FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20463

STATEMENT OF REASONS OF 

COMMISSIONERS SHANA M. BROUSSARD AND ELLEN L. WEINTRAUB

Once again and likely with no surprise to any individuals familiar with the Federal Election 

Commission’s activity in the last few years, the Commission failed to investigate former President 

Donald J. Trump and his 2020 authorized campaign committee, Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. (the 

“Trump Committee”) for credible allegations that Trump and the Trump Committee violated federal 

campaign finance law.1

 This time, three complaints alleged violations of the foreign national 

prohibition,2 a statutory provision “intimately related to the process of democratic self-government” and 

the right of the government to “reserve ‘participation in its democratic political institutions’ for citizens 

of this country.”3 Specifically, the allegations centered on a months-long series of communications 

through which Trump and his personal attorney, Rudolph “Rudy” Guiliani, pressured Ukrainian 

President Volodymyr Zelensky, both directly and indirectly through their representatives – including 

Giuliani’s associate, Lev Parnas, and diplomatic officials Gordon Sondland and Kurt Volker – to make 

an official public announcement and conduct an investigation into two allegations, one concerning 2020 

presidential candidate and current President Joseph R. Biden and the other concerning the Democratic 

National Committee (“DNC”). The record indicates that Trump, Giuliani, and Parnas asked that 

Zelensky investigate these two allegations and announce the investigation with explicit references to the 

allegations, for the purpose of benefiting Trump’s reelection campaign. Based on the available

information, we voted to approve the recommendation of our nonpartisan Office of General Counsel 

(“OGC”) and find reason to believe that Trump and the Trump Committee knowingly solicited a foreign 

1

 See Certification, MURs 7645, 7663, and 7705 (Donald J. Trump, et al.) (July 18, 2022); Certification, MURs 7645, 

7663, and 7705 (Donald J. Trump, et al.) (July 31, 2022); see also Stmt. of Reasons of Comm’rs Shana M. Broussard & 

Ellen L. Weintraub at 1 n.1, MUR 7784 (Make America Great Again PAC, et al.) (June 15, 2022) (noting Commission’s

failure to investigate violations of federal election laws by Trump or his Committee alleged in at least 24 complaints where 

the nonpartisan Office of General Counsel recommended moving finding reason to believe a violation occurred). 

2

 52 U.S.C. § 30121; 11 C.F.R. § 110.20.

3

 Bluman v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 800 F.Supp.2d 281, 287 (D.D.C. 2011) (three-judge court) (quoting Bernal v. 

Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 220 (1984) and Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 295 (1978)).

BEFORE THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

In the Matter of

Donald J. Trump, et al.

)

 ) 

 ) 

 ) 

 

 

 MURs 7645, 7663, and 7705 

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Statement of Reasons

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national to provide in-kind contributions from Ukrainian nationals.4 Unfortunately, three of our 

colleagues voted against moving forward and the Commission once again was unable to enforce the 

law. 

I. Background 

At this point, the facts are well-known from rigorous news reporting and testimony. In 2018 and 

early 2019, Giuliani, along with his associates Parnas and Igor Fruman, engaged in a concerted effort to 

develop evidence against Biden, including several attempts to meet with former Ukrainian Prosecutor 

General, Viktor Shokin5, and Shokin’s successor, Yuriy Lutsenko. Not satisfied with the results of 

these efforts, Trump himself, during a July 25, 2019 telephone call, urged Zelensky to investigate these 

allegations and work with Giuliani to do so. In discussions between intermediaries leading up to and 

after that July 25 call, Trump and Giuliani linked Zelensky’s cooperation to a White House visit for 

Zelensky and $391 million in U.S. security aid to Ukraine, both of which Zelensky and the Ukrainians 

desired and which U.S. officials testified was considered crucial to U.S. interests.6 

Zelensky, directly and through his aides, expressed concern about becoming embroiled in a U.S. 

domestic political matter.7

 After news of Trump’s and Giuliani’s efforts became public, the security aid 

was released, and Zelensky ultimately did not announce the requested investigations. In response to 

reporters’ questions about his reasons for asking Zelensky to investigate Biden, Trump acknowledged 

4

 Certification, MURs 7645, 7663, and 7705 (Donald J. Trump, et al.), (July 18, 2022). In addition, we voted to 

approve OGC’s recommendation to find reason to believe that Guiliani and Parnas solicited, or provided substantial 

assistance in the solicitation of, contributions from Ukraine. Id. 

5

 These efforts included seeking to obtain a U.S. visa for Shokin in exchange for a meeting to discuss the Bidens. 

Michael Sallah, et al., Two Unofficial US Operatives Reporting to Trump’s Lawyer Privately Lobbied a Foreign Government 

in a Bid to Help the President Win in 2020, BUZZFEEDNEWS, https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/mikesallah/rudygiuliani-ukraine-trump-parnas-fruman (cited in Compl. at 4, MUR 7645); Deposition of Deputy Assistant Secretary George 

Kent before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence for the U.S. House of Representatives at 44 (Oct. 15, 2019) 

(“The next time I heard Mr. Guiliani’s name mentioned was on the 9th of January this year, 2019, when I was copied on an 

email that Giuliani was calling the State Department regarding the inability of the previous prosecutor general Viktor Shokin

to get a visa to come to the United States.”).

6

 Deposition of Ambassador William B. Taylor before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence for the U.S. 

House of Representatives at 28 (Oct. 22, 2019) (“Taylor Dep.”) (“At one point the Defense Department was asked to 

perform an analysis of the effectiveness of the assistance. Within a day, the Defense Department came back with the 

determination that the assistance was effective and should be resumed. My understanding was that the Secretaries of 

Defense and State, the CIA Director, and the National Security Advisor, sought a joint meeting with the President to 

convince him to release the hold, but such meeting was hard to schedule, and the hold lasted well into September.”); id. at 

132 (stating that the opinion that aid should be resumed was the “[u]nanimous opinion of every level of interagency 

discussion.”); Deposition of Laura K. Cooper before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence for the U.S. House of 

Representatives at 16 (Oct. 23, 2019) (“Cooper Dep.”) (“Q: In 2018 and 2019, has Ukrainian security assistance received 

bipartisan support? A: It has always received bipartisan support, in my experience. Q: And that’s both in the House and 

the Senate? A: Absolutely, in my experience. Q: And what about at the interagency level? A: I have witnessed, even in 

the recent past, overwhelming consensus in favor of providing Ukraine security assistance. Q: And when you say ‘within 

the recent past,’ you mean even over the course of this year? A: Even over the course of the summer.”). 

7

 Taylor Dep. at 30. 

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that he believed Biden was “crooked” and should be investigated,8 and he later said, in a televised 

interview, that he would make Biden’s alleged corruption “a major issue in the campaign.”9

 

II. Legal Analysis 

The Act and Commission regulations prohibit any “foreign national”10 from directly or 

indirectly making a contribution or donation of money or other thing of value, or an expenditure, 

independent expenditure, or disbursement, in connection with a federal, state, or local election. These 

are core provisions of the Act, fundamental to safeguarding our democracy from foreign interference, 

and the Commission is the exclusive civil authority empowered to enforce them.11 Moreover, the Act 

and Commission regulations prohibit any person from knowingly soliciting, accepting, or receiving any 

such contribution or donation from a foreign national,12 and Commission regulations further prohibit 

any person from knowingly providing substantial assistance in soliciting, making, accepting, or 

receiving any such contribution or donation.13 Under Commission regulations, “to solicit” means “to 

ask, request, or recommend, explicitly or implicitly, that another person make a contribution, donation, 

transfer of funds, or otherwise provide anything of value.”14

8

 Remarks by President Trump and President Niinistö of the Republic of Finland in Joint Press Conference, The 

White House (Oct. 2, 2019), https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-presidentniinisto-republic-finland-joint-press-conference/ (“Q: What did you want about Biden? What did you want [President 

Zelensky] to look into on Biden? PRESIDENT TRUMP: . . . Look, Biden and his son are stone-cold crooked.”); Kevin 

Breuninger, Trump says China should investigate the Bidens, doubles down on Ukraine probe, CNBC (Oct. 3, 2019), 

https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/03/trump-calls-for-ukraine-china-to-investigate-the-bidens.html (cited in Compl. at 4, MUR 

7705) (quoting Trump as stating “They should investigate the Bidens...[l]ikewise, China should start an investigation into 

the Bidens, because what happened in China is just about as bad as what happened in Ukraine.”).

9

 Fox News, Trump blasts Biden’s record in ‘Hannity’ exclusive interview, YOUTUBE (Mar. 4, 2020) at 5:54–7:47, 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fqjrlKfW93I&feature=youtu.be&t=354 (“HANNITY: Let me ask you, because we now 

know that there is a corruption issue and there’s an investigation officially in the country of Ukraine as it relates to Joe 

Biden . . . after all you went through, and now that you see Ron Johnson in the Senate and you see Ukraine investigating this 

issue . . . it has to be a campaign issue; how do you plan to use it, or do you plan to use it? TRUMP: . . . That will be a 

major issue in the campaign, I will bring that up all the time because I don’t see any way out. . . . That was purely corrupt.”).

10 The Act’s definition of “foreign national” includes an individual who is not a citizen or national of the United States 

and who is not lawfully admitted for permanent residence, as well as a “foreign principal” as defined at 22 U.S.C. § 611(b), 

which, in turn, includes “a government of a foreign country.” 52 U.S.C. § 30121(b)(1); see also 11 C.F.R. § 110.20(a)(3). 

11 52 U.S.C. § 30121(a)(1); 11 C.F.R. § 110.20(b), (c), (e), (f). Courts have upheld provisions of the Act prohibiting 

foreign national contributions and independent expenditures on the ground that the government “has a compelling interest for 

purposes of First Amendment analysis in limiting the participation of foreign citizens in activities of American democratic 

self-government, and in thereby preventing foreign influence over the U.S. political process.” Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 

2d 281, 288 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d 565 U.S. 1104 (2012); see United States v. Singh, 924 F.3d 1030, 1041-44 (9th Cir. 2019).

12 52 U.S.C. § 30121(a)(2); see also 11 C.F.R. § 110.20(g) (providing that “no person shall knowingly solicit” a 

foreign national contribution (emphasis added)); 11 C.F.R. § 110.20(a)(4) (defining “knowingly” to include “actual 

knowledge” that the target of the solicitation is a foreign national). 

13 11 C.F.R. § 110.20(h). In this context, the Commission has explained that “substantial assistance means active 

involvement in the solicitation, making, receipt or acceptance of a foreign national contribution or donation with an intent to 

facilitate successful completion of the transaction[,]” and “does not include strictly ministerial activity undertaken pursuant 

to the instructions of an employer, manager, or supervisor.” Contribution Limitations and Prohibitions, 67 Fed. Reg. 69,928, 

69,945-46 (Nov. 19, 2002) (“Prohibitions E&J”).

14 11 C.F.R. § 110.20(a)(6) (incorporating the definition at 11 C.F.R. § 300.2(m)).

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A “contribution” includes “any gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money or 

anything of value made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office.”15 

Under Commission regulations, “anything of value” includes all in-kind contributions, which include 

“the provision of any goods or services without charge or at a charge that is less than the usual and 

normal charge for such goods or services.”16 The Commission has recognized the “broad scope” of the 

foreign national contribution prohibition and found that even where the value of a good “may be 

nominal or difficult to ascertain,” such contributions are nevertheless prohibited.17

Here, Trump knowingly solicited Zelensky by asking, requesting, or recommending, directly 

and through intermediaries,18 that Zelensky provide two deliverables: The Ukrainian investigation of 

allegations regarding Burisma/Biden and 2016 election interference, and a public announcement of that 

investigation. So, the questions before the Commission then were: 1) whether the Ukrainian 

government acting through its head, Zelensky, is a foreign national within the meaning of the Act; 2) 

whether the deliverables sought are things “of value” under the Act; and 3) whether Trump sought the 

deliverables “for the purpose of influencing a federal election.” 

 1. “Foreign National” 

As an initial matter, the Act and Commission regulations explicitly include foreign governments 

within the scope of the foreign national prohibition.19 Therefore, both Zelensky as an individual and the 

Ukrainian government, with Zelensky acting as its head, are foreign nationals for the purposes of the 

prohibition. 

15 52 U.S.C. § 30101(8)(A). 

16 11 C.F.R. § 100.52(d).

17 Advisory Op. 2007-22 (Hurysz) at 6 (quoting 120 Cong. Rec. 8,782 (Mar. 28, 1974) (statement of Sen. Bentsen, 

author of the amendment prohibiting foreign national contributions) (“I am saying that contributions by foreigners are 

wrong, and they have no place in the American political system”); Prohibitions E&J, 67 Fed. Reg. at 69,940 (“As indicated 

by the title of section 303 of BCRA, ‘Strengthening Foreign Money Ban,’ Congress amended [52 U.S.C. § 30121] to further 

delineate and expand the ban on contributions, donations, and other things of value by foreign nationals.” (emphasis added)).

18 That a solicitation is made through intermediaries does not change the analysis. Commission regulations specify 

that a “solicitation may be made directly or indirectly” and thus capture solicitations made through persons acting on behalf

of the principal or principals. 11 C.F.R. § 300.2(m) (incorporated in foreign national prohibition at 11 C.F.R. § 

110.20(a)(6)); see Factual & Legal Analysis (“F&LA”) at 5–6, MUR 7122 (Right to Rise USA, et al.) (Oct. 11, 2018) 

(finding that the agent of an independent expenditure-only political committee (“IEOPC”) solicited foreign national 

contributions by having a conversation with a foreign national, the majority owner of a foreign company, about the foreign 

company’s U.S. subsidiary contributing to the IEOPC, and then emailing both the Chief Executive and a foreign national 

board member of the subsidiary to indicate that the foreign parent company’s majority owner “expressed interest” in making 

a contribution to the IEOPC); Conciliation Agreement, MUR 7122 (Right to Rise USA) (settling IEOPC’s violations of 

52 U.S.C. § 30121(a)(2) and 11 C.F.R. § 110.20(g) arising from agent’s solicitation).

19 52 U.S.C. § 30121(b)(1) (stating that “foreign national” includes a “foreign principal, as such term is defined by 

section 611(b) of title 22 [of the U.S. Code],” which in turn defines “foreign principal” to include “a government of a foreign 

country”); 11 C.F.R. § 110.20(a)(3)(i). 

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2. Thing “of Value” 

Next, we turn to whether the deliverables sought are things “of value” under the Act. The

information available in these matters indicated that both the actual investigations and the official public 

announcement of such investigations that Trump sought from Zelensky were things “of value” because 

they were unique, nonpublic “deliverables,”20 the provision of which involved the use of the Ukrainian 

government’s official resources to confer an electoral benefit on Trump’s 2020 presidential reelection 

campaign.

The announcement would have benefited Trump’s reelection campaign by publicizing and

appearing to give credence to negative allegations of corruption against one of Trump’s potential 2020 

election opponents, Biden, and Biden’s political party, the DNC – akin to negative campaign 

advertising, or hiring a prominent public figure to criticize an electoral opponent.21 Trump, and perhaps 

to an even greater extent Giuliani, publicly aired these allegations about Biden and the DNC. However, 

only Zelensky (or a similarly high-ranking government official) could announce an official investigation 

of the allegations on behalf of Ukraine, lending them the authority that would be at the root of the 

potential electoral benefit. 

Further, unlike using campaign advertisements and other paid efforts to disseminate the 

damaging narrative, which would have involved spending campaign funds and reporting the 

expenditures in disclosure reports,22 an announcement by Zelensky would have used Ukrainian 

resources, thus seeking a significant electoral benefit at no cost to the Trump Committee and with no 

public disclosure.23 Indeed, Zelensky and his aides were involved in multiple, weeks-long negotiations 

with Department of State officials regarding the requested announcement, including the specific 

20 Deposition of Ambassador Gordon Sondland before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence for the U.S. 

House of Representatives at 30 (Oct. 17, 2019) (“Sondland Dep”) (“My recollection is that the statement was written 

primarily by the Ukrainians, with Ambassador Volker’s guidance, and I offered my assistance when asked. This was the, 

quote, “deliverable,” closed quote, referenced in some of my [text] messages. A deliverable public statement that President 

Trump wanted to see or hear before a White House meeting could occur.”); id. at 289-90 (“The deliverable, I believe, was 

the press statement.”); Deposition of Special Representative for Ukraine Negotiations Kurt Volker before the Permanent 

Select Committee on Intelligence for the U.S. House of Representatives at 184 (Oct. 3, 2019) (“Volker Dep.”).

21 See 11 C.F.R. § 100.52(d)(1) (including “advertising services” among examples of “goods or services” which, if 

provided without charge or at a reduced charge, would result in a contribution). Third parties have spent considerable 

amounts to amplify damaging allegations or propagate a damaging narrative about a candidate. See, e.g., Conciliation 

Agreement ¶ IV.15, MURs 5511 and 5525 (Swiftboat Veterans and POWs for Truth) (Dec. 11, 2006) (“During the 2004 

cycle, [Swiftboat Veterans and POWs for Truth] spent $19,304,642 for 12 television advertisements that were broadcast in 

the Presidential election battleground states . . . and on national cable television stations . . . [and a]ll of these advertisements 

attacked the character, qualifications, and fitness for office of Senator John Kerry, the Democratic Presidential nominee.”). 

Even if a third party is not a foreign national and is otherwise permitted to make such expenditures under the Act, if those 

expenditures are “coordinated” with a candidate, authorized campaign committee, or an agent thereof, the result is either a 

“coordinated expenditure” or a “coordinated communication,” either of which results in an in-kind contribution from the 

third party to the candidate. See 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(7)(B)(i); 11 C.F.R. § 109.20(b) (coordinated expenditures for activity 

that does not include communications); 11 C.F.R. § 109.21 (coordinated communications). 

22 See 52 U.S.C. § 30101(9)(A) (defining “expenditure”); id. § 30104(b) (mandating periodic disclosure of all 

expenditures).

23 Compl. Attachment, MUR 7663 (Nov. 18, 2019) (The White House, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at 3 

(July 25, 2019) (“July 25 Call Memo”)) (“The President: I would like you to do us a favor though because our country has 

been through a lot and Ukraine knows a lot about it.”).

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language that it would need to include.24 As opposed to a voluntary statement by Zelensky in his 

personal capacity, Ukraine directed human and logistical resources towards the announcement,25 akin to 

the type of resources necessary for the provision of a “service” at no charge, which Commission 

regulations include in the definition of a “contribution.”26 

In sum, Trump sought the disbursement of Ukrainian resources for a deliverable that Zelensky 

was uniquely situated to provide, and which supplied an electoral benefit to the Trump Committee: 

Amplifying and giving an official imprimatur to a narrative casting Trump’s potential election opponent 

in a negative light. As such, the announcement, including the resources expended to further the 

announcement, was a thing “of value” under the Act. 

Trump also sought an actual investigation by Ukraine into the allegations that Joe Biden 

improperly coerced Ukraine to shut down an anticorruption investigation of Burisma to protect his son, 

Hunter Biden, and that the DNC coordinated with Ukraine’s efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential 

election. Like the announcement Trump desired, the investigation would have involved Ukraine using 

its resources to confer a potential benefit on Trump’s 2020 reelection campaign, and thus, was a thing of 

value under the Act. 

Opposition research – research into potentially damaging information about political opponents 

– is a service that campaigns commonly expend resources on,27 and the Commission has concluded that 

the provision of free opposition research may constitute a contribution under the Act. In MUR 5409, 

the Commission found that a corporation made prohibited in-kind contributions by providing a 

campaign with its private lists of organizations and individuals with similar political views, which the 

corporation “utilized its resources to obtain and compile,” and which “contain[ed] information that may 

be of value in connection with” a federal election.28 

The requested investigation would have required a third party, the Ukrainian government, to use 

its resources to provide a benefit to the Trump Committee — i.e., researching negative information 

about Trump’s potential election opponent, Biden, and Biden’s party, the DNC — thereby relieving the 

Trump Committee of the attendant expense of that investigative effort. As such, the requested 

24 See Sondland Dep. at 84; 169 (“What I understood was that breaking the logjam with getting the President to finally 

approve a White House visit was a public utterance by Zelensky, either through the press statement or through an interview 

or some other public means, that he was going to pursue transparency, corruption, and so on.”); 240 (“[T]he first time I recall 

hearing about 2016 and Burisma was during the negotiations of the press statement.”); 347; Volker Dep. at 71–72 

(discussing negotiating the text of the statement).

25 See Taylor Dep. at 135–36.

26 11 C.F.R § 100.52(d)(1); see id. § 100.111(e)(1); cf. 11 C.F.R. § 114.4(c)(6) (providing that disbursements for 

announcements of endorsements by a corporation or labor organization to the general public are not contributions or 

expenditures provided that the public announcement is not coordinated with a candidate, a candidate’s authorized 

committee, or their agents, and the amount of the disbursement is de minimis).

27 See FEC, 2017-2018 Disbursement Data, https://www.fec.gov/data/disbursements/?two_year_transaction

_period=2018&data_type=processed&disbursement_description=research (including 7,599 disbursement entries including 

the description “research”); see also Ellen L. Weintraub, The Law of a ‘Thing of Value,’ FED. ELECTION COMM’N (Oct. 

2019), available at https://www.fec.gov/resources/cms-content/documents/2019-10-ELW-the-law-of-a-thing-of-value.pdf. 

28 First Gen. Counsel’s Report at 10, MUR 5409 (adopted as dispositive). 

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investigation squarely falls within prior Commission matters finding that third party research conducted 

on a campaign’s behalf for no charge or at a reduced charge results in an in-kind contribution.29 

This is true even if the requested investigation ultimately failed to produce any useful 

information for the Trump Committee. Like an opposition research service paid for by any campaign, 

the “value” of the requested Ukraine investigation in this context, for the Act’s purposes, derives from 

the cost of the investigative effort, without regard to the perceived value of the resulting information, 

just as the value of a campaign ad, for the Act’s purposes, generally derives from the production and 

distribution costs without regard to its effectiveness in persuading voters. Accordingly, because 

Ukraine’s government would have had to use its resources to investigate the allegations, thus sparing 

the Trump Committee the expense of doing so and potentially allowing the campaign to otherwise 

direct its resources, the requested investigation was a thing “of value.”30 

3. “For the Purpose of Influencing a Federal Election” 

The available information indicates that the requested announcement and investigation were 

sought “for the purpose of influencing” a federal election.31 In analyzing whether the provision of 

funds or any other thing of value is a “contribution” under the Act and Commission regulations, the 

Commission has concluded that the question is whether a thing of value was “provided for the purpose 

of influencing a federal election [and] not whether [it] provided a benefit to [a federal candidate’s] 

campaign.”32 The electoral purpose may be clear on its face, as in a third party’s payments for a 

coordinated communication, or inferred from the surrounding circumstances.33 

Trump repeatedly requested that Zelensky confer with Giuliani and investigate allegations 

regarding Biden and 2016 election interference during their July 25, 2019, phone call.34 Trump’s later 

comments regarding the July 25 call, including his statement that he would make Biden’s alleged 

corruption “a major issue in the campaign,”35 and his ongoing support for Giuliani’s investigation of the 

same allegations, indicate that the request was motivated by an electoral purpose — i.e., seeking and 

publicizing damaging information about Biden, Trump’s potential opponent in the 2020 U.S. 

29 See also 11 C.F.R. § 100.52(d)(2).

30 See F&LA at 3–4, 13–14, MUR 6414 (discussing the nature and value of investigative services provided by a 

research company, some of which were allegedly provided at a discount or at no charge).

31 52 U.S.C. § 30101(8)(A)(i).

32 F&LA at 6, MUR 7024.

33 E.g. Advisory Op. 1988-22 (San Joaquin Valley Republican Associates) at 5 (concluding third party newspaper 

publishing comments regarding federal candidates, coordinated with those candidates or their agents, thereby made 

contributions); see F&LA at 17–20, MURs 4568, 4633, and 4634 (Triad Mgmt. Servs., Inc.) (finding reason to believe 

corporation and related nonprofit organizations made contributions by providing federal candidates with “uncompensated 

fundraising and campaign management assistance” and “advertising assistance[,]” including spending “several million 

dollars” on coordinated advertisements); Advisory Op. 2000-08 (Harvey) at 1, 3 (concluding private individual’s $10,000 

“gift” to a federal candidate would be a contribution because “the proposed gift would not be made but for the recipient’s 

status as a Federal candidate”). 

34 July 25 Call Memo.

35 See supra footnote 8. 

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presidential election,36 and the DNC. Trump further demonstrated that electoral purpose by repeatedly 

refusing — without first receiving the public announcement of the investigation — to schedule a White 

House meeting with Zelensky. 

Trump’s funneling of Ukraine policy through his personal attorney, Giuliani, further accords 

with that conclusion. Upon returning from Zelensky’s inauguration in May 2019, the U.S. delegation, 

including then-Secretary of Energy Rick Perry, Sondland, and Volker, urged Trump to show support for 

the new Ukrainian President by scheduling a White House meeting with Zelensky. Rather than 

engaging with officials at the Department of State, Department of Defense, or National Security 

Council, however, Trump directed that any discussion about meeting with Zelensky be channeled 

through Giuliani, who held no government position and was acting as Trump’s personal attorney.37 In 

his July 25, 2019, call with Zelensky, Trump requested that Zelensky consult with Giuliani and 

Attorney General William Barr, rather than going through traditional diplomatic channels, about 

investigating the Biden/Burisma and 2016 election interference allegations.38 Trump’s use of his 

personal attorney, rather than the usual and official actors in U.S. foreign policy, demonstrates that 

Trump viewed the effort to discredit Biden and the DNC as a personal matter, namely, that it was for the 

purpose of influencing the 2020 presidential election. 

Numerous U.S. officials expressed concern regarding the requests that Zelensky announce and 

investigate these allegations, stemming from the fact that the announcement and investigation were 

pursued through an improper, irregular channel — namely, through Giuliani, a private citizen acting as 

Trump’s personal attorney39 — rather than through an official channel, such as a request for 

intergovernmental law enforcement cooperation, and were sought for the apparent purpose of benefiting 

Trump politically rather than advancing U.S. interests or policy. For example, at a July 10, 2019, 

meeting between Bolton and one of Zelensky’s representatives, Oleksandr Danyliuk, Bolton reacted 

negatively to Sondland’s statement to the Ukrainians that the White House would agree to schedule an 

official meeting for Zelensky after Ukraine initiated the investigations; Bolton swiftly ended the 

meeting and afterward instructed his associate, Dr. Fiona Hill, to inform the National Security Council’s 

legal counsel about Sondland’s statement and that he, Bolton, was not party to the offer.40 

36 See Kenneth P. Vogel, Rudy Giuliani Plans Ukraine Trip to Push for Inquiries That Could Help Trump, N.Y. TIMES

(May 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/09/us/politics/giuliani-ukraine-trump.html (cited by Compl., MUR 7645) 

(reporting that Giuliani planned trip “potentially to damage Mr. Biden, the early front-runner for the 2020 Democratic 

presidential nomination”).

37 Volker Dep. at 305; Sondland Dep. at 25; see Letter from Rudolph W. Giuliani to Volodymyr Zelensky, PresidentElect of Ukraine (May 10, 2019) (“Giuliani Letter”), https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/excerpt_2_final.pdf (“I am 

private counsel to President Donald J. Trump. Just to be precise, I represent him as a private citizen, not as President of the 

United States.”). 

38 July 25 Call Memo.

39 See Giuliani Letter; see also Rudy W. Giuliani (@RudyGiuliani), Twitter (Nov. 6, 2019, 3:43 PM), 

https://twitter.com/RudyGiuliani/status/1192180680391843841. 

40 Deposition of Lieutenant Colonel Alexander S. Vindman before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 

for the U.S. House of Representatives at 17 (Oct. 29, 2019) (“Vindman Dep.”); Deposition of Dr. Fiona Hill before the 

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence for the U.S. House of Representatives at 65–67, 70–71 (Oct. 14, 2019) (“Hill 

Dep.”). 

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At a follow-up meeting without Bolton, Sondland again told the Ukrainians that a White House 

visit for Zelensky would happen only after the announcement of the Burisma/Biden and 2016 election 

interference investigations, after which Hill and Vindman confronted Sondland to express their view 

that Sondland’s statement was inappropriate.41 The fact that Bolton, Hill, and Vindman all expressed 

immediate concern with the requests to the Ukrainian delegation indicates that they perceived — and 

objected to — the linkage between an important diplomatic goal and the announcement of an 

investigation into Trump’s potential electoral opponent. 

Zelensky’s representatives, Andrey Yermak and Danyliuk, also understood the purpose of the 

request to be political, expressing concern about Ukraine being improperly drawn into a U.S. domestic 

political matter. On July 20, 2019, ten days after his meeting with Bolton, Danyliuk told then-acting 

ambassador Bill Taylor that Zelensky “did not want to be used as a pawn” in U.S. election matters.42 

Yermak, Zelensky’s closest advisor, also expressed concern that Ukraine could get drawn into a U.S. 

domestic political issue by satisfying Trump’s and Giuliani’s wishes. After the Trump-Zelensky phone 

call, and after Yermak met with Giuliani on August 2, 2019, where they discussed the White House visit 

and a public announcement of the investigations, Yermak sent Volker a draft of a potential 

announcement, which generally discussed Ukraine’s commitment to combating corruption but lacked 

specific mention of the Biden/Burisma and 2016 election interference allegations.43 Upon considering 

Yermak’s proposed statement, however, Giuliani reportedly rejected it because it did not contain 

specific references to the allegations, telling Volker that if the announcement “doesn’t say Burisma and 

2016, it’s not credible.”44 

Giuliani’s reported insistence on these specific references belies the argument that the 

announcement’s purpose was non-electoral — e.g., that it was sought to publicly ensure Ukrainian 

commitment to investigating corruption.45 Volker testified that to implement Giuliani’s instructions and 

advance the negotiations, he incorporated the desired references and sent a revised draft statement to 

Yermak, although Volker also advised Yermak that announcing an investigation with specific 

references to these two allegations was “not a good idea” and that a “generic statement about fighting 

41 Vindman Dep. at 29–31; Hill Dep. at 69–70.

42 Taylor Dep. at 30.

43 Letter from Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs Chairman, Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent 

Select Committee on Intelligence Chairman, and Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on Oversight and Reform 

Chairman to Members of the Intelligence, Oversight and Reform, and Foreign Affairs Committees, Attachment at 3-4 (Oct. 

3, 2019) (“First Volker Text Excerpts”), https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/_cache/files/a/4/a4a91fab-99cd-4eb9-9c6cec1c586494b9/621801458E982E9903839ABC7404A917.chairmen-letter-on-state-departmnent-texts-10-03-19.pdf; Volker 

Dep. at 71, 113.

44 Volker Dep. at 71–72, 113; see also MSNBC, Exclusive: Rachel Maddow Interviews Lev Parnas - Part 2, 

YOUTUBE (Jan. 15, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xj-4V5ui8H4 (“Maddow Interview Pt. 2”) at 16:17–17:02 

(“They [Zelensky’s administration] announced something about corruption, that he’s going to be on corruption, but Giuliani 

blew his lid on that saying, ‘That’s not what we discussed.’ That it wasn’t supposed to be a corruption announcement, it has 

to be about Joe Biden and Hunter Biden and Burisma.”). 

45 See Taylor Dep. at 36 (“Ambassador Sondland told me that President Trump had told him that he wants President 

Zelensky to state publicly that Ukraine will investigate Burisma and alleged Ukrainian interference in the 2016 

election. . . . He said that President Trump wanted President Zelensky in a box by making [a] public statement about ordering 

such investigations.”).

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corruption” would be better.46 These sentiments appear to reflect contemporaneous recognition by the 

officials involved that conditioning a White House visit — seen by officials on both sides as critical to 

the diplomatic relationship47 — on the public announcement and investigation of these specific 

allegations was improper, because it placed pressure on Zelensky to provide deliverables that could 

draw him and Ukraine into the 2020 U.S. presidential election. 

Trump’s refusal to release the Congressionally-approved security aid to Ukraine, despite many 

requests to do so, also underscores the personal, electoral motive driving the demand for the 

announcement and investigation.48 Officials at their respective agencies uniformly agreed, and 

represented vocally, that the aid to Ukraine was vital and effective, a perspective mirrored in bipartisan 

Congressional support for the aid appropriation.49 The Department of Defense raised a further concern 

that the OMB hold on appropriated funds presented a potential violation of federal appropriations law, a 

concern later validated by the U.S. Government Accountability Office.50 Taylor expressed his concern 

about the apparent reason for the hold on security funds to Ukraine, writing in a text message to Volker 

and Sondland, “I think it’s crazy to withhold security assistance for help with a political campaign.”51 

Nevertheless, Trump continued to refuse to release the aid, telling Sondland that Zelensky would 

have to announce the investigation for the aid to be released.52 Trump’s refusal to release the aid, 

46 Volker Dep. at 44.

47 Deposition of Christopher Anderson before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence for the U.S. House of 

Representatives at 50 (Oct. 30, 2019); Taylor Dep. at 76–77; Volker Dep. at 38; Deposition of David A. Holmes before the 

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence for the U.S. House of Representatives at 41 (Nov. 15, 2019). 

48 For the Act’s purposes, a solicitation need not involve any coercion, pressure, or reciprocal inducement; to “solicit” 

requires only that someone “ask, request, or recommend” another person provide a contribution, donation, transfer of funds, 

or other thing of value. 11 C.F.R. § 300.2(m). Nevertheless, any such coercion, pressure, or inducement offered may 

provide relevant “context” in which the communications must be viewed to determine whether they would have been 

“reasonably understood” to convey “a clear message” asking, requesting, or recommending that the listener provide a 

contribution, donation, transfer of funds, or other thing of value. Id. As such, even if the White House meeting and the 

release of U.S. security aid to Ukraine were not conditioned on or linked to the public announcement and investigation — 

i.e., even if there was no quid pro quo — the record would still support the conclusion that the request for Zelensky to 

publicly announce and conduct the investigation was a solicitation. The fact that Trump, Giuliani, and Parnas pressured and 

induced Zelensky, by using the White House visit and U.S. security aid to Ukraine as leverage, only adds further contextual 

support for that conclusion.

49 Taylor Dep. at 28 and 132; Cooper Dep. at 16. 

50 Deposition of Timothy Morrison before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence for the U.S. House of 

Representatives at 163 (Oct. 31, 2019) (“Morrison Dep.”) (“Q: Was there any discussion of the legality or illegality of the 

hold at the PCC meeting? A: Yes. Q: What was — can you explain what was discussed? A: Because of the nature of the 

appropriations, is it actually legally permissible for the President to not allow for the disbursement of the funding. . . . Q: 

Okay. Who was raising concerns that there may be a legal problem? A: OSD. Q: That’s Office — A: Office of the 

Secretary of Defense. Q: DOD, okay. And did they raise concerns about possible violations of the Impoundment Act? A: 

Yes.”). The U.S. Government Accountability Office issued a report on January 16, 2020, finding that OMB violated the 

Impoundment Control Act when it withheld from obligation $214 million of the security assistance for a “policy reason.” 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, Decision, Matter of Office of Management and Budget—Withholding of Ukraine 

Security Assistance, B-331564 at 1, 6, 8 (Jan. 16, 2020). 

51 First Volker Text Excerpts at 9. 

52 Morrison Dep. at 190–91; Taylor Dep. at 39.

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viewed in context with his explanatory statement to Sondland, indicate an electoral motivation driving 

his demands of Zelensky, namely, influencing the 2020 presidential election through the announcement 

and investigation of his potential opponent and the opposing political party. 

In sum, there was more than enough information available to support the Commission opening 

an investigation into these allegations. Indeed, at this stage, the standard is merely whether there is 

“reason to believe” a violation has occurred.53 Plainly, that standard was met. Yet despite the wealth of 

available information, our colleagues, again, unsurprisingly, tied the Commission’s hands from even 

investigating these serious allegations or ever holding anyone accountable for these apparent and 

egregious violations of law. 

______________________ __________________________ 

Date Shana M. Broussard 

Commissioner

______________________ __________________________ 

Date Ellen L. Weintraub

Commissioner

53 See Statement of Policy Regarding Commission Action in Matters at the Initial Stage in the Enforcement Process, 

72 Fed. Reg. 12,545 (Mar. 16, 2007).

August 31, 2022

August 31, 2022

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