### T E X A S C O U R T O F A P P E A L S , T H I R D D I S T R I C T , A T A U S T I N

NO. 03-09-00639- CV

David Evan Schanzle, Appellan t

v. JP MC Specialty f/k/ a WM Specialty Mor tgage LLC by its Servicer in Fac t Chase Hom e F inan ce LLC, Appellee

F ROM TH E DISTRI CT COURT O F TRAVIS CO UNTY, 126 TH JUDICI AL DISTRICT NO. D-1 -GN-0 7-0 0226 8, H ONO RAB LE RHO NDA HURLEY , JUDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N Appellant David Evan Sc h an z l e, appea ring pro se, appea ls the trial court’s order g ranting summary judgme nt in favor of appellee J PMC Specialty Mortg ag e L L C (“JPM C”) in a suit for judicial fore closure and brea ch of contra ct based on Schanzle’s defa ult on a home equity loan. We affir m the judgme nt of the trial cour t.

BACK GR OUND On Aug ust 21, 2003, Schanzle executed a home equity note and secur ity instrument perf ecting a lien on rea l proper ty located in Travis County , Texas. The note require d repa y ment of the orig inal principal amount of $84,000, at an i n t erest rate of 10.45%, to Amerique st Mortg ag e Company

. Amerique st assig ned Schanzle’s home equity loan to WM Specialty Mort gage L L C (“WM Specialty ”).Schanzle made pay ments on the note until Dec ember 2006, when he failed to make the monthly pay

ment due Dec ember 1. After sending Schanzle a notice of defa ult and opportunity
to cure in J anuar

y 2007, WM S pecia lty acc eler ated the note on Fe bruar y 27, 2007, notify ing Schanzle that the principal balanc e of th e n o t e wa s d u e and pay able at that time. When Schanzle failed to pay the acc eler ated balanc e of $82,487.52, WM Specialty filed suit for judicial fore closure and bre ach of

contra ct. Schanzle filed a pro se answe r, asser ting that WM Specialty ’s suit was barr ed by res judicata. Schanzle’s claim of res judicata appea rs to have been premised on the fac t that WM Specialty had previously filed an application for expedited fore closure of the lien under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 736. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 736 (providing proce dure for filing application for expedited fore closure of lien for home equity l o an ). T h e rec ord for the expedited fore closure proce eding , which was filed under cause number D-1-G N-07-000656 in Travis County District Court, is not proper ly befor e us in this appea l. I t i s u ndisputed, howeve r, that WM Specialty ’s application for expedited fore closure was denied. Of signific ance to this appea l, Rule 736(9) states: 1

No order or deter

mination of fac t or law under R u l e 7 3 6 s h all be res judicata or constitute collater al es toppel or estoppel by judgme nt in any other proce eding or suit.

. . . The denial of an application under these rules shall be without prejudice to the rig ht of the applicant to re- file the application or seek other relief at law or in equity in any court of c ompetent jurisdiction.

Schanzle contends that WM Specialty ’s application for expedited fore closure was denied 1 beca use the loan violated the constitutionally imposed cap on fee s for home equity loans. See Tex. Const. ar t. X VI , § 50(a) (6)( E) (fe es other than interest for home equity loans may not e x cee d three perc ent of orig inal principal amount). Be cause the proce eding befor e us in this appea l is a separ ate cause from the expedited fore closure proce eding , we overr ule Schanzle’s motio n t o compel the production of r ecor ds relate d to the expedited forec losure proc eeding

. 2Tex. R

. C i v . P

. 736(9). WM Specialty ’s subsequent suit for judicial fore closure, the proce eding

g iving rise to this appea l, was filed pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedur e 735. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 735 (stating that party seeking t o foreclose lien cre ated for home equity loan may file suit for judicial fore closure)

.

I n addition to his pro se answe r, Schanzle filed counter claims ag ainst WM Specialty for fra ud and “pre datory lending , ” alleg ing violations of the Texas Constit ution and a number of fede ral statutes.

On Fe bruar

y 16, 2009, WM Specialty , ref err ing to itself as J PMC Specialty Mortg ag e L L C f/k/ a WM Sp e c ia lt

y M o r tg a g e L L C, filed an amende d petition, repr esenting that “WM Specialty Mo rt gage L L C chang ed its name to J PMC Specialty Mortg ag e L L C,” and that “JP MC Specialty Mortg ag e L L C is the leg al owner and holder of the Home Equity L oan.” Certifica tion of the name ch an ge from the Delaw are Secre tary of State was attache d to the amende d petition. Al s o o n Fe bruar y 16, J PMC filed a “motion to substitut e nominal party ,” reque sting to substitut e Chase Home Financ e, L L C as J PMC’s mortg ag e servicing ag ent in place of AMC Mortg ag e Service s, I nc. Schanzle subsequently

filed written objec tions to t he motion to substi tute. On M arc h 12, 2009, J PMC filed a motion for summ ary judgmen t o n its claims for brea ch of contra ct and judi ci al fo rec losure, as well as Schanzle’s counterclaims, and a hearing on the motion was set for April 28. On April 2 0 , Schanzle moved to strike the aff idavit of L aure n Przy by lek, Assistant Vice- President of J PMC, in support of J PMC’s motion for summary judgme nt. I n his motion to strike, S chanzle arg ued that Przy by lek could not have per s o nal knowledge of t he circ umstances surrounding his home equity loan beca use “her employ er” had o n l y rec ently “purc hased the alleg ed debt at auction.” The day befor e the hear ing, Schanzle filed his response to
3J PMC’s motion for summary judgme nt, which J PMC moved to strike as untimely

. See Tex. R. Civ.

P. 166a (c) (re sponse to motion for summary judgme nt must be filed no later than seve n day s prior to hear ing on motion).

After the hear ing, the trial court issued order s g ranting J PMC’s motion to substitut e

a nominal party , deny

ing Schanzle’s motion to strike the Przy b y l ek aff idavit, striking Schanzle’s response to J PMC’s motion for summ ary judgmen t as u n timely , and gra nting summ ary judgme nt in f avor of J PMC on all claims and counter claims. I n g rantingsummary judgme nt, the trial court 2

awa rded J PMC its reque sted relief of fore closure and dismiss ed Schanzle’s counter claims with prejudice

. After

the trial cour

t’s judgme nt was issued, Schanzle filed a reque st for finding s of fac t and conclusions of law and a motion for new trial. The trial court declined to issue finding s of fac t and conclusions of law, and the motio n fo r n ew t ri al was overr uled by opera tion of law. Schanzle then re moved the suit to feder al cour t. The fede ral court rema nded the suit bac k to state court for lack of jurisdiction, and this appeal followe d.

STANDARD OF REVIEW Summary judgme nts are revie wed de novo. V a l en ce Operating Co. v. Dorsett , 164 S.W .3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005). To preva il on a motion for summary judgme nt, the movant must

The trial court also issued a letter summarizing its ruling s and stating, “Eve n if th e 2 defe ndant’s response to the motion for summary judgme nt

. . . was not struck as untimely , the court would g rant the plaintiff’s motio n fo r s u m mary judgme nt as plaintiff is entitled to judgme nt as a matter of la

w.” 4show that there is no issue of materia l fac t and that it is entitled to judgme nt as a matter of law. TX

Far W est, Ltd. v. Texas Invs. Mgmt., Inc. , 127 S.W .3d 295, 301 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.). Evidence favor able to the non-movant is taken as true and ever y rea sonable in fe re n ce m u s t be indulge d in favor of

the non-movant a

nd any doubts resolved in its favor. Id.

DISCUSSIO N Schanzle raises nine issues on appea l, arg uing that (1) J PMC’s motion for summary judgme nt was improperly supported by the unsigne d and unverifie d aff idavit o f Przy

by lek, (2) summary judgme nt was improper beca use the loan violated the Texas Constit ution and the Texas Debt Collection Practice s Act, see Tex. Fin. Code Ann. §§ 392.001-.404 (West 2006), (3) a conflict

o f i n tere st exis ts beca

use the same attorney repr esente d all assig ns or succe ssors to Amerique st, (4) J PMC’s motion for summary judgme nt was frivolous in light of the prior expedited fore closure proce eding , (5) J PMC forf eited its rig ht of fore closure by failing to cure the constitutional violation, (6) the controve rsy was private l y settled in Schanzle’s favor once the time period for curing the constitutional violation had passed, (7) the cre ation of the secur ity instrument “cr eate d a sham trust,” (8) J PMC and its a ffiliated entities do not hold a debt collector ’s bond with the Texas Sec reta ry of State, and (9) the trial court “abuse d its discretion and acte d without Subject Matter J urisdiction.” We will address ea ch of the se ar g uments in turn.

First, Schanzle’s contention that Przy by lek’s aff

idavit is unsigne d and unverifie d is
not supported by the rec ord. Przy by lek’s signa ture an d t h e notary ’s signa ture and seal are both visible on pag e two of the aff idavit, which is contained in the suppl em en tal cler k’s rec ord, along with J P MC’s motion for summ ary judgme nt and the rest of its summary -judg ment evidenc e. See

5Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 312.011(1) (West 2005) (def ining “af fidavit” as “a statement in writing of

a fac t or fac ts s i gn ed by the party making it, sworn to befor e an office r authorized to administer oaths, and officia lly cer

tified to by the office r under h i s seal of office ”). Be cause Przy by lek’s aff idavit is properly

signe d and ver ified, we overr ule this issue. I n his second issue on appea l, Schanzle arg ues that summary judgme nt was improper beca use the hom e eq u i ty loan violated the Texas Constit ution and the Texas Debt Collection Practice s Act (“TD CPA”). See Tex. Const. art. XVI , § 50(a) (6)( E) (g overning home equity loans); Tex. Fin. Code Ann. §§ 392.001-.404. Schanzle’s arg ument reg arding violations of the TDCPA is limit ed to the statement that J PMC failed “to verify and validate the d eb t as i s required by the [TDCP A].” No cit ati ons to the rec ord or leg al authorities are provided in support of Schanzle’s T DC P A claim. Our revie w of the TDCPA sheds no light on the potential basis for Sc h an z l e’ s 3 complaint. As a result, Schanzle’s TDCPA claim is wa i ved for inadequa te briefing

. See Tex. R. Ap p . P

. 3 8.1(i) (appe llant’s brief must contain clea r arg ument, with appropr iate citations t o authorities and rec ord); see also Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn , 573 S.W .2d 181, 185 (Tex. 1978) (“L itigants who repr esent themselves must comply with the applicable proce dural rules, or else they would be g iven an unfair advanta g e over litigants repr esente d by counsel.” ). Schanzle’s alleg ation reg arding the TDCPA is also waived bec au s e i t wa s not proper ly prese nted to the trial court as a counterclaim or a g round for deny ing summary judgme nt, instead appea ring for the first time in

Whil e Schanzle does include a citation to Carringt o n v. A meriquest Mortgage Co. , 3 49 S.W .3d 342 (Tex. 2001), this case supports the proposition that a lender may cure a violation of the constitutional cap on fee s for home equity loans by ref unding the overc harg e within a rea sonable time. See id. at 347. The TD CPA is not addre ssed in Carringt on . 6Schanzle’s post-judgm en t re q u es t for finding s of fac t and conclusions of law. See Tex. R. Civ.

P. 166a(c ) (“I ssues not expressl y p re sented to the trial court by written motion, answe r or other response shall not be considere d on appea l a s g rounds for reve rsal.”) ; Carrizal es v. Texas Dep’ t of Protective & Regulatory Servs. , 5 S.W .3d 922, 925 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, pet. denied) (stating that claims not proper ly

raised in tria l court ar e wa ived on appe al). I n making his constitutional arg ument, Schanzle cont ends that summary judgme nt

was improper beca

use the loan violated the constitutionally ma n d a ted three -per cent cap on fee s other than i ntere st for home equity loans. S ee Tex. Const. art. XVI , § 50(a) (6)( E). A four-y ear statute 4 of limit ations has been applied to vio lations of the constitutional require ments for home equity loans, calc ulated from the date of closing o n the loan. See Rivera v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. , 262 S.W .3d 834, 840 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.) (“[W] e conclude the leg al injury occur red when Country

wide made a loan to the Riveras in excess of the amount allowed by law.

. . . Thus, the Riveras’ cause of action for Country wide’s violation of [section 50(a) (6)( B) of home equity p ro v i sions of constitution] acc rued September 28, 2001, the date of closing of the Riveras’ home equity loan.”) ; see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.051 (West 2008) (four -y ear statute of limit ations applies to actions for which limit ations period has not otherwise been creat ed by statute). The home equity loan at issue in this case closed on Aug us t 2 1 , 2 0 0 3

. Schanzle’s

We note that this arg ument was not proper ly raised in a timely response to J PMC’s motion 4 for summary judgme nt, as the trial court struck Schanzle’s response as untimely

. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c ) (“I ssues not expressly prese nted to the trial court by written motion, answe r o r o ther response shall not be consider ed on appe al as g rounds for r ever sal.”). Schanzle does not a rg ue on appea l that the trial court err ed in striking his r esponse to JPMC ’s motion for summary judgme nt. We will, however, a ddress Scha nzle’s constituti onal ar g ument in the interest of justice.

7counter claim alleg ing violations of section 50(a) (6)( E) of the ho m e eq u i t y provisions of the

constitution was not filed until October 10, 2007. As a result, Schanzle’s counter claim is barr ed by the four- y ear

statute of limitations. Schanzle’s sec ond issue on appea l is overruled. 5 I n his third issue, Schanzle contends that a conflict of interest exis ts beca use J PMC’s counsel repr esents “all four assig ns and/or succe ssors to Amerique st.” This complaint is waived for inadequa te briefing , as Schanzle prese nts no arg ument, leg al authorities, or citations to the rec ord. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i). We note also that there is no evidenc e that the interests of WM S p ecia lty , J PMC, or any of the mortg ag e service rs involved in this case wer e ever sufficie n t l y adver se to cre ate a conflict of interest. See Tex. Disciplinary R. Prof’l Conduct 1.06(b), reprinted in Tex. Gov’t Code Ann., tit. 2, subtit. G app. A. The rec ord contains an assig nment of the note and transfe r of the se curity

interest fr om Ameriquest to WM S pecia lty , as well as documents from the Delaw are Secre tary of State cer tify ing WM Specialty ’s name chang e to J PMC. There is no indication that any entity other than J PMC was the pro p er holder of the not e at the t ime summary judgme nt was g rante d. We overrule this iss ue on appe al.

I n his fourth issue, Schanzle arg ues that J PMC filed a frivolous motion for summary judgme nt, prese nt ed “f

ak e evidenc e,” and made “a frivolous non-applica ble arg ument that some statute of limit ation ap p l i es .” This arg ument is unsupported by leg al authority or citations to the

rec ord, and has there fore been waived by inadequa te briefing

. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i).

For counter claims arising out of the same transac tion or occur renc e upon which an action 5 is based, the a

pplicable limitations pe riod is e x tended for 30 day s afte r the da te the par ty ’s answe r is due. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.069 (West 2008). Schanzle cannot avail himself of this exception to the limit ations period beca use his answe r was d u e August 13, 2007, and his counter claims wer e not filed until October 10, 2007, more than 30 da y s later. See id. 8Fur

thermore , while Schanzle states th at J P M C’s motion for summary judgme nt was frivolous beca use “the ultimate materia l fac t” had been “found in Schanzle’s favor in a previous proce eding ,” Texas Rule of Civil Procedur e 736 provides that the denial of an application for expedited fore closure is not res judica ta and doe s not “constitute collater al estoppel or estoppel by judgme nt in any other proce eding or suit.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 736(9). The rule g oes on to state that denial of such

an application “shall be without prejudice to the rig ht of the applicant to

. . . seek other relief at law or i n equity in any

court of c ompetent jurisdiction.” Id. Thus, by the pl ain l ang uag e of Rule 736, J PMC was entitled to file a suit for judicial fore closure afte r its application for expedited fore closure

was denie d , and any ruling s made in the expedited fore closure proce eding had no res judicata or collater al estoppel e ffe ct. See id. We overrule this iss ue on appe al.

Schanzle’s fifth and six th issues are rela ted to his arg ument that the home equity loan

was void due to a violation of the Texas Constit ution. See Tex. C o nst. art. XVI , § 50(a) (6)( E). Specifica lly , Schanzle asser ts in his fifth issue that the lien was rende red invalid when J PMC failed
to cure its constitutional violation by ref unding any char g es in excess of the three -per cent cap on fee s. See id. § 50(a) (6)( Q)(x)(a) (lende r who char g es fee s in e x cess of constitutional cap may cure violation and validate lien by ref u n d i n g o v er char g e not later than 60th day afte r being notified of violation). Schanzle arg ues in his six th issue that at the completion of the 60-day period to cure , the
matter was settled in his favor and he was entitl ed to damag es for brea ch of c ontrac t. See id. We have alre ady deter

mined that Schanzle’s counter claim for violation of the constitutional cap on fee s is barr ed by the statute of limit ations. See Rive r a , 2 6 2 S

. W

. 3 d at 840. As a result, we overr ule Schanzle’s fifth and sixth i ssues on appe al.

9I n a seventh issue on appea l, Schanzle asser ts that the cre ation of the secur ity interest “cr eate d a sham trust.” This a rg ument, which is prese nted without leg al authority , citations to the

rec ord, or any additional explanation, is waived for inadequa te briefing

. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i).

S ch anzle arg ues, in his eig hth issue on appea l, that “[n] one of the corpor at i o n s involved in t h e m y

riad of plaintiff corporations hold a debt collector ’s bond with the S ecr etar y of State.” Presumably , this arg ument ref ers to the bond require ment in section 392.101 of the financ e code. See T ex . Fin. Code Ann. § 392.101. Section 392.101 provides that a “third-pa rty debt collector or cre dit bur eau may not e ng ag e in debt collection unless the third-par ty debt collector or

cre dit burea

u has obtained a surety bond,” a copy of which “must be filed with the secr etar y of state.” Id. For purposes of the bond require ment, howeve r, “a debt co l l ec tor does not include the consumer’ s cre ditors, a mortg ag e servicing company , or an assig nee of a debt, as l ong as t he debt

was not i n defa

ult at the time it was assig ned.” CA Partners v. Spears , 274 S.W .3d 51, 79 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2008, pet. denied) (quoting Perry v. Stewart Titl e Co. , 756 F.2d 1197, 1 208 (5th Cir. 1985)). Be cause ever y entity that has been named on the plaintiff’s side of this dispute is either a mortg ag e servicing company or a bona fide assig nee of the debt, section 392.101 is inapplicable to this case

. See id. We overrule this iss ue.

I n his ninth i s s ue, Schanzle contends that the trial court abused its discretion and
act e d w it h o u t s u b je c t- ma tt er jurisdiction. Schanzle does not provide further arg ument or explanation in support of this issue. We will, howeve r, construe his br iefing liberally and addre ss this issue by resolving the rema ining complaints appea ring in Schanzle’s brief that cannot be cate g orized under

one of the other

eig ht issues on appea l. Specifica lly , these complaints are that the trial court err ed

10in (1) g ranting summary judgme nt without establishing a “Sum Certain of the alleg ed debt,”

(2) failing to provide 21 day s’ notice befor e the s u mmary -judg ment hear ing, (3) failing to issue finding s of fac t and conclusions of law at Schanzle’s reque st, and (4) failing to rule on his objections to J PMC’s mot ion to substi tute a nominal par ty

. Schanzle’s arg ument reg arding the lack of a “sum cer tain” appea

rs to be based on the fac t that J PMC’s amende d petition states, “Af ter allowing all just and lawful pay ments, offse ts, and

cre dits ag ains t t h e No te, the principal balanc e owing on the Note as of May 18, 2007, was $82,487.52,” while its motion for summary judgme nt s t at es , “Af ter allowing all just and lawful pay

ments, offse ts, and cre dits ag ainst the Note, t h e b al an ce o wi ng on the Note as of Dec ember 31, 2008, was $37,087.95.” The rea son for th i s signific ant reduc tion in the principal balanc e afte r Schanzle’s defa ult is not clea

r from the rec ord. I n any event, the trial court was not obliga ted to include the principal balanc e in its order g ranting summary judgme nt. As a g ener al rule,

a final judgme nt “mus t b e s u ff i ci entl y definite and cer

tain to define and protec t the rig hts of all litigants, or it should provide a definite means of asce rtaining such rig hts, to the end that minist eria l

o ff i ce rs can car

ry the j udg ment into execution without asce rtainment of fac ts not there in stated. ” Stewart v. USA Custom Paint & Body Shop, Inc. , 870 S.W .2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1994). The trial court’s order in this ca se expressly awa rds judgme nt in favor of J PMC for fore closure of the rea l pr operty in question, and provides a leg al descr iption of the proper ty

. Under the circ umstances, the lang uag e of the order is sufficie ntly definite an d ce rt ai n to constitute a valid final judgme nt. See id. The judgme nt is also proper ly limit ed to the relief reque sted in J PMC’s motion for summary judgme nt,

as the motion specific al l y states, “JP MC Specialty seeks to satisfy the judgme nt solely from the

11fore closure proce eds and seeks no defic iency ag ainst [S chanzle].” Given t h e requested relief, the

trial court did not err in faili n g t o identify the note’s principal balanc e in the order g ranting summary judgme nt. 6 Schanzle’s arg ument reg arding notice of the mot i on for summary judgme nt is not supported by the rec ord. J PMC’s motion fo r summary judgme nt includes a cer tificate of service indicating that Schanzle was serve d on Marc h 12, 2009. The n o t i ce of hear ing, which contains a

cer tificat e of service dated Marc h 24, 2009, indicates that the hear ing on J PMC’s motion for summary judgme nt was set for April 28, 2009. See Tex. R. C iv. P. 166a(c) ( motion mus t be filed and served at least 21 day s befor e h ea ri n g). Ba sed on this rec ord, we conclude that Schanzle had adequate notice of

both the motion and the hear ing da te. Wit h respe ct to Schanzle’s arg umen t that the trial court err ed in failing to issue finding s of fac t and conclusions of law, t h e s u p re m e court has held that finding s of fac t and conclusions of law are improper in a summary -judg ment proce eding

. See IKB Indus. ( Nigeria) Ltd. v. Pro-Li ne C orp. , 938 S.W .2d 440, 441-42 (Tex

. 1997). According ly , the trial cour t did not

err in declining to issue findings of fac t and conc lusions of law in response to Scha nzle’s reque st. As for Scha

nzle’s objections to J PMC’s motion to substitut e, the trial court signed

an order g ranting J PMC’s motion on May 4, 2009. The rec ord contains a letter from the trial court, also dated May 4, 2009, which states, “Plaintiff’s Traditional Motion for Final Summary J udg ment

I t is also unclea

r how Schanzle might have been prejudice d by this reduc tion in the note’s 6 p ri n ci p al balanc e. J PMC’s motion for summary judgme nt and supporting aff idavit repr esent a judicial admission that the principal balanc e was $37,087.95 as of Dec ember 31, 2008. See Houston First Am. Sav. v. Musick

, 650 S.W .2d 764, 767 (Tex. 1983) (holding that asser tions of fac t in party ’s live pleading s are reg arde d as for mal judicial admissions).

12and Plaintiff’s Motion to Substi tute Nominal Party came on for hear ing on April 28, 2009. Having

considere d the motions, responses , summary judgme nt evidenc e and arg uments of counsel, the court g rants both of the motions.” (Emphasis adde d.) This letter c larifies tha t the trial court considere d S ch anzle’s response befor e gra nting J PMC’s motion. Thus, in g ranting J PMC’s motion, t h e t ri al court impliedly

overr uled Schanzle’s objec tions. Whil e Schanzle does not specify the basis for his contention that the trial court lacke d subject-matter jurisdiction, we note that this is a suit for judicial fore closure on proper ty located in Travis Count y . District courts have j u ri sdiction over suits to deter mine title to rea l proper

ty

. See T ex . C o n s t

. ar t

. V, § 8 (jurisdiction of district courts); Chambers v. Pruitt , 241 S.W .3d 679, 684 (Tex. App.—Dallas 20 0 7, no pet.) (“D istrict courts g ener ally have exclusive jurisdiction to deter mine title to real prope rty .”); see also Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 26.043 (West 2004).

Be cause Schanzle has failed to identify any manner in which the trial court abused its discretion or lacke d subject-matter jurisdiction, his ni nth issue on appea l is overruled. Having overr

uled all of Schanzle’s issues on appea l, we aff i rm t h e order g ranting summary judgme nt i n fa vor of J PMC. To the extent Schanzle intended to raise any additional arg uments bey ond those addre ssed here in, those arg uments are waived for inadequa te briefing

. See Tex. R. App. P . 38.1(i).

CONCLUSION

We affir m the trial court’ s order

g ranting summary

judgme nt.

13__________________________________________ Diane M. H enson, Jus tice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pember ton and Henson Affir med Filed: De cembe r 9, 2010

14