[ DO NOT PUBLISH] 

## In the 

# United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________
No. 22

- 10008
Non

- Argument Calendar

____________________
CHEY GARRIGAN,
Plaintiff

- Appellant,

versus SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE STATE OF ALABAMA, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE, CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE,

Defendants

- Appellees. USCA11 Case: 22-10008 Date Filed: 06/10/2022 Page: 1 of 72 Opinion of the Court 22

- 10008

____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama D.C. Docket No. 2:21

- cv

- 00482

- ECM

- KFP

_

___________________ Before G RANT , L UCK , and L AGOA , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM : The district court abstained from hearing a case challenging a state’s judicial assignments , citing the suit’s interference with

state court operation s . We agree that the injunction sought here would cut to the core of the administration of the state’s circuit court system by shaping which judges can hear which cases, and affirm.
I. Chey Garrigan petitioned an Alabama circuit court for primary custody of her child. Soon after she moved for recusal of the judge assigned to preside over her case, Judge Michelle Thomason. She argued that Thomason had displayed bias toward her in an earlier proceeding and, more important for our purposes, that Thomason la cked authority to hear her case. Thomason had been elected as a district judge, not a circuit judge. And in Alabama only the circuit courts have jurisdiction over proceedi ngs to modify a custody order entered in a divorce proceeding. See A la. Code §§ 12

- 1

- 2, 30

- 2

- 1 ; see also id. § 30

- 3

- 5. But a presiding circuit judge USCA11 Case: 22-10008 Date Filed: 06/10/2022 Page: 2 of 722

- 10008 Opinion of the Court 3 can appoint a district judge to serve as a special circuit judge

— and that is what happened here.

M ost recently, in 2018, the presiding judge for the 28th judicial circuit “temporarily appo inted” Thomason to serve as a special circuit judge. That appointment supposedly was under section 12

- 9A

- 8 of the Alabama Code, which allows a presiding judge to appoint a district judge within the circuit to serve as a special circuit judge, based on the “needs of the circuit, including the currency, congestion, and backlog of criminal and civil cases.” State rules then provide that the assignment “shall continue until revoked by the presiding judge or until the assigned judge leave s office, whichever co mes first.” Ala. R. Jud. Admin. R. 13(A). The appointment order later cited two other Code provisions. One was section 12

- 17

- 7 0, which allows a presiding judge to “designate from time to time a district court judge” that can then wield “the same powers and authority as a circuit judge to handle all cases involving domestic relations.” The other was section 12

- 1

- 14.1, which allow s a presiding judge, at the request of an “affected judge,” to appoint a special circuit court judge for a renewable term of “temporary service” not to exceed 180 consecutive days. Garrigan hinged her motion on the last provision, contending that no “aff ected” circuit judge had requested Thomason’s appointment and that Thomason’s service was far from temporary

— Thomason, she asserted, had been hearing circuit court cases for more than a decade. Thomason denied the recusal motion. Garrigan then petitioned Alabama’s court of civil USCA11 Case: 22-10008 Date Filed: 06/10/2022 Page: 3 of 74 Opinion of the Court 22

- 10008 appeals for a writ of mandamus ordering Thomason’s recusal. That petition was also denied. Garrigan then turned to federal court for relief. As relevant here, she sued Thomason and the now

- presiding judge, Judge J. Clark Stankos ki, alleging that they had violated her due process right to have her case heard by a court of competent jurisdiction. She sought an injunction that would bar Thomason from hearing her custody case and any other circuit court proceedings involving her
, an d Stankoski from assigning circuit court cases to any district judge, including Thomason.
The district court abstained under Younger v. Harris from hearing the case against the two judges. See 401 U.S. 37 (1971). This appeal followed.
II.
We review a dec ision to abstain for an abuse of discretion. Tokyo Gwinne t t, LLC v. Gwinnett County , 940 F.3d 1254, 1266 (11th Cir. 2019).
III.
The breed of abstention at issue is Younger abstention, a doctrine establishing that, in certain “exceptional cases,” “federal courts may and should withhold equitable relief to avoid interference with state proceedings.” 31 Foster Children v. Bush
, 329 F.3d 1255, 1274 (11th Cir. 2003). USCA11 Case: 22-10008 Date Filed: 06/10/2022 Page: 4 of 722

- 10008 Opinion of the Court 5
Younger abstention can apply only when a federal case would affect one of three kinds of st ate proceedings: state criminal prosecutions, civil enforcement proceedings, and “civil proceedings involving certain orders uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions.” Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs , 571 U .S. 69, 78 (2013) (quotation omitted and alteration adopted). The state custody proceeding could fall, if anywhere, in the third category. So the question is whether it involves an order that furthers the Alabama courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions.
We count two. First, the order appointing Thomason as a special circuit judge cuts to the “core of the administration” of Alabama’s judicial system. Juidice v. Vail , 430 U.S. 327, 335 (1977). The appointment process allows a state judicial c ircuit to manage its docket to ensure the efficient administration of justice; the appointment decisions turn on “the needs of the circuit, including the currency, congestion, and backlog of criminal and civil cases.” Ala. Code § 12

- 9A

- 8( a ). Second, the o rder denying Garrigan’s recusal motion similarly implicates the judicial system’s “regular operation.” Juidice , 430 U.S. at 335. R ecusal decision s affect which judge can hear a case
, and so shape the allocation of cases across the court . We thus conclud e that Younger abstention can apply to this case: one targeting orders that shape a state court’s case assignment s and judicial appointments. Our inquiry does not end there. We must ensure that three other conditions are met: the state proceeding must be ongoing, USCA11 Case: 22-10008 Date Filed: 06/10/2022 Page: 5 of 76 Opinion of the Court 22

- 10008 implicate important state interests, and provide an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional challenges. See Sprint Commc’ns , 5 71 U. S . at 81; Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n , 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982). To start, the custody proceeding was still pending when Garrigan filed the federal suit, the relevant time for determining whether abstention is appropriate. See Liedel v. Juv. Ct. of Madison Cnty. , 891 F.2d 1542, 1546 n.6 (11th Cir. 1990). And for the reasons already given, the suit implicates the state’s important interest in administering its judicial system. See Juidice , 430 U.S. at 335. The injunctions that Garrigan seeks target who can hear circuit court cases, and how a circuit court can use district judges to address its administrative “needs.” Ala. Code. § 12

- 9A

- 8( a ). Finally, the state provides other ways for Garrigan to raise her due process con cerns. She has already availed herself of one, the mandamus process. The state also notes that she can raise this challenge again on appeal from the ultimate custody decision. See Cook v. Cook , 515 So. 2d 1269, 1270 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987). Th at remedy w ould suffice, even though Garrigan contends that Thomason lacks authority to decide her case; the state appellate court can hear the challenge and direct the circuit court to set aside any judgment entered without authority. See Ex parte DiGeronimo , 195 S o. 3d 963 , 969 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015). Thus, the district court correctly concluded that all three conditions for abstention were present. USCA11 Case: 22-10008 Date Filed: 06/10/2022 Page: 6 of 722

- 10008 Opinion of the Court 7

* * *
We have said that “even with the deferential standard of review, only the clearest of justifications merits ab stention.” Tokyo Gwinne t

t

, 940 F.3d at 1267 (quotation omitted and alteration adopted). That justification is present here, where a party seeks to interfere with decisions to assign a judge to and keep a judge on an ongoing state proceeding. The distric t court’s dismissal is therefore AFFIRMED

. USCA11 Case: 22-10008 Date Filed: 06/10/2022 Page: 7 of 7