C O U R T O F A P P E A LS EI GHTH D I STRI CT OF TEXAS ELPASO, TEXAS M I C HA E LHE C T ORM AR T I NE Z , Ap pe lla nt,
v . THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
. § § § § § § N o. 08 -0 6- 00 33 5- CR

Appeal f rom the 1 12th DistrictCourt
o f Pecos County , Texas ( TC# P- 26 09 -1 12 -C R)

O P I N I O N This is an appea l from convictions on two counts of a g g ravated assault with a de adly wea pon. Appellant plea ded guilty

to the jury

and the jury

assessed punishment at t en y ear s’ imprisonment on the fi rs t c ount, and

te n y e ars ’ c omm

un ity su pe rv isi on on the se c on d c ount. We a ff ir m. I. SUMMAR

Y OF THE E VIDENCE On the evening of Aug ust 27, 2005, Florinda Fier ro, L ucia Ma rtinez, and Dion Chavez went t o an ev en t called Ha

rvest F est in Fort Stockton, Texas. The thre e then we nt to Lucia Ma rtinez’s house at a pproxi mately

ten or e leven p.m. The y

saw Appe llant’s car

parke d by

the house. He was
se pa rate d f ro m L uc ia Mart ine z at

the tim e . Luc ia Ma

rt ine z we nt int o th e ho us e . A ft e r a bo ut t hir ty
se c on ds , s he ra

n s c re amin g fr om the ho us e ; App e lla nt w a s f oll ow ingwi th a

kn if e . Sh e jum

pe d in to the bac k seat of F ierro’ s car . Fier ro’s window was open, and Appellant stabbed her i n the ar m. Prior to goingto eng ag e Chave z, who had exit ed the c ar, A ppellant tapped on the car window with the knife a nd told Fierr o that he would be ba ck. Chave z tried to lea d Appellant aw ay from the ve hicle, but Appellant told Chavez he would be back for him, and he ag ain t urned towards the c ar. Chave zy elled at F ierro to dr ive off. A s she started to dr ive awa y , the police a

rrived. When Office r Enrique I rig oy en of the For t Stockton P olice De partment a rrived, he saw Ap p el l an t s t an ding ne x t to a small pickup truck with his arms behind his bac k. Chavez warne d Of fi c e r I ri goy en that

Ap pe lla nt w a s arm e d w itha

kn if e . A no the r o ff

ic e r a rr ive d, and

the y bo th
arr ested Appe llant. Upon further investigation, Office r I rig oy en found a twe lve-inch- long knif e on t h e b u mp er

o f t h e p i cku

p t ru ckn ea r w h er e A p p el l an th adb ee ns t an d i n g.

II. DI SCU SSIO N A. Iss ue No . On e I n I ssue No. One , Appellant conte nds t h at his trial counsel did not provide e ffe ctive assista n c e o f

c o u n s e l, d

u e to h is f

a il u r e to e xe r c is e a

c h a ll e n g e f

o r c a u s e , r e qu e s t a d d it io n al pere mptory

challeng es, or further question a member of the venire panel conce rning the member ’s ability to speak Eng lish. Successf ul cl ai m s o f i n ef

fe ct i v e a s s i s t an ce o f c o u n s el m u s tfi rs td em o n s t ra t e t h at counsel was not functioning as counse l gua rante ed by t h e Six th Amendment in providingrea sonably eff ective assistance
. Strickland v. W ashington , 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). The second prongof this test require s a showing that counsel’s err ors wer e so serious as to deprive the def endant of a f air trial, suc h th at t h er e arises a rea sonable proba

bility that, but for counse l’s unprofe ssional
err ors, the re s ult of the trial would have been dif fer ent. Reasona

ble proba bility is a likelihood sufficie nt to undermine c onfidenc e in the outcome. Id. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. Texas adopted the Strickland test in W

ilk e rso n v . S tate , 726 S.W .2d 542, 548 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986), cert. de nied , 48 0 U .S. 94 0 ( 19 87 ); se e als o Mc Fa rla nd v . S

tate , 845 S.W .2d 824, 842 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) , cert. de nied , 508 U.S. 963 (1993) ( overruled on other grounds by Mo sle yv . S tate , 983 S.W .2d 249, 264 n.18 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998), cert. de nied , 526 U.S. 1070 (1999)).Th e c on sti tut ion a l r ig ht t o c ouns e l do e s n ot gua ra nte e e rr or le ss re pr e se ntatio n. I n ord e r t o meet the c onstitut ional standard, c ounsel must provide rea sonably eff ective a ssistance. W

ilkerson , 72 6 S. W.2 d a t 54 8. I n re vie wi ng ine ff e c tiv e -a ssi sta

nc e a sse rt ion s, the tot a lity of re pr e se ntatio n is examined, a s opposed to f ocusing upon isolated acts or omissions. I neff ective a ssistance of c ounsel cannot be established by

isolating or separ ating out one portion of the trial counsel’ s perf ormanc e for e x amination. Br idge v . S tate , 726 S.W. 2d 55 8, 57 1 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 86 ). I n th a t r e g ard , th is Court, on review , will not enga g e in hindsighte d compar isons of how other c ounsel, in particular , appellate counsel, mi g ht have tried the ca se. See W ilkerson , 726 S.W .2d at 548. A fa ir assessment of tr ia l c ouns e l’ s p e rf

or manc e re qu ir e s th a t e ve ry e ff or t be ma de to e lim inate the dis tor tin g e ff e c ts of hindsight, to re construct the c ircumstance s at tri al , an d t o evaluate the conduc t from counse l’s perspe ctive at the time. Sta ffo rd v . S tate , 813 S.W .2d 503, 506 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). We must i ndulge a strongpresumption that counsel’s c onduct falls within the wide rang e of
rea sonably

profe ssional assistance. A n appellant must overc ome the pre sumption t hat, under the circ umstances at trial, the cha lleng ed ac tion could be consider ed sound trial strate g y . Strickland, 466 U. S. a t 68 8- 89 , 1 04 S. Ct . at 20 65 ; Sta ffo rd , 813 S.W .2d at 506. Ultimately , an appe llant bear s the burden of proving ineffe ctive assist ance by a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e. Tho mp so n v . S tate , 9 S.W. 3d 80 8, 81 3 (Tex
. Cr im. Ap p. 19 99 ); Brad le yv . S tate , 960 S.W .2d 791, 804 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1997, pet. ref

’d). Any a lle g a tio n o f ine ff

e c tiv e ne ss mus t be fir

mly fo un de d an d af

fi rm a tiv e ly

de mon str a te d in the re cord. Thompson , 9 S.W .3d at 813. In the majority of instance s, an appe llant cannot re but the presumption of re asonable assistance , beca use the recor d on direc t appea l is sim ply undevelope d and does not adequately ref

lect the alleg ed fa ilings of tria l counsel. Id. at 813-14. A silent re cord that provides no explanation for c ounsel’s ac tions will not or dinarily overc ome the strongpresumptionAppe l l an t h as s u ppl eme n t ed t h e r ec or d w i t h a n a f f i dav i t s t at i n g t h at h e wa s n ot adv i s ed by t r i al c ou n s el of 1 a c er t ai n mat t er pri or t o pl eadi ng gu i l t y . Al s o, t he St at e h as at t ach ed an af f i davi t f r om Ap pel l ant ’ s t r i al coun s el wh i ch e x p la ins v a rio u s m a tter s tha t o c c u rr e d d u rin g h is re p re se n ta tio n o f A p p e llan t. N e ithe r a ff id a v it w a s intr o d u c e d a t t ria l. T he ap p el l at e reco rd canno t be s up p l em ent ed wi t h evi d e n c e n o t de vel o p ed duri ng t he p roce ed i ngs sur round i ng t he d e fen d a n t’s t ria l. T h e p ro p e r a v e n u e fo r intro d u c ing e v id e n c e n o t c o n ta ine d in the trial re c o rd is a h e a rin g p u rs u a n t t o a m o tio n fo r n e w trial o r a n a p p lica tio n fo r w rit o f ha b e a s c o rp u s. T h e su p p le m e n ta tio n ru le s c a n n o t b e us e d to c re a te a ne w re c o rd
. R a m ire z v . S ta te , 1 04 S. W
. 3d 549 , 551 n. 9 (T ex. Cri m. Ap p. 200 3). Fur t her , we can not cons i der an a ttac h m e n t to a b rie f tha t is n o t p a rt o f t h e a p p e llate re c o rd
. See T EX . R. A PP . P . 3 4 .1 ; J a m e s v . S ta te , 997 S. W
. 2d 898, 9 0 1 n. 5 (T ex. A p p . - - B eaum o nt 19 9 9 , no p et .). A cco rdingl y , we have no t co nsi d ered ei t her of t he af f i d avi t s i n our d isp o sitio n o f t h is a p p e a l. of re asonable assistance
. Se e Ry lan de r v . S tate , 101 S.W .3d 107, 110-11 (Te x . Crim. App. 2003). Any err or in trial strategy

will be deeme d inadequate re presen t at i o n only if counsel’ s actions ar e without any

plausible basis. Id. I ndeed, an appellate court should not dec l ar e t ri al counsel ineffe ctive without a rec ord showing that counsel had some opportunity to expl ain himself, abse nt conduct “ so outrag eous that no competent attorney would have e ng ag ed in it.” Go od sp e e d v . S tate , 1 8 7 S
. W
. 3 d

3 9 0 , 3 9 2 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 2 0 0 5 ) ( ci t i n g Ga rc ia v . S tate , 5 7 S. W. 3 d 4 3 6 , 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001), cert. de nied , 537 U.S. 1195 (2003)). I n the pre sent case , while a motion for new trial was filed, which alleg ed g ener ally that the
ve rd ic t w a s c on tr ary

to t he law a nd the e vid e nc e , n o h e ari ngwa s h e ld o n th e mot ion . T he re c or d is sil e nt a s to tr ia l c ouns e l’ s e xplanatio n f or his a c tio ns . Ac c or din g ly , App e lla nt ha s fa ile d to ov e rc ome the pre sumption of reasona ble assistance
. See R

ylander , 101 S.W .3d at 110-11. 1 Appellant asse rts there are a number of instance s in the rec ord which demonstrate that trial
c o u n s e l w a s i n e f

f e c t i v e i na l l o w i n g v e n i r e m anS e n o b i o A r an d a t o b e c o m e a

m e mb e r o f t h e j u r

y. Duringthe voir dire pr ocee ding, the court a sked all sole propr ietors of businesses to a pproac h the bench, if their businesses would have to close if they serve d on the jury . Venire men Senobio Ara nda and Gustavo B enave nte appr oache d, and the f ollowing e x chang e occ urre d: COURT: All rig ht. What’s y our name ? VENI REPERS ON: Senobio Aranda
.COURT: You g ot that? Can y ou find his name? What’s y our situation, sir?

VENI REPERS ON: Idon’t speak too much g ood Eng lish. CO UR T: Wel l, you ’r e do ingg oo d. Sta y wi th us. Why

do n’ t y ou sta y wi th u s? You stay with us. All right. I

appre ciate it. Tha

nk y ou. And y our name? VENI REPERS ON: Gustavo B enave nte. COURT: What is y our situation? VENI REPERS ON: Don’t speak Eng lish. CO UR T: Yo u’ re do ingg oo d. Why do n’ t y ou

sta y wi th u s? Th e lawye rs wi ll t a l k t o y o us o m e m o r e a

b o u ti t , b u ts t ay

w i t hu s f o r aw h i l e . O k a y? Al l r ig ht. Yo u s tay

wi th u s. Al l r ig ht. Ne xt? L ater , prior to the fina l selection of the jur y , venire man B enave n t e aga in approa ched the bench, a nd the following occur

red: COURT: Mr. B enave nte? VENI REP ERS ON : Ye s? COURT: All rig ht. Are you from San Ang elo? VENI REPERS ON: Idon’t understa nd Eng lish. After this exchang e, Benavente was excused upon the m utual ag ree ment of Appe llant’s trial
c o u n s e l an d

t h e p r o s e c u t o r . S e n o b i o A r an d a w a s s e l e c t e d

f o r t h e j u r y. Duringthe State’s portion of the voir dire proce eding , the prosec utor stated that there wer e four theor ies of punishment: deterr ence ; protection; reha bilitation; and retribution. The prose cutor the n a sk e d me mbe rs of

the pa ne l to wh ic h th e or

y the y su bs c ri be d. As de pic te d in th e re c or d, so me members of

the pane l stated the word f or the theor

y , others stated the word “ number” befor e the Ara bic numera l, and some just stated the Ara bic numera l. When Senobio Ara nda wa s questioned,he stated, “Number 2.” Appellant sug g ests that Ara nda exhibited no real sig ns of under standing the Eng lish languag e, beca

use he responde d in E ng lish only afte r he ha d just heard some twe lve other prospec tive jurors re spond to the question with merely a number answe r. Appe l l an t als o maintains that Aranda ’s tenuous g rasp of the Eng lish langua g e wa s de mon str a te d, g ive n h is r e sp on se to t he pr os e c uto r’ s q

ue sti on t o th e ve nir e me mbe rs c on c e rn ingthe ir fa vo ri te te le vis ion

sh owand wh a t the y c on sid e re d to be the mos t impo rt ant thi ng that chi ldr e n mu st be taug ht. Aranda

responde d: STATE: Mr. Ara

nda, do you have a

favor ite TV show? VE NIRE P E R S ON : Ye ah
. Ol d
. Ho rs e r ac es an d ru n n i n g. STATE: Okay . What’s the most im portant thing we tea ch our c hildren? VENI REP ERS ON : To be ho ne st a nd re sp e c t. Appellant sug g ests that it is hi g hly likely that Ara nda wa s merely

taking cues f

rom the answe rs of the oth e r v e ne ir e me mbe rs . Appellant points to a final example of what he consider s another i n d i ca t o r of Aranda ’s inability to speak Eng lish, which arose during the def ense’ s portion of the voir dire examination. Ap pe lla nt’ s tr ia l c ouns e l a sk e d th e ve nir e me mbe rs wh e the r t he y c ou ld con side r p ro batio n in assessingpunishment. When Ara nda was questioned, he nodded his he ad. Appe llant contends that t h i s re s p o n s e s h o we d

n o s i gn s o f c o mp re h en s i o no f E n gl i s h , b ec au s e, p ri o r t o Ar an d a’ s qu es t i o n i n g, at least ten me mbers of the venire wer e posed the question, and they ans we re d i n a mere “yes” or

“ no ” or sim ply no dd e d th e ir

he a ds
. Appellant asse rts that the above -mentio n ed i ncidents show Ar anda did not under stand Eng lish at all, and that he ha d a prope nsity for mimicking his English-spe akingcounter parts on the
ve nir e . App e lla

nt r e a so ns that it

wa s extr e me ly lik e ly that “A ra nd a re ma ine d in

the da rk fo r m os tof t he procee dings, was unable to decipher the jury char g e, and simply

capitulated by

mimicking the conduct of

the other juror s when re nderinga ver dict.” Appellant ac knowledg es that, abse nt a firm found at i on in the rec ord, a r eviewingcourt cannot spe culate a s to why counsel a cted in a cer

tain manner with reg ard to trial strateg y . Howeve r, Appellant conte nds that this record is a dequate to dem o n s trate that there w as no possible trial str a te g y that cou ld sanc tio n his tri a l couns e l’ s fa ilure to inq uir e fu rt he r int o Ar and a ’s la c k of a bil ity to speak Eng lish or to seek additional per emptory jury strikes. Appellant re asons that the trial str a te g y wa s to ob ta in p ro batio n, and Ar and a ’s ina

bil ity to s pe ak E ng lis h w or

ke d a g a ins t th is strateg y . We disag ree . Ge ne ra lly , w ith re g ard

to d e c isi on s o f whe the r t o s tr ike a ve nir e pe rs on

fo r c a us e , a n a pp e llate court de fer s to the d ec i s i o n of the trial c ourt, which wa s in a position to actually see a nd hear the
v en iremembe r in the conte x t of the voir dire
. Em e nh ise r v . S tate , 1 9 6 S
. W
. 3 d

9 1 5 , 9 2 7
- 2 8 ( T e x. Ap p. -- F or

t Wor th 2 00 6, pe t. r e f’ d) . A n a pp e llate c ourt

wi ll u ph old a tr ia l c ourt ’s de c isi on no t to strike a juror for cause , unless there is no adequate basis in the rec ord to support the ruling
. Vuong
v . S tate , 830 S.W .2d 929, 944 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. de nied, 506 U.S. 997 (1992). L ike the trial court, a n appellant’ s trial attorney is also in a position t o deter mine whether

to challeng e the venire member f

or ca use. Appellate courts do not have the bene fit of observinga venir emember ’s demea nor and tone of voice , which ar e import an t ch ar acte ristics both sides analy ze when making voir dire de cisions. Se e Mo on e yv . S tate , 817 S.W .2d 693, 701 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). We f ind tha t App e lla nt’ s c on te nti on

that the va

ri ou s c ite d e xamp le s sh owthat A ra nd a c ou ld not s p e ak E n g li s hto th e e xte n t t

h a t h e c o u ld

n o t s e r v e a s a ju r o r to b e s o me w h a t s tr a in e d and
s p ec u l at i v e. Fu rt h erm o re , t h e p re s u mp t i o nt h at t ri al co u n s el ’s co n d u ct fa l l s wi t h i nt h e w i d e r an ge of re asonable profe ssional assistance applies t o counsel’s de cisions reg ardingwhich venir emember sto challeng e or strike
. Se e J ac k so n v . S tate , 8 7 7 S.W .2d 768, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (trial counsel’s f

ailure to challeng e im partial juror did not constitut e inef fec tive assistance , beca

use re cord did not indicate why

counsel did not strike that venire member) . A critica l component in deter mining wh e the r c ouns e l e rr e d wo uld be so me ind ic a tio n o f h is c lie nt’ s p e rc e pti on s and c omm un ic a tio ns , if any , with counsel duringthe cour se of the voir dire proce eding
. Se e De lri o v . S tate , 840 S.W .2d 443, 446-47 (Te x . Crim. App. 1992). W e h ave no indication what, if any , interplay occur red be tween Appellant and his trial c ounsel. Acc ording ly , on the re cord be for e us, we find that Appe llant has failed to meet his burden in demonstratingthat he re ceive d ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel. I ssue No. One is ove rruled. B. I s s ue N o . Tw o I n I ssue No. Two, Appellant asser ts that his trial counsel pr ovided ineff ective a ssistance of
c ouns e l in

that couns e l fa ile d to inf

or m him that, if fo un d g uil ty , he wo uld have to s e rv e ha lf of his sentenc e inca

rce rate d befor e bec oming e ligible f or par ole. Specific ally , Appellant argues that, by
n o ti n f o r m i n g Ap p e l l an to f

h i s p ar o l e e l i g i b i l i t y, Ap p e l l an t ’ s p l e a o f g u i l t y w a s n o tf

r e e l y, knowing ly , and voluntarily enter ed. Whe n a pa rt y c ha lle ng e s th e vo luntari ne ss o f a ple a , e nte re d u

po n th e a dv ic e of

c ouns e l, contendingthat his counsel wa s i n ef fective, the voluntariness of the plea de pends on (1) whether counsel’s advice was within the rang e of c ompetence demande d of attorne y s in criminal case s and, if not, ( 2) whether there is a rea sonable probability that, but for counse l’s err ors, he would not have pleade d g uilty

and would have insisted on goingto trial. Ex Parte M oody , 991 S.W .2d 856, 857-58 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Ag ain, there is a strong presumption that counsel’s c onduct fe ll within the wide ra ng e of r easona

ble profe ssional assistance. Sa lin as v . S tate , 1 63 S.W. 3d

73 4, 74 0 ( Te x. Cr im. App. 2005). To de feat this presumption, “‘any alleg ation of ineff

ectivene ss must be firmly

foundedin the rec ord, and the re co rd m ust affirmatively demonstrate the alleg ed inef fec tiveness.’” Thompson , 9 S
. W
. 3 d

at 8 1 4 (q u o t i n g Mc

Fa rla nd v . S tate , 928 S.W .2d 482, 500 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), cert. de nied , 519 U.S. 1119 (19 9 7 ))
. W h en n o specific rea son is given f or counse l’s decisions, a r ecor d on direc t appea l will rarely contain suff

icient information to eva luate an ineffe ctive assistanc e cla im. Se e Bo nev . S tate , 77 S.W .3d 828, 830, 833 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Thompson , 9 S.W .3d at 813-14. I n the case before us, a s Appellant’s a ffidavit is not proper ly befor e us, the rec ord is simply

bare conce rning exactly

wha t t ri al counse l advised, why he did so, and whether that had any

eff ect on Appe llant. I ssue No. Two is over ruled. C. Issue No. Three I n I ssu e No . T hr e e , App e lla nt m a int a ins tha

t tr ia l coun sel’ s f

a ilure to i nf

or m hi m th a t, i f fo un d guil ty , h e wo uld

have to s e rv e ha lf of his se nte nc e inc arc e ra te d b e fo re be inge lig ibl e fo r p aro le
cause d Appellant’s plea

to be involuntary
. At trial, Appellant plea ded guilty without a plea ba

rg ain, and he stated that his g uilty plea wa s fre ely

and volu n t ar i l y gi v en . He wa s admonished as to the appropr iate ra

ng e of punishment and tr ial counsel indicated that he and Appe llant had had leng thy dis c us sio ns c on c e rn ingthe g uil ty ple a and a llo wi ngthe jur

y to a sse ss p un ish me nt. An i nvoluntary g uilty plea must be set aside. Boyk in v. Alabama , 3 95 U. S. 2 38 , 2 44 , 8 9 S. Ct. 17 09 , 1 71 3 ( 19 69 ); W ill iam s v . S

tate , 5 2 2 S. W. 2 d 4 8 3 , 4 8 5 ( T e x. Cr im
. Ap p . 1 9 7 5 )
. To deter mine whether

a plea is voluntar

y , we c onsider the r ecor d as a whole. W illiams, 522 S.W .2d at 485. I f counse l convey s err oneous information to a defen d ant, a plea of guilty based on that misinformation is invol untary
. E xp a r t e G r i

f fin , 6 7 9 S.W .2d 15, 17 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); Mc Gu irev . S

tate , 617 S.W .2d 259, 261 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). A defendant’s c laim that he was misinformed by

counsel, standingalone, is not enoug h to r ender his plea involuntary
. Fimberg v. Sta te , 922 S.W .2d 205, 208 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, pet. re f’d) . I n case s in which ag uilty plea has been held to have be en involuntary , the re cord ha s contained c onfirmation by counsel of the misinformation or documents properly in evidence aug menting the defe ndant’s testimony that
reve al the misinformation a nd show its c onvey ance to the defe ndant. See , e.g. , Gr iff in , 679 S.W .2d
a t 15 ; Ex parte Burns , 6 01 S.W. 2d 37 0, 37 2 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 80 ); State v. Hartman , 810 S.W .2d 22 , 2 2 ( Te x. Ap p. -- B e a

umo nt 1 991, no pe t.) ; Mu rp hy v . S tate , 663 S.W .2d 604, 610 (Tex. App.- -Houston [1st Dis t.] 1983, no pet.). As no suc h co n fi rmation is properly befor e us, we find that Appellant has f

ailed to establish that his g uilty plea was involuntary
. I ssue No. Thre e is overr uled. III . C ON CL USI ON We a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt
.

KENNET H R. CARR, J ustice May 8, 2008 B e f o r e C h e w , C
. J. , M c C l u r e , a n d C ar r , JJ. (Do Not Publish)