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17-923-cv 

Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. 

 

 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A 

SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED 

BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. 

WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY 

MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE 

NOTATION ASUMMARY ORDER@). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY 

OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held 

at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New 

York, on the 19th day of October, two thousand seventeen. 

 

PRESENT: JOHN M. WALKER, JR., 

REENA RAGGI, 

PETER W. HALL, 

 Circuit Judges. 

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YING LIN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. No. 17-923-cv 

 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY, JOHN F. KELLY, IN HIS OFFICIAL 

CAPACITY AS SECRETARY, UNITED STATES 

CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, 

DIRECTOR USCIS LEON RODRIGUEZ, IN HIS 

OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR, DISTRICT 

DIRECTOR PHYLLIS COVEN, IN HER OFFICIAL 

CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF THE NEW YORK 

DISTRICT OFFICE, 

 Defendants-Appellees. 

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APPEARING FOR APPELLANT: EDWARD J. CUCCIA, Cuccia & Campise, 

PLLC, New York, New York. 
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APPEARING FOR APPELLEES: ELLIOT M. SCHACHNER, Assistant United 

States Attorney (Varuni Nelson, Assistant 

United States Attorney, on the brief), for 

Bridget M. Rohde, Acting United States 

Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, 

Brooklyn, New York. 

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District 

of New York (Pamela K. Chen, Judge). 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, 

AND DECREED that the judgment entered on March 1, 2017, is AFFIRMED. 

Plaintiff Ying Lin, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, sues 

under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq., and 

Declaratory Judgment Act (“DJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2201, for review of the United States 

Citizenship and Immigration Services’s (“USCIS’s”) denial of her application to adjust 

her status to lawful permanent resident. She here appeals from the dismissal of her 

complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5). 

On such an appeal, “we review factual findings for clear error and legal 

conclusions de novo.” Mantena v. Johnson, 809 F.3d 721, 727 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). While we must “accept[] all material facts alleged in the 

complaint as true and draw[] all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor,” we do so 

mindful that “[t]he plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction by a 

preponderance of the evidence.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, “[i]t 

is well settled that this Court may affirm on any basis for which there is sufficient support 

in the record, including grounds not relied on by the district court.” Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai 
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Precision Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395, 413 (2d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). In applying these standards here, we assume the parties’ familiarity with the 

facts and procedural history of this case, which we reference only as necessary to explain 

our decision to affirm. 

The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq., precluded 

the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction here. It states in relevant part that, 

[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), . . . 

no court shall have jurisdiction to review[:] (i) any judgment regarding the 

granting of relief under section . . . 1255 of this title [(relating to adjustment 

of status)], or (ii) any other decision or action of the Attorney General or 

the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for which is specified 

under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General or the 

Secretary of Homeland Security. . . . 

8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B). Subparagraph (D) provides a limited exception to this 

jurisdictional bar for “constitutional claims or questions of law.” Id. at § 1252(a)(2)(D). 

Lin’s complaint does not fall within this exception because, although she challenges the 

adverse statutory eligibility determination informing the adjustment of status denial, the 

USCIS also denied Lin’s adjustment application on discretionary grounds, which Lin 

does not challenge. Those grounds included more than one justification independent of 

those pertaining to the statutory ineligibility determination, for example, Lin’s failure to 

appear in immigration court or to surrender to United States Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement custody, her failure to comply with the Removal Order, and her false 

statements. In these circumstances, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) bars judicial review of both the 

statutory and discretionary determinations. See Ling Yang v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 278, 

279-80 (2d Cir. 2008). 
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That Lin’s complaint is nominally brought under the APA and the DJA compels 

no different result. First, judicial review of agency action is not available under the APA 

where such review is limited by another statute—here, the INA. See 5 U.S.C. 

§ 701(a)(1); Delgado v. Quarantillo, 643 F.3d 52, 55 (2d Cir. 2011). Second, the 

“declaratory judgment statute does not confer jurisdiction on a district court” 

independently. See Fleet Bank, N.A. v. Burke, 160 F.3d 883, 886 (2d Cir. 1998). 

Accordingly, the district court correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain 

Lin’s complaint. 

In light of that conclusion, we decline to reach the issue of jurisdiction under 

8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5). See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (“As a general 

rule courts and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which 

is unnecessary to the results they reach.”). 

We have considered Lin’s remaining arguments and conclude that they are 

without merit. Accordingly, the dismissal of her complaint for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction is AFFIRMED. 

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court