J-S65021-14

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

DENISE D. WHITE

Appellant No. 3563 EDA 2013

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence November 22, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0009139-2009

BEFORE: PANELLA, OLSON and PLATT,* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 25, 2014

Appellant, Denise D. White, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered on November 22, 2013, as made final by the denial of Appellant’s 

post-sentence motion on December 5, 2013. On this direct appeal, 

Appellant’s court-appointed counsel has filed both a petition to withdraw as 

counsel and an accompanying brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 

U.S. 738 (1967) and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 

2009).1 We conclude that Appellant’s counsel has complied with the 

procedural requirements necessary to affect withdrawal. Moreover, after 

independently reviewing the record, we conclude that the instant appeal is 

____________________________________________

1 See also Commonwealth v. McClendon, 434 A.2d 1185 (Pa. 1981).
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wholly frivolous. We therefore grant counsel’s petition to withdraw and 

affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence.

On January 7, 2013, Appellant entered an open guilty plea to 

aggravated assault and endangering the welfare of a child.2 During the plea 

colloquy, Appellant admitted that she was pleading guilty to both charges 

because she was, “in fact, guilty of those offenses.” N.T. Guilty Plea 

Hearing, 1/7/13, at 26. Further, Appellant admitted that, if the case went to 

trial, the Commonwealth would be able to prove, beyond a reasonable 

doubt, the facts underlying the crimes. Id. at 25-27. Specifically, Appellant 

admitted to the following underlying facts: on January 16, 2009, Appellant 

was inside her Philadelphia house when she immersed her seven-month-old 

son in a vase full of boiling water, inflicting upon her son “substantial third 

degree burns to [25] percent of his lower back, [as well as to his] abdomen, 

genitalia, [and] upper thighs.” Id. at 11-22. During the colloquy, Appellant 

also admitted that, at some point in the prior two months, her son had 

sustained blunt force trauma to the head; this blunt force trauma resulted in 

her son suffering a “chronic subdural hematoma with two [] skull fractures.” 

Id. at 11-22.

Prior to pleading guilty, Appellant read and signed a detailed, five-page 

written guilty plea statement. See Written Guilty Plea Statement, 1/7/13, at 

____________________________________________

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a)(1) and 4304(a)(1), respectively.
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1-5. Moreover, prior to accepting Appellant’s plea, the trial court conducted 

a lengthy and inclusive oral colloquy. N.T. Guilty Plea Hearing, 1/7/13, at 3-

27. After the colloquy, the trial court found, as a fact, that Appellant’s plea 

was “knowing[ly], voluntary[ily], and intelligent[ly]” entered. Id. at 27. 

Therefore, the trial court accepted Appellant’s plea and deferred sentencing, 

pending a pre-sentence investigation and psychiatric report. Id. 

On November 22, 2013, the trial court sentenced Appellant to serve an 

aggregate term of two to four years in prison for her convictions. N.T. 

Sentencing, 11/22/13, at 36-38. Appellant did not file a motion to withdraw 

her plea. Instead, Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion, wherein 

Appellant requested that the trial court “issue an [o]rder modifying 

[Appellant’s] sentence, and reducing [her sentence to a term of] 11 1⁄2 to 23 

month[s]” in county jail. Appellant’s Post-Sentence Motion, 12/2/13, at 1-2. 

The trial court denied Appellant’s post-sentence motion on December 5, 

2013 and Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court.

On appeal, Appellant’s court-appointed counsel has filed a petition for 

leave to withdraw and has accompanied this petition with an Anders brief. 

Within the Anders brief, Appellant essentially claims: that the Philadelphia 

Court of Common Pleas did not have jurisdiction over her case; that she 

should have been permitted to withdraw her plea, as her plea was 

involuntary; that her plea counsel was ineffective for failing to fully advise 

her of the consequences of pleading guilty; and, that her sentence is illegal. 

See Appellant’s Brief at 8-9.
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Before reviewing the merits of this appeal, this Court must first 

determine whether counsel has fulfilled the necessary procedural 

requirements for withdrawing as counsel. Commonwealth v. Miller, 715 

A.2d 1203, 1207 (Pa. Super. 1998).

To withdraw under Anders, court-appointed counsel must satisfy 

certain technical requirements. First, counsel must “petition the court for 

leave to withdraw stating that, after making a conscientious examination of 

the record, counsel has determined that the appeal would be frivolous.” 

Miller, 715 A.2d at 1207. Second, counsel must file an Anders brief, in 

which counsel:

(1) provide[s] a summary of the procedural history and 

facts, with citations to the record; (2) refer[s] to anything in 

the record that counsel believes arguably supports the 

appeal; (3) set[s] forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal 

is frivolous; and (4) state[s] counsel’s reasons for 

concluding that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel should 

articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling case law, 

and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion that 

the appeal is frivolous.

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361.

Finally, counsel must furnish a copy of the Anders brief to her client 

and advise the client “of [the client’s] right to retain new counsel, proceed 

pro se or raise any additional points worthy of this Court’s attention.” 

Commonwealth v. Woods, 939 A.2d 896, 898 (Pa. Super. 2007).

If counsel meets all of the above obligations, “it then becomes the 

responsibility of the reviewing court to make a full examination of the 
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proceedings and make an independent judgment to decide whether the 

appeal is in fact wholly frivolous.” Santiago, 978 A.2d at 355 n.5, quoting

McClendon, 434 A.2d at 1187. It is only when both the procedural and 

substantive requirements are satisfied that counsel will be permitted to 

withdraw.

In the case at bar, counsel has met all of the above procedural 

obligations.3 We must, therefore, review the entire record and analyze 

whether this appeal is, in fact, wholly frivolous. Our analysis begins with the 

issues raised in the Anders brief.

Appellant first claims that the Philadelphia County Court of Common 

Pleas did not have jurisdiction over her case. This claim is frivolous.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 102 establishes the territorial applicability of 

Pennsylvania’s Crimes Code. In relevant part, this section provides:

(a) General rule. – Except as otherwise provided in this 

section, a person may be convicted under the law of this 

Commonwealth of an offense committed by his own conduct 

or the conduct of another for which he is legally accountable 

if []:

(1) the conduct which is an element of the offense or 

the result which is such an element occurs within this 

Commonwealth[.]

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 102(a).

____________________________________________

3 Appellant has not responded to counsel’s petition to withdraw.
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In the case at bar, Appellant admitted that the crimes to which she 

pleaded guilty occurred in her Philadelphia house. See N.T. Guilty Plea 

Hearing, 1/7/13, at 18. Since “each court of common pleas within this 

Commonwealth possesses the same subject matter jurisdiction to resolve 

cases arising under the Pennsylvania Crimes Code,” and since Appellant 

admitted that the crimes to which she pleaded guilty occurred in 

Philadelphia, the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas undoubtedly possessed 

subject matter jurisdiction to resolve Appellant’s criminal case. 

Commonwealth v. Bethea, 828 A.2d 1066, 1075 (Pa. 2003). Appellant’s 

claim to the contrary is frivolous.

Next, Appellant claims that she should have been permitted to 

withdraw her guilty plea, as her plea was involuntary. This claim is waived, 

as Appellant failed to raise this claim before the trial court. 

Under our rules and precedent, “[i]ssues not raised in the lower court 

are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” Pa.R.A.P. 

302(a). Therefore, to preserve a challenge to a guilty plea, the individual 

must raise the issue prior to sentencing, at sentencing, or in a post-sentence 

motion. Failing this, the challenge is waived. Commonwealth v. Tareila, 

895 A.2d 1266, 1270 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2006); Commonwealth v. 

D’Collanfield, 805 A.2d 1244, 1246 (Pa. Super. 2002). In the case at bar, 

Appellant failed to confront the trial court with any challenge to her guilty 

plea. The current issue is thus waived.
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For her third issue on appeal, Appellant claims that her counsel was 

ineffective for failing to fully advise her of the consequences of pleading 

guilty. This claim is unreviewable on direct appeal. Commonwealth v. 

Grant, 813 A.2d 726, 738 (Pa. 2002) (“as a general rule, a [defendant] 

should wait to raise claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel until 

collateral review”); Commonwealth v. Holmes, 79 A.3d 562, 620 (Pa. 

2013) (“absent [certain, specified] circumstances [(that are inapplicable to 

the case at bar)] claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are to be 

deferred to PCRA review; trial courts should not entertain claims of 

ineffectiveness upon post-verdict motions; and such claims should not be 

reviewed upon direct appeal”).

Finally, Appellant claims that her sentence was illegal. This claim is 

frivolous, as Appellant admits that her sentence was “at the lowest part of 

the minimum of the [sentencing] guidelines.” Appellant’s Brief at 9. 

Therefore, since Appellant’s sentence does not exceed the statutory 

maximum term, Appellant’s final claim on appeal is frivolous.

We have thus independently considered the issues raised within the 

Anders brief and have determined that they are frivolous, waived, or 

unreviewable on direct appeal. In addition, after an independent review of 

the entire record, we see nothing that might arguably support this appeal. 

The appeal is therefore wholly frivolous. Accordingly, we affirm Appellant’s 

judgment of sentence and grant counsel’s petition to withdraw appearance.
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Petition to withdraw appearance granted. Judgment of sentence 

affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/25/2014