the FAA's Motion for Summary Judgment, that judgment be granted to 

the FAA. 

. ~~ 

Respectfully submitted this 17 dayofFebruary, 2015. 

CHRISTOPHER ~-R. STEVENSON 

Attorney 

Office of the Regional Counsel 

24 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certifY that the foregoing Response in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment 

was sent: 

original and one copy via Federal Express to: 

Federal Aviation Administration 

800 Independence Avenue, S.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20591 

Attention: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430 

Wilbur Wright Building- Suite 2Wl000 

one copy via Federal Express (with attachments) and facsimile (without attachments) to: 

The Honorable J.E. Sullivan 

Administrative Law Judge 

Office of Hearings, M-20 

U.S. Department of Transportation 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE (Ell-310) 

Washington, DC 20590 

facsimile: (202) 366-7536 

Robert P. Silverberg, Esq. 

1101 30th Street, NW, Suite 120 

Washington, D.C. 20007 

Facsimile: (202) 944-3306 

~~~s Program Analyst 

Office of the Regional Counsel 

_fEB 17 

Dated 

25 
U;S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

OFFICE OF HEARINGS 

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION 

FEB l 8 2015 

D 

. HEAHING DOCKET 

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 

Complainant, 

vs. 

AIRBORNE MAINTENA-NCE AND 

ENGINEERING SERVICES, 

Respondent. 

Docket No. F AA-2013-0291 

FAA Case No. 2011S0290032 

Judge Sullivan 

DECLARATION OF FRANK LIPINSKI 

COMES NOW the Declarant, Frank Lipinski, and states as follows: 

1. I am over the age of 18 and I understand the obligations of an oath. 

2. I am c1mently employed with the Federal Aviation Administration as an Air Carrier 

Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI) at the Orlando Certificate Management Office (CMO), 

currently on long-term detail to the Flight Standards Air Carrier Maintenance Division, Cargo 

Focus Team. 

3. I have served at the Federal Aviation Administration as an Aviation Safety Inspector 

(Airworthiness) since 2000. As an Aviation Safety Inspector, and then as a Principal 

Maintenance Inspector (PMI), I was trained to evaluate, and routinely do evaluate, whether 

maintenance was performed in accordance with maintenance programs and manuals; and 

whether it was performed in accordance with the Federal Aviation Regulations. In addition my 

private sector experience with the B-727, which is discussed below, as part of my duties at the 

FAA I attended a multi-week factory service training course at the Boeing facility in Long 

Beach. 

4 .I served in the United States Marine Corps and Navy from 1970 through 1988. While in 

the Navy, I served as an Aircraft Maintenance Technician Senior Chief, Crew Chief, Plane 

Captain, Flight Crew Plane Captain, Quality Assurance Inspector (All Systems), Quality 

Assurance Representative (All Systems), Quality Assurance Department Chief, Maintenance 

Control Manager/Chief, Flight Engineer, Flight Engineer Check Airman/Standards Evaluator, 

Flight Loadmaster, and Radio Operator. 

~ GOVERNMENT i .!!'l:!.IBIT 

i -J,) ! 

! I 

. ' 

1 i 
-- ----------------------------------

5. In 1988 !received a Mechanic Certificate with Airframe and Powerplant ratings, and a 

Flight Engineer certificate, both based on my !11-ilitary experience. In I 990 I received a Pilot 

certificate. From 1988 through 1991, I worked at American Air Freight, Laredo Air, and 

American Jet Center, serving variously as a mechanic, flight engineer, maintenance supervisor, 

inspection supervisor, and maintenance instructor. This included working with B-727 aircraft. In 

1992 and 1993 I worked as the chief flight engineer, Director of Maintenance, and General 

Manager for Alcai:r Air Transport. After that I worked from 1994 through 1998 as a flight 

engineer, maintenance inspector, and maintenance supervisor for Trans Air Link Airlines. This 

again included working on B-727 aircraft. I also worked as a maintenance technician 

maintenance supervisor at Spirit Airlines before joining the FAA. 

6. I was the reporting inspector for this EIR and for the related case against Capital Cargo 

International Airlines (Capital). I was also the PMI for Capital during for years before this 

violation occurred and remained PMI until Capital shut down. In reaching the opinions offered in 

this declaration, I have considered all documents contained in the EIR, my personal observations 

of the aircraft, my conversations with employees and managers at Capital and AMES, and 

additional documents provided by AMES during discovery. The documents I have reviewed 

include the maintenance packages for the original work done by AMES, the re-work done by· 

AMES, documents on the vibration incident in April of20 I 0, aircraft logbook pages, portions of 

the B-727 Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM), and letters and e-mails between the FAA, 

AMES, and Capital. 

My Suppos~d "Bias" 

7. My statements and opinions in this case are based on my observations and experience in 

aircraft maintenance. I have no "bias" against Airborne Maintenance and Engineering Services 

(AMES), although I have formed opinions about them based on interactions with them and 

Capital, and my investigations in this and other cases, and in the performance of my duties as 

PMI for Capital (such as determining whether to approve an addition to Capital's operations 

specifications to permit the use of AMES as a maintenance provider). 

8. - My statements in the EIR, both in my inspector's statement and in Section B, were honest 

and accurate to the best of my knowledge and understanding at the time those statements were 

made. My statements about my personal observations of the condition of the aircraft when I 

inspected them in May of 2010 are not exaggerated. · 

9. I have reviewed the accusations of bias made against me by AMES in its motion for 

summary judgment, the pages of Jeff Becker's deposition that are mentioned in that part of the 

motion, _and the declarations that are mentioned in that part of the motion. Again, I am not biased 

against AMES. It says in the motion that I complained about Capital being forced to use the 

services of AMES after Capital was bought by parent company Air Transportation ServicesGroup (ATSG) and AMES was created out of the Airborne Express (ABX) maintenance 

department. On the contrary, Capital personnel complained to me that they were going to be 

required to use the services of AMES because ATSG had told them to. It is stated in the motion 

that I used the "derogatory term" of"mother ship" when referring to ATSG. Although I do not 

recall the particular incident that Becker mentions, I have used that term to refer to ATSG. I used 

2 
that term because it was how personnel at Capital frequently referred to ATSG. AMES says in its 

motion that I "went so far as to say" that I "preferred CCIA use the services of' another repair 

station (Flight Star), and that I attempted to steer Capital to that other repair station. Personnel at 

Capital made it very clear to me tltat they preferred the services of Flight Star, which was the 

repair station Capital had previously been using and continued to use for some tasks. I was, and 

am, of the opinion that using Flight Star, which had extensive B-727 experience (AMES had 

none), would have resulted in fewer maintenance issues for Capital. In the context of Capital's 

repeated issues with AMES and Capital personnel repeatedly complaining to me about the 

quality ofthe work from AMES, we would have discussed the quality of Capital's other 

maintenance options. However, I never attempted to "steer'' Capital into using one repair station 

or another. It is stated in tl1e motion and declarations that during a March 2012 meeting I referred 

to AMES as "evil," that I was going to "war" against AMES, that I would "take no prisoners," 

that the "shit is going to start," and that it was my goal to have AMES's certificate SUSpended. 

This meeting took place months after this case and the related case agaiost Capital had been 

completed and sent to the Region. I koow that I did not say that my goal was to have AMES's 

certificate suspended. I do not recall making the other statements. One of the declarations I 

reviewed said that I said during a March 2012 meeting that it would beneftt Capital io a 

"potential" enforcement ca!le if they dropped AMES. This is not true. 

Improper Installation of Main Landing Gear and Flying Doors 

10. I remain of the opioion that AMES iolproperly installed the landing gear and flying doors. 

on N287SC, N898AA, and N899AA. My personal observations of the aircraft in May 2010 

included direct observation of improperly placed shimming washers and damage to the flying 

doors, flap track fairings, and other components that was caused by improper riggiog. The 

Capital and AMES maintenance records, plus my conversations witll Capital and AMES 

managers, and written statements to me from Capital and AMES, all confirmed that the landiog 

gear and flying doors had not been properly installed. 

11. Installing tile main landing gear and flying doors requires the use of shims in tile flyiog 

door hinges and other fittings. Placement of these shiols, especially the shims in tile priolary 

forward and aft hinges for each flyiog door, is called riggiog. These shiols make sure that the 

flying door is held tightly in tile proper position, with enough clearance between it and other 

components, and so that when the landiog gear retract the surface of the flying door is even with 

the surface of the wing. The actuation rod that closes the flying door is powerful and strong 

enough that the flying door will close regardless of whether the door is properly positioned. If 

the door is not properly rigged, this will resulted in stress and then damage to the components of 

the flying door assembly, the flying door itself, and associated structures. 

12. I am aware that AMES claims that it did not have to koow or use the information io 

AMM 32-12-11/401. AMES is right that AMM 32-11-00 does not explicitly call out AMM 32-

12-1111. But, as I explained at my deposition, this is not how the B-727 AMM is designed. The 

B-727 AMM requires the mechanic to have koowledge ofthe manual system generally. For 

example, I discussed earlier the procedure for changing a main landing gear wheel. The 

procedure for changing the wheel tells the mechanic to remove two bolts and raise the wing door 

to servicing position. It does not tell the mechanic where the bolts are, what they look like, what 

3 
the servicing position is, or about the red warning paint that shows the mechanic that the door is 

extended to the proper servicing position to insert the bolt. This information is found elsewhere 

in the AMM. The instructions for configuring the hinges when reinstalling the flying doors, in 

AL(9), instruct the mechanic to tighten a nut to standard torque, but do not tell the mechanic 

what the standard torque is. That same instruction tells the mechanic to install a cotter pin, but 

does not tell him where to install it. The section that contains the diagram on exactly where the 

cotter pin goes is AMM 32-12-111401. The same is true of the proper configuration of the 

shimming washers for those hinges. AMM 32-11-00 does not say exactly what the configuration 

is supposed to be, but that diagram can be found in AMM 32-12-11/401. A mechanic using the 

B-727 AMM needs training on where else in the manual to look for the details of some tasks, or 

at least the training to recognize when he needs additional information so he can figure out where 

it is. 

13. As stated above, it is my opinion that AMES, in performing maintenance on a B-727, 

needed to be aware of the manual system generally, not just the individual section it was 

performing. However, none of my opinions in this declaration as to whether AMES properly 

performed the main landing gear and flying door installations depends on whether AMES 

followed the diagran1s in AMM 32-12-11/401. While my own observations of the shims on the 

tln·ee aircraft in fuis case showed that those shims were not arranged as specified in AMM 32-12-

1!!40 I, ignoring fuis does not change whether AMES properly performed fue maintenance. As 

discussed below, each ofthe main landing gear/flying door installations on each of fue aircraft 

was performed improperly even without considering AMM 3 2-12-11/40 I. · 

14. I have been informed that AMES asserts that the cause offue damage to the aircraft that I 

observed in May 2010, and that was documented by Capital and AMES, was "wear and tear." 

The damage was not normal wear and tear. As I said during my deposition, fuere was a small 

amount o[wear and tear on these aircraft, but the damage I was referring to in my inspector's 

statement and in fue EIR was not wear and tear. Normal wear and tear for fuese components 

might be paint deterioration, worn or possibly torn rubber seals, aged lubrication, affixed dirt, or · 

the presence of metallic dust in the hinges from the frequent movement. The type of damage I 

observed could not be normal wear and tear. My observations of other Capital B-727 aircraft 

during fue May 2010 inspections, including some that had been flying much longer since their 

most recent C checks, did not reveal the sort of damage I observed on these three aircraft. When 

the installation and rigging of the landing gear and flying doors is properly performed, this sort 

of damage will aln10st never occur prior to the next C check (when the doors will be removed, 

reinstalled, and rigged again). 

15. I have been informed that AMES and Mr. Becker claim that it is impossible to know if 

the B-727 flying doors are improperly rigged wifuout performing a gear swing. They are wrong. 

A gear swing is requrred to definitely determine that a flying door is properly rigged. However, it 

can be possible to tell that a flying door is out of rig. In this case, pails of all three aircraft were 

damaged where fue doors, hinges, flap track fairings, and other components had been scraping, 

rubbing, or binding against each other. When the door is properly rigged, these components do 

not scrape, rub, and bind against each other. So by looking at the damage yon can tell that the 

door is not properly rigged. 

4 
--------------------------------------cc 

16. Performing maintenance for Capital, AMES was required to follow Capiial' s 

maintenance program. That program required that AMES follow the B-727 AMlv!. 

N899AA 

17. AMES approved N899AA for return to service in August 2009 after removing and 

replacing both main landing gears. According to Capital, the aircraft was used on 784 flights 

between that return to service and when we inspected the aircraft in May of2010. 

18. The damage and other problems noted on the right-hand flYing door and associated 

components during the May 2010 inspection, as documented when Capital worked on the aircraft 

inToledo, and as documented when AMES performed the re-work on the aircraft included: 

• The flap track fairing was damaged by the forward hinge cover upper hinge pin, which 

had migrated out of the hinge; 

• The flap track fairing was also damaged from rubbing at the forward hinge cover; 

• The wrong pin was installed in the hinge cover mid hinge; 

• A hinge loop on the forward hinge cover was cracked and needed to be replaced; 

• The aft hinge cover had to be replaced; 

• The aft angle on the fairing was damage and needed to be replaced; 

• The shimming washer configuration on both hinges was incorrect; 

• There was excessive play (looseness) in the gear fitting. 

19. The condition of the flying door and associated components in May of2010 demonstrates 

that the right -hand main landing gear and flying door were not properly installed by AMES in 

August of 2009. 

20. AMES was required to properly install and secure the hinge covers, including the hinge 

pins, but they did not, as specifically noted in Capital's documentation. 

21. AMES was required to properly configure the shimming washers on the forward and aft 

hinges, but they did not, as specifically noted in their own re-work documents. 

22. AMES was required to shim the gear fitting, but did not, as reflected in the need to reshim the gear fitting because it was loose. 

23. The other damage to the flap track fairing and excessive wear on a hinge cover also 

shows that the doors were not properly rigged, because these components were rubbing against 

other components when they should not have been. 

24. The discrepancies discussed above are not consistent with normal wear and tear. 

25. The damage and other problems noted on the left-hand flying door and associated 

components during the May 2010 inspection, when Capital worked on the aircraft in Toledo, and 

when AMES performed the re-work on the aircraft included: 

5 
----------------~-------------··-·------------------

• The shimming washer configuration on both hinges was incorrect; 

• There was excessive play (looseness) in the gear fitting; 

• The forward hinge cover bracket needed to be replaced due to excessive wear; 

• There was damage to the flying door where the door was chafing on improperly 

positioned hydraulic line clamps, which was addressed by repositioning the hose swivel 

clamps. 

26. AMES was required to properly route and clamp the hydraulic lines, but did not, as 

specifically noted in their own re-work documents. I am aware that AMES has stated that the 

initial build-up for the main landing gear assembly was performed by another vendor. This does 

not change my conclusion. According to their own maintenance documents, AMES performed 

the entire removal and replacement of main landing gear, specifically including section 5 

(Installation of Main Landing Gear). This section begins with an instruction to "prepare a main 

landing gear assembly for installation," and specifically states that this includes hydrauliclines 

and clamps. Later in the process, the mechanic is instructed to install a trunion swivel complete 

with hydraulic lines. AMES specifically signed off having completed these steps, and then (as 

required by Capital's maintenance program) signed off having performed an inspection to ensure 

that the work was performed properly. Even if another vendor did the initial build-up, AMES 

performed the maintenance because AMES signed off having performed the maintenance, and 

then approved the installation for return to service. 

· 27. AMES was required to properly configure the shimming washers on the forward and aft 

hinges, but they did not, as specifically noted in their own re-work documents. AMES was 

required to properly shim the gear fitting, but did not, as reflected in the replace hardware 

damaged from the gear fitting being too loose. These, and the excessive wear that required 

replacement of the forward hinge bracket, are not consistent with normal wear and tear. 

N898AA 

28. AMES approved N898AA for return to service in August 2009 after removing and 

replacing both main landing gears. According to Capital, the _aircraft was used on 628 flights 

between that retoro to service and when we inspected the aircraft in May of 2010. 

29. The damage and other problems noted on the right-hand flying door and associated 

components during the May 2010 inspection, as documented when Capital worked on the aircraft 

in Toledo, and as documented when AMES performed the re-work on the aircraft included: 

• The flying door had gouged the skin of the \ving; 

• The skin of the flying door was cracked at a hinge fitting; 

• The forward hinge needed to be replaced because it had cracked; 

• The aft hinge needed to be replaced because it was loose; 

• Many hinge bushings showed excessive wear and had to be replaced; 

• There was such excessive wear on a flap track fairing attach plate that it was chafed 

through. 

6 
30. These discrepancies, especially the damage to the wing, flying door, and hinges, 

demonstrate that the right-hand main landing gear and flying door were not properly installed. 

The damage recorded is not consistent with normal wear and tear. 

31. The damage and other problems noted on the left-hand flying door and associated · 

components during the May 2010 inspection, as documented when Capital worked on the aircraft 

in Toledo, and as documented when AMES performed the re-work on the aircraft included: 

• There were gouges in the flying door at an attach bracket and at the stop bracket; 

• The forward hinge was cracked; 

• Hinge bushings had to be replaced because they were worn beyond limits; 

• An aft hinge cover pin had migrated out of the hinge and a hinge lobe was cracked; 

• There was a cracked bushing in the gear fitting; 

• The aft internal stiffener in the fairing was cracked twice; 

• There was a crack in the flap track fairing's forward attach plate; 

• The swivel clamps for the hydraulic lines were incorrectly positioned; 

• Even after repairs, the door could not be adjusted into rig and needed to be replaced. 

32. AMES was required to properly route and clamp the hydraulic lines, but did not, as 

specifically noted in their own re-work documents. As discussed above, AMES signed off this 

work as being completed and approved the aircraft for return to service. Preparing the assembly 

for installation and installing the trimion swivel complete with hydraulic lines is specifically 

called for in the landing gear installation process (AMM 32-11-00, page 422). AMES is 

responsible for whethet the maintenance it performed and singed off was done propedy. 

33. The other discrepancies also demonstrate that the left-hand main landing gear and flying 

door were not properly installed. Not only were there gouges and cracks, but the door itself had 

been bent by the actuator repeatedly closing the door when it was out of rig. This is why the 

flying door could not be adjusted back into rig after the other damage was repaired, and why the 

door had to be replaced. The damage recorded is not consistent with normal wear and tear. 

N287SC 

34. AMES approved N287SC for return to service in March2010 after removing and 

replacing both main landing gears. Inspection after a vibration incident on April 16, 2010 found 

that the tubular bearing was missing from where the wing door actuation rod connected with the 

drag strut on the right -hand main landing gear. 

35. No relevant maintenance was perfo!'med on the aircraft between March 22, 2010 and 

April16, 2010. The only reason why this tubular bearing would be missing is a failure to install 

it in the first place. 

36. I have been informed that AMES and Mr. Becker claim that the missing tubular bearing 

on N287SC was probably the result of a tire change. This is wrong. I have reviewed Mr. 

Becker's depositions where Mr. Becker claims that some people when changing the tire will 

"remove that bolt that contains the tubular bearing and hold up the flying door out of the way as 

7 
they change the wheel." I have been told that AMES describes this as a "shortcut." No mechanic 

would change a tire in the way described by Mr. Becker. It is not a shortcut. The B-727 flying 

door actuation rod has a pair of bolts that are specifically designed for changing the wheel- you 

remove the two bolts, the actuation rod extends a few inches, and then you put one of those two 

bolts back in, which supports the flying door while the wheel is being changed. The instructions 

for doing this work are listed in AMM 32-45-01 pages 401-404 (Main Gear WheelsRemoval/Installation), and the diagram showing the actuation rod and bolt positions is in AMM 

32-12-00 (Main Gear Doors- Description and Removal). This procedure could not possibly 

have any effect on the tubular bearing, which is part of the attachment fitting where the actuation 

rod attaches to the landing gear, which can be seen in AMM 32-11-00 page 403 Detail A. 

37. In his deposition, Mr. Becker refers to moving the flying door out of the way of the wheel 

change by removing the rod actuation attachment bolt. This bolt attaches the actuation rod to the 

wing door. The attachment bolt slides into a hollow pin. This hollow pin can be seen in Figure 

401 of AMM 32-12-11 page 403. The procedure suggested by Mr. Becker would require the 

mechanic to entirely detach the actuation rod from the flying door. There would be no built-in 

way to support the flying door. The physical process of removing and reinstalling the actuation 

rod attachment bolt is more difficult than process for removing the correct bolts. A mechanic 

improperly performing the procedure in that way would have made his life much more difficult. I 

have never seen or heard of a mechanic changing a B-727 wheel that way. 

38. Whether or not a mechanic would change a wheel in the way described by Mr. Becker, 

the hollow pin that goes around the actuation rod attachment bolt was not what was missing on 

N287SC. As previously discussed, what was missing on N287SC was the tubular bearing th!lt is 

pa1t of the fitting where the actuation rod connects to the drag strut. Changing a wheel by 

removing the attachment bolt could not affect the tubular bearing. I have never seen or heard of a 

mechanic changing a wheel by detaching the actuation rod from the landing gear. 

39. According to Capital, the aircraft was used on 172 flights between that return to service 

and when we inspected the aircraft in, May of201 0. 

40. The damage and other problems noted on the left-hand flying door and associated 

components during the May 2010 inspection, as documented when Capital worked on the aircraft 

in Toledo, and .as documented when AMES performed the re-work on the aircraft included: 

• The hinge cover pins for both the forward and aft hinge covers were improperly installed; 

• There was damage to the flap track fairing at the forward hinge opening; 

• The door was in a discrepant condition, which was addressed by placing multiple 

bushings (exact quantity unknown). 

41. AMES was required to properly install and secure the hinge covers, including the hinge 

pins, but they did not, as specifically noted in AMES's re-work documentation. 

42. These discrepancies, especially the damage to the flap track fairing, demonstrate that the 

right-hand main landing gear and flying door were not properly installed. The damage recorded 

is not consistent with normal wear and tear. 

8 
43. The Boeing AMM, which was required to be followed under Capital's maintenance 

program, required that AMES properly route and clamp hydraulic lines, properly install hinge 

covers (including the hinge pins), install all required components (including the tubular bearing), 

properly shim the hinges and gear fittings, and in general rig the door so that proper clearances 

between components would prevent damage to the aircraft from rubbing, scraping, and binding. 

Each time that AMES did not properly install a component it was failing to follow the AMM and 

failing to follow Capital's maintenance program. These improper repairs also meant that the 

aircraft were not restored to their original or properly altered condition. 

Further declarant sayeth naught. 

I, Frank Lipinski, declare this /JJ/day of February, 2015, under penalty of perjury that 

the ove statements are true and correct. 

::u <iii . j 

9 
In The Matter Of: 

Airborne Maintenance and Engineering Services 

Jeffrey Becker 

October 29, 2014 

Legal Realtime Reporting 

622 E. Central Blvd 

Orlando, FL 32801 

Original File 102914 Becker final. txt 

J\'Hn-U-Script® with Word Index 

GOVERNMENT 

EXHIBIT 

.. t<\< 
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

or the "C" Check at an earlier date or are you 

asking what they 

MR. STEVENSON: At this time right now, I am 

asking about the original reinstallation. 

MR. SILVERBERG: That's not the 30(b)6 

question and you know that. 

BY MR. STEVENSON: 

Q. Okay. That's -- as to each of the three 

aircraft, the identity of any individuals currently or 

formerly employed by AMES who have personal knowledge of 

the original reinstallation of the MLG and flying doors 

by AMES. 

MR. SILVERBERG: Asked and answered. 

MR. STEVENSON: Okay. So --

MR. SILVERBERG: We've been through that. 

16 BY MR. STEVENSON: 

17 Q. So you don't. These people have no personal 

18 knowledge. They are or the extent of their personal 

19 knowledge to be able to say, well, I signed that off. 

20 This is the process that I followed. 

40 

21 MR. SILVERBERG: That's your question. That's 

22 the form of your question. Go ahead. Continue. 

23 A. I can go ahead and answer by stating that we 

24 performed an investigation when this first came to our 

25 attention. Any technicians and inspectors that had taken 
1 part in any of these installations -- and I don't 

2 remember specifically, but I do recall that the answers 

3 were exactly as Bob referenced. They reviewed the 

4 maintenance manual, they reviewed the nonroutine sign 

5 offs and there was no additional information they 

6 provided other than that at the time we did the 

7 investigations. 

8 BY MR. STEVENSON: 

9 Q. Okay. And is that still true today that they 

10 would not be able to provide any additional information? 

11 I don't know why it would've changed, but I have to ask. 

12 A. We have not talked to them since the initial 

13 investigation. 

Q. Okay. And is that -- just for clarity of the 

record, I had been asking you about just 899AA. Is this 

also true of the original reinstallation, sorry, of the 

main landing gear replacement on N898AA, in or about 

October of 2009? 

41 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

A. Yeah. My recollection is that we, like I said, 

we initiated an investigation. I don't recall if it was 

21 tail number specific. I know it was specifically about 

22 the subject of the rigging of the doors because that's 

23 what the issue was at hand, yes. But without looking at 

24 our discrepancy notice files or the corrective action 

25 report files, I can't answer specific tail numbers or 
1 

2 

A. 

Q. 

No. They are just repositioning it. 

Okay. And are they repositioning it -- may I 

3 presume that you're saying they repositioned it further 

4 than they would just by opening the landing gear? 

5 A. Correct. 

6 Q. And it is AMES' belief that it's possible that 

7 the bushing could've fallen out during that procedure? 

8 MR. SILVERBERG: Objection. Asked and 

9 answered. Go ahead and answer. 

A. Correct. 

BY MR. STEVENSON: 

47 

10 

11 

12 

13 

Q. There are some -- with respect to this 

component, there are references to a bushing or a tubular 

14 bearing. Are you aware of any difference between those 

15 

16 

or are they referring to the same thing? 

A. I've seen it listed different ways in the AMM 

17 depending on where you look. I've seen it stated as a 

18 tubular bearing or tubular bushing. 

19 Q. Okay. But those would be references to the 

20 same component? 

21 

22 

A. 

Q. 

Right. 

You're aware that CCIA told the FAA that the 

23 missing bushing was the result of AMES' actions in 

24 reinstalling the landing gear in March of 2010? 

25 MR. SILVERBERG: Objection as to the form of 
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

55 

of these photographs are from the right wheel well or are 

they from both landing gear? 

A. Yeah. I guess I don't recall specifically, but 

I do know we spent a lot of time in the right-hand wheel 

well of 287. Frank was showing us the issues and 

basically, the statement was, hey, these are the types of 

issues that he sees on the other airplanes. 

Q. Okay. So we've talked about the conduit. At 

the time in May of 2005 when you were in Toledo, was this 

conduit properly routed? 

A. 

Q. 

No. 

Okay. Now, some emphasis, I think would be 

13 fair to say, has been placed by AMES on Inspector 

14 Lipinski's description of this conduit as being quote, 

15 "crushed". Would you agree that that's important to 

16 AMES? 

17 A. I believe it's just a terminology that 

18 misrepresents actually what we're seeing here. 

19 Q. Okay. And if I understand correctly, the 

20 terminology that AMES has used is that the conduit was 

21 pinched? 

A. Pinched. That's what the write up was. That's 

what's in the documentation. 

22 

23 

24 Q. And to you, what's the difference between, in 

25 this context, between pinched and crushed? 
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

A. 

memory. 

Again, you know -- and I'm talking from my 

It's based on the way that Mr. Lipinski phrased 

it in the EIR. I'm trying to remember exactly where the 

word crushed came from and I believe it's in the EIR. 

think it misrepresents those people that are not 

knowledgeable. 

Crushed, to me, has a connotation of that it 

was beyond use. That it wasn't doing its job. That it 

9 was -- it created an airworthiness issue, which 

I 

10 Mr. Lipinski is completely incorrect in that assessment. 

11 Q. Okay. So one of the things that you mentioned 

12 would be if the conduit couldn't be -- sorry. That the 

13 word crushed would imply that the conduit couldn't be 

14 used. 

Right. 

56 

15 

16 

A. 

Q. Okay. So when Inspector Lipinski says that the 

17 conduit is crushed, do you think that that's just a 

18 question of degree from pinched or do you think it's 

19 completely out there? 

20 A. I believe it's completely out there. This 

21 aircraft had no history. That's an antiskid conduit, so 

22 there's wires running through the conduit from the 

23 antiskid sensors in the wheel. This airplane had no 

24 history of antiskid issues. So you would believe that 

25 there would be logbook write ups and issues regarding 
1 off. So this is another certificated agency had signed 

2 off on this door before we got it. 

3 And number two is, we were under the direction 

4 of Charles Working. He said replace the door, so we 

5 replaced the door. 

6 Q. I understand. So that was -- that's an 

7 entirely new door being put on? 

8 

9 

A. 

Q. 

Correct. 

Okay. And if I understand correctly, you did 

10 not feel that that would've been necessary. 

11 

12 

A. It says replace door with customer supplied 

door. This was a customer request. I have no knowledge 

99 

13 of why he wanted us to replace that door, but he asked us 

14 to do it so we did it. 

15 

16 

Q. 

A. 

Sure. 

It also says to check bushing and hardware for 

17 condition and wear. And it says specifically that we 

18 checked those bushings for condition. It doesn't say 

19 that we would replace them. It just says we checked 

20 them. Of course, it has the pinched wiring conduit. 

21 Yes, I agree that once this was found, this 

22 should have been replaced so, yes, that was done. That 

23 was item number 3. 

24 Item number 4, remove and replace left-hand 

25 flying door, forward roller assembly. It says we 
124 

1 Q. I'm sorry, just for clarity, was that a yes or 

2 a no? You said mm-hmm and I'm just trying to --

3 

4 

5 

6 

A. Yes. Yes. My contention is, is that there's a 

possibility. There was another maintenance event. Ben 

Bucks' statement in one of the letters was that there 

were no other maintenance events and I'm just stating 

7 it's incorrect. There's a possibility that that could've 

8 happened. 

9 Q. Sure. Based on, you know, your knowledge and 

10 experience, do you know how likely that would be? 

11 MR. SILVERBERG: Objection. But go ahead. 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

A. Where my frame of reference comes from is my 

discussions with Mike Ebert, who was then the director of 

line maintenance for AMES. 

When the tubular bearing came up missing as 

part of the investigation, I talked to Mike and I said, 

okay. So what's, you know, what's the line maintenance 

version of what goes on? You know, how does that work? 

And he said that he had had conversations with somebody 

in Capital Cargo I don't know who. It may have been 

21 Mark Summers, it may have been some other line 

22 maintenance folks from Capital Cargo, but that at times, 

23 the line maintenance people will remove that bolt that 

24 contains the tubular bearing and hold up the flying door 

25 out of the way as they change the wheel. 
125 

1 That procedure is not in the Capital Cargo 

2 procedures for changing the wheel. And in the Boeing 

3 procedures for changing the wheel, it has that note that 

4 specifically says, hey, you'll damage the hinge cover if 

5 you remove the link that way. Because you're holding up 

6 the door, it's not steady. 

7 So that's where my, again, that's where my 

8 frame of reference is coming from. That there was an 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

opportunity for that tubular bearing to be missing. That 

coupled with when we did our investigation, the mechanic 

that performed the work specifically said in his 

statement, I recall putting the tubular bearing back in. 

Q. Sure. So if I understand correctly, for the 

tubular bearing to have come out while the mechanic was 

changing the tire, that mechanic would have to have been 

doing that maintenance action in a way that the Boeing 

AMM specifically tells him not to do because it might 

18 damage these hinge covers? 

19 A. Yeah. All I recall is it has a note specific 

20 that says, if you do not use this other procedure, that 

21 hinge cover damage can occur. And as we found, almost 

22 every single one of the airplanes that came in had some 

23 form of hinge cover damage. 

24 Q. Do you think that it is more likely that the 

25 bushing was left out when the MLG was installed at AMES 
1 or more likely that this mechanic violated the AMM and 

2 lifted that door such that the bushing fell out? 

3 A. I think as I stated in my response to the Ben 

126 

4 Buck, we did not have any proof or even any inkling that 

5 that bushing or that tubular bearing was missing. And 

6 not only did we have a statement from the technician that 

7 says he specifically recalls putting the bearing back in, 

8 but again, the doors were swung. They met all the fair 

9 conditions. We can only assume that if you're gonna go 

10 ahead and do a function check to make sure that all the 

11 procedures followed, that that door, there would've been 

12 issues or problems with that door if that tubular bearing 

13 was missing when it left the AMES facility. 

14 So all I could say is, I am fairly confident 

15 that AMES left that tubular bearing in. Also that 

16 airplane flew and we got an e-mail from Randy Buol, the 

17 vice-president of Capital Cargo said the airplane flew 

18 perfect. No problems noted after the gear changes. You 

19 would think that if that tubular bearing missing had 

20 caused vibration, that you would've felt it immediately. 

21 Again, you know, putting, stringing all those 

22 conclusions together, I find it hard to believe that AMES 

23 left out that tubular bearing. And that's why I stated 

24 it in the, in the CAR that I responded to Ben Buck, that, 

25 you know, we're here to help as much as we can, which is 
100 

1 replaced it. Other than that, you know, I can't comment. 

2 It doesn't say what the condition was. But again, you 

3 

4 

know, I have to state we're under Mr. Working's orders. 

It didn't say try to repair it. It didn't say lube it. 

5 He told us to replace it. So it was a customer request. 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

We replaced it. 

Q. Sure. 

A. Item number 5. It says panel on inboard side 

of inboard flap track fairing has three bad nut plates. 

I'm not sure what was wrong with the nut plates, but we 

replaced the nut plates. This was inside the inboard 

flap track fairing. From my recollection of the landing 

gear change procedures and everything else, it does not 

ask us to inspect that fairing. So again, I'm not sure 

where the three bad nut plates were. If they found them 

and they were stripped, then obviously, they need to 

change them, but again, that's normal line maintenance, 

wear and tear type repairs. 

Stop strip missing, right landing gear. Right 

landing gear wing door forward hinge door metal stop 

21 strip missing. Again, this is where Capital Cargo signed 

22 off on it, you know, a month prior. We replaced the 

23 strip. Again, these are the type of things that you 

24 would find in just a typical line environment type stuff. 

25 Q. Do you know if that strip was something that 
101 

1 needed to be replaced or 

2 A. I mean, it's a stop strip. So, you know, my 

3 recollection is, yeah, it's a wear strip. It's something 

4 that a stop stops against. So it became dislodged. 

5 Item number 10, left-hand main landing gear 

6 wing door forward and aft hinge cover, hinge pins 

7 improperly installed. This is on the left-hand side. 

8 These hinge pins are part of a hinge pin cover assembly. 

9 It's part of the landing gear change procedures. My 

10 recollection is we don't do anything with these hinge 

11 pins. So again, I have no comment about what they mean 

12 by improperly installed or whether AMES, you know, had 

13 done that. Because as far as I know, there was no work 

14 done on these hinge covers when it was in the -- when 287 

15 was in our facility in March. 

16 Q. Do you know if that was something that needed 

17 to be done? 

18 

19 

A. I'm 

the description. 

yeah. I'm sorry, I'm just looking at 

Improperly installed. It doesn't tell 

20 me if they were loose or exactly what was going on. 

21 Q. Okay. 

22 A. But then again, it was in operation for two 

23 months after it left our facility. So if a line mechanic 

24 found a loose hinge pin and did something, we wouldn't 

25 have known about it. 
102 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

Item Number 9, left-hand inboard flap fairing 

has slight damage in forward main landing gear wing door 

hinge at, I'm sorry, at forward main landing gear wing 

door hinge opening. Blended. It was a blend and treat. 

6 

7 

8 

Q. Do you know whether or not that was something 

that would've been needed to be done in accordance with 

the AMM or the MIP? 

A. This says we requested engineering to evaluate 

9 it. 

10 

11 

12 yeah. 

A. 

No, 

MR. SILVERBERG: If you know. 

Yeah. I mean, no. I'm thinking. I don't --

I don't know. I don't know if it again, 

13 just based on the, you know, this could've been something 

14 as minor as chips on paint or, you know, something, but 

15 bottom line, it was blended. So based on my knowledge of 

16 what defines an airworthy or unairworthy condition, 

17 blending is a minor repair. A minor repair, by 

18 definition, doesn't impact airworthiness. 

19 Item number 8, again, another hinge opening, 

20 blended damage. It was a blend and treat repair. So 

21 again, minor. And that's all the items in Exhibit M. 

22 

23 

BY MR. STEVENSON: 

Q. Okay. So would it be fair to say that, setting 

24 aside the pinched conduit, your opinion would be that 

25 almost all of that work was not something that was 
115 

1 you have the partial work accomplished for item 11? 

2 

3 

4 

A. Yes. 

Q. One of the entries in the discrepancy it says 

for entry number one it says, as written, door removed 

5 FOM. What would a technician mean when he says FOM? 

6 

7 

8 

9 

A. To facilitate maintenance. 

maintenance. 

All right. 

Facilitation of 

Q. 

A. So in order to check the hardware stack, he had 

10 to remove the door. 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

Q. Sure. Proceed. 

A. Item number 7, left-hand main flying door has 

excessive play at gear gitting. They really meant 

fitting, misspelled fitting. And they checked and 

replaced hardware. 

Now, it says in the corrective action, 

installed gimbal hardware as required per 32-11. The 

gimbal, when they refer to the gimbal fitting, it is the 

19 end of the actuation rod. This is the fitting where the 

20 tubular bearing is. So, again, this airplane was in 

21 service for nine months. They found some play and so 

22 

23 

24 

25 

they fixed it. 

Q. Now, as I review this, since, ultimately the 

question we ask is necessary or unnecessary. When I look 

at this, it says that they installed the gimbal hardware 
116 

1 as required per the 727 AMM. So do you agree with this 

2 write up that that is something that they needed to 

3 replace? 

4 A. Yes. If you find excessive play in that 

5 fitting, yes, you should go ahead and you should 

6 definitely, yeah, you should go ahead and repair it. 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

Q. Okay. 

A. Yeah. And, yeah, I mean, I keep restating from 

AMES' position, you know, it left our facility nine 

months prior. 

Q. I understand that. 

A. Okay. 

MR. SILVERBERG: And you'll hear that as often 

as necessary. 

A. And then item number 8 is same write up for the 

right-hand side. 

BY MR. STEVENSON: 

Q. Then that's the same write up as the gimbal and 

had play and needed to be replaced? 

A. Right. 

Q. Okay. 

A. Item number 12, aft angle on right wing fairing 

at FWA flying door cutout is damaged. I'm not 

24 immediately sure what FWA means. Removed and replaced 

25 angle. 
117 

1 So again, as part of their cursory inspection, 

2 they found an angle damage and they replaced it. I can't 

3 determine whether that was something that would've or 

4 should have been caught. It may have been they covered 

5 the angle with this right-hand fairing. I just -- I 

6 don't know. 

7 Q. Sure. Now, when you're saying you're not sure 

8 if that's something that should have been caught, do you 

9 mean that at the time it was originally installed? 

10 

11 

A. Right. 

AMES' work scope, 

I mean, the instructions going back to 

changing the gear, from my 

12 recollection, there's nothing in changing the gear that 

13 has to do anything with the right wing fairing. And so, 

14 yeah, I guess what I'm saying is I'm not familiar with 

15 this aft angle. I'm not sure where it's located. 

16 Q. Okay. So do you -- would you know, based on 

17 this write up, whether or not as of May 2010, it was 

18 necessary to replace the angle as was done here? 

19 A. Yeah. And again, we did a very detailed 

20 inspection of all these areas. And like I said, with 

21 Charles Working and my inspectors, or the supervisor, and 

22 so, yeah, I'm just -- I'm just stating, I'm not sure 

23 exactly where this is. When they refer to a fairing, it 

24 may have been inside the fairing. Again, they were doing 

25 inspections over and above what had been done prior. 
118 

1 Q. Well, I understand that, but are you -- would 

2 you be able to say based on this write up, whether or not 

3 that as of May 2010 when they did find this d~age 

4 A. Mm-hmm. 

5 Q. -- it was necessary to go ahead and replace 

6 that? 

7 A. Oh, absolutely. Any time you find d~age on an 

8 airplane, yes, you write it up and you repair it, you 

9 replace it. 

10 

11 

12 

13 

Q. 

A. 

Q. 

A. 

Okay. 

Item 13 we had already talked about. 

Sure. 

Item 14, this is the left-hand and right-hand 

14 main landing gear gimbal fitting do not have cotter pins. 

15 Needs torque checked and safetied. 

16 This is interesting in that Mr. Lipinski brings 

17 it up in the EIR. Mr. Buck misquotes it in his LOI 

18 response. This is an in situ finding. This is the 

19 inspector -- I talked to the inspector, Mr. Dave Hopper, 

20 and he recalls this issue. They were getting an okay to 

21 swing the gear. He was doing a general visual of the 

22 installation. And he found that they had forgot to put 

23 

24 

cotter pins on the end of these bolts. So they wouldn't 

install them. So the airplane never flew without the 

25 cotter pins, which is -- which again, Mr. Buck 
130 

1 Q. But you indicated that that damage having been 

2 found by AMES, that was something that needed to be 

3 replaced. 

4 A. Right. 

5 

6 

Q. So I'd like you to think about things in those 

terms as well. Not just is this something that we 

7 would've done during the replace, but at the point in 

8 time when AMES and its mechanics and repairmen were 

9 looking at this aircraft in May of 2010, is this 

10 something that actually requires a maintenance action as 

11 compared to our customer told us to do it so we're just 

12 going to do it. 

13 A. Okay. I understand. 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

MR. SILVERBERG: When you address each one, 

call out the item number so the record is clear. 

THE WITNESS: Okay. 

MR. SILVERBERG: Thank you. 

A. Yeah. This is item number l. Right-hand main 

19 gear door reported for discrepant conditions. 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

MR. SILVERBERG: Right. 

A. Suspect worn bushings. 

MR. SILVERBERG: One second. Okay. So this 

is not in the order that was produced. Did you 

reorder these? 

MR. STEVENSON: It shouldn't be. 
135 

1 done this work, was it necessary work? If this 

2 right-hand main gear wing door, if it was fairing and had 

3 no issues during Capital Cargo's operation, yeah, these 

4 worn bushings, just because we replaced them, doesn't 

5 mean they were worn out of any limits. 

6 Now, in the partial work accomplished, they go 

7 through very specific limits that they evaluated on each 

8 one of these bushings and they determined that they were 

9 going to replace them. 

10 Q. Now, if I understand correctly, as you said, 

11 they go through the specific limits on a good number of 

12 bushings and on some of them, they actually did note that 

13 the wear was out of limits. So would replacing those 

14 bushings then be something that was necessary to do? 

15 A. Oh, yeah. I mean, just like any other write 

16 up, once you find a write up that's out of limits, you're 

17 compelled to go ahead and replace them. But the 

18 nonroutine, itself, wouldn't have been written unless 

19 there was issues with the operation of the door to begin 

20 with. So they wouldn't have gotten down to this level of 

21 inspection unless there was actual operation issues with 

22 the door. 

23 number 2. 

24 

25 A. 

This was the same write up. I'm on item 

MR. SILVERBERG: Okay. 

Item number 2, the same write up for the 
143 

Actually, the next item number 18, they found 

two missing screws. Item number 15, three gouges. Now, 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

these three gouges were of a -- these three gouges 

necessitated a repair, so they performed the sheet metal 

repair for these three gouges. But again, three gouges, 

you know, could've been -- the damage could've been 

caused by a number of items, a number of issues. It 

doesn't state here in the nonroutine where the gouges 

were. It is in the flying door. So by definition, a 

sheet metal repair to a flying door is a non-pressurized 

11 area, so it's not an airworthy issue. This issue is a 

12 minor repair. 

13 Left main landing gear flying door inboard 

14 lower, again, a fastener missing, so they replaced the 

15 fastener. 

16 Q. Which number is this? 

17 

18 

19 

A. 

Q. 

A. 

I'm sorry, number 17. 

Okay. 

They replaced the rivet. 

20 Item number 16, skin gouged. And it was a 

21 blend and treat repair. 

22 Item number 19 is written up as a tool mark on 

23 inner surface of main landing gear flying door between 

24 nonroutines 0015's gouges and the upper hinge. 

25 Let me see here. This is written up by one of 
146 

1 Q. Okay. So during the original landing gear 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

installation, you wouldn't have done anything with the 

clamps, but then you did do something with the clamps at 

this point in time? 

10 

11 

12 

A. Again, it was due to the fact that the level of 

the inspection that we were doing when the airplanes came 

in in May. 

Q. You mean, was this something that having been 

detected in May, was that something that needed to be 

fixed? 

A. Oh, yeah, absolutely. Right. 

Item number 25, left wing forward flying door 

13 fitting has cracked bushing and it gives a part number. 

14 And they removed and replaced the bushing. 

15 Quite frankly, I don't recognize the bushing 

16 part number. I'm sorry, in the partial work 

17 accomplished, it states that it is the forward hinge 

18 aircraft side bushing and it references the service 

19 bulletin for replacement, so it must have been one of the 

20 bushings inside the hinge fitting. You would not have 

21 seen this from the outside, so this is something they 

22 found after they removed the door. And they replaced the 

23 bushing. Left wing fairing and forward flying door hinge 

24 needs removed to facilitate maintenance. 

25 MR. SILVERBERG: This is number 
148 

1 would've removed the door and then they would've found 

2 this condition after they removed the door. It wouldn't 

3 have been visible unless you dropped the door. 

4 Item number 28, left wing forward fairing, aft 

5 internal stiffeners cracked in two places. Actually, 

6 

7 

8 

this was referenced in another nonroutine. So this is 

after they removed the fairing. It was an internal 

stiffener and they would not have seen this stiffener 

9 until they removed the fairing. And then they repaired 

10 it in accordance with SRM. Again, that's something you 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

would not have seen and it would not be part of the AMM 

procedures for changing a gear. 

Q. But that was something that once detected, 

needed to be replaced? 

A. Correct. Item number 29, left wing forward 

fairing, inboard attach plate is cracked, so they 

replaced the attach plate. Again, this is an internal 

part of the fairing, so we wouldn't have seen this item 

unless we removed it. 

Item number 30, right wing forward fairing 

inboard attached plate is chafed through on the 

right-hand side. The same attach plate as in the 

left-side had to be replaced. Again, you wouldn't have 

seen it unless you removed the fairing. 

Item 33, left-hand main landing gear flying 
1 door requires replacement. Cannot adjust. So this 

2 refers -- this is the nonroutine referred to when that 

3 other nonroutine said that the left-hand door failed, 

4 this provides the procedures for changing that door. 

5 And again, rightfully so, this nonroutine was 

6 initiated on May 31st. So, yes, well after they 

7 performed the gear swings. 

149 

8 Item number 32, remove and -- remove right-hand 

9 main landing gear antiskid conduit for transfer to 287. 

10 So they robbed the antiskid conduit to send it off to 287 

11 and then they replaced it. 

12 MR. SILVERBERG: Robbed in the technical 

sense. 

A. Yeah. Cannibalized, took it off of one 

airplane so it could be installed on another. 

MR. SILVERBERG: I wanted to make sure Rita 

didn't assume we're a bunch of thieves. 

A. And then, yeah, Exhibit Q includes a copy of 

the RFTS. I'm sorry. And RFTS means request for 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 technical service. It's a memo document that comes from 

21 heavy maintenance to engineering, requesting assistance. 

22 BY MR. STEVENSON: 

23 

24 

Q. 

A. 

Okay. 

So, yeah, these are a number of the items and 

25 the nonroutines are referenced. 
MAINTENANCE MANUAL 

MAIN GEAR WHEELS- REMOVAL/INSTAlLATION 

1. General 

A. Matching of tires on dual wheels is necessary so that each tire will have 

the same contact area with the ground and carry an equal share of the 

Load. Whenever possible, install tires having equal pressure and 

inflated diameters within 1/2 inch. Tires with diameters that differ 

more than 3/4 inch must not be used in pairs. Position Larger diameter 

wheel assemblies on inboard side of gear. 

EA 2. Equipment and Materials 

A. Wheel Change Dolly- Commercially available 

B. Main Landing Gear Wheel Retaining Nut Wrench - 3ME65-72761 

C. Airplane Jack for Main Gear 

D. Torque Wrench 

E. Grease 

(1) Aeroshell 5 (preferred) (AMM 20-60-02) 

(2) MIL-G-81322 (alternate) (AMM 20-60-02) 

F. Dow Corning- 200 fluid or No. 10 machine oil (AMM 20-60-02) 

G. Axle Thread Protector - F72880-3 or F72913-3 

3. Main Gear Wheel Removal 

A. Set parking brake to hold brake disks aligned for when the wheel is 

installed. 

NOTE: If brake disks misalign when brake pressure is off, it will be 

necessary to align brake disks before installing wheel. 

B. Jack main gear until wheel clears and deflate tire (AMM Chapter 7, 

Jacking). 

YOU MUST NOT REMOVE THE TWO WHEELS AT THE SAME TIME. IF THE 

AIRPLANE ACCIDENTALLY FALLS OFF THE JACK, INJURIES TO PERSONS 

AND DAMAGE TO THE AIRPLANE CAN OCCUR. 

(1) If tire cannot be deflated, back off valve stem slowly while 

applying a slight pressure on the valve stem during removal . 

••• EXCESSIVE TWISTING FORCE CAN CAUSE SEPARATION OF VALVE 

CORE PARTS. STAY OUT OF VALVE PATH DURING REMOVAL OR 

INJURY MAY RESULT. 

C. Remove hubcap bolts (Fig. 201) and hubcap. 

D. Remove axle nut Lockbolt. 

E. Remove axle nut using special wrench. 

F. Remove washer and outer bearing. 

G. To remove outboard wheels, remove two bolts through wing door actuating 

rod, raise wing door to servicing position and replace one bolt. 

I CAUTION DO NOT REMOVE ACTUATION ROD ATTACHMENT BOLT AND RAISE DOOR 

ABOVE NORMAL SERVICE POSITION AS HINGE COVER MAY BE DAMAGED. 

H. Install axle thread protector. 

EFFECTIVITY------------, 

D6-23043 

ANS ALL 

BOEING PROPRIETARY- Copyright (C)- Unpublished Work- See t 

32-45-01 

GOVERNMENT 

EXHIBIT 

LL 

401 

25/09 
I. 

J. 

K. 

MAINTENANCE MANUAL 

Position wheel change dolly, raise wheel, and remove .. 

Mark the reason for the tire removal on the tire to aid the inspectors 

when they examine the tire. 

Make sure that inner main wheel bearing and dust seal remain in wheel. 

NOTE: On airplanes using wheels equipped with metal felt-type dust seal, 

inner main wheel bearing and dust seal are retained in wheel with 

a retainer ring. On airplanes using wheels equipped with metal 

rubber-type dust seal, inner main wheel bearing and dust seal are 

not retained with a retainer ring. 

4. Main Gear Wheel Installation 

NOTE: Main landing gear may have one of two types of dust seals supplied 

with the wheels. One type consists of a metal felt-type seal used 

with a wiper ring and a retaining ring. The other type consists of a 

metal rubber-type seal used without a wiper ring and retaining ring. 

A. On airplanes using wheels equipped with metal felt-type dust seal, make 

sure that dust seal and inner bearing are held in place in wheel by a 

retainer ring and that antirotation tab on dust seal ring is in notch in 

wheel hub. 

B. On airplanes using wheels equipped with metal rubber-type dust seal, make 

sure that dust seal and inner bearing are positioned properly in wheel. 

Installation instructions are imprinted on side of seal: THIS SIDE 

TOWARD BEARING. 

NOTE: Make sure that 

installation. 

felt-type dust 

machine oil or 

for 15 minutes 

bearing has been packed with grease before wheel 

On airplanes using wheels equipped with metal 

seal, make sure that felt has been soaked in light 

Dow Corning 200 fluid for 5 minutes and let drain 

prior to installation. 

C. Check and align brake disks if necessary (Fig. 401). 

D. Position wheel assembly on dolly and slide into position on brake and 

inner bearing. 

NOTE: Whenever possible, install tires having equal pressure and 

inflated diameters within 1/2 inch. Position larger diameter 

wheel assemblies on inboard side of gear. 

E. Install outer bearing and align washer tab with keyway on axle. Hand 

pack bearing with grease before installation. 

F. Lubricate threads with grease and install the axle nut. While rotating 

the wheel, tighten axle nut to 360-420 pound-feet. Stop the wheel. 

Loosen the axle nut to almost zero torque. While rotating the wheel, 

tighten the axle nut to 100 pound-feet minimum and, if necessary, 

continue to tighten the axle nut so that the lockbolt hole aligns. 

G. Install axle nut lockbolt and tighten 25 to 35 pound-inches. 

EFFECTIVITY·------------, 32-45-01 

D6-23043 

ANS ALL 

BOEING PROPRIETARY- Copyright (C)- Unpublished Work- See title page for details. 

Page 402 

Jul 25/13 
OUTER BEARING 

MAINTENANCE MANUAL 

Main Gear Wheel Installation 

Figure 401 

EFFECTIVITY'------------, 

06-23043 

ANS ALL 

AXLE 

BRAKE 

MOUNTING 

FLANGE 

32-45-01 

Page 403 

Apr 01/05 

BOEING PROPRIETARY- Copyright (C)- Unpublished Work- See title page for details. 
MAINTENANCE MANUAL 

H. Make sure that antiskid drive coupling and transducer drive shaft are not 

bent. 

1· CAllTION cl MAKE SURE THAT ANTISKID DRIVE COUPLING AND TRANSDUCER DRIVE 

SHAFT ARE NOT BENT. A BENT DRIVE SHAFT WILL RESULT IN 

INTERMITTENT ANTISKID RELEASES DURING OPERATION. 

I. Make sure that antiskid drive spider mates with antiskid drive coupling. 

J. Position hubcap, install hubcap bolts and lockwire, applying standard 

torque as follows: 

(1) 20 to 25 pound-inches for NAS1103 bolts used with NAS679A3W nuts. 

(2) 30 to 35 pound-inches for NAS1303-7 bolts used with BACN10GW3 nuts. 

(3) 35 ±3.5 pound-inches for NAS1303 bolts used with helicoil inserts. 

K. Remove temporary bolt from wing door actuating rod as installed in 

step 3.G and install the two wing door actuating rod bolts to return wing 

door to normal position. 

L. Prior to letdown, inflate the tire to the proper pressure (AMM 12-15-31). 

M. Lower gear and remove jack. 

EFFECTIVITY'-------------, 

ANS ALL 

D6-23043 

32-45-01 

Page 404 

Jul 25/09 

BOEING PROPRIETARY- Copyright (C) -Unpublished Work- See title page for details. 
MAINTENANCE MANUAL 

MAIN GEAR DOORS - DESCRIPTION AND OPERATION 

1. General 

A. The main gear doors close over the wheel well opening when the landing 

gear is retracted or extended by the normal hydraulic system (Fig. 1). 

Wheel well doors are normally operated by hydraulic power. Wing doors, 

operated by mechanical linkage from the landing gear, close over the 

shock strut aperture only when the gear is retracted (fig. 2). A safety 

bar mechanism is provided to completely open the wheel well doors when 

the gear is lowered by manual extension, or should the power operating 

system of the doors malfunction. A ground release mechanism permits the 

doors to be opened for access to each wheel well when the airplane is 

serviced. Wheel well doors are closed by hydraulic actuation only. An 

airtight seal runs around the edge of the doors. 

2. Main Gear Doors 

A. The main gear doors consist of inner and outer alclad skins with internal 

ribs and stiffeners. The doors are in two parts. An inner door hinged 

to the keel beam and an outer door hinged to the outer edge of the inner 

door. The door actuator and actuation beam are connected to a large 

bracket on the inner door. The outboard end of the actuator pivots in 

the actuator beam which in turn is connected to the structure by a 

swinging link and an adjustable rod. Linkage for the manual release is 

carried on the forward inner edge of the inner door. The linkage picks 

up the release mechanism on the keel beam. The outer door is raised by 

its hinges when the inner door closes. At each end of the outer door a 

radius rod is installed between the outboard edge of the door and act to 

raise the outer end into position as the door closes (Fig. 1). A bracket 

mounted on the aft end of the inner door near the hinge line provides an 

attachment for the gear sequence valve control rod. 

3. Wing Doors 

A. The wing doors are built up from a front and rear spar, with ribs, 

stiffeners, and an inner and an outer skin. Each door carries an end 

plate (Fig. 2). The front and rear spars project beyond the upper end of 

the door where the ends of the spars are machined to provide hinges. The 

doors are hinged to the inboard flap inner rail. An actuator rod is 

attached to a support fitting mounted on the door center rib. The 

opposite end of the actuator rod is attached to the shock strut. 

B. The door end of the actuator rod can be extended to hold the wing door 

out from the gear to provide access for wheel and brake removal. A red 

stripe on the actuator rod insert shows when the rod is extended 

(fig. 3). 

EFFECTIVITY------------, 

D6-23043 

ANS ALL 

I GOVERNMENT 

; EXHIBIT 

1AV!M 

32-12-00 

Page 1 

Jul 25/09 

BOEING PROPRIETARY- Copyright (C)- Unpublished Work- See title page for details. 
MAINTENANCE MANUAL 

DOOR 

ACTUATING ROD 

HOLE FOR SECOND BOLT WHEN 

ROD IS IN NORMAL POSITION 

ACTUATING 

ROO INSERT 

RED STRIPE 

WING DOOR ACTUATING ROD 

(SERVICE POSITION) 

_Ai"-- DOOR IN 

SERVICING POSITION 

LOCK ROLLER 

Main Gear Wing Door Servicing Position 

Figure 3 

EFFECTIVITY'------------, 32-12-00 

D6-23043 

ANS ALL 

BOEING PROPRIETARY- Copyright (C) -Unpublished Work- See title page for details. 

Page 4 

Apr 01/05 
BEFORE THE 

US DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

OFFICE OF HEARINGS 

WASHINGTON, DC 

COPY 

In the matter of: Docket No. FAA-2013-0291 

FAA Case No. 2011S0290032 

AIRBORNE MAINTENANCE AND) 

ENGINEERING SERVICES, ) 

) Administrative Law Judge 

Respondent ) J.E. Sullivan 

) 

FRANK LIPINSKI 

Deposition of FRANK LIPINSKI taken on behalf of 

Airborne Maintenance and Engineering Services, at the 

Federal Aviation Administration, Office of the Regional 

Counsel, Southern Region, 1701 Columbia Avenue, College 

Park, Georgia, commencing on December 18, 2014, at 

9:25 a.m. before Jennifer L. Pope, Certified Court 

Reporter and Registered Professional Reporter. 

1 

LYON REPORTING, INC. GOVERNMENT 

EXHIBIT 

CERTIFIED COURT REPORTERS NN 

P.O. BOX 81124, ATLANTA, GA 30366 770/4~8-5500 800/767·2030 FAK 770/458·1277 
49 

1 explain the condition of the aircraft. I understand 

2 that. 

3 A. Okay. 

4 Q. But we have a concept of wear and tear that 

5 you've now --

A. Of course. 

7 Q. Okay. But you didn't mention it in 

8 Section B. You took no account of that; correct? 

9 Your conclusions are not based on concepts of wear 

10 and tear? 

11 MR. STEVENSON: Objection. That was a 

12 compound question, and I'm confused by it. 

13 BY MR. SILVERBERG: 

14 Q. Let me ask you: Is wear and tear discussed 

15 at all in Section B? 

16 A. No. 

17 Q. It is not. Why not? You've acknowledged 

18 to me it is a factor. 

19 A. It is a factor on aircraft. It was not a 

20 factor in these, and the damage incurred. It's not 

21 wear and tear. 

22 Q. You're not saying there was no wear and 

23 tear, are you, with respect to any of these three 

24 aircraft? 

25 A. I'm-- no. Of course, there's wear and 

LYON REPORTING, INC. 
1 tear. 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

Q. 

A. 

Q. 

With respect to all three aircraft? 

All 16 they had on their ops specs. 

I'm talking about these three aircraft. 

They're the only ones we're talking about today, 

sir. 

A. I know, but this wear and tear was not 

associated with the damage, absolutely not. 

Q. Okay. There was some degree of wear and 

10 tear, but your position is that it doesn't fully 

11 explain the condition of the flying doors as you saw 

12 it? 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

A. On a scale of one to ten, one being the 

least and ten being the most, the wear and tear --

Q. The most what? 

A. The worst wear and tear, one to ten. These 

were at one or less wear and tear. 

not from wear and tear. 

The damage was 

Q. How do you determine these are a one on 

20 your scale? 

21 

22 

A. I just gave you a scale. 

a hypothetic scale like tire wear. 

That's all, just 

There's a scale. 

23 Q. But it's not a formal scale? 

24 A. No. I'm just 

2 5 L __ Q_. __ Y_o_u __ ' _r_e_t __ r_y_i_n_g_t_o_l_· l __ l_u_s_t_r __ a_t_e_a __ P_o_l_· n_t_? ______ _ 

LYON REPORTING, INC. 

50 
In The Matter Of: 

Airborne Maitenance and Engineering Services 

Richard D 'Arcy 

October 28, 2014 

Legal Realtime Reporting 

622 East Central Boulevard 

Orlando, Florida 32801 

Phone: 407.440.3822 

Fax: 407.895.4483 

Original File 102814_DARCY.TXT 

lVHn-U-Script® with Word Index 

GOVERNMENT 

EXlilBIT 

OQ 
1 

2 

3 

Q. 

A. 

Q. 

Richard D'Arcy 

Okay. 

Flightstar had violations, also. 

Repairs -- heavy repair stations are not 

4 necessarily violation free, right? 

5 

6 

A. 

Q. 

No. 

Okay. So was there a qualitative 

7 difference between Flightstar and AMES? 

8 A. Flightstar had been 30 to 35 years 

9 experience with the 727 aircraft. 

10 Q. So did that --

11 A. Not necessarily the facility as a whole, 

12 but the personnel working there. Most of the personnel 

13 at the time working at Flightstar worked on some of the 

14 first 727s built when Eastern Airlines got them. And a 

15 lot of Flightstar•s personnel were formed with Eastern 

16 Airlines. And they had a -- they had a vast experience 

17 in the 727s. So there was a large experience pool in 

18 Flightstar. 

87 

19 Q. In terms of the authority of Flightstar and 

20 the authority with AMES with respect to main landing 

21 gear changes, was it identical? 

22 

23 

24 

25 

A. 

Q. 

A. 

Q. 

I'm sorry, when you say authority? 

Repair station ratings? 

Oh, sure. Yes. 

It was identical? 

Legal Realtime Reporting