1996 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

12-17-1996

Farley v. Phila Housing Auth

Precedential or Non-Precedential:

Docket 96-1286

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Recommended Citation

"Farley v. Phila Housing Auth" (1996). 1996 Decisions. Paper 15.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1996/15
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

 

 No. 96-1286 

 

 LATICIA FARLEY 

 v. 

 PHILADELPHIA HOUSING AUTHORITY; FLOYD BAKER; 

 PAMELA DUNBAR; CLAUDE ROSS 

 Philadelphia Housing Authority, 

 Floyd Baker, Pamela Dunbar and 

 *Claude Ross, 

 Appellants 

 *Amended Notice of Appeal filed 

 4/8/96 

 

 On Appeal from the United States District Court 

 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 

 (D.C. No. 95-cv-06616) 

 

 Argued October 28, 1996 

 BEFORE: SCIRICA and COWEN, Circuit Judges 

 and FEIKENS, District Judge** 

 (Filed December 17, 1996) 

Denise J. Baker, Esq. (Argued) 

Philadelphia Housing Authority 

2012 Chestnut Street 

Philadelphia, PA 19103 

 COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT 

 

** Honorable John Feikens, United States District Judge for the 

 Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by designation. 
Michael Donahue, Esq. (Argued) 

Community Legal Services 

1424 Chestnut Street 

Philadelphia, PA 19102 

 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES 

 

 OPINION 

 

COWEN, Circuit Judge. 

 Appellants, the Philadelphia Housing Authority and its housing 

management personnel, 

Floyd Baker, Pamela Dunbar, and Claude Ross (collectively "the PHA"), 

appeal the March 8, 

1996, order of the district court granting summary judgment to Laticia 

Farley, a public housing 

tenant, and denying their cross-motion for summary judgment. The district 

court held that Farley 

had a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and ordered the PHA to 

fully comply with the 

arbitration award that directed it to make repairs to Farley's apartment. 

The PHA contends that 

the district court did not have jurisdiction to enforce the arbitration 

award, and erred in holding 

that Farley had a cognizable federal cause of action under § 1983 to 

enforce a public housing 

grievance award pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437d(k) and 1983. We hold that 

the parties did not 

intend to limit enforcement of grievance awards to state court. We also 

hold that Farley can 

bring a § 1983 action to enforce her federal right to implement the 

grievance procedure provided 

for in the Housing Act. 

 I. 

 

 A. 

 The United States Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1437 et seq., was designed 

to provide 

"decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings" within the financial reach of 

families of low income. 42 

U.S.C. 

§ 1437 (1994). In order to encourage the construction and operation of 

low-income housing, the 

Act authorizes the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to 

provide grants, 

low-interest loans and tax exemptions to local public housing agencies 

known as PHAs. Because 
they receive federal subsidies, the PHAs are able to charge below-market 

rent to eligible lowincome tenants. In exchange for receiving public funding, the local PHAs 

are required to operate 

public housing in compliance with the provisions of the Act. 

 Section 1437d(k) is the provision at issue in this appeal. As 

amended in 1983, this 

section provides that each public housing agency must implement an 

administrative grievance 

procedure for the resolution of all tenant disputes concerning adverse PHA 

action. It sets forth 

the grievance/arbitration procedure that the local PHAs must follow, as 

well as the rights to 

which tenants are entitled under that procedure. 

 The history of § 1437d(k) and its accompanying regulations dates back 

to 1971, when 

HUD issued a series of public housing circulars requiring the PHAs to 

recognize certain 

minimum tenant rights and provide an administrative grievance forum for 

tenant complaints 

concerning adverse PHA action. See U.S. Dept. Of Housing and Urban 

Development Circulars 

RHM 7465.8 and 7465.9. In 1975, HUD codified the requirements from the 

circulars in the 

Code of Federal Regulations. The circulars are currently codified in 24 

C.F.R. § 966 (1994). 

These regulations require the local PHAs to establish and implement 

grievance procedures that 

provide tenants with hearings if they dispute any PHA action or inaction 

concerning lease 

provisions or local regulations. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 966.50, 966.51(a), 

966.53(a)(1994). The City 

of Philadelphia's specific grievance procedure is outlined in the consent 

decree entered in Brown 

v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, No. 72-2083 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 15, 

1974)("Brown consent 

decree"); see also Stipulation and Order Supplementing and Clarifying the 

Stipulation and Order 

of June 14, 1974, Brown v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 72-2083 (E.D. 

Pa. Apr. 24, 1978). 

 Farley seeks to enforce a specific regulation which states that 

grievance awards are 

binding on the local housing authorities and requires them to "take all 

actions, or refrain from 

any actions, necessary to carry out the decision [of the hearing 

officer]." 24 C.F.R. § 966.57(b) 

(1994). Her cause of action arises strictly under § 1437d(k). Regulation 

§ 966.57(b) merely 

interprets that section. 

 B. 

 Farley is a tenant of a building in Philadelphia that is managed by 

the Philadelphia 
Housing Authority. She filed administrative grievances with PHA, seeking 

a number of repairs 

to her rental unit. She also sought an abatement of rent. Farley claimed 

that the repairs sought 

were necessary to prevent water from leaking into the basement of her 

rental unit. These repairs 

included repair or replacement of the heater, replacement of the windows, 

repair of the holes in 

the basement walls, repair of the leaking pipe in the basement, and 

repairs as necessary to 

remedy the low water pressure throughout her unit. 

 An arbitrator held a grievance hearing and entered an award in 

Farley's favor. The award 

stated: 

 1. The Philadelphia Housing Authority shall inspect and 

repair 

all items of a non-contract nature within thirty (30) 

days of the date of 

this Award. Any matters which require contract work 

shall be noted 

and written advice thereof shall be provided Ms. Farley and 

her counsel 

within thirty (30) days of this Award. All contracted work 

shall be completed within 

ninety (90) days of the date of this Award. 

 2. Ms. Farley is awarded a Ten (10%) percent abatement of 

rent for the 

period July 1, 1995 through such time as the requested 

repairs are completed. The 

abatement shall be credited to Ms. Farley's rent account. 

App. at 159. 

 The PHA did not make the required repairs; nor did it give Farley the 

rent abatement. 

Thereafter, Farley filed an action in the district court to enforce her 

grievance award. The matter 

was brought for resolution in the district court by cross-motions for 

summary judgment. The 

PHA argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction to enforce the 

award or grant relief on what 

was basically a garden-variety state landlord/tenant dispute. Holding 

that it had jurisdiction to 

hear the matter, the district court granted Farley's motion for summary 

judgment and denied the 

PHA's cross-motion for summary judgment. This appeal followed. 

 

 II. 

 The jurisdiction of the district court to hear this matter and enter 

judgment on the 

arbitrator's award, is the issue on appeal. The district court 

entertained subject matter 

jurisdiction over the action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337, 

1343(a)(2),(3),(4) and §§ 2201, 
2202. We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We 

exercise plenary review 

over questions of subject matter jurisdiction and the district court's 

grant or denial of summary 

judgment. See Clark v. Clabaugh, 20 F.3d 1290, 1292 (3d Cir. 1994); see 

also Jordan v. Fox, 

Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994); Brown v. 

Francis, 75 F.3d 

860, 864 (3d Cir. 1996). 

 III. 

 The PHA asserts that the district court had no jurisdiction under § 

1983 to enforce 

Farley's grievance award. It argues that under the Brown consent 

agreement, the PHA consented 

only to the jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania state courts to enforce 

arbitration awards. It further 

contends it had no reasonable expectation that it would be called upon to 

defend arbitration 

enforcement proceedings in federal court. 

 In support of its argument, the PHA states that the express terms of 

Brown incorporate 

the entire Pennsylvania Arbitration Act of 1927. It also points to a 

provision in the 1978 

amendment to Brown that reads, "[i]f either party should appeal an 

arbitrator's award, such 

appeal shall be governed by the provisions of the Pennsylvania Arbitration 

Act of 1927." 

Stipulation and Order Supplementing and Clarifying the Stipulation and 

Order of June 14, 1974, 

App. at 55, para. 3. The PHA argues that inclusion of this paragraph in 

the Brown consent 

agreement evidences the parties' intent to incorporate the entire 

Pennsylvania Arbitration Act of 

1927. The PHA further cites a provision of the Pennsylvania Arbitration 

Act that states, "[a]n 

appeal may be taken from an order confirming, modifying, correcting, or 

vacating an award, or 

from a judgment entered upon an award, in accordance with the existing law 

in respect to appeals 

to the Supreme and Superior Courts." 5 P.S. § 175(a). Also brought to 

our attention is a 

provision from the Pennsylvania Act stating that all grievance awards 

"shall have the same force 

and effect, in all respects as, and be subject to, all the provisions of 

law relating to a judgment in 

an action at law, and it may be enforced as such in accordance with 

existing law." 5 P.S. § 174. 

In addition, the PHA cites to a provision that states, "[t]he provisions 

of this act shall apply to 

any written contract to which the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, or any 

agency or subdivision 

thereof, of any municipal corporation or political division of the 

Commonwealth shall be a 
party." 5 P.S. § 176. The PHA argues that, taken together, the abovecited provisions indicate 

that the parties consented solely to the jurisdiction of Pennsylvania 

state courts to enforce 

arbitration awards. We disagree. 

 The Brown consent decree is a settlement agreement between the PHA 

and its tenants. 

We, therefore, construe it as a contract. See Pennwalt Corp. v. Plough, 

Inc., 676 F.2d 77, 79 (3d 

Cir. 1982). The scope of the Brown decree "must be discerned within its 

four corners, and not 

by reference to what might satisfy the purposes of one of the parties to 

it." United States v. 

Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 682, 91 S.Ct. 1752, 1757 (1971). Reading the 

above provisions 

(paragraph 3 of the Brown amendments and §§ 174, 175, and 176 of the 

Pennsylvania Act) and 

looking to the entire documents, we find nothing in the Brown consent 

agreement demonstrating 

that the parties intended that enforcement actions be brought exclusively 

in state court. 

 The Brown decree is completely silent concerning the method for 

enforcement of 

arbitration awards. Paragraph 3 of the agreement does not incorporate the 

entire Pennsylvania 

Arbitration Act. It incorporates the Act only insofar as the Act concerns 

appeals of the award of 

an arbitrator. The issue before the district court was not the propriety 

of the arbitrator's 

resolution of the grievance, but only the enforcement of the award arising 

from that grievance. 

Looking to the four corners of the consent agreement, we conclude that the 

parties to that 

agreement intended that state court procedures would apply only to the 

appeal of arbitrators' 

awards, not the method by which awards were to be enforced. 

 Finally, we cannot accept the position of the PHA that the provisions 

of the Arbitration 

Act are automatically incorporated into every contract involving a 

Commonwealth agency. SeePennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n v. Sanders & Thomas, 

Inc., 336 A.2d 609, 615 (Pa. 1975) 

(incorporation of Act has occurred only where the contract contained an 

arbitration clause); see 

also Monte v. Southern Delaware County Auth., 321 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1963). 

In Monte, this 

Court stated that it would not "oust federal jurisdiction . . . merely 

because the Authority, as an 

arm of the state, is a party to this agreement." Id. at 873. We held 

that under the specific Montecontract, arbitration awards could be 

confirmed only in the Pennsylvania Court of Common 

Pleas. We found that the parties in Monte intended to preclude federal 

court jurisdiction because 

the agreement in Monte contained a provision that incorporated the entire 

Pennsylvania 
Arbitration Act. Unlike the agreement in Monte, the Brown consent decree 

does not contain any 

such statement or any other indicia of intent to foreclose the enforcement 

of arbitration awards in 

federal court. 

 The PHA cites to DePaul v. Kauffman, 272 A.2d 500, 506 (Pa. 1971) for 

the proposition 

that statutory and regulatory provisions of law in force at the time the 

Brown consent decree was 

entered became part of that agreement with the same effect as if expressly 

incorporated in its 

terms. Unlike the instant case, DePaul involved a constitutional 

challenge to the Pennsylvania 

Rent Withholding Act. The appellants in that case claimed the Act 

unconstitutionally impaired 

the obligation of contracts. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected 

their claim, stating, "[a]s 

applied to leases entered into or renewed after the effective date of the 

Act, there can be no 

‘impairment', for the laws in force when a contract is entered into become 

part of the obligation 

of contract ‘with the same effect as if expressly incorporated in its 

terms.'" Id. (quoting Beaver 

County Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Winowich, 187 A. 481, 484 (Pa. 1936)). The 

court went on to 

say, "[w]ith regard to leases that predate the effective date of the Act, 

it must be borne in mind 

that ‘the interdiction of statutes impairing the obligation of contracts 

does not prevent the state 

from exercising such powers as . . . are necessary for the general good of 

the public, though 

contracts previously entered into between individuals may thereby be 

affected.'" Id. (quoting 

Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 437, 54 S.Ct. 231, 240 

(1934)) (alteration 

in original). 

 The resolution in DePaul is not precedent for the instant case. We 

do not conclude that 

the Brown consent decree automatically incorporates the Pennsylvania 

Arbitration Act. In order 

to determine whether the Pennsylvania Act was incorporated into the Brown 

consent decree we 

must consider the intent of the parties. See Halderman v. Pennhurst State 

School & Hosp., 901 

F.2d 311, 322 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 850, 111 S.Ct. 140 (1990). 

Nothing in Brownevidences the intent of the parties to incorporate the 

entire Pennsylvania Act. Even if the parties 

did intend to incorporate the entire Pennsylvania Act, (which we do not 

believe they did), the 

Pennsylvania Arbitration Act, like the Brown consent decree, does not 

contain any provisions or 

procedures regarding enforcement. The Act provides only that awards that 

have been confirmed, 
modified or corrected shall be judgments which "may be enforced as such in 

accordance with 

existing law." 5 P.S. § 174. Nothing in the Act requires PHA tenants to 

enforce their awards in 

state court. 

 IV. 

 Section 1983 provides a remedial device to enforce rights under the 

United States 

Constitution and federal law. In Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 7-8, 100 

S.Ct. 2502, 2506 

(1980), the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs may invoke § 1983 to 

redress violations of federal 

statutory law by state actors. The Supreme Court has set forth two 

exceptions to this general 

rule. See Pennhurst State School and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 101 

S.Ct. 1531 (1981); 

see also Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 

453 U.S. 1, 101 

S.Ct. 2615 (1981). The Pennhurst exception applies where the statute did 

not create enforceable 

rights within the meaning of § 1983. Pennhurst holds that Congress must 

have intended for the 

federal statute at issue to create enforceable rights in the private 

party, not for it to merely state a 

preference or policy declaration. Id. at 19, 101 S.Ct. at 1541. Under 

the Sea Clammersexception, § 1983 cannot be invoked if Congress manifested 

in the statute itself an intent to 

foreclose its private enforcement. In Sea Clammers, the Court found that 

in enacting the Federal 

Water Pollution Control Act and the Marine Protection, Research, and 

Sanctuaries Act of 1972 

Congress devised comprehensive remedial schemes that provided for private 

actions and left no 

room for additional private remedies under § 1983. See also Smith v. 

Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 

1012, 104 S.Ct. 3457, 3469 (1984)(indicating that a § 1983 action would be 

inconsistent with 

Congress' carefully tailored remedial scheme in the Education of the 

Handicapped Act). 

 Following this framework, we look to the Pennhurst and Sea Clammers 

exceptions to 

determine whether Farley has an enforceable federal right. In doing so, 

we must analyze the 

relevant statutory provisions "in light of the entire legislative 

enactment." Suter v. Artist, M., 

503 U.S 347, 357, 112 S.Ct. 1360, 1367 (1992). We must determine whether 

Congress intended 

the statutory provision to benefit the plaintiff. See Golden State 

Transit Corp. v. City of Los 

Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106, 110 S.Ct. 444, 448 (1989). Further, the 

statutory language must be 

mandatory, not merely precatory in nature. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 18, 101 

S.Ct. at 1540. 
Finally, the right may not be "‘too vague and amorphous' to be ‘beyond the 

competence of the 

judiciary to enforce.'" Golden State, 493 U.S. at 106, 110 S.Ct. at 448 

(quoting Wright v. City 

of Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 431-32, 107 

S.Ct. 766, 774-75 

(1987)). 

 A. 

 Farley's § 1983 claim does not fall within the Pennhurst exception. 

We conclude that by 

enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(k), Congress intended to give public housing 

tenants a right to 

enforceable grievance awards. First, Farley, as a public housing tenant, 

is an intended 

beneficiary of the procedures outlined in § 1437d(k) and its accompanying 

HUD regulations. In 

another case involving the very same issue, the United States Court of 

Appeals for the District of 

Columbia examined the legislative history of § 1437d(k), as well as the 

enforcement history of 

the circulars that § 1437d(k) codified. See Samuels v. District of 

Columbia, 770 F.2d 184 (D.C. 

Cir. 1985). The Samuels court found "Congress clearly intended to require 

local PHAs to 

provide an administrative grievance procedure for tenant complaints of 

adverse PHA action, and 

nothing in the structure or history of the [Housing] Act indicates that 

Congress intended to 

foreclose private enforcement of that obligation." Id. at 198. Samuels 

also found support in the 

fact that the provision "uniformly speaks of a tenant's entitlement to 

particular procedural 

protections in the face of adverse PHA action." Id. at 197. 

 Second, the language of § 1437d(k) and 24 C.F.R. § 966.57(b) is 

mandatory, specific, and 

clear. The language is not too vague or amorphous to be enforced by 

courts. The Samuels court 

noted that before the codification of § 1437d(k), several courts of appeal 

entertained tenant 

challenges to PHA action and inaction under the original grievance 

procedures as set forth in the 

circulars that pre-dated § 1437d(k). See Samuels, 770 F.2d at 198. These 

courts uniformly held 

that the grievance procedures were mandatory and binding on the PHAs. Id. 

Likewise, we 

conclude that in enacting the grievance procedure under the Housing Act, 

Congress intended to 

impose mandatory obligations on PHAs. Section 1437d(k) and the 

accompanying regulations 

plainly set forth the grievance procedure that PHAs must follow. Section 

1437d(k) is not a 

general policy section or a "'nudge in the preferred direction[].'" 

Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 19, 101 
S.Ct. at 1541 (quoting Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 413, 90 S. Ct. 1207, 

1218 (1970)) 

(alteration added). Rather, § 1437 confers enforceable rights within the 

meaning of Pennhurstand § 1983. 

 B. 

 Farley's claim also does not fall within the Sea Clammers exception. 

The Supreme Court 

has held that in enacting the U.S. Housing Act, Congress did not 

specifically foreclose a § 1983 

remedy by enactment of a comprehensive scheme of remedial mechanisms. See 

Wright v. City 

of Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 107 S.Ct. 766 

(1987). Although 

Wright dealt with the Brooke Amendment, a provision under the Housing Act 

that imposes a rent 

ceiling on public housing, the Court also spoke generally about the 

Housing Act. 

 First, the Supreme Court cautioned that courts should not "‘lightly 

conclude that 

Congress intended to preclude reliance on § 1983 as a remedy' for the 

deprivation of a federally 

secured right." Id. at 423-24, 107 S.Ct. at 770 (quoting Smith v. 

Robinson, 468 U.S. at 1012, 

104 S.Ct. at 3468.) The Court then found support in the fact that "HUD 

itself has never provided 

a procedure by which tenants could complain to it about the alleged 

failures of PHA's to abide 

by . . . HUD regulations; nor has it taken unto itself the task of 

reviewing PHA grievance 

procedure decisions." Id. at 426, 107 S.Ct. at 772. The Court continued, 

"HUD thus had no 

thought that its own supervisory powers or the grievance system that it 

had established 

foreclosed resort to the courts by tenants." Id. The Court concluded 

that nothing in the Brooke 

Amendment or elsewhere in the Housing Act evidences that Congress intended 

to supplant the § 

1983 remedy. Id. at 429, 107 S.Ct. at 773. It also noted "the statecourt remedy is hardly a 

reason to bar an action under § 1983, which was adopted to provide a 

federal remedy for the 

enforcement of federal rights." Id. Adhering to Wright, we must reject 

the PHA's argument that 

Farley should have litigated this garden-variety landlord/tenant case in 

state court. 

 The PHA argues that Wright is "not worthy of reliance," and we should 

disregard it. 

Appellant's Br. at 17. The PHA also implies that Wright has been put into 

question by a line of 

cases that has come after it, and is no longer good law. In making this 

assertion, the PHA cites 

specifically to Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 112 S.Ct. 1360 (1992). 

The PHA contends, first, 
that Suter changed the state of the law by announcing that Congressional 

intent is the most 

important factor in implying a private right of action. We do not find 

this argument persuasive. 

Prior to Suter, the Supreme Court certainly found importance in 

ascertaining whether Congress 

intended to create private rights. Indeed, in Wright, the Court based its 

decision on its finding 

that Congress did not intend to preclude a § 1983 cause of action for the 

enforcement of tenants' 

rights secured by the Housing Act. Wright, 479 U.S. at 425, 107 S.Ct. at 

771. 

 Second, the PHA argues that in the years following the Wright 

decision, the Supreme 

Court has disfavored implying private rights of action in spending 

statutes. Appellant's Br. at 43 

(citing Suter v. Artist M, 503 U.S. 347, 112 S.Ct. 1360 (1992)(specific 

language in the Adoption 

Assistance and Child Welfare Act, a spending statute, did not create a 

federally enforceable right 

under § 1983)). Although Congress's key purpose behind the Housing Act 

was to provide 

funding for local housing authorities, the Supreme Court and other courts 

have found that 

Congress also intended to establish tenant rights. See Wright v. City of 

Roanoke Redevelopment 

and Housing Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 107 S.Ct. 766 (1987)(plaintiffs could 

bring a § 1983 action to 

enforce Brooke Amendment of Housing Act which imposes a rent ceiling); see 

also Samuels v. 

District of Columbia, 770 F.2d 184 (D.C. Cir. 1985)(plaintiffs could bring 

§ 1983 action to 

enforce grievance procedure under 1437d(k)); Concerned Tenants Ass'n of 

Father Panik Village 

v. Pierce, 685 F. Supp. 316 (D. Conn. 1988)(plaintiffs could bring § 1983 

action to enforce § 

1437p, which mandates that local authorities obtain HUD approval of 

demolition). 

 Moreover, although Suter, like this case, involved a spending 

statute, the specific 

statutory language at issue in Suter is completely distinguishable from 

the language in 

§ 1437d(k). Suter involved a provision of the Adoption Assistance and 

Child Welfare Act, 42 

U.S.C. § 671(a)(15), which provides that states must make "reasonable 

efforts" to prevent 

removal of children from their homes and to facilitate reunification of 

families where removal 

has occurred. The Court held that this language does not confer an 

enforceable right upon the 

Act's beneficiaries. Instead, it found that the statutory language 

"impose[d] only a rather 

generalized duty on the State." 
Suter, 503 U.S. at 363, 112 S.Ct. at 1370. By contrast, § 1457d(k) does 

not merely impose a 

general duty. Instead, it mandates the very grievance process that PHAs 

must follow and details 

the rights to which the tenants are entitled. 

 The Supreme Court did not sub silentio overrule Wright in Suter. It 

remains good law. 

Wright held that by enacting the Housing Act, Congress intended to grant 

enforceable rights to 

tenants of public housing. Nothing in Suter or any other case alters this 

conclusion. 

 V. 

 The district court was correct that it had jurisdiction to enforce 

Farley's public housing 

arbitration award. Nowhere in the Brown consent decree did the parties 

intend to limit 

enforcement of awards to state court. The district court was also correct 

that Farley, a public 

housing tenant, could maintain a § 1983 action to enforce her federal 

right to an enforceable 

grievance procedure as provided for in the Housing Act. We will affirm 

the May 8, 1996, order 

of the district court granting Farley's motion for summary judgment and 

denying the PHA's 

cross-motion for summary judgment.