FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

Washington, DC 20463

 January 12, 2023 

ADVISORY OPINION 2022-25 

Jessica Furst Johnson, Esq. 

Caleb Acker, Esq. 

Holtzman Vogel Baran Torchinsky & Josefiak PLLC 

2300 N Street, Northwest, Suite 643A 

Washington, DC 20037 

Dear Ms. Johnson and Mr. Acker: 

 We are responding to your advisory opinion request on behalf of Mike Crapo for 

U.S. Senate (the “Committee”) regarding the application of the Federal Election 

Campaign Act, 52 U.S.C. §§ 30101-45 (the “Act”), and Commission regulations to the 

proposed use of the campaign funds to pay for various residential security installations 

and upgrades to the homes of Senator Michael D. Crapo. The Commission concludes 

that the proposed use of campaign funds for these security installations and upgrades to 

the Senator’s homes against threats arising from the Senator’s status as a federal 

officeholder is a permissible use of campaign funds under the Act and Commission 

regulations. 

Background 

The facts presented in this advisory opinion are based on your letter received on 

November 18, 2022. 

The Committee is the principal campaign committee for Senator Michael D. 

Crapo.1 The Committee “receives contributions and makes expenditures on behalf of the 

campaign.”2 

1

 See Advisory Opinion Request at AOR001. See also Mike Crapo for U.S. Senate, FEC Form 1 

(Statement of Organization) (filed Nov. 21, 2022), 

https://docquery.fec.gov/pdf/164/202211219546833164/202211219546833164.pdf . 

2

 AOR001.
AO 2022-25 (Crapo) 

Page 2

The request lists numerous instances of “concrete threats of physical violence 

against Members [of Congress] and their families”3 going back several years and 

continuing to the present4 and goes on to state that “[t]he current threat environment that 

Members and their families face must again be met with increased security measures.”5

 

The U.S. Capitol Police recently completed surveys for Senator Crapo’s homes in 

Idaho and Washington, D.C., and provided the Senator with security recommendations. 

Both surveys explain that “[a]s a Member of Congress, one may become the target of 

potential acts of terrorism, civil disobedience, civil disturbance, threats of violence, theft 

of services, theft of physical or intellectual property, burglary, vandalism, other acts of 

criminal mischief, and unauthorized trespassing.”6

 

For both of his residences, the U.S. Capitol Police recommended that Senator 

Crapo make a series of security enhancements including: 

1) Installing an electronic home security system. The recommended system 

would include an alarm system and intrusion detection system, video door 

intercom stations, arming stations, motion sensors, door contacts, window 

contacts and glass break sensors, and duress alarms and mobile alarm 

pendants. This system would be monitored at all times by a reputable service 

provider; 

2) Installing an exterior closed-circuit video system to provide live monitoring, 

video recording and motion and sound detection. The recommendation is that 

such a system should provide camera views of all access points and sides of 

the residence;

3) Replacing outer doors with solid-core wood doors or metal-clad doors, install 

with non-removable hinges, and install deadbolts and peepholes. The 

recommendation also included additional keyed locks, security bars on sliding 

doors, and locking mechanisms on gates (which may require the installation of 

additional gate posts); 

3

 Id.

4

 See, e.g., John Bowden, FBI Arrests Man Who Allegedly Threatened to Kill Pelosi, The Hill (Jan. 

12, 2021), https://thehill.com/policy/national-security/533843-fbi-arrests-man-who-allegedly-threatened-tokill-pelosi/; Jeff Pegues and Gina Martinez, Suspect in Paul Pelosi Attack Had List of Targets, Law 

Enforcement Sources Say, CBS News (Oct. 31, 2022), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/paul-pelosi-attacksuspect-target-list-sources-say-nancy-pelosi-husband/; Joseph Wulfsohn, Protestors gather outside 

McConnell’s Kentucky home, one calls for his stabbing ‘in the heart’, Fox News (Aug. 6, 2019), 

https://www.foxnews.com/media/protestors-gather-outside-mcconnells-ky-home-one-calls-for-hisstabbing-in-the-heart; Allyson Waller, Homes of Mitch McConnell and Nancy Pelosi Are Reported 

Vandalized, New York Times (Jan. 2, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/02/us/mcconnell-pelosihouse-vandalized.html. 

5

 AOR002.

6

 Id. (quoting the surveys entitled, “Physical Security Assessment” and “Residential Security 

Survey”). 
AO 2022-25 (Crapo)

Page 3

4) Installing security film on all accessible windows to prevent surreptitious 

observation into the residence;

5) Installing an automated residential lighting application for interior and add 

motion-activated lighting to exterior; and

6) Installing a lockable mailbox for mail delivery.7

Question Presented

May the Committee permissibly use campaign funds to pay for the various 

residential security installations and upgrades as recommended by the U.S. Capitol 

Police to protect Senator Crapo and his family at their Idaho and Washington, D.C. 

homes?8

Legal Analysis 

Yes, the Committee may use campaign funds to pay for the requested residential 

security installations and upgrades to Senator Crapo’s homes in Idaho and Washington, 

D.C. as recommended by the U.S. Capitol Police to protect from the ongoing threat 

environment arising from the Senator’s status as a federal officeholder.

The Act identifies six categories of permissible uses of contributions accepted by 

a federal candidate, two of which are “ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in 

connection with duties of the individual as a holder of Federal office,” and “any other 

lawful purpose” not prohibited by 52 U.S.C. § 30114(b). 52 U.S.C. § 30114(a); see also 

11 C.F.R. § 113.2(a)-(e).

The Commission has issued numerous advisory opinions authorizing the use of 

campaign funds to protect against threats to federal officeholders’ physical safety, on the 

grounds that the need for such security expenses would not exist irrespective of the 

officeholders’ activities or duties. In Advisory Opinion 2022-02 (Steube), Advisory 

Opinion 2020-06 (Escobar), Advisory Opinion 2011-17 (Giffords), Advisory Opinion 

2011-05 (Terry), and Advisory Opinion 2009-08 (Gallegly), Members of Congress faced 

specific and ongoing threats to the safety of themselves and their families. The facts 

presented in those advisory opinions suggested that the threats were motivated by the 

requestors’ election campaign, duties as a holder of federal office, or both. 

7

 AOR002-3.

8 The advisory opinion request asks whether “Members of Congress” may use campaign funds for 

the proposed residential security costs. Commission regulations provide that requests regarding the 

activities of third parties do not qualify as advisory opinion requests. 11 C.F.R. § 112.1(b). As such, the 

Commission is responding to your request only as it applies to Senator Crapo and the Committee. Other 

federal officeholders may rely on this advisory opinion to the extent their factual circumstances are 

materially indistinguishable from those described herein. See 11 C.F.R. § 112.5(a)(2). 
AO 2022-25 (Crapo)

Page 4

The Commission concluded in each instance that the expenses for the proposed 

security upgrades would not have existed irrespective of the requestors’ duties as federal 

officeholders or election campaigns. Therefore, the Commission concluded that the use 

of campaign funds to pay for the security upgrades was permissible under the Act and

Commission regulations.9 

The Commission has also previously considered the implications of the 

heightened threat environment faced by Members of Congress collectively, necessitating 

increased residential security measures even if an individual Member has not received 

direct threats. In Advisory Opinion 2017-07 (Sergeant at Arms), the Commission 

considered information from the House Sergeant at Arms about the threats faced by 

Members of Congress due to their status as federal officeholders, and the 

recommendation of the Capitol Police that Members of Congress install or upgrade 

residential security systems to protect themselves and their families. In light of that 

information, the Commission concluded that certain costs of installing or upgrading home 

security systems, i.e., “cameras, sensors, distress devices and similar non-structural 

security devices, as well as locks, in and around a Member’s residence” 10 would 

constitute ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in connection with Members’ duties 

as federal officeholders, and that therefore Members of Congress may use campaign 

funds to pay reasonable costs associated with home security systems.11

The Commission has also considered the Members’ safety when they are not at 

home or protected by federal agents. The Commission concluded that in the face of 

ongoing threats and the continuing heightened threat environment stemming from 

Members’ duties as federal officeholders, it would not be personal use for Members to 

use campaign funds to pay the costs “for bona fide, legitimate, professional personal 

security personnel to protect themselves and their immediate families due to threats 

arising from their status as officeholders, when federal agents are not protecting the 

Members or the Members’ families.”12

Here, the Commission again considers the need for a federal officeholder to take 

proactive measures to protect himself and his immediate family due to threats arising 

from his duties as a federal officeholder. As in Advisory Opinion 2017-07 (Sergeant at 

Arms), the Committee seeks to install or upgrade security features in and around the 

Senator’s homes, as recommended by the U.S. Capitol Police, to protect the Senator and 

9 See Advisory Opinion 2022-02 (Steube) at 5; Advisory Opinion 2020-06 (Escobar) at 3; Advisory 

Opinion 2011-17 (Giffords) at 3; Advisory Opinion 2011-05 (Terry) at 4; Advisory Opinion 2009-08 

(Gallegly) at 4.

10 Advisory Opinion 2017-07 (Sergeant at Arms) at 3.

11 Id.

12 Advisory Opinion 2021-03 (NRSC/NRCC) at 3. See also Advisory Opinion 2022-17 (Warren 

Democrats) at 4-5 (approving use of campaign funds to purchase enhanced cybersecurity measures for 

officeholder’s home network because officeholder was subject to heightened cybersecurity threats due to 

her role as federal officeholder). 
AO 2022-25 (Crapo)

Page 5

his family due to threats that arise from his duties as an officeholder. The Commission 

has previously considered the use of campaign funds to pay for most of the specific 

security features recommended by the U.S. Capitol Police in this matter, and found it to 

be permissible.13 Although security film has not yet been directly addressed by the 

Commission, it is a removeable security measure designed to mitigate potential threats 

stemming from the Senator’s duties as a federal officeholder, and therefore falls within 

the category of “non-structural security devices” for which the use of campaign funds 

was authorized in Advisory Opinion 2017-07 (Sergeant at Arms). Thus, each of the 

requested security items falls within the previously approved categories of “cameras, 

sensors, distress devices and similar non-structural security devices, as well as locks, in 

and around a Member’s residence.”14 

Accordingly, the Committee may use campaign funds to pay the costs15 for the 

requested installations and upgrades of security systems to protect Senator Crapo and his 

family in their Idaho and Washington, D.C. homes as ordinary and necessary expenses 

incurred in connection with the Senator’s duties as an officeholder. Consistent with prior 

advisory opinions, the Commission emphasizes that this conclusion is based on the 

information you provided about the current heightened threat environment experienced 

by Members of Congress, as assessed by the Capitol Police, and that if the threat 

environment should diminish significantly at some point in the future, this conclusion 

may no longer apply.16 

This response constitutes an advisory opinion concerning the application of the 

Act and Commission regulations to the specific transaction or activity set forth in your 

request.17 The Commission emphasizes that, if there is a change in any of the facts or 

assumptions presented, and such facts or assumptions are material to a conclusion 

13 See Advisory Opinion 2022-02 (Steube) at 4-5 (approving use of campaign funds for installation 

of security gate); Advisory Opinion 2020-06 (Escobar) at 4 (approving use of campaign funds for 

installation of security lighting); Advisory Opinion 2017-07 (Sergeant at Arms) at 3 (approving use of 

campaign funds to purchase non-structural residential security systems); Advisory Opinion 2011-07 

(Giffords) at 3 (approving use of campaign funds for security lighting and locks); Advisory Opinion 2011-

05 (Terry) at 4 (approving use of campaign funds to purchase CCTV system).

14 Advisory Opinion 2017-07 (Sergeant at Arms) at 3. In Advisory Opinion 2022-02 (Steube), the 

Commission determined that while the costs of purchasing and installing a locking steel gate at the entry of 

the Congressman’s property may not fall within the category of being for “non-structural security devices” 

authorized in Advisory Opinion 2017-07 (Sergeant at Arms), they do fall within the category of ‘locks[ ] in 

and around a Member’s home.” Advisory Opinion 2022-02 (Steube) at 5, quoting Advisory Opinion 2017-

07 (Sergeant at Arms) at 3.

15 The Commission assumes that the Committee will pay the fair market value for the residential 

security measures described in this request to avoid receiving potentially impermissible in-kind 

contributions from vendors.

16 See, e.g., Advisory Opinion 2017-07 (Sergeant at Arms); Advisory Opinion 2011-17 

(Giffords) at 3.

17 See 52 U.S.C. § 30108.
AO 2022-25 (Crapo) 

Page 6

presented in this advisory opinion, then the requestor may not rely on that conclusion as 

support for its proposed activity. Any person involved in any specific transaction or 

activity which is indistinguishable in all its material aspects from the transaction or 

activity with respect to which this advisory opinion is rendered may rely on this advisory 

opinion.18 Please note that the analysis or conclusions in this advisory opinion may be 

affected by subsequent developments in the law including, but not limited to, statutes, 

regulations, advisory opinions, and case law. Any advisory opinions cited herein are 

available on the Commission’s website.

On behalf of the Commission, 

Dara Lindenbaum, 

Chair

18 See id. § 30108(c)(1)(B).