* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

1 Williams was represented by counsel at the trial level.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-41091

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

$34,000 CURRENCY, In United States Currency and/or Coin More or Less

with All Accumulated Interests Thereon

Defendant

ANTHONY BARNETT HARRIS

Claimant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Texas 

USDC No. 1:04-CV-716

Before JOLLY, DENNIS, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Claimant-Appellant Anthony Barnett Harris (“Harris”), acting pro se,1

appeals from the verdict in an in rem action brought by the United States

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

July 16, 2008

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 07-41091

2

against $34,000 in U.S. currency seized from Harris. For the following reasons,

we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 18, 2004, a Houston police officer, Frank Fulbright, was working

surveillance around hotels and motels in Houston, looking for drug trafficking

activity. Harris’s rental car with Alabama plates, parked at one of the hotels,

raised Fulbright’s suspicions. Fulbright contacted the hotel and learned that an

individual from Alabama named “Anthony Barnet [sic]” was registered there.

Fulbright ran a computer check on the driver’s license number given to the hotel

and received a report under the name Anthony Barnett Harris listing a previous

arrest for delivery of cocaine.

When Harris and another man, likely James Henry Williams (“Williams”),

left the hotel in a jeep, Fulbright followed. The jeep’s occupants began looking

back, driving erratically, and in Fulbright’s opinion, “trying to lose the tail.”

Fulbright returned to the hotel for further surveillance. Fulbright later observed

the two men driving the rental car and apparently seeking to evade Fulbright

by parking the car and “peeking around corners.” Later that night, Harris and

Williams left the motel and headed east on Interstate 10 toward Beaumont.

Fulbright suspected that Harris and Williams were involved in drug trafficking

activity because they acted suspiciously, drove a rental car with out-of-state

plates, paid for the hotel room in cash, spent most of their time in the hotel

room, and left the hotel a day early despite having paid for an additional night.

Based on his suspicions, Fulbright contacted Beaumont Police Officer Jerry

LaChance and told him he suspected Harris might be involved in narcotics

trafficking. 

LaChance and his partner Aaron Burleson spotted Harris’s car on

Interstate 10, followed it for several miles, and pulled Harris over for speeding

and failure to maintain a single lane. Harris seemed very nervous, so Burleson
No. 07-41091

3

did a pat-down, which recovered nothing. LaChance ran a criminal history

check and drivers license check in the police cruiser while Burleson questioned

Harris and Williams. Burleson asked permission to search the car, and Harris

denied permission. Subsequently, a police drug dog alerted to the trunk of the

car. In a suitcase in the trunk, the officers found and seized $34,000 in U.S.

currency in “a brick like bundle,” wrapped in several shopping bags. Harris and

Williams were not arrested, charged with any crime, or issued any citation.

Before trial in the government’s seizure action, a magistrate judge

considered Harris’s motion to suppress the currency. Harris claimed that the

currency was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment and therefore could

not be used in the forfeiture proceeding. See One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v.

Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 696 (1965); Wren v. Towe, 130 F.3d 1154, 1158 (5th

Cir. 1997). Invoking Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), Harris argued that (1) the

initial stop was unsupported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, and

therefore was not“justified atits inception,” and (2) even if the stop was initially

justified, its scope exceeded the original justification for the stop. The

magistrate judge drafted a twenty-one page “Findings of Fact and

Recommendation on Motion to Suppress,” which recommended that the motion

be denied. The district judge adopted those factual findings and

recommendations in full. After a two-day trial, the jury concluded that the

currency was “furnished, or intended to be furnished, by any person in exchange

for a controlled substance.” See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6). The currency therefore

was properly subject to forfeiture. 

In this appeal, Harris argues (1) the district court erred in denying his

motion to suppress evidence; (2) the jury verdict was not supported by sufficient

evidence; and (3)the government’s attorney made improper comments in closing

arguments, undermining Harris’s right to a fair trial. 
No. 07-41091

4

II. DISCUSSION

A. Motion to suppress

In an appeal of a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we review

questions of law de novo and factual findings for clear error. United States v.

Cano, 519 F.3d 512, 515 (5th Cir. 2008). 

In ruling on Harris’s motion to suppress, the district court first concluded

that the Terry stop was initially justified. The court found that the initial stop

was based on the officers’ objectively grounded and reasonable belief that traffic

violations had occurred. The district court credited the officers’ statements that

Harris was traveling 70 m.p.h. in a 65 m.p.h. zone and that the car bumped the

shoulder stripe on three different occasions. The only contrary evidence was

Harris’s testimony that he was not speeding or swerving out of his lane. This is

a simple factual finding that we cannot overturn absent clear error. See United

States v. Roberson, 6 F.3d 1088, 1092 (5th Cir. 1994) (“This polemic is

oft-repeated daily in traffic courts across this country. In each case the issue is

one of credibility, and in each case its resolution is left to the factfinder.”). 

The fact that the stop was motivated in part by a suspicion of drug activity

does not undermine the officers’ legitimate justification based on a traffic

violation. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996) (noting that “a

traffic-violation arrest . . . would not be rendered invalid by the fact that it was

‘a mere pretext for a narcotics search.’” (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414

U.S. 218, 221 n.1 (1973))); Goodwin v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 162, 173 (5th Cir. 1997)

(“So long as a traffic law infraction that would have objectively justified the stop

had taken place, the fact that the police officer may have made the stop for a

reason other than the occurrence of the traffic infraction is irrelevant for

purposes of the Fourth Amendment and comparable Texas law.”).

The more complex question in this case is whether the officers permissibly

prolonged the traffic stop:
No. 07-41091

5

[A] Fourth Amendment violation occurs when the detention extends

beyond the valid reason for the stop. Once a computer check is

completed and the officer either issues a citation or determines that

no citation should be issued,the detention should end and the driver

should be free to leave. In order to continue a detention after such

a point, the officer must have a reasonable suspicion supported by

articulable facts that a crime has been or is being committed.

United States v. Santiago, 310 F.3d 336, 341-42 (5th Cir. 2002) (citations

omitted). Although a canine search is not itself a “search” within the meaning

of the Fourth Amendment, United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 607 (1983), it is

a Fourth Amendment violation if the canine search prolongs the stop after a

computer check comes back clean and the officers lack other grounds for

reasonable suspicion. See United States v. Dortch, 199 F.3d 193, 198-201 (5th

Cir. 1999). 

In this case, the district court found it unclear whether the dog alerted

before or after the completion of the computer check. Nevertheless, the court

concluded that the officers had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity beyond

that supported by the traffic violations. The court cited Fulbright’s report that

the men were behaving suspiciously and that Harris had a prior drug conviction;

Harris’s nervousness during the traffic stop; Harris’s and Williams’s inconsistent

answers to the officers’ questions; and Williams’s refusal to make eye contact

with Burleson. The court concluded that this evidence was sufficient to support

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. 

We look to the totality ofthe circumstances when determining whether an

officer’s suspicion is reasonable. United States v. Grant, 349 F.3d 192, 197 (5th

Cir. 2003). This court has held that mere “uneasy feelings,” inconsistent stories,

and nervousness are insufficient—by themselves—to support reasonable

suspicion. See Santiago, 310 F.3d at 338-39; Dortch, 199 F.3d at 200. Present

in this case, however, was the additional factor of Fulbright’s report that Harris

and Williams had attempted to elude him in Houston, see Illinois v. Wardlow,
No. 07-41091

6

528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (“Nervous, evasive behavior is another pertinent factor

in determining reasonable suspicion . . . .”), as well as the officers’ knowledge of

Harris’s prior drug conviction. Therefore, we hold that the district court did not

err in concluding that the sum of this evidence supported reasonable suspicion

to detain Harris and Williams “for a[s] long as it took to diligently pursue a

means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicion.” 

Harris argues thatthe dog’s alert alone is insufficient to support forfeiture.

See United States v. One Gates Learjet Serial No. 28004, 861 F.2d 868, 871 (5th

Cir. 1998) (holding a dog’s alert and trace amounts of cocaine found on a private

jet insufficient to support forfeiture under 28 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4)). However, that

argument goes to the legality of the forfeiture itself, not to the validity of the

search following the dog’s alert. It is well established that a drug dog’s alert to

the trunk of a car during an otherwise valid Terry stop supports at least

reasonable suspicion for officers to search the trunk. See, e.g., United States v.

Garcia-Garcia, 319 F.3d 726, 730 (5th Cir. 2003) (“Once the dog alerted, the

agents had, at a minimum, sufficient reasonable suspicion to permit them to

prolong the stop to explore further the potential source of the dog’s alert.”);

United States v. Williams, 69 F.3d 27, 28 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The fact that the dog

alerted provided probable cause to search [the trunk of a car].”). Because we

conclude that the search was proper, we hold that the district court correctly

denied Harris’s motion to suppress. 

B. Record on appeal

Harris also argues that the jury verdict was not supported by the evidence

and that the government’s attorney mischaracterized and disparaged a defense

witness during his closing statement. However, Harris failed to provide this

court with a full copy of the district court’s trial transcript. Under the Federal

Rules of Appellate Procedure, an appellant who “intends to urge on appeal that

a finding or conclusion is unsupported by the evidence or is contrary to the
No. 07-41091

7

evidence . . . must include in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to

that finding or conclusion.” FED. R. APP. P. 10(b)(2). An appellant may file a

partial transcript if the appellant also files a statement of the issues on appeal.

FED. R. APP. P. 10(b)(3). 

In this case, Harris filed a partial transcript that includes a 103-page

excerpt of the original trial transcript. Key portions of the transcript were

omitted, including Harris’s own testimony, testimony of his business partner,

Chantel Baker (“Baker”), and the final argument of Harris’s trial counsel, Don

D. Becker. On March 18, 2008, the Clerk of the Court notified Harris that the

additional transcript would not be made part of the record unless Harris first

obtained leave to supplement the record on appeal. Although Harris attempted

to submit a full transcript, he did so without seeking or obtaining leave of this

court. Harris claims that he submitted a statement of the issues under Rule

10(b)(3), but the docket reflects no such statement. 

“‘The failure of an appellant to provide a transcript is a proper ground for

dismissal of the appeal.’” RecoverEdge L.P. v. Pentecost, 44 F.3d 1284, 1289 (5th

Cir. 1995) (quoting Richardson v. Henry, 902 F.2d 414, 416 (5th Cir. 1990)

(dismissing appeal based on sufficiency of the evidence because appellant failed

to include a transcript)). However, the decision to dismiss based on lack of a

transcript is within our discretion. See Coats v. Pierre, 890 F.2d 728, 731 (5th

Cir. 1989) (noting that the Court of Appeals has discretion in fashioning a

response to the failure to include the transcript on appeal, and that dismissing

the entire appeal is a drastic remedy to which we should rarely resort).

Although Harris is acting pro se, we normally do not review any claims that

challenge the sufficiency of the evidence at trial without viewing the complete

transcript. See, e.g., Coats v. Penrod Drilling Corp., 5 F.3d 877, 890-91 (5th Cir.

1993) (declining to consider a sufficiency of the evidence challenge to a jury

verdict when the appellant failed to provide the trial transcript). Regardless of
No. 07-41091

2 For the first time in his reply brief, Harris makes the unsupported assertion that he

instructed his trial attorney to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence at the close ofthe trial,

but that his attorney refused. Harris offers no basis for this court to excuse his failure to

preserve this issue based on vague and unsupported allegations of ineffective assistance of

8

Harris’s failure to provide the entire trial transcript, we can easily affirm the

judgment below, in part because Harris failed to preserve the following

objections at trial.

C. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Even without a full copy of the trial transcript, we decline to reverse the

jury verdict because Harris failed to preserve this claim. Harris alleges that the

government failed to produce evidence or testimony at his trial sufficient to

support a conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 881. Harris notes his evidence that the

currency derived from a legitimate business he runs with his partner, Baker. He

also points out that after the stop and seizure, authorities did not investigate

him for any drug-related offense,the officers did nottestthe currency or Harris’s

hands for drug residue, and they did not find any drugs or paraphernalia after

searching the car.

Normally, our standard of review for a jury verdict is high: “We may

overturn a jury verdict only if it is not supported by substantial evidence,

meaning evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded

men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions.”

Snyder v. Trepagnier, 142 F.3d 791, 795 (5th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation

marks omitted). In this case, however, Harris failed to preserve this issue on

appeal by failing to move for judgment as a matter of law under FED. R. CIV. P.

50(a) at the close of the evidence and did not make a similar motion after the

jury verdict. Navigant Consulting, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 508 F.3d 277, 288 (5th Cir.

2007) (“Generally, a party who fails to present a Rule 50(a) motion on an issue

at the close of evidence waives . . . its right to challenge the sufficiency of the

evidence on appeal.”). Therefore, we will review only for plain error.2
No. 07-41091

counsel. 

3 We are also skeptical of whether Harris could succeed on this claim even if he had

preserved this argument.

4 Harris also argues that the jury’s verdict rests on impermissible “drug courier

profil[ing].” See United States v. Hanson, 801 F.2d 757, 762 (5th Cir. 1986). However,

Hanson’s holding applies only to whether certain characteristics of an individual may support

reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment, not the question of whether the

government may confiscate currency under 18 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6). Id.

5 The prosecutor’s statement questioned why Baker, as an accountant, would run an

all-cash business:

THIS MS. BAKER WOMAN, WHO IS SUPPOSEDLY AN

ACCOUNTANT, OR GOT A WHAT, AN ONLINE DEGREE FROM PHOENIX

SCHOOL OFSOMETHING OR ANOTHER, HER TESTIMONY ISSUPPOSED

TO BE SO CREDIBLE. DO YOU REALLY BUY THE FACT THAT SHE, THIS

WOMAN WITH ALL OF THIS TRAINING, IS SCARED OF BANKS? HAS

SHE NOT EVER HEARD OF THE FDIC AND FEDERALLY INSURED

ACCOUNTS? WHAT’S SHE GOT TO BE SCARED OF? 

YOU KNOW THE TRUTH OF THE MATTER IS WHAT SHE HAS GOT

OVER THERE IS THE SAME THING THAT A LOT OF DRUG DEALERS

HAVE. SHE HAS GOT A LITTLE FRONT BUSINESS IN THERE

9

Proceeding under plain error review, Harris cannot succeed on the merits.3

The incomplete record before us reflects thatthe jury heard substantial evidence

to support probable cause thatthe seized cash was involved in drug transactions:

a narcotics dog alerted to the money; the money was vacuum-wrapped and

divided into $1,000-dollar increments with rubber bands (which two experienced

police officers testified was standard practice for handling and transporting drug

money); and Fulbright testified that he thought Harris’s behavior in Houston

suggested drug activity.4 We cannot conclude that no reasonable jury would

have found that this money was involved in drug transactions.

D. Improper Argument

Harris also contends that the government’s comments in its closing

statement violated Harris’s right to a fair trial. Specifically, Harris complains

that the prosecutor spoke disparagingly about Baker’s educational history and

motive in running a cash-only business.5 Again, however, Harris’s counsel failed
No. 07-41091

LAUNDERING MONEY.

10

to make an objection at trial. “Although we may review such challenges even

where no contemporaneous objection was made, we are, of course, extremely

reluctant to address for the first time on review errors which the trial court was

not given the opportunity to consider and correct.” Whitehead v. Food Max of

Miss., Inc., 163 F.3d 265, 276 (5th Cir. 1998) (citations and internal quotation

marks omitted). Therefore, we review for plain error.

Harris presumably presented Baker’s testimony in attempt to argue that

the seized currency was for use in a legitimate business; thus, the legitimacy of

that business was a pertinent concern to the jury. The prosecutor’s statement

merely observed that it was suspicious that a trained accountant would run an

all-cash business. Courts permit “reasonable latitude” in counsel’s closing

arguments. Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d 276, 283 (5th Cir. 1975).

The comments in question did not place before the jury facts not in evidence, see

id., but merely proffered a possible conclusion based on the trial evidence.

Therefore, we find no error. 

Accordingly, we AFFIRM with respect to the district court’s evidentiary

ruling and AFFIRM the final judgment of the district court.