CHECKING IRAN’S NUCLEAR AMBITIONS

Edited by

Henry Sokolski

Patrick Clawson

January 2004
ii

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This book is the result of nearly 2 years of planning and analyses commissioned 

by the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC) to reconsider U.S. 

efforts to arrest Iran’s nuclear weapons ambitions. It received support from 

several organizations including The Smith Richardson Foundation and the U.S. 

Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute. Robert “Robin” Dorff, Douglas 

Lovelace, and Marianne Cowling worked closely with NPEC to assure the book’s 

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the book’s authors and to the project’s co-chairman, Patrick Clawson who helped 

guide their research. Finally, a special word of thanks is due to Carly Kinsella, 

the center’s research coordinator and Albert Wohlstetter Fellow. Only with her 

tireless help and that of the Strategic Studies Institute, could this volume have 

made it into print. 

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ISBN 1-58487-149-0
iii

CONTENTS

Preface

Patrick Clawson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

Introduction

Henry Sokolski . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

1. Checking Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions: Report Recommendations

 NPEC Project on Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

2. Iran’s “Legal” Paths to the Bomb

 Victor Gilinsky. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

3. Iran’s Internal Struggles

 Geneive Abdo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

4. The Prospects for Regime Change in Iran

 S. Rob Sobhani . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

5. Winning Iranian Hearts and Minds

 Abbas William Samii . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

6. U.S.-Iranian Strategic Cooperation since 1979

 Geoffrey Kemp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

7. The Challenges of U.S. Preventive Military Action

 Michael Eisenstadt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

About the Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 

v

PREFACE

 In his introduction to the September 2002 National Security 

Strategy of the United States, President George W. Bush wrote, 

“The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of 

radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly declared that 

they are seeking weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and evidence 

indicates that they are doing so with determination. . . . Terrorists 

are organized to penetrate open societies and to turn the power of 

modern technologies against us.”

Iran is the poster-child for the nexus of terrorism and WMD. It 

is the world's foremost state-sponsor of terrorism, as well as one of 

the countries most actively pursuing nuclear weapons. Washington 

is vigilant about Iran’s support for a network of Islamist terrorist 

organizations and persistent in pressing Iran to end its fi nancial, 

political, material, and operational support to them. At the same 

time, the United States has to come up with effective strategies to 

ensure that Iran does not acquire nuclear weapons. Were Iran to 

acquire nuclear weapons, there is a grave risk it would be tempted 

to provide them to terrorists. After all, mass casualty terrorism done 

by proxies has worked well for Iran to date. Iranian assistance to 

the terrorists who blew up the U.S. and French barracks in Beirut in 

1983 was a grand strategic success, forcing the United States, and for 

a while France, out of Lebanon while not bringing any retaliation 

down on Iran. Similarly, the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers 

barracks in Saudi Arabia caused the Saudis to make a strategic 

reconciliation, and, once again, Iran faced no retaliation. 

The fear about what Iran might do with nuclear weapons is fed by 

the concern that Tehran has no clear reason to be pursuing nuclear 

weapons. The strategic rationale for Iran’s nuclear program is by 

no means obvious. Unlike proliferators such as Israel or Pakistan, 

Iran faces no historic enemy who would welcome an opportunity 

to wipe the state off the face of the earth. Iran is encircled by 

troubled neighbors, but nuclear weapons do nothing to help counter 

the threats that could come from state collapse in Afghanistan, 

Pakistan, Iraq, or Azerbaijan. Instead, Iranian acquisition of nuclear 
vi

arms could set off a chain reaction―increased U.S. assets directed 

against Iran, active Israeli planning for Iran contingencies, and quite 

possibly nuclear proliferation by Iranian neighbors such as Saudi 

Arabia and Turkey―which would leave Iran worse off than if it had 

never developed nuclear arms. Instead of starting an arms race that 

it is certain to lose, Iran would be much better off strategically if it 

pressed for agreements to limit arms throughout the Gulf: to restrict 

the size of the new Iraqi army, to freeze and reduce the size of the 

Arab Gulf monarchies’ militaries, and to phase down the size of the 

U.S. force in the area. However, Iran’s leaders seem remarkably 

impervious to careful strategic thinking about international security; 

put another way, perhaps they are more driven by considerations of 

national prestige or domestic politics.

Hopefully European and American leaders will agree on how to 

proceed about Iran’s nuclear program. To date, European leaders 

seem to concentrate on signifi cant incentives (“bigger carrots”) for 

responsible behavior to the near exclusion of threatening painful, 

punitive measures (“bigger sticks”) for continued irresponsible 

behavior, while Americans do the reverse. It would be progress 

if each side more openly acknowledged that the most promising 

approach combines both carrots and sticks, and if each side 

more bluntly stated that it was prepared to consider using both 

instruments. That said, it is at least possible that, in the end, Europe 

will take the lead in offering Iran incentives while the United States 

takes the lead in threatening punitive measures.

Achieving trans-Atlantic consensus on how to respond to Iran’s 

nuclear program will be diffi cult. This is a remarkably bad time 

for the international community to face the Iran nuclear problem, 

because the tensions about the Iraq WMD issue still poison relations 

and weaken U.S. ability to respond. Nevertheless, Iran’s nuclear 

program poses a stark challenge to the international nonproliferation 

regime. The intelligence about the Iran threat is coming from a United 

Nations agency―namely, the International Atomic Energy Agency 

(IAEA)―and there is no doubt that Iran is developing worrisome 

capabilities. If the world community led by Western countries is 

unable to prevent Iranian proliferation, then it is unclear that there is 

much meaning to global nonproliferation norms. 
Iran’s nuclear program raises stark shortcomings with the global 

nonproliferation norms. The basic deal behind the Treaty on the 

Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is that countries are 

allowed to acquire a wide range of troubling capabilities in return 

for being open and transparent. The NPT gives Iran every right to 

have a full closed fuel cycle, with large uranium enrichment facilities 

and a reprocessing plant that can extract substantial amounts of 

plutonium―capabilities which would permit Iran at any time to 

rapidly “break out” of the NPT, building a considerable number of 

nuclear weapons in a short time. Had Iran been fully transparent 

about its nuclear activities, then even if Iran had gone so far as to 

operate a full closed fuel cycle, the international community would 

have been split deeply about how to react. It is fortunate indeed that 

Iran decided to cheat on its NPT obligations by hiding some of what 

is doing, because that has made much easier the construction of an 

international consensus that Iran’s nuclear program is troubling. But 

the experience with Iran should lead to refl ection about whether the 

basic NPT deal needs to be revisited.

 PATRICK CLAWSON

Deputy Director

Washington Institute for 

Near East Policy 

vii

INTRODUCTION

Henry Sokolski

Considering the latest Iranian nuclear developments, one might 

question whether a study now on how best to restrain Tehran is 

simply one that’s come too late. To be sure, estimates vary as to 

when Iran could build its fi rst bomb. Some believe Tehran could do 

it before the end of 2005; others think Iran would only be able to do 

so by the end of the decade. In either case, though, the die seems cast: 

If Iran wants, it has all that it needs eventually to build a bomb on 

its own. Certainly, trying to deny Iran further nuclear technology in 

the hopes that this will prevent it from getting nuclear weapons is no 

longer a credible strategy.

The questions this edited volume addresses are whether or not 

any strategy can prevent Iran from going nuclear, what the proper 

goals of such a strategy might be (deterring use, keeping Tehran 

from deploying weapons, getting it to dismantle its nuclear program, 

etc.), and what other nonproliferation goals ought to be attempted 

(including trying to dissuade other nations from following Iran’s 

example). The answers this volume offers are: 1) in the long-run Iran 

will gain little from going nuclear, and 2) much can be gained by 

enforcing the nonproliferation rules Iran agreed to and spelling out 

the costs to Iran of its continuing acquisition of nuclear weaponsrelated capabilities.

The book’s seven chapters were commissioned as the fi rst of a 

two-part Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC) project 

on Iran supported by the Smith Richardson Foundation and the 

Offi ce of Net Assessment within the Department of Defense. The 

project’s interim conclusions and policy recommendations are 

contained in this book’s fi rst chapter, “Checking Iran’s Nuclear 

Ambitions.” The key point made here is that whatever is done to keep 

Iran from proceeding with its nuclear program should be done with 

a eye toward deterring other states, including Iran’s neighbors, from 

following Tehran’s example of using the NPT and the International 

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to get within weeks of having a large 

ix
arsenal of nuclear weapons. The details of just how Iran has been 

able to do this are spelled out in the book’s second chapter, “Iran’s 

‘Legal’ Paths to the Bomb,” by former U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commissioner Victor Gilinsky. In this chapter, Mr. Gilinsky details 

how Iran can use Bushehr and its “civilian” uranium enrichment 

program to come within weeks of having dozens of bombs even 

while being intrusively inspected by the IAEA.

Would Iran ever actually deploy nuclear weapons though? 

Much depends on one’s read of just how long-lived and truculent 

the current regime is. These issues are taken up in the volume’s 

next two chapters. In “Iran’s Internal Struggles,” Genieve Abdo, an 

internationally recognized observer of Iranian politics, argues that 

the revolutionary government is unlikely to be overthrown anytime 

soon and that it will persist in its hostile foreign policies. Rob Sobhani, 

a leading American-Iranian commentator, however, argues that 

with suffi cient U.S. support of the right sort, the current government 

in Iran could give way to a far more liberal and peaceable regime. 

But what is the “right” kind of support? Abbas William Samii, Radio 

Free Europe’s Iranian broadcast analyst, explores this question in 

chapter 5, “Winning Iranian Hearts and Minds.” Although Mr. 

Samii does not rule out speedy regime change, he warns that it is 

not likely and that for that reason, the United States needs to have 

a long-term outreach program that will encourage a more favorable 

opinion of the United States among the general Iranian population.

This, then, raises the question of timing. If favorable regime 

change may not come before Iran acquires nuclear weapons or the 

ability to quickly acquire them, what other course of action might the 

United States and its allies take to infl uence Iranian decisionmakers? 

One course would be to try to cut Iran a deal. As former U.S. National 

Security Council staffer and Nixon Center Middle East expert 

Geoffrey Kemp explains in chapter 6, the history of such efforts 

has been mixed. Mr. Kemp, though, argues that circumstances now 

might actually be ripe for fruitful negotiations. And what if they are 

not? In the book’s fi nal chapter, Michael Eisenstadt, the Washington 

Institute’s Gulf security analyst, raises the veil on what might be the 

last resort--military action. In his chapter, “The Challenges of U.S. 

Preventive Military Action,” Mr. Eisenstadt details the various risks 

x
associated with both overt and covert military attacks against Iran’s 

nuclear program.

None of the most popular policy options, in short, are sure bets; 

all are fraught with dangers. This is why it is critical to make sure 

that Iran at least understands that it will not be rewarded or given 

a pass on its pursuit of worrisome nuclear activities. In the fi rst 

instance this means that the United States and its allies must make 

full use of existing restraints against nuclear weapons proliferation--

the IAEA and the NPT--to make sure Iran does not become a model 

of how to exploit the rules, but rather an example of what happens 

to states that bend or fl aunt them. Beyond this, the United States 

and its allies must make clear what Iran can expect if it continues its 

nuclear power program--even if within the legal letter of the IAEA 

Statute--and how much better Iran’s future would be if it terminated 

its program and cut its ties to terrorists, who might otherwise gain 

access to the nuclear know-how Iran has already mastered.

In the end, of course, diplomacy is meaningless unless it is backed 

by the prospect of force. Cooperative military planning, creating new 

security arrangements, covert military actions, defense cooperation 

and transfers that are aimed at limiting the harm Iran’s nuclear 

activities might otherwise pose will all soon become urgent matters. 

What specifi cally needs to be done will be more fully detailed upon 

completion of this project’s second phase, later in 2004.

xi

1

CHAPTER 1

CHECKING IRAN’S NUCLEAR AMBITIONS:

REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS

Nonproliferation Policy Education Center Project on Iran

This report is based on commissioned research and commentary 

of over 30 of the nation’s leading experts on Iran and nuclear 

proliferation. It was over a year in the making. Unlike most analyses, 

which have focused solely on the immediate worry of Iran going 

nuclear, it sees Iran’s nuclear program as a persistent danger and 

catalyst for other states to acquire nuclear weapons options of their 

own. These nuclear programs along with Iran’s would confront 

the United States and its allies with intolerable long-term security 

dangers. The report supports neither overt military action against 

Iran’s nuclear facilities nor trying to cut a deal with Iran not to make 

nuclear weapons. Instead, it makes three recommendations, none of 

which U.S. or allied offi cials have yet fully adopted:

1. Challenge Iran’s Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) noncompliance 

as being decisive to the future of nuclear nonproliferation. If Iran 

succeeds in coming within weeks of being able to breakout of the 

NPT and quickly acquire nuclear weapons, it will demonstrate 

to the world (and every other nation that might want nuclear 

weapons) how any state can use the NPT to get the bombmaking 

capabilities it wants. Unlike what happened with Iraq or North 

Korea, then, the United States and other like-minded nations 

need to enforce and amplify the NPT to curb Iran before it 

acquires more than a bomb’s worth of separated plutonium 

or highly enriched uranium (HEU). Toward this end, the 

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should be urged to 

follow the requirements of its charter and at least fi le an interim 

report to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) about the 

known technical IAEA violations Iran has itself admitted to, and 

highlight concerns the IAEA still has about additional Iranian 
2

weapons-related activities relating to the trace quantities of HEU 

that the IAEA has found. In addition, this report should: 

• insist that Iran uphold the freeze on its uranium enrichment 

and processing activities that it agreed to October 21 with 

Germany, France, and the United Kingdom;

• establish a reasonable schedule for clarifying the origin of the 

trace amounts of the bomb usable HEU the IAEA has found;

• call on all nations to temporarily suspend any further 

nuclear cooperation with Iran until the IAEA can clarify this 

matter and establish whether or not Iran has come into full 

compliance with the NPT; and,

• ask the permanent fi ve members of the UNSC (P-5) to agree 

to how they would act upon receipt of an IAEA report that 

found a member to be not clearly in full compliance with 

either its IAEA safeguards agreement or the NPT.

Among the country-neutral resolutions that the P-5 should consider 

and urge the UNSC to adopt while the IAEA is evaluating the 

evidence concerning Iran’s compliance status are:

• authorizing UN members to interdict the imports of 

any technology, material, or equipment relevant to the 

development of nuclear weapons or their means of delivery to 

any nation that the IAEA had formally identifi ed as no longer 

being clearly in full compliance with its NPT obligations;

• banning any peaceful nuclear cooperation with such states 

the IAEA has identifi ed until the IAEA confi rms its full 

compliance with the NPT; 

• prohibiting NPT members from withdrawing from the treaty 

(i.e., requiring the imposition of all the obligations of the NPT 

on all NPT members whether they have been identifi ed by 
3

the IAEA or not) unless or until they fi rst surrender all of the 

nuclear capabilities they previously gained while a member 

of the treaty;

• authorizing the imposition of UN and UN member state 

economic penalties against states the IAEA has identifi ed 

as no longer clearly being in full compliance with their 

NPT obligations on a progressive basis, starting with small 

measures (e.g., a ban on loans from international fi nancial 

institutions) and escalating to harsher measures; and,

• creating a P-5 NPT secretariat to see to it that above measures 

are actually implemented.

The aim of these resolutions (and their development, which would 

take several months) would be three-fold. First, their development 

and adoption should help deter further violation of the NPT by Iran 

and spell out what action the UNSC would take when the IAEA 

fi nally determines Iran’s compliance status. Second, they (and 

their country-neutral character) should help deter Iran’s neighbors, 

or other nations, who might otherwise be tempted to hedge their 

security bets by acquiring a nuclear weapons option of their own. 

Third, they should help give the Russians and the Europeans 

additional justifi cation for withholding preferential trade and 

nuclear cooperation from Iran if it persists in developing a nuclear 

weapons option.

Finally, for reasons detailed later in this report, it is clear from 

the evidence the IAEA has found already that the agency ultimately 

will have to conclude that Iran is no longer clearly in full compliance 

with its NPT obligations, i.e., that Iran is in violation. This, in turn, 

should trigger the sanction responses detailed above. 

2. Encourage Iranians to debate the merits of their nuclear power 

program and support of terrorism. The IAEA demands made 

of Iran at its last board of governors’ meeting on September 12, 

2003, prompted a limited debate. Iranian offi cials, however, were 

not pressed very hard. Although some hardliners still object 

to Iran making any concessions, no offi cial has yet conceded 
4

that Tehran should give up its enrichment or power reactor 

programs. Nor has any Iranian offi cial argued that Iran can do 

more than it already has to explain the mysterious HEU traces 

IAEA inspectors found. A key reason why more debate has not 

been generated in Iran about Tehran’s nuclear policies is that few 

in the United States or Europe have insisted that Iran do much 

more than minimally satisfy the IAEA. This must change. 

First, the more Iranians are pressed on their nuclear policies 

and continued support of terrorism, the more likely it is that the 

current government will make additional needed concessions. 

Second, and more important, the more Iran is pressed on these 

issues, the more likely it is that the internal debate it produces 

in Iran will itself foster greater fi rmness within the international 

community to press on these matters. This, in turn, will be 

critical to warn off other states from ever trying to emulate 

Iran’s example. Of course, those that want to work with the 

revolutionary government in Iran claim that is what they are 

trying to accomplish by offering to cut Tehran a deal―i.e., to give 

it benefi ts up front in exchange for promises of better Iranian 

behavior later. The history of the last 2 decades of such deal 

making, however, is a story of time invested with little to show 

in return. In the case of deal making over Iran’s nuclear program, 

the time lost, moreover, will only bring Iran closer to acquiring 

bombs. Instead of taking this approach, then, the United States 

and its allies should make it clear to Iranians what they can 

expect the costs and benefi ts will be to their country of pursing 

alternative nuclear foreign policies. Specifi cally, after the P-5 

considers the country-neutral proliferation-related resolutions 

noted above, and the IAEA and the UNSC sanction Iran, the 

United States and its friends should highlight the prospect of Iran 

having to engage in a competition against most of its neighbors 

and the world and contrast this with the benefi ts Iran could 

expect to receive if it relinquished its nuclear power program 

and cut its ties with terrorist organizations. Tehran should 

be told that if it fails to follow up its latest October 21, 2003, 

pledge to suspend its enrichment of uranium with verifi able 

moves to dismantle its nuclear power program, it will risk being 
5

further isolated economically, diplomatically, and militarily. 

Conversely, the major powers should make it clear that Iran can 

expect to receive security guarantees, an end to U.S. sanctions, 

and access to high technology and international capital markets 

if Iran dismantles all of its nuclear power-related facilities (i.e., 

all but its small research reactor facilities) and ends its support 

of terrorist organizations. The deadlines for Tehran taking these 

remedial actions should be early and clear―i.e., well before Iran 

could possibly acquire its fi rst bomb―within 24 months or less. 

At the same time and to assure this explanation has credibility 

among Iranian reformers, the United States should launch 

additional long-term initiatives to undermine the revolutionary 

government’s efforts to demonize America. These initiatives 

should include more creative forms of outreach as well as direct 

forms of relief such as increased disaster relief and public health 

assistance. 

3. If Iran continues to pursue worrisome nuclear activities, 

ramp up U.S. and allied military regional capabilities both to 

neutralize the Iranian threat and forestall further proliferation.

The United States and the military coalition in Iraq already must 

guarantee Iraq’s security against a potentially hostile Iran. The 

United States and its key allies are also committed to interdicting 

commerce in nuclear weapons-related items to trouble states 

like Iran under the Proliferation Security Initiative. Beyond this, 

the United States and its key allies ought to consult with the 

Gulf Coordination Council states, Jordan, Turkey, Israel, and 

Egypt about what these nations’ military plans are for coping 

with a militant, nuclear (or near-nuclear) Iran. Plans should be 

prepared now on how additional military cooperation (including 

intelligence sharing, missile defense cooperation, joint training, 

base sharing agreements, etc.) might best counter the threat and 

what new security arrangements, if any, would be appropriate. 

Details on these issues will be developed as a part of the 

Nonproliferation Policy Education Center’s (NPEC) planned 

follow on study, which will be completed in 2004.
6

Principal Assumptions.

Some may see these recommendations as harsh. Given what the 

IAEA has learned about Iran’s nuclear weapons effort, though, the 

urgency of addressing Iran’s possible breakout has clearly increased. 

Stunned earlier this year by the discovery of several new nuclear 

production facilities, trace quantities of highly enriched uranium, 

and Iran’s admission to making uranium metal and importing 

signifi cant quantities of special nuclear materials from China, most 

experts now believe Iran could get a bomb within 3 to 5 years, while 

some analysts fear it could do so in 24 months or less. Given the 

size of Iran’s nuclear power-related facilities, completion of its fi rst 

weapon, moreover, could quickly be followed by the production of 

scores of weapons. Iran’s neighbors―nations that are all historically 

allied with the United States, including Israel, Saudi Arabia, 

Turkey, and Egypt―are unlikely to welcome Iran coming so close 

to acquiring nuclear weapons. The adverse responses they might 

take include seeking new security ties, acquiring their own nuclear 

weapons options and relying less on the United States to assure their 

security. 

All of these possibilities highlight America’s need to act 

decisively with its closest friends to dissuade Iran from continuing 

on its current path and to make sure that no nation emulates Iran’s 

nuclear example. The question is how. 

Currently, there are three fashionable proposals to curb Iran’s 

nuclear program, each of which is too uncertain or too self-defeating 

to effectively address the nuclear threat. 

• Bomb Iran’s Known Nuclear Sites. Iranians fear this. Exercising 

this option, though, is risky. A “surgical” strike could start a war 

(Iranian counterstrikes against U.S. forces in Iraq or terrorist 

strikes elsewhere against the United States and Israel, etc.). Even 

with the best planning, such a strike would be unlikely to destroy 

all of Iran’s covert weapons efforts or stop its weapons scientists 

from resuming work. To maximize surprise, the United States 

(or Israel) would want to attack before securing other nations’ 

support. This, however, could jeopardize international backing 
7

to contain Iran afterwards and would likely raise serious doubts 

about the utility of the NPT and the IAEA―norms that might 

otherwise help justify such a raid. 

• Change the Regime. The United States and its allies say they 

want to promote human rights and pluralistic politics in Iran. 

Ultimately, this requires regime change (whether by overthrow or 

major reform). How might this advance nuclear nonproliferation 

in Iran? Is the regime in Iran likely to change before it acquires 

a bomb? Would a new government end the nuclear program (or 

surrender any bomb materials it might have produced)? How (if 

at all) could promoting such a change stigmatize Iran as an NPT 

violator to discourage would be bombmakers from following 

suit? The answers to these questions remain unclear. 

• Cut a Deal. Many offi cials in Europe, Asia, Russia, and China 

favor cutting a deal with Tehran. They would like to see the 

understanding the United Kingdom, France, and Germany 

reached with Iran on October 21, 2003, as the fi rst step toward 

a larger deal. The logic of this approach is to give Iran what it 

wants―U.S. recognition, lifting of U.S. sanctions, U.S. security 

guarantees and, in time, withdrawal of U.S. military forces in the 

Gulf and access to advanced technology and Western markets―

for what we want―an end to Iran’s dangerous nuclear activities, 

a cut-off of support of terrorist organizations, and adherence 

to agreed human rights strictures. But how long would it take 

to conclude such a deal? How could one prevent Iran from 

stringing the United States and its allies along until it acquired 

all it needed to breakout with a nuclear arsenal? Given what Iran 

could do covertly and the vast amounts of plutonium its power 

reactors would be producing, how likely is any inspection, 

including the IAEA’s new l992+3 inspection protocol, to detect 

covert enrichment or reprocessing activities early enough to 

prevent Iran’s speedy completion of a bomb? Could the current 

government, which has already cheated on the NPT, be trusted 

to deliver on its promises? How could any deal be cut without 

it looking like a reward for Iran skirting the NPT? Would such 
8

a deal with the hard-line government undercut pro-American 

democratic reformers by suggesting that America’s real interest 

is geo-strategic realpolitik rather than support for liberalization? 

How could a deal be squared with the Bush administration’s 

declaration that past deals with Middle East autocrats fed antiAmericanism and terrorism and that it is now in U.S. strategic 

interests to transform the Middle East?

Considering only these options, the outlook for halting Iran’s 

program seems grim. Yet, if one views the current nuclear crisis as 

part of a larger, long-term, security competition, the United States 

and its friends have clear advantages that would allow them to take 

approaches different from the those described above. In a year-long 

series of NPEC workshops, 30 regional experts, in fact, identifi ed 

three enduring weaknesses of the current Iranian regime that could 

be exploited:

• It is enormously unpopular. Recent student demonstrations 

and the consequent government crack down (with thousands of 

arrests) are indicative of how 70 percent of the population (now 

under age 30 with no memory of the l979 revolution) feels. The 

government’s fear of popular resistance forces it to fractionate 

and repress a variety of government bodies to guard against 

signifi cant political reform. It also requires it to maintain an 

external threat to sustain domestic control. As a result, Iranian 

offi cials tend to demonize the United States and Israel and obsess 

about what Iran’s immediate neighbors might do. This last point 

has immediate implications for any negotiated deal over Iran’s 

nuclear program. When members of Iran’s Expediency Council 

met in Geneva with the co-chairmen of this project, they had 

diffi culty believing the United States and its allies would reverse 

their hostility toward Iran if Iran cut off its ties to terrorist 

organizations, promoted human rights, and terminated its 

nuclear program. Instead, they wanted the United States to agree 

to a list of demands before Iran acted.

• It is strategically lonely. Iran lacks friends and does not work 

well with others. Despite its most recent agreement to suspend 
9

its uranium enrichment activities (for how long, is still unclear), 

it still is at odds with the European Union (EU) over human 

rights; the IAEA for dodging agency resolutions that it come 

totally clean on its nuclear past; and the United States and 

most of the world for harboring and supporting terrorists―now 

including Al Qaeda agents―who are all too willing to use any 

means (including chemical, biological, or nuclear devices) to 

attack Israel, Europe, and the United States. Given its loneliness, 

Tehran is particularly anxious to avoid being brought before 

the UN. Meanwhile, locally, Iran is suspicious of nearly all of 

its neighbors and is still quite frightened of being attacked or 

subverted by the United States or Israel. This, in turn, encourages 

it to turn inward. The end result is that the country that Iran 

now has the closest military cooperation with―North Korea―is 

itself on the outs. As for its closest diplomatic allies―Russia and 

China―these states’ help is triggered less by Iran’s needs than a 

desire to oppose the United States.

• It is desperate for Western help. The fl ip-side of Iran’s strategic 

loneliness is its overweening sense of self-importance. Iranian 

offi cials believe that Iran should be the most powerful and 

richest state in the region and cannot understand why it is not. 

Meanwhile, Iran’s high level of corruption and state interference 

in the economy has wrecked the economy and produced a 

domestic unemployment rate of over 25 percent: To deal with 

this, Iran must let over 200,000 of its young people emigrate 

annually to the West to fi nd work. As Iranian offi cials see it, the 

only way to reverse these trends is to get full access to advanced 

Western technology, Western fi nancial assets, and America’s 

enormous export market.

What is interesting about these weaknesses is how they feed one 

another: The more strategically lonely Iran gets, the more desperate 

it is for Western help; the more unpopular its government becomes, 

the more it blames outside forces for its shortcomings. This, in turn, 

only makes it more strategically isolated. There was considerable 

debate among the workshop participants about how long the current 
10

regime might last and what it would take to bring it down―some 

thinking it was fragile, most thinking that it would go on for many 

years. But, in the end, all thought Iran would eventually give way to 

some more moderate form of rule. 

Given the uncertainly regarding the revolutionary government’s 

longevity, the question arises as to how the United States and its 

friends should proceed against Iran’s nuclear program, which is 

progressing at a rapid rate. If the objective is to try to terminate the 

program immediately, the shortcomings of the three most popular 

options already noted come into play. If, on the other hand, the 

objective is to keep Iran from making or deploying nuclear weapons 

and to make sure Iran does not become a model for other would 

be bombmakers to follow, then the United States and its friends 

can exploit the Revolutionary government’s enduring weaknesses. 

With proper care, the United States and its allies could even see 

Iran’s current government give way to a less hostile regime. These 

long-term aims were the ones the working group believed were the 

ones most worthy of U.S. and allied effort and would require timely 

application of one or more of America’s and its allies’ strengths. 

These include:

• Power to lead and maintain military alliances. In the last 

16 years, the United States has operated alone or in concert 

effectively against Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan. More importantly, 

after toppling Saddam and the Taliban, the United States and its 

friends have made it clear that they will be backing Iraq’s and 

Afghanistan’s security, and in all probability operating out of 

Iraq and Afghanistan for the next decade or more. In addition, the 

United States has friendly military relations with the U.K., Spain, 

Poland, Japan, most of the EU, Pakistan, Israel, Egypt, Kuwait, 

Turkey, Jordan, and most of the Gulf Cooperation Council. It also 

has close ties with several nations that have extensive experience 

operating covertly against a variety of Middle Eastern nations.

• Ability to apply economic leverage. The United States, the EU, 

and Japan have all been on record as opposing Iran’s nuclear 

weapons activities. All have backed the IAEA’s efforts to get Iran 

to come clean on its previously undeclared nuclear activities. 
11

Japan has held back from investing billions for oil development 

in Iran. The EU, meanwhile, has put off extending a major trade 

protocol with Iran until and unless it makes its nuclear program 

more transparent, improves its human rights record, and ends 

its ties with terrorist organizations. Germany, France, and Great 

Britain indicated in their October 21 understanding that Iran 

“could expect easier access to modern technology and supplies 

in a wide range of areas,” but only if it suspends its enrichment 

and processing activities and is able to convince the IAEA that its 

nuclear activities are entirely peaceful. Also, the United States, 

which constitutes Iran’s largest potential export market, could 

expand trade with Tehran signifi cantly, if it chose to do so. To 

date, Washington has cut off private U.S. investment in Iran 

and has frozen Iranian overseas assets which Iran erroneously 

believes amount to billions of dollars.

• Attractive alternative political and social culture. The United 

States and Europe are culturally attractive to a majority of 

Iranian citizens. Many have visited and studied in the West and 

continue to do so. More have listened to or seen Western popular 

music, television, or movies. Western democracy is also seen 

as an attractive political alternative. The current government 

encourages some expressions of popular will and is quite 

sensitive about its lack of popularity for this reason. Recently, 

the government actually paid Cuba to jam alternative Iranian 

broadcasting from Los Angeles for fear of its seditious infl uence. 

Precisely because the government paints the United States as the 

Great Satan, embracing aspects of U.S. and Western culture is 

seen by Iranians as a way to resist.

Competitive Strategies.

Keeping these strengths in mind, participants in NPEC’s 

workshops suggested that the United States and its friends approach 

curbing Iran’s nuclear ambitions as part of a larger, more general 

competition whose aims would include:
12

• demonstrating U.S. and allied support for the welfare of common 

Iranians. This effort should be geared to help undermine the 

Revolutionary government’s efforts to portray the United 

States and its friends as security threats that warrant repressive 

domestic rule;

• making it clear to Iran and its neighbors (i.e., Saudi Arabia, 

Egypt, Syria, and Turkey) that following Iran’s nuclear example 

or violating the NPT is a poor way to hedge their own security 

bets, and that NPT and IAEA requirements are fi rm and will be 

in enforced.

• showing America’s allies who believe a quick deal with Iran is 

possible and desirable that any sound understanding―one with 

clear, worthwhile goals, and deadlines―is something that the 

current regime is incapable of delivering on until and unless the 

government undergoes major change.

• alerting Iran that any further progress on its “civilian” nuclear 

power program risks isolating it further and increasing the 

military risks it otherwise would not have to run.

• creating a P-5 NPT secretariat to see to it that above measures are 

actually implemented.

To achieve these larger goals, the group concluded that the 

United States and its friends should pursue a series at least three 

separate but related competitive strategies. These strategies’ 

ultimate aim would be to deter and delay Iran and its neighbors from 

developing or deploying nuclear weapons, keep America’s allies 

united in opposing the current regime’s most threatening activities, 

and increase pressures on the current regime either to change or to 

give way to a less hostile one that would be less wedded to having 

nuclear weapons:

1. Challenge Iran’s NPT noncompliance as being decisive to the 

future of nuclear nonproliferation. The United States has done well 

to get the IAEA Board of Governors (including Russia) to demand that 
13

Iran freeze its enrichment and possible reprocessing facilities, allow 

more intrusive inspections, and clarify its past nuclear activities. 

Firmness on these points prompted Iran to agree to accede to these 

demands in an understanding reached with Germany, France, and 

the United Kingdom on October 21, 2003. Senior Iranian offi cials 

made it very clear that under no circumstances could their country 

succeed if the matter of their nuclear activities were characterized as 

being illegal and were referred to the UN for action. An immediate 

danger now that Tehran has said it would comply with the IAEA’s 

September 12 demands, however, is that the United States or its 

allies might settle for only partial delivery on Iran’s pledges. Given 

growing evidence that Iran is developing a nuclear weapons option, 

such weakness would not only give Iran a pass to pursue its nuclear 

ambitions, but encourage other nuclear weapons aspirants (starting 

with Iran’s neighbors) to follow in Tehran’s footsteps. This later 

prospect is at least as worrisome as the fi rst. It will likely take the 

IAEA some months to make sense of the Iranian documents and 

nuclear equipment it is now examining in its effort to determine 

Iran’s NPT compliance status. During this period, the IAEA should 

call for a temporary suspension of all nuclear cooperation with Iran. 

Ultimately, however, the IAEA will have little choice but to fi nd Iran 

either to be in violation or not clearly in full compliance and this, in 

turn, should prompt sanctions. Indeed, doing anything less would 

seriously jeopardize the IAEA’s credibility and that of the NPT. The 

reasons why already are plain:

• Iran has already admitted to violating its safeguards agreement 

with the IAEA by not properly alerting the IAEA about its 

importation of uranium and conversion of uranium into metal.

• The IAEA’s own statute stipulates that the agency must report all 

safeguards violations to the UNSC. As such, not to report would 

be to have the IAEA punt on its own procedures and suggest that 

the IAEA can be duped or bullied.

• Although the IAEA set October 31, 2003 as the deadline for Iran 

to explain the trace amounts of HEU the IAEA found, Iranian 

offi cials claim that they will never be able to fully resolve this 
14

mystery except to claim that the centrifuge equipment they 

imported was “contaminated” and that the brokers that sold this 

equipment can’t say where they bought this equipment from.

• HEU is directly usable to make kiloton-yield weapons.

• There is good reason to believe that this equipment came by way 

of Pakistan’s or Russia’s nuclear weapons program (which goes 

to Iran’s intent to build weapons in violation of Article II of the 

NPT, a key provision that prohibits non-weapons state members 

from seeking or receiving “any assistance in the manufacture of 

nuclear weapons”). On this last point, Iranian offi cials insist that 

the burden of proof that it is in violation is on the IAEA. Yet, 

just the reverse is the case: Once a state is found in possession 

of undeclared special nuclear materials, the burden is on it to 

explain how it could possess such material without being found 

in violation of the NPT.

• If Iran did enrich uranium to make HEU, it would have violated 

its IAEA safeguards agreement since it would have failed to 

notify the IAEA of the introduction of special nuclear material 

into an undeclared enrichment facility.

• If the IAEA fails to report these points to the UNSC as the IAEA’s 

charter requires, it will appear weak and only encourage more 

Iranian welshing (e.g., Iranian offi cials’ recent announcement 

that it is “studying” how it could possibly suspend its enrichment 

activity).

• Finally, unless an IAEA violations fi nding is in prospect (or its 

functional equivalent―i.e., an IAEA fi nding that it cannot fi nd 

Iran to be in full compliance), any state could simply follow 

Iran’s example and violate the NPT or IAEA in the expectation 

that the IAEA would give them a similar pass. 

In addition to these points, members of the IAEA’s board of 

governors should refl ect on IAEA director general el Baradei’s 

own recent public warnings that were prominently featured in the 
15

October 18, 2003, edition of The Economist. In a detailed column that 

he authored, the director general spoke out about the limitations of 

IAEA inspections. There is no monitoring effort, he explained, not 

even the additional protocol the IAEA is asking Iran to implement, 

that can prevent nations from acquiring nuclear weapons so long 

as they are allowed to have enrichment, reprocessing, and power 

reactor programs. NPEC-commissioned research corroborates these 

points. If Iran uses natural uranium, it could make its fi rst bomb in 

36 months or less. In the case of using light water reactor fresh fuel 

as enrichment feed, the time lines would be much shorter―under 

selected scenarios, a matter of days or weeks. Once Iran’s light 

water power reactor is up and running, the time lines for it making 

plutonium for bombs are also short. The Russians announced in 

the fall of 2003 that they intend to slip the completion date of the 

reactor another 2 years. It remains to be seen if the Russians stick 

to this schedule. Russia has also proposed to take back any spent 

fuel generated from Bushehr. In any case, 12-15 months after the 

reactor goes into operation, it will contain roughly 60 bombs’ worth 

of near weapons-grade plutonium. With only modest investment, 

Iran could easily build a reprocessing plant covertly at any time in 

4 to 6 months in a space 30 feet by 40 feet by 130 feet, using readily 

accessible technology. With such a facility on the ready, Iran could 

run the reactor and then tell inspectors and Russians that it wants 

to examine the spent fuel. This might cause alarm (or not); it would 

hardly matter. In as little as a week, well before anyone could agree 

on the facts, much less a clear course of action, Iran could make a 

bomb’s worth of plutonium metal a day.

It is for this reason and because of Iran’s past cheating (and 

its contradictory explanations about the trace quantities of HEU 

inspectors found), that the IAEA should report to the UNSC even 

before it completes its analysis of Iranian documents and equipment 

associated with the agency’s discovery of trace quantities of HEU. In 

this “interim” report, the IAEA should:

• call on all nations to suspend temporarily any further nuclear 

cooperation with Iran until the IAEA can clarify this matter and 

establish whether or not Iran has come into full compliance with 

the NPT;
16

• insist that Iran uphold the freeze on its uranium enrichment 

and processing activities that it agreed to October 21, 2003 with 

Germany, France, and the United Kingdom;

• establish a reasonable schedule for clarifying the origin of the 

trace amounts of bomb usable highly enriched uranium (HEU) 

the IAEA has found.

• ask the permanent fi ve members of the UNSC (P-5) to agree to 

how they would act upon receipt of an IAEA report that found a 

member not to be clearly in full compliance with either its IAEA 

safeguards agreement or the NPT.

The fi ling of this report would be immediately benefi cial. At the 

very least, it would help provide the justifi cation the Russians need to 

keep from completing Bushehr. This is important. Without Bushehr, 

Iran lacks any “peaceful” justifi cation for mining, enriching, or 

reprocessing nuclear materials for power production. Also, without 

this reactor, Iran would be deprived of the lightly enriched uranium 

fuel required to complete the two quickest routes to generating a 

large number of nuclear weapons―weapons usable plutonium from 

Bushehr’s spent fuel or weapons uranium derived from the lightly 

enriched uranium it could feed into its centrifuge program. 

It also could help set a major revitalization of the NPT into 

motion by getting the P-5 focused on enforcing the NPT. Such an 

effort is urgently needed since the UNSC has still taken no action on 

the IAEA’s violation report it fi led in February 2003 regarding North 

Korea. 

Among the NPT enforcement actions the P-5 ought to consider 

and adopt are:

• calling on all nations to cooperate in interdicting all nuclear 

related exports and imports to and from the identifi ed violator 

until that nation comes back into full compliance with the NPT;

• banning any further peaceful nuclear cooperation with any state 

the IAEA has determined is not clearly in full compliance with 
17

its NPT obligations until such time as the agency validates full 

adherence;

• insisting that all of the provisions of the NPT continue to apply to 

states even if they then attempt to withdraw from the NPT until 

and unless they dismantle or surrender the nuclear goods they 

have acquired under the NPT;

• authorizing increasingly stiff economic sanctions against states 

the IAEA identifi es as no longer clearly being in full compliance 

with their NPT obligations starting with the suspension of 

international fi nancial institutional investments so long as the 

noncompliant state fails to resolve its violations; and,

• creating a P-5 NPT secretariat to see to it that the above measures 

are actually implemented.

This effort, like the IAEA’s own review of the evidence regarding 

Iran, would likely take several months. During this period, though, 

there would be a presumption against any state taking any step to 

violate or undermine the NPT. Beyond this, it also would increase 

U.S. and allied leverage to get Iran to reconsider its nuclear program, 

and increase international support for isolating Iran if it continues to 

develop nuclear weapons-related capabilities.

2. Encourage Iranians to debate the merits of their nuclear power 

program and support of terrorism. As has already been noted, Iran 

could possibly have its fi rst uranium bomb in as little as 2 years. It 

will take some months, at best, to get the IAEA and the UN Security 

Council to determine Iran’s compliance status and to impose sanctions 

as appropriate. Whatever the outcome of these international efforts, 

though, the United States and its allies need separately to explain 

what Iranians can expect from a U.S.-led coalition if Iran continues 

its nuclear power program (which effectively assures Iran a nuclear 

weapons option) and retains its ties to terrorist organizations. At the 

same time, the United States and its key allies should also explain 

what benefi ts Iranians can expect―improved relations with the West 

that include a lifting of sanctions, major power security guarantees, 
18

energy aid, enhanced trade relations with Europe, and formal 

diplomatic relations with the United States―if they drop their ties to 

terrorists and end their nuclear power activities. 

A key requirement for receiving any benefi ts would be for 

Iran to dismantle its nuclear power-related facilities in a verifi able 

way. The dismantling of these facilities would have to commence 

before these facilities could ever produce their fi rst bomb’s worth of 

uranium or plutonium, i.e., before the end of 2005. If Iran did this, 

the United States and its key Western allies should ease work visa 

regulations to help absorb the many Iranian nuclear technicians that 

would otherwise be without work. Iran would also have to cut ties to 

terrorist organizations. Here the potential nexus between terrorism 

and nuclear weapons fi gures largely. Certainly, if Iran comes within 

weeks of being able to have a large arsenal of nuclear weapons, it will 

only feel more confi dent in sheltering and supporting terrorists, the 

harboring of which would otherwise make Iran a potential military 

target. There also is the prospect that Iran might actually share its 

nuclear knowledge with these organizations. In this case, Iran could 

use these groups as strategic proxies to pose the very nuclear threats―

against the United States, Iran’s neighbors, and Israel―that Iran’s 

own acquisition of a weapons option would otherwise accomplish. 

Also, as long as Iran keeps its ties to these terrorist organizations, it 

can always arm them with chemical or biological agents and other 

explosives, even if it abandons its nuclear power-related activities. 

With these arms, terrorists could accomplish many of the same goals 

that the United States and its allies fear these organizations might 

with nuclear weapons. Getting Iran to cut its terrorist ties, as such, 

is no less critical than getting it to end its nuclear weapons relevant 

activities.

Who should take the lead in explaining these points to Iran―

Washington, the EU, Russia, or the P-5―and how these points would 

be presented, would have to be worked out. 

As a compliment to this effort and to increase the credibility 

of the benefi ts Iranians could expect if they did drop their nuclear 

power program and terrorist support, the United States should 

launch a long-term outreach effort to the Iranian people (particularly 

those unhappy with the current style and substance of the current 

government’s rule). The aim here would be to undermine the 
19

Revolutionary government’s demonization of the United States, 

which it uses to help justify its hostile, repressive policies. Achieving 

this objective will require persistent effort and should start with one 

or more of the following modest steps:

• Ease current travel restrictions on friendly Iranians visiting 

the United States. Under post-9/11 restrictions, Iranian 

dissidents and goodwill sports teams visiting the United 

States must be fi ngerprinted and photographed. In 2001, the 

Bush Administration allowed a wrestling team to enter the 

United States without fi ngerprinting. This was duly noted 

and appreciated. A way to make this outcome more likely and 

predictable is needed for desirable Iranian visitors. In addition, 

the United States should sponsor visits to the United States from 

Iranian journalists, prominent Iranian women, and Shia clergy.

• Provide logistical support for the direct broadcast of dissidents’ 

messages into Iran. Given the recent Cuban jamming of 

broadcasts from Los Angeles, the U.S. Government should make 

available alternative secure means for these groups to reach their 

audiences. And it should provide material for use by private 

broadcasters and extend and expand the Voice of America 

television broadcasts in Persian, which have had diffi culty 

securing stable funding.

• Make free instruction opportunities available over the internet. 

The Iranian government has had diffi culty controlling the 

public’s use of the internet to access Western sites and to 

communicate internationally. The United States and its friends 

should exploit this by offering the Iranian public a wide variety 

of internet educational courses tailored to their needs and desire 

for self-improvement. These internet courses should be offered 

free of cost from accredited recognized educational institutions 

and should lead to degrees to the extent possible.

• Expand disaster relief as required. This would not require a 

change in U.S. policy, only a more active effort to implement and 

properly publicize it. 
20

• Provide counternarcotic assistance. The United States already 

is trying to stem the fl ow of Afghani drugs (the key source of 

Iranian drug users). It should augment these efforts and publicize 

what it has accomplished there. The UN Offi ce for Drugs and 

Crime (UNODC) has an offi ce in Tehran and is working to help 

reduce drug sales and use in Iran. Section 307 of the U.S. Foreign 

Assistance Act, however, prevents Iran from benefi ting from U.S. 

contributions to international organizations. This prohibition has 

been waived for Iran in the cases of the IAEA and UNICEF. The 

President has not yet waived it for UNODC, though. This should 

be reviewed. 

• Public health and health care assistance. Over 20,000 Iranians 

have contracted HIV/AIDs, mostly as a result of narcotics 

use. To address this growing problem, the United States could 

facilitate public health professionals’ travel to Iran to assist in 

current World Health Organization (WHO) efforts to control this 

virus in Iran. More generally, the United States could expand its 

public health professional exchanges with Iran and work with 

local hospitals and doctors to establish the kind of computerbased public health monitoring systems currently being installed 

at very low costs in the United States and in NATO nations. 

These efforts, which serve a number of political purposes 

(including reaching out to the possible future leaders of Iran) should 

be continued even if they fail to get the current government to 

reconsider its nuclear power program and support of terrorism. That 

said, if the rulers in Tehran fail to have a change of heart on these 

issues, the United States and its friends must be prepared for a much 

longer competition to turn Iran around. This longer competition 

would necessarily involve shoring up U.S. and allied security 

relations with Iran’s neighbors (to limit the harm to regional and 

international security that Iranian nuclear threats might otherwise 

pose) and undermining Iran’s confi dence in the wisdom of its 

current policies.

3. If Iran continues to pursue worrisome nuclear activities, 

ramp up U.S. and allied military regional capabilities both to 
21

neutralize the Iranian threat and forestall further proliferation. 

The United States and the military coalition in Iraq already must 

guarantee Iraq’s security. Many of these same countries are also 

cooperating in efforts under the Proliferation Security Initiative to 

interdict nuclear weapons-related goods from reaching or leaving 

countries like Iran. Beyond this, the coalition needs to consult 

with the Gulf Cooperation Council states, Jordan, Turkey, Israel, 

and Egypt about their military plans for coping with a militant, 

nuclear (or near-nuclear) Iran. Certainly, Iran must understand that 

if it persists in developing its nuclear weapons option, it will face 

security costs and risks that would outweigh the possible value of 

acquiring nuclear weapons. At a minimum, plans should be made 

now on how additional military cooperation with Iran’s neighbors 

(including intelligence sharing, missile defense cooperation, joint 

training, base sharing agreements, etc.) might best counter the threat 

and what new security arrangements, if any, would be appropriate. 

The general aim of these efforts should be to give Iran a choice 

between being outside of these arrangements (and a key reason for 

their establishment) or becoming an equal member by dropping 

its terrorist ties and becoming nonnuclear. Detailing what kind of 

security cooperation is desirable and clarifying the merits of overt 

and covert military action will be the focus of NPEC’s follow-on 

analysis to be completed next spring.

23

CHAPTER 2

IRAN’S “LEGAL” PATHS TO THE BOMB

Victor Gilinsky

Introduction and Summary.

Recent events have reinforced the persistent suspicion that Iran 

seeks nuclear weapons. That suspicion is fed by Iran’s drive to obtain 

all aspects of nuclear power technology, whether economically 

justifi ed or not. Iran’s strong emphasis on those technologies that 

would permit production of nuclear explosives―plutonium and 

highly enriched uranium―is especially worrisome. So is Iran’s 

resistance to accepting more effective international inspections 

and, even more so, its likely violation of its current reporting 

obligations.

Iran’s rationale for pursuing these technologies is that they would 

support the operation of its nuclear power reactors for generating 

electricity. So far, Iran has only one Russian-supplied unit, Bushehr 

1, under construction. But it looks more and more as if the country―

that is to say, the directorate of the nuclear program―has more in 

mind than generating electricity. Consider, for example, the issue 

of plutonium. The Bushehr reactor, like any uranium-fueled power 

reactor, would produce militarily-signifi cant amounts of plutonium 

in its fuel during operation. Under U.S. pressure to make sure the 

plutonium from Bushehr did not end up in bombs, the Russians have 

agreed to take back the reactor’s radioactive spent fuel, 1 percent of 

which would produce plutonium during the reactor’s operation. 

Most power reactor operators are delighted to get rid of their spent 

fuel. The contained plutonium has no economic value. Iran, however, 

has made it clear that it intends to pursue reprocessing technology 

to separate the plutonium from spent fuel, which raises questions 

about the future of that Bushehr product. 

As was revealed in August 2002 by an opposition group, Iran is 

also building a heavy water plant at Arak.1 Iran has since informed 
24

the IAEA it intends to build a heavy water reactor, which would be 

even more suited to producing plutonium. 

Iran is also opening the door to producing the other nuclear 

explosive of interest―highly enriched uranium.2 Bushehr, like all 

water-cooled power reactors, would use low enriched uranium as 

fuel that Russia would normally supply. Yet in August 2002 it was 

brought to light by the same Iranian dissidents that Iran was building 

uranium centrifuge enrichment plants.3 These cannot remotely be 

justifi ed economically on the basis of Iran’s nuclear power program. 

They would, however, be of major importance for producing nuclear 

weapons. The secretiveness about these plants during their early 

development is unsettling. Even more unsettling is the likelihood 

that Iran violated its safeguards agreement with the International 

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in testing its pilot enrichment plant. 

Likely IAEA Reporting Violations.

Iran, as a consequence of its adherence to the Nonproliferation 

Treaty, was obligated to inform the IAEA if it tested its centrifuges 

with uranium hexafl uoride gas. It did not so inform the IAEA. It now 

asserts it used other gases for testing. It is, however, very diffi cult 

to believe Iran’s assertion that it built its pilot centrifuge cascade 

and launched a huge centrifuge complex construction project 

without testing its unit design with the real stuff, so to speak. Such 

an omission would have violated all normal engineering practice. 

Moreover, Iran has resisted IAEA efforts to take environmental 

samples at the facility to check on Iran’s claim.4 Iran insists that it 

is not obligated to permit such sampling since it has not signed the 

Additional Protocol requested by the Agency of all its members. 

There are a number of other IAEA reporting failures and activities 

that have raised concern:5

• In 1991, Iran imported 1.8 tons of natural uranium and failed 

to report it to the IAEA. Iran said it was not legally required 

to report it. The IAEA said Iran must declare all such imports 

“as soon as possible.” 
25

• Iran informed the IAEA in May that it intended to build a 

heavy-water research reactor at Arak, the existence of which 

the IAEA learned about in 2002 from media reports. This 

plant would yield weapons-grade plutonium. 

• Iran has converted natural uranium into uranium metal. The 

IAEA says “the role of uranium metal . . . needs to be fully 

understood, since neither (Iran’s) light water reactors nor its 

planned heavy water reactors require uranium metal.”

Resisting the IAEA Additional Protocol.6

Adding to long-term suspicions is that Iran has been also 

unwilling to accept advanced IAEA safeguards―the so-called 

Additional Protocol that most countries have signed―that would 

permit more extensive inspection by the Agency. 

The Additional Protocol (based on INFCIRC/540 [corr.]) is, 

according to the IAEA, the key to its strengthened safeguards 

system. Signers agree to provide the IAEA with broader information 

covering all aspects of its nuclear fuel cycle-related activities, 

including research and development and uranium mining. They 

must also grant the Agency broader access rights, including short 

notice inspections of all building at nuclear sites. They must also 

allow the IAEA to use advanced verifi cation technologies, including 

environmental sampling. 

The new Protocol would also allow the Agency to obtain more 

and earlier design information. The current requirement is that the 

IAEA is to obtain such information “as early as possible” without 

specifying a defi nite time.7

Iran recently said it would accept such a protocol if the United 

States and other countries would relax current restrictions on nuclear 

technology exports to Iran.8 The United States would not agree for 

obvious and sensible reasons.

Is the Civilian Program Only a “Cover”?

There is still a tendency, even among those convinced Iran is 

intent on getting nuclear weapons, to see the country’s nuclear power 
26

program as a cover for a separate clandestine weapons program for a separate clandestine weapons program 

rather than part of a weapon program and to fail to appreciate the 

nuclear explosive production capacity of the “civilian” program 

itself, especially that of the Russian-supplied Bushehr power reactor 

nearing completion. 9 Weapon design and preparation for weapon 

fabrication would, of course, have to be under cover, at least so long 

as Iran remains a member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). 

Clandestine nuclear explosive production activities may take place, 

too. Still, it is not generally appreciated just how close Iran’s planned 

nuclear program brings that country to a bomb. And not only would 

these activities―entirely legal under the current interpretation of the 

NPT so long as the IAEA can inspect them―bring Iran to the threshold 

of a bomb, but to the capacity for producing large numbers of them.10

This report will provide estimates of the formidable potential of the 

reactor and related fuel cycle facilities.

Brief Background to Iran’s Nuclear Program

Iran was one of the fi rst signers of the NPT. From the fi rst, 

however, Iran exemplifi ed the hypocrisies embedded in the Treaty. 

The Treaty started as an effort among non-nuclear states to stem the 

spread of nuclear weapons capabilities. In its fi nal form it became a 

deal between the haves and have-nots―the have-nots would promise 

to forego nuclear weapons and allow the IAEA to inspect their 

nuclear facilities (a promise reversible on 90 days’ notice) in return 

for full access to all peaceful applications of nuclear technology just 

short of bombmaking. The Shah ratifi ed the NPT in 1970 and soon 

after that started planning a grandiose nuclear power program that 

at one point included 23 nuclear power plants. It appears though 

that the Shah had more in mind than generating electricity and that 

he also started a secret nuclear weapons research program at about 

the same time. 

All this came to a halt with the 1979 Islamic revolution and 

the Shah’s departure. The new rulers apparently revived nuclear 

activities in the mid-1980s, when reports once again reached the 

West of bomb-related interests on the part of Iran. Unlike Iraq, which 

tried (and failed) to produce nuclear explosives by means of a secret 
27

nuclear weapons project outside of the “declared” sector subject to 

IAEA inspections, Iran has skillfully exploited the weakness of the 

NPT. There is nothing illegal from the point of view of the Treaty, for 

example, in separating plutonium from irradiated reactor fuel, or in 

producing enriched uranium, so long as the facilities are accessible 

to IAEA inspectors. Since obtaining the nuclear explosive material is 

the most diffi cult part of making a bomb, this permissiveness allows 

a would-be bombmaker to get very close to his goal. And since an 

illicit bomb design and manufacturing capability is relatively easy 

to hide―it does not involve nuclear materials―it can be prepared 

secretly in parallel with overt explosive material production, so that 

when the material is ready it can almost immediately be put to bomb 

use. 

That is the assumption the IAEA uses, at least in principle, for 

the purpose of guiding the timing of its own inspections. Article 28 

of the current IAEA-Iran agreement states the “timely detection” 

principle: 

The objective of the safeguards procedures set forth in this part of 

the Agreement is the timely detection of diversion of signifi cant 

quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to 

the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive 

devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such 

diversion by the risk of early detection.11

The IAEA estimates that once in possession of the explosive 

material, a country that is so inclined and has made the necessary 

preparation in design and manufacturing capability can produce 

bombs in a week or two.

12 Interestingly, the IAEA then sets a goal 

for inspection frequency for holders of such materials at a month, 

and even that goal is not met consistently. Obviously, the Agency 

has given up the ability to provide “early warning” of an attempt 

to make one or a small number of bombs, and has relied on the 

deterrence effect of its ability to detect a larger bomb manufacturing 

effort within a month or so of the start of bomb manufacture. The 

effectiveness of a deterrent based on such a delayed unmasking of a 

would-be bombmaker is very much open to question. 
28

Plutonium: Iran’s Light Water Reactor at Bushehr.

The light water reactor that Russia is building for Iran, and of 

which Iran would like to get additional units, is a copious source of 

plutonium. This plutonium would not be diffi cult for Iran to extract. 

Too much has been made of the diffi culty of reprocessing light water 

reactor (LWR) fuel, especially by a country with Iran’s industrial 

base.13

The Bushehr nuclear power station based on the Russian LWR, 

with an electric generating capacity of 1,000 megawatts, is apparently 

nearing completion and the builders say it will be ready for fueling 

and testing within a year. Once it starts commercial operation it 

could produce―like any reactor of its type―about 250 kilograms of 

plutonium a year in the reactor’s fuel. The signifi cance of such an 

amount is obvious when one considers that the amount needed for a 

bomb is several kilograms. 

To avoid accusations that they are helping the Iranians produce 

bombs, the Russians have said they have arranged to take back the 

reactor’s spent fuel. In fact, they say they will pay Iran to get it back, 

which is a very unusual arrangement considered from a commercial 

Figure 1. Bushehr Light Water Reacter.
29

point of view. Usually, operators of nuclear plants welcome any 

opportunity to ship it elsewhere. The fact that the Russians had to 

agree to pay for the spent fuel suggests the Iranians were not eager 

to get rid of it. The Iranians apparently forced the Russians to pay 

blackmail in order to revise their contract to one that would protect 

them against charges of contributing to weapons capabilities in 

Iran, which raises concerns all by itself. In any case, it is uncertain 

how such a spent fuel repatriation scheme would work and how 

effective it would be in the event the Iranians decided they wanted 

to stop shipping fuel to Russia. The arrangement has been thrown 

further into question by Iran’s statement that it intends to acquire the 

capability to reprocess LWR fuel to extract plutonium, a capability 

it would not need to operate the nuclear units economically, and 

would have no use for if the spent fuel is to return to Russia.14

Despite the obvious plutonium production potential of the 

Bushehr reactor, the conventional concern about how Iran might 

obtain nuclear weapons has not centered on that plant. It has been 

that it might conduct a clandestine nuclear weapon program in the 

“shadow” of its civilian nuclear electric power program. For example, 

a Washington think-tank report on Iran, written in 2000, says the 

following under the heading of “Reactors and Proliferation”:

It not clear that Iran’s reactor purchases are meant to be an 

integrated part of Iran’s nuclear weapons effort, as distinguished 

from a way of acquiring the necessary nuclear technology. The 

reactor design Russia is selling Iran produces only very limited 

amounts of plutonium, and no country has as yet used a similar 

reactor design to acquire fi ssile material.15

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) congressional testimony at about 

the same time conveys pretty much the same message:

Work continues on the construction of a 1,000-megawatt nuclear 

power reactor at Bushehr that will be subject to International 

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. This project will not 

directly support a weapons effort, but it affords Iran broad access 

to Russia’s nuclear industry.16

Plutonium from Bushehr (in fact, from all LWRs) is more 

signifi cant for weapons use than generally appreciated. A recent 
30

Livermore report calculates that such a reactor can produce about 

300 kilograms (about 50 bombs’ worth) of near-weapon-grade 

plutonium produced by the fi rst refueling―about 15 months after 

startup.17 As mentioned earlier, the diffi culty of extracting such 

plutonium from the radioactive spent fuel in which it is embedded 

has also been exaggerated. As put in an earlier 1995 Livermore 

report, the plutonium “can be separated from spent fuel with modest 

facilities and equipment.” 18

The utility of bombs made from such near-weapons grade 

plutonium (“fi rst cycle plutonium,” from LWR spent fuel removed 

after one normal operation cycle) does not differ much from that of 

so-called weapons grade plutonium. The difference comes from the 

higher content of the plutonium-240 isotope (14 percent in the fi rstcycle plutonium as opposed to about 6-7 percent in weapons grade). 

The plutonium-240 fi ssions spontaneously, thus releasing neutrons 

to start a premature chain reaction in the fi ssile plutonium-239 as 

it is compressed in a detonating warhead. The random plutonium240 spontaneous fi ssions introduce an uncertainty in yield because 

the premature chain reactions do not produce the maximum yield. 

The same problem affects the weapons grade material, only to a 

lesser extent, at least at the relatively basic weapons design level we 

assume here.19 (The problem more or less goes away in advanced 

weapon designs.) Calculations on the performance of near-weapons 

grade plutonium performed for NPEC show that―using technology 

not much beyond that of the fi rst U.S. weapons―the probability is 

high of attaining yields above the low kilotons with this material. 

The mean yield would be about 10 kilotons and the probability of 

exceeding a yield of about 20 kilotons would be about one-third, 

more or less the yield of the bombs dropped on Japan. 20

The previously cited 1995 Livermore report stated more 

generally that “reactor-grade (RG) plutonium, such as that produced 

in commercial power reactors (after three fuel cycles rather than one 

as assumed above and thus of lower utility), can be used to construct 

a nuclear weapon with a yield of “at least a kiloton.” The results cited 

here for the fi rst-cycle plutonium describe performance considerably 

better than this. 
31

Uranium Enrichment.

Iran is also developing uranium enrichment technology. It has 

pilot centrifuge facilities and has plans for building fairly large 

plants. Iran’s claim is that it is interested in uranium enrichment 

for the production of LWR fuel. The centrifuges in the enrichment 

plants could also easily be reconfi gured to produce highly enriched 

uranium. 

It came as a surprise to the IAEA, and apparently to intelligence 

agencies as well, that Iran has a substantial uranium enrichment 

program. It took dissident groups within Iran to directed intelligence 

to a pilot plant at Natanz. The IAEA visited this plant and found a 

pilot facility using a cascade of more than 100 centrifuges. The 

IAEA offi cials reported seeing components for about another 1000 

centrifuges. There are now public photographs available of a larger 

facility being built partially underground with two meter thick walls. 

It isn’t clear whether the technology was an indigenous adaptation, 

or whether another country supplied it. An obvious candidate is 

Pakistan. 

Weapons Signifi cance of the Enrichment Facilities Iran is Building 

and Planning.

21

To get an idea of the scale of Iran’s uranium enrichment capacity 

and its signifi cance in terms of weapons, it is useful to consider 

Figure 2. Enrichment Plant Construction.
32

the enrichment capacity that is needed to support the refueling of 

a single large power reactor of the type the Russians are building 

at Bushehr. This requires a technical digression on the subject of 

enrichment as it applies here. Readers uninterested in the technical 

details can skim to the result without loss. 

The core of a typical 1000 megawatt LWR such as the Bushehr 

reactor contains about 75 tons of low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel, a 

third of which is replaced at each refueling, about every 18 months. 

That means the requirement for fresh LEU fuel amounts to about 

17 tons per year. Such LWR fuel is typically enriched to about 3-

4.5 percent in uranium 235. (Recall that natural uranium contains 

about 0.7 percent uranium-235, the rest being uranium-238.) For the 

purpose of this calculation let us assume the fuel enrichment is 3.6 

percent uranium-235. 

Enrichment capacity is expressed in units of “separative work 

units” (SWU)–kilograms per year, or sometimes in tons SW per 

year. (These kilograms and tons are not amounts of material― amounts of material―

unfortunately a somewhat confusing point.)

To produce 17 tons of 3.6 percent LEU fuel requires about 75 tons 

of separative work per year.22 The separative work requirement is 

not precise because it depends on how the enrichment plant is run. 

This result assumes that the plant feed is natural uranium at 0.7 

percent uranium-235 and that the “tails assay,” the enrichment of the 

rejected material, is at 0.3 percent uranium-235. By raising the tails 

assay, by “skimming the cream” of a larger amount of feed material, 

one can reduce the amount of separative work required. 

The total enrichment capacity of the plant is the sum of the 

individual enrichment capacities of the components―in this case, 

centrifuges. If we assume a nominal individual centrifuge capacity 

of 5 kilograms of separative work per year (or 5 SWU per year), such 

a plant would contain about 15,000 centrifuges. This is roughly in 

the range, within a factor of two or three, that the Iranians seem to 

be talking about for the large plants that are in the initial stages of 

construction.

Now consider how much highly enriched uranium such a plant 

could produce if the centrifuge cascade―the grouping of individual 

centrifuges―is reconfi gured for that purpose. A similar enrichment 
33

calculation, assuming natural uranium feed and a 0.3 percent tails 

assay, shows that the same plant reconfi gured could produce nearly 

400 kg of 90 percent uranium-235, say 20 bombs’ worth, per year.23

Using LEU as Feed Material Reduces Need for Enrichment 

Capacity.

Even more interesting is the possibility of using LEU as feed, that 

is, starting with uranium already enriched to, say, 3.6 percent rather 

than starting with natural uranium. Such low enrichment uranium 

could be either material imported for fueling LWRs or material 

previously enriched in Iran. Perhaps counter-intuitively, it turns 

out that most of the separative work to obtain HEU is already done 

in bringing natural uranium to the level of LEU because there is so 

much material to deal with at the lower enrichment levels. It turns 

out that if one starts with LEU feed, the nearly 400 kilograms of HEU 

per year (at about 90 percent uranium-235) could be turned out by 

an enrichment plant with a capacity of slightly over 15 tons SW/yr, 

or about one-fi fth of the capacity needed for starting with natural 

uranium feed. This calculation assumes a 1.5 percent tails assay and 

therefore 16 tons of LEU feed per year, or about the amount of LEU 

needed annually to fuel a reactor of the Bushehr type. With a lower 

tails assay the separative work requirement would go up but the 

feed requirement would go down, and similarly for the reverse.

The separative work requirements scale with the amount of 

product. Starting with LEU, a smaller quantity of HEU, say, 100 

kilograms of HEU per year, enough for about fi ve nominal bombs 

per year, could be produced by a plant with an enrichment capacity 

of less than 4 tons of separative work per year. With the same 

assumptions as used previously that would amount to less than 

1000 centrifuge units, roughly the level of equipment that the IAEA 

inspectors saw on hand in the form of components in a recent visit to 

Iran.

Summary: Iran’s Two “Legal” Paths to Nuclear Explosives.

To summarize, the technical possibilities, all “legal” under the 

NPT, include both plutonium and highly enriched uranium. In terms 
34

of physical capability, once Bushehr is operational, which is slated for 

the end of 2004, Iran would have the possibility of using the Bushehr 

reactor plus a reprocessing capability it would have to develop. That 

could give it a bomb capability to produce dozens of warheads, 

though likely no earlier than, say, 2006. Another possibility, in light 

of Iran’s construction of a heavy water plant, would base a military 

plutonium production capability on a heavy water reactor, but that 

could only come to fruition several years later. 

The other, or possibly complementary, course would be based on 

highly enriched uranium produced in centrifuge plants, either the 

known plants or clandestine ones. A very small facility involving, 

say, 1,000 machines of modest capability, that could probably be 

hidden effectively, could produce several HEU warheads a year. 

If Iran made full use of a larger facility of the sort it appears to be 

building, the bomb production capacity would scale accordingly. 

Of course, either course would involve treaty violations from 

which would follow diplomatic and possibly military consequences. 

The violation would not be mitigated by a withdrawal from the 

treaty. A country cannot legally gain the fruit of treaty adherence by 

accumulating the wherewithal for a bomb and then withdrawing. 

(That refl ects a standard principle in contracts, but it would be 

helpful if the NPT members would say so explicitly.) 

Changing the System of Protection in Terms of Allowable 

Technology, Inspections, and Enforcement.

Iran illustrates the vulnerabilities of the current international 

system of protection against proliferation. A major diffi culty is 

that the present international norm is too permissive. The NPT has 

been read to say that all technologies and materials are acceptable 

so long as the owners declare them to be peaceful and allow IAEA 

inspection. But we know it is dangerous to allow members to get 

arbitrarily close to a bomb, or to have nuclear explosives around that 

others could steal. So we have tried to plug the holes in the treaty 

with various export controls over what we delicately call “sensitive” 

technology. Yet if North Korea had not been so foolish as to cheat, 

but instead had let the IAEA watch its pre-1992 reprocessing, 

there would not have been grounds for objection, at least under 
35

the treaty. Iran has taken a more sophisticated approach and is 

cleverly exploiting the weaknesses of the NPT. We cannot keep our 

fi ngers in the nuclear dike forever. We need a rule that limits what 

is acceptable in terms of civilian nuclear power technology to that 

there is a greater safety margin between it and possible military 

application. It will likely have to be a common rule applicable to all. 

That may sound unrealistic, but the alternative is unsustainable.

The once-through LWR fuel cycle is sometimes called 

“proliferation-resistant.” It is a considerable improvement, in terms 

of security, over some of the alternatives, but it has its problems, too, 

and requires a very tight system of inspection, at least in suspicious 

places. At a minimum we need the upgrading in IAEA inspections 

that would follow from adoption of the “Additional Protocol” that 

most countries have signed and Iran has resisted. 

Improved inspection will not be worth much as a deterrent 

unless behind it is a credible and effective reaction to violations. It 

used to be said years ago that, whatever the defi ciencies of IAEA 

inspections, if there was ever a serious violation, there would be an 

immediate and tough international response. We have discovered 

enforcement is a complicated matter and there are always reasons to 

hold off. Consider the North Korean affair that has dragged for over 

10 years after the IAEA found a serious violation. A chief problem is 

that the NPT has no enforcement mechanism so the matter is left to 

individual members. We need some kind of permanent international 

arrangement. 

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2

1. State Department briefi ng, May 9, 2003. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/

2003/20439.htm.

2. Highly enriched uranium (HEU) is uranium enriched in the isotope 

uranium 235 (the fi ssile fuel and explosive). For weapon use the proportion of 

uranium 235 has to be over, say, 80 percent. Natural uranium contains only about 

0.7 percent uranium 235 and about 99.3 percent uranium 238. The uranium 238 

is more or less inert in this context but when irradiated by neutrons, as it would 

be sitting in an operating power reactor, it can get turned into plutonium 239, the 

other nuclear explosive. Water-cooled power reactors use low enriched uranium 

(LEU) fuel with about 4 percent uranium 235. Most of the world’s LEU is enriched 

in large plants in the United States, Russia, and Europe. The water-cooled reactors 
36

are called LWRs, or light water reactors, to distinguish them from heavy water 

reactors.

3. U.S. intelligence apparently fi rst learned of previously secret nuclear 

facilities―including a uranium enrichment plant at Natanz based on centrifuge 

technology―from an Iranian opposition group. If that is correct, it raises questions 

about the quality of U.S. intelligence. 

4. Reuters dispatch from Tehran, June 12, 2003. “In a confi dential report 

obtained by Reuters in Vienna last week, the IAEA said it had requested permission 

to take samples at a workshop at Kalaye where Iran had admitted to constructing 

components for centrifuges designed for enriching uranium.” 

5. Reuters report from Vienna, June 15, 2003.

6. IAEA Safeguards factsheet, http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Periodicals/Fact

sheets/English/S1_Safeguards.pdf.

7. The Text Of The Agreement Between Iran And The Agency For The 

Application Of Safeguards In Connection With The Treaty On The NonProliferation Of Nuclear Weapons, entered into force on May 15, 1974. Article 42, 

contains the following: 

Pursuant to Article 8, design information in respect of existing 

facilities shall be provided to the Agency during the discussion 

of the Subsidiary Arrangements. The time limits for the provision 

of design information in respect of the new facilities shall be 

specifi ed in the Subsidiary Arrangements and such information 

shall be provided as early as possible before nuclear material is 

introduced into a new facility.

8. United Press International, Tehran, Iran, May 30, 2003. Iranian Foreign 

Minister Kamal Kharrazi said on Friday Iran would sign the Additional Protocol 

pertaining to the International Atomic Energy Agency if sanctions against it were 

lifted and nuclear technology for peaceful purposes was put at its disposal, the 

offi cial Islamic Republic News Agency reported.

9. For background on the Iranian nuclear program, see Nuclear Threat Initiative 

web site at www.nti.org. The CIA addresses the issue of the possibility of an Iranian 

nuclear weapons program in a periodic report to Congress. A recent edition 

contained an increased appreciation of the signifi cance of Iran’s planned fuel 

cycle facilities: Unclassifi ed Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology 

Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 

July 1 Through December 31, 2001, CIA, January 2003.
37

10. In this connection, a June 11, 2003, Reuters report from Tokyo states 

“Iranian experts on nuclear issues secretly visited North Korea this year, possibly 

to ask North Korean offi cials for advice on how to handle international inspectors, 

a Japanese newspaper said on Wednesday.” 

11. The Text Of The Agreement Between Iran And The Agency For The 

Application Of Safeguards In Connection With The Treaty On The NonProliferation Of Nuclear Weapons, Entered Into Force on May 15, 1974.

12. IAA Safeguards Glossary (2001), p. 22. See www.iaea.org.

13. The issue arose in the context of the U.S.-supplied LWRs for North Korea 

(built and mostly paid for by South Korea) that were part of the 1994 U.S.-DPRK 

Agreed Framework, and which in many ways parallel the Russian-supplied LWR 

for Iran. The State Department decried the Russia-Iran deal but defended the U.S.-

DPRK one, ultimately on the claim that the DPRK wouldn’t be able to extract the 

plutonium produced in the LWRs, a pollyannaish assumption. 

14. Khatami speech February 9, 2003.

15. A. H. Cordesman, “Iran and Nuclear Weapon,” Centerfor Strategic 

and International Studies (CSIS) report, 2000. This report, available at http:

//www.csis.org/mideast/reports/irannuclear02072000.pdf //www.csis.org/mideast/reports/irannuclear02072000.pdf, contains a good deal of , contains a good deal of 

interesting background.

16. Statement by John A. Lauder, Director, DCI Nonproliferation Center to 

the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Russian Proliferation to Iran’s 

Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missile Programs, October 5, 2000. 

17. Livermore, 2000.

18. 1995 Livermore report: “Extraction and Utility of Reactor-Grade 

Plutonium for Weapons” (U) (see for example, http://www.thoriumpower.com/fi les/

tech percent20plutoniumblications/reactor_plutonium.pdf).

19 The fi rst plutonium weapons―Trinity and Nagasaki―got around this by 

using plutonium that had only about 1 percent plutonium-240, which means it 

was extracted from uranium fuel that had been lightly irradiated. Even then, there 

was some slight chance that the weapon would produce a low yield.

20. The design improvement amounts to, in effect, a doubling of 1945 bomb 

assembly speed. Sixty years later, that should be within the capabilities of fi rsttime entrant into the bomb club.

21 See, for example, http://www.urenco.de/trennarbeit/swucal_e.html.
22. Not to be confused with the mass of the uranium core which happens to 

have the same fi gure.

23. The exact number is 388. The fi gure is rounded to 400 because the numbers 

are all approximate. The bomb equivalent assumes a nominal 20 kg of Uranium235 per warhead.

38
39

CHAPTER 3

IRAN’S INTERNAL STRUGGLES

Geneive Abdo

Overview.

This chapter argues that prospects for fundamental reform, 

much less outright revolutionary change, in the Islamic Republic 

of Iran are minimal in the short- to medium-term. In the complete 

absence today of any coherent, organized opposition and that 

of any competing ideology that could effectively challenge the 

continued clerical dominance, Iran’s national struggle will remain 

for the foreseeable future a matter to be hashed out within the ruling 

coalition of “political mullahs” and lay revolutionary activists and 

other Islamic intellectuals. It is the members of this elite, known 

in contemporary Persian as “insiders,” who together comprise 

the two primary political factions, labeled by the Western terms 

“reformers” and “hard-liners.” The fate of the Iranian nation has 

remained exclusively within this carefully controlled circle since the 

consolidation of the Islamic Revolution, and there are no signs that 

either wing is prepared to open the door to meaningful participation 

by “outsiders” beyond the pale of the revolutionary discourse. As 

a result, any clues to the future of Iran must be found among the 

behavior, interests and ideology of the “insiders.”

To show why this is the case, I will present a complex, 

interrelated set of religious, social and political factors shaping the 

nation’s destiny. These include: the essence and dynamics of the 

ruling clerical caste, which is deeply divided among “hard-liners,” 

“reformers,” and quietist “traditionalists”; the structure of the 

Islamic state and the extraordinary concentration of executive and 

supervisory powers in the hands of the appointed supreme clerical 

leader; the failure of “internal reform” led by President Mohammad 

Khatami; and the complete lack of any legitimate or credible 

opposition political movement or cohesive ideological challenge to 
40

the current Islamic political system.

I will analyze both the pillars of Iranian stability that keep the 

conservative establishment in power and the institutions and forces 

that may come one day to threaten the regime. Throughout, I will 

argue that neither revolution nor fundamental reform is likely 

anytime soon. The profound reason for this deadlock lies in the 

central theological, not political, debate dominating contemporary 

Iran: The dream among some to modernize Islam and the ambition of 

others to establish a “pure” Islamic state have clashed, destabilizing 

the country and undermining the democratic promise of the Islamic 

revolution.

The result is a nation frozen in place, one that will remain so 

until these deep-set contradictions underpinning the state and its 

relationship to society are resolved. Is Iran to be a Shi’ite Muslim 

state ruled by clerics with a monopoly on religious truth? Or is it to 

be a republic under the will of the people, while remaining consistent 

with religious and cultural traditions? While the focus of this paper 

is exclusively on Iran, it is worth noting that this broader struggle―a 

struggle not of Islam versus the West, but of Islam versus Islam―is 

actively at play in postwar Iraq and across the broader Muslim 

world.

After detailing the factors listed above and discussing their 

implications for regime stability, I will explore some of the potential 

turning points that could alter this roadmap and accelerate any 

emerging demands for fundamental change. I will also identify some 

key events and developments that could alert U.S. policymakers and 

other Iran-watchers to possible changes in the religious, social, and 

political landscape. These include the upcoming struggle over the 

succession to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, which could 

well mark the beginning of the end of the “Khomeini generation”; 

the selection and approval of the presidential candidates for the 2005 

elections; continued attempts by reformists, so far futile, to modify 

the legislative process at the expense of the clerical establishment 

and in favor of popular will; and the ability of the political elite to 

forestall the demands of the educated and growing numbers of postrevolutionary Iranians. Of course, exogenous events also shape any 

nation’s destiny, particularly those of the magnitude of the U.S.-led 
41

military campaign to topple Saddam Hussein and his Baathist regime 

in neighboring Iraq. Although events on the ground are moving 

quickly, I will briefl y outline the immediate impact and likely future 

effects of the Iraq war and its aftermath on Iran’s domestic political 

scene. 

Finally, I will discuss the implications of the expected course of 

Iranian affairs―most charitably seen as “muddling through” and 

deferring the most diffi cult political, social, and religious questions 

as long as possible―on one of the pressing issues facing Washington 

decisionmakers: Iran’s relationship to the United States. It is worth 

noting that whenever its own core values are involved, Iran remains 

for the most part highly immunized against outside interference in 

both its domestic affairs and its foreign policy.

Domestic Politics: Islam versus Islam.

Amid the chaos of the 1979 Islamic Revolution and its dizzying 

aftermath, it is easy to lose sight of the fact that Ayatollah Khomeini 

was a radical―not just politically, but in religious terms. In the face 

of almost universal opposition among the handful of recognized 

senior Shi’ite theologians in Iran and Iraq, he single-handedly 

revolutionized the role of the clergy and stood the entire notion 

of relations between traditionally quietist Shi’ism and the state, 

corrupt by religious defi nition and prone to error and sin, on its 

head. Begun in the 1940s and refi ned in 1970 during his exile to the 

Iraqi holy city of Najaf, Khomeini’s vision extended the clergy’s 

traditional authority over orphans, the insane or anyone else unable 

to fend for himself―an established principle known as velayat, or 

guardianship―to society as a whole. 

Against the traditional role for the clerics as moral guides and 

intercessors on behalf of the people with an inherently corrupt 

political authority, Khomeini proposed that the clergy should 

assume direct political power, in what would become the fi rst 

theocracy of the modern age. In other words, the clergy and the state 

would become one and the same. To the majority of Shi’ite thinkers 

this was blasphemy; the sacred texts make it clear that with the fi nal 

disappearance of the last of the community’s rightful leaders, the 
42

sainted 12 Imams, in 941 AD, no mere mortal could unite temporal 

and religious authority in one offi ce. Nonetheless, Khomeini pressed 

ahead, skillfully exploiting the weakness and divisions among both 

his clerical and secular opponents, with a speed and fi nality that 

surprised even his most ardent supporters; few if any had expected to 

live to see this blueprint for religious government enacted. With the 

ratifi cation of Iran’s new Islamic constitution in 1979, the principle of 

supreme clerical rule―the velayat-e faqih, or the guardianship of the 

jurisconsult―was established in law. It provides for an appointed 

senior Shi’ite cleric and expert in Islamic law to have fi nal say over 

almost all state affairs, including control over the security forces and 

the right to declare war. These powers were further buttressed by 

constitutional revision in 1988-1989, in preparation for the succession 

after Khomeni’s death.

The velayat-e faqih remains the most prominent feature of Iran’s 

political system, providing the state with what its supporters say is 

an Islamic essence. Hard-line theoreticians refer to this system as 

a “guided” republic, to distinguish it from the liberal, democratic 

republics of the West, with the supreme leader and the many state 

organs he controls responsible for guiding the nation along the 

righteous path. This attempt to co-opt the established role of Shi’ite 

clerics as moral guides, however, has failed to win over traditional 

theologians, who abhor their fellow clerics wielding political 

authority. Practical-minded critics among them also point to the 

very real risk to the standing of the clerical caste once it assumes 

responsibility for the state; the inevitable failures and set-backs of 

statesmanship cannot but tarnish the clergy’s standing in the eyes of 

the people. Finally, the traditionalists and many of their allies fear 

that Shi’ism is in danger of being reduced to a state ideology, a grave 

threat to a faith that has long prided itself on its independence, its 

intellectual rigor and its ability to adapt to the changing circumstances 

of life.

Together, these “traditionalists” make up by far the single 

biggest of the three clerical factions; the others are the “hardliners” now in charge of the state, and the “reformists” seeking to 

liberalize and modernize―but not supplant―the existing Islamic 

order. True to their quietest credo, the traditionalists refrain from 
43

outward expression of their opposition to the velayat. What’s more, 

these traditionalists―comprising a large body of senior clerics, their 

seminary students, and followers―could not be expected to ally 

themselves with any political reform that failed to respect Shi’ite 

religious and cultural values. Thus, they represent an unlikely source 

of anti-regime mobilization, although the steady accumulation 

of religious opposition to direct clerical rule may one day pose a 

serious threat to the legitimacy of the current order. 

While the religious critique of supreme clerical rule dates back 

decades, more recently, the velayat velayat has also become a target on political has also become a target on political 

grounds among pro-reform clerics and many lay intellectuals, who 

see its present incarnation as a recipe for despotism and a violation 

of the democratic promise of the revolution. A number of former 

seminary students of Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, a 

revolutionary-turned-dissident recently freed from house arrest for 

challenging the religious credentials of the present supreme leader, 

have developed a damaging critique of absolute clerical rule in an 

attempt to reform and modernize the Islamic political system. Most 

prominent among these are the mid-ranking clerics Abdollah Nouri 

and Mohsen Kadivar, the latter of whom was recently a visiting 

scholar at Harvard University.

Lay political activists, taking advantage of a brief period of press 

freedom during President Khatami’s early years in offi ce, brought 

the critiques of Kadivar, Nouri, and their allies from out behind the 

walls of the seminary and exposed them to the Iranian public for the 

fi rst time. They also added their own opposition, drawn from their 

political commitment to expanded personal and social freedom, the 

rule of law and the need for a civil society within an Islamic order. 

Many are well-versed in the political philosophy of the West, which 

they have sought to harness for their own needs. At the same time, 

they are critical of what they see as the excessive freedom of the West 

and of its threat to traditional cultural and religious values.

These critics of the present clerical system advocate a greater 

degree of public participation in political life through a number 

of reforms that include: popular election of the supreme leader 

and the imposition of term limits on the offi ce; watering down 

or removing the power to veto parliamentary legislation by the 
44

clerics of the Guardian Council controlled by the Leader; an end 

to the “vetting” of candidates for parliament and the presidency 

by this same council; the removal of direct clerical control over 

the judiciary; and the strengthening of the powers of the elected 

president, as a counter-weight to the appointed Supreme Leader. 

The result, say proponents, would be a fundamental rebalancing 

of the relationship between the people and the clergy and more 

representative of a true “Islamic republic,” as envisioned by the 

broad coalition that overthrew the U.S.-backed Shah. Interestingly 

enough, many of these proposals were refl ected in the fi rst drafts of 

the post-revolutionary constitution (and some were drawn from the 

experience of the 1906-11 Constitutional Revolution), only to be lost 

in Khomeini’s unexpected push for his maximalist demands of the 

velayat-e faqih. 

After a period of disarray following the 1997 presidential 

landslide by the reformist cleric Mohammad Khatami, the hardline establishment soon regained its footing. Relying on the organs 

of executive power under their control, chiefl y the judiciary, the 

Guardian Council, and the security apparatus, they nullifi ed the 

president’s popular mandate for change and thwarted pro-reform 

legislation passed by parliament. Special clerical courts answering to 

the Leader, once dubbed the “Islamic Inquisition” by the pro-reform 

press, began the steady prosecution of religious dissent within the 

clerical ranks. Political opposition was quashed, with reformist 

leaders hauled before courts, thrown into prison or even murdered 

by death squads tied to the intelligence service. The leader and his 

circle also deployed gangs of religious zealots to break up political 

or religious protests, as well as the more formal Islamic militia, the 

basij. Both were used to great effect to ruthlessly suppress the July 

1999 student protests that rocked Tehran and other major cities. 

By April 2000, the hard-liners felt suffi ciently strong to undo the 

most noteworthy achievement of the Khatami era, forcing the mass 

closure of dozens of independent newspapers and prosecuting 

leading editors, publishers, and commentators. Not long after, the 

president publicly confessed he had no real power. The political 

critique of absolute clerical rule was forced back into the shadows, 

and the dream of reform among ordinary Iranians was in tatters. 
45

Disillusioned with this failure, very few of Khatami’s constituents 

bothered to vote in the latest municipal elections, which were held 

in March 2003, leaving the fi eld to big conservative gains.

Nor is the regime likely to face any danger from the frequent but 

scattered economic and social protests that erupt regularly among 

ordinary people, often in the less developed towns, villages, and 

urban neighborhoods. These are generally provoked by a breakdown 

in municipal services, by corruption, or heavy-handed police tactics, 

fed by underlying frustration at persistently low living standards, 

high unemployment, and a widening disparity in income and 

opportunity. To date, such protests have been completely devoid of 

any political demands and there have been no attempts by the elites 

of any stripe to try to tap into this autarkic dissatisfaction. 

In sharp contrast to the run-up to the Islamic Revolution, the 

fruit of a “theology of discontent” decades in the making among 

many classes and factions, domestic politics in Iran today remains 

very much restricted to the narrow circle of “insiders.” I will discuss 

the failure of the reform movement in detail in Part IV below, but 

it is worth noting here that the unwillingness, or inability, of the 

so-called reformers to acknowledge or give voice to this popular 

discontent has doomed them to impotence. With the primary forms 

of potential opposition―theological, political and socio-economic―

all muffl ed, Iran’s national struggle has come down to an elite affair, 

best described as the struggle of Islam versus Islam. 

The Structure of the State.

Iran’s Islamic constitution provides an extraordinary 

concentration of executive power not in the hands of the elected 

president but in those of the Supreme Leader, or vali-ye faqih,

appointed by a council of clerics dominated by hard-liners. In fact, 

the Iranian president wields less real power than perhaps any other 

elected chief executive in the world. This new constitution defi nes 

the Islamic Republic as a new kind of state, one ruled by qualifi ed 

Islamic jurists until the missing Twelfth Imam, the last rightful 

ruler who disappeared in 941, makes his anticipated return to earth 

to usher in the age of perfect justice. The vali-ye faqih was given 

authority over the three branches of government, with specifi c 
46

rights and duties detailed in Article 110. These include the right to 

appoint a Guardian Council, a body dominated by clerics to ensure 

parliament passes no laws or regulations in violation of the sharia, 

the Muslim holy law; supreme command over the military and the 

security forces, with the power to declare war and make peace; and 

the authority to confi rm or reject the election of the president. 

The Islamic constitution also creates a series of interlocking 

clerical bodies, ultimately controlled by the vali-ye faqih, at the 

expense of popular sovereignty as envisioned by many of Khomeni’s 

lay revolutionary allies. In addition to the Guardian Council, which 

sits above the elected parliament and which has ultimate authority 

over both interpretation of the constitution and national elections, the 

law calls for a clerical Assembly of Leadership Experts, designed to 

select the leader and then supervise his work. Finally, the document 

mandates that all fi ve seats on the Supreme Court and the offi ce of 

prosecutor general be fi lled by Islamic jurists, with the head of the 

court and the prosecutor both direct appointees of the leader.

The completion of the fi nal draft constitution by the Assembly 

of Experts, under the energetic leadership of Khomeini’s star 

pupil, Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti, bequeathed the world the 

fi rst theocracy of the modern age. But the haste with which it was 

thrown together, with some delegates virtually tripping over one 

another to add more and more power to a supreme offi ce earmarked 

for Khomeini, left the constitution a deeply fl awed document, rife 

with legal shortcomings and outright contradictions. The most 

serious problems revolve around the remnants of a more liberal, 

democratic version, which can be found in the fi nal document, 

only to be undermined elsewhere by the qualifi cation that they 

be “consistent with Islamic standards.” Specifi cally, these sections 

had to do with the rights and sovereignty of the people. Article 56, 

for example, notes that God alone exercises absolute power to rule 

over men, power that he has delegated to the people at large, not 

to the Islamic jurists. Other key articles also invoke the will of the 

Iranian people as the source of the state’s legitimacy, as expressed 

in popular elections for president and the parliament. Finally, the 

text devotes considerable attention to the fundamental rights of the 

people, including freedom of expression, freedom of the press, and 
47

freedom to form political parties. None of these rights has ever been 

fully respected, but their very presence and the presence of other 

expressions of popular sovereignty have left Iran’s political system 

unstable and subject to future challenges on both religious and 

political grounds.

With the end of his life drawing near, Khomeini came to realize 

that there were no prominent religious fi gures who could fulfi ll the 

political requirements of his offi ce; after all, most of the senior clergy 

remained cool, to say the least, to the idea of religious government. So 

in a stunning about-face, Khomeini severed the connection between 

the most senior clergy―the sources of religious emulation―and the 

offi ce of supreme ruler, a link that had always been presented as 

central to his conception of Islamic government. Khomeini ordered 

a revision of the constitution, creating by decree a special assembly 

to do the job. The mission was clear: rework the law of the land to 

pave the way for his designated successor, the mid-ranking cleric, 

Ali Khamenei. Article 109, requiring the leader to be selected from 

among the senior-most clerics, the marjas, was scrapped. Other 

articles that would have allowed for a collective clerical leadership, a 

return to idea of the clergy as a whole as the “general representative” 

of the Imams, were also jettisoned. The powers of the leader were 

strengthened further at the expense of the elected president, while 

the offi ce of prime minister was eliminated altogether. The revisions 

also abolished the judicial council that oversaw the work of the 

courts and the prosecutors, replacing it with a single judiciary chief 

answering only to the leader. Further changes gave the vali-ye faqih

explicit authority to delineate the general policies of the Islamic 

Republic and to supervise implementation of those policies, as well 

as the right to appoint the head of the state broadcasting monopoly.

This further centralization of power has left the institution of 

the velayat-e faqih virtually impregnable to any foreseeable political 

challenge. The pro-democracy student riots of July 1999, the 

worst social unrest since the aftermath of the revolution, provide 

an excellent case in point. Despite the fury of the street protests, 

which caught many at home and abroad by surprise, the regime 

had no real diffi culty in suppressing the outbreaks and in ensuring 

that nothing on such a scale would be repeated anytime soon. 
48

Nor did the students’ demands for greater freedom of expression 

and less clerical interference in their daily lives resonate among 

the population at large or among the pro-reform “insiders,” who 

immediately distanced themselves from the protesters. Relying on its 

total domination of the police and the security apparatus, as well as 

the volunteer Islamic basij militia and the less formal vigilante forces 

based in neighborhood mosques, the regime crushed the student 

protests in a matter of days. Brutal tactics, including beatings, 

torture, lengthy imprisonment, and the threat of death sentences, 

halted any incipient opposition movement in its tracks. Many 

Western observers took the student protests, however truncated, as 

a sign of a growing demand on the part of Iran’s huge youth cohort 

for a secular society. In fact, my extensive interviews with campus 

activists and ordinary students during and after the July unrest 

made it clear the vast majority of educated youth were demanding 

greater social and political freedom within an Islamic context; they 

want an Islamic system, just not this Islamic system. 

Khomeini’s reworking of the constitution also refl ects the 

often-overlooked fl exibility of the ruling circles, another factor in 

their longevity. To justify the radical changes needed for a smooth 

handover of power after his death, the ailing leader cited the 

overriding need to ensure the survival of the Islamic political system. 

In doing so, he invoked the religious principle of expediency, or 

maslahat. Clearly, it was in the best interests of the Islamic Republic to 

have an orderly transition, even at the risk of undermining religious 

practice. Likewise, maslahat maslahat was at work when, in a direct slight was at work when, in a direct slight 

to the established clerical system, Khamenei was given the title of 

ayatollah despite his lack of religious and scholarly credentials. To 

the chagrin of the clerical critics of the Islamic Republic, Khomeini 

and his allies had long resorted to maslahat whenever the practical whenever the practical 

needs or interests of the Iranian state clashed with the traditional 

teachings of Shi’ite Islam. This was as true for such fundamental 

issues as taxation and banking, on which religious law places 

explicit if inconvenient restrictions, as it was for the prohibitions 

against music and chess, both of which were later waived in the 

face of social reality. In one notable ruling, it was decreed that soccer 

players and wrestlers, who enjoy enormous popular followings in 
49

Iran, were not in violation of religious law when they wore shorts or 

other immodest clothing required for their sport. Nor was watching 

such events on television or in person a violation of the sharia.

As tensions began to mount between the traditional reading 

of Islamic law, as championed by the Guardian Council, and the 

demands of modern legislation approved by the elected parliament, 

Khomeini was forced increasingly to step in to bridge the gap. In 

January 1988, he implemented a startling and far-reaching measure 

to protect his young republic, declaring that a genuine Islamic state 

had the right to disregard religious law when passing legislation. 

Whatever was in the interest―or maslahat―of maintaining the ruling ―of maintaining the ruling 

Islamic order, he argued, represented the “most important of God’s 

ordinances” and took precedence over all others “derived or directly 

commanded by Allah.” One month later, he institutionalized this 

principle by creating an Expediency Council to determine the 

interests of state and break deadlocks between parliament and the 

Guardians. The Expediency Council, whose members are chosen 

directly by the leader, was also accorded legislative powers of its 

own. This new body, with the reliable Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani at 

its head, was then given legal sanction in the revised constitution.

The enormous concentration of power in the hands of the 

establishment clerics, led by Khamenei and his allies, has provided 

the regime with more than enough tools to head off any challenge to 

its authority. It has also successfully thwarted the reform movement 

and its attempts to introduce greater popular participation and 

greater pluralism. After the unexpected setback of the 1997 Khatami 

landslide, the hard-liners soon realized they retained all the legal 

authority they needed to regain the upper hand, and they did so 

decisively. Their efforts were assisted by the mainstream reform 

movement, which, true to its “insider” roots and tone deaf to 

popular demands, declared at the outset its opposition to any 

attempt to revise the constitution. As a result, any signifi cant reform 

will remain more a matter of negotiation within the narrow circle 

of competing elites than an endeavor fuelled by public demand, 

popular vote or protest.
50

The Failure of Internal Reform.

With deep structural change in the form of constitutional revision 

off the table from the start, the pro-reform movement with Khatami 

at its symbolic head nonetheless squandered perhaps the best chance 

in a generation for internal reform. With almost 70% of the popular 

vote in May 1997 for his reformist platform, Khatami failed to take 

advantage of the opening and the disarray among his hard-line 

rivals. Instead of pressing quickly to implement campaign pledges 

to introduce the rule of law and to begin building a civil society 

before the conservatives could regroup, the new administration 

and its allies settled for half-measures. A letter from a prominent 

member of the radical wing of the Khatami coalition argued the 

president-elect faced serious obstacles that could be addressed only 

by swift and resolute action. These recommendations included a 

major foreign policy address denouncing terrorism and proclaiming 

Iran’s readiness for relations with all nations on the basis of mutual 

respect; creating true political parties; promoting freedom in the 

universities; introducing independent newspapers and radio and 

television stations; and banning the Islamic vigilante groups that 

oppressed society at every turn. With the exception of a policy of 

press freedom, all of the other measures were stalled or ignored 

completely; even the opening of independent newspapers―arguably 

the one short-lived success of the Khatami era―was seriously 

delayed by bickering within the reformist camp.

The March local elections in Iran marked the formal low point 

for the reform movement led by Khatami and his allies. During my 

almost 3 years in Iran, from 1998 to early 2001, the capital, Tehran, 

was a hotbed of pro-reform political activism. But this time, just 12 

percent of eligible voters bothered to cast ballots, a far cry from the 

heavy turnout that characterized the president’s fi rst election, or 

later polls for local councils and parliament. Across Iran, candidates 

associated with Khatami fared poorly, while those aligned with the 

conservative faction gained strength, even capturing the high-profi le 

offi ce of Tehran mayor. 

Such dismal results on the part of the reformist project should 

have come as no surprise. Their seeds, in fact, were sown as far 

back as the summer of 1999, when Khatami virtually turned 
51

his back on his most ardent supporters, the nation’s university 

students who had taken to the streets to press the president’s own 

demands for freedom and tolerance, and cast his lot with the ruling 

establishment. In a fateful address in the city of Hamadan on July 

27, 1999, Khatami marked both the defi ning moment in his tenure 

and a turning point for the mainstream reform movement. A huge 

crowd of mostly male students crammed the local soccer stadium to 

await the president. Many chanted, “Khatami, we love you,” under 

the baking sun; they were certain the president would endorse their 

aspirations and commiserate in their losses at the hands of the police 

and the vigilantes. But when he took the podium, Khatami stunned 

his audience with a strong endorsement of the status quo. Instead 

of instilling confi dence in his foot soldiers, who had just risked 

their lives fi ghting in the streets for change, the president chose to 

rewrite the history of the pro-democracy protests, denying what 

many―including this author―had seen with their own eyes. “My 

dear ones, today in order to put down the riots and to put out the 

fl ames of violence for the nation, others use tanks, armored cars and 

heavy weapons. Our forces did not use fi rearms to tackle the rioting. 

The disturbance was put down calmly.”

Khatami went on to dismiss the pro-democracy protests in 

Tehran as the work of thugs. “It was an ugly and offensive incident, 

which marred the image of our dear, patient, rational people . . . It 

was to express vengeance toward the system. It had nothing to do 

with the honorable nation or the university students.” Many of the 

president’s more militant supporters were stunned. Had not the 

students risked all to take their grievances beyond the walls of the 

universities and go directly to the people? Had they not protested to 

secure the very rights the president had affi rmed was their legal due 

within the Islamic political system? 

Over time, I watched as Khatami steadily abandoned his core 

supporters who had fi rst put him in offi ce―the religious intellectuals, 

including many prominent newspaper editors, publishers and 

commentators, as well as reform-minded clerics, feminists, and 

lay political activists. In one particularly poignant moment, two 

leading newspapermen, Mashallah Shamsolvaezin and Hamid Reza 

Jalaiepour sent a plaintive letter to the president, whose agenda they 
52

had pushed relentlessly, asking for his protection from the hardliners in the police and the courts. 

These were brave men, ready to risk prosecution for their proreform convictions. Jalaiepour, a big, gregarious man, kept a kit bag 

with a razor and toothbrush by his desk in case he was hauled off 

by the police. And both did time in jail. Yet, they could not disguise 

their hurt and anger that they had been abandoned by the symbolic 

head of the reform movement. “Either tell us that our press activities 

are illegal . . . or tell us clearly from which government body we are 

to get a minimum of political and professional security to continue 

our work.” They had taken Khatami at his word and pursued his 

promise of reform to its logical conclusions. With the police virtually 

knocking on their door, they asked, where was the president now? 

Khatami never responded.

When Election Day rolled around this March, millions of 

ordinary Iranians, who often took their cues from the political and 

cultural elite, voted with their feet and stayed away from the polls. 

How had it all gone so wrong? 

At least four factors contributed to this failure. First, Khatami 

was a loyal product of the system he sought to reform. Second, his 

commitment to―and understanding of―the broader reform project 

and its theological, social, and political implications was always 

in doubt. Third, the obstacles to profound structural change, in 

particular those posed by the country’s constitution that all but 

guaranteed the hold of the hard-line clerics, were enormous. And 

fi nally, the president and his allies failed to build a fi rm foundation 

for their proposed Islamic civil society, eschewing the timeconsuming work of creating genuine political parties and grassroots 

organizations and instead relying on a sort of media campaign―in 

this case, the formation of an independent press―to carry the day.

On a cold winter day in 1997, Mohammad Khatami presented 

himself to Iran’s supreme clerical leader at the latter’s residence 

in Jamaran, once a village but now part of the sprawling capital, 

Tehran. He was considering a run for the presidency but had told 

his backers he was determined to give the leader, who has the fi nal 

word in all matters of state, the chance to veto his candidacy from 

the start. He told Ayatollah Khamenei that his message of tolerance, 
53

pluralism, and openness could draw Iranians, who had grown 

increasingly apathetic and cynical, back into the political system. He 

would also reach out to women and ethnic minorities, broadening 

popular support for the Islamic system and, by extension, for the 

leader himself. The leader, like everyone else in Iran, assumed 

Khatami could never win, and he gave the candidate his blessing to 

run while making no comment on his election platform. The result 

was the landslide victory of May 1997.

It is important to recognize that the reforms that came to be 

associated with the campaign of 1997 and the person of Mohammad 

Khatami represent only one of several key strands that made up the 

coalition of clerics, workers, leftist militias, secular and religious 

intellectuals, Iranian nationalists and university students who 

carried out the Islamic Revolution almost 2 decades earlier. For 

years, any push toward greater democracy, pluralism, and the rule 

of law were subordinated fi rst to the demands of consolidating 

the revolution and purifying society of Western infl uence, as well 

as to the struggle with the Great Satan in the aftermath of the U.S. 

Embassy takeover. The bloody Iran-Iraq war, which dragged on for 

8 years, further retarded the nascent reform movement. It was only 

with the end of the war in 1988 and the death in 1989 of Khomeini―a 

man, his son records, who was broken by the failure to bring down 

Saddam Hussein―that the reformers began to fi nd their voice.

However, the tensions within the Khatami coalition began to 

show within days of its stunning electoral victory. Activists like 

Shamasolvaezin and Jalaiepour were impatient to push the reformist 

agenda. They argued for the immediate creation of a political party 

and the formation of grassroots organizations. But they were vetoed 

by powerful rivals inside the Khatami camp, who feared alarming 

the clerical establishment and diluting their own political power. 

Instead, the two men, joined by the U.S.-educated engineer Mohsen 

Sazegara, poured their enormous energies into creating the fi rst 

truly modern newspapers of the post-revolutionary era.

This was, it turned out, a fateful decision, for it represented the 

path of least resistance and distracted the reform movement from 

the more basic building blocks of their proposed civil society, such 

as true political parties and nongovernment organizations (NGOs). 
54

For Khatami, himself a former newspaper publisher, and the other 

intellectuals and activists who supported him, the written word 

was a seductive device. A free press, they argued, would mobilize 

public opinion, act as a check on arbitrary state power, and energize 

a society beaten down by revolution, war, death, and suffering. 

Sports, Western movie stars, pro-reform clerics, and biting political 

commentary all competed for readers’ attention. “We were thinking 

about happiness and life, instead of sadness and death―to publicize 

life,” Sazegara told us. “We were thinking of a kind of renaissance 

by happiness.” The result, the color daily newspaper Jameah, was a 

spectacular success. Daily circulation quickly hit 100,000, the paper’s 

break-even point, on its way to 300,000 and beyond. Plans for an 

independent publishing house, a political club, and a lecture series, 

all affi liated with Jameah, began to take shape.

The hard-line authorities soon recognized the danger. The election 

of Khatami was bad enough, they reasoned, but the unbridled voice 

of a truly independent press was another matter all together. Backed 

by the supreme leader, the Tehran prosecutor closed the newspaper 

and its successor and jailed its founders. So began a game of cat and 

mouse between the pro-reform press and the hard-liners in control of 

the courts. Religious imperative was also invoked to silence dissent, 

and many editors and publishers were jailed on charges of violating 

Islamic values.

The early Khatami years saw an explosion of independent 

newspapers and journals. These publications introduced educated 

Iranians to the reformist ideas and modernist theological debate that 

had once been restricted to private reading circles or hidden behind 

the walls of the religious seminaries. Corruption at the highest levels 

was exposed, and the powerful chief of the feared secret service was 

brought down in a murder scandal uncovered by the press. But 

one by one, these newspapers and magazines fell to the entrenched 

power of the clerical establishment, which exercised power through 

the un-elected institutions under its control, chiefl y through the 

judiciary. In April 2000, these “press wars” closed dozens of 

publications. Prominent editors, publishers and commentators were 

hauled before the courts. The crowning achievement of the Khatami 

years was over.
55

Seven months later, I sat in the audience as the president 

confessed before a conference of lawyers and religious jurists that 

he had failed. His campaign promises to introduce the rule of law 

and create a civil society had proven empty. “After three and a 

half years,” a grim-faced Khatami said, “I must be clear that the 

president does not have enough rights to carry out the heavy task on 

my shoulders.” 

Markers and Roadmaps.

A number of factors and events bear watching by U.S. 

policymakers as they study the roadmap ahead. These include:

• The selection of presidential candidates for the election of 

Spring 2005. The Guardian Council of conservative clerics 

has established its right to vet all candidates for parliament 

and the presidency, and it has acted aggressively to defend 

the interests of the establishment. In 1997, it barred all 

but four of 238 hopefuls. A Council member told me the 

inclusion of Mohammad Khatami―whom virtually everyone, 

including the candidate and his inner circle, assumed would 

lose―among the fi nalists was the single biggest mistake in 

the panel’s history. How will the hard-line clerics handle 

pro-reform candidates this time? Will they risk further 

alienating an already apathetic and dispirited electorate? Can 

they prevent a qualifi ed lay candidate, or will they retain the 

clerical monopoly on the post?

• The eventual secession to the Supreme Leader. Born in 

1939, Khamenei remains relatively young. He appears to 

have recovered from unknown health problems―rumors in 

Tehran included cancer but these could not be confi rmed―

that plagued him in the late 1990s and looks more vigorous 

than he was at that time. However, a smooth transition is vital 

to political stability. The steady loss of religious authority by 

the Leader’s offi ce suggests any successor would come from 

among the “political mullahs.” Any deviation from this 
56

toward a fi gure more acceptable in religious terms, or a return 

to the earlier notion of a ruling clerical council in place of a 

single Leader, would be highly signifi cant.

• The reform movement has mounted a series of so far 

unsuccessful challenges to the supervisory and veto powers 

of the hard-line clerics on the Guardian Council. A frustrated 

Khatami has repeatedly threatened to put the matter to public 

referendum, or even to resign, to break the deadlock between 

popular and clerical power. It is unclear whether such a 

referendum could be held at all, or what its impact might be. 

The resignation ploy appears a doomed gambit; the president 

has already lost so much credibility with ordinary Iranians, 

and he has issued similar threats before without following 

through. Any steps, however unlikely, to rebalance the 

relationship between the Islamic state and the Islamic republic

are worth noting.

• More than half of the Iranian population is under 25, with 

no memory of the Islamic Revolution and little real recall, if 

any, of Khomeini. This second generation of the Revolution 

has little or no commitment to the values and ideals of the 

ruling elites. Many are well educated, thanks to an extensive 

university system, and the system must fi nd a way to meet 

their economic, social, and political aspirations. However, it is 

vital to stress again that the common Western argument, that 

this generation has rejected Islam and yearns for a secular 

Iran, is completely without foundation. Rather, today’s youth 

want greater freedom of expression, cultural and political 

pluralism, and more economic opportunity―attributes they 

believe are compatible with their religious and cultural values. 

How effectively will the regime absorb this new generation, or 

will it continue to sit back as the best and the brightest pursue 

opportunity overseas in a debilitating “brain drain”? Will this 

new generation make common cause with other disaffected 

elements of society? Or will its most ambitious members 

simply seek their place among the “insiders,” a trend already 

visible among a number of campus leaders today?
57

Domestic Politics and U.S.-Iran Relations.

Despite more than 2 decades of hostility and the lack of 

diplomatic ties, the U.S.-Iranian relationship is a defi ning force in 

the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic. It also represents a huge, if 

often unstated, presence in the domestic affairs of the nation. Here in 

Washington, that primacy has long fostered the mistaken notion that 

the United States can exert considerable infl uence over the terms of 

any bilateral relationship and over Iran’s internal affairs as part of 

any future rapprochement. In fact, the Islamic Republic is almost 

impervious to conventional outside pressure, particularly from 

the “Great Satan.” Armed with its revolutionary and anti-colonial 

ideology and insulated against the general desire among ordinary 

Iranians for a resumption of ties, the ruling elite must sort out this 

matter within its own ranks.

Each faction is continually weighing the costs and benefi ts for 

itself―not for the nation―and calculating the risks and uncertainties 

involved. For example, the infl uential bazaari merchants, who 

dominate much of the domestic economy and enjoy close ties to the 

clerical establishment, are clearly tempted by the potential rewards of 

expanded foreign trade; but they also realize their dominant positions 

in commerce and capital formation could easily be overshadowed 

by a complete opening to the outside and the arrival of American 

banking giants. While most reformist politicians generally favor an 

end to Iran’s isolation and xenophobic foreign policies, they remain 

deeply anti-American (many were former hostage-takers, and 

they have replaced the anti-British views of their forefathers with 

intense distrust of the United States). The Supreme Leader, often 

among the most shrill of anti-American voices, remains fearful that 

restored ties would undermine Iran’s religious and cultural values. 

At the same time, each faction wants to be sure that it controls the 

relationship, in order to channel the benefi ts toward its supporters 

and to accrue the political gains for ending the deadlock. Only when 

a broad consensus is reached among these “insiders,” will there be 

movement on the American front, and it will certainly not come at a 

cost of major concessions on the part of Iran.

This phenomenon underscores the futility of periodic U.S. 

overtures, often to the more pragmatic conservatives like former 
58

president Rafanjani (“a man we can do business with”), or to his 

successor Khatami, whose reformist platform has led many in 

Washington to see him as a “democrat” and thus a natural ally. It 

also invalidates the conventional wisdom among Western diplomats 

in Tehran that appeals to Iran’s national interests will inevitably 

draw the country closer to the United States. A botched attempt by 

the Clinton White House to establish a secret channel to Khatami 

soon leaked to the conservatives, prompting the Supreme Leader to 

issue a blistering public attack on America and to launch a damaging 

witch hunt against Western “bases” among the reformist faction. 

In February 2000, a U.S. message of congratulations to the 

reform movement for its relatively strong showing in parliamentary 

elections completely overshadowed the event itself. As a result, the 

reformers were forced to use their victory press conference, called to 

lay out an ambitious legislative agenda before the people and a huge 

international press corps, to assert their anti-American credentials 

and deny they were Western lackeys. Similarly, any goodwill from 

Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s attempt in March of that year 

to voice regret for the U.S. role in the 1953 coup that restored the 

Shah was completely squandered by references in that same speech 

to undemocratic elements among Iran’s ruling circles, remarks 

that outraged the entire Iranian elite. The most recent attempt 

by Washington to shape the Iranian political landscape came last 

summer, with a declaration by President Bush that America was 

effectively abandoning any support for Khatami and the reform 

movement and calling on the Iranian people to overthrow their 

government. For the reasons outlined earlier in this chapteer, this 

bid will likewise fail.

If the troubled bilateral relationship and the Islamic Republic’s 

domestic policies remain largely immune to overt U.S. suasion, 

then what of Iran’s foreign policy? U.S interests and concerns lie in 

several specifi c areas: the possible export of the Islamic Revolution, 

with its model of authoritarian clerical rule; and Tehran’s response 

to events in postwar Iraq.

The overthrow of the Shah and the rise of clerical power that 

followed deeply alarmed Muslim rulers across the Middle East, as 

well as their Western backers. Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq, 

and Bahrain―all with sizeable and restive Shi’ite populations―were 
59

terrifi ed that Khomeini’s call for worldwide Islamic revolution 

threatened their grip on power. The authoritarian leaders of Sunni 

states like Egypt and Jordan, long denounced by Islamist activists as 

corrupt and religiously illegitimate, were also badly shaken. After 

all, the leader of the Islamic Revolution saw himself as the leading 

voice for the global ummah, or Muslim community of believers, 

rather than just a the new head of state. Millions of Muslims, both 

Shi’ite and Sunni, were inspired by the Iranian experience. Over 

time, however, this vision began to crumble under the weight of the 

Iranian model’s declining religious authority, its practical setbacks 

in running a state, and the need to focus increasingly on domestic 

problems and issues. In the early 1990s, Supreme Leader Khamenei 

formally renounced the export of the revolution, and today Iran’s 

relations with its neighbors are defi ned less by ideology than by 

traditional geopolitics. 

While events in predominantly Shi’ite southern Iraq have 

reignited fears in some quarters of a resurgence of revolutionary 

fervor on the part of Iran, recent history suggests the Islamic 

Republic would be more than content to see a stable, non-hostile 

Iraq on its border, regardless of the structure or form of government 

there. And, in fact, Khatami said as much on his just-completed visit 

to Lebanon, where he held talks with state offi cials as well as with 

the leaders of the Shi’ite movement Hezbollah. The president called 

for a democratic Iraq, based on the principle of “one man, one vote.” 

This mirrors the latest public comments by Ayatollah Mohammad 

Bakr al-Hakim, a Shi’ite cleric and the leader of the Supreme Council 

of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). 

Hakim fl ed to Iran after the failed Shi’ite rebellion, encouraged 

by Washington in 1991, against Saddam Hussein, and he directs a 

formidable political and militia organization. His status as an exile 

opposition fi gure in Tehran for more than a decade, before his return 

to postwar Iraq, often obscures the fact that Hakim and SCIRI are 

not simply puppets of their former hosts in Tehran. As the scion 

of a leading clerical family in the Iraqi holy city of Najaf, Hakim 

commands both religious and popular support, while SCIRI’S role in 

armed resistance to the Baathist regime has conferred considerable 

political legitimacy on the group. Hakim should not be viewed as a 

mere stalking horse for Iranian-style clerical rule in Iraq. Nor is he 
60

likely to seek any veto over a pluralistic postwar government.

On a more fundamental level, the fall of Saddam Hussein, who 

brutally suppressed the Shi’ite leadership, could open the way to a 

return of Najaf as a leading Shi’ite religious and intellectual center. 

The Iraqi city, site of the shrine to the Shi’ite saint, Imam Ali, had lost 

its standing in 1922 when its most active members were effectively 

forced out by the British. Many, including the young Ruhollah 

Khomeini, relocated to the sleepy Iranian town of Qom, which soon 

became a vital center of religious learning and later an important 

hub of revolutionary activity. 

If Najaf once again regains its seat at the center of the Shiite 

world, a Qom-Najaf corridor would infl uence the role of Shiite Islam 

in the region and solidify the Shi’ite infl uence over a postwar Iraqi 

government.

Conclusion.

In conclusion, religion will continue to play an important role 

in the domestic affairs inside Iran and the region. The strength of 

the clerical establishment should not be underestimated. Thus, any 

notions that Iran is on the verge of a second revolution which would 

prompt the fall of the clerics is unrealistic. Such a proposition is put 

forth by Iranian ex-patriots whose secular orientation has blinded 

them to the realities of Iran over the last 2 decades. Similarly, the 

proposition that Iran’s younger generation is awaiting the chance 

to overthrow the regime and could do so with a little push from the 

United States, is also a false assumption. For all the reasons stated in 

this chapter, Iran’s youth are not seeking a secular state but rather 

a reformed Islamic system which takes into account their religious 

and cultural values while also meeting their needs in the modern 

world. Furthermore, history in Iran and the history of revolutions 

have shown that it takes far more than unhappy people to foment 

revolutions. A broad-based social movement, comprised of workers, 

secularists, students, and modernist clerics, would be necessary to 

carry out a revolution. Such a coalition is absent in Iran and there is 

no indication that one is on the horizon.
61

CHAPTER 4

THE PROSPECTS FOR REGIME CHANGE IN IRAN

S. Rob Sobhani

The people are very dissatisfi ed, and they are right to be so, and 

I swear to God that the society is on the brink of explosion. If this 

discontent increases, as is the case, the regime will be threatened.

Ayatollah Ebrahim Amini

Assembly of Experts

(Power to Appoint 

Supreme Leader) 2002

Introduction.

The question before us today is: What are the prospects of Iran’s 

revolutionary government giving way to reform or overthrow over 

the next 10-20 years? Furthermore, and more importantly for the 

United States, what groups and forces within Iran are opposed to 

the current revolutionary government and/or its efforts to develop 

nuclear power and long-range strategic weapons systems?

The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that Iran’s 

revolutionary government can be overthrown within 2 years

should the United States adopt a more robust policy of empowering 

the Iranian people to change the regime in Tehran. A regime change 

in Iran would put an immediate end to Iran’s pursuit of weapons 

of mass destruction and instead focus the efforts of the new secular 

government on the domestic priority of pulling Iran out of its 

current Third World status. Equally important, the demise of the 

Islamic Republic of Iran at the hands of the Iranian people would 

send a very powerful message to the rest of the Muslim world that 

Islam, as a form of governance, has failed. The failure of political 

Islam would be a victory for the United States and our war against 

Islamic fundamentalism.

The end result of a more robust policy on Iran would allow 
62

President Bush to look the American people in the eyes and state the 

following: “On September 11, 2001, an arc of tyranny and dictatorship 

stretched from Afghanistan through Iran into Iraq. Today, an arc of 

freedom rules in Kabul, Tehran, and Baghdad. And the world is a 

safer and better place as are the peoples of Afghanistan, Iran, and 

Iraq.”

Iran: Challenge and Opportunity.

Militant Islam is today’s engine of international terror. Islamist 

schools breed a new militant generation, Islamist sermons mobilize 

opinion against the free world, Islamist ideology legitimizes recourse 

to terror and Islamist “charities” bankroll the global network of 

terror. While most Muslim states are aware of this threat to the 

world and their own stability, there is one that is actually governed 

by Islamists: The Islamic Republic of Iran.

Therefore, the principal component of the war against terrorism 

should be the war against militant militant Islam, which over the last 20 Islam, which over the last 20 

decades has been inspired, nurtured, and funded by the Islamic 

Government of Iran. The demise of the clerical regime in Iran would 

go a long way in “draining the swamp” of militancy and radicalism in 

the broader Muslim world with enormous geopolitical consequences 

for U.S. national security interests. Therefore, the permanent success 

of this campaign rests on a regime change in Iran. 

In short, the United States faces two immediate timelines: one, the 

mullahs’ access to a nuclear bomb, and the other, institutionalization 

of democracy through a regime change. The fundamental goal of 

U.S. foreign policy should be the acceleration of the regime change 

timeline.

In many respects, the people of Iran face a similar set of timelines. 

The choices facing Iran over the next 10-20 years are simple: a 

country relegated to permanent Third World status with a nuclear 

bomb or an advanced, modern, secular country at peace with itself 

and its neighbors. 

The geopolitical interests of the United States coincide with the 

interests of a majority of Iranians: a fundamental change in the nature 

of the regime in Tehran. The overthrow of the Islamic Republic of 

Iran is good for America and good for the Iranian people. Therefore, 
63

Washington’s strategy should be to support those forces inside and 

outside Iran which share America’s political, economic, military, 

and geopolitical vision for the region. Towards this end, the United 

States must continue to isolate the clerical regime and encourage the 

growing spirit of rebellion among the repressed Iranians.

Assumptions.

1. Unwilling to pursue serious dialogue on normalizing relations 

with Washington, Tehran’s foreign policy goal instead is to defeat 

the U.S.-led sanctions policy and to only engage the U.S. private 

sector (American energy companies, in particular). For this purpose, 

the apologists for the clerical regime have established well-funded 

“nonprofi t” entities within the United States to soften Washington’s 

tough stance against the clerical establishment.

2. Led by the 50 million youth, the demand for reform in Iran 

created President Khatami in 1997. In fact, the reform movement 

was created by the mass demand for change. However, his inability 

to deliver has broadened the mass discontent and accelerated the 

implosion of the clerical regime. The historic election of 1997 was 

a clear signal to the clerical establishment that Iranians want the 

freedom to live and prosper without “divine intervention,” and that 

they want an end to their country’s international isolation.

3. Despite offi cial denunciations, a reservoir of goodwill toward 

America exist among a majority of Iranians. The people of Iran 

would welcome America’s principled, transparent and vocal 

support of the movement for democracy and rule-of-law in their 

country. Therefore, U.S. policy should not be held hostage to the 

history of U.S.-Iranian relations and events surrounding 1953. As 

far as a majority of freedom-loving Iranians are concerned, 1953 is 

history. Washington must overcome this ingrained psychological 

barrier, created in large measure by U.S. and Iranian academics of 

the left and self-loathing businessmen and journalists dependent 

upon Iranian visas and access (see section on U.S.-Iranian ties).
64

4. Irrespective of who is President of Iran, the Islamic Republic’s 

constitution specifi cally rejects popular sovereignty and puts 

ultimate power in the hands of the Supreme Leader, un-elected by 

the people and answerable only to “Allah.”

5. The popular overthrow of the Islamic Republic of Iran will send 

a very powerful message to the entire Muslim world—Islam does 

not solve the socio-economic problems that are at their root internal: 

poverty and corruption, suppression, absence of democracy, and 

economic opportunity.

Public Opinion in Iran.

In August of 2002, the Tarrance Group conducted a poll of 

public opinion in Tehran. This research project― the fi rst of its 

kind―was designed to fulfi ll two main objectives: a) provide a broad 

assessment of the social, economic, and political landscape of Iran; 

and b) determine whether or not Iranians believe in a fundamental 

change of the political system in Iran.

The fi ndings from this survey validate stories that have recently 

been reported by international news agencies about a growing level 

of dissatisfaction within Iran towards the current regime. One fi nding 

in particular best summarizes the current mood in Iran: 63 percent 

of respondents believe that freedom and economic opportunity can 

only come as a result of “a fundamental change” in Iran’s system 

of government. Agreement with this viewpoint exceeds 50 percent 

among every major demographic group and is highest among those 

who rely on satellite television and the internet for information 

about issues facing Iran (72 percent and 75 percent respectively).

Along the same line, 71 percent of respondents indicate that they 

would support a national referendum that allows the people of Iran 

to decide what system of government is best for the country. Once 

again, this is something that transcends all demographic categories.

The mounting frustration within Iran’s citizenry can partially 

be attributed to the facts that only one-in-three respondents (33 

percent) feel that Khatami has delivered on his campaign promises, 

and there is little expectation that things will change during his 

remaining 3 years in offi ce. While 29 percent of respondents say 
65

Khatami is capable of bringing reform, a plurality (41 percent) of 

Iranians believe that it is time for a new approach.

The maximum support the regime gets is between 15 to 19 

percent. The cross tabs indicate that this level of support is from 

respondents whose families have clerical ties.

In what comes as a rejection of the regime’s 23 years of hostility 

against the exiled Iranian community, 72 percent of those surveyed 

would welcome the involvement of Iranians living abroad in helping 

to rebuild their homeland. Moreover, just one-in-four respondents 

(25 percent) are of the opinion that history will judge the “founder of 

modern Iran” unfavorably; a fi nding that essentially means that the 

Pahlavi era is well regarded by many despite the regime’s attempt to 

convince people otherwise.

In conclusion, the majority of Iranians living in Tehran want 

to see fundamental changes in the way their country is governed. 

People feel that the clerics have gone too far and overstepped their 

traditional role, and that the country would be better served if they 

were not directly in charge of the government. Part of the solution―as 

supported by a decisive majority of survey respondents―is to hold 

a “free, fair, and transparent national referendum,” allowing the 

people of Iran to select the system of government that they desire.

History of U.S.-Iranian Relations.

Much of the policymaking community in Washington has held 

back from making aggressive policy recommendations towards 

the clerical regime. This is the result of a complete misreading of 

the broad outlines of our country’s relations with Iran. The United 

States has nothing to apologize for concerning its relations with Iran. 

In fact, America’s timely interventions preserved Iran’s territorial 

integrity and prevented that country from falling behind the “Iron 

Curtain.”

President Bush should begin his assessment of U.S.-Iranian 

policy with an objective look at the history of relations between 

Washington and Tehran. By gaining a historical perspective on 

U.S.-Iranian relations, President Bush would understand that while 

offi cials of the Islamic regime have been lecturing America on what 

Washington has done wrong, the United States was not always seen 

as an enemy of Iran’s national interests.
66

America’s fi rst attempt at helping Iran was in 1911, when London 

and St. Petersburg were manipulating the debt-ridden Qajar dynasty. 

Morgan Shuster, an offi cial of the U.S. Treasury Department, was 

appointed fi nancial advisor by the Iranian government to prevent 

the strangling of an impoverished Iran by Britain and Russia. 

Unfortunately, Britain and Russia succeeded in sabotaging his 

mission.

In 1925, after a bloodless coup supported by the military, 

Reza Shah Pahlavi assumed the throne and embarked on the 

modernization of Iran with the help of American advisors. This 

attempt to bring Iran into the 20th century ended with the onset of 

World War II. 

In 1941, Soviet troops reoccupied northern Iran, once again 

threatening its sovereignty. From 1941 to 1946, the Soviet Union, 

with the support of the KGB-infi ltrated Iranian communist party, 

began to dismember Iran by creating a second “Republic of 

Azerbaijan” on the Iranian side of the border. When the war ended, 

Soviet troops refused to leave northern Iran. Iran then appealed 

to the United Nations, and America forcefully supported Iran’s 

right to independence. Meanwhile, George Allen, then American 

ambassador to Iran and an ardent supporter of its autonomy, was 

arguing for more direct American assistance. The result was an 

ultimatum from President Harry S Truman to Josef Stalin to get out 

of Iran. The Soviets withdrew, and Iran was saved from disappearing 

behind the Iron Curtain. 

During his CNN debut, Iran’s President Mohammad Khatami 

focused on the 1953 coup against Prime Minister Mohammad 

Mossadeq. Khatami charged that the ousting of Mossadeq and the 

Shah’s return to power with Washington’s assistance was a major 

contaminator of U.S.-Iranian relations. The truth is more complex. 

Until 1953, the United States had supported Mossadeq, particularly 

when Britain attempted to remove him because he was viewed as a 

threat to British oil interests in Iran. By 1953, however, Mossadeq’s 

policies had brought Iran to the brink of fi nancial ruin. Iran’s 

communist party―already strong among the industrial working 

class, intellectuals, students, and army offi cers―further extended its 

infl uence during this period. The Soviet fl ag and Stalin’s pictures 
67

appeared in the streets of Tehran. Concerns about the communist 

threat to Iran forced America to act against Mossadeq’s increasingly 

authoritarian tactics and in favor of the Shah. Once again, America’s 

timely intervention―which, ironically, was supported by the clerics 

at the time due to their dislike of atheistic communism―saved Iran 

from falling under Soviet domination.

The one episode in this long history that stands out as a policy 

mistake occurred in 1964, when the U.S. Department of Defense 

pushed for, and got, full immunity from prosecution for all American 

personnel stationed in Iran. Iranians, irrespective of their political 

ideology, were outraged. This policy mistake gave an unknown 

cleric named Ruhollah Khomeini a national issue on which to rise to 

power: “They have reduced the Iranian people to a level lower than 

that of a dog.” On November 4, 1964, Khomeini was exiled from Iran 

for his remarks, and on the same day 15 years later, he sanctioned 

the attack on the American embassy.

During the 1970s, Washington’s military alliance with Tehran 

was a major deterrent to Saddam Hussein’s designs on Iran and the 

Persian Gulf. This mutually benefi cial alliance came to an abrupt 

end with the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its 

rejection of so many things American. Emboldened by the sudden 

disappearance of the Shah, Hussein invaded Iran in 1980. The people 

of Iran paid dearly for their government’s anti-American policy―one 

million died, and millions more were wounded.

The taking of 52 American diplomats hostage by Iranian students 

in 1979 and the subsequent Algiers Agreement that ended this 

hostage crisis in 1980, is used by some within the policymaking 

community as a basis for refraining from adopting a policy of 

regime change. The Algiers Agreement calls for “noninterference” 

by Washington in the internal affairs of Iran. It is the opinion of 

this writer that Iranian-sponsored acts of terrorism against the 

United States overseas render this document’s clause pertaining to 

“noninterference” as null and void. Furthermore, America’s national 

security paradigm has changed signifi cantly since the tragedy of 

September 11, 2001. We cannot allow any rogue nation, including 

Islamic Iran, to develop a nuclear bomb and blackmail and/or 

threaten the United States and our allies in the region.
68

With this long history in mind, the United States should not 

invest its diplomatic and political energies in apologizing for recent 

“past mistakes” in exchange for normalization of relations with 

Tehran, or refrain from adopting a more robust policy towards those 

responsible for the murder of Americans. Instead, Washington must 

take the high moral ground and lend its unwavering support to 

empowering the people of Iran for a regime change.

Implications of Regime Change.

The geopolitical and economic consequences of a regime change 

in Iran and an end to that country’s pursuit of a nuclear bomb are as 

follows.

• The cornerstone of U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf is the 

uninterrupted exploration, development, and transportation 

of oil and gas to international markets. A regime change in 

Iran would signifi cantly enhance this long-standing U.S. 

policy.

• Enhance the stability and security of Washington’s Persian 

Gulf allies. Countries like Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab 

Emirates (UAE), and Kuwait would breath easier knowing 

that the geopolitical vacuum created by the fall of Saddam 

Hussein would not be fi lled by Islamic Iran. Bahrain would 

feel less threatened knowing that Islamic Iran would not 

manipulate and encourage the Shi’a of Bahrain to challenge 

King Hamad’s reforms. The Amir of Qatar would not have 

to worry about a nuclear accident threatening the massive 

liquifi ed natural gas (LNG) infrastructure built to market 

natural gas to markets worldwide. The United Arab Emirates 

(UAE) might fi nally fi nd a receptive government in Tehran 

willing to compromise on the three disputed islands of Abu 

Musa and the Bigger and Lesser Tombs. 

• Decouple Russia from its military, diplomatic, and geopolitical 

ally in Tehran. The new Iranian government would have very 

little justifi cation for pursuing a relationship with the Russian 
69

Federation and, in fact, might view its relations with Russia 

through a new competitive context; namely, competing with 

Russia for pursuit of customers in the worldwide natural gas 

markets.

• The nascent government of Afghanistan would no longer 

have to be concerned over Iranian adventurism within its 

borders. This would increase the chances for stability and 

economic reconstruction in Afghanistan. A Kabul-Tehran 

axis defi ned by cooperation and alliance with the United 

States could only enhance stability in that part of the world 

and rout out remaining elements of al-Qaeda and Taliban. 

• Images of millions of Iranians marching through the streets 

of Iran chanting “Death to the Islamic Republic” broadcast 

across the Muslim world would be nothing less than a 

historic earthquake of enormous proportion. The rejection of 

Islam as a form of governance would impact Iran’s neighbors 

Turkey, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq immediately. 

The question that would be asked throughout the Muslim 

world would be “Why, why have Iranians rejected Islam?” 

Pakistan’s increasingly radicalized Islamic politics, Turkey’s 

new Islamic Party, the Shi’a of Lebanon, Bahrain, Iraq, and 

Saudi Arabia and Egypt’s underground Islamic cells would 

all be impacted. 

• Regime change in Iran would put an immediate end to 

support for Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, al-Qaeda, and 

the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General 

Command (PFLP-GC). The new Iran would cut off all ties 

to these terrorist organizations out of principle but more 

importantly out of economic necessity. Iran’s meager 

resources would be devoted to rebuilding Iran.

• The fi rst diplomatic act of a new, secular, and free Iran 

would be to recognize Israel’s right to exist. Throwing Iran’s 

diplomatic weight behind Israel would further isolate the 

Arab world and its intransigence towards Israel.
70

• An Iran that is focused on developing its vast oil and gas 

resources in the Persian Gulf would allow for a more rational 

exploitation of the Caspian Sea hydrocarbon resources. A 

pro-American Iran willing to act as a stable corridor would 

add multiple pipeline options for the transport of Caspian Sea 

oil and gas to international markets.

• Beyond geopolitical considerations, President Bush should 

indicate to the Iranian people that America is ready once 

again to be Iran’s partner in prosperity. Both sides would have 

much to gain. Iran’s more than 70 million people would once 

again constitute a market for American goods and services. 

American energy companies would have the chance to invest 

in Iran’s vast hydrocarbon resources. In short, economic 

engagement can lay the foundations for a return to normalcy 

in U.S.-Iran relations.

What Needs to be Done.

Within Iran, the youth that make up a majority of the population, 

journalists of reformist newspapers, clerics who question the 

legitimacy of the Supreme Leader, and women who are at the 

forefront of defying the ruling theocrats are Washington’s natural 

allies. Engagement and collaboration between these groups and 

America should be the cornerstone of U.S. policy towards Iran. 

However, a fundamental problem facing U.S. policy towards 

Iran is the lack of available resources to fund projects in support of 

freedom and democracy in Iran. As a result, a signifi cant vacuum 

exists in U.S. policy towards Iran that is unfortunately being fi lled 

by apologists for the Islamic Republic of Iran in the United States. 

The cost of empowering the Iranian people to change their regime 

(over a 2-year timetable) should not exceed $200 million. (Note: 

The Department of Defense (DoD) spends $3.6 billion/month 

on operations in Iraq and $700 million/month on operations in 

Afghanistan.)

Adequate funding of projects that are inline with the broader 

U.S. policy objectives outlined by President Bush’s State of the Union 
71

Addresses can go a long way towards empowering the people of 

Iran to affect change in their country.

The following are some funding options for review and 

consideration by the U.S. DoD:

• Short-term Funding: 

o Produce and disseminate a civil disobedience training 

video via satellite into Iran. This Farsi language video with 

young men and women as instructors would highlight the 

role of civil disobedience in toppling dictatorships. The 

video would then be distributed throughout Iran.

o Hold a major conference on Iran at Georgetown University. 

Very senior U.S. Government offi cials and leading Iranian 

opposition fi gures would attend this conference. The 

conference would be broadcast live into Iran with the 

purpose of demonstrating to those inside Iran that the 

disparate opposition is united in its demand for a regime 

change. Images of a united opposition at a conference with 

senior offi cials from the Bush Administration broadcast 

live into Iran (and carried by all U.S. and non-U.S. outlets) 

would be a major boost to the morale of those inside Iran 

willing to confront the security forces of the regime. It 

would also send a very powerful message to members of 

the ruling clergy that their days may be numbered. 

o Produce and disseminate educational videos in Farsi on 

democracy in America to the Farsi-speaking media for 

broadcast into Iran. A major component of this project 

would be to highlight the positive role that American 

women of Iranian descent are playing in the life of our 

country. At this juncture in Iran’s history, it is very 

important to highlight the failures of the regime and to 

contrast this with the realities of life in America through 

the lens of the American-Iranian community. 

o Investigate, compile, and disseminate the human rights 

abuses of the regime through visits by the victims of these 
72

human rights violations to Western capitals. In addition 

to the fundamental differences with the Islamic regime on 

such issues as weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and 

terrorism, it is important that the issue of human rights 

be a major focus of American demands for the Iranian 

people.

o Invite senior and junior Shia clergy from Tehran, Qoma, 

and Mashad to the United States for meetings with their 

Jewish, Christian, and Muslim counterparts.

o Sponsor a trip for 30 Iranian journalists to take a tour called 

“Get to Know America and Americans.” Let them then go 

back to Iran asking this fundamental question: “Why do 

Americans of Iranian descent living in the United States 

enjoy a higher standard of living than Iranians in Iran?”

o Invite leaders of the student movement to testify on 

Capitol Hill about their ordeal and how they envision 

a future Iran. Giving these young men and women a 

platform would provide enormous moral support to the 

entire movement inside the country.

o Invite prominent Iranian women to meet with female 

members of Congress, successful entrepreneurs, journalists, and nonprofi t organizations like Mothers Against 

Drunk Driving (MADD).

o Immediately fund satellite TV stations based in Los Angeles 

that are viewed by millions inside Iran. Integration of 

these stations into a National Iranian Radio and Television 

Network would provide an excellent platform for U.S. 

offi cials to enunciate their vision for U.S.-Iranian relations 

and for Iranian dissidents to share their vision of a future 

Iran with their compatriots.
73

• Long-term Funding:

o Fund for 1 year the operating expenses of a U.S.-based 

nonprofi t foundation established to support democratic 

principles, secularism, human rights, and a free market 

economy in Iran. This 1-year funding would cover 

personnel and major stand-alone projects. All the projects 

outlined above could be rolled into the activities of this 

U.S.-based nonprofi t foundation.

o Provide funding to produce a comprehensive blueprint 

for a post-theocratic Iran. This blueprint would cover 

the future shape of Iran’s polity in the following areas: 

constitution, foreign and national security, energy, 

agriculture, health care, fi nance, commerce, role of 

religion in society, and economics. The blueprint would 

be disseminated into Iran through an aggressive media 

campaign to demonstrate to the Iranian people, “A Vision 

Of The Future Beyond An Islamic Republic.”

These major initiatives could be launched at a Rose Garden event 

where President Bush announces via satellite to the Iranian people 

(carried by Radio Farda, Voice of America, British Broadcasting 

Corporation, Radio Israel, etc.) his fi rm commitment and dedication to 

empowering the Iranian people to change their form of government. 

Prominent members of the President’s own American-Iranian staff, 

prominent and not-so-prominent members of the American-Iranian 

community, and members of the Iran National Coalition would 

be present at this event. This historic occasion would mark the 

beginning of the end for the Islamic Republic of Iran and embolden 

the Iranian people to rise.

Iranian Dissidents and a National Coalition.

One of the only prominent Iranian opposition fi gures outside Iran 

publicly calling for an end to Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear bomb is Reza 

Pahlavi. In both his public and private speeches he has staked out 

a position in line with U.S. concerns about regional instability as a 
74

result of nuclear proliferation. In addition, and according to various 

press reports, his message of civil disobedience, nonviolence, and 

national referendum are gaining momentum inside Iran, albeit at a 

slow pace.

The rationale for supporting Reza Pahlavi and other dissidents 

outside Iran (like Dr. Azar Nafi si, Dr. Manouchehr Gandji, Mehmat 

Ali Chehregani, Sepehr Zanganeh, Ladan Boroumand, Mehangiz 

Kar, Parviz Sayyad, Abbas Goli Bakhtiar, Esmail Khoee, and Hamid 

Ladjevardi) is that there is a limit to how far one can criticize the 

regime while inside Iran. It is only from the outside that one can 

seriously question and challenge the regime. It is therefore imperative 

that the United States encourage and support the activities of these 

dissidents as symbols of opposition to the Islamic Regime. However, 

the United States must not impose a solution that includes dissidents 

like Reza Pahlavi. Rather, the United States must encourage the 

formation of an Iranian National Coalition with Reza Pahlavi and 

other dissidents as members of the coalition.

Critics of this approach will argue that this is a repeat of America’s 

1953 debacle in Iran. This argument is far from accurate. The United 

States would merely be leveling the playing fi eld for Reza Pahlavi 

and members of the Iranian National Coalition to put forward 

their ideas as to how Iran’s future should be shaped. The Iranian 

people would make the fi nal decision in a free, fair, and transparent 

referendum.

In order to ensure the success of Iranian dissidents and the 

Iranian National Coalition, the following steps need to be taken:

1. Provide logistical support for the direct broadcast of dissidents’ 

messages into Iran.

2. Give more airtime to members of the Iranian National Coalition 

on the VOA, Radio Farda, and other U.S.-based and non-U.S.-based 

outlets.

3. Identify “safe houses” in the United States, Europe, and the 

Middle East for members of the regime who wish to meet with Reza 

Pahlavi and members of the coalition.
75

4. Invite Reza Pahlavi and members of the coalition to Capitol 

Hill to testify and share visions for Iran with the U.S. Congress.

5. Ask America’s allies in the Persian Gulf to fully fund the 

activities of Reza Pahlavi and the Iranian National Coalition for a 

2-year period.

Iran Coordinator.

The activities outlined above can be supervised under the 

Offi ce of Iran Coordinator. President Bush should appoint an 

Iran Coordinator in order to ensure an outcome favorable to U.S. 

interests in the post-theocratic Iran. The people of Iran are now 

looking beyond the Islamic regime, and President Bush’s recent 

statements since September 11 have emboldened them and inspired 

the more courageous to publicly challenge that regime. An Iran 

Coordinator is needed to ensure that President Bush’s intentions are 

communicated to Iranians in an honest and unadulterated fashion. 

The Iran Coordinator would also engage the people of Iran in a clear 

and open dialogue about their future. 

Further, the role of an Iran Coordinator would include providing 

the administration with timely, pro-active policy initiatives designed 

to ensure that the government of Iran does not sabotage U.S. efforts 

in post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. The campaign to liberate Iraq from 

Saddam Hussein dovetails with Washington’s goal of exporting 

democracy to Iran. Any U.S. policy toward Iraq and Iran must be 

mutually reinforcing in order to achieve maximum benefi ts for U.S. 

national security interests. Therefore, it would be important that the 

Iran Coordinator explain America’s Iraq policy to the Iranian people 

via the VOA, BBC, Radio Israel, Radio Free Iran and other satellite 

stations based in Los Angeles.

Appointment of an Iran Coordinator would be one of the most 

signifi cant demonstrations of America’s resolve to establish relations 

with the democratic and free Iran of the future. It would demonstrate 

that the United States is serious when it says that it will support the 

people of Iran in their quest for freedom and democracy. Indeed, the 

Islamic regime could well begin to unravel immediately after this 

appointment was announced because of the psychological effect on 
76

the mind-set of all Iranians.

A fundamental feature of Iranian political culture has been the 

“Green Light Syndrome.” In other words, the West in general, and 

Washington in particular, decide the course of events in countries 

like Iran. Therefore, if and when the time comes for one regime to 

go or for a person to be supported, the United States will give the 

Green Light, and it will happen. The majority of Iranians already 

view President Bush’s “Axis of Evil” speech and his recent strong 

statement in support of the people as a sign that Washington is ready 

to give that “green light.” The appointment of an Iran coordinator 

would be further “evidence” that the United States has given the 

“green light” that the regime must go.

The Coordinator would report to the National Security Advisor 

and attend all policy sessions on Iran. The purpose of the Iran 

Coordinator would be to ensure that any regime change in Iran is 

favorable to U.S. interests. The primary responsibility of the Iran 

Coordinator would be to disseminate the administration’s policy 

into Iran and to advise the administration of the Iranian response. 

To this end, the Coordinator would vet opposition groups to ensure 

that they share Washington’s national security interests and are 

genuine democrats. Finally, maximum impact would be achieved 

if the Iran Coordinator were fl uent in Farsi and Azeri, understood 

Iranian political culture, and was an American of Iranian descent.

Islamic Bomb versus Iranian Bomb.

A fundamental dynamic at play in Iran today is a renewed 

sense of national pride at being Iranian. Islam, both as a religion 

and form of governance, has taken a backseat to nationalism. The 

historic struggle between traditionalism and modernity that has 

been the mainstay of Iranian history is now swinging away from 

traditionalism. Indeed, the Islamic Revolution of 1979 was, in many 

ways, a counter-revolution. After years of taking a backseat to 

modernity, the forces of traditionalism had fi nally triumphed. In 

many respects, Mohammad Khatami’s fi rst victory in 1997, owed as 

much to his use of nationalist themes and the inclusion of pride at 

being Iranian as well as a Muslim nation.
77

Viewed in this context, any announcement by the Islamic 

Republic of Iran that Iran successfully detonated a nuclear bomb 

would be welcomed by an overwhelming majority of the people. 

This euphoria would be temporary but nonetheless widespread 

because it would appeal to the Iranian sense of nationalism. Should 

the regime make an announcement that the “nation has acquired an 

Iranian bomb” then it would be welcome and legitimize the regime. 

However, should the regime portray this event as an Islamic bomb 

at the service of the Muslim world, then the entire context of what 

this means to the nation would change. An “Islamic bomb” would 

be viewed by the Iranians as a tool in the hands of the clergy to 

intimidate and blackmail its neighbors. An Iranian bomb would be 

viewed as a legitimate means to defend the nation against any real 

or perceived enemy. It would be justifi ed as: “Well, if the Pakistanis 

have it, why not us. If the Israelis have it, why not us. If the Americans 

have it, why not us.”

The Clerics and a Nuclear Bomb.

The 14 grand ayatollahs living in Iran would most likely support 

and give their blessing to the continuation of Iran’s pursuit of 

a nuclear bomb so long as it was put into the service of Islam; a 

defense of Muslims and not used for offensive purposes. Of the 5,000 

recognized ayatollahs in Iran, some might disagree with resources 

being diverted to pursuing a nuclear option, but a majority would 

be supportive. Those clerics opposed to the regime such as Grand 

Ayatollah Montazeri would not welcome the news of a bomb in the 

hands of the regime, but he would be supportive of the fact that the 

“Muslim nation of Iran has acquired this capability.”

Junior clerics who have been vocal in their opposition to the 

concept of velayate-faqih, such as Mohsen Kadivar and Abdollah 

Nouri, would in all likelihood support continuation of Iran’s quest 

for a nuclear bomb. They would, however, lend their support so 

long as the program was transparent, in order to ease the country 

out of its current international isolation. They would, for example, 

favor open access to all facilities. 
78

Nonclerics and a Nuclear Bomb.

The relatives of the powerful such as Mohammad-Reza Khatami; 

Jamileh Kadivar, the wife of Ataollah Mohajerani, Khatami’s former 

Minister of Islamic Guidance; Ali-Reza Nouri, the younger brother 

of Abdollah Nouri; and Hadi Khamenei, the estranged brother of 

the Supreme Leader, would also welcome Iran’s quest for a nuclear 

bomb. This group, would, however, view this weapon in the broader 

context of Iranian deterrence capabilities and not within the Islamic 

context.

Gholam-Hossein Karbaschi, the former mayor of Tehran, may 

play a prominent role in the future of Iran and, as such, his position 

on the issue of Iran’s quest for a nuclear bomb would be instructive. 

As Tehran’s no-nonsense mayor, Karbaschi turned Tehran into a city 

“that works.” His tenure as mayor and popularity during this period, 

coupled with his still close ties to former President Rafsanjani, 

suggests that he would pursue the nuclear option. He would see 

this as a political platform for his own advancement, albeit using the 

bomb itself in the context of defending Iran. 

Any members of the regime’s revolutionary security forces that 

emerged to take charge in a coup or regime change scenario would 

most likely continue the quest for a nuclear bomb. They most likely 

would see this as a positive platform and a nationalist agenda that 

would play well with the majority of Iranians. Furthermore, as a 

“military person” the issue would be put into the context of Iran’s 

need to deter its “regional enemies” or stay at a parity with its 

neighbors, Pakistan and India.

Conclusion.

The United States has a historic opportunity to put the genie of 

Islamic fundamentalism back into the bottle by empowering the 

Iranian people to change their regime. If Washington is serious 

about ending Islamic Iran’s nuclear ambitions; if Washington is 

serious about ending Islamic Iran’s support for global terrorism; if 

Washington is serious about promoting democratic pluralism in the 

Middle East; then a robust proactive policy of regime change is the 

only option to consider. In the end, America must remain true to the 
79

core values that have made our country a beacon of hope for millions 

around the world: freedom, rule-of-law, and economic opportunity. 

It is time we made it very clear to the Iranian people that we support 

their quest for freedom and will act upon this quest, and that we will 

not engage their tormentors in any way shape or form. Empowering 

the people of Iran to change their regime is in America’s national 

security interests; but it is also a long-standing tradition of our moral 

fabric as a nation. The words of another President are instructive in 

this regard:

Whenever the standard of freedom has been and shall be unfurled, 

there will be America’s heart, her benediction and her prayers.

 John Quincy Adams

81

CHAPTER 5

WINNING IRANIAN HEARTS AND MINDS

Abbas William Samii*

Iran could become a nuclear capable state in the next 24-30 months 

(June 2003-December 2005), in light of progress at Bushehr and other, 

undeclared, facilities. The military option―from preemptive strikes 

against nuclear facilities to a full-scale invasion―is one way to 

preclude this eventuality. Many Iranians have a positive impression 

of the United States and a dislike of their own regime, but it is very 

unlikely that they would react positively to an American attack or to 

an American-backed successor government. 

Iranian attitudes towards the U.S. currently fall between two 

extremes. Iran and its people can seem rabidly anti-American, with 

a history of hostage takings and mobs continuing to chant “Death 

to America” on a weekly basis. American visitors to the country, 

however, report that such activities are almost pro forma by now, and 

a 2002 opinion poll in Tehran found that almost three-quarters of 

the population favors the resumption of direct Iran-U.S. talks. (The 

United States broke relations with Iran on April 7, 1980.) At the same 

time, visitors to Iran describe a proud and nationalistic people who 

retain skepticism about U.S. motives, and opinion polls refl ect this.

The United States could mitigate the impact of any military 

action against Iran by persuading Iranians beforehand of its positive 

intentions towards them, and this will take more than White 

House declarations of support for the Iranian people. This chapter 

recommends several concrete actions to win Iranians’ hearts and 

minds. Washington should provide disaster relief to Iran, permit 

enhanced international cooperation in Iranian counternarcotics 

activities, assist Iranian HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment 

____________

*Dr. Samii is the Regional Analysis Coordinator for Southwest Asia at Radio 

Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Inc. (RFE/RL). The views expressed here do not 

necessarily refl ect the offi cial policy or position of RFE/RL.
82

programs, and provide assistance to Iranian refugee support 

activities. Washington also should encourage Iranian participation 

in multilateral international fora and acknowledge Iran’s concerns 

about regional developments, ease restrictions on Iranians’ ability to 

visit the United States, and end its resistance to Iranian membership 

in the World Trade Organization. 

All of these actions would be pointless if Iranians are not aware 

of them. Coupled with the concrete steps of the hearts and minds 

campaign, therefore, must be an aggressive information operations 

campaign that would counter Tehran’s anti-American propaganda 

and disinformation. Accurate information about U.S. activities 

should be relayed to Iran via FM and shortwave radio, satellite 

television, and the Internet.

The policy recommendations in this chapter may not have a 

serious short-term effect because most foreign-policy decisionmaking 

in Iran is in the hands of a small elite. The impact of a hearts and 

minds campaign would be much more signifi cant in a decade, as 

the 44.3 million Iranians who are under 30―roughly two-thirds of 

the population of 66.4 million―and who did not participate in such 

formative experiences as life under the pro-U.S. monarchy, activism 

in the 1978-79 revolution, or fi ghting in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War, 

come of age.1

PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS AND THE GREAT SATAN

It is unrealistic to be very specifi c about the attitudes of a 

population as large as Iran’s, but for many observers, a number of 

images stand out―blindfolded American diplomats being led out of 

the Embassy in Tehran in 1979 and a cleric toying with the remains 

of an American serviceman killed in the April 1980 hostage rescue 

mission, burning of the American fl ag at public events, and Friday 

prayer congregations chanting “Death to America.” Then there is the 

description of the United States as “the Great Satan.”2

The Satanic reference to the United States was more than just 

a comparison to the Devil. It was an “important device in the 

reeducation of the Iranian people to the new revolutionary ideology 

of the Iranian state”―a lamentation that materialism had replaced 

spiritualism and the assignment of blame to the United States.3 The 
83

Great Satan drew men from the path of righteousness towards sin. 

The Iranian monarch, his family, and his entourage were corrupt, 

but the United States was perceived as “the ultimate source of 

that corruption.”4 Moreover, Iran-U.S. relations were marred by 

misperceptions and misunderstanding.

The Great Satan terminology also refl ected “outrage” directed 

against the United States. A scholar explained:

The outrage felt by the Iranian people was heightened by the 

knowledge, rarely admitted after the revolution, that many 

Iranians were themselves largely to blame for Iran’s economic 

and social diffi culties during the years of Pahlavi rule.5

Some Iranians may chant against the Great Satan, but according 

to visitors, the Iranian public does not share the anti-American 

sentiments of its leadership. Journalist Elaine Sciolino developed 

a set of rules to help her “survive the setbacks and embrace the 

surprises of Iran,” and rule number 12 is, “Iranians Like Americans.”6

She notes that Iran offi cially sees America as its greatest enemy, 

but at the same time, many Iranians see America as the Promised 

Land. Sciolino cites the popularity of inexpensive pirated software, 

CDs, and videos, the availability of knock-off Wrangler jeans in 

Qom, and the way in which individuals who demonstrated against 

America would ask her for help getting a visa. Throughout her book, 

furthermore, Sciolino notes that she is generally received with great 

warmth.

Two of Sciolino’s other rules, however, lead one to question this 

warmth. One rule is, “Hospitality Doesn’t Mean Openness,” and 

the other rule is, “Being Polite is Better than Telling the Truth.”7

These rules result in reservations about the depth of fondness for 

Americans that Sciolino describes.

Journalist Afshin Molavi has written about Iranians and their 

attitudes towards the United States, too. Molavi writes that as he 

is sitting in a park with the Friday Prayer sermon blasting antiAmerican vituperative in the background, a group of young women 

approaches him; one asks for help in completing a Green Card 

application and another describes her application to an American 

university.8 In another case, Molavi is watching a hard-liner rally 
84

against the writers of an allegedly blasphemous play.9 The crowd 

is led in cries of “The Playwrights Must Die,” “Reform Means 

Blasphemy,” “Death to Israel,” and, of course, “Death to America.” 

After the rally, however, one of the more enthusiastic chanters 

approaches Molavi and asks, “How can I get a Green Card?” 

Like Sciolino, Molavi recognizes that Iranians are sometimes 

economical with the truth and may not be completely forthcoming 

about their real feelings; in his words, “a remarkable ability to be 

evasive, tell half-truths, and lie outright.”10 He describes this as a 

survival mechanism. And the quest for Green Cards appears to be 

associated with the quest for better economic opportunities and 

greater social freedom. Indeed, many younger Iranians travel to 

Damascus to get Canadian visas for these very reasons and because 

American visas are relatively diffi cult to get. 

Another American reporter who has traveled to Iran extensively 

since the Islamic revolution, Robin Wright, also notes the dichotomy 

of opinions towards the United States. In 1982 she encountered a 

group of Revolutionary Guards who were looking for Americans; 

when she reluctantly identifi ed herself they wanted to know the 

score of the Nebraska-Oklahoma football game.11 She also notes 

that thousands of Iranians, including some top government offi cials, 

were educated in the United States, and she describes the annual 

reunion of the Islamic Association of U.S. and Canadian Graduates.12

Youthful participants at the annual rally to commemorate the seizure 

of the U.S. Embassy are bused in, and one tells Wright that he sees it 

as a day off from school, while many others say that if given a choice, 

they would rather watch an American movie.13 At the same rally, a 

young man asks Wright for help getting a visa to the United States.

Polls and surveys have been used in recent years to weigh public 

opinion. Iran’s Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance sponsored 

a series of polls in 2001 that used innovative means to explore 

Iranians’ sentiments on a range of issues (but not on attitudes towards 

other countries).14 Some 16,274 people in 28 cities participated in the 

polling, but it does not appear that such thoroughness is the norm. 

The Ayandeh Research Institute and the Islamic Culture and 

Guidance Ministry’s National Institute for Research Studies and 

Opinion Polls conducted a survey in September 2002 which found 
85

that 74.7 percent of Tehran residents favored negotiations with the 

United States, and 64.5 percent favored the resumption of Iran-U.S. 

talks.15 Yet 70.4 percent of respondents said that the United States 

is unreliable, 62 percent did not believe in Washington’s sincerity 

in the anti-terrorism campaign, and 65.6 percent did not think that 

Washington is sincere in its defense of freedom and democracy. 

Two later surveys provided contradictory results. A late-March 

2003 telephone poll of Tehran residents found that 84 percent of 

respondents believe that Iran should continue its current policy of 

neutrality and noncooperation with the United States.16 A survey 

conducted 3 weeks later found that 83 percent of Tehran citizens 

distrust the U.S. Government, and 85 percent of those polled think 

of the United States as an “invading and colonial country.”17

This reversal in attitudes towards the United States can be 

explained in several ways. The latter two surveys were conducted 

when U.S. forces were participating in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 

(which started on March 20, 2003), and most Iranian newspapers 

were not published from March 20-April 5, due to the Noruz (the 

Iranian new year) holiday. During this period the only readily 

available sources of information were Iranian radio and television, 

which produced highly critical, biased, and inaccurate reports 

about the war. Entekhab, Iran, Aftab-i Yazd, and Yas-i No newspapers 

produced a few special issues during this period, but these, too, 

were generally critical of the war effort and played up the negative 

aspects of the confl ict. Although the survey results were made 

available, furthermore, information on the sample size or survey 

technique was not reported.

There are questions about the September 2002 survey, too. 

During the pollsters’ trial, the public prosecutor charged some of the 

defendants with forging the poll’s results, completing questionnaires 

without questioning anybody, not actually visiting some of the 

addresses that they listed, and sometimes listing addresses that did 

not exist.18 Needless to say, being charged with a crime does not 

make a person guilty, nor can one view the trial relating to the poll 

as much more than a political event.

Iranians are friendly towards Americans and favorably inclined 

towards the United States, but they are also nationalistic and favor 
86

their independence. These sentiments are to some extent rooted 

in the country’s history of encounters with foreign invaders and 

neo-colonialists. Therefore, President George W. Bush’s inclusion 

of Iran in his January 2002 “axis of evil” reference was insulting to 

many Iranians, although the Iranian legislature later questioned the 

Defense Minister about activities that contributed to this statement. 

“Iranians’ fi erce nationalism is characterized by intense suspicion 

and outright resentment of outside infl uences,” a former Iranian 

offi cial writes, and he warns, “any U.S. strategy that even remotely 

raises the specter of foreign interference in Iran is doomed to fail.”19

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The United States can enact several measures that would build 

on the pre-existing positive sentiments described above. The ones 

listed below would have negligible costs for the United States. These 

policy recommendations could be enacted immediately, but it would 

take some time for them to have an impact.

Disaster Relief. 

The United States should continue to provide disaster relief for 

Iran. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in 

March 1997 provided $25,000 to the International Federation of the 

Red Cross to assist victims of Ardabil Province earthquakes that 

killed almost 1,000 people, injured 2,600, and left more than 60,000 

people homeless.20

The United States also provided assistance in May 1997 after an 

earthquake measuring 7.1 on the Richter scale caused devastation 

in Khorasan Province. In June 2002 an earthquake measuring 6.3 on 

the Richter scale killed more than 230 people, injured another 1,300, 

and left an estimated 25,000 people homeless. USAID sent $350,000 

worth of humanitarian aid (water containers, water purifi cation 

systems, blankets, and personal hygiene kits) to Iran via a chartered 

aircraft, and provided another $50,000 to International Federation of 

the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies to provide blankets to the 

victims.21

Iran’s Sistan va Baluchistan Province is badly affected by 
87

drought, and the main source of water there is the Helmand River, 

which originates in Afghanistan. The Taliban essentially blocked 

the river’s fl ow into Iran, and, although the situation improved in 

Autumn 2002 due the improved relationship between Tehran and 

Kabul, Iranians continue to bemoan the relative scarcity of water. 

The United States could encourage Kabul to be more generous with 

the river’s waters.

Counternarcotics Cooperation.

22

Tehran claims that up to 2 million Iranians are addicted to or 

abuse drugs, and drug-related convictions account for 40 percent of 

the prison population. American nongovernmental organizations 

already have provided assistance for addiction treatment and 

counseling. Washington could underwrite such activities. Moreover, 

club drugs such as ecstasy (MDMA) are becoming popular in Iran, 

and the United States could share its experiences in dealing with this 

new phenomenon.

Most of the drugs come from Afghanistan, the world’s largest 

opium producer, and Tehran’s main way of dealing with this problem 

is interdiction―static defenses, law enforcement, and military 

measures. Tehran has promoted crop substitution in Afghanistan 

and is providing counternarcotics training for its neighbors, and these 

are areas in which Iran and the United States could cooperate. The 

UN Offi ce for Drugs and Crime (UNODC, previously the UN Drug 

Control Program) has an offi ce in Tehran and is actively involved 

with Iran’s Drug Control Headquarters. U.S. legislation (the Foreign 

Assistance Act of 1961, see below), namely the requirement that the 

United States reduce its contribution to an international program in 

a proportionate share to its contribution to Iran, can and should be 

waived in order to facilitate such cooperation.

HIV/AIDS Prevention and Treatment.

The fi rst case of AIDS in Iran was reported in 1987. Some 4,846 

people in Iran have been diagnosed as HIV-positive as of mid-2003, 

although there are unoffi cial estimates that up to 23,000 people 
88

in the country have AIDS.23 Iran’s problem with narcotics is the 

main reason for the prevalence of the virus, with the sharing of 

contaminated needles, especially in prisons, accounting for 65 

percent of the cases. So far, the main Iranian solution to this problem 

has been to separate addicted prisoners from those who are jailed for 

narcotics offenses.24

Iran’s wider approach focuses mainly on prevention through 

the provision of information and educational materials to patients 

and the community; voluntary testing and counseling; serological 

and behavioral surveillance; and HIV care, support, and treatment. 

Moreover, related medicine is distributed free of charge. The World 

Health Organization (WHO) provides support to the Iranian 

Ministry of Health, Treatment, and Medical Education’s program to 

control HIV/AIDS. This program includes blood screening, health 

promotion and education, training workshops; and developing local 

capacities, expertise, and awareness among public health workers. 

Washington could facilitate public health professionals’ travel to 

Iran to participate in intellectual exchanges, and it could make more 

money available for the WHO activities.

Refugee Assistance. 

Iran currently hosts some 2.55 million refugees―2,355,000 

Afghans, 203,000 Iraqis, and 5,522 others. The government, which 

is facing an estimated 25 percent unemployment rate, has enacted 

a number of policies to encourage the refugees to go home because 

they supposedly take jobs that would otherwise go to Iranians, 

they consume social services, and they supposedly contribute to 

the crime rate. These measures include forcible repatriation, the 

withdrawal of services (ex: children’s education, health care), and 

the refusal to permit Afghan husbands of Iranian women to stay in 

Iran. Employers who hire refugees who do not have a work permit 

face heavy fi nes. 

The United States could provide assistance to Iranian refugee 

support activities through the Offi ce of the UN High Commissioner 

for Refugees (UNHCR). Not only would this help the refugees, but 

also it would ease the pressure on the Transitional Administration 

of Afghanistan and on the fl edgling Iraqi leadership. Indeed, in 2000 
89

the United States provided the UNHCR with $7.4 million to support 

its activities on behalf of Afghan refugees in Iran and Pakistan, and 

it provided a nongovernmental organization called the International 

Rescue Committee with $905,349 to assist repatriation of Afghan 

refugees from Iran and Pakistan. 

Multilateral Dialogue. 

The encouragement of Iranian participation in multilateral 

international fora and acknowledgement of Iranian concerns in 

bilateral meetings has taken place before and should continue. The 

most recent example is the meeting of American and Iranian offi cials 

to discuss the war in Iraq.25 Tehran has been praised for its role in the 

November 2001 meeting in Bonn, Switzerland, about Afghanistan, 

and it was seen as an important participant in the UN’s 6+2 

grouping (Afghanistan’s immediate neighbors, the United States, 

and Russia). 

Iran fi rst offered to mediate between Armenia and Azerbaijan 

over Nagorno-Karabakh in 1992-1993. The Organization for Security 

and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) Minsk Group, which is chaired 

by France, the United States, and Russia and is spearheading 

the peace process, suggested in early 2001 that Tehran should be 

informed of progress. As a French diplomat explained: 

[Our aim is] to keep the Iranian authorities informed and to make 

it clear to them that no one will be kept aside. We certainly do 

not want to give the impression that we are acting against the 

interests of one or another country in the region. There cannot be 

a stable and long-lasting peace if it is not endorsed by all regional 

countries.26

A similarly inclusive approach in other regional fora, such as the 

Gulf Cooperation Council, would demonstrate an interest in and 

consideration towards Iranian concerns.

Visa Regulations and Travel Restrictions. 

The treatment of Iranian visitors to the United States should be 

modifi ed in some way. Greater concern about homeland security in 
90

the post-September 11, 2001, environment is normal and acceptable, 

but the Iranian regime plays up the diffi culties Iranians encounter in 

getting visas and in actually trying to enter the United States. 

A group of senior clerics associated with Ayatollah Mohammad 

Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi accepted an invitation to participate in a 

December 1999 conference at Georgetown University but withdrew 

when immigration offi cials at John F. Kennedy Airport in New 

York tried to fi ngerprint and photograph them. Iranian fi lmmaker 

Jafar Panahi, who was detained at John F. Kennedy Airport in April 

2001 for not having a transit visa, complained publicly that he was 

mistreated and chained like a medieval prisoner. In February 2000 an 

Iranian wrestling team complained bitterly about the fi ngerprinting, 

and in May 2001 it boasted about the absence of fi ngerprinting. 

A U.S. consular presence in Iran, which has not existed since 

1979, would facilitate the visa application process and possibly 

reduce such events. The United States should continue to push for 

this, although it seems unlikely. In November 1999, Iranian Supreme 

Leader Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Husseini Khamenei explained that 

Tehran rejected such a proposal because “they [the Americans] want 

to open an intelligence-political site in Tehran to make contact with 

sold-out elements.”27 In January 2000 the director of the Kish Free 

Trade Zone said that a U.S. application to open a consulate there 

would be viewed favorably, but the Foreign Minister countered by 

saying, “we have a clear position towards the United States. We 

have no relations with the United States to talk about the opening of 

a U.S. consulate in any part of the country.”28

World Trade Organization (WTO) Membership. 

Iran fi rst sought WTO membership in 1996, and in July 2001 the 

White House declared that its opposition to Iranian membership is 

“under review.” WTO decisionmaking is based on consensus, and 

the United States has blocked Iran’s application consistently (most 

recently in February 2002).29 Other countries, such as France and the 

European Union, reportedly support Iranian membership, while 

the German Economics Minister pointed out that a normalization 

of ties with the United States would have to precede a successful 
91

membership application.30

There is domestic opposition to Iranian WTO membership, too. 

Unions have protested against membership on the grounds that it 

would lead to job losses.31 Opposition also comes from leftists who 

favor a state-run economy, hardline isolationists, and conservative 

traditional merchants who want to maintain import controls because 

they have favorable licensing arrangements. A Ministry of Science, 

Research, and Technology offi cial accused “unnamed parties” of 

blocking the country’s WTO application.32 The head of the Islamic 

Republic of Iran Customs Administration (IRICA) also has noted 

that certain organizations, which he refused to identify, oppose 

joining the WTO because removal of tariff barriers and subsidies 

would eliminate their advantage.33

Iranian offi cials normally blame the United States regarding the 

WTO issue. Washington would eliminate this grievance by allowing 

Iranian membership. Just as importantly the role of the state in the 

economy would be reduced and privatization would progress. 

Iranian economic interaction with the rest of the world would 

increase, and as Iranians recognize this interdependence they would 

have a greater interest in reducing actions that alienate the country 

from the international community. 

POLICY CONSTRAINTS: THE WHITE HOUSE AND THE LAW

Any initiatives will require awareness of U.S. policy towards Iran, 

which was spelled out in several statements from the White House. 

President George W. Bush in a January 2002 statement specifi ed a 

desired change in Iranian behavior.34

Well, fi rst of all, Iran must be a contributor in the war against 

terror; that our nation and our fi ght against terror will uphold the 

doctrine, either you’re with us or against us; and any nation that 

thwarts our ability to rout terror out where it exists will be held to 

account, one way or the other.

As Iranian students held demonstration in July 2002, President 

Bush specifi ed another aspect of U.S. policy on Iran.35 “The people 

of Iran want the same freedoms, human rights, and opportunities 
92

as people around the world,” he said. “Their government should 

listen to their hopes.” The President added, “As Iran’s people move 

towards a future defi ned by greater freedom, greater tolerance, they 

will have no better friend than the United States of America.”

“The United States wants to see a democratic and prosperous Iran, 

integrated into the global economy,” a top National Security Council 

(NSC) offi cial said in an August 2002 speech.36 He said that U.S. policy 

towards Iran follows two tracks, one of which publicly identifi es the 

unacceptable aspects of Iranian behavior―”sponsorship of terror, 

pursuit of WMD, and repression of the clearly expressed desires of 

the Iranian people for freedom and democracy.” The other track lays 

out a vision of partnership and support for the Iranian people.

U.S. policy is not about imposing change on Iran, but it will 

support Iranians’ quest for self-determination, the NSC offi cial 

said.37 Nor is U.S. policy about factions or individuals in the Iranian 

governmental apparatus. 

U.S. policy is . . . about supporting those who want freedom, 

human rights, democracy, and economic and educational 

opportunity for themselves and their fellow countrymen and 

women.

In addition to White House policies, several laws and regulations 

impose restrictions and limits on possible initiatives regarding Iran. 

Only one of these laws, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (Public 

Law 87-195), is relevant to the policy recommendations discussed 

above.38 This act bans U.S. foreign assistance to governments 

supporting international terrorism, and the State Department has 

identifi ed Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism since January 1984.39

Section 307 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 states that 

Iran and other state sponsors of terrorism cannot benefi t from U.S. 

contributions to international organizations. The United States 

would reduce its contribution to the international program in a 

proportionate share. This means that U.S. contributions to the 

UNODC are reduced in proportion to UNODC contributions to 

Iranian counternarcotics activities. U.S. contributions to UNICEF 

and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are exempt 

from this restriction, and this provision does not apply to disaster 
93

relief aid. Section 620A permits the President to waive the restrictions 

if this is in the national interest. 

MONITORING AND EVALUATION

The recommendations in the previous section could have 

an impact on Iran at the grass-roots level and especially among 

people who have had little prior interaction with Americans. The 

recommendations will not be very effective, however, if the Iranian 

public does not know that the United States is responsible. For 

example, the earthquake assistance that the United States provided 

in 2002 was delivered by chartered aircraft and by non-U.S. crews. 

And if Iran does gain WTO membership, Tehran will almost certainly 

claim that this is a diplomatic victory for it and another refl ection of 

failed U.S. efforts to isolate it.

Getting this information to the Iranian public will not be easy due 

to serious media restrictions. The offi cial Islamic Republic of Iran 

Broadcasting (IRIB) runs all the radio and television stations, and its 

hard-line bias often is criticized by Iranians themselves. 

Foreign radio stations that broadcast in the Persian language 

are very popular in Iran, because they provide relatively unbiased 

news about international events, offer a platform for Iranians who 

do not have access to state media, and in one case, carry entertaining 

programs. Among these foreign stations are the British Broadcasting 

Corporation, Deutsche Welle, Radio France International, Kol 

Yisrael, Radio Beijing, NHK Radio Japan, Voice of America, and 

Voice of Russia. 

The U.S.-sponsored Radio Farda began broadcasting to Iran 

in December 2002, having replaced the 4-year-old Persian Service 

of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Radio Farda is on the air 24 

hours a day and is available via FM, shortwave, and satellite signal. 

Its target audience is the under-30 population, so it broadcasts pop 

music to attract these listeners. It also has 15-minute newscasts at 

the top of the hour 20 times a day and 3-minute newscasts at the 

half-hour 20 times a day. Four times a day it transmits 30-minute 

newsmagazines. 

Satellite television is popular. The impact of Los Angeles-based 

stations that are run by Iranian expatriates, such as Pars TV and 
94

NITV, was demonstrated in the week starting October 21, 2001, 

when NITV urged Iranians to take to the streets to protest against 

the government. Iranians actually did so, rioting after losing a 

World Cup soccer qualifying match. They chanted slogans against 

the government and destroyed property. During several days of 

demonstrations in Tehran in June 2003, satellite broadcasts again 

urged Iranians to take to the streets and to confront the regime’s 

security forces. 

Not only is satellite television popular, it is illegal.40 There are 

periodic police sweeps in which satellite dishes are confi scated, and 

at the end of April 2003 President Hojatoleslam Seyyed Mohammad 

Khatami-Ardakani and Speaker of Parliament Hojatoleslam Mehdi 

Karrubi complained about unauthorized jamming of satellite 

television signals.41 Reporters Without Borders noted the jamming 

of foreign television and radio signals in June 2003.42 As satellite 

receiving equipment becomes smaller and less expensive, it will 

become more readily available to the Iranian public, thereby making 

it easier to communicate directly with the Iranian people.

The Iranian print media also operates under numerous 

restrictions, the most onerous being the undefi ned “red-lines,” 

the crossing of which often leads to a publication’s closure.43 The 

courts have closed approximately 80 publications since April 2000, 

and Reporters Without Borders refers to Iran as “the biggest jail for 

journalists in the Middle East” in its annual report for 2002.44

One of the means by which Iranians are overcoming the state’s 

attempt to monopolize information sources is by turning to the 

Internet. Persian language websites (for example, www.rooznegar.com, 

www.emrooz.org, www.alliran.net), as well as foreign news sources, 

are increasingly popular with Iranians. Iranians also exchange 

information in chat rooms and blogs. The Minister of Post, Telegraph, 

and Telephone estimated that 15 million Iranians would have access 

to the Internet by March 2005.45 The Internet, therefore, is another 

way to publicize U.S. initiatives. 

Constant monitoring of Iranian media, interviews with Iranians 

living in the United States, and traveler surveys would provide the 

necessary input on the effectiveness of the recommended initiatives. 

This, in turn, would facilitate making adjustments to those initiatives 

that are having the desired effect, elimination of the ineffective ones, 
95

and adoption of new ones.

CONCLUSION

The United States cannot ignore Iran and hope that Tehran’s 

attitudes will soften and its behavior change with time, because of 

the threat it will pose in the near future. Iran is pursuing programs 

to produce nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, regardless 

of its status in the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear 

Weapons (NPT), the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and 

the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).46 Most Intelligence 

Community agencies believe that the United States will face an 

ICBM threat from Iran by 2015, and Iran’s missile inventory already 

is among the largest in the Middle East.47 Iran remained “the most 

active state sponsor of terrorism during 2002,” according to the U.S. 

State Department’s annual Patterns of Global Terrorism―2002 report, 

providing support for violent groups such as Lebanese Hizballah, 

Hamas, and the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ). 

The policy recommendations described above are unlikely to 

affect Iranian strategic thinking or its international behavior in the 

short-term. But these steps will resonate with young Iranians who 

were born after the revolution and who have become disenchanted 

and frustrated with their country’s rulers. These individuals hope 

for a better future, and a hearts and minds campaign will persuade 

them that the United States is a friend that wants to help them 

achieve that future. Such a campaign is, furthermore, in line with the 

Bush administration’s policy of supporting the Iranian people. 

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 5

1. According to the UN Population Division, the population in 2000 was 66.43 

million; http://esa.un.org/unpp/p2k0data.asp. The Central Intelligence Agency’s 

World Factbook estimates that as of July 2002, the population was 66,622,704.

2. Mark J. Roberts, “Iran and the ‘Great Satan,’“ Joint Forces Quarterly, Autumn 

1995. 

3. William Beeman, “Images of the Great Satan: Representations of the United 

States in the Iranian Revolution,” in Nikkie R. Keddie, ed., Religion and Politics in 
96

Iran-Shi’ism from Quietism to Revolution, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983, 

pp. 191, 192.

4. Ibid., p. 216.

5. Ibid., p. 201.

6. Elaine Sciolino, Persian Mirrors–The Elusive Face of Iran, New York: The Free 

Press, 2000, pp. 28, 43-45.

7. Ibid., pp. 29, 34.

8. Afshin Molavi, Persian Pilgrimages―Journeys Across Iran, New York: W. W. 

Norton & Co., 2002, pp. 79-82.

9. Ibid., pp. 102-104.

10. Ibid., p. 142.

11. Robin Wright, The Last Great Revolution, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000, 

p. xv.

12. Ibid., p. 194.

13. Ibid., pp. 252-253.

14. Nazgol Ashouri, “Polling in Iran: Surprising Questions,” Policywatch #757, 

The Washington Institute of Near East Policy, May 14, 2003.

15. Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), September 22, 2002. Iran’s press 

corps accused Ayandeh Research Institute of taking money from the Washingtonbased Gallup Organization to fabricate the poll. Richard Burkholder, director 

of international polling at Gallup, told RFE/RL’s Persian Service that Gallup 

is a private company and is not connected with the U.S. Government; and 

when Gallup pays foreign companies to conduct polls, they use questions and 

methodology developed by Gallup. National Institute for Research and Opinion 

Polls director Behruz Geranpayeh said that the Iranian legislature’s research 

center commissioned the survey; IRNA, December 31, 2002.

16. Iranian Students News Agency (ISNA), March 23, 2003.

17. The Iranian Students Opinion Polls Center conducted the survey; IRNA, 

April 14, 2003.

18. Public prosecutor’s offi ce representative Ali Asqar Tashakori discussing 
97

Vahid Sinai and Mehdi Abbasirad, cited by IRNA, December 31, 2003.

19. Jahangir Amuzegar, “Iran’s Crumbling Revolution,” Foreign Affairs, 

January/February 2003.

20. USAID Press Release, March 10, 1997.

21. Ibid., July 3, 2002, U.S. State Department’s Offi ce of International 

Information Programs, usinfo.state.gov.

22. See A. William Samii, “Drug Abuse: Iran’s ‘Thorniest Problem,’” Brown 

Journal of World Affairs, Winter/Spring 2003.

23. Health Ministry public relations department chief Hushmand Sefi di, cited 

by IRNA, May 22, 2003; Health Ministry offi cial Mohammad Mehdi Guya, cited 

by IRNA, May 20, 2003.

24. Prisons Organization chief Morteza Bakhtiari, cited by IRNA, January 16, 

2003.

25. National Security Council offi cial Zalmay Khalilzad and U.S. Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of State Ryan Crocker reportedly met with Iran’s representative 

to the United Nations, Mohammad Javad Zarif, and/or other senior Iranian 

offi cials and Islamic Revolution Guards Corps offi cers in January and March; 

UPI, March 26, 2003, and The Washington Post, April 18, 2003. Tehran denied that 

any discussions occurred, with Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi saying that Iran 

is not ready for the restoration of diplomatic relations with the United States, 

“because the United States is not ready for the kind of relations based on mutual 

respect among countries;” AP, April 21, 2003.

26. Former French Ambassador to Tehran and Minsk Group co-Chairman 

Philippe de Suremain, in an interview with Jean-Christophe Peuch, “Iran Offers 

To Mediate In Nagorno-Karabakh Dispute,“ RFE/RL Weekday Magazine, July 

25, 2001. 

27. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s speech to students and staff of Sharif University 

in Tehran, Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, November 22, 1999.

28. Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi, cited by IRNA, January 24, 2000.

29. Frances Williams, “Iran’s bid to join WTO is blocked by U.S.,” Financial 

Times, February 14, 2002.

30. IRNA, April 9, 2003, April 17, 2003. German Economics Minister Werner 

Mueller, cited by IRNA, August 15, 2002.
98

31. IRNA, November 9, 2001.

32. Mohammad Nahavandian, cited by IRNA, October 22, 2002.

33. IRICA President Masud Karbasian, interview with Hamshahri, October 20, 

2002.

34. Remarks by the President in a meeting with his economic team, The 

Oval Offi ce, January 10, 2002, U.S. Department of State’s Offi ce of International 

Information Programs, usinfo.state.gov.

35. Statement by the President, July 12, 2002, U.S. State Department’s Offi ce of 

International Information Programs, usinfo.state.gov.

36. Special assistant to the president and senior director for Southwest Asia, 

Near East and North Africa on the National Security Council Zalmay Khalilzad’s 

speech at the Washington Institute of Near East Policy, August 2, 2002, U.S. State 

Department’s Offi ce of International Information Programs, usinfo.state.gov.

37. Ibid.

38. Kenneth Katzman, U.S.-Iran Relations: An Analytic Compendium of U.S. 

Policies, Laws, and Regulations, The Atlantic Council of the United States Occasional 

Paper, December 1990, pp. 59-63.

39. State sponsorship means that Iran provides terrorists with safe-haven, 

travel documents, arms, training, and technical expertise, state support, or 

toleration.

40. A good study on this issue is Steven Barraclough, “Satellite Television in 

Iran: Prohibition, Imitation, and Reform,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 37, n. 3, July 

2001.

41. IRNA, April 22, 2003.

42. http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=7151.

43. See A. William Samii, “The Contemporary Iranian News Media, 1998-

1999,” Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal, Vol. 3, n. 4, 

December 1999; and A. William Samii, “Sisyphus’ Newsstand: The Iranian Press 

Under Khatami,” MERIA Journal, Vol. 5 n. 3, September 2001.

44. http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=1438
99

45. Minister of Post, Telegraph, and Telephone Ahmad Motamedi, cited by 

Iran Daily, March 10, 2003.

46. Central Intelligence Agency, “Unclassifi ed Report to Congress on the 

Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and 

Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 2002,” http://

www.cia.gov/cia/publications/bian/bian_apr_2003.htm.

47. National Intelligence Council, “Foreign Missile Developments and 

the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015,” Unclassifi ed Summary of a National 

Intelligence Estimate, December 2001, http://www.cia.gov/nic/pubs/other_products/

Unclassifi edballisticmissilefi nal.htm.

101

CHAPTER 6

U.S.-IRANIAN STRATEGIC COOPERATION SINCE 1979

Geoffrey Kemp

U.S. attempts at strategic cooperation with Iran have evolved 

through a number of stages since the traumatic revolution of 1979. 

The fi rst phase lasted through the 1980s and ended with the death 

of Khomeini in 1989. The second phase witnessed the Gulf War and 

the efforts by President Rafsanjani and, later, President Clinton to 

establish some sort of modus vivendi. However it was accompanied 

by harsher U.S. sanctions and strident anti-Israeli behavior and 

rhetoric from Iran. The third phase began with the surprise election 

of Mohammad Khatami in 1997 and the new hopes for U.S.-Iranian 

rapprochement. It ended with the fall of Saddam Hussein. The 

current phase of the relationship will be dominated by postwar Iraq, 

Iran’s continued support for terrorism and the advanced status of 

Iran’s nuclear program. One way or another a climax to U.S.-Iranian 

relations is likely in the coming year or so.

Phase 1: 1979-89.

The fi rst years of the revolution were dominated by the 14-month 

hostage crisis--November 1979-January 1981--precipitated when 

Iran, in violation of international law, took American diplomats into 

its custody in Tehran. Dramas of the hostage crisis had a profound 

and dramatic impact on American public opinion and politics. It 

was one of the key reasons President Carter lost the 1980 election 

to Ronald Reagan. Two months earlier, Iran was invaded by Iraq 

and the 8-year Iran-Iraq War began. Despite Saddam’s aggression, 

the United States was quietly pleased to see the regime facing a new 

major threat and while the United States professed neutrality, there 

were expectations and hopes that Saddam’s forces would topple the 

Ayatollah’s new government.

Thus when the Reagan administration assumed offi ce in January 

1981, it had no interest in modifying the tough line policy towards 
102

the Iranian regime, but as the war bogged down in Iran, the issue 

was not on the front burner of the new administration.

It assumed much more importance in June 1982 when, against 

expectations, the Iranian army successfully expelled Iraq from 

Iran and then made the fateful decision to carry the war onto the 

Arabian Peninsula, thereby threatening not only Iraq but also the 

oil-rich Arab monarchies. This coincided with a period in Iran 

when revolutionary zeal was at its peak and the hope of spreading 

Islamic revolutions all around the region was openly talked about. 

The problem was that the regime’s zealotry was not shared by most 

of its neighbors, and Iran found itself isolated with the exception 

of support from Syria and Shiite factions in Lebanon. The United 

States concluded that a successful Iranian offensive against Iraq 

would pose a major strategic threat to the region and therefore a 

distinct “tilt” towards Iraq began. In other words, the fi rst truly 

strategic decision the United States made after the hostage crisis 

was to oppose Iran in a forceful and effective way. Iran became 

subjected to a widespread, worldwide embargo orchestrated by the 

United States called Operation STAUNCH, while Iraq, on the other 

hand, was openly supported by the majority of Arab states, Europe, 

the Soviet Union and, more circumspectly, the United States. 

At the beginning of the second Reagan administration, it was 

clear that there would be no early end to the Iran-Iraq War. Iran’s 

lack of spare parts for its sophisticated U.S.-made Air Force was a 

major constraint on its military operations, and the regime was losing 

vast numbers of soldiers in suicide missions trying to breakthrough 

the Shatt al-Arab barrier and take the city of Basra. It was the 

extraordinary constraints on Iran’s Air Force and missile capabilities 

that persuaded the Iranians to do the unthinkable--consider doing 

business with the United States and Israel--by now known as the 

Great Satan and Little Satan, respectively. 

This was the beginning of the ill-fated Iran-Contra scandal 

involving a deal to trade arms for American hostages held in 

Lebanon by pro-Iranian groups, with the residuary benefi t that 

some of the money from the arms sales would go to the Nicaraguan 

contras. The rationale for the willingness of the White House to 

consider this overture to Iran, was based on a highly controversial 

intelligence analysis that believed that there were moderate forces in 
103

revolutionary Iran who were prepared to compromise and reach a 

rapprochement with the United States. It was argued that this would 

be in American interests because of parallel concerns about growing 

Soviet infl uence in Iran and the fear that Iran would ultimately fall 

under Soviet hands, which would have signifi cantly raised the 

strategic risks to the United States in the Persian Gulf region. At that 

time the Soviet offensive in Afghanistan was still in high gear. 

While such an approach to Iran was bitterly contested by both 

the Pentagon and the State Department, the arms-for-hostage deal 

nevertheless proceeded and very nearly destroyed the second 

Reagan administration. However, very few arms found their way to 

Iran, but the United States increased its support for Iraq, especially 

real time intelligence sharing. U.S. attitudes toward Iran became 

increasingly feisty, and towards the end of the war the United States 

became directly involved in the fi ghting as part of a multilateral 

operation to protect Arab oil tankers that were being attacked by the 

Iranians. On July 3, 1988, the U.S. warship Vincennes accidentally 

shot down an Iranian airliner, killing 290 civilians. The end of the 

war came soon after this event. Iran was a defeated power which 

had been humiliated and isolated by the international community 

and subject to the most brutal attacks by Saddam Hussein’s 

forces which were using chemical weapons. At no time did the 

international community protest beyond nominal utterances, and to 

this day Iran’s sufferings and humiliation during this period are felt 

by all Iranians, whether moderate, hard-liner, or anything else. 

Phase 2: 1989-96.

The end of the Iran-Iraq War was followed a year later by the 

death of the Ayatollah Khomeini. This opened the possibility of a 

thaw in U.S.-Iranian relations. In his inaugural address on January 

20, 1989, President George H. Bush appeared to reach out to Iran 

when, in reference to the American hostages still held in Lebanon 

by pro-Iranian groups, he said, “today there are Americans who are 

held against their will in foreign lands, there are Americans who are 

unaccounted for. Assistance can be shown here and will be long 

remembered. Good will begets good will.” 
104

The Iranians read this as a signal that if they cooperated in getting 

the release of the hostages, they would be rewarded in some way. 

Most of the hostages were released. However, no rewards were 

forthcoming. Iran remained a highly sensitive political issue for the 

White House. George Bush, himself, had been tainted by the IranContra scandal and had no desire to follow in the steps of Carter and 

Reagan and burn his fi ngers on overtures to this prickly regime. 

Another opportunity for cooperation came during the 1990-91 

Gulf War. Iran made a strategic decision to sit out the war and 

mount no serious opposition to the American-led coalition. Iran 

provided refuge for fl eeing Iraqi airplanes and never turned them 

over to the Saddam Hussein regime during or after the Gulf War. 

From the Iranian point of view, they had made a strategic decision 

to help the coalition by not interfering. They expected at the end of 

war that there might be some gesture from the administration. 

In a postwar speech, Bush offered four key challenges for the 

new Middle East: to create shared security arrangements, to control 

weapons of mass destruction, to promote a comprehensive ArabIsraeli peace and to promote economic development. These goals 

became part of the cornerstone of the Madrid Peace Conference 

which was convened in November 1991. Iran was not invited, not 

consulted, and left out of the negotiations. It responded by hosting 

a gathering of radical states opposed to the Madrid Conference. The 

messages coming from Iran during this period remained mixed. The 

new President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani was considered more 

pragmatic than Ayatollah Khomeini. However, it was not until the 

Clinton administration came into offi ce in 1992 that the Rafsanjani 

government attempted any new initiatives, and this was not until 

several years into the administration. 

The Clinton administration came into offi ce in January 1993, and 

as is always the case, a reappraisal of U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf 

was undertaken. The administration criticized the Reagan-Bush 

legacy arguing that the efforts prior to August 1990 to balance Iraq 

against Iran and tilt towards Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War were 

based on faulty thinking. The Clinton team did not believe that 

a regional balance of power was sustainable. The United States 

needed to treat both Iran and Iraq as “backlash or rogue” states that 

should be contained and isolated. 
105

Clinton administration policy toward Iran can be broken down 

into three periods. The fi rst period, May 1993 to May 1995, saw the 

enunciation of the “dual containment” strategy as an effort to keep 

both Iran and Iraq impotent: the United States would become the 

guarantor of Gulf security, act as the “balancer” in the region, and 

deploy suffi cient military power to deter, or if necessary defeat, both 

Iraq and Iran in a future confrontation. 

However, it was clear from the beginning that a differentiated 

policy of containment toward the two countries would be pursued. 

Iraq was subject to UN-mandated international sanctions resulting 

from the invasion and occupation of Kuwait in August 1990. U.S. 

policy was to eventually remove the Saddam Hussein regime. In 

the case of Iran, U.S. policy was initially more benign, the focus 

being to change key elements of Iranian policy, namely support for 

international terrorism, rejection of the Arab-Israeli peace process 

(including Israel’s right to exist), development of weapons of mass 

destruction, and violations of human rights and international law. 

These objectives have remained consistent since 1993. 

Meanwhile, Iranian President Rafsanjani sought to open Iran 

to the outside world and to attract the foreign capital Iran needed 

to rebuild after nearly a decade of war and revolution. A key part 

of Rafsanjani’s new policy of openness was easing Iran’s tense 

relationship with the United States. He believed that a more 

open policy with Washington would facilitate Iran’s economic 

development, particularly in the energy sector. Much of the National 

Iranian Oil Company’s drilling equipment had been purchased in 

the late 1970s and was badly in need of modernization. 

Iran pursued Rafsanjani’s “moderate” foreign policy and sought 

to reform the economy. Parts of the Iranian economy were liberalized 

and opened to outside competition. In numerous interviews with 

western media, Rafsanjani sought to downplay the years of enmity 

with the United States and emphasized Iran’s newfound openness 

to change. Iran also worked to improve relations with American’s 

closest allies, especially Saudi Arabia and the European Union 

(EU). 

The United States pursued an ambiguous policy concerning 

economic relations with Iran. While the offi cial policy called for 

“dual containment,” the reality was that the United States continued 
106

to trade with Iran, and U.S. oil companies continued to purchase 

Iranian oil and sell it on the world market. Then, in 1995, came a 

U.S. decision to impose unilateral sanctions on Iran and forbid U.S. 

companies from doing business in the Islamic Republic. This was 

a result of two converging pressures. First, the administration’s 

efforts to convince Europeans and Japan that U.S. economic isolation 

or containment of Iran was a good idea was offset by the reality that 

the United States was Iran’s premier trading partner. Second, by 

1995 anti-Iranian voices in the U.S. Congress had convinced the 

administration that further economic sanctions on Iran would be 

imposed the Congress. So the executive branch itself issued an 

executive order banning further trade in May 1995.

Ironically, the catalyst of this decision was Iran’s surprise 

announcement of an offer to an American company, Conoco, to 

develop an Iranian off-shore gas fi eld in the Persian Gulf at South 

Pars. Conoco offi cials had worked for many years on the project 

and beat out the French company, Total, for the contract. The 

announcement sent shockwaves through Washington. Although 

the agreement clearly violated the spirit of dual containment, senior 

State Department offi cials were forced to admit that the deal was 

legal. For their part, senior Iranian offi cials, such as President 

Rafsanjani, may have hoped that the Conoco deal would help to 

open a new period of U.S.-Iranian relations and to justify Tehran’s 

foreign policy and economic reforms. Thus began a second, more 

confrontational period of the Clinton administration’s policy toward 

Iran which remained in place until May 1997.

During this second phase, the debate in Washington was 

between hawks and superhawks. Few, if any, decisionmakers were 

in favor of offering Iran an “olive branch.” The hawks were those 

who wished to further isolate Iran economically, while trying to fi nd 

ways to cooperate with Europe in order to increase pressure on the 

Iranian government to change its policies. The superhawks were 

those who saw no possibility of negotiating with or moderating the 

actions of the Iranian regime--what was necessary was a change of 

regime.
107

Phase 3: The Khatami Years.

The surprise election of Mohammad Khatami in May 1997 

dramatically changed American attitudes towards Iran and ushered 

in the third period of Clinton’s Iran policy. The election threw 

the Clinton administration into something of a furor. Khatami’s 

overtures to the United States following his election included 

a remarkable interview with CNN Correspondent Christianne 

Amanpour on January 7, 1998, where he called for a “dialogue of 

civilizations” between the United States and Iran. Over the coming 

months there was a fl urry of activity suggesting that a breakthrough 

in relations might be possible. In June 1998, Madeline Albright made 

a speech at the Asia Society calling for a road map to better relations, 

and President Clinton issued a statement at the time of the World 

Cup soccer match between the United States and Iran, “as we cheer 

today’s game between American and Iranian athletes, I hope it can 

be another step towards ending the strains between our nations.” 

The United States then made another strategic gesture to Iran 

on October 8, 1999, by placing the premier opposition group to the 

Iranian regime, the Mujahideen e-Khalq, on the terrorist list making 

them susceptible to laws that freeze their fi nancial assets in the United 

States, deny U.S. visas to their families, and subject Americans who 

assist them fi nancially or with weaponry to 10 years in prison. This 

gesture to the new Iranian leadership was reportedly due in part 

to President Khatami’s decision to replace the former intelligence 

Minister, Ali Fallahian, an architect of the terror campaigns, as well 

as other controversial personnel in the old Iranian cabinet. 

The Iranian direct response to these gestures was tepid and 

did little to mollify the critics of Clinton who believed that he was 

reaching out too far. The unresolved issue of the June 1996 Khobar 

Towers terrorist bombing outside Dhahran still haunted U.S. offi cials, 

as did the continued Iranian stridency towards Israel. Nevertheless, 

the fi rst four years of Khatami’s presidency were ones of high hopes 

for better U.S.-Iranian relations. A lot of track two activity occurred 

but no clear breakthroughs. During this period Iranians remained 

bitterly divided on the wisdom of strategic cooperation with the 
108

United States and displayed very ambivalent behavior. 

Khatami’s reelection in 2001 held out hopes that perhaps the 

process could be restarted with the election of George W. Bush and 

his Vice President, Dick Cheney. Cheney, as Chief Executive Offi cer 

of Halliburton prior to joining the administration, had given several 

speeches questioning the wisdom of continued sanctions against 

Iran. The real opportunity came after September 11, 2001, and the 

inevitability of a U.S. war in Afghanistan which would deeply affect 

Iran. Iran feared the Taliban and quietly was delighted at their 

overthrow. During that war, the Iranians did cooperate with the 

United States and were helpful in efforts to form the interim Afghan 

government at meetings in Bonn in December of that year. Again, it 

was clear that those elements in the Iranian government interested 

in better relations were using the Afghan war as an opportunity to 

reach out. However, at the same time, more revolutionary elements 

were increasing their strategic cooperation with terrorist groups 

in the Middle East, notably Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic 

Jihad, and, ultimately, the Palestinian Authority. The discovery of 

the Iranian arms heading for Palestine on the Karine-A merchant 

ship, poisoned all hopes for rapprochement in the early days of 

the Bush administration. In fact, it was following this incident that 

Iran was placed on the “axis of evil” and clearly put in the sights 

of America’s new policy on preemption. Iranian meddling in 

Afghanistan after the war did not help their case either. 

As it became clear in the summer and fall of 2002 that a crisis 

with Iraq, in one form or another, was inevitable, U.S. offi cials met 

secretly with Iranian counterparts to assure that, if there was a war 

with Iraq, Iran would play the same role it did during the fi rst Gulf 

War. From what is known of the record, Iran’s behavior during 

the Iraq War was relatively cooperative, but in the aftermath of the 

war it is clear that the charges of Iranian intervention have to be 

taken seriously. Again this refl ects a bitter debate in Iran about the 

wisdom of strategic rapprochement with the United States at this 

time. Reformers, by and large, see the fall of Saddam Hussein as 

an opportunity to open up to the administration, accept the reality 

of American power in the region, and move on to resolve the 

horrendous domestic problems they face. Alternatively, the hard-
109

liners see the American threat as more ominous than ever. Iranian 

strategic planners were not unhappy with the situation in Iraq prior 

to Saddam’s fall. He was, after all, contained by the United States 

and was placed under a strict international arms embargo. Iranians 

now worry that a new, strong Iraq will emerge which will clearly 

pose threats to them. 

Phase 4: Future Prospects for Cooperation.

The coming months will be some of the most critical in U.S.-

Iranian relations. The dramatic news that became public in the latter 

months of 2002 and confi rmed in February 2003, that Iran’s nuclear 

infrastructure was far more advanced than the public had been led to 

believe, puts the possibility of the Iranian bomb front and center and 

poses a most severe challenge to America. This, paralleled with the 

uncertainty in Iraq, means that sooner or later some confrontation 

with Iran over nuclear weapons, terrorism, and involvement in Iraq 

is inevitable unless the Iranians choose this moment to walk away 

from the Arab-Israeli confl ict, reign in their terrorism, and fi nd some 

way to fi nesse their nuclear program within the confi nes of the 

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

If Iran decides that the time has come for a political dialogue with 

Washington, the most diffi cult task will be to persuade its leaders 

that its security will be enhanced if it abandons terrorism and defers 

a nuclear weapons program. 

However, Iran will argue that it still lives in a nuclear 

neighborhood. Israel, Pakistan, and India will be presented as 

evidence of the nuclear asymmetries. So long as a dialogue focuses 

on these regional discrepancies, little progress is likely. Israel will not 

contemplate negotiating about its bomb until a generation of peace 

between itself and its neighbors has passed. Likewise, Pakistan will 

not forsake the bomb so long as India is perceived as a threat. India, 

always concerned about China, will not abandon its bomb until the 

United States, Russia, China, the U.K., and France do likewise. Thus, 

it is quite unrealistic for Iran to expect a nuclear quid pro quo for 

its own restraint. This is where carrots, as well as sticks, become 

important. If Iran ends military and fi nancial support to terrorist 
110

groups, signs the additional protocol of the NPT, and complies with 

the statutes of the Chemical Weapons Convention, real progress 

may be possible. The carrots could be considerable. The United 

States could help resolve bilateral issues, including the return of 

fi nancial assets held since the revolution and the end of executive 

and legislative trade sanctions. Under these circumstances the 

United States should be prepared to work with Iran in developing 

investment opportunities in the region, including energy projects.

If there is future regional cooperation, Iraq and Iran must 

participate. However, much will depend on the confi guration and 

policies of a new Iraqi regime and how much residual control will 

rest with the United States or UN occupation forces. Iran’s leaders 

will be very suspicious of the United States and its role in postwar 

Iraq, especially given the presence of a formidable U.S. military 

force. To convince them that the United States seeks cooperative 

security arrangements rather than coercive dominance will not be 

easy, especially since the two key U.S. demands of Iran--abandon 

terrorism and stop the nuclear weapons program--are linked in 

Iranian eyes to their national security.

Iran faces tough political choices with regard to its U.S. policy, 

but the Bush administration also needs to address Iran’s security 

needs if terror is stopped and the bomb put on hold. It is unrealistic 

to expect Iran to stop its missile program or slowdown the 

modernization of its conventional forces absent a new cooperative 

regional security environment. For it is not only weapons of mass 

destruction that determine security priorities. The future of the U.S. 

military presence in the Arab world and the size and confi guration 

of Iraq’s restructured armed forces will be key factors infl uencing 

Iranian perceptions. 

The coming months will be critical for U.S.-Iranian relations. The 

dramatic news that became public in the latter months of 2002 and 

was confi rmed in February 2003, that Iran’s nuclear infrastructure 

was far more advanced than the public had been led to believe, puts 

the possibility of the Iranian bomb front and center and poses a most 

severe challenge to the United States and to Middle East regional 

security and the global non-proliferation regime. This development, 

paralleled by the uncertainty over developments in Iraq, means that, 
111

sooner or later, some confrontation with Iran over nuclear weapons, 

terrorism, and involvement in Iraq is inevitable unless the Iranians 

choose to moderate their policy towards the Arab-Israeli confl ict, 

reign in their support for terrorism, and fi nd some way to fi nesse 

their nuclear program within the confi nes of the NPT.

The advanced status of the Iranian nuclear program has been 

revealed most explicitly in recent visits to the country by IAEA 

inspectors. It will soon be known whether or not Iran will comply 

with international pressures to sign the Additional Protocol to 

provide more transparency about its nuclear activities. Even if Iran 

takes this step, there will be many skeptics who will argue that such 

action will merely delay the day when Iran can get the bomb. The 

good news is that the international community, particularly the 

Europeans, Russians, and Japanese, now seem to share American 

concerns about what the Iranians are up to. 

By early 2003, the Russians and the Europeans were becoming as 

worried as the Americans about the Iranian nuclear program and, 

while the war in Iraq set cooperation back a pace, there is no doubt 

that the initiatives undertaken by the United States in probing the 

IAEA to be more assertive towards Iran has been reciprocated in 

Moscow and Brussels. This is a very positive development in view 

of the laidback European attitudes of the past and the formerly 

uncooperative behavior of Russia. It does suggest that by consistently 

dwelling on the problems posed by an Iranian bomb, the U.S. 

Government and U.S. nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have 

had an infl uence on the thinking of key partners. Whether or not 

this combination of pressure will affect the regime’s behavior is but 

one element in the debate about how to handle this dangerous and 

diffi cult problem. The other hope is that the Iranians themselves, as 

a result of rational and careful debate, will come to see that nuclear 

weapons do not serve their national interest even though they have 

incentives, and to some extent, the right to develop a self-suffi cient 

nuclear energy program. 

Thus, there may be a small window of time during which Iranian 

opinion can be infl uenced towards restraint. This outcome is by no 

means certain and will depend upon many contingencies, but it is 

surely worth making a determined effort to have constructive input 
112

into the Iranian debate. It is interesting to note that on another issue 

of importance to Iran, namely its policy towards Israel, the Iranian 

Parliament has become more open to questioning the dogma of the 

regime which has been to deny Israel’s right to exist and support 

groups that advocate the use of force against Israel. Now a number 

of senior Iranians, including members of Parliament, are asking the 

very fundamental question: how does a policy of confrontation with 

Israel serve Iranian national interests? Since this is one of the key 

issues that bedevil U.S.-Iranian relations, it is a fair question. The 

objective, therefore, of stimulating any debate in Iran about nuclear 

weapons must be to have Iranians ask the same question: How 

would the bomb serve our national interests? 

If Iran continues to refuse to have a formal offi cial dialogue 

with the United States to discuss each country’s concerns, the 

probabilities for dangerous encounters will increase. Iran will 

not kowtow publicly to American demands, especially in view of 

the diffi culties the United States continues to face in postwar Iraq. 

However if approached with a serious set of proposals, Iran’s leaders 

might rethink their agenda. The United States should explore the 

possibilities for better relations while continuing its message on 

terrorism and WMD. If this opportunity is missed, the likelihood of 

confrontation will increase and, at an indeterminate time, an Iranian 

bomb will materialize.
113

CHAPTER 7

THE CHALLENGES OF U.S. PREVENTIVE MILITARY ACTION

Michael Eisenstadt

For some U.S. policymakers and military planners, Israel’s 1981 

raid on Iraq’s Osiraq nuclear reactor may serve as an object lesson 

regarding the potential benefi ts of preventive military action against 

Iran’s nuclear program. Not widely appreciated is how risky and 

diffi cult the Osiraq raid was, and how the factors which ensured 

its success make attempting similar action against Iran’s nuclear 

facilities so challenging. U.S. preventive action against Iran’s nuclear 

program would necessarily bear little resemblance to the Osiraq 

raid, and the results would unlikely be as decisive and lasting.

The success of the Osiraq operation obscured diffi culties in 

planning and execution. The raid was the longest mission the Israeli 

Air Force had undertaken at that time. The strike package (eight F16s escorted by six F-15s) fl ew nearly the entire 2,000 km mission over 

hostile airspace, yet managed to achieve surprise. The F-16s were 

operating very close to their maximum unrefueled combat radius; 

had they been challenged by Jordanian, Saudi, or Iraqi aircraft, they 

would have lacked endurance to engage in evasive maneuver or 

sustained aerial combat. The raid on Osiraq pushed Israel’s air force 

to the very limits of its operational capabilities.1

Several factors contributed to the Israeli success in 1981:

• The Osiraq reactor―a highly visible and vulnerable target―

was the centerpiece of Iraq’s nuclear program, and its 

destruction set the effort several years back.2 Learning from 

this experience, Iraq subsequently dispersed and hid its 

nuclear infrastructure. Other proliferators―including Iran―

have since done the same.3
114

• Israel may have benefi ted from French aid in destroying 

Osiraq. French intelligence reportedly emplaced a homing 

beacon at Osiraq to help Israeli pilots locate the facility or 

target a critical underground structure there.4

• For Israel, Iraq was an enemy state that was pledged to its 

destruction. For Israeli cabinet members who voted in favor 

of the raid, the imperative to eliminate a perceived existential 

threat ultimately overshadowed countervailing political 

considerations.

• Iraq was at war with Iran at the time, and was thus constrained 

in its ability to strike back against Israel. Retaliation eventually 

took the form of an unsuccessful Iraqi attempt to strike the 

Israeli nuclear reactor at Dimona with missiles during the 

1991 Gulf War.

Many of the conditions that were conducive to success at Osiraq, 

however, do not apply to the case of U.S. preventive action against 

Iran’s nuclear program. In particular:

• Key elements of Iran’s nuclear program are dispersed and 

concealed. Accordingly, it would not be possible to disable 

Iran’s nuclear program by a single strike against a solitary 

facility; multiple simultaneous strikes against several sites 

would probably be required. 

• While foreign technicians and advisors have access to parts 

of the declared civilian nuclear program (notably the Bushehr 

power plant), facilities involved in any clandestine parallel 

program are almost certainly off-limits to foreigners.

• Though relations between Washington and Tehran are tense 

and occasionally hostile, the United States is interested in 

encouraging political change in Iran, and in improving 

relations with that country. Preventive action might 

complicate, if not undermine, these efforts.
115

• Iran could respond to a preventive strike by retaliating against 

U.S. interests in Iraq, the Persian Gulf region, or against the 

United States itself, by means of Iranian agents or associated 

terrorist groups such as the Lebanese Hizballah.

For these reasons, preventive action against Iran (whether covert 

action involving U.S. intelligence assets or overt military action 

by U.S. military forces) is a much more complicated proposition 

than the Israeli strike on Osiraq. Signifi cant intelligence and 

targeting challenges would have to be overcome, the potential for a 

nationalistic backlash in Iran and renewed tensions with U.S. allies 

would have to be managed, and Iranian retaliation would have to be 

deterred or disrupted. 

Nonetheless, prevention must be given serious consideration for 

a number of reason: it is unclear whether the diplomatic option that 

the United States is now pursuing will bear fruit; solutions may be 

found to the intelligence, targeting, political, and security challenges 

of preventive action against Iran; and by keeping this option on the 

table, the United States can use the threat of prevention as a spur to 

multilateral diplomacy. 

This chapter will thus assess the risks, challenges, and implications 

of prevention, assuming that the potential consequences of a nuclear 

Iran are suffi ciently grave to justify consideration of such a potentially 

perilous course of action. It will not, however, evaluate the risks of 

not taking preventive action or the implications of a nuclear Iran for taking preventive action or the implications of a nuclear Iran for 

U.S. interests, which is a necessary element of any net assessment of 

the pros and cons of preventive action, but beyond the scope of this 

chapter.5

IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM: A HARD TARGET

Bushehr: Part of the Nuclear Target Set.

Iran’s nuclear program has made steady progress. The power 

plant at Bushehr is fi nally approaching completion. According 

to Russian offi cials, Unit I at Bushehr may be completed by late 

2003 or early 2004, with the fi rst consignment of reactor fuel to be 
116

delivered during this timeframe.6 Problems have dogged Iran’s 

nuclear program from its inception. Russia originally undertook to 

complete Unit I by 1999, though technical and fi nancial problems 

caused repeated delays. It is conceivable that new technical snafus, a 

Russian decision to hold-up the shipment of reactor components or 

fuel, or teething problems during reactor startup, could further delay 

completion of the project. Iranian offi cials have indicated, however, 

that the successful completion of Unit I might lead to contracts for 

additional nuclear power plants at Bushehr and Ahvaz, providing a 

powerful incentive for continued Russian cooperation.

Bushehr provides Iran with two potential routes to “the Bomb”: 

low-enriched uranium fuel earmarked for Bushehr could be diverted 

and further enriched to weapons-grade material, or the reactor could 

be used to produce plutonium for weapons use. 

Though not ideally suited for the purpose, Bushehr could 

produce enough plutonium for dozens of nuclear weapons per year. 

If Tehran were willing to violate its Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 

(NPT) commitments or withdraw from the NPT, Iran could separate 

truly prodigious quantities (scores of bombs worth) of weapons- or 

reactor-grade plutonium annually―depending on fuel burn-up. 

Although reactor-grade plutonium is not ideal for bombmaking 

(Heat and radioactivity makes it diffi cult and dangerous to work 

with, while its isotopic composition makes for an ineffi cient and 

unreliable bomb in rather crude weapons designs.), the United 

States demonstrated the military utility of reactor-grade plutonium 

in a 1962 underground nuclear explosive test.7 Assuming that 

the Bushehr reactor comes on line in early 2004, Iran could start 

producing spent fuel containing plutonium by some time in 2005. 

Separation of plutonium from spent fuel and weaponization could 

take several months more, provided that Iran had the requisite 

know-how. Thus, Iran could conceivably produce a bomb using 

plutonium from Bushehr within three or four years.

Clandestine Fissile Material Production: Dispersed, Hardened, 

Hidden? 

In response to detailed allegations by an expatriate Iranian 

opposition group, Iran has acknowledged that it is building a heavy-
117

water production plant and plans to build a 40MWt natural uranium 

research reactor at Arak, and that it is constructing a gas-centrifuge 

plant at Natanz. The existence of these facilities, confi rmed by the 

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in a June 2003 report 

to its Board of Governors,8 and Iran’s prior failure to declare their 

existence, raises the troubling question of whether these facilities 

were formerly intended to be core elements of a clandestine weapons 

program.

Little is known about the natural uranium reactor that Iran plans 

to build at Arak, but Iranian offi cials have indicated that it will be 

a CANDU-type design intended for research purposes. 9 A typical 

40MWt research reactor could produce suffi cient plutonium for a 

few weapons a year. Construction of such a reactor usually takes 5-7 

years, so it will be some time before this reactor becomes a factor in 

Iran’s proliferation calculus.

The Iranian centrifuge program reportedly benefi ted from 

Pakistani help in the early 1990s (and perhaps more recently) and 

North Korean help in the late 1990s, and appears to have made 

steady progress.10 Iran is currently building a uranium conversion 

facility at Esfahan to produce uranium hexafl uoride feed-stock 

for its centrifuge program; Iranian offi cials claim that the plant is 

nearly ready to start operation. Moreover, a February 2003 IAEA 

visit revealed that Iran is producing gas centrifuges. (If it tested 

these using uranium hexafl uoride gas before commencing mass 

production―and it seems implausible that it would not have done 

so―it may have already broken its NPT commitments.) A visit to a 

facility at Natanz found a small pilot cascade of 160 centrifuges and 

parts for 1,000 more, in a facility large enough to accommodate 50,000 

centrifuges. The discovery of Natanz has raised questions about the 

possible existence of clandestine centrifuge cascades elsewhere in 

Iran.

More recently, the National Council for Resistance―the Iranian 

opposition group that fi rst revealed the existence of nuclear facilities 

at Arak and Natanz in August 2002―has claimed that such a pilot 

plant is located at Kalahdouz (about 14km west of Tehran) and that 

Iran is building a fuel-fabrication facility at Ardekan (about 30km 

northwest of Yazd, in central Iran)―presumably to service the fuel 

requirements of the Bushehr reactor.11
118

In sum, Iran appears well on the way to attaining all of the 

elements needed to produce large quantities of fi ssile material by 

either the plutonium or uranium-enrichment routes. Assuming 

all goes right for Iran, it could produce its fi rst nuclear weapon 

within three or four years. The window of opportunity for effective 

preventive action may well be better measured in months than in 

years.

North Korea: An Alternative Source of Fissile Material?

Over the past 2 decades, Iran has emerged as the premier 

customer for North Korean arms, missiles, and, more recently, 

nuclear technology. Were North Korea to reprocess its declared stock 

of spent fuel (it appears to have started doing so already), it could 

separate enough plutonium within a matter of months for fi ve to six 

nuclear weapons. Pyongyang might then opt to export some of that 

plutonium. Were North Korea to continue its uranium enrichment 

program, resume operation of its existing reactor, and complete 

work on two unfi nished reactors, it could be producing enough 

fi ssile material within 5 years for up to 50 nuclear weapons per 

year.12 Based on its record, there is reason to believe that Pyongyang 

might be willing to sell fi ssile material and weapon design data to 

proliferators in the Middle East and elsewhere. Thus, North Korea 

offers an alternative, nonindigenous route for the acquisition of 

fi ssile material by Iran.

THE CHALLENGES OF PREVENTION

Preventive action cannot stop a determined proliferator as far 

along as is Iran, though it could substantially delay Iran’s nuclear 

progress. The principal goal of U.S. action would be to delay Iran’s 

nuclear program long enough to allow for the possible emergence of 

new leadership in Tehran willing to either eschew nuclear weapons, 

freeze its nuclear program short of the production of fi ssile material, 

or act responsibly, should it acquire nuclear weapons. 
119

Intelligence Challenges.

The United States could pay a high price for preventive action, 

including an anti-American nationalist backlash in Iran, damage to 

its international standing, and the death of U.S. citizens targeted by 

Iranian retaliation. Accordingly, U.S. decisionmakers will have to 

feel reasonably confi dent that preventive action will signifi cantly 

delay Iran’s acquisition of its fi rst nuclear weapon by a number of 

years, before they could countenance such a course of action. Simply 

imposing human or material costs or causing modest delays will―

under most circumstances―not likely be considered a suffi ciently 

large payoff to justify the possible risks and costs involved. 

Such a cost/benefi t calculus will translate to exacting 

requirements for detailed, accurate, and complete intelligence 

regarding Iran’s nuclear program. Here, the U.S. track record is 

not particularly encouraging; for years, Iraq, North Korea, and 

most recently Iran, successfully hid large parts of their nuclear 

programs from the United States. Signifi cant intelligence gaps 

concerning Iran’s nuclear program may remain. The fact, however, 

that sensitive information about Iran’s nuclear program is fi nding 

its way to expatriate Iranian opposition groups indicates that there 

may be “leakers” in the program who might be willing to provide 

sensitive information to foreign intelligence services. The possibility 

that the United States could obtain actionable intelligence regarding 

Iran’s nuclear program should not be ruled out.

Technical Challenges.

The technical processes related to fi ssile material production 

create both vulnerabilities and challenges. Plutonium programs 

may be vulnerable to interdiction due to their reliance on large 

reactors that produce signifi cant signatures―though it may be 

possible to locate a plutonium production reactor underground to 

reduce prospects for detection and destruction.13 Destroying the 

reactor at Bushehr or the one planned for Arak might set back Iran’s 

plutonium program several years, provided Iran is not building or 

operating a clandestine plutonium production reactor elsewhere. 
120

While it would be preferable to target these prior to start-up to 

avoid exposing civilians downwind to fallout, there may be ways 

to disrupt operations or destroy the reactors after start-up without 

releasing radioactive material into the environment and creating a 

downwind hazard.

Centrifuge programs pose a more complex set of challenges. 

A large number of workshops and factories may be involved in 

producing and assembling centrifuges, and they can be widely 

dispersed and easily hidden. Centrifuge cascades have relatively 

low electrical power requirements (a tell-tale signature of other 

enrichment technologies), and can be housed in small, dispersed, 

nondescript facilities which would be diffi cult to detect by means 

of remote sensors, as well as in huge plants―such as the one at 

Natanz.14 If preventive action is to have a long-term impact, both 

centrifuge component production and gas centrifuge enrichment 

facilities would have to be destroyed, which may not be practically 

possible. The uranium conversion plant under construction at 

Esfahan is also a likely target. Destroying it could set back Iran’s 

centrifuge program several years―provided Iran does not possess a 

pilot plant or duplicate facility elsewhere. 

Political Challenges.

There seems to be broad support across political factions in Iran 

for the government’s efforts to acquire nuclear weapons.15 Thus, 

should the United States act preventively, it must do so in a way 

that ensures that such action does not poison the reservoir of proAmerican goodwill among young Iranians or derail the movement 

for political reform, thereby complicating efforts to encourage 

political change and improve U.S.-Iranian relations. In political 

terms, overt U.S. military action would entail the greatest risk. For 

this reason, the United States might fi rst consider other options, such 

as preventive action by allies, or covert action on its own.
121

OPTIONS FOR PREVENTIVE ACTION: ALLIED, COVERT, OR 

OVERT?

Allied (Israeli) Military Action. 

Other than Israel, few, if any, U.S. allies would be willing or able 

to carry out such an operation. However, Iran’s leaders (and many 

others in Iran and elsewhere) would tend to see an American hand 

behind an Israeli military operation, and Iran might be tempted to 

strike back in ways that would harm both Israel and the United 

States (e.g., by encouraging Palestinian or al-Qaida terrorism against 

Israeli or American targets, or goading the Lebanese Hizballah―with 

its thousands of katyusha rockets in southern Lebanon―to heat up 

the border with Israel). Israel, however, might be willing to accept 

these risks in order to deal with a perceived existential threat.

Covert U.S. Action. 

Covert action would probably be the most politically expedient 

way for the United States to disrupt Iran’s nuclear program. It might 

include one or more of the following measures, including:

• harassment or murder of key Iranian scientists or 

technicians;

• introduction of fatal design fl aws into critical reactor, 

centrifuge, or weapons components during their production, 

to ensure catastrophic failure during use;

• disruption or interdiction of key technology or material 

transfers through sabotage or covert military actions on land, 

in the air, or at sea;

• sabotage of critical facilities by U.S. intelligence assets, 

including third country nationals or Iranian agents with 

access to key facilities; 
122

• introduction of destructive viruses into Iranian computer 

systems controlling the production of components or the 

operation of facilities;

• damage or destruction of critical facilities through sabotage 

or direct action by U.S. special forces.

Some of these actions might have only a modest effect on Iran’s 

nuclear effort; others might have a signifi cant impact. Covert 

action could, however, reduce the risks of a political backlash and 

retaliation―since it might not be possible for Iranian authorities to 

determine, for instance, whether the death of a scientist was due to 

natural or unnatural causes, or whether damage to a critical facility 

was due to an industrial accident or sabotage. 

For covert action to succeed, the United States would have to 

disrupt both Iran’s plutonium and uranium-enrichment programs. 

This might require a sustained covert campaign entailing various 

actions―the assassination of key personnel, the recruitment of agents 

or saboteurs at key facilities, the subversion of critical computer 

networks, direct action operations against critical facilities, etc. Any 

one of these actions would be diffi cult enough to pull off; conducting 

a sustained campaign in which the United States maintained 

plausible deniability would be even harder. For this reason, covert 

action may have a role to play, but is unlikely to have a broad, longterm impact on Iran’s nuclear program.16

Overt U.S. Action.

Overt military action (e.g., cruise missile and/or air strikes) may 

offer the best hope for success. For political and operational security 

reasons, however, the United States would probably avoid staging 

from facilities in friendly Arab states in the region. (And most Arab 

states would probably prefer not to aid or abet such an operation, to 

avoid becoming a target for Iranian retaliation.) U.S. decisionmakers 

would probably prefer to go it alone, rather than approach regional 

partners with requests for access, basing, or overfl ight privileges that 

would likely yield only marginal military benefi ts, while possibly 
123

compromising the operation and straining relations with important 

friends and allies. 

Such a mission is likely to rely on naval platforms capable of 

launching Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles (TLAMS) and 

strike aircraft against targets in southern and central Iran, while Air 

Force B-52s and B-2 stealth bombers operating from the continental 

United States would likely be tasked to strike targets deep in Iran 

(e.g., near Tehran). Range would not be a problem, and providing 

they achieve surprise, U.S. forces would stand a good chance of 

avoiding losses at the hands of Iranian air defenses. Nearly all fi xed 

wing fi ghter aircraft in the U.S. Naval and Air Force inventory can 

deliver precision munitions, and the United States has a number 

of conventional penetrator munitions (such as the GBU-28 laserguided bomb and the AGM-86D Conventional Air-Launched Cruise 

Missile Block III) for use against hardened and/or buried facilities. 

(The Natanz centrifuge facility will reportedly be hardened and 

buried―protected by several meters of reinforced concrete and 

buried some 75 feet underground when completed.)17 There are, 

however, signifi cant challenges associated with the targeting of 

hardened, buried facilities.18

Overt action, however, is politically problematic. It could 

prompt an anti-American backlash among formerly friendly 

Iranians, strengthen the hand of hard-liners, and prompt the 

regime to retaliate against U.S. interests in the Gulf or elsewhere. 

For this reason, should overt military action be deemed necessary, 

Washington would be wise to make a serious effort to mitigate 

a possible backlash by explaining that its actions derived from a 

desire to prevent nuclear weapons from falling into the hands of the 

hard-liners who are loathed by many Iranians for their involvement 

in repression at home and terrorism abroad. This is a concern that 

many Iranians might understand―if not share. And through verbal 

and written warnings, military demonstrations, preventive arrests 

of Iranian agents, and other measures, the United States should take 

steps to deter and/or disrupt Iranian attempts to retaliate.
124

IRAN’S RETALIATORY CAPACITY

Should it choose to retaliate, Iran has several options: it could 

disrupt oil shipments from the Persian Gulf; attack U.S. Naval assets 

in the region; or engage in subversion and terrorism against U.S. 

allies and interests. 

Iran could disrupt oil exports and shipping in the Gulf. According 

to a recently published U.S. defense intelligence assessment, “Iran’s 

navy . . . could stem the fl ow of oil from the Gulf for brief periods 

by employing a layered force of diesel-powered KILO submarines, 

missile patrol boats, naval mines, and sea and shore-based antiship cruise missiles.”19 It is unclear, however, what Iranian policy 

objective would be served by this course of action: such a step would 

likely invite reprisals against Iran’s oil production infrastructure 

and exports via the Strait of Hormuz (which accounts for about 85 

percent of Iran’s foreign exchange earnings), causing grave harm to 

Iran’s economy, which is the clerical regime’s “Achilles’ heel.” This 

is an option of last resort for Iran, to be used only if denied the use of 

the strait, or if other vital interests were threatened.

Likewise, Iran could attack U.S. Naval assets in the Gulf, and 

in a surprise attack, it might succeed in infl icting painful losses on 

elements of the 5th Fleet (the Naval equivalent of a “sucker punch”). 

There can, however, be little doubt that the U.S. riposte would 

cripple or destroy Iran’s navy. This would likewise be a risky course 

of action for Iran.

Iran’s capacity for terror and subversion remains one of 

Tehran’s few levers in the event of a confrontation with the United 

States, since―barring the use of chemical or biological weapons―it 

otherwise lacks the ability to challenge the United States on anything 

near equal terms. In response to U.S. prevention, Iran might sponsor 

terrorism in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman―all of 

which host important U.S. military facilities―to sow fear among 

the Arab Gulf states and cause them to curb U.S. access to military 

facilities in the Gulf. And thanks to its ties to the Lebanese Hizballah 

(considered by U.S. offi cials as “the A-Team of terrorism”) and, 

more recently, its provision of safe haven and assistance to al-Qaida, 

it has the means to launch a bloody terrorist campaign against U.S. 

interests in several continents, and in the United States itself. 
125

Though neither Iran nor Hizballah are known to have directly 

targeted U.S. personnel or interests since the 1996 Khobar Towers 

bombing, Iran is keeping its options open: Iranian agents surveil U.S. 

personnel and installations from time to time, and Hizballah retains 

a signifi cant presence and support infrastructure in the United States 

that could be used to mount terrorist attacks on the United States.20

Moreover, U.S. offi cials recently claimed that al-Qaida offi cials in 

Iran were involved in the planning for the May 2003 bombings of 

three residential compounds in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, that killed 25 

(not including the nine bombers).21 Thanks to its ties to Hizballah 

and al-Qaida, as well as its own intelligence assets, Iran could inspire 

or initiate attacks on U.S. interests in the Middle East, Europe, South 

America, and in the United States, were it to decide to do so.

CONCLUSIONS

For a variety of reasons, the Israeli raid on Osiraq was a unique 

case, characterized by conditions that are unlikely to be replicated 

again elsewhere. Preventive action by the United States against Iran’s 

nuclear program today would have to contend with intelligence, 

military-technical, and political challenges more daunting than 

those faced by Israel in 1991.

Successful U.S. prevention would require exceptionally complete 

intelligence; near fl awless military execution; and deft post-strike 

diplomacy to mitigate an anti-American nationalist backlash, deter 

retaliation, and, most importantly, ensure that military action does 

not poison pro-American sentiment or derail the movement for 

political change in Iran. The complex, daunting, and somewhat 

contradictory nature of these challenges (e.g., successful prevention 

could harm short-term prospects for political change and complicate 

long-term prospects for rapprochement with a new Iran) only 

underscores the importance of exhausting diplomatic options before 

giving serious consideration to military action. 

Washington, moreover, must supplement these efforts with a 

serious push to halt North Korea’s nuclear program and to prevent 

North Korea from emerging as a nuclear supplier to Iran, lest North 

Korea obtain the means to undo the nonproliferation efforts of the 

international community in Iran. 
126

Nonetheless, preventive action must remain “on the table” as an 

option, both as a spur to diplomacy by the international community, 

and out of a recognition that there might arise certain circumstances 

in the future in which preventive action might become a viable 

option: should the United States obtain an intelligence windfall 

regarding Iran’s nuclear program that provides it with a complete 

and detailed picture of the program; should sabotage/covert 

action become possible as a result of the recruitment of well-placed 

agents; or should Iran be found responsible for encouraging or 

commissioning an act of anti-U.S. terrorism that results in signifi cant 

loss of U.S. life. Under such circumstances, the United States might 

be inclined to hit Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, as part of a broader 

retaliatory action against terrorist-related facilities in Iran.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 7

1. For more details, see Major General David Ivri, “The Attack on the Iraqi 

Nuclear Reactor: June 1981,” in The War Against Terror (Hebrew), Tel Aviv: 

Revivim, 1988, pp. 31-35.

2. The raid, however, failed to eliminate Iraq’s pool of scientifi c expertise, 

which was rechanneled into efforts to enrich uranium after the Osiraq raid. It 

also failed to destroy the highly enriched uranium (HEU) reactor fuel that Iraq 

later hoped to use in its crash program to build a nuclear weapon after it invaded 

Kuwait in 1990.

3. It should be noted that Iran knows about the vulnerability of nuclear 

reactors to air attack from direct experience. In September 1980, in the opening 

days of the Iran-Iraq War, it unsuccessfully attacked Iraq’s Osiraq reactor, and 

subsequently sustained several successful Iraqi attacks on the Bushehr nuclear 

power plant in 1985 and 1987. 

4. MidEast Mirror MidEast Mirror, January 24, 1991, p. 27; Khidhir Hamza, , January 24, 1991, p. 27; Khidhir Hamza, Saddam’s Bombmaker, 

New York: Scribner, 2000, pp. 129-130.

5. For more on the implications of a nuclear Iran, see Michael Eisenstadt, 

“Living with a Nuclear Iran?” Survival, Vol. 41, No. 3, Autumn 1999, pp. 124-148; 

and Kori N. Schake and Judith S. Yaphe, The Strategic Implications of a NuclearArmed Iran, Washington, DC: National Defense University, Institute for National 

Strategic Studies, 2001, McNair Paper No. 64.

6. Presumably, this will be contingent on Tehran agreeing to Moscow’s 

conditions for the transfer of the fuel, which are that Iran will: 1) return spent fuel 
127

to Russia for reprocessing, and 2) sign an additional protocol with the IAEA that 

will give the latter more effective and intrusive means to monitor Iran’s nuclear 

activities.

7. J. Carson Mark, “Reactor Grade Plutonium’s Explosive Properties,”, 

Washington, DC: Nuclear Control Institute, August 1990, 6 pp; Department of 

Energy Factsheet, “Additional Information Concerning Underground Nuclear 

Weapon Test of Reactor-Grade Plutonium,” at http://ccnr.org/plute_bomb.html; 

Harmon W. Hubbard, “Plutonium from Light Water Reactors as Nuclear Weapon 

Material,” April 2003, at http://www.npec-web.org/projects/hubbard.pdf.

8. Director General of the IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement 

in the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2003/40, June 6, 2003.

9. Mark Hibbs, “AEOI President Told IAEA Last Week Iran Aims to Construct 

CANDU PHWRs,” Nuclear Fuel, May 12, 2003, p. 19.

10. Mark Hibbs, “U.S. Concluded by Early 1990s Iran Bought Centrifuge 

Know-How,” Nuclear Fuel, February 3, 2003, p. 3; Mark Hibbs, “Iran Obtained 

Enrichment Know-How from Pakistan, Intelligence Says,” Nucleonics Week, 

January 16, 2003, pp. 1, 12; Mark Hibbs, “Pakistan Believed Design Data Source 

for Centrifuges to Be Built by Iran,” Nuclear Fuel, January 20, 2003, pp. 1, 14-16; 

Douglas Frantz, “Iran Closes in on Ability to Build a Nuclear Bomb,” Los Angeles 

Times, August 4, 2003, p. A1.

11. AP, “Iran Sites Linked to Weapons,” The Washington Post, July 9, 2003, p. 

A23.

12. Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, “Beyond the Agreed 

Framework: The DPRK’s Projected Atomic Bomb Making Capabilities, 2002-09,” 

December 3, 2002, at www.npec-web.org/projects/fi ssile2.htm.

13. It is worth noting that after the destruction of Osiraq, Iraq investigated 

the possibility of building a nuclear power plant underground―as a protective 

measure―and Belgian, French, Finnish, Italian, and Soviet companies were asked 

to assess the viability of such a project. Iraq allegedly abandoned this approach in 

1983 after determining that the costs of going underground were “astronomical.” 

S/26333, “Consolidated Report on the Twentieth and Twenty-First IAEA On-Site 

Inspections in Iraq Under Security Council Resolution 687, 1991),” August 20, 1993, 

p. 14. Iraq, however, apparently approached China shortly thereafter regarding 

the purchase of an above-ground nuclear power plant. According to a declassifi ed 

U.S. Army document, principle considerations relating to site selection for such a 

reactor included―not surprisingly― “defensibility . . . from possible attacks” and 

“ability to camoufl age from satellites.” Michael Knapik, “U.S. Document Says 

China Studied Building Iraq a Power Reactor,” Nucleonics Week, July 4, 1991.
128

14. On the challenges of detecting clandestine nuclear facilities and activities 

by technical means, see Anthony Fainberg, Strengthening IAEA Safeguards: Lessons 

from Iraq, Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University, 

April 1993, pp. 20-41.

15. Karl Vick, “Iranians Assert Right to Nuclear Weapons: Issue Unites 

Conservatives, Reformers,” The Washington Post, March 11, 2003, p. A16.

16. Here, it is worth noting that Israel is believed to have undertaken a series 

of covert operations against Iraq’s nuclear program prior to the strike on Osiraq. 

These actions included the destruction of the Osiraq reactor’s core by saboteurs as 

it awaited shipment from the French port of La Seine-sur-Mer near Toulon in April 

1979, and the murder in Europe of an Egyptian-born scientist and several Iraqi 

scientists associated with the nuclear program the following year. Ultimately, 

covert action did not obviate the need for overt military action to take out the 

Osiraq reactor.

17. David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, “Iran: Furor Over Fuel,” 

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 2003, Vol. 59, No. 3, pp. 12-15, at http:

//www.thebulletin.org/issues/2003/mj03/mj03albright.html.

18. See, for instance: Clifford Beal, Mark Hewish, and Leland Ness, “Hard 

Target Attack: Forging a Better Hammer,” International Defense Review, Vol. 29, 

July 1996, pp. 32-38; Lieutenant Colonel Eric M. Sepp, Deeply Buried Facilities: 

Implications for Military Operations, Air War College Center for Strategy and 

Technology Occasional Paper No. 14, May 2000, at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/

awcgate/cst/csat14.pdf.

19. Prepared testimony on the “Global Threat” by Vice Admiral Lowell E. 

Jacoby, USN, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, before the Senate Select 

Committee on Intelligence, February 11, 2003, and the Senate Armed Services 

Committee, February 12, 2003. 

20. Statement of Robert S. Mueller III, Director, Federal Bureau of 

Investigation, before the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 

11, 2003, at: www.usembassy.it/fi le2003_02/alia/A3021103.htm.

21. Dana Priest and Susan Schmidt, “Al-Qaida Figure Tied to Riyadh Blasts; 

U.S. Offi cials Say Leader is in Iran with Other Terrorists,” The Washington Post, 

May 18, 2003, p. A1.
129

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

GENEIVE ABDO has reported from numerous Islamic countries 

for a decade. She is currently the religion writer of the Chicago 

Tribune. Before that, she worked for the Boston Globe and was the 

correspondent in Iran for The Guardian and a frequent contributor to 

The Economist and the and the International Herald Tribune. She is the author 

of No God but God: Egypt and the Triumph of Islam (Oxford University 

Press, 2000) and most recently, with Jonathan Lyons, of Answering 

Only to God: Faith and Freedom in Twenty-First-Century Iran (New 

York: Henry Holt Company, 2003). 

PATRICK CLAWSON is deputy director of the Washington Institute 

for Near East Policy and senior editor of Middle East Quarterly. He 

has published numerous scholarly articles on the Middle East in 

Foreign Affairs, International Economy, Oxford Bulletin of Economics 

and Statistics and Middle East Journal. Also, he has published opinion 

articles in the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, and Washington 

Post. Mr. Clawson was co-convenor of the Presidential Study 

Group organized by The Washington Institute, which published 

its recommendations to the new Bush administration in the form 

of a monograph, Navigating Through Turbulence: America and the 

Middle East in a New Century (The Washington Institute, 2001). His 

most recent authored and edited works include: How to Build a New 

Iraq after Saddam, editor (The Washington Institute, 2003) and The 

Last Arab-Israeli Battlefi eld? Implications of an Israeli Withdrawal from 

Lebanon, co-editor (The Washington Institute, 2000).

MICHAEL EISENSTADT is a senior fellow at The Washington 

Institute. He is a specialist in Persian Gulf and Arab-Israeli security 

affairs and has published on U.S. strategy in the Middle East, regional 

security, nonconventional weapons proliferation in the Near East and 

Southwest Asia, and the armed forces of Iraq, Iran, Syria, Israel, and 

the Palestinian Authority. His recent publications include U.S. Policy 

in Post-Saddam Iraq: Lessons from the British Experience, 1914-1948,

co-edited with Eric Mathewson (The Washington Institute, 2003), 

The Last Arab-Israeli Battlefi eld? Implications of an Israeli Withdrawal 
130

from Lebanon, co-edited with Patrick Clawson (The Washington 

Institute, 2000). Mr. Eisenstadt is a reserve offi cer in the U.S. Army. 

He served in 1991 in Operation Provide Comfort, and more recently 

at the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), on the Joint 

Staff, and in the Offi ce of the Secretary of Defense during Operation 

ENDURING FREEDOM and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. 

VICTOR GILINSKY is an independent energy consultant 

and former Nuclear Regulatory Commissioner under Presidents 

Ford, Carter, and Reagan. He has been active on proliferation 

issues for many years, going back to his early work at RAND in 

Santa Monica, California. In 1971 he moved to the Atomic Energy 

Commission in Washington, DC, where he was Assistant Director 

for Policy and Program Review. From 1973 to 1975, he was head 

of the RAND Physical Sciences Department. From 1975 to 1984, 

he served on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, having been 

appointed by President Gerald Ford and reappointed by President 

Jimmy Carter. During his NRC tenure, Dr. Gilinsky was heavily 

involved in nuclear-export issues. In 1982 he received Caltech’s 

Distinguished Alumnus Award. He has a Ph.D. in physics from the 

California Institute of Technology.

GEOFFREY KEMP is the Director of Regional Strategic Programs 

at the Nixon Center. He served in the White House during the fi rst 

Reagan administration and was Special Assistant to the President 

for National Security Affairs and Senior Director for Near East and 

South Asian Affairs on the National Security Council Staff. Prior to 

his current position, Dr. Kemp was a Senior Associate at the Carnegie 

Endowment for International Peace where he was Director of the 

Middle East Arms Control Project. In the 1970s he worked in the 

Defense Department in the Policy Planning and Program Analysis 

and Evaluation Offi ces and made major contributions to studies on 

U.S. security policy and options for Southwest Asia. In 1976, while 

working for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Dr. Kemp 

prepared a widely publicized report on U.S. Military Sales to Iran. 

His most recent publication is “Stopping the Iranian Bomb” which 

appeared in the Summer 2003 edition of The National Interest. Dr. 
131

Kemp received his Ph.D. in political science at M.I.T., and his M.A. 

and B.A. degrees from Oxford University.

ABBAS WILLIAM SAMII is the senior regional analyst for 

Southwest Asia at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, where he 

prepares the weekly Iran Report, examining politics, terrorism, 

military affairs, economics, and social developments. He also covers 

Iraq and Afghanistan. Dr. Samii’s publications include “The Security 

Relationship Between Lebanon And Pre-Revolutionary Iran,” in 

Distant Relations: Iran and Lebanon in the Last 500 Years, Houchang 

Chehabi and Hassan Mniemnieh, eds. (I. B. Tauris, 2003), and “The 

Internal Struggle Over Iran’s Future,” in The Region at the Center of 

the World: Crises and Quandaries in the Contemporary Persian Gulf, 

Barry Rubin, ed. (London: Frank Cass, 2002). His work has appeared 

in Middle East Journal, Middle East Policy, The Weekly Standard, and 

Wall Street Journal Europe. Dr. Samii received his Ph.D. from the 

University of Cambridge and was a Fulbright Scholar.

S. ROB SOBHANI is the President of Caspian Energy Consulting. He 

consults with various agencies of the U.S. Government and members 

of the U.S. Congress on American foreign policy as well as with 

private organizations on developing and implementing strategies 

for development in the Middle East and Caspian Sea region. He 

serves as an adjunct professor at Georgetown University. Dr. 

Sobhani has previously worked for the U.S. Agency for International 

Development and for former Congresswoman Connie Morella (RMD). He is a regular contributor to national print media on U.S. 

domestic and foreign policy issues, and a frequent commentator 

on U.S. and international television and radio networks. Dr. 

Sobhani received his Ph.D. in political economy from Georgetown 

University. 

HENRY SOKOLSKI is the Executive Director of the Nonproliferation 

Policy Education Center, a Washington-based nonprofi t organization 

founded in l994 to promote a better understanding of strategic 

weapons proliferation issues for academics, policy makers, and the 

media. He served from 1989 to 1993 as Deputy for Nonproliferation 

Policy in the Offi ce of the Secretary of Defense and earlier in the 
132

Offi ce of Net Assessment and as a legislative military aide in the 

U.S. Senate. Mr. Sokolski has authored and edited a number of 

works on proliferation related issues including, Best of Intentions: 

America’s Campaign Against Strategic Weapons Proliferation (Westport, 

CT: Praeger, 2001).