## NUMBER 13 - 2 0 - 00 4 2 1 - C V 

## COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI

– EDINBURG

ALFONSO M. PRADO, M.D., MIGUEL A. DELEON, M.D., EUMING CHONG, M.D., JIE GUO, M.D., VALLIER C. OJADI, M.D., AND NEONATOLOGY CONSULTANTS OF CORPUS CHRISTI, PLLC , Appellant s ,
v. FELIX MOYA AND SERENE LEE BARRAGAN, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS NEXT FRIENDS OF X.X., A MINOR , Appellee s .

On appeal from the 105th District Court of Nueces C ounty, Texas.



## MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Longoria and Tijerina

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Tijerina Appellant s Alfonso M. Prado, M.D., Miguel A. DeLeon, M.D., Euming Chong, M.D.,2

Jie Guo, M.D., Vallier C. Ojadi, M.D., and Neonatology Consultants of Corpus Christi, PLLC , attempted to appeal an order denying their objections to the expert report of William D. Rhine, M.D. This Court advised appellants that the order made the basis of the appeal was not a n a ppealable order

. The appellants have now filed a “First Amended
Motio n for Nonsuit Without Prejudice Pending Appealable Interlocutory Order.” They
assert that the y have filed an appropriate order with the trial court and , once that order
has been signed, there will be an appealable interlocutory judgment. The appellants state that they no longer wish to pursue th is current appeal , and request that we dismiss the appeal without prejudice

. Appellee s , Felix Moya and Serena Barragan, individually and as next friends of X.X., a minor, have filed a response to this motion through which they assert that (1) a “nonsuit” is not an available remedy for appellants, (2) appellants have not followed th is Court’s directive to correct the jurisdictional defect regarding this appeal, and (3) dismissal of th is “ improper and improvident” appeal is appropriate under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 42.3. The Texas Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed that we examine the substance of a motion to determine the relief sought, not merely the form or title of a pleading. In re Interest of J.Z.P. , 484 S.W.3d 924, 925 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam) ; see Ryland Enter., Inc. v. Weatherspoon , 355 S.W.3d 664, 666 (Tex. 2011 ) (per curiam) (stating that “courts should acknowledge the substance of the relief sought despite the formal styling of the pleading” ) ; State Bar of Tex. v. Heard , 603 S.W.2d 829, 833 (Tex. 1980) (“We look to the substance of a plea for relief to determin e the nature of the pleading, not merely at the3

form of title given to it.”). Accordingly, t he Court , having examined and fully considered
the “First Amended Motion for Nonsuit Without Prejudice Pending Appealable Interlocutory Order” and the response ther eto, is of the opinion that the appellants’ motion
should be construed as a motion to dismiss. See In re Interest of J.Z.P. , 484 S.W.3d at
925 ; Ryland Enter., Inc. , 355 S.W.3d at 666; State Bar of Tex. , 603 S.W.2d at 833

. Thus ,
we are of the opinion that the motion should be granted as construed

. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 42.1(a)(1) (allowing the court to “dismiss the appeal or affirm the appealed judgment or order unless such disposition would prevent a party from seeking relief to which it would otherwise be entitled”)

. W e grant the motion to dismiss , and we dismiss the appeal. C osts will be taxed against the appellant s

. See id . R. 42.1(d) (“Absent agreement of the parties, the court will tax costs against the appellant.”)

. Having dismissed the appeal at the appellants ’ request, no motion for rehearing will be entertained, and our mandate will issue forthwith. JAIME TIJERINA Justice

Delivered and filed on the 1 st day of April , 202 1

.