### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 15

– 0101
Filed December 23 , 20 16 Amended January 25, 2017

STATE OF IOWA , Appellee ,

vs.
TROY RICHARD BROOKS , Appellant

.

On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals

.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Rebecca Goodgame Ebinger , Judge.

The defendant seeks further review of a court of appeals decision affirming the denial of his motion to suppress in a probation revocation
proc eeding. DECI SION OF COURT OF APPEALS AND JUDGMENT OF
DISTRICT COURT AFFIRMED
.

Grant C. Gangestad and Robert G. Rehkemper of Gourley, Rehkemper & Lindholm, P.L.C., West Des Moines , for appellant

.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Mary A. Triick , Assistant Attorney General, John Sarcone, County Attorney, and Mark Taylor, Assistant County Attorney , for appellee

.2

MANSFIELD , Justice
. Th is case involves a defendant who was on probation after having
been convicted of drug offenses related to methamph etamine . Th e defendant’s sister and father , concerned that he had relapsed, contacted his probation officer. They reported the defendant was u sing methamphetamine in the family home, was missing work, and had
locked himself in his bedroom since the previous day. Two probation officers were dispatched to the residence. Wh en they arrived, the father
told them th e defendant was upstairs and “out of his mind.” With the father’s consent, and without objection from the defendant, the probation
officers entered the defendant’s upstairs bedroom. The defendant was
observed disoriented and covered in feces . He admitted he had relapsed and used methamphetamine.
The State commenced a probation revocation proceeding. The
defendant filed a motion to suppress all statements and evidence obtained upon entry into his be droom, claiming a violation of a rticle I , section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. The district court denied the motion, and on discretionary review , the court of appeals affirmed this denial.
On furth er review, we also affirm the district court . We conclude the warrantless entry into the defend ant’s bedroom by probation officers carrying out a probation mission did not violate a rticle I, section 8 under the circumstances presented here.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
On October 22, 2013, Troy Brooks, who had a lengthy history of prior drug

- related offenses, pled guilty in the Polk County District Court
to conspiracy to manufacture a controlled substance (methamphetamine) , a Class “C” felony in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(1)( c )(6) ( 2013 ), and possession of a controlled substance, third3

offense (methamphetamine) , a Class “D” felony in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(5). Sentencing took place on December 23. At that time, Brooks received consecutive sentences of up to ten years in prison on the conspiracy offense and up to five years in prison on the possessi on offense. However, at the same time, t he district court suspended Brooks’s
pr ison sentences and placed him on probation f or two years. The sentencing order required Brooks to sign a probation agreement and otherwise submit to the supervision of the Fifth Judicial District Depart ment of Correctional Services. Brooks’s written probation agreement included the following
condit ions : I will submit to a search of my person, property, residence, vehicle, or personal effects, at any time, with or without a search warrant or arrest warrant, if reasonable suspicion exists, by a peace officer or probation/parole officer.

. . . . I shall not possess, ingest, inject or otherwise use any non

prescribed drug.

. . . . I will make myself and my residence available for visits at the discretion of my supervising officer. On September 15, 2014, Brooks’s regular probation officer,
Michael Eva ns, received a voicemail from Brooks’s sister and eighty

- year

old father. The voicemail indicated Brooks had been using methamphetamine in the family house and had locked himself in his
bedroom since the previous day

. The voicemail also stated that Brook s had b een missing work due to drug use and had been concealing the
results of drug tests with bak ing soda.4 That same morning, Evans also received a phone message from the manager of a drug treatment fac ility Brooks had attended in the past. The manager c onfirmed Brooks’s drug relapse and s tated that B rooks
was “a real mess” and Evans should addres s the situation quickly.
Evans was at a court hearing in Lucas County when he rec eived the voicemails. For this reason, he could not go to the Brooks family
home . Instead, Evans contacted Lance Wignall and Ryan Smith, who
were also employed as probation officers by the Fifth Judicial District Department of Correctional Services

. He asked that “they respond to the address because [he] was indisposed at anothe r hearing.” Wignall and Smith arrived at the Brooks home later that day. Brooks’s father opened the front door and told the officers that Brooks was upstairs and “out of his mind.” He gave them permission to enter
Brooks’s room. 1 The probation officers knocked on Brooks’s bedroom
door and concluded it was locked. Brooks’s father advised th ere was no lock on the door, so the officers surmis ed that Brooks had somehow barricaded himself in. Upon further knocking , the door opened

. 2 The probation officers noticed a large knife on the floor that appeared to have been wedged between the door and the doorframe. It is not clear whether
the knife had fallen out or Brooks had removed it.
The off icers saw Brooks immediately

— surprised, dis oriented , and
covered in fecal matter. The officers conducted a quick search of the

1 At the suppression hearing, Brooks testified that he had exclusive use of the bedroom and had rented it from his father. There is no indication that the probation officers knew this beforehand.

2 Brooks testified at the hearing that he did not consent to the officers entering his room. Wignall, however, testified that Brooks said repeatedly he was going to open the door until the do or came open. The district court found that Brooks “said repeatedly that he was going to open the door, but then did not do so.”5

room and placed Brooks in handcuffs. Brooks admitted he had relapsed
and had been using methamphetamine.
Officer Evans filed a probation violation report as a result of t he September 15 incident. Prior to the probation revocation hearing,
Brooks filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the home
visit as a violation of his rights under a rticle I, secti on 8 of the Iowa
Constitution. Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied Brooks’s
motion . The court reasoned, The facts of this case demonstrate the important difference between searches by law enforcement officers and actions by probation officers tasked with supervising individuals in the community. Here, family members who had allowed Defendant to reside with them calle d Defendant’s probation officer . They were scared. They needed help. They could not handle the situation by themselves and they wanted Def endant out of their home. The Defendant was “out of his mind” and had locked himself inside his room. The officers responded to the home as quickly as possible. The Defendant’s assigned probation officer was unable to respond due to his presence at a cou rt hearing in a different county, but he contacted probation officers who are specifically assigned to deal with emergency situations such as this one. And this was an emergency situation. An individual does not have to be nonresponsive or overdose to ha ve an emergency. Defendant’s state of mind when officers eventually made contact with him confirmed th e family’s concerns were valid.

. . .

. . . .

. . . [T]he Court finds that Defendant’s right to be free from unreasonable searches under Article I, s ection 8 of the Iowa Constitution was not infringed when probation officers entered his room on September 15, 2014 and conducted a cursory search. The court added,
Even if the officers’ actions vio lated Defendant’s rights under A rticle I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution, the Court6 would follow the reasoning in Kain v. State , 378 N.W.2d 900 (Iowa 1985), and find that evidence gathered illegally w as not subject to exclusion in a pro b ation revocation proceeding. On January 9, 2015, the district court revok ed Brooks’s probation and imposed the original sentence of imprisonment for each offense. Brooks filed an application for discretionary review with this court and request ed a stay of his incarceration

. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.106 (1). We granted Brooks’s application and transferred the case to the court of appeals. The court of appeals affirmed the district court on the
basis of Kain

. Brooks then filed an application for further review, which we granted.
II. Standard of Review.
We review the district c ourt’s denial of a motion to suppress based on the deprivation of a constitutional right de novo. State v. Ochoa , 792 N.W.2d 260, 264 (Iowa 2010). We make “an independent evaluation [based on] the totality of the circumstances as shown by the entire

reco rd.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Breuer , 577 N.W.2d 41, 44 (Iowa 1998)). “We give deference to the district court’s fact findings due to its opportunity to assess the credibility of witnesses, but we are not bound by those findings.” In re Pardee , 872 N.W.2d 384, 390 (Iowa 2015) (quoting State v. Tyler , 867 N.W.2d 136, 153 (Iowa 2015)).
III. Analysis. On appeal, Brooks argues that the probation officers’ entry into his
bed room violated his rights under a rticle I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution and that any information acquired as a result of that entry must be suppressed. The State responds that the entry was lawful, and further argues that even if it was unlawful, the exclusionary rule does not apply in probation revocation proce edings. Article I, section 8 of t he Iowa Constitution provides,7 T he right of the people to be se cure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable seizures and searches shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons and things to be seized. “We employ a two

- step approach to determine whether there has been a
violation of

. . . article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution.” State v.
Kern , 831 N.W.2d 149, 164 (Iowa 2013) (quoting State v. Lowe , 812 N.W.2d 554, 567 (Iowa 2012)). “ First, the def endant must show he or
she has ‘ a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched. ’ ” Id. (quoting Lowe , 8 12 N.W.2d at 567). “ Second, if so, we must determine whether the defendant’s rights were violated. ” Id. “We jealously guard our right to construe a provision of our state constitution differently than its federal counterpart, though the two provisions may contain nearly identical language and have the same general scope, import, and purpose.” State v. Jackson , 878 N.W.2d 422, 442 (Iowa 2016).
A
. Brooks’s E x pectation of P rivacy. At th e time of the incident, Brooks was living with his sister and father

. B rooks’ s father

— the owner
of the residence

— freely and voluntarily c onsented to the probation officers entering the home in order to check on Brooks

. Nonetheless,
Brooks a rgues he maintained a legitimate expectation of privacy in the

room in which he was staying in his father’s home. To establish a legitimate expectation of privacy in his room, Brooks
must show “ (1) a subjective expectation of privacy and (2) this expectation of pri vacy was reasonable. ” Tyler , 867 N.W.2d at 168 (quoting State v. Ortiz , 618 N.W.2d 556, 559 (Iowa 2000)). “The determination of whether a person has a legitimate expectation of privacy with respect to a certain area is made on a case

- by

- case basis,8

consi dering the unique facts of each particular situation.” Id. (quoting State v. Fleming , 790 N.W.2d 560, 564 (Iowa 2010) ). At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Brooks testified that he
had ex clusive possession of the room and had been paying his father monthly rent to solely occupy the room. Brooks also testified that he
believed no one had the right to enter his room without his consent,
in cluding his father. We have held that a tenant, unrelated to a landlord, may have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in a rented bedroom under the Iowa
Constitution

. See Fleming , 790 N.W.2d at 567. In Fleming , we declined
to adopt the “community

- living exception” used by other jurisdictions , under which a person renting a room within a single

- family home has no separate expectation of privacy. Id. at 566

– 67 . Instead, we reasoned
that tenants in a house do not reasonably believe they are “ giving up the right to privacy in their personal space.” Id. at 567. While an individual may surrender h is or her p rivacy in a communal space , such as a living

room or a bathroom, we concluded it is reasonable that “the individual bedrooms remain private.” Id. The entry here was not into a comm unal space, but instead, into
Brooks’s personal bedroom. Brooks testified that he rented the bedroom from his father, although there is no evidence the probation officers knew this. We will assume for purposes of our decision that Brooks had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his bedroom.
B
. Special

- N eeds D octrine
. We must now determine whether Brooks’s rights under article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution were violated when Officers Wignall a nd Smith entered his bedroom. Among other things, t he State argues that the probation officers’ entry was justified by the special

- needs doctrin e . We believe it would be helpful to9 begin by reviewing our recent article I, section 8 caselaw concerning searches and seizures of probationers and parolees

. I n State v. Baldon , we concluded that a parole agreement containing a prospective consent

- to

- search provision is insufficient, by itself, to establish the voluntary consent necessary to justify a suspicionless search under article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution

. See 829 N.W.2d 785, 802

– 03 (Iowa 2013) . In that case, the defendant had signed a parole agreement that included a blanket consent to future
search es with or without a warrant or reasonable cause

. Id. at 78 7 . An

on

- duty police officer discovered that Baldon was staying in a motel well

known for being a high

- crime location

. Id. at 787

– 88. A police sergeant called Baldon’s parole officer and requested permission to search Baldon’s motel room and vehicle pursuant to the parole agreement. Id.
at 788. P olice officer s on the scene and the parole officer conduct ed the search together, which was “completely based on [the] agreement and nothing more.” Id. ( alteration in original). The officers discovered marijuana in Baldon’s ve hicle , which resulted in a charge of p ossession of marijuana with intent to deliver

. Id. On appeal, the only issue we addressed was “whether a parole agreement containing a consent

- to

- search clause renders suspicionless and warrantless searches of parolees reasonable under the search and
seizure clause of the Iowa Constitution.” Id. at 78 9

– 90. We did not consider whether the State’s maintenance of a parole system presented “special needs [] beyond the normal need for law enforcement.” Id. at 789 (alteration in original) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O. , 469 U.S. 325, 351,
105 S. Ct. 733, 748 , 83 L. Ed. 2d 720, 741 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring)). Further, we “largely set aside” cases dealing with probationers and instead focused primarily on parolee cases. See id. at10

795. We held that “the search provision contained in Baldon’s parole

a greement does not represent a voluntary grant of consent within our constitutional meaning” and therefore the suspicionless search of Baldon’s car violated article I, section 8. Id. at 803. Shortly after Baldon , we decided another parolee case in State v.
Kern , 831 N.W.2d at 149. In that case, Kern was on parole and had signed a parole agreement with a similar blanket consent

- to

- search provision. Id. at 155

– 56. A caseworker with the Iowa Department of Human Services received a complaint that marijuana was being grown, processed, and sol d in the house where Kern resided. Id. at 156. Kern’s
sixteen

- year

- old daughter and infant grandchild occasionally stayed at
the house. Id. The caseworker visited the home, accompanied by two police officers, and aske d Kern for consent to search the house. Id. Kern refused, and the caseworker removed the children from the home. Id.
The reafter the police officers returned to the house, without Kern’s parole officer, and informed Kern that the officers were going to search the house “because Kern was a parolee and had consented to a search in her parole agreement.” Id. at 156

– 57. The officers found marijuana and guns in various rooms of the house and Kern was charged with four drug
offenses

. Id. at 157.
Kern challe nged the police officers’ search as a violatio n of her constitutional rights, whereas the State argued the search was justified under several exceptions to the warrant requirement. Id. at 157

– 58. W e determined that no exception to the warrant requirement justified the warrantless search of Kern’s home under article I, sect ion 8 of the Iowa
Constitution. Id. at 177. Although we ultimately concluded that it was unnecessary to decide whether the special

- needs doctrine was “viable in the context of parole under the Iowa Constitution” based on the facts of11

that case, we did outline the scope of the doctrine were we to rec ognize the existence of such an exception. See i d. at 170. First, we noted the “obvious limitation” that the doctrine would apply only to searches conducted by parole officers consistent with the parole mission. Id. ; cf. Ochoa , 792 N.W.2d at 294

– 95 (Cady , J., concurring specially) (recognizing the distinction between interests unrelated to general law enforcement and interests “involving enforcement of criminal laws”). This limitation e nsures that th e search
furthers the g oals of parole rather than the i nterests in law enforcement.
Kern , 831 N.W.2d at 170. Second, we recognized that the special

- needs doctrine “cannot be used by police to make an end

- run around the constitutional protections otherwise available to parolees.” Id. Because the search conducted by t he police officers was “instigated and dominated by the needs and interests of law enforc ement,” we declined to consider applying the special

- needs doctrine in Kern

. Id. at 172. We subsequently addressed a warrantless search of a probationer ’s home by police officers in State v. Short , 851 N.W.2d 474 (Iowa 2014). Following a reported burglary, police officers received information that implicated the defendant, Justin Short. See id. at 476. Police officers
obtained a search warrant for the wrong address. Id. Yet without getting

a valid new warrant , they conducted a search of Short’s apartment
anyway
. Id. at 476

– 77. Short was on probation for unrelated crimes

. Id.
at 477. However, Short’s probation officer did not participate in the
search , and it was undisputed that the search was not connected with Short’s probation , but was instead “an investigatory search by law
enforcement related to new crimes.” Id. at 477. On appeal, we considered whether law enforcement officers, “as distingu ished from probation officers,” may conduct a warrantless search12 for investigatory law enforcement purposes of a probationer’s home under article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. Id. at 481. We held that the warrant requirement has “full applicabil ity” to home searches of probationers by law enforcement. Id. at 506. Given the absence of a warrant, we reversed the denial of Short’s motion to suppress, while making it clear that we were not addressing “the legality of home visits or other types of s upervision by probation officers pursuant to their ordinary functions , [or]

. . . the question of whether a probationer may validly consent to warrantless home searches.” Id.
In our Short decision, we relied heavily upon State v. Cullison , 173 N.W.2d 533, 540

– 41 (Iowa 1970), which had invalidated a warrantless search of a parolee’s home by a parole officer. Id. at 492

– 96. Although
Cullison involved a parolee, not a probationer, we sai d in Short that “the analytic structure of Cullison appl ies with equal force to both.” Short , 851 N.W.2d at 492. Importantly, the issue in Cullison was whether the parole officer could search the parolee’s house for evidence “relative to the prose cu tion of an offense separate and apart from that upon which
he had been previously granted a parole.” Cullison , 173 N.W.2d at 540

. 3 Lastly , we returned to the special

- needs doctrine in the 2015 case
of State v. King , 867 N.W.2d 106 (Iowa 2015). Like the defendants in
Baldon and Kern , Donald King was a parolee. Id. at 109. He had been paroled following multiple convictions for possession and intent to deliver methamphetamine. Id. He had also signed a parole agreement with a

3 We added in Short , There is substantial authority, for instance, for the proposition that while evidence obtained through home visits, or searches by probation officers, may not be used in new criminal prosecutions, it may be used for purposes of establishing a violation of probation or parole. 851 N.W.2d at 505.13

standard consent

- to

- search provision. Id. During meetings with his parole officer, King had complained about his drug treatment and generally “seemed to be losing his motivation to succeed at parole.” Id. King’s parole officer was concerned that King was either “ on the verge of another relapse” or would abscond from parole. Id. During a h om e visit, the parole officer decided to check King’s bedroom for signs of drug use.
Id. at 110. He informed King of his intention to search, and King did not
refuse

. Id. The parole officer noticed a sunglasses case in King’s bedroom, opened the case, and discovered two bags of marijuana. Id. King was charged with possession of marijuana as a result of the search.
Id. He moved to suppress the results of the search based on article I,
section 8. Id.
The State defended the parole officer’s search as justified by the special

- needs doctrine. Id. We first acknowledged that we had not yet applied the special

- needs doctrine to warrantless search es of parolees or probationers by parole or probation officers. See i d. at 116

. However, we ultimately concluded t hat the special

- needs exception authorized the parole search at issue

. Id. at 12 6

– 2 7. We balanced three factors i n reaching that conclusion: (1) the nature of the privacy interest intru ded upon by the search, (2) the character of the intrusion, and (3) the nature of the governmental concerns and the efficacy of the search policy. See
id. at 117

– 26.
In our King opinion, we noted, “A distinction exists between searches to pursue the purposes of law enforcement and those to pursue the purposes of carrying out the mission of parole.” Id. at 122. We also
stated , “The concerns that prompt the parole search in general need to be broad enough to achieve the purpose of parole, but narrow enough that the search not be arbitrary or depart from the parole mission.” Id.14

at 124

. W ith respect to the facts at hand, we said , “The immediacy of the government concerns [was] derived from the general mission of parole supervision.” Id. at 126.
We believe the King three

- factor analysis sup ports the application

o f the special

- needs doctrine to this probation case. Critically, as in King , this was not an entry for law enforcement purposes. Rather, two probation officers entered Brooks’s bedroom after being summoned by Brooks’s regular probation officer who was otherwise tied up but had received a family report of a drug relapse. The int rusion was limited.
Th e probation officers entered the bedroom, saw Brooks’s obviously disoriented condition, conducted a “cursory search” (which is not even at issue here), questioned Brooks, and arrested him for a probation
violation. As the district c ourt put it, The officers had reasonable suspicion that Defendant was violating the terms of his probation based upon the statements made by the family members. They came to the home, were invited in, and attempted to make contact with Defendant. This is exactly what probation officers are supposed to do. Probationers are expected to abide by conditions of their probation, including in this case refraining from possessing or using illegal drugs.
See Iowa Code § 907.6 (2015)

. P robation officers are requi red by statute
to “ supervise , assist, and counsel [a] person during the term of the person’s probation.” Id. § 907.8(1). They are to “investigate all persons referred to them for investigation by the director of the judicial district department of correc tional services which employs them.” Id. § 907.2. They are to “keep informed of each person’s conduct and condition and shall use all suitable methods prescribed by the judicial district department of correctional services to aid and encourage the person to bring about improvements i n the person’ s conduct and condition.” Id.15 Probation officers “shall make reports to the court when alleged
violations occur.” Id. Probation officers are peace officers. Id. This means they have authority to make arrests that the general public does
not have . See id. §§ 804 .6

– .7, .9. Close supervision of probationers furthers legitimate goals such as rehabilitating the probationer, protecting the community at large, and reducing recidivism. See id. § 907.6; see also Gri ffin v. Wisconsin , 483
U.S. 868, 8 75, 107 S. Ct. 3164, 3169 , 97 L. Ed. 2d 709, 718 (1987)

. Consequently, the probation officer and probationer share an “ongoing relationship” that is not entirely adversarial in nature. See King , 867 N.W.2d at 121 , 126

. Pro bation supervision

— like parole supervision

— “necessarily involves” intrusion by the government as probationers
assimilate to social norms

. Id. at 121.
T his is not a case like Short , where the probationary status of the
defendant became an after

- the

- fact justification for a warrantless search of his residence for independent law

- enforcement purposes
. This was a probation mission from the beginning (when the defendant’s probation
officer received a call from t he defendant’s sister and father ) until the en d (when the defendant was charged with viola ting the terms of probation
and not a separate crime). Brooks disputes that the entry into his bedroom was performed by
actual probation officers. However, the district court found otherwise , and based on our de novo review of the record , we agree with the district
court

. Officer Evans was Brooks’s regular probation officer. He testified
that he asked two of his “coworkers”

— Wignall and Smith

— to respond to
the calls he received from Brooks’s f amily and from the manager of the treatment facility. Wignall, one of those coworkers, appeared at the16 hearing and testified he is a probation officer employed by the Fifth Judicial District Department of Correctional Services. This was further
confirmed by the district court’s questioning:
THE COURT : One follow

- up question, Mr. Evans. Were all of the officers that you asked to respond in your stead, since you were in court someplace else, were they all also probation/parole officers? THE WITNESS : Yes , ma’am, they were. For reasons not explored at the hearing, but which may have to do with reducing the risk of a misunderstanding with the public , Wignall regularly wore a polic e uniform with a “Polk County Sheriff” patch on the
sleeve. He also carried a firearm. Yet Wignall explained that his position meant he only arrested probationers or parolees who had violated the terms of their probation or parole, even though he did have the general authority to make a ny arrest. Hi s job description meant he did not write tickets or citations, did not respond to calls for service, and did not

r espond to calls from dispatch. As a member of the fugitive unit in the Fifth Judicial District Department of Correctional Services, Wignall ’s duties differed from those
of a n average probation officer because he was responsible for “folks that abscond supervision” and dealt with “ situations that include home visits
and high

- risk situations.” 4 Wignall acknowledged that he did not have a list of probationers he regularly supervised and did not normally conduct traditional home visits of probationers. And the trip to the Brooks family
home was n ot a preplanned home visit. Still, it was a probation visit , as confirmed by the fact s that Brooks’s regular proba tion officer initiat ed
the visit and no independent criminal charges resulted from it . In sum,

4 Evans belonged to the same fugitive unit , even while serving as Brooks’s regular probation officer

.17

w e agree with the district court and reject Brooks’s claim that Wignall
and Smith entered his room “as law enforcement officers” and for law enforcement purposes.
The record indicates that the Fifth Judicial District Department of Correctional Services has set up a separate unit of probation officers that have special training and carry firearms so they can de al with high

- risk situations. In our view, this does not alter the basic analysis under King

. Some probationers present more risks than others, for example if they have been actively using methamphetamine. Some probation

- related
duties are more hazardous than others. It would not make sense to adopt a rule that a proba tion mission ceases to be a probation mission just because the probation officer is carrying a firearm for protection

. The focus should remain, rather, on the activity itself: Was the probation officer engaged in supervision of a probationer (which can in clude an arrest for a probation violation) or was she or he conducting a separate law enforcement investigation? In this regard, the impromptu entry here can be contrasted with
the investigative search that occurred in Cullison . In that case , a parole
off icer visited a parolee and became suspicious when the parolee refused to unlock an interior door in the parolee’s apartment. Cullison , 173 N.W.2d at 534

– 35. The parole officer left the apartment, came back with a set of master keys, and ultimately convin ced the parolee that he should open the locked door for the officer. Id. at 535. The officer found stolen merchandise in the locked room and the paro lee was charged with a new
offense

. Id. On appeal, we took no issue with the parole officer’s initial en try because the parole officer went inside to determine why the parolee had not reported to work. See i d. at 539 ; see also King , 867 N.W.2d at 12218 (“The initial intrusion by the parole officer in the apartment, however, was consistent with the mission of parole and was not part of the analysis that found the search of the home to be unconstitutional.” (discussing Cullison , 173 N.W. 2d at 53 9 ) ) . Inste ad, we concluded the parole officer’s further search of the locked room in the apartment, for the purpose of discovering independent criminal activity, “became
intertwined with the state’s interest in law enforcement” and therefore required a warrant. See K ing , 867 N.W.2d at 122 (discussing Cullison , 173 N.W.2d at 539

– 40).
T he entry into Brooks’s bedroom arguably stands on stronger legal ground than the Kin g search in several ways

. In King , the parole officer
had at most “reasonable suspicion” of a parole violation. Here , by contrast, the probation officers had more than reasonable suspicion

. Brooks does not deny, in fact, that probable cause existed t o believe he
had violated the terms of his probation. Furthermore, unl ike in King , the warrantless entry here did not result in an independent prosecution on a new charge. It simply led to revocation of Brooks’s existing probation. It is true that Brooks, unlike the parolee in King , did not lead the
officers into his bedroom

. But he did not object to their coming in , either, and instead told the probation officers he was going to open the door. Shortly thereafter t he door, in fact, opened. For the reasons stated, we find the special

- needs doctrine applies , and the en try into Brooks’s room did not violate his r ights under article I,
section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. In light of this conclusion, we need not reach the State’s argument that the entry into Brooks’s bedroom also should be sustained under the community ca retaking exception to the warrant requirement. See State v. Crawford , 659 N.W.2d 537, 543 (Iowa19 2003) (setting forth the elements of this exception); State v. Carlson , 548 N.W.2d 138, 140

– 41 (Iowa 1996) (considering police officers’ entry into a
home under the community caretaking exception). Likewise, we do not reach the State’s contention that the exclusionary rule does not apply in probation revocation proceedings. See Kain , 378 N.W.2d at 902

– 03 (holding that article I, section 8 does not require the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence in prob ation revocation proceedings).
IV. Conclusion.
W e conclude that the warrantless entry into Br ooks’s bedroom did
not violate a rticle I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. We affirm the
decision of the c ourt of appeals and the judgment of the district court.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AND JUDGMENT OF
DISTRICT COURT AFFIRMED. Cady, C.J., and Waterman and Zager, JJ., join this opinion. Appel, J., files a dissenting opinion in which Wiggins and Hecht, JJ., join.20

#15

– 0101, State v. Brooks APPEL, Justice (dissenting). I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority in this case. As previously indicated in State v. King , I view the so

- called special

- needs exception to the warrant requirement an unfortunate development. 867 N.W.2d 106, 134

– 36 (Iowa 2015) (Appel, J., dissenting). I view the majority’s bypass of the warrant requirement as unjustified. I also have little doubt that the exclusionary rule, under article I, section 8 of the
Iowa Con stitution, applies in a probation setting.
I. Warrant Requirement as Bulwark to Liberty. In my view, it is imperative that effective limitations be placed on search and seizures by the government. The mechanism selected by the
drafters of the Iowa Constitution, article I, section 8, was the warrant requirement based upon probable cause which describes with particularity the place to be searched and the person to be seized. See Iowa Const. art. I, § 8. The warrant requirement of article I, section 8 is one of the
bulwarks of individual liberties in Iowa. The warrant clause accomplishes a number of purposes. By requiring that warrants be based on probable cause, the public is protected from unwarranted and arbitrary searches and seizures. History has repeatedly shown that unfettered discretion by those with power inevitably leads to abuse of authority. Equally importantly, however, the warrant requirement limits the purposes of the search and the areas to be searched. Thus, the warrant requiremen t means that law enforcement must not only demonstrate probable cause that a crime has been committed, but must also limit the21 search to areas that would reasonably turn up evidence of the suspected
crime. Finally, the warrant requirement is in writing. This salutary feature ensures that we have a contemporaneous record of the reasons for the search, the nature of the supporting probable cause, and any limitation imposed by the court. As can be seen, the warrant requirement does the heavy lifting of sear ch and seizure law. The importance of search and seizure protections was emphasized by Justice Robert Jackson after his return from Germany as Chief Prosecutor for the United States at the Nuremberg Trials. According to Justice Jackson, These [search and seizure provisions] are not mere second

- class rights but belong in the catalog of indispensable freedoms. Among deprivations of rights, none is so effective in cowing a population, crushing the spirit of the individual and putting terror in every hear t. Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first and most effective weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary government. Brinegar v. United States , 338 U.S. 160, 180, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 1313, 93
L. Ed. 1879, 1893 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
The great backbone of our constitutional tradition

— the need for effective restraints against arbitrary government enforced by fearless
courts

— cannot be lost because of unpleasant factual contexts in which the issues present themselves. As noted by Justice Fr ankfurter decades
ago, It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people.

. . . [W]e must deal with [the defendant’s] case in the context of what are really t he great themes expressed by the Fourth Amendment.22

United States v. Rabinowitz , 339 U.S. 56, 69, 70 S. Ct. 430, 436, 94
L. Ed. 653, 662 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Moreover, we should not succumb to tired notions of efficiency, reasserted by som e on a decennial basis, to dilute the constitutional protections. As noted by Justice Stewart, we must never forget that “the mere fact that law enforcement may be made less efficient can never by itself justify disregard of the Fourth Amendment.” Mincey v. Arizona , 437 U.S. 385, 393, 98 S. Ct. 2408, 2414, 57 L. Ed. 2d 290, 301 (1978). Further, because of the centrality of search and seizure law to our constitutional fabric, we must, as was done at the dawning of the last century, construe the search and seizure provision in article I, section 8 “in a broad and liberal spirit.” State v. Height , 117 Iowa 650, 657, 91 N.W. 935, 937 (1902) (quoting People v. Forbes , 38 N.E. 303, 305 (N.Y. 1894)). If we are to do our job properly, every one of our draft sea rch and seizure opinions should be held up against this standard before our work is completed. Most emphatically, search and seizure law cannot, and must not, devolve into a question of modern, pragmatic “reasonability” untethered from the warrant require ment. For starters, the language of the constitutional provision, taken in context, does not allow it. As noted by Justice Frankfurter, “One cannot wrench ‘unreasonable searches’ from
the text and context and historic content of the Fourth Amendment.”
R abinowitz , 339 U.S. at 70, 70 S. Ct. at 436, 94 L. Ed. at 662; see also
State v. Ochoa , 792 N.W.2d 260, 289 (Iowa 2010). Further, to do so lays the groundwork for unprincipled decision

making based largely on after

- the

- fact calculations rooted in personal philosophies. Indeed, every time a new “special needs” exception is developed or expanded, courts are rewriting the constitutional fabric of23 search and seizure law to fit the court’s perception of a desired public policy. The use of “reasonability” unte thered to the warrant requirement as the touchstone of search and seizure law amounts to the following constitutional rule: The warrant requirement applies, unless we think it wise that it does not apply. It is a short step to say that the warrant require ment is fine, as long as there are no adverse consequences. Or, one might say, when an individual needs the protection of the warrant requirement the most, there will be an available off

- the

- shelf exception to avoid it. Viewing search and seizure from th e viewpoint of law enforcement, courts applying the “reasonability” approach risk functioning more as an internal police commission flagging only exceptionally flagrant violations rather than as an independent judicial tribunal jealously guarding individua l rights. Of course, there have long been a few jealously guarded exceptions to the warrant requirement. For example, searches in exigent circumstances where probable cause may be present but there is no time to obtain a warrant have traditionally been u pheld. But the exceptions should be applied sparingly by the judiciary in order to fiercely guard the constitutional role of the warrant. Such fierce defense of the warrant requirement is not evident in this case. Indeed, the notion the warrant requirem ent is subject to only “jealously and carefully drawn exceptions,” a notion which we have repeatedly stated, is notably absent in this case. Ochoa , 792 N.W.2d at 278 (quoting Jones v. United States , 357 U.S. 493, 499, 78 S. Ct. 1253, 1257, 2 L. Ed. 2d
151 4, 1519 (1958)); State v. Strong , 493 N.W.2d 834, 836 (Iowa 1992). The majority opinion seems more interested in jealously guarding the discretion of law enforcement but not the warrant requirement.24 Here is why I draw that conclusion. In King , we emphas ized that parole was “divorced from the general interests of the state in law enforcement.” 867 N.W.2d at 122 (majority opinion). Here, obviously, the “warrant team,” the sworn law enforcement officers trained to arrest people and who had no relationship with parolees, can only be regarded as part of law enforcement in any functional sense. So, while King touted the “divorce” between parole and law enforcement, that divorce is not present here. Further, in King , the majority cited Griffin v. Wisconsin f or the proposition that “[a]lthough a probation officer is not an impartial magistrate, neither is he the police officer.” Id. at 126 (quoting 483 U.S. 868, 876, 107 S. Ct. 3164, 3170, 97 L. Ed. 2d 709, 719 (1987)). Here, of course, the searchers were po lice officers in every meaningful sense of
the word. Second, King emphasized the “ongoing supervisory relationship” between the parole officer and the parolee. Id. at 122 (quoting Griffin , 483 U.S. at 879, 107 S. Ct. at 3171, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 721). It ci tes “[t]he absence of an adversarial relationship” between the parolee and the parole officer. Id. at 125. But here there was no ongoing relationship
between the law enforcement officers who conducted the search and the parolee. Unlike in King , it does not matter to the majority that the law enforcement officers here were strangers to the parolee. Third, King emphasized the limited nature of the holding. In King , the majority concluded that “parole officers have a special need to search the home of par olees as authorized by a parole agreement and not refused by the parolee when done to promote the goals of parole.” Id. at 126. The fact that the parolee had not refused the search by a parole25 officer was an integral part of the holding. Id. at 126

– 27. The majority
now abandons that limitation in King today. After filing a full

- throated dissent in King , I nonetheless ended on a somewhat optimistic note, emphasizing the narrowness of the ruling. I
wrote
the majority opinion is extremely limited. It does not apply to the activities of law enforcement. It does not endorse freestanding reasonableness, a hungry beast that could threaten the warrant requirement.

. . . It reserves the question of whether a paro lee has a right to refuse the search.
Id. at 136 (Appel, J., dissenting). My optimism that the limits of King might hold has proved unfounded. We are left, at least for now, with a requirement of reasonable suspicion before law enforcement officers, who happen to be organizationally part of probation bureaucracies, may conduct a warrantless search of a probationer’s home. And so, defenders of a vibrant search and seizure jurisprudence under article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution have no choice but to once again retreat to the next position and dig in. Perhaps it is possible that the reasonable suspicion limitation may come to mean somethi ng under article I, section 8 of the
Iowa Constitution. See Ochoa , 792 N.W.2d at 287

– 91. In other words, it may yet have real teeth. If reasonable suspicion does prove to have real teeth, the consequences of today’s ruling may be somewhat contained. Th e benefits of a contemporaneous record that arises from a warrant requirement will be lost, of course, and the substantive protection against arbitrary search and seizures will be somewhat watered down. If teeth are absent, however, our search and seizure law will slide further down the abyss of unfettered discretionary searches and seizures for26 thousands of our citizens who are on probation. For them, constitutional search and seizure protection under article I, section 8 will be rendered meaningless by courts responding to perceived pragmatic considerations rather than the command of the constitution itself. If so, we will have drifted a long, long way from the declarations in State v. Cullison that parolees, and by implication probationers, do not suff er a diminution of constitutional protections from warrantless searches and seizures in their homes simply because of their status as parolees. 173 N.W.2d 533, 537 (Iowa 1970).
II. Application of Exclusionary Rule in Parole Proceedings.
Because the sea rch, in my view, was invalid without a warrant, I now address the next question, namely, whether the exclusionary rule applies in probation revocation proceedings. As noted by the parties, in
State v. Swartz , 278 N.W.2d 22, 26 (Iowa 1979), and State v. Ka in , 378 N.W.2d 900, 903 (1985), we held the exclusionary rule did not apply in probation determinations. In Swartz , we emphasized the purpose of the exclusionary rule was “to discourage unconstitutional acts by law enforcement officials.” 378 N.W.2d at 2 3. Kain simply followed Swartz with no analysis. Kain , 378 N.W.2d at 902

– 03.
After Swartz and Kain were decided, however, we then decided
State v. Cline , 617 N.W.2d 277 (2000), abrogated in part on other grounds in State v. Turner , 630 N.W.2d 601, 606 n .2 (Iowa 2001). In
Cline , we addressed the argument that the sole purpose of the exclusionary rule was to deter police misconduct. 617 N.W.2d at 289. As is apparent, the notion that the sole purpose of the exclusionary rule
is to deter misconduct was th e centerpiece in Swartz , 278 N.W.2d at 26,
and its follower Kain , 378 N.W.2d at 903. We also considered the27 argument that the rule has no ameliorative effect on the judicial or legislative branches. Cline , 617 N.W.2d at 289

– 90.
In Cline , we disagreed wi th both propositions. Id. Unlike in
Swartz , we stressed that the exclusionary rule serves purposes beyond deterrence of police misconduct. Id. at 289. We noted that in our early search and seizure cases we emphasized the exclusionary rule “provided

a r emedy for a constitutional violation and protected judicial integrity.”
Id. ; see also State v. Sheridan , 121 Iowa 164, 168, 96 N.W. 730, 731 (1903) (stating that to admit illegally obtained evidence is to “emasculate the constitutional guarantee”). Thus, we emphatically stated in Cline that the exclusionary rule was constitutionally based, not simply a judicially created remedy, and that the exclusionary rule protects the integrity of the court by refusing to admit illegally obtained evidence. 617 N.W.2d at 289

– 90. As a result, we joined a growing number of states declining, under state search and seizure constitutional provisions, to adopt the so

- called “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule created by the United States Supreme
Court in United States v. Leon , 468 U.S. 897, 922, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3420,
82 L. Ed. 2d 677, 698 (1984). Cline , 617 N.W.2d at 289

– 93; see, e.g. , State v. Marsala , 579 A.2d 58, 66

– 68 (Conn. 1990); Gary v. State , 422 S.E.2d 426, 428

– 29 (Ga. 1992); State v. Lopez , 896 P.2d 889, 902 (Haw. 1995); State v. Guzman , 842 P.2d 660, 671

– 72 (Idaho 1992); State v.
Novembrino , 519 A.2d 820, 854

– 57 (N.J. 1987); State v. Gutierrez , 863 P.2d 1052, 1067 (N.M. 1993); Commonwealth v. Edmunds , 586 A.2d 887, 905 (Pa. 1991); State v. Oakes , 598 A.2d 119, 126

– 27 (Vt. 1991); State v.
Scull , 862 N.W.2d 562, 572 (Wis. 2015). In states that emphasize judicial integrity and the constitutional nature of the exclusionary rule, the exclusionary rule has been applied in28 probation and parole se ttings. The reasoning is obvious. In State v. Marquart , the New Mexico Court of Appeals considered whether the search and seizure provision of the New Mexico Constitution required the exclusionary rule to be applied in probation revocation proceedings. 945 P.2d 1027, 1031 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997). The Marquart court noted that the New Mexico Supreme Court had rejected a good

- faith exception to the exclusionary rule in Gutierrez , 863 P.2d at 1067. 945 P.2d at 1031. It further noted that in doing so, the Ne w Mexico Supreme Court emphasized that the exclusionary rule is not a “mere ‘judicial remedy’ ”
but instead was a rule “to effectuate .

. . the constitutional right of the
accused.” Id. (quoting Gutierrez , 863 P.2d at 1067). The Marquart court held the e xclusionary rule applied in probation revocation proceedings.
Id.
In State ex rel. Juvenile Department v. Rogers , the Supreme Court of Oregon considered the application of the exclusionary rule under Oregon’s constitutional provision related to search an d seizure in probation revocation proceedings. 836 P.2d 127, 129 (Or. 1992). The Oregon court, also emphasizing the “personal right to be free from an unlawful search and seizure,” found the exclusionary rule applied in probation proceedings. Id. at 129

– 30. Similar reasoning with comparable results may be found in State v. Dodd , 419 So. 2d 333, 335 (Fla. 1982), Mason v. State , 838 S.W.2d 657, 659 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992), and Howard v. State , 308 S.E.2d 424, 425 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983). In my view, the logic o f Cline compels application of the exclusionary rule in parole and probation proceedings. Under Cline , the exclusionary rule is not merely a judicially created remedy but enforcement of a personal constitutional right. 617 N.W.2d at 289.29 Further, the in tegrity of the court is equally affected by introduction of tainted evidence in a parole proceeding as it is in any other case.
III. Conclusion. For the above reasons, I would conclude that the search without a warrant in this case was invalid under art icle I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. Further, as a result of the constitutional violation, evidence obtained from the search is inadmissible in a probation revocation proceeding. As a result, I would reverse the decision of the district court in t his case. Wiggins and Hecht, JJ., join this dissent.