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RUSSIA, IRAQ, AND OTHER POTENTIAL SOURCES

OF ANTHRAX, SMALLPOX AND OTHER

BIOTERRORIST WEAPONS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

DECEMBER 5, 2001

Serial No. 107–56

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey

DAN BURTON, Indiana

ELTON GALLEGLY, California

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina

DANA ROHRABACHER, California

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California

PETER T. KING, New York

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio

AMO HOUGHTON, New York

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina

JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado

RON PAUL, Texas

NICK SMITH, Michigan

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania

DARRELL E. ISSA, California

ERIC CANTOR, Virginia

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona

BRIAN D. KERNS, Indiana

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia

TOM LANTOS, California

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American

Samoa

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio

CYNTHIA A. MCKINNEY, Georgia

EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama

BRAD SHERMAN, California

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida

JIM DAVIS, Florida

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York

BARBARA LEE, California

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada

GRACE NAPOLITANO, California

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California

DIANE E. WATSON, California

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director

STEPHEN G. RADEMAKER, Deputy Staff Director/Chief Counsel

MARILYN C. OWEN, Staff Associate

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

WITNESSES

Richard O. Spertzel, VMD, Ph.D., Consultant, Head of Biological Weapons

Inspections, United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), 1994–

1998 ....................................................................................................................... 5

Dr. Kenneth Alibek, President, Advanced Biosystems, Inc., Former First Deputy Chief, Civilian Branch, Soviet Offensive Biological Weapons Program .... 8

Elisa D. Harris, Research Fellow, Center for International and Security Studies, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland ....................................... 13

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

Richard O. Spertzel: Prepared statement .............................................................. 6

Dr. Kenneth Alibek: Prepared statement .............................................................. 10

Elisa D. Harris: Prepared statement ..................................................................... 15

APPENDIX

The Honorable Donald M. Payne, a Representative in Congress from the

State of New Jersey: Prepared statement .......................................................... 45

The Honorable Earl Blumenauer, a Representative in Congress from the

State of Oregon: Prepared statement ................................................................. 45

(1)

RUSSIA, IRAQ, AND OTHER POTENTIAL

SOURCES OF ANTHRAX, SMALLPOX

AND OTHER BIOTERRORIST WEAPONS

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 5, 2001

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:20 a.m. in Room

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Henry J. Hyde (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.

Chairman HYDE. The hearing will come to order. Our subject

today is Russia, Iraq and other potential sources of anthrax, smallpox and other bioterrorist weapons. I scheduled today’s hearing for

two reasons. First, I thought we could all benefit from an update

on what foreign countries are doing in the area of biological weapons development. Second, we are all interested in learning as much

as we can about the likely source of the anthrax that was mailed

to Senators Daschle and Leahy and others.

The threshold question regarding the source of the anthrax is

whether it is of a type that could have been produced by an individual or a group working alone. In other words, could someone

like the Unabomber or al-Qaeda have produced this anthrax without the involvement of a state? If the answer to that question is

no, we confront the prospect that a nation with a biological weapons program either knowingly decided to unleash this poison on the

American people or has so little control over its biological weapons

that they were able to fall into terrorist hands. The $64,000 question: Which state could this be? Are there any

physical characteristics of the anthrax sent through our mails that

either point toward or away from the biological weapons programs

of which we are aware? Press reports suggest that the anthrax had

at least three distinctive characteristics. First, it was derived from

the Ames strain of anthrax. Second, it appears to have been treated to make it float in the air more readily to the point where lab

workers have been unable to force the spores to remain still on a

slide. And, third, it was highly concentrated, up to 1 trillion spores

per gram, according to one report.

Our witnesses may know of additional unique characteristics.

But how does it all add up? Do the characteristics of the anthrax

sent through our mails rule in or rule out the biological weapons

programs of such countries as Iraq, Russia, and the United States

as sources of the anthrax?

2

No matter the conclusion come to by the learned scientists with

us today, we cannot escape one glaring fact: it is possible to terrorize the innocent people of any nation with a small amount of

weapons-grade anthrax, not to speak of other horrible biological

agents which are an integral part of the biological weapons programs of several rogue states.

Biological weapons pose a clear and present danger to our national security, and that is why we are here. We are fortunate

today to be joined by some of the leading experts on the biological

weapons programs of these countries, who can hopefully shed some

light on these issues.

And so I yield such time as he may consume to the Ranking

Democratic Member of our Committee, Mr. Lantos.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to

commend you for calling this important hearing. It may be one of

the most important of our session. Today we find ourselves in a

new age of insecurity in which the most dreaded diseases to plague

mankind can be used as weapons of terror and mass destruction.

Biological terrorism of this sort has already taken a toll in this

country. The recent anthrax attack that killed five Americans,

sickened others and placed our entire Nation in a state of high anxiety is but a preview of what awaits us if we do not eradicate the

bioterrorist threat.

Today’s hearing focuses on the potential sources and suppliers of

bioterrorist agents such as those that invaded the U.S. Postal Service. Our chief concerns are Russia and the former states of the Soviet Union, whose governments are cooperating with us to reduce

this threat, and Iraq, whose repressive regime is clearly not.

Although the extent of the former Soviet Union’s biological weapons program is not entirely clear, the steps the United States must

take to dismantle it are. Over the past decade, we have launched

several nonproliferation programs to secure facilities, strengthen

export controls and promote the employment of former weapons scientists and engineers who might otherwise be tempted to sell their

services to rogue states and terrorist organizations. These programs are manifestly in America’s national security interests and

have served us well.

Parenthetically let me pay public tribute to my friend George

Soros who gave, as I recall, a hundred million dollars to the Yeltsin

regime for the sole purpose of funding Soviet scientists so they will

not be hired away by rogue States. This was a public spirited and

farsighted gesture.

Much more needs to be done, however, in this area. I plan on

working with you, Mr. Chairman, and with other colleagues to

craft new legislation that would dramatically strengthen our

counterterrorism programs. It is imperative that Congress legislate

on the issue of securing the former Soviet Union’s biological weapons materials.

Now, Mr. Chairman, Iraq is an entirely different challenge, demanding an entirely different response. Our nonproliferation policies targeting Iraq, including our efforts to redeploy weapons inspectors buy us time but do not eliminate the underlying threat.

Unless there is a fundamental change in Iraq’s government, and

Saddam Hussein is gone, I have no doubt that Iraq will continue

3

to develop biological weapons and other weapons of mass destruction for use against its neighbors, against the United States, our

forces and facilitates abroad.

Mr. Chairman, as of this month, there have been no international inspectors allowed in Iraq for 3 full years. This cannot

stand. Military action may soon be required. As the President assesses the terrorist threat posed by Saddam Hussein and the steps

the United States must take to neutralize it and to eliminate it, I

urge him to act decisively and judiciously.

We must seek the views of countries that are relevant, but we

must not be captive to those views. And we must not shy from

using force if necessary.

Mr. Chairman, time is running out on our ability to meet the

threat of biological terrorism. The terrorists attacks of September

11th and the subsequent anthrax attacks targeting this very body

have marked the point of no return.

The future is built or destroyed by the actions the United States

and our friends take from this point forward, before more perish

from the scourge of biological terrorism. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you. Mr. Gilman, do you have an opening statement?

Mr. GILMAN. Just briefly, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you for

arranging this very timely hearing. We certainly cannot do enough

in preparing to respond to any biological or chemical attack. And

I am pleased that you have gathered together some excellent panelists today. We have heard from Dr. Alibek before. And I know he

has some great testimony for us—as well as the other two panelists—so we welcome to the hearing our panelists who are with us

today. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you. Mr. Menendez.

Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to commend

you for holding this hearing. And as the Chairman of the House

Democratic Task Force for Homeland Security, I would just like to

touch on one or two points that I think are pertinent to this hearing and to our issue of national preparedness for biological attack.

I would like to start with a quote from the book, Germs, which

said,

‘‘Plans should be prepared for the establishment of adequate

laboratory and vaccine production facilities and stockpiles of

essential medical supplies, and in the event some enemy attack

appears imminent, prompt action should be taken to establish

a civil defense committee.’’

Now, that was the recommendation of a Committee to Defense

Secretary James Forestal in 1949. For over a half a century, it has

been ignored by consecutive Administrations to this day. These

measures and others are part of a bill that we have introduced, the

Biological Terrorism Protection Act, or Biopac, H.R. 3255. I encourage both the House and the Bush Administration to look at this

legislation, and generally, to move forward on this vitally important issue.

There are specific reasons why we must be more vigilant about

this threat. Our enemies know that they cannot challenge us head

on, and so look for asymmetric or unconventional ways to take us

4

on. This is one of them. Pharmaceutical products are manufactured

worldwide and lab equipment is widely available making production of biological agents much easier than in past years.

The fall of the former Soviet Union put tens of thousands of scientists with knowledge of biological weapons development available

to rogue nations or terrorist groups with evil intent. And in a parallel to computer technology, advances in biological technology will

make it easier for rogue nations or terrorists groups to develop

germ weapons.

So finally what can we do? I think our laws need to be toughened. Biopac’s comprehensive approach to biological terrorism is

needed. It addresses investments in emergency preparedness and

response and public health, infrastructure protection, including agriculture and water systems, information sharing and better intelligence coordination, as well as the military’s role, as well as seeking to secure abroad the biological and chemical agents that exist,

and seeking to secure them; where possible, degrade or destroy

them.

Finally, the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972 needs an enforcement mechanism. And I am glad to report that working with

Ranking Member Lantos, Biopac includes just such a provision. I

would hope that the Administration and this Committee would

pursue this important priority.

The war in Afghanistan is going very well, Mr. Chairman, but

I think we need to come to an understanding that while that war

is going well, the preventative war here at home needs to have a

heightened sense of urgency. So I look forward to the witnesses,

and particularly Dr. Alibek, who ran the 60,000-strong Soviet biological warfare program and is widely respected in the U.S. biological warfare community.

I look forward to hearing some of the comments that he has to

make, not only for those countries that we have identified, but

other countries as well.

And I thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for holding this important

hearing.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you. Does anyone else have an opening

statement? If not, I am now pleased to introduce our distinguished

witnesses. Dr. Richard Spertzel was the head of biological weapons

inspections for the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq

from 1994 to 1998. As a consultant in all matters relating to biological weapons and bioterrorism, he has served many U.S. Government agencies, including the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the

Central Intelligence Agency, and the Department of State.

Dr. Spertzel earned his Ph.D. in microbiology from the University of Notre Dame and holds a degree in radiation biology from the

University of Rochester. He served in the United States military’s

veterinary corps for over 22 years, where he specialized in biological warfare and biological warfare defense. We welcome you, Dr.

Spertzel.

Our next witness will be Dr. Ken Alibek, who is a Vice President

of Hadron, Inc., and President of its Advanced Biosystems, Inc.

subsidiary. He leads their development of medical and scientific research programs in biological weapons defense, analytical research

and treatment of infectious diseases, and analytical research in the

5

areas of industrial biotechnology, microbiology and medical microbiology.

A retired Soviet Army colonel, Dr. Alibek served as First Deputy

Chief of the civilian branch of the Soviet Union’s Offensive Biological Weapons Program, and has more than 20 years’ experience in

development, management and supervision of high containment

pathogen laboratories. Dr. Alibek defected to the United States

from Russia in 1992 and has subsequently served as a consultant

to numerous U.S. Government agencies.

He has testified before Congress on many nonproliferation issues

and recently authored Biohazard, published by Random House. He

holds M.D., Ph.D. and Doctor of Sciences degrees. We look forward

to hearing from you, Dr. Alibek.

Our final witness is Ms. Elisa Harris, a Research Fellow at the

Center for International and Security Studies at the University of

Maryland. From 1993 to 2000, she was Director for Nonproliferation and Export Controls on the National Security Council staff.

She has also held a number of research positions, including those

at the Brookings Institution, Royal United Services Institute in

London, and the Center for Science and International Affairs at

Harvard.

She is a former SSRC-MacArthur Foundation Fellow and a

former staff consultant to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Ms. Harris has authored numerous publications and is a graduate

of both Georgetown University and Oxford, where she earned her

masters in philosophy. We welcome you back to the Committee,

Ms. Harris.

Dr. Spertzel, if you will begin with your testimony. I would ask

each of you to try to encapsulate the things you have to say, in give

or take 5 minutes, in order to leave more time for questioning.

Please be assured that your full statement will be made a part

of the record and will be perused minutely. So without objection,

your full statements will be included and we will start with you,

Dr. Spertzel.

STATEMENT OF RICHARD O. SPERTZEL, VMD, PH.D., CONSULTANT, HEAD OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS INSPECTIONS,

UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMISSION ON IRAQ (UNSCOM),

1994–1998

Mr. SPERTZEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Indeed, I will summarize my written statement.

I will start out by saying that Iraq certainly has the capability

of making the kind of product that we have seen in the Daschle

letter. Now, having said that, I will try to give some reasons and

background behind it.

International experts from 14 different countries on 3 occasions

reviewed Iraq’s latest declaration of 1997, and all concluded that

it was an incomplete account of what they had achieved and what

their program was all about.

Iraq certainly knows how to produce 100 percent pure spores.

That is a technique that they developed in a two-step fermentation

process which is capable of giving them the kind of concentrations

that we are seeing in the Daschle letter.

6

Although Iraq denied that they had attained any higher than

about 10 to the 10th or 10 billion, Iraq also had the capability of

drying anthrax. They denied having done it, but their contacts with

foreign companies revealed that they looked into obtaining the kind

of materials that would be necessary in that process, such as the

kind of silica and other types of material that would give those special properties that makes it really airborne.

Now, we know from actual evidence in 1994 of a related agent,

bacillus thuringiensis, a biopesticide, that they demonstrated their

capability of producing a small particle using a spray dryer without

milling. In that case, they used Bentonite as the additive.

We also know that Iraq was actively pursuing attempts to obtain

the Ames strain as well as other highly pathogenic strains from

many countries. In one case we know that they were denied from

one laboratory. We do not know whether they were successful in

the others because those laboratories involved not only Western

Europe, but Eastern European at the time, as well as African countries.

Iraq also appears to be continuing its program. It may have been

in abeyance during the time of the Special Commission inspections,

but they maintained their technical staff intact as a unit, and with

the destruction of their principal fermentation plant, Al Haqam,

they maintained that team as employees of the National Monitoring Directorate.

In addition, they retained equipment that we could not identify

specifically as being part of their vast program, and they still have

that today, including a spray dryer with the capability of producing

a small particle aerosol.

They also developed the indigenous capability of producing fermenters, centrifuges, and spray dryers as well as the necessary

media for growing the organisms. One of the reasons for this is because that was the trigger that gave their program away and identified it to the Special Commission.

The agents of concern with Iraq have to be the organisms that

cause anthrax, tularemia, brucellosis, and smallpox. With that I

will conclude my statement.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Spertzel follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RICHARD O. SPERTZEL, VMD, PH.D., CONSULTANT, HEAD

OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS INSPECTIONS, UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMISSION ON

IRAQ (UNSCOM), 1994–1998

Iraq’s official position as reflected in its Biological ‘‘Full, Final and Complete Declaration,’’ includes an account of weaponization of liquid preparations of botulinum

toxin, Bacillus anthracis spores, and aflatoxin. Additionally, Iraq acknowledges investigation of Clostridium perfringens and ricin. Three reviews from late 1997

through July 1998 by broad-based international review panels convened in New

York, Vienna, and Baghdad all concluded this declaration was an incomplete and

inadequate representation of Iraq’s biological warfare research and development

program.

Assessment by the experts seconded by their host governments to the United Nation’s Special Commission (UNSCOM) concluded the account of Iraq’s BW program

contained in its current FFCD had serious deficiencies and inaccuracies in all areas.

Even when the experts focused solely on those areas directly related to the material

balance they concluded that none of the components or subcomponents of the material balance could be verified. Key elements in the material balance are the accountability for bulk agents, munitions and material. These are the weapons systems,

their production, deployment and destruction as well as the production of bulk

7

agents and munitions, munitions filling and the acquisition of raw materials, equipment and supplies including bacterial growth media, essentially BW agent precursors. I do not wish to dwell further on the inadequacies and inaccuracies of Iraq’s biological FFCD. The question at hand is what might Iraq have in its possession today

or what might Iraq be capable of producing.

Iraq’s Capability: Iraq has the equipment, facilities, material, and expertise to

have an active BW program. Agents of concern must include Bacillus anthracis

spores (anthrax), Francisella tularensis (tularemia), Brucella melitensis and smallpox. Antibiotic resistant strains are well within Iraq’s capability. I believe any leakage from Iraq’s program would be with full concurrence of the Iraqi government.

Anthrax: I do not believe science will identify the laboratory or country from

which the present anthrax spores are derived. The quality of the product contained

in the letter to Senator Daschle was better than that found in the Soviet, US or

Iraqi BW program, certainly in terms of the purity and concentration of spore particles.

Speaking to the Iraqi BW program, Iraq certainly knew how to produce 100%

pure spores as part of its fermentation production process. Although Iraq claims a

low concentration in its final liquid product, such low levels can not be substantiated and the process used by them is capable with slight tweaking to produce the

levels seen in the Daschle letter. Iraq used bentonite in its production of Bacillus

thuringensis spores as recovered in 1994 by UNSCOM; however, Iraq through

TSMID, its procurement arm for its BW program, also sought a supply of pharmaceutical grade silica in 1988 and 1989. Although suggestive evidence indicates Iraq

was able to obtain such material we did not obtain definitive evidence to prove this

acquisition. Iraq was also interested in obtaining other materials that would make

a good additive for weapons-grade material. Iraq, unlike the Soviet and US programs, did not mill its dried product; rather the Iraqi BW team learned the method

of obtaining a readily aerosolizable small particle product in a one step spray drying

procedure.

Iraq had obtained anthrax and other bacterial agents from the ATCC in the US

and Pasteur Institute, Paris, France. Iraq asserted that it filled aerial bombs and

Al Hussein warheads with Volum strain anthrax spores (which was also planned

for its drop tank weapon system). Iraq made extensive efforts to obtain the Ames

strain in 1988 and 1989 as well as several other pathogenic strains from various

countries of, at the time, Western and Eastern Europe and several African countries. Iraq’s request for the Ames strain was denied by a laboratory in the UK;

UNSCOM did not know what success Iraq had from its contact with other laboratories and countries.

Iraq claimed it did not dry anthrax spores for its weapons. Yet we know that its

BW personnel knew how to produce high quality dried preparations and had the

equipment and material to produce such dried preparations. Because Iraq asserted

it had destroyed all such material in 1991 before UNSCOM inspectors had arrived,

no samples of such preparations were obtained; if it retained any dried material,

it was not in Iraq’s interest to disclose the presence of such material. Dried anthrax

spores remaining from its pre-1991 program would still be viable and pose a significant threat.

Smallpox: Iraq does not acknowledge any studies on smallpox. However, a smallpox epidemic swept through northern Iraq in the mid 1970s, just two to three years

after it embarked on a program to acquire the capability for weapons of mass destruction. It is most unlikely that Iraq would have missed the opportunity to acquire

clinical samples for any biological agent that might be of future benefit to the government. Thus it is prudent to make the assumption that Iraq possesses the necessary seed material for smallpox production. It has the necessary facilities, expertise and equipment for such development. A number of other clues strongly suggests

that indeed it had an interest if not an active program in such a weapon development.

Other agents: Iraq also had an interest in many other agents such as agents that

induce tularemia, plague, and brucellosis. Again, Iraq has the facilities, equipment,

materials, and personnel to be conducting such development.

State versus non-state association: I have maintained from the first descriptions

of the material contained in the Daschle letter that the quality appeared to be such

that it could be produced only by some group that was involved with a current or

former state program in recent years. The level of knowledge, expertise, and experience required and the types of special equipment required to make such quality

product takes time and experimentation to develop. Further, the nature of the finished dried product is such that safety equipment and facilities must be used to protect the individuals involved and to shield their clandestine activity from discovery.

8

Chairman HYDE. Dr. Alibek.

STATEMENT OF DR. KENNETH ALIBEK, PRESIDENT, ADVANCED BIOSYSTEMS, INC., FORMER FIRST DEPUTY CHIEF,

CIVILIAN BRANCH, SOVIET OFFENSIVE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM

Dr. ALIBEK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee for having me here and for allowing me the opportunity to

discuss with you the issues of biological weapons threats and biological terrorism.

In my opinion this is a very important issue now because we

have already seen quite a significant event here in the United

States. Fortunately, I can say that the type of delivery we have

seen here in the United States is the least effective way to deploy

biological weapons. But even in this case, we can see that the entire country was in constant anxiety and fear because of this small

number of letters and small number of biological agents.

It is very important for us to realize that in case of a more significant event, we could see more serious, more devastating consequences after deployment of one or another type of biological

weapons.

Discussing the Soviet Union’s offensive weapons capability, I

would like to say first, this program started in late 1920s and officially continued until the beginning of 1992, when President

Yeltsin signed a decree to stop any work in the field of research

and development of biological weapons by Russia.

In this case, I would like to clarify that the country which was

involved in research and development of biological weapons was

the Soviet Union. I cannot accuse Russia in any wrongdoing because I have no information of that, but there are some questions

which are still unanswered by this country.

The Soviet Union’s offensive biological weapons program was a

big, very huge, sophisticated, very powerful program. It was strictly

a military program, and I am talking just about the military program. There were some other programs run by the KGB, or some

other entities, but the biggest one was the military program.

There were several major departments and directorates involved

in the research, development and manufacture of biological weapons. Major agents involved in research and development were anthrax, plague, tularemia, brucellosis, glanders melioidoses, viral

agents like smallpox, ebola, Marburg hemorrhagic fevers, some encephalitis, like equine encephalitis and Japanese encephalitis, some

other hemorrhagic fevers, Bolivian hemorrhagic fever, Argentinian

hemorrhagic fever, lassa fever and so on and so forth.

I know for sure that this program was downsized sometime in

the late 1980s and beginning of the 1990s. I hope Russia now

doesn’t have any significant offensive biological weapons capability.

But it still has three facilities we are not able to visit and inspect,

and we cannot say what kind of work is being done now behind the

closed doors of these three major biological weapons facilities.

At the same time, I would like to say Russia had a huge amount

of scientists involved in research and developing biological weapons. After this program was downsized, many of them left the program. Some of them came to the United States, some of them went

9

to Europe, some of them went to Asia, some of them disappeared

and nobody can answer the question of where these people are

now.

In my opinion, we need to continue our efforts in employing

former Russian biological weapons scientists to keep them, as far

as possible, from being acquired by any terrorist group or rogue

countries, because many of them are underemployed or unemployed.

There is another issue. In my opinion, we need groups of former

biological weapons scientists who have not been reached by our efforts to employ those scientists. These scientists are everywhere in

the world including—as I said before—the United States, Europe,

Asian countries and so on and so forth.

So we need to find a way how to find and employ these scientists,

because these specific scientists, in my opinion—keeping in mind

their very sophisticated knowledge—could be perfect help to the

United States in developing sophisticated biological weapons, and

medical defense against biological weapons.

Talking about anthrax, I know something about this powder sent

to different locations. Unfortunately I cannot disclose my source of

information. I saw, let me say, some pictures. Without getting into

detail, my first conclusion is that I am convinced this agent and

this product cannot be considered as a Russian or an American

weapon.

We discussed the concentration of about one trillion cells, but it

is a different issue. In addition to the concentration, you need to

know how to make this product in a fine particle size.

What I haven’t seen is the fine particle size. Yes, some of this

formulation was in fine particle size. But there are many particles,

which were a larger size. And in this case I cannot say it was done

by highly trained professionals—I would like to emphasize, highly

trained professionals.

Chairman HYDE. Dr. Alibek, we have three votes which have

been called over which we have no control. We will have to run

over and vote. So we will stand in recess until immediately after

the third vote, which I am guessing will be completed in 1⁄2 hour

to 45 minutes.

So if you will rest, we will pick up with you again as soon as we

get back. Thank you.

The Committee stands in recess.

[Recess.]

Chairman HYDE. The Committee will come to order.

Dr. Alibek, you were testifying and we will return to you.

Dr. ALIBEK. I would like to repeat what I said before.

My analysis shows that this product was not obtained using either American or Russian production techniques. Why I am saying

this is we agreed the concentration was high, about 3 trillion

spores in 1 gram. But at the same time, I don’t believe it was a

direct measurement where we had 1 gram and in this 1 gram there

were 3 trillion spores.

If you have several particles and you measure these particles and

you count the number of spores in these particles, then you just

multiply and say the theoretical concentration could be 1 trillion.

It is a completely different process.

10

What we forget is that when you have a big number of particles,

you also have a huge number of empty spaces in this 1 gram. You

would never be able to achieve one-thousandth when you have, let

me say, particles in 1 gram size. In this case, I wouldn’t say this

statement: This product was 1 trillion spore concentration.

Second, I know there was quite a wide distribution in the size

of these particles from, say, very small parallels 1, 2, 3 or 5, 10 microns up to 35, 50 microns. It means again that it is not a product

which was done professionally.

Then, when we talk about particle form, what is important when

you analyze electron microscopy, you can see in particle form

whether or not there is a million process involved. And I didn’t see

any signs of a million process. That’s third.

And fourth, we know the level of sophistication of batches of this

product was different. The first product was not very sophisticated;

it contained some vegetative cells or, let me say, immature spores

and suggests the Daschle letter contained more or less sophisticated product, mostly in the form of spores. In this case, again, if

it was done using the same strain and was done by the same group

or by the same individual, it showed a process of learning in the

process of manufacturing.

The first batches were not very sophisticated. Then they did additional study, additional work and then produced a more sophisticated product. Of course, this is no more than my assumption, but

you know my assumptions are based on what I know about anthrax as a biological weapon.

Let me finish, saying this. This product was not manufactured by

highly trained professionals, but some sort of professionals, I would

say. I cannot determine the level of professionalism of these people,

but they know something about technology and anthrax production.

But these are not people who know a great deal about actual technological processes to develop and manufacture anthrax biological

weapons.

At the same time, I cannot say it was done by a single individual. It could be, but it could be done either in the United States

by so-called homegrown terrorist groups or it could be brought from

overseas. Just by analyzing this product, you cannot answer this

question. It would require additional study by some experts from

completely different fields. Psychology or the FBI probably would

be the best sources to determine who could make this product. Let

me conclude by this statement.

Thank you.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you very much, Dr. Alibek.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Alibek follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. KENNETH ALIBEK, PRESIDENT, ADVANCED BIOSYSTEMS,

INC., FORMER FIRST DEPUTY CHIEF, CIVILIAN BRANCH, SOVIET OFFENSIVE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to

discuss the issues of biological weapons and biological terrorism with you. I am in

a rather unique position to discuss these issues, since I developed biological weapons

for the Soviet Union for nearly twenty years, until my defection in 1992. Since arriving to the United States, my personal and professional goal has been to make the

greatest contribution I can to eliminating the danger of biological weapons.

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WHAT ARE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS?

Biological weapons are weapons of mass destruction (or mass casualty weapons,

to be precise, since they do not damage nonliving entities) that are based on bacteria, viruses, rickettsia, fungi, or toxins produced by these organisms. Compared

to other types of weapons (nuclear, chemical or conventional), biological weapons are

unique in their diversity. Dozens of different agents can be used to make a biological

weapon, and each agent will produce a markedly different effect. These differences

in effect are shaped by various properties of the particular agent, such as its contagiousness, the length of time after release that it survives in the environment, the

dose required to infect a victim, and of course the type of disease that the agent

produces.

Biological weapons formulations are of two types: a liquid or a dry powder. For

most agents, the liquid form is easier to produce, but the dry form stores longer and

disperses better when deployed. The basic steps for creating a liquid biological

weapon are:

• Obtaining a sample of the microorganisms to be used

• Culturing the microorganisms until there is enough for a weapon

• Concentrating the culture to make it strong enough for a weapon

• Adding certain ingredients to stabilize the culture.

For a dry weapon formulation, this liquid culture is dried out and then ground

up into microscopic particles. For toxin weapons, the toxin must first be extracted

from the source—either the liquid bacterial culture or a plant or animal—and then

concentrated.

Biological weapons can be deployed in three ways:

• Contamination of food or water supplies, which are then ingested by the victims

• Contamination of physical objects (e.g. books, mail), leading to inhalational or

contact infection

• Release of infected vectors, such as mosquitoes or fleas, which then bite the

victims

• Creation of an aerosol cloud, which is then inhaled by the victims (or, if the

targets are plants, the cloud then settles on and infects the plants).

By far, the most efficient and effective mode for applying biological weapons is

creation of an aerosol cloud. Such a cloud is made up of microscopic particles and

is therefore invisible. It can be produced in several ways, all of which involve either

an explosion (a bomb or a bomb within a missile) or spraying (usually involving a

special nozzle on a spray tank). The effectiveness of the cloud is determined by numerous factors, such as the amount of agent that survives the explosion or spraying,

and the wind and weather conditions. The primary result of an effective cloud is

simultaneous infections among all those who were exposed to a sufficiently dense

portion of the cloud. In addition, agents that can survive for a long time in the environment will eventually settle, contaminating the ground, buildings, water and food

sources, and so on. In some cases, these sediments can form another dangerous aerosol cloud if they are disturbed.

GLOBAL BIOLOGICAL WEAPON PROLIFERATION

Following the breakup of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the

threat of proliferation of mass casualty weapons has grown dramatically. In some

ways, the danger posed by the proliferation of biological weapons and biotechnology

is greater than that of nuclear proliferation. For example, the acquisition, manufacture, deployment, and movement of nuclear components or weapons is much more

expensive and difficult to achieve than that of biological agents. A freeze-dried vial

of anthrax can easily be obtained and concealed, and the knowledge of how to turn

that vial of anthrax into a biological weapon is in the possession of hundreds of scientists and technicians. The recent incidents of anthrax dissemination through the

Postal Service have only served to demonstrate the reality of this threat.

The growing frustrations among scientists within the former Soviet bioweapons

community add to the risks of proliferation. Despite initiatives directed by the

United States government to employ some of these scientists and to shift the focus

of their research to peaceful projects, more needs to be done. Many of these scientists are highly trained in biotechnology and their talents could be directed toward finding new methods of preventing or treating the diseases caused by these

pathogens. Several former bioweapons scientists have emigrated to the West and

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are currently under-employed. We fear that in order to feed their families, others

may offer their technical skills on the open market, which could provide our enemies

with technical expertise or ready-made, engineered organisms. Some Russian microbiologists are reportedly teaching students from rogue states that are interested in

this expertise. Other prominent scientists have simply dropped out of sight.

In a report to the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations in 1995, the

U.S. Office of Technological Assessment identified 17 nations believed to possess biological weapons. It is estimated that at least 20 countries, including China, Iraq,

North Korea, and Israel, either have active research programs or were formerly involved in biological weapons research and production. In many cases, these are nations that are also engaged in chemical and nuclear programs, since they feel the

necessity to protect themselves from hostile neighbors by any means necessary.

ANTHRAX

The use of anthrax as a biological weapon has gained a great deal of attention

in the last 2 months. Anthrax is a bacterial infection caused by Bacillus anthracis, and has long been seen as one of the most likely candidates for weaponization, having been studied by the Soviet Union, United States, United Kingdom, Iraq, and

others.

The infection can take one of three forms, characterized by the route of entry into

the body: cutaneous, gastrointestinal, and inhalational. Cutaneous anthrax, the

form seen in newsrooms in New York City, is characterized by a formation of a skin

lesion, or eschar, at the site of infection. This is the most common form of infection,

caused when anthrax spores gain entry to the skin via a cut or scrape while the

person is handling anthrax-contaminated material, normally an infected animal carcass. Cutaneous anthrax is easily treatable with antibiotics and has a low mortality

rate.

Gastrointestinal anthrax is associated with consuming food contaminated with anthrax spores. This is the rarest form of infection, and is also treatable with antibiotics if seen early enough.

Inhalational anthrax is the most serious form of anthrax infection, seen in the

cases in Florida and Washington DC. The disease begins when aerosolized anthrax

spores are inhaled. Once in the lungs, immune systems cells called macrophages,

whose normal function is to ingest, kill, and degrade invading pathogens and activate other immune system cells. However, instead of being killed, the spores reactivate and grow into live bacterial cells. The macrophages transport the bacteria to

the lymph nodes, where they proliferate and spread, eventually breaking out of the

lymph system into the bloodstream. During this period of lymphatic replication, the

patient only displays non-specific symptoms much like the flu. Once in the bloodstream, the bacteria proliferate further and begin producing anthrax toxin. Eventually the bacteria spread through the entire circulatory system at high concentrations. Death from inhalational anthrax is associated with shock and multiple organ

failure. When untreated, inhalational anthrax is almost 100% fatal, and though

antibiotics (such as ciprofloxacin) can have an effect if administered early enough

(as has been the case for the recent survivors of anthrax exposure), once the patient

shows specific symptoms of anthrax infection, it is usually too late. Cases of inhalational anthrax were much more numerous at the end of the 19th century, when the

disease was associated with occupational exposure to contaminated animal hides

and wool (leading to its being termed woolsorters’ disease).

THE REAL EFFECTS OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS: THE SOVIET/RUSSIAN PROGRAM

The Soviet biological weapons research program lasted for over fifty years until

its official dissolution by Boris Yeltsin in 1992. In that time, the Soviet program not

only caught up with the U.S. program (which was halted in 1969), behind which

it had lagged by about five years, but it became the most sophisticated biological

weapons program in the world by far. However, there are still questions as to the

true status of research at the laboratories formerly involved in the program. Therefore, it would not be prudent to consider that Russia presents no military threat

whatsoever. In addition, as noted above, biological weapons technology can possibly

proliferate from Russia to other countries less friendly to the U.S. For these reasons,

it is important that we continue to collaborate with Russia to reduce the threat of

proliferation.

There are three main reasons that I am concerned about possible biological weapons research and development in Russia today. First, many of Russia’s former biological weapons facilities have never been subjected to international inspections.

Second, Russia continues to publicly deny the size or even existence of many aspects

of the former Soviet program. And third, among Russian scientists’ published work,

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there are many studies I feel are dual-purpose or even outright offensive biological

weapons work.

To gain insight into the extent and sophistication of the weapons research performed in the Soviet Union, consider the following excerpt from an interview published in the 3 March 1998 issue of the Russian newspaper Izvestiya with Lieutenant General Valentin Yevstigneyev, head of the 15th Directorate of the Russian

Ministry of Defense until 1992. At that time, this directorate was the military arm

of Russia’s biological weapons program. He was the Deputy Director of the Ministry

of Defense’s NBC Defense Directorate. The interviewer is questioning Yevstigneyev

about the 1979 anthrax incident in Sverdlovsk (now Yekaterinburg), which is now

widely known to have been the result of an accidental release of anthrax spores

from a military production facility there. At that time, the Sverdlovsk facility was

producing and stockpiling scores of tons of anthrax biological weapon formulation

annually. Yevstingeyev describes the weaponized anthrax being developed at

Sverdlovsk at that time as possibly being 100% lethal:

Interviewer: Do you claim, as before, that in 1979 on the Sverdlovsk-19 military base, no explosions of munitions with a ‘‘biological’’ filling nor massive

deaths occurred?

Yevstigneyev: People who don’t know much about bacteriology might be able

to believe the newspaper stories (which, by the way, is indeed happening now).

The professionals simply laugh.

International experts found four different strains (of the virus culture—author’s note) of anthrax. Four different bacteria! Different, you understand? If a

bomb exploded, would there really be four strains? How can you explain that

people fell ill 50 kilometers away, but on the military base, where this explosion

supposedly occurred, no one fell ill? Next door to the base is a tank division—

two fatal cases . . . Believe me, if this was a single military release, two or

three days and everyone would be finished!

Additionally, Peter Burgasov, former Chief Sanitary Physician of the Soviet Union

and a researcher in the biological weapons program, became the first official in the

program to admit to the development and testing of weaponized smallpox in a November 2001 interview in the Russian newspaper ‘‘Courier.’’ Burgasov describes a

1970’s test of a smallpox weapon on Vozrazhdenie (Rebirth) Island, a biological testing site in the Aral Sea:

BURGASOV: On Vozrazhdenie Island in the Aral Sea, the strongest recipes

of smallpox were tested. Suddenly I was informed that there were mysterious

cases of mortalities in Aralsk. A research ship of the Aral fleet came 15 km

away from the island (it was forbidden to come any closer than 40 km). The

lab technician of this ship took samples of plankton twice a day from the top

deck. The smallpox formulation—400 g of which was exploded on the island—

‘‘got her’’ and she became infected. After returning home to Aralsk, she infected

several people including children. All of them died. I suspected the reason for

this and called the Chief of General Staff of Ministry of Defense and requested

to forbid the stop of the Alma-Ata—Moscow train in Aralsk. As a result, the

epidemic around the country was prevented. I called Andropov, who at that

time was Chief of KGB, and informed him of the exclusive recipe of smallpox

obtained on Vozrazhdenie Island.

This is a real biological weapon! The minimum radius of contamination was

15 km. One could imagine what would have happened if instead of one lab technician, it was 100–200 individuals. Also, in Manchuria in 1912, 110,000 people

died of smallpox at one time.

The above can be considered evidence that a new assessment of the biological

weapons and defense capabilities of the former Soviet republics is long overdue.

Chairman HYDE. Ms. Harris.

STATEMENT OF ELISA D. HARRIS, RESEARCH FELLOW, CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL AND SECURITY STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND, COLLEGE PARK, MARYLAND

Ms. HARRIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to express

my appreciation for the invitation to testify and note that it is a

real pleasure to return to the Committee where I began my professional career 25 years ago. I would like to start this morning by

14

talking about the potential implications of the September 11 attacks and then say a few words about policy recommendations.

The September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the

Pentagon and the subsequent anthrax incidents have focused renewed attention on the threat of biological weapons. But whether

we have crossed a threshold, whether the longstanding taboo

against the use of disease as a weapon of war and terror has been

irrevocably eroded is in my mind far from clear.

First, there is little evidence in the public domain indicating that

the threat from national biological weapons programs has increased dramatically in the last few years.

Second, there is little information publicly available indicating

that any subnational group or terrorists, other than the as yet unidentified perpetrators of the current anthrax attacks, pose a real

biological weapons threat today. Although it may be too early to

predict on the basis of a single set of events that the biological

weapons threat is growing, the fact that the anthrax incidents here

in the U.S. involve relatively pure, highly concentrated anthrax

powder capable of creating an aerosol simply from the mere act of

opening a letter is indeed a cause for concern.

We don’t know, of course, who is behind these attacks. But both

the current attacks and any future bioterrorism incidents would

have to come from one of three potential sources. The first potential source is countries that are both state sponsors of international

terrorism and that have an indigenous biological weapons program.

Dr. Spertzel has mentioned Iraq. That is one country which fits

into this category, but there are others as well—North Korea, Iran,

Syria and Libya. All of these countries have been identified by U.S.

Government officials as both terrorism and proliferation concerns.

A second potential source of assistance for foreign or domestic

terrorists comes from the past U.S. and former Soviet biological

weapons programs.

And the third and final possibility is, of course, that of a purely

homegrown effort, what White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer

described as a ‘‘Ph.D. microbiologist with a well-equipped lab.’’

Clearly, both the material and equipment needed to make biological agents are publicly available. That said, knowing what is needed to make biological agents is not the same as knowing how to do

it, as was demonstrated by the Aum Shinrikyo’s failed attempts to

use biological weapons in the 1990s.

In the time that I have left, I would like to concentrate on some

policy recommendations for dealing with the biological weapons

threat. In my view, because of the catastrophic potential of biological weapons in the hands of national or subnational groups, the

first line of defense to deal with this problem must be prevention,

specifically, trying to deny groups the ability to acquire biological

weapons. I would like to suggest four policy options that can help

achieve this goal of prevention.

First, we must strengthen the international ban on the development and possession of biological weapons, as embodied in the 1972

Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. As you know, efforts

have been under way since 1995 to conclude a protocol to strengthen the BWC. Unfortunately, in July, the Bush Administration rejected this draft protocol effort. I believe that given the very real

15

potential for national biological weapons programs to be a source

of technical and material assistance to aspiring biological terrorists, more effective international measures to enforce the BWC’s

prohibition on developing and possessing biological weapons clearly

are required. I hope the Bush Administration abandons its opposition to an ongoing process that would allow both U.S. proposals to

strengthen the BWC and other ideas to be discussed, and an acceptable set of solutions to evolve over time.

My second policy recommendation is to strengthen oversight of

laboratories conducting research involving dangerous biological

pathogens. Various rules, disclosure requirements and monitoring

arrangements exist in the biological area, but almost none are

geared toward preventing deliberate or inadvertent misuse of biotechnology research for destructive purposes.

We need only look at the work the Soviet Union did to develop

a genetically modified, vaccine-resistant strain of anthrax or the inadvertent development of a new, highly virulent mousepox pathogen by Australian scientists to realize that the potential for

misapplication of biotechnology research is very real. These developments underscore the need for an oversight arrangement in this

particular area.

Third, we need to strengthen controls over biological pathogens

themselves. The U.S. should extend the current regulations governing facilities that transfer pathogens to other facilities that also

possess select agents. We should also seek support for stronger

international measures to safeguard culture collections and other

sources of dangerous pathogens.

Finally, we should expand efforts to prevent the proliferation of

expertise and materials from the former Soviet biological weapons

program. During the Crawford summit last month, Presidents

Bush and Putin agreed in a joint statement to expand their cooperation in this area, but no concrete manifestations of that enhanced cooperation have been announced.

One obvious area, which Dr. Alibek referred to, would be to build

upon the programs begun by the Clinton Administration to prevent

the proliferation of capabilities from the former Soviet biological

weapons program. This will not be cheap. I would suggest, based

on my experience overseeing these programs over the last 8 years,

that upwards of $750 million in additional funding could well be

required to approach this in a comprehensive fashion. But given

the real potential for critical elements of the former Soviet program

to contribute to national or terrorist biological weapons efforts, I

believe such an investment would be a prudent step.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Harris follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ELISA D. HARRIS, RESEARCH FELLOW, CENTER FOR INTER- NATIONAL AND SECURITY STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND, COLLEGE PARK,

MARYLAND

Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank the Committee for inviting me to testify

today about the recent anthrax attacks here in the United States. In my testimony

this morning, I will begin by considering the potential implications of September 11

and the subsequent anthrax attacks. I will then explore possible means by which

terrorists might acquire the capability to use biological weapons, either here at

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home or against U.S. targets overseas. In concluding, I will discuss several policy

options for preventing or impeding terrorist efforts to acquire biological weapons.

POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS OF SEPTEMBER 11 AND BEYOND

The September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon and subsequent anthrax attacks in Florida, New York and Washington have focused renewed

attention on the threat of biological weapons use by terrorists or other sub-national

groups. In a statement on November 1, President Bush declared: ‘‘. . . the threat

is growing. Since September 11, America and others have been confronted by the

evils these weapons can inflict. This threat is real and extremely dangerous. Rogue

states and terrorists possess these weapons and are willing to use them.’’

It is certainly the case that, over the past two months, America has had a glimpse

of what it can mean to use disease for hostile purposes. Before October, no American

ever died as a consequence of a terrorist attack with biological agents, although

some 750 people were poisoned with salmonella by the Rajneeshee cult in Oregon

in 1984. Today, five people are dead from inhalation anthrax. Five others have been

treated for the inhalation form of the disease and another ten are recovering from

the cutaneous or skin form. In addition, tens of thousands of media, postal and government employees have been prescribed powerful antibiotics prophylactically because of possible anthrax exposure.

But whether we have crossed a threshold, whether the longstanding taboo against

the use of disease as a weapon of war and terror has been irrevocably eroded, is

far from clear. First, there is little evidence in the public domain indicating that the

threat from national biological weapons programs has increased dramatically in the

last few years or, for that matter, since the end of the Cold War. In June, Secretary

of Defense Rumsfeld told Congress that at least thirteen countries are seeking biological weapons. This compares with statements in 1997 from Clinton Administration officials to the effect that about a dozen countries were pursuing a biological

weapons capability. Most of these programs date to the 1980s, some even earlier.

Some, such as Iran’s program, are more mature and thus pose a greater potential

threat than in the past. However, the most serious and direct biological weapons

threat to the United States, from the former Soviet Union, has all but disappeared.

Second, there is little information publicly available indicating that any sub-national group or terrorists, other than the as yet unidentified perpetrator of the current anthrax attacks, pose a real biological weapons threat today. Since September

11, much attention has been focused on the possibility of Osama bin Laden’s alQaeda network acquiring biological weapons. On November 11, Secretary Rumsfeld

publicly stated that it was ‘‘reasonable to assume’’ he might very well have ‘‘chemical or biological’’ weapons. Rumsfeld emphasized, however, that it’s ‘‘one thing to

have the chemical or biological capability. It’s another thing to have figured out how

to weaponize it or develop the ability to deliver it.’’ According to various press reports, intelligence officials assess that al-Qaeda has a ‘‘crude chemical—and possibly

biological—capability.’’ Information obtained from Afghanistan itself in recent weeks

has done little to clarify the situation.

According to the London Times, instructions for preparing ricin, a biological toxin,

have been found in an abandoned house once used as a terrorist training center in

Kabul. However, it has been known for a number of years that jihad or holy war

manuals contain sections devoted to biological and chemical warfare, including instructions on how to prepare toxins, toxic gas and drugs. Various documents related

to anthrax, including how to use it as a weapon, as well as diagrams that seem to

show a possible method for dispersing some type of biological or chemical agent from

the air have been found in the abandoned Kabul offices of an organization with ties

to Afghanistan’s Taliban government. According to the New York Times, however,

words scribbled on the diagram appear to say ‘‘cyanide,’’ which is a World War I

era chemical agent. Central Command officials are said to have identified more than

40 potential weapons of mass destruction sites in Afghanistan and are conducting

tests of samples from such sites. Thus far, however, no actual chemical or biological

weapons or agents have been found.

As far as is publicly known, other than the Rajneeshee salmonella incident in

1984, the only significant terrorist effort to acquire and use biological weapons occurred in the early 1990s, when the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo tried on nearly

a dozen occasions to develop and disseminate biological agents, including anthrax

and botulinum toxin, among the Japanese population. Despite ample financial and

technical resources, including a Ph.D. microbiologist, the Aum failed spectacularly:

none of their biological attacks produced a single casualty.

The Aum Shinrikyo did, of course, have somewhat more success with chemical

weapons. In April 1995, the cult disseminated the nerve agent sarin in the Tokyo

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subway at the height of morning rush hour, killing a dozen Japanese citizens and

injuring another 1,000. Following this attack, many experts confidently predicted

that the normative and technical barriers to the development and use of chemical

weapons had been dealt a fatal blow, and that it was not a matter of whether, but

when, terrorists would use chemical weapons again. Six years later, those barriers

are not only still in place, but have been strengthened by the entry into force and

implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

POTENTIAL SOURCES OF ASSISTANCE

Although it may be too early to predict, on the basis of a single set of events, that

the biological weapons threat is growing, the fact that the recent anthrax incidents

here in the U.S. involved relatively pure, highly concentrated anthrax powder capable of creating an aerosol hazard from the mere act of opening an envelope is a

cause for serious concern. At the present time, we do not know who is behind these

attacks, how they acquired the high quality anthrax found in the letters to Senate

Majority Leader Daschle and Senator Leahy, or whether they have access to additional anthrax or other biological agents. That said, both the current attacks and

any future bioterrorism incidents would have to come from one of three potential

sources.

One possible source is countries that are both state sponsors of international terrorism and that have indigenous biological weapons programs. Senior Pentagon officials, including Secretary Rumsfeld, have spoken publicly about this possibility. On

September 30, during an appearance on ‘‘Meet the Press,’’ Rumsfeld noted that several nations that support international terrorists are also trying to acquire chemical,

biological or nuclear weapons, and that ‘‘it doesn’t take a leap of imagination to expect that at some point those nations will work with those terrorist networks and

assist them in achieving and obtaining those kinds of capabilities.’’ Although Rumsfeld did not name names, Iraq, North Korea, Iran, Syria and Libya are the key

countries identified in U.S. government reports as both terrorism and proliferation

concerns. Any one of these countries could in theory provide assistance of various

kinds, including actual biological agents, to foreign or domestic terrorists. As a practical matter, however, the programs are at various levels of maturity.

On one end of the spectrum is Iraq, whose biological weapons program first began

in the mid-1970s and was restarted again in the 1980s, during the Iran-Iraq War.

Although Baghdad repeatedly denied having a biological weapons program, following the defection of General Hussein Kamal in 1995, Iraq finally acknowledged

having produced some 30,000 liters of concentrated BW agent, including anthrax

and botulinum toxin, and having filled it into missile warheads and bombs. Iraq also

admitted to having conducted R&D on a range of other agents, including ricin, clostridium perfringens, which causes gas gangrene, T–2 toxins, and camelpox, which

is in the same virus family as smallpox. There have been widespread reports in the

press that Iraq has rebuilt some of the dual-use facilities used to develop and

produce these agents. Iraq’s expulsion of UNSCOM inspectors in December 1998

and its subsequent refusal to accept inspections from UNMOVIC, the UN follow-on

organization, have precluded the international community from pursuing concerns

about the status of the Iraqi program.

At the other end of the spectrum is Libya, which has not been able to move beyond the R&D phase in its biological weapons program, although it may, according

to Under Secretary of State John Bolton, be capable of producing small quantities

of biological agent. In between are North Korea, Iran and Syria. North Korea has

been pursuing a biological weapons capability since the 1960s. In a recent speech,

Under Secretary Bolton stated that the United States believes that North Korea has

developed and produced, and may have weaponized, biological agents, and can

produce military quantities of agent within weeks of a decision to do so. Bolton said

Iran, whose biological weapons program began in the 1980s, probably has produced

and weaponized biological agents. In recent years, Iran has actively sought dual-use

materials and expertise from institutes formally associated with the Soviet biological weapons program. According to Bolton, Syria’s biological weapons program is believed to be in the R&D stage, although it may be capable of producing small quantities of agent.

A second potential source of assistance for foreign or domestic terrorists comes

from the past United States and former Soviet Union’s biological weapons programs.

The U.S. program, which began during World War II, investigated a variety of biological agents including anti-personnel agents like anthrax and tularemia, anti-crop

agents such as wheat stem rust and rice blast, and anti-animal agents like foot and

mouth disease. Following President Nixon’s 1969 decision to terminate the offensive

biological weapons program and renounce unconditionally any future use of biologiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:54 Jan 31, 2002 Jkt 076481 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\FULL\120501\76481 HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
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cal or toxin weapons, U.S. biological agent stocks, including some 220 pounds of anthrax, were destroyed and U.S. facilities were shut down or converted to public

health or biological defense activities.

The Soviet program was the largest in the world, employing upwards of 60,000

personnel at its height in the 1980s. Much of the R&D and production of biological

weapons was undertaken at secret facilities run by the Soviet military or at civilian

facilities under the management of an organization known as Biopreparat. The Soviet program explored the full-spectrum of traditional anti-personnel biological

agents, ranging from lethal agents such as anthrax, smallpox and plague to incapacitating agents such as tularemia, glanders and Venezuelan equine encephalitis.

Soviet biological weapons scientists also undertook extensive efforts to develop antiplant and anti-animal agents and used genetic engineering techniques to modify traditional agents, for example by imparting antibiotic resistance, and to explore possible cocktails or combinations of agents.

In April 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin ordered the termination of the offensive program. In the years that followed, some research and production facilities

were deactivated and many others underwent severe personnel and funding cuts.

However, the U.S. government continues to be concerned that some elements of the

former Soviet program remain.

The final possibility is that of a purely homegrown effort, what White House press

secretary Ari Fleischer described, in relation to the recent anthrax incidents, as ‘‘a

Ph.D. microbiologist’’ with a ‘‘well-equipped microbiology lab.’’ Clearly, both the materials and the equipment needed to make biological agents are publicly available.

Seed cultures of biological pathogens can be purchased from among the more than

1500 culture collections around the world operated by commercial enterprises and

research institutions. Both the nutrient media in which the pathogens are grown

and the fermenters or bioreactors in which the production process occurs also are

widely available, owing to their role in legitimate research and commercial activities. Finally, equipment to transform the liquid agent into a dry powder of the optimal particle size for inhalation into the lungs is also available in the pharmaceutical

and other industries.

That said, knowing what is needed to make a biological agent is not the same

as knowing how to do it, as was demonstrated by the Aum Shinrikyo’s failed biological weapons attacks in the early 1990s. To be successful, an aspiring bioterrorist

would have to: select the right strain (some are more virulent and thus more effective at producing casualties than others); produce and purify the required amount

of material; and dry and mill the agent or take other steps to reduce the particles

to the optimum size and maximize their ability to create a sustained aerosol hazard.

The technical challenges would not, however, end there. The terrorist would also

have to select a delivery system for the agent and then disseminate it without either

contaminating himself or degrading or killing the agent (some agents are highly vulnerable to meteorological conditions such as UV light, heat and humidity).

Whoever is behind the recent anthrax attacks has demonstrated an ability to disseminate a small quantity of high quality anthrax on a limited scale. Whether a ‘‘biological Unabomber’’ could effectively mount a large-scale attack is unclear. In 1999,

the General Accounting Office deemed it unlikely, concluding that terrorists working

outside a state-run laboratory infrastructure would have to ‘‘overcome extraordinary

technical and operational challenges to effectively and successfully weaponize and

deliver a biological agent to cause mass casualties.’’

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The anthrax incidents have shown how much needs to be done to improve our

ability to defend against and manage the consequences of the use of biological weapons. However, it would be a grave mistake to stop there. The catastrophic potential

of biological weapons in the hands of national or sub-national groups is so great that

the first line of defense must be prevention, specifically, trying to deny such groups

the ability to acquire biological weapons. I would like to suggest four policy options

that can help achieve this goal.

First, strengthen the international ban on the development and possession of biological weapons, as embodied in the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

(BWC). As you know, the BWC lacks enforcement provisions, but efforts have been

underway since 1995 to conclude a legally binding protocol to strengthen the Convention. In July, the Bush administration rejected the draft protocol, arguing that

it was both too weak and too strong—too weak to catch cheaters; too strong to avoid

putting at risk sensitive U.S. trade secrets or biological defense activities. In its

place, the administration has proposed, at the Review Conference for the Convention currently underway in Geneva, an alternative package comprised primarily of

19

recommendations for national measures to be undertaken by individual BWC parties.

The administration’s proposals for measures to increase national control over activities that could be misused for biological weapons purposes are a useful first step,

but they can and should be made more robust. For example, in addition to national

legislation criminalizing activities prohibited under the BWC, the U.S. should propose and other parties support the Harvard-Sussex Program’s proposal for a multilateral convention that would make it a crime under international law for any persons knowingly to engage in prohibited biological weapons activities and would subject such individuals to prosecution or extradition.

The Bush administration has also proposed international measures to clarify concerns that another party is violating the BWC and for investigating suspicious disease outbreaks or the alleged use of biological weapons. However, these proposals

do little to advance existing mechanisms in the BWC itself or that have been agreed

internationally. As such, they fall seriously short of what is required.

Given the very real potential for national biological weapons programs to be a

source of technical and material assistance to aspiring biological terrorists, more effective international measures to enforce the BWC’s prohibition on the development

and possession of biological weapons clearly are required. Ultimately, these international measures, whether related to criminalization, the exchange of information,

or on-site activities, must be embodied in a legally binding form. Institutional arrangements will also be needed to ensure that these measures are implemented effectively.

It is critical that BWC parties make provision at the Review Conference to continue their efforts toward a more effective regime. Clearly, this matter cannot wait

for the next Review Conference in five years. I hope the Bush administration will

abandon its opposition to an ongoing process so that both the U.S. and other proposals for strengthening the Convention can be discussed and acceptable solutions

evolve over time.

Second, strengthen oversight of laboratories conducting research involving dangerous biological pathogens. Various rules, disclosure requirements and monitoring

arrangements exist in the biological area. However, almost none are geared toward

preventing the deliberate or inadvertent misuse of biotechnology research for destructive purposes. Within the United States, federal oversight of activities involving biological pathogens is focused largely on the safety of laboratories and the manufacturing process and the safety and efficacy of pharmaceutical products themselves, as opposed to the potential implications of the scientific research that ultimately results in those products. For example, there are OSHA regulations governing the safe handling and containment of pathogens in laboratories and FDA requirements for Good Manufacturing Practices at facilities that produce drugs and

other products being licensed for human use. There also are FDA requirements for

prior notification of human clinical trials and for oversight of those trials by Institutional Review Boards, and for reviewing documents and research to ensure the safety and efficacy of biological products licensed for human use. In terms of basic research, however, only a narrow set of facilities working with biological pathogens—

those engaged in certain types of recombinant DNA research that receive NIH funding for their work—are subject to mandatory federal prior approval requirements.

Three developments in recent years highlight the ambiguities and risks posed by

certain types of biological research, including the potential for biotechnology research to be misused for hostile purposes. They also underscore the critical need for

oversight arrangements in this area. In 1997, scientists at a once-secret military research center near Moscow published an article describing the development of a new

type of anthrax that could overcome the standard Russian and American vaccines.

Earlier this year, Australian scientists exploring ways to sterilize mice revealed that

they had discovered how a new, highly dangerous pathogen might be made. And

this past fall, the New York Times reported on secret American biological defense

research, including plans to replicate the Russian work on a genetically modified

version of anthrax. Each of these developments raises legitimate questions and concerns.

To be effective, new oversight arrangements for biotechnology research must be

developed and implemented with input from and support by the scientific community. Such arrangements should include agreed rules to govern work with dangerous

pathogens, disclosure requirements to permit independent scientific review of that

work, monitoring requirements to provide confidence in the accuracy of the information disclosed, and legal rules and institutional procedures to specify legitimate uses

and assure protection of proprietary aspects of that information. Ultimately, such

an oversight regime would have to be global in scope, given that arrangements set

only within the United States or among a limited group of countries would not proVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:54 Jan 31, 2002 Jkt 076481 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\FULL\120501\76481 HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
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vide adequate protection or be politically acceptable. Work to develop a prototype

regime for preventing destructive applications of biotechnology research is being carried out under the direction of Dr. John Steinbruner at the Center for International

and Security Studies at Maryland.

Third, strengthen controls over biological pathogens themselves. Following Iraq’s

use of chemical weapons against Iranian military forces and its own Kurdish population during the Iran-Iraq War, the United States and other Western countries imposed export controls on equipment and materials that could be used to make chemical, and subsequently biological, weapons. Today, 33 countries participate in the socalled Australia Group, an informal multilateral body that seeks to harmonize national export controls over chemical and biological-related exports.

In addition to this informal multilateral arrangement, since 1997 the United

States has required facilities that send or receive particularly dangerous pathogens—the 36 microbes and toxins on the so-called Select Agent List—to be registered with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and to report all domestic transfers of such materials. However, as the recent anthrax incidents have

shown, U.S. facilities that sent or received dangerous pathogens before 1997 are not

subject to this reporting requirement. Moreover, most of the more than 1500 culture

collections around the world make biological cultures available to researchers with

few restrictions or controls.

In October, the Congress moved to tighten domestic controls over access to biological pathogens by passing legislation prohibiting felons, illegal aliens, individuals

from terrorist countries and other restricted persons from possessing or transferring

biological pathogens on the CDC Select Agent List. The blanket restriction on access

to pathogens by individuals from terrorist countries working in the United States

has been criticized by scientific organizations, which rightly fear that specific individuals may be prevented from undertaking work that could result in important

public health or national security benefits. The ability to waive this provision should

be added to the legislation.

More broadly, the U.S. should extend the current regulations governing facilities

that transfer pathogens to cover facilities that also possess Select Agents. We should

also given the CDC the resources it needs to be able to conduct the necessary inspections of registered facilities. In the five years since adoption of the original regulations, only about 60 of the approximately 250 registered labs reportedly have been

inspected. Finally, we should seek support for stronger international measures to

safeguard culture collections and other sources of dangerous pathogens around the

world from terrorists or national biological weapons programs.

Fourth, expand efforts to prevent the proliferation of expertise and materials from

the former Soviet biological weapons program. Since 1994, the United States has utilized a variety of nonproliferation assistance programs to prevent former Soviet biological weapon scientists, relevant equipment, and pathogens from contributing to

foreign biological weapons activities. Under these programs, managed by the Departments of State, Defense, Energy, HHS, and Agriculture, more than 5,000 scientists have received funding for collaborative research both on public health

threats and on biodefense related projects. In addition, the world’s largest anthrax

production facility, at Stepnogorsk in Kazakhstan, has been dismantled. Efforts

have also been undertaken to tighten the security at the various culture collections

around the former Soviet Union. Much more, however, remains to be done.

During the Crawford summit last month, Presidents Bush and Putin agreed, in

a Joint Statement, to expand their cooperation to prevent and defend against the

threat of bioterrorism. No concrete manifestations of this enhanced cooperation

have, however, been announced. One obvious area would be to build upon the programs begun by the Clinton administration to prevent the proliferation of capabilities from the former Soviet biological weapons program. Senator Kennedy and his

staff have been working on this issue, and have developed a number of valuable

ideas. They include dismantling and redirecting additional former biological weapons production facilities, expanding collaborative research on global diseases such

as HIV and TB, broadening work with U.S. scientists on vaccines and other medical

countermeasures to biological weapons, facilitating commercialization activities at

former biological weapons facilities, and strengthening the security at culture collections and other sites that maintain dangerous pathogens. A comprehensive program

of this type would not come cheap—upwards of $750 million would be required over

the next five years. However, given the very real potential for critical elements of

the former Soviet program to contribute to national or terrorist biological weapons

efforts, such an investment would be a prudent step.

This concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to try to answer any

questions you might have.

21

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Lantos.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me first

express my very sincere commendation to all three of our witnesses. They have presented outstanding papers, and I am deeply

grateful to them for their willingness to share their knowledge. We

are in awe of your technical expertise, but we are bumbling in the

dark when it comes to policy recommendations, as you are, because

clearly your technical expertise takes us only a certain way in making policy decisions with respect to how we protect the American

people from these horrendous future possibilities. So let me think

out loud and then invite all three of you to comment.

I take it we must begin with the assumption that the capability

of producing these weapons of mass destruction is a necessary, but

certainly insufficient precondition for using them against the

United States and the American people. We would not be worried

if the British had these capabilities or if the Australians had these

capabilities. So we have to look for motivation and we have to look

to the historic record.

Now, I would like to begin the speculation by quoting our Secretary of Defense, Don Rumsfeld, who basically said that several

nations that support international terrorists are also trying to acquire chemical, biological and nuclear weapons; and it doesn’t take

a leap of imagination to expect that at some point those nations

will work with those terrorist networks and assist them in achieving and obtaining those kinds of capabilities. This is a very profound statement by Don Rumsfeld, because what he does, he marries up rogue states with terrorist networks and assumes that

there will be some collaboration between those two sets of entities.

Now, there is one more sort of obvious fact that we have to deal

with and that is the timing of the anthrax letters. It would be an

extraordinary coincidence if the timing of the Daschle letter and

the Leahy letter would be just a happenstance having nothing to

do with September 11. You really must have either an unbelievable

degree of naivete or sort of a bizarre twist of mind to think that

these two events just happened to coincide.

I do not believe that they just happened to coincide. I believe

that there is a relationship between the attack on the Pentagon

and the Towers and the anthrax letters. I can’t prove it, but logic

would indicate that there is a very strong probability that there is

a relationship. We then need to ask, since we don’t know who did

it, what country among the rogue countries is more likely to have

the capability to have been a participant in this monstrous attack.

I would like to ask each of you—and I know this is difficult, and

you are guessing as a layman is guessing, more or less—what country would you put on the top of the list, Dr. Spertzel, as the most

likely candidate for having been implicated in this?

Mr. SPERTZEL. I said in the very beginning, when I first heard

the description of the Daschle letter, that I believed it had to be

an overseas connection, state sponsorship. And like you, sir, I also

found the timing to be the most fantastic coincidence that I had

ever seen.

Now, having said all that, I then said I could name several possible sources, but clearly number one on my list would be Iraq.

Now that has received some further credence in my mind because

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either on the 19th or the 20th of September, an article that appeared allegedly written by Uday in the Babel Newspaper referred

to a ‘‘virus that would’’—the exact wording to the effect that

‘‘A virus would attack the raven and it would respond to antibiotics at first, but in later times, would no longer be controlled

by antibiotics.’’

Now, that is again a horrible coincidence, if you like, on the 19th

or 20th of September. And yet the first anthrax publication, or in

the media or that the government knew about, was in October and,

to me, that just adds further credence. And then when you combine

that with the repeated contacts between Iraq personnel by some of

their security agents and the al-Qaeda network, it even adds to

that, as well as the three defectors that have all independently

made the allegation of Iraq training terrorists, non-Iraqi personnel,

at one of my favorite locations in Iraq, Salman Pak Peninsula.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much.

Dr. Alibek.

Dr. ALIBEK. In my opinion, I would say this letter sent, this product could be manufactured by some terrorist groups, not by any

country itself. But at the same time, what I would like to say, these

people could be trained by some people with knowledge of how to

develop biological weapons in another forum.

In this country it is absolutely agreed that one of these countries

could be Iraq. It could be Libya or Syria. It is very difficult to say,

but they have got this capability. But I wouldn’t limit this just by

these countries.

What we need to keep in mind is that some al-Qaeda or some

other terrorist groups—let me say not highly trained experts, not

very professional experts—could develop something by themselves,

of course, not in the cavities of Afghanistan. In this case, what we

need to look for are very different groups either supported by one

of these countries I mentioned or working independently like the

al-Qaeda group that has one or another cell involved in manufacturing biological weapons.

Mr. LANTOS. Ms. Harris?

Ms. HARRIS. As I said in my statement, there are three possible

scenarios here. One is the rogue state scenario. And clearly Iraq

would top, I think, everyone’s list.

Mr. LANTOS. Would Iraq top your list also?

Dr. ALIBEK. Correct.

Mr. LANTOS. All three of you are in agreement that Iraq is the

most likely source?

Ms. HARRIS. If it is, in fact, a deliberate effort by another state

to inflict harm on the United States, then Iraq clearly had the most

advanced biological weapons program outside of the former Soviet

Union. I think, as you mentioned in your statement, if a link to

Iraq, which hasn’t been made yet, does eventually emerge—and I

am somewhat more skeptical than Dr. Spertzel on that point—but

if it does emerge, it just reinforces the importance of getting U.N.

inspectors back into Iraq.

It has been 3 years since the inspectors were kicked out. We

don’t have as clear an idea as we should of what is happening in

Iraq. And we have absolutely no capacity to stop the reconstitution

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of the dual-use facilities that were central to Iraq’s nuclear, chemical and biological programs. I applaud the Administration’s recent

efforts to give renewed emphasis to getting an inspection force into

Iraq.

Mr. LANTOS. May I just ask one quick question, Mr. Chairman?

I know I have overrun my time, but think it is relevant to developing this story.

Since one of the factors we decision-makers have to rely on is

past history of all the rogue nations, of all the nations on the state

sponsors of terrorism list, which ones have a history of using biological or chemical weapons?

Dr. Spertzel.

Mr. SPERTZEL. Well, I am not 100 percent that I know all of

them, but certainly again we come back to Iraq, which used chemical weapons against the Kurds in the north. Some reasonably good

evidence is beginning to accumulate to suggest that they may also

have used a biological agent that is aflatoxin, although that is not

definitive yet. At least Iraq is one of those countries.

And I would also like to add, if I may, that getting inspectors

back into Iraq is not worth a darn unless they can go in with the

kind of authority that we had up until October 1996.

Thank you.

Mr. LANTOS. Dr. Alibek.

Dr. ALIBEK. First, we suspected and still suspect that the Soviet

Union, not Russia, used biological weapons during World War II.

Of course we are now talking about Russia, because it is an improbability that Russia would share this information officially—I

would say officially—with terrorist groups. Of course, it is highly

unlikely.

Iraq is a real case because for Saddam Hussein, of course, there

was no question of deploying either chemical or biological weapons.

In this case, there is no moral limitation for this country, for this

dictator to either use or to share biological weapons and knowledge

with terrorist groups. In my opinion, it is important to know.

But additionally, I would say, when we discuss terrorist groups

and especially when we say it is very difficult, for example, to deploy biological weapons, we often refer to the Aum Shinrikyo case.

I would like to suggest it is not overwhelming information that

Aum Shinrikyo made a significant and, let me say, dramatic mistake in that they were not able to find an avirulent strain of anthrax, they didn’t test their anthrax strain, and they actually developed their weapon based on a non-virulent strain. In this case,

of course, nobody would be killed; that is absolutely obvious. And

we should stop using Aum Shinrikyo’s impossible case to prove that

biological weapons may not work.

Ms. HARRIS. Just to respond to Dr. Alibek, my point was that the

Aum Shinrikyo illustrated the technical hurdles that need to be

overcome by a terrorist group. And I think the Aum’s failure to secure and deploy effectively a virulent strain of anthrax, simply underscores the challenges that have to be met in this area.

Responding to your question, Mr. Chairman, clearly both Iraq

and Iran used chemical weapons during the Iraq-Iran war in the

1980s. There are also reports of Libyan use on a smaller scale of

chemical weapons in Chad in the same time period. My prepared

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statement addresses the biological capabilities of those countries.

Clearly Iraq is at a different end of the spectrum in terms of its

bio program than, for example, a country like Libya, where we

have successfully, I think, slowed down their program through export controls and other mechanisms during the 1990s.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you.

I would like to ask the panel collectively whether it isn’t a reasonable possibility that a country that wants to manufacture weapons grade anthrax couldn’t do it and hide it from many inspectors?

Or is it such an undertaking that it cannot be concealed from inspectors?

Dr. Spertzel?

Mr. SPERTZEL. It depends on the scale to start with. But at a

moderate scale, if they had an appropriate laboratory that was unknown to the inspectors or that the inspectors were not allowed to

inspect because of restrictions placed upon them, yes, it would be

possible to conduct such a program without being found by the inspectors.

And if you were to allow, as I believe the latest protocol called

for, notification of the basis of a challenged inspection through the

oversight panel serving Iraq, you may just as well have sent it directly to Baghdad—in which case, within 24 to 48 hours, you

wouldn’t find anything. You could have all the suspicions you wanted; you would not find evidence.

Chairman HYDE. Well, we know that Iran is a signatory to the

Nonproliferation Treaty, and yet we know that Russia is cooperating with her on nuclear technology. And we know that the international inspectors have given Iran a clean bill of health because

they can’t get to the places where the development of the nuclear

weapons is going on. We kid ourselves with all these paper treaties

that don’t have a meaningful inspection regime without having to

give them a tip-off as to when you are coming or where you are

going. This is worse than nothing, because it deludes you into believing you are protected.

And that is really what worries me. My nightmare scenario is a

vial of very poisonous anthrax coming in a diplomatic pouch to the

U.N. and just being placed in the water supply and watching the

chaos that would go on.

You are shaking your head. You mean that couldn’t happen?

Mr. SPERTZEL. It would be very difficult to have any significant

effect by placing it into the water supply. Now if there were other

means of delivering it, I would agree with you.

Chairman HYDE. How about the air conditioning?

Mr. SPERTZEL. That is a different situation.

Chairman HYDE. We will switch. That is a substitute for water.

I just wanted to make a point that taking refuge behind treaties

when the signatories to the treaties are determined to defeat them

is worse than nothing and very dangerous.

Ms. HARRIS. Could I jump in on this point, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman HYDE. Yes, my whole line of questioning was directed

to you.

Ms. HARRIS. Clearly, treaties don’t provide a 100 percent guarantee of finding smoking-gun evidence of noncompliance, but we do

25

learn an enormous amount as a consequence of arms control and

nonproliferation treaties. We get information through data declarations that supplements information we obtain through national

means. We have legally binding mechanisms for being able to pursue compliance concerns. And although those on-site inspections

may not produce smoking-gun evidence, you learn an awful lot

going on inspections about what a country may be trying to do in

a particular area. We know this from actual experience, doing inspections in Russia.

You can learn enough from these inspections to help target and

guide your intelligence collection, or help focus your export controls, or inform your biodefense efforts. Inspection regimes need to

be seen not as a be-all and end-all in and of themselves. Instead,

those regimes and the treaties that contain the provisions for those

inspections should be seen as part of a broader set of tools, the synergy of which really does advance your efforts to first characterize

the nature of the threat and, secondly, be able to respond to it.

Chairman HYDE. Don’t those treaties require cooperation between the signatories, so you come into my lab and you see what

I am doing, and I get to go into your lab and see what you are

doing; and maybe you make out pretty well on that kind of a deal?

Ms. HARRIS. Obviously, inspection requirements are almost always reciprocal. But let us be concrete here.

The Chemical Weapons Treaty and the draft protocol for the Biological Weapons Convention both contain very robust protections

that enable us to safeguard both proprietary commercial information and national security information. Let me give you an example.

I know from talking to chemical industry representatives before

the Chemical Weapons Convention came into force in 1997 that

their biggest concern was loss of commercial proprietary information. If you talk to chemical industry representatives today, they

will say it hasn’t happened. The treaty has very important protections for proprietary information, and all those protections and

more were built into the draft protocol for the Biological Weapons

Convention.

Chairman HYDE. I have heard that some countries have developed their weapons going to school on what other countries have.

Is that correct, Doctor? Are you indicating an ambiguity there?

Mr. SPERTZEL. Well, I have got to confess that I have not been

overwhelmed with either the proposals being put forth for the BWC

nor those implemented under the CWC. I was dismayed when I

learned that under the CWC, you can go to this building, but you

can’t go to that building which is on the same compound.

I go back to my Iraqi experience. They tried to pull that with us,

that this building of chemicals, biologists can’t go in there; and

what they started to do is start to move stuff from one building to

another depending on which team they thought was going to arrive. And that, to me, is not very productive.

Chairman HYDE. Very well. I will move on. We could have—— Dr. ALIBEK. I have been on the Russian side when we first started discussion of visits between the United States and the Soviet

Union. My personal experience was that as soon as the United

States and other countries agreed just to visit some facilities, the

26

Soviet Union decided to start developing a completely new type of

mobile biological weapons facility, which would never be detected

by any inspection. When you have 48 hours for 4 inspectors just

to visit one of the facilities, in my opinion it is a mockery. You

would never be able to detect anything having such a short time

frame because, believe me, I know how this facility could be hidden—especially if it is a small mobile facility. You can mask the

facility by the production of any products.

In this case, I am not against treaties, but they must be different

from what we have now. For example, could you imagine a situation where you come to Russia or China having 48 hours and four

inspectors to inspect a huge facility, you would never be able to

find any definitive information. This is the biggest problem.

But at the same time it gives you a wrong understanding that

we are doing something against the threat of biological weapons.

In my opinion, it will be a significant mistake if we sign this existing protocol developed in Geneva.

Chairman HYDE. Was there not an anthrax production facility in

the then Soviet Union at Sverdlovsk?

Dr. ALIBEK. After the Soviet Union stopped developing anthrax

at the facility in Sverdlovsk, it relocated its production to develop

a completely new weapon in Stepnogorsk.

Chairman HYDE. We never got to inspect that. In fact, it was denied for years that it was manufacturing anthrax.

Dr. ALIBEK. That is the biggest problem. It is the principle of two

sides discussing this issue and saying, we know you are developing

and manufacturing this weapon. No, we didn’t do this; find the

proof.

In this case, what we will have is well an ongoing situation because with Russia—everybody knows about the Soviet Union, what

facilities, what kind of capabilities, what kind of weapons, so on

and so forth.

Has it helped us to force the Russians to admit that they headed

a huge offensive biological weapons program? No.

Chairman HYDE. I am trespassing on my colleagues’ time, and I

don’t mean to do that. I just want to ask one quick question of Dr.

Spertzel, and then we will get to you; and then I will humbly apologize to my colleagues for taking the time.

Did they have mobile biological weapons manufacturing facilities

in Iraq?

Mr. SPERTZEL. We did not have absolute proof that they did. At

an unguarded moment, General Omar al-Saudi, who is senior advisor to Saddam, made the statement that he directed the bio group

to evaluate the possibility of mobile laboratories for production purposes.

We also know that they imported three mobile production laboratories, but I don’t know what the production was for. The terminology was on some documents that we obtained. So I can’t say definitively they did, but we have every reason to believe they might

have.

Chairman HYDE. Ms. Harris?

Ms. HARRIS. I just would like to make three points.

First, I think our inability to go to Sverdlovsk, despite concerns

about the release of anthrax from a military facility there in 1979,

27

underscores and demonstrates very clearly why we need some sort

of international, legally binding mechanism to be able to pursue

concerns about evidence we have that another country is developing or producing biological weapons.

Secondly, Dr. Spertzel said that when Iraq knew we were coming

to a particular building, it moved things somewhere else. That is

exactly the point. We watched them move things. We used other

intelligence assets to follow what was going on.

Did we know the details of what they were moving and all the

particulars? No. But the existence of those inspection provisions

forced the Iraqis to take steps that we were then able to pick up

through our own national intelligence means.

Third, Dr. Alibek pointed out that when the Soviets knew we

were going to be inspecting certain facilities, they then moved their

illegal work to other types of facilities. That, too, underscores the

value of inspection arrangements.

Part of what you want to try to do in arms control and nonproliferation is complicate the efforts of a cheater, of a proliferator.

By forcing a country to move their production or research activities

from one place to another, you make it harder and more costly for

them to pursue that program.

Chairman HYDE. We have a new doctor in security and complications. Mr. Tancredo.

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have just one quick

question.

Recognizing our ability to destroy the physical plant in which

these chemical and biological agents are produced of course begs

the next question, and that is, can we feel secure in the knowledge

that the physical destruction of the plant itself would also actually

destroy the biological or chemical element that we are going after?

Is there a possibility that in the destruction of the plant there is

a disbursement of the element?

Mr. SPERTZEL. I think I would have to differentiate between two

different types of plants, one that precedes the finished product

and then one that may have the finished product. But blowing up

a production facility, a fermentation plant may contaminate the

local soil for some reasonable distance around, but is unlikely to

create a significant aerosol hazard for exposing the populace to inhalation.

If, on the other hand, you were dealing with a stored, dry material of the nature that is rarely airborne from an explosion, where

you would destroy some of the material, you would still have a significant aerosol release associated with that. There are procedures

that could minimize the effort.

But to answer your question, yes, it would be possible.

Dr. ALIBEK. When we discuss biological weapons today, we need

to distinguish biological weapons facilities from possible bioterrorist

facilities, because when we talk about military-type biological

weapons, these weapons require large production capabilities, large

reactors for cultivation, large equipment for concentration, drying

and so on and so forth. Military deployment is usually to deploy biological weapons in large amounts using different deployment techniques.

28

But when we talk about a terrorism-type of facility, could we locate it? By destroying a large production capability, we could reduce the threat of possible use of large amounts of military biological weapons. But bioterrorism threat, bioterrorism facilities, we

probably need to do some work to find where they are located and

how they can be eliminated.

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Delahunt.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and let me compliment the Chair for putting together another extraordinary

panel, one that I find very informative. And also let me suggest

that the Chair has, I think, focused on what I consider the fundamental issue here, which is, where do we go from here?

We can speculate as to who is responsible, whether it is Iraq or

some homegrown terrorist group, as to what has happened; and

hopefully our intelligence agencies and our law enforcement agencies are going to investigate this, and we will move forward. But

I think the fundamental issue is the value of treaties, if there is

any value in treaties—and there seem to be shades of disparate

opinion.

First, Ms. Harris, I would suggest that $750 million ought not to

deter us from protecting ourselves as best we can from bioterrorism

or bioattacks. I would remind us all that we have spent, since September 11, in excess of $55 billion and, most unfortunately, the loss

of 5- or 6,000 American lives. So let us put that in focus.

It was the Ranking Member, Mr. Lantos, who said that we

should be concerned about which nations have these capabilities.

Well, I would advocate the position that I would hope that no nation would have these capabilities, whether it be Great Britain or

Australia or the United States. I see no good coming from those

kind of capabilities. What I do see is leakage, leakage to terrorism

groups, to infiltrators. I just don’t think it makes any sense at all.

There ought to be a total and complete prohibition of the development in the research into these kind of weapons. They don’t belong

anywhere on this Earth.

But, again, to get back to the treaty issues, you seem to advocate

in behalf of the treaties; and I do see your point that even if there

is a violation, the activity of violation has the potential to prompt

intelligence opportunities, to find out what is going on and why are

those things happening. Violations would serve as a red flag to intelligence agencies to either intensify our intelligence or to take the

appropriate steps, whether it be under the auspices of the treaty,

or to take bilateral steps to raise this issue.

But the Chairman makes a good point. If it is just on paper,

what value is it? I think it was Dr. Alibek that said, well, he supports treaties, but I guess this argument is coming down to, how

do we enforce the compliance mechanism? Clearly, I think, that is

the direction that we want to go in.

But let me start with you, Dr. Harris, and ask, what is your assessment of the proposal, the current protocol that I understand

that the Bush Administration has rejected? And is there a protocol

that meets a certain comfort level in terms of verification of compliance that you could outline or that you could imagine?

29

And I would ask the same question to Dr. Alibek and Dr.

Spertzel, because I would be interested in seeing that protocol. I

think we are making a mistake not putting forth something that

we could live with.

Ms. HARRIS. Thank you, Congressman.

I should say in the interest of full disclosure that during my 8

years working on the Clinton NSC staff, the BWC protocol was one

of my primary areas of responsibility. So it will come as no surprise

to you that I believe that a set of legally binding obligations for

countries to disclose information and to open up their relevant facilities to on-site activity is an important part of a broader strategy

for dealing with the biological weapons threat.

That said, I think it needs to be understood that biological weapons pose the most difficult verification challenge of any weapon of

mass destruction. If, by ‘‘verification,’’ we mean being able to determine on short notice with high confidence that a country is violating their obligations, I am not sure that it is possible to create

any international, legally binding regime that will give you a highconfidence verification capability.

What I think you can achieve and what, in fact, the Clinton Administration and our allies in the U.K. and throughout NATO,

Japan and elsewhere were pursuing was a protocol that would help

make it harder for cheaters to continue to cheat. The goal was to

raise the risk of detection, to make continued illegal activity more

expensive and more difficult, and thus try to deter it.

Today, I want to emphasize, most of the countries that are of biological weapons proliferation concern are parties to this treaty—the

vast majority of them. However, there is nothing standing in their

way. There are no enforcement provisions whatsoever in the 1972

treaty.

So they have a free hand. It was the judgment of many that putting in place a set of legally binding transparency arrangements,

data declarations complete with the ability to go on-site, would

have made it harder for cheaters to cheat, would have complicated

those programs, and would have given us access to information

that we could have added to our own national intelligence information about these programs. The protocol would have given us a capacity to go somewhere in Iraq or Iran, both of which are BW parties, or force them to refuse an inspection, which in and of itself

would have said something to the international community about

what these countries were up to.

So is verification in the traditional sense possible in the biological weapons area? Very, very difficult. But there are still important

benefits to be achieved from a set of legally binding dislosure and

inspection arrangements.

Thank you.

Dr. ALIBEK. In my opinion, any treaty is futile concerning biological weapons and would never protect us against bioterrorism, because there are some organization that don’t sign treaties.

When we talk about countries, for example, it is possible. But in

that case we are talking about real biological weapons activities

that are military activities. But when we discuss biological terrorism, these facilities would be very small, tiny places you would

never uncover. In this case, we need to be absolutely clear that any

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treaty would never protect us against bioterrorism in terms of

verification, if we developed a verification processes.

When we talk about whether or not we need to have treaties,

yes, we do need to have treaties. But it must be a completely different type of treaty, in my opinion.

Again, as I said before, I come in with knowledge on both sides,

in Russia and in the United States. When you have got three or

four inspectors, when you have got large facility, and you have got

48-hour notice, you have got a short time. In such case, you have

no time to distinguish this facility. Of course, you can have your

suspicions, but you never will be able to have a definitive answer

whether or not this facility is a biological weapons facility or a legitimate facility.

Just as a small example, well-known, is Iraq. We sent in many

inspection teams, a lot of them. We found something. But the actual sites with programs, we started getting only after Saddam

Hussein’s son-in-law defected from Iraq. That was the starting

point. In that case, of course, we had nearly full access to all facilities and sites within Iraq.

Could you imagine something like this in Russia or China? No,

I don’t think so.

Mr. LEACH [presiding]. Dr. Spertzel, could you respond briefly?

Mr. SPERTZEL. Yes, I will.

For the most part, I agree with what Dr. Alibek has said. I think

it is worth adding, however, in the case of Iraq, I think that is a

good example. Yes, in theory on paper we had the right to immediate access, unannounced, unchallenged. But it was a paper authority. It was not reality. Every time we approached something

that had some indication that there was something there, we would

know it because we would be challenged, and we would be stopped.

It was just repeated. So unless there are some teeth behind the

protocol, it isn’t worth the paper that it is written upon.

It comes back to the question that was raised, that is, what is

the enforcement mechanism behind it? And I am sorry to say, don’t

count on the U.N., because I think we saw ample illustration of

that in the case of the Iraqi situation. From October 1996 on, we

were wasting our time, and if the UNMOVIC gets back into Iraq,

unless things change, it will be one of the larger criminal actions,

in my opinion, fostered on mankind, because it will be a complete

sham.

Mr. LEACH. Thank you.

Mr. Cantor.

Mr. CANTOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have two questions; and I think, Dr. Alibek, the first one is directed toward you. I think before the Committee broke for the vote

you had been talking about the fact that the delivery of the anthrax through the Daschle and other letters was not perhaps the

most efficient way of getting the anthrax here; and I would ask

you, does that in any way tell us anything about the perpetrators

of this act?

Also, perhaps Chairman Hyde had talked about his biggest

nightmare. What should we be trying to ready ourselves for, or perhaps take steps to apprehend individuals who might be up to trying to deliver the anthrax in a more ‘‘efficient manner’’? And do you

31

think that a State Department-type awards program similar to

that that we are offering to prevent acts of physical terrorism

against our facilities would work in this field trying to track some

of the biological agents and those who might try to use them

against America?

Dr. ALIBEK. Yes, you are absolutely right. I said that letter-borne

anthrax is the least efficient way to deploy anthrax. Why? It is

very difficult to say. But I can assume that this group or this individual used this way to deliver for one or two important reasons.

First, it would be very difficult to trace mail back to find this individual, because he could be everywhere. Whether you live, for example, in California, or in Iraq, a letter is sent from one location.

In this case, there is no person or individual who was at the place

of deployment at the time of actual deployment. It would be very

difficult to find this individual, or group of these people.

Second, in my opinion, it was accidental, or it was a major idea.

They understood the American psychology, mentality. Because

what they understood in this case, this deployment, as I said it before, it was not an actual biological weapon attack, it was a psychological economic attack using biological agents. They achieved

something in this specific case, in my opinion.

But when we talk about some other techniques to deploy, I feel

some reluctance to discuss them. But because it has been already

published and discussed on TV, unfortunately, we will have many

vulnerable places. It could be administrative buildings. It could be

commercial buildings, and so on and so forth. We need to start

thinking out of the box, in my opinion.

If there is an event, of course, we start at this point. But when

the event starts going away, we start calming down. Of course, it

is our past, because this past would be our future again, but in a

completely different forum.

We need to do many things in terms of our preparedness, our

possible response, training people, informing people, developing

new treatments and so on and so forth, because there are many

areas we have not covered yet.

In my opinion, I would like to repeat once again, what we haven’t

done yet is doing some work with Russian scientists. We started

funding some Russian entities—just to keep them employed in Russia. But what we need to keep in mind, in my opinion, it is a major

point. I would like to emphasize that many Russian scientists previously involved in developing biological weapons, now they are

overseas, some of them in the former Soviet Union countries, some

of them in the United States, in Canada, France, some in other

countries. In this case, we have no idea what they are doing. We

have no idea whether or not they have been reached by somebody

just to sell their expertise.

But you know, just to reduce this threat, we need to develop our

new program. It wouldn’t be a very expensive program. But what

we need to do, we need to find a way to find these Russian scientists, to invite them to the United States, to employ these scientists here in the United States. Because, keeping in mind their

knowledge in many fields of biological weapon threats and biological weapon defense, we would have a significant boost in our biological weapons defense study.

32

Especially I would like to say, our theory about anthrax and

smallpox, in my opinion, is dead wrong. Because there are many

different agents that could be used in bioterrorist attacks. In this

case, we need to reevaluate our understanding of the biological

weapons threat. We need to develop a new concept of protection

against biological weapons.

Mr. CANTOR. Thank you.

Mr. LEACH. Thank you.

Did you have further questions, Mr. Cantor?

Mr. CANTOR. No, that is okay, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Schiff.

Mr. SCHIFF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I very much appreciate all of your testimony today, and I agree

with my colleagues.

Mr. LEACH. Withhold for a second, Mr. Schiff. We will go to a

second round if you have another question.

Mr. CANTOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SCHIFF. Thank you.

Again, I appreciate your testimony. I agree with my colleagues

that the anthrax terrorism is not unrelated to September 11th. I

may disagree to some extent in that the fact that this is not wholly

a separate event from September 11th, although it does not mean

that it was a coordinated event.

I think, frankly, it is more likely that this was an opportunistic

terrorist event related to the 11th in that it provided a great opportunity to enhance the terror of September 11th and bootstrap itself

onto that date. Much as I would love to believe this was international, it grieves me to think that the greater likelihood may be

this is domestic, and that someone born on American soil may have

given this kind of aid and comfort to our enemies.

We talked a fair amount already about state sponsorship. I think

you were all in agreement if there was a state sponsor, the most

likely candidate was Iraq, even though their evidence is extraordinarily sparse.

I wanted to ask about a couple of things. One, if there were no

state sponsor, who would the most likely organizations be without

a state sponsor? And, also, if this were domestic, what would the

perpetrator—what would their profile look like?

To give form to those questions, I wanted to mention a couple of

things. My suspicion that this is domestic rather than international

has much to do not with the quality of the anthrax, which is some

of what you have talked about, but the nature of who the targets

are, the somewhat haphazard nature of the attack itself, and some

of the written correspondence that accompanied the attack.

And I gathered, Dr. Alibek, from your statement—and this had

not been apparent to me before—that the emerging quality of the

anthrax indicates someone who has been experimenting perfecting.

And if that is the case and they came up with a better product

which ended up being sent to Senator Daschle, the question is

raised, why would they send the inferior product to some of the

other targets unless, perhaps, there was not an infinite supply of

anthrax.

33

I wanted to ask you, number one, whether that indicated not

only someone who was improving their craft but also may not have

unlimited access to anthrax.

I also think I heard you say that there was no uniformity in the

size of the anthrax spores, indicating that it was professional but

not highly professional; and I wanted to ask you, in the event that

it were domestic, would someone, for example, of your training or

someone else’s training in a research lab in the United States be

able to go out on their own, in their own basement and gather the

materials necessary to produce this on their own?

Would, for example, former scientists of the Soviet Union or a

disgruntled U.S. Scientist be able—in the privacy of their home— to produce what we have seen here? And also, if not, if this would

require a complex lab, could a lab worker on their own within a

domestic lab in the United States, without likely discovery of other

workers, be able to produce this and sequester it away from the

lab?

Dr. ALIBEK. There is an expression that politics is the art of the

possible. And in this case I would say bioterrorism, unfortunately,

is the art of the possible, too. You know what I mean in this specific case. It would depend on the equipment you have got, the

strain you have got. For example, if it is a well-known, well-trained

expert, but he or she or this group doesn’t have sufficient equipment, the specific equipment to manufacture anthrax using regular

production techniques, if this person is knowledgeable, he or she or

this group would use some materials they understand could be

used to manufacture not very sophisticated anthrax. In this case,

there are many different possibilities.

Mr. SCHIFF. If I may just focus in on that real quickly.

Let’s say you had a disgruntled U.S. researcher who had the expertise but did not have the equipment, couldn’t do it within their

own lab without discovery. Is there any of this equipment, other

than the anthrax itself, that would be proscribed from purchase,

from mail order or on-line sales? Or couldn’t you assemble your

own lab without anyone ever noticing by purchasing the equipment

from various suppliers?

Dr. ALIBEK. Let me explain it this way. If you are an expert in

biotechnology—I am not discussing what level of knowledge you

have got—you need to understand what are the major parameters

you need to achieve just to get a workable product.

For example, if you work with anthrax, you know what kind of

parameters you need to achieve the conditions you need to have

just to grow this agent. You know that you can use one type of

equipment, another type of equipment, a third type of equipment

or no equipment whatsoever. That is possible, too.

When you start analyzing what kind of product you want to get

and how much of this product you need to get, of course, you can

use a principle completely different from our process of thinking.

We think by analyzing the situation from the point of what kind

of equipment is needed just to manufacture this type of product.

But their process of thinking could be completely different—what

kind of parameters needed just to have this product. And proceeding from this you realize very simple equipment, just regular

containers for growing, bought at one——

34

Mr. SCHIFF. But, Doctor, to obtain the quality of the anthrax that

we have seen sent to Senator Daschle, would you need any equipment beyond which you can order on the open market without

causing any attention to yourself? In other words, if you have access to anthrax in a laboratory and you are able to obtain some,

is there any technological or economic bar to obtaining the rest of

the equipment you need to do this in your own home?

Dr. ALIBEK. You know, that is a very important point, because

just to get this type of product, there is no necessity to have any

sophisticated equipment. I have said this several times before this

anthrax scare. It could be done if this person knows how to do this,

using very simply techniques, very simple equipment, and this

product could be obtained in any amount.

Mr. SCHIFF. One of the reasons that I introduced legislation a

couple of weeks ago, which is a parallel of Senator Feinstein’s, Senator Kyle’s legislation to improve lab security in the United States,

is really for exactly this point. I think the investigation thus far

has revealed, number one, that we didn’t know how many labs actually had it, even in this country, and that there are still not adequate safeguards to know who has it, who is working on it for what

reason. Is it a legitimate research purpose?

What do you think—and I know this is very gross speculation—

but if you had to speculate, if this were domestic, what would the

profile be of someone with the knowledge base to do this? In other

words, would it have to be someone who had experience in a weapons program? Could it be somebody who simply worked at a university laboratory doing research? Given the quality of what has

been produced, what do you think the profile would need to be?

Dr. ALIBEK. It’s very difficult to answer this question because I

am not an FBI agent or expert in psychology, but just——

Mr. SCHIFF. I don’t really mean—— Dr. ALIBEK. As a regular citizen, if I may, with some knowledge

in this field, I would imagine somebody who has some knowledge

in this field, not necessarily in the field of anthrax, but not a person who was not trained at all. I am talking about the lowest level

of expertise. It could be a lab technician. It could be a technician

working at one of the hospitals. It could be a technician working

at one of the companies or even somebody who worked before,

many years before, in this field.

But what is important in this case, is to get some information on

how to do this. Recently, there was a publication in the New York

Times that one individual from Utah was selling some manuals on

how to make anthrax. When this manual was analyzed, it was absolutely obvious to me that it was a primitive process, but it was

a workable process. In this case, if somebody bought this manual

and has some knowledge, has some time and training, this person

would be able to develop this product. It would take some time, but

especially by paying attention—— There were two different products. First product was not very sophisticated and contained many vegetative cells, and second one

was more sophisticated. It could mean that there was some sort of

training process, some time for getting smart for this group or this

individual, just to go from a less sophisticated product to more sophisticated product.

35

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, if you will indulge me—— Mr. LEACH. I’ll tell you what. I would prefer, Mr. Schiff, because

you have gone 15 minutes, that I address some questions. Mr.

Delahunt has some questions. And we will come back to you.

Mr. SCHIFF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LEACH. Let me go into a little bit of history, if I may.

In 1969, when President Nixon unilaterally decided that the

United States should not pursue a biological weapons development

program, he did it based upon a scientific panel that was constructed which came to the conclusion that it was much too dangerous to experiment with this, even in this most sophisticated

country in the world. I raise this because there came to be a Biological Weapons Convention of 1972, of which I was a member of

the delegation and negotiated.

From a simple moral perspective, it is inconceivable to me that

any moral scientist anywhere would attempt to experiment with biological agents. And I stress this because the simple morality is

that these agents can be too easily escape from a scientific enclave

and if used can too easily backlash on the entire world community.

Now, I again raise this because the subject has been raised of scientists for hire. I think it is very impressive that there has been

very little evidence of this. And sometimes we think about trying

to hire people to avoid things. But I think a Russian patriot would

be unlikely to want to participate at any price with another country in this venture, because they would know the implications of

it. In fact, there are some stories of Russian scientists going 6 to

8 months without pay.

So sometimes when we think about ways to assist, and I think

we can—for example, by hiring scientists in as constructive a way

as possible, but we ought to do it with great respect that no moral

scientist would enter this field.

But I want to go into something that I wanted to ask you about,

Dr. Alibek. The 1972 convention was the Biological and Toxic

Weapons Convention. By 1979 there was growing evidence that

toxic weapons were being used and toxins being biologically derived

from dormant agents in Southeast Asia, and then some indications

possibly later in Afghanistan, agents that came originally from the

Soviet Union. Would you have any knowledge of this? Can you

speak on that subject, the subject of yellow rain?

Dr. ALIBEK. I have been asked this question many, many times;

and, unfortunately, I cannot provide you with any conclusive information saying that there was no such yellow rain. I came to work

for this program in 1975, and I have never heard about any

microtoxin weapons developed by the Soviet Union. And, here in

this case, I cannot say yes or no because there were many different

enterprises involved in the research and development of biological

weapons. Something could have been done by the Minister of Agriculture. But I cannot say that there was yellow rain, and the Soviet

Union used this biological weapon in Southeast Asia.

Regarding using biological weapons in some other places, I cannot say I do know this, because it was not official discussion between some minister of defense officials of the Soviet Union and

myself. One of them mentioned that Glanders biological weapons

were used in Afghanistan. It was just on one occasion, I would say.

36

But what results they obtained they had no idea, because they

used Glanders in some remote locations of Afghanistan.

Mr. LEACH. The term is Glanders? Could you spell that?

Dr. ALIBEK. G–L–A–N–D–E–R–S. You know, it is a bacterial infection. It is not highly lethal, but lethal enough. And mostly it is

an infection.

But to address your statement regarding moral issues, the different moral issues, in my opinion, it is a very important statement. But, we shouldn’t make a mistake, because when we talk

about scientists, we usually refer to scientists working in the West.

And you know the scientists here in the West probably would feel

it morally unacceptable to being involved in any, let me say, bioterrorist activity or biological weapons activity. But we shouldn’t

apply American moral ethical standards to any other countries, like

some Middle East countries, and scientists in the Middle East or

scientists of the former Soviet Union.

I don’t want to accuse anybody. But, for example, using my own

knowledge in the Soviet Union, this was not the case. Okay. We

understood that there was no such program in the United States,

that it was terminated in 1969. But even after that, when we found

out that there was no program, many Russian scientists still believe that they have done something very important. They have no

psychological problems. They have no moral problems. They have

no ethical problems. They are proud, and they consider themselves

as veterans of the Soviet Union.

Mr. LEACH. Well, thank you. That is very thoughtful.

Let me turn to the more immediacy of the present. Several days

ago the New York Times reported that the very high concentration

of anthrax spores in the Daschle and Lahey letters suggested that

possibly this came out of a United States biological laboratory. Do

you agree this concentration level could or could not have been

achieved by Iraq?

Dr. ALIBEK. First, I wouldn’t overestimate this finding. The problem is this.

First, I don’t believe it was possible just to have one gram of this

product, to measure the actual concentration in one gram. In my

opinion, it was a matter of recalculation of the count. When experts

find some particles of this product, what they usually do, they

measure size, then they calculate how many spores this particle

could house, then multiply this amount in just such a way to find

out how many spores would be in one gram of such formulation.

In my opinion, there is a significant technical mistake here. You

cannot directly transfer this number to one gram, because if you

count a number of spores in several particles, even knowing the

size, the problem is when you have one gram of those particles, you

would see a huge number of empty spaces between the particles.

In this case, the real concentration in one gram would be completely different—it wouldn’t be 1,000 spores.

There are many other factors, but because of time limits I will

not elaborate. But I will say there is no evidence that this product

was obtained using American production techniques.

Mr. LEACH. Dr. Spertzel, would you care to comment? In your

opening statement you indicated you thought it was quite possible

37

that this could have come from a country like Iraq. Is that your

basic feeling?

Mr. SPERTZEL. Yes, it is. Iraq basically used a two-step process

in the fermentation procedure which enabled them to get 100 percent spores from their material. And by a slight tweaking of that

system you can increase the production level by a couple of orders

of magnitude higher than what Iraq claims that they got. So, basically, they can start out with about 10 to the 11th before they dry

it, and the drying process should increase it by about another load.

At least that appears to be the situation.

Beyond that, we don’t know—what Iraq has acknowledged that

they got was much lower than that.

The other way that Iraq can attain this is by preparing anthrax

stern stream vaccine by growing the material on the surface of

auger plates. Going with this procedure, you would in fact have no

trouble getting to 10 to the 12th concentrations.

Mr. LEACH. You also noted in your prepared statement that Iraq

does not mill anthrax, but rather uses a spray drying process. Does

this process produce anthrax with different characteristics than the

milled anthrax, and does this give any indication of whether or not

the anthrax that we have seen may or may not have come from

Iraq?

Mr. SPERTZEL. As Dr. Alibek has indicated, and I believe, both

the U.S. and Soviet Union milled theirs. Iraq did not. I don’t know

whether the Daschle product has been milled or not. It is my understanding, but this is unofficial, that it doesn’t show the kind of

evidence that you should be able to see that would indicate that it

was milled. But that doesn’t mean this necessarily points specifically to Iraq. It may be an arrow pointing in that direction.

But, again, as Dr. Alibek has already indicated, there are some

other procedures whereby you can dry small product, small quantities, and not use a milling device in doing so.

Mr. LEACH. Well, finally, relating back to your prepared statement, you indicated that Iraq used Bentonite in its production of

biological weapons and may have attempted to use silica. How does

this relate to the anthrax that was mailed here in the United

States, and are there any hints in that direction that ought to be

looked at?

Mr. SPERTZEL. Well, it has been reported—in fact, it initially was

reported that there were signs of rings around the particles that

suggested they were similar to those rings seen in the one sample

that we brought back from Iraq that contained Bentonite.

On the basis of not finding alumina in further analysis, it was

concluded that this was not Bentonite. That may or may not be

true, because there are procedures—in fact, there is pharmaceutical material being prepared that contains only trace amount

elements of alumina because alumina has been extracted from Bentonite.

But, in addition to that, as I have indicated in my written statement, Iraq made serious efforts to obtain silica, pharmaceutical

grade silica, in 1988 and 1989. In that era, had they tried to get

it, I see no reason that they would not have been successful, because there was no prohibition of any kind against selling this type

of material.

38

Mr. LEACH. Just one final follow-up in this category. What do we

know about the medium in which the anthrax sent through the

mail was grown? And was a similar medium used by Iraq or other

countries?

Mr. SPERTZEL. As far as I know, we don’t know anything about

the media upon which this was grown. Iraq does not particularly

use an unusual form of media. They used either a nutrient broth

or a tripsum soya broth, both of which are readily available anywhere, as the initial growth component. They would then transfer

a portion of that into their final production which contained much

less energy, a so-called modified G media.

But, I would not expect evidence of this media to adhere in sufficient quantity to be indicative one way or the other, and particularly if they washed the spores, which they may or may not have

done.

Mr. LEACH. Thank you.

Well, let me just conclude, before turning to Mr. Delahunt, one

other aspect. I mentioned earlier the morality of experimenting

with this sort of thing. In our country we have a great curiosity factor among young people and older people with new theories of logic

and science, and I just think it has to be stressed, even though

some Americans in college have literally attempted to build atomic

bombs, that there is no area whatsoever that it is more dangerous

to try to experiment with than to make one of these kinds of weapons or to develop an anthrax or any other disease, and it is a place

where curiosity must stop.

It is not only immoral, it is illegal under our law and under

international sanctions. There should be no temptation whatsoever

to stretch the imagination for anybody anywhere to try to develop

those kinds of things.

Mr. Delahunt.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I thank the Chair for indulging me. I would like

to associate myself with your final observation. I think it is important that it be emphasized.

Just very briefly—and I thank you for your patience—I want to

make sure I am reaching the right inferences. In the hypothetical

scenario that Mr. Schiff put forward relative to Utah, I drew the

inference that it can be done even in a very primitive way. But if

we were to look at either individuals or terrorist organizations,

their resources, their capacity to weaponize, whether it be anthrax

or other weapons is somewhat limited. That it really is a nation

state, whether it be Iraq, the Soviet Union, the United States,

whomever, that would have the resources to provide a level of sophistication in terms of the development of these things, these

items, to the point where they have a very high degree of deadliness with the potential to impact a large percentage of the population.

So we can make a distinction between groups like al-Qaeda, individuals, someone like the Unabomber, versus the capacity of nation

states. Am I being accurate with that conclusion?

Mr. SPERTZEL. Yes, I think so. I am personally not a believer in

the mad Unabomber-type situation. Because, while you may not

need the equipment, it does have to be done with some degree of

safety, not necessarily for yourself. If you are the perpetrator, you

39

can find ways of protecting yourself, albeit cumbersome, while

working on this. But you don’t want to give yourself away either.

Mr. DELAHUNT. But the point is, as Dr. Alibek indicated, you

know there are manuals out there, how to do it. And I understand

it is primitive. But I think you have answered my question, and I

don’t want to indulge any more.

Mr. SPERTZEL. If I may. The critical part of this is not in growing

the organism. The critical part is making that final dried product.

And that is what, I contend, tends to rule out or argues against—

not ruling out, argues against the home-grown terrorist, unless you

envision somebody who is working and operating not in his garage,

not in the basement of his house, but in isolation maybe in the

western desert, where there is nobody around him for 50 or 100

miles.

Mr. DELAHUNT. In a more sophisticated environment.

Let me just ask one final question. Back to the enforcement and

compliance mechanism of treaties, let’s presume that we could design and develop a mechanism that would meet all of your concerns. What would you recommend or suggest as sanctions for failure to comply? Because I think that the United States has lost or

is losing the argument in terms of world opinion regarding sanctions on Iraq for failure to comply with that particular United Nations resolution.

Would there be or could there be a series—and I will direct this

to Ms. Harris to begin with, and then you, Dr. Spertzel—a sanctions regime that would be invoked automatically for failure to

comply? Let’s say, for example, the denial of a visit to a particular

site? Or am I just going off into some area that it just can’t happen?

Ms. HARRIS. Congressman, I think that most countries would be

reluctant to agree in advance to an automatic sanctions regime in

which this particular activity would result in that particular penalty. For a variety of foreign policy reasons, countries prefer to retain flexibility in how to respond to situations. So I think automatic

sanctions are very unlikely.

What I think we do need is more of a debate about the types of

responses that would be appropriate to given events. Clearly, if a

country used biological weapons on a large scale, the response

should be much more robust and direct and painful than if you

were looking at a violation of a different type.

We need to think more about sanctions and how to tailor sanctions to the specific nature of the violation. But I am skeptical that

countries would agree in advance.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Well, what about even a mechanism that required a transparent debate about what would be an appropriate

assessment? In other words, don’t put the onus on the United

States, for example, in the case of Iraq. But put it in a forum that

it is not a mandated—for example, it is not a mandated violation

but that it becomes subject to an open process and one that results

in a meaningful sanction. I think we have got to think out of the

box a little bit on this.

Ms. HARRIS. I agree with you, sir. But I think the starting point

has to be an ability to pursue concerns about violations before you

40

can get to the point of saying, here we have the evidence, and let’s

talk about how to respond.

So the first step has got to be to try and construct a regime that

makes it harder for countries to pursue these kinds of capabilities

and gives you some prospect for being able to pursue concerns

when you get information from your own intelligence means.

We simply don’t have that capability today. And the proposals

that the Bush Administration has brought to Geneva that are

being discussed this week won’t get us there either.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you.

Mr. SPERTZEL. I don’t mean to sound terribly fatalistic, but

maybe that is what I am. I personally don’t believe that there is

anything beyond replacing them that you can do to a truly rogue

regime that doesn’t care what happens to its people. Because Saddam could have had the sanctions lifted a long time ago if he would

have only complied with the inspection system. But he doesn’t care.

Now, furthermore, those sanctions on Iraq are not half as effective or maybe even a quarter as effective as what the general population, the world population, believes they are.

We used to inspect the central distribution point for vaccines,

antibiotics, and other medications that Iraq was claiming that they

couldn’t buy because of the sanctions regime, and these were going

out of date sitting on the shelves not being distributed. Why? Because it did not suit his public relations aspect, and he didn’t care

what it did to his people.

If you have a rogue state of that nature, I don’t know what you

can do to it. And if you don’t have something that basically is enforceable on the people who don’t comply, that is, if you have a

sanctions regime and you find that Russia or France or China is

violating that sanctions regime, unless you can bring some kind of

a punitive effort against them, you can’t enforce it; and that is exactly what we have seen with Iraq.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you.

Mr. LEACH. Thank you.

Mr. Sherman.

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Just a quick comment about the Iraqi regime’s sanctions. I think

we have probably saved millions of people by requiring that the

money that Iraq gets for selling its oil goes into a fund which can

be used only for food, medicine, et cetera. I am confident that if

Saddam Hussein was allowed to spend that money on anything he

wanted, perhaps nothing would be spent on food and medicine, and

it would all be spent on palaces and on his weapons development

program.

The phenomenal failure of the United States to explain that to

the rest of the world is kind of shocking for a nation that is able

to make sugar water with bubbles and call it Coca-Cola and sell

that around the world for a hundred years. So our ability to explain ourselves in one area is considerably greater than another.

I am going to ask a question or two that go beyond the exact

scope of these hearings, but when I have such a learned panel I

would like to take advantage of it.

All of the anthrax that has been detected in the United States,

is it all the Ames strain?

41

Mr. SPERTZEL. You mean in terms of?

Mr. SHERMAN. The recent terrorist actions.

Mr. SPERTZEL. As far as I know, they are Ames-like.

Mr. SHERMAN. Ames-like.

Mr. SPERTZEL. I am not that certain. They have not yet performed a complete genetic profile, and until that is done you cannot

say that it is identical to what I prefer to call the Ames isolate. Because, in fact, Ames-like anthrax is found throughout much of the

western states. I believe the outbreak in cattle in Texas in the year

2000 and in California in year 2001 I believe is an Ames-like

strain.

Because early on, in this current letter situation, it was announced that what they had found was a strain that was similar

to one isolated in Iowa in the 1950s, as well as being found in

Texas and Haiti.

What I am getting at is, unless you do a complete genetic profile

and make the comparison, Ames-like strains can be found many

places.

Mr. SHERMAN. And how long does it take do this complete genetic profile? Should we assume that that is being done at each—

I see your colleagues nodding her head. But how long does it take

to do this complete genetic analysis?

Mr. SPERTZEL. It is my understanding that it is being done. I am

not certain how long it takes. I am not a molecular biologist. I cannot answer your question.

Mr. SHERMAN. I believe in addition to the anthrax terrorism in

the United States, there has been one international letter that

went from Switzerland to South America, not to mention a few

other rumors that I believe have all been disproved. Do we know

whether that was Ames strain? And I realize this is out of the

scope of this hearing and not what you came here to discuss.

Mr. SPERTZEL. According to what I have read in the newspapers,

CDC has said it is not the same as the Daschle material and the

New York Post material. They did not say whether it was a vaccine

strain or a pathogenic strain. It is just different.

Mr. SHERMAN. Shifting back to Iraq, if Saddam Hussein agreed

to the most wide-open type of investigations and inspections, that

the inspectors could go anywhere and look at anything anywhere

in Iraq, would we be able to stop a determined effort to develop bioterrorist weapons simply because the United Nations had been

granted that kind of carte blanche inspection?

Mr. SPERTZEL. Not necessarily. As Dr. Alibek has indicated, the

quantities that would be needed—and I am really not even talking

about grams, so you could go up to even a half kilogram or kilogram—to produce that kind of quantity would not take a particularly large facility. It would have to have safety conditions that

would confine the spores so that they would not reveal their presence.

But, again, with detection methods for bioagents, field detection

methodologies are not that good. So you would actually have to

visit the site and be collecting samples to go back to the laboratory,

which means you would have to have some evidence, probably some

intelligence guiding you, to get there.

42

Mr. SHERMAN. So you would inspect the laboratories that you

knew were places where this work could be done, but if somewhere

in a Bagdad suburb a new laboratory was created, you wouldn’t

know to go look there, and you can’t very well knock on the door

of every suburban home surrounding Bagdad.

But I see Ms. Harris also may have a comment.

Ms. HARRIS. Could I just jump in here, Congressman?

Clearly, if U.N. inspectors had unlimited access to any facilities

they wanted, you couldn’t have a hundred percent guarantee that

you would stop the Iraqi BW program. I agree with Dr. Spertzel

on that point.

But if you did have very robust inspection rights in Iraq, coupled

with ongoing monitoring of the dual-use facilities that have been

central to Iraq’s biological weapons program in the past, or that

could be used in the future for biological weapons efforts, I think

this would substantially degrade Iraq’s capabilities in this area

and, therefore, reduce the threat to us and to our friends and allies

in the region.

So I think it is important that we not look at this in black-andwhite terms. The fact that you can’t catch everything doesn’t mean

that having an inspection presence and, most importantly, ongoing

monitoring of the dual-use facilities, won’t have a major security

benefit for us in terms of the BW threat.

Mr. SHERMAN. Is there certain equipment that is needed where

there are limited numbers of that item of equipment in Iraq and

we know where each one of those items of equipment is, that dualuse facility perhaps?

Mr. SPERTZEL. Well, one of the principles behind the monitoring

regime that we had established was based on equipment and technology know-how. We had developed quite an extensive list, a rather broad list, and any facilities that had any item of that list of

equipment were required by Iraq to be declared.

That didn’t mean they always did it. In fact, we were continually

finding, right up through 1988, new items of equipment that had

never been declared. We always perceived monitoring not as a prohibition absolute but rather as a deterrent, that they would be

playing a game of roulette and risk being caught.

But that only applies to either the known facilities that you as

a monitoring regime know about or that the country has voluntarily seen fit to declare, and we have ample evidence many times

over of new facilities that were not declared. In fact, one of those

was actually the nearest thing to a high containment facility that

Iraq had, and they never bothered declaring it. We stumbled on it

accidentally in either late 1996—I believe it was early 1997.

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you.

I thank the Chairman for his indulgence.

Mr. LEACH. Thank you.

I wanted to leave with just one thought about treaties, and for

some reason it never gets addressed.

I think it is self-evident that treaties in this area cannot be comprehensively perfect on evil countries. On the other hand, to the

degree that they serve as a deterrent as part of international law,

they make it more difficult for evil countries, but they also may

make it less likely that a quasi-difficult country might develop

43

these weapons. And it is in the interests of the United States and

the world community and civilization in general not to have these

weapons developed in quasi-difficult countries or in countries that

generally follow the rule of law; there are some stunningly dangerous. So that, in and of itself, is a plus.

With regard to the truly evil country, it also serves, when you

have international legal regimes established, as a basis for actions

against those countries. So whether they be sanctions that may or

may not be perfect or whether they be interventions that may or

may not be difficult, there is a case that is always profound for developing international agreements, and I think arguably in this

area, above any other conceivable area, because these weapons

have the potential capacity of destroying mankind, and that has to

be understood. Plagues can be developed for which there may not

be a perfect antidote, and so we all have an obligation to be profoundly alert to this particular issue. And it happens in a very

minor way, that it has been evidenced to date.

Finally, let me just say that, as I understand it, the good news

about anthrax is that it is incommunicable. The bad news is not

quite like nuclear isotope where you have a 10,000 year half-life.

These spores do last, though, for decades, if not longer and, in perfect circumstances, for very, very much longer. So anthrax is not

a very happy circumstance. But there are more unhappy ones that

are conceivable, and that is the basic realm we are dealing with.

In any regard, I want to, on behalf of Chairman Hyde, thank all

of you. You have been exceptional witnesses, and the Committee is

very appreciative for your testimony.

The Committee is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:25 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

(45)

A P P E N D I X

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DONALD M. PAYNE, A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for calling this hearing today on the very important

issue of Russia, Iraq and Other Potential Sources of Anthrax, Smallpox and Other

Bioterrorist Weapons. I appreciate the opportunity to address this subject.

I, like all of my colleagues who are here today to address the deadly anthrax and

related viruses, am concerned about the acquisition of and capability to produce biological weapons. I am especially concerned about their potential to affect our nation,

our citizens, and our way of life, and want to express my deep concern over the possibility that biological agents could find their way into the hands of rogue nations

or terrorists.

Realizing that the potential for leakage of agents, material, equipment and technology to produce biological weapons to terrorists from several former states of the

Soviet Union (including Russia, Kazakhstan , Uzbekistan) and from Iraq, and realizing that Russian defectors in the 1990’s revealed that the Soviet Union and subsequent Russian governments violated the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention

(BWD) by developing and maintaining the world’s largest offensive biological weapons program, we have a lot to be concerned about.

My concern is further heightened by the fact that most public information on the

Iraqi biological weapons programs comes from the now-defunct United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) which, from 1991 until Iraq banished international inspectors in December 1998, UNSCOM sought to locate and verify the destruction

of Iraq’s nuclear chemical, and biological weapons programs.

It is frightening to know that although UNSCOM sought to locate and verify the

destruction of Iraq’s nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs, its officials

were never satisfied that they discovered the full extent of the Iraqi biological weapons program, and strongly suspected that Iraq retained a significant covert biological weapons capability.

It is very important that the Committee closely examine the implications of this

new terrorist threat, which has affected us all, in ways that none of us could have

ever imagined.

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing the testimony of today’s witnesses, in

hopes that we can come to grips with this situation, as soon as possible.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE EARL BLUMENAUER, A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF OREGON

Mr. Chairman, I congratulate you and Ranking Member Lantos for organizing

this hearing. It is an important topic that warrants our discussion at this time in

our quest to assure the safety of U.S. citizens.

The use of biological weapons dates back centuries. In 1346, for example, the bodies of Tartar soldiers who had died of the plague were thrown over the walls of the

besieged city of Kaffa (now Fedossia in the Crimea) to infect the populace within.

In the 1767 French and Indian War in North America, both the English and French

used blankets infected with smallpox to spread the disease among the native population.

We mourn the deaths of the five individuals who have been killed here in the

United States this fall by anthrax. In order to carry out their attacks, the perpetrators of these heinous crimes needed the dangerous strains of anthrax with the extraordinarily high concentration of deadly spores. They also needed technological exVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:54 Jan 31, 2002 Jkt 076481 PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\FULL\120501\76481 HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
46

pertise. There are actions we can take to restrict access to these weapons and the

technology necessary to use them and therefore minimize the risks of bioterrorist

attack.

We certainly need to identify any weak links in our system here that could allow

dangerous substances to be accessed by the wrong people. We need to institute strict

federal controls and inspections of any biowarfare materials, including those used

for research.

A good health care system, as well as an effective disease detection and medical

response program, are the primary requirements in a country’s bioweapon protection strategy. These should be coupled with resources for intelligence, anti-terrorism, civil biodefense and emergency programs.

However, no single government will be able to totally protect its citizens from the

nightmare of biological terrorism or warfare by these means alone. Multi-level and

interlinked national and international strategies are required. Countries must exercise the political determination to establish and enforce stringent multilateral controls on the transfer of biotechnology, and must protect the absolute international

prohibition on biological weapon development and use. The best defense against a

biological weapons attack is to prevent terrorists or rogue states from acquiring bioweapons or their components in the first place.

On the international level, in order to better protect ourselves, the U.S. should

provide greater support for the Nunn-Lugar program and other similar programs,

and we need to support the mechanisms agreed to by a multilateral group to ensure

effective verification of the Biological Weapons Convention.

During FY94–99, the U.S. provided about $20 million for the Departments of Defense, Energy, and State for alternative and collaborative research projects. Included

among these is the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, established by Congress in 1991. It authorizes the use of Defense Department funds

to assist with the safe and secure transportation, storage, and dismantlement of nuclear, chemical and other weapons in the former Soviet Union. We funded the CTR

program at $443.4 million last year. It is an excellent investment and we should

do more.

Another important program I want to mention is the Civilian Research and Development Foundation, a nonprofit charitable organization that encourages opportunities for former weapons scientists to transition to productive civilian research. It is

funded in the State Department at $16 million this year, $1 million more than its

FY01 budget.

The fifth review conference of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in Geneva, Switzerland will conclude this week. This conference is considering a proposal

for developing legally binding verification measures. The U.S. has opposed the

mechanisms agreed to by a multilateral group that would ensure effective

verification. Just as the U.S. expects international cooperation in its war on terrorism, so too should the U.S. be a partner in non-military, practical international

measures like this that would slow the spread of dangerous biological weapons.

The BWC, a multinational disarmament treaty to ban the production and use of

biological weapons, was completed during the Nixon Administration. The treaty entered into force in 1975, without an agreed-upon means to verify compliance. In

1994, after evidence of treaty violations by Iraq and the former Soviet Union, parties to the treaty met to discuss creation of legally binding verification measures.

Over the past seven years, 22 meetings have been held. Yet, today, there are still

no monitors traveling the globe, checking to see that dangerous substances are accounted for, securely stored and being used only for legitimate purposes.

Over the years, the group meeting to strengthen the BWC has disagreed over

compliance measures, the issue of cooperative exchange of biotechnology and materials, and export controls. However, by last spring, most nations other than the U.S.

had agreed to a draft protocol. The U.S. has continued to resist inspections as being

burdensome and risky to U.S. pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms that fear the

theft of trade secrets. The Department of Defense believes that, without the presence of U.N. inspectors, Iraq may have reconstituted its BW facilities and again

begun covert BW production. Despite that, the Bush Administration has rejected a

draft verification protocol now being concluded by Convention Parties.

I hope that the time will come to give real teeth to the Convention. We must not

squander these review conferences.

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