FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

Washington, DC 20463

MEMORANDUM

TO:

FROM:

DATE:

SUBJECT: 

The Commission 

Office of the Commission Secretary VFV

November 30, 2022

Comment Regarding AOR 2022-24 (Allen Blue) from

Brendan Fischer

Attached is a comment received from Brendan Fischer. This 

matter is on the December 1, 2022 Open Meeting Agenda.

Attachment
Federal Election Commission 

1050 First Street, NE 

Washington, DC 20463 

ao@fec.gov

RE: Comment on Advisory Opinion Request 2022-24 (Allen Blue)

I write in my personal capacity to comment on the two drafts regarding Advisory 

Opinion Request 2022-24 (Allen Blue). Specifically, this comment addresses how 

contributions from an irrevocable trust should be attributed. The Commission has 

long treated contributions from analogous trusts as attributable to the individual or 

individuals who actually provided the funds, and it should do so here as well. 

The requester, Mr. Blue, seeks to establish an irrevocable trust during his lifetime 

that would make contributions to candidates, political committees, and other 

recipients.1 The trust would make contributions to designated recipients, such as 

the Democratic nominee in a particular district or state, and also make 

contributions according to broader standards, such as supporting “candidates and 

committees that further Mr. Blue’s support for progressive candidates.”2 Among 

other things, Mr. Blue asks how such contributions should be attributed.3

Draft A correctly concludes that any contribution made by the trust, and financed 

by Mr. Blue, be attributed to both the trust and to Mr. Blue. Such a conclusion is 

consistent with past Commission guidance and protects the public’s right to know 

where political money is coming from.

Over decades of Advisory Opinions, the Commission has concluded that the 

testamentary estate of a donor is the successor legal entity to the individual donor, 

and as such, the trust’s contributions are considered contributions from the 

individual who provided the funds, with the trust sharing the individual’s 

contribution limit.4

As the Commission explained in Advisory Opinion 2004-02 (NCEC), when a political 

committee reports contributions made by such a testamentary trust, the committee 

must disclose the name of “both the trust and the name of the decedent.”5

1 AOR at 1. 

2 AOR at 2. 

3 AOR at 3, 5. 4 See, e.g., AO 2015-05 (Shaber), AO 2004-02 (NCEC), AO 1999-14 (Council for a Livable World).

5 AO 2004-02 (NCEC) at 3.
2

Contributions from other testamentary trusts have similarly been attributed to the 

decedent who provided the funds.6

Although the trust proposed by Mr. Blue is not a testamentary trust because it 

would be funded and active during his lifetime, both Drafts A and B recognize that 

the same principles apply to the trust at issue in this request.7

Consistent with prior Commission precedent, both Drafts A and B correctly 

conclude that “the limits that apply to a contribution by the proposed trust to a 

candidate or political committee are those that would apply to Mr. Blue (whether he 

is living or deceased at the time of the contribution) at the time that the trust 

relinquishes control of the funds to the ultimate recipient political committee or 

candidate.”8

However, the drafts diverge as to how such a contribution should be attributed. 

Draft A correctly concludes that all contributions from the trust be attributed to 

both the trust and to Mr. Blue.9 Draft B, in contrast, concludes that only 

contributions to “designated recipients based on objective criteria set forth in the 

trust instrument” be attributed to both the trust and to Mr. Blue, whereas 

contributions made pursuant to “discretionary standards” in the trust document be 

attributed only to the trust.10

If the Commission were to adopt Draft B, it could lead to the odd result where a 

donor transfers funds to a trust, and shares a contribution limit with that trust, but 

contributions from the trust might be attributed exclusively to the trust, rather 

than to the actual source of the funds.

Of greater concern is that Draft B could open a new dark money loophole whereby

donors might funnel money through trusts to candidates, political parties, and 

super PACs while keeping their names off of FEC reports.11

6 See, e.g., Libertarian National Committee, 2020 February Monthly Report at 52, FEC Form 3X 

(filed Feb. 20, 2020), https://docquery.fec.gov/cgi-bin/fecimg/?202002209186907419 (bequested 

contribution from requester in AO 2015-05 attributed to the decedent).

7 Draft A at 5-6, Draft B at 5-6.

8 Draft A at 10, Draft B at 11.

9 Draft A at 6-9.

10 Draft B at 6-10. I concur with comments from Campaign Legal Center that a trust contribution 

should also be attributed to trustees when they exercise discretion over the recipient. However, in 

every instance, a contribution made by such a trust should also be attributed to the donor who

provided the funds, and with whom the trust shares a contribution limit.

11 Under Draft B, a donor would have to give a trustee “discretionary standards” in order to secretly 

finance candidates and political committees, but this provides little solace. Under Draft B, if a donor 

directed a trustee to, say, “support candidates who support a deregulated cryptocurrency market,” 

the donor could potentially buy substantial influence while keeping the public in the dark. Such a 

concern is not unfounded. See Marco Quiroz-Gutierrez, Sam Bankman-Fried says he donated just as 
3

In many states, trusts are shielded by financial secrecy laws that prohibit the public 

from knowing where the funds originally came from. Indeed, the 2021 Pandora 

Papers leak revealed how trusts in U.S. states like South Dakota are harboring 

billions of dollars of “offshore” wealth in the name of foreign government officials 

and kleptocrats.12

If a contribution is made in the name of a trust without attribution to the true 

donor, voters would often have no ability to identify where the money had come 

from, or who had directed it. Very often, a voter could only identify that a trust was 

registered by a generic registered agent in a state like Delaware or South Dakota.13

As a result, voters would be deprived of information about who is financing 

candidates or seeking to influence their vote.

I respectfully ask the Commission to adopt Draft A’s requirement that any 

contribution made by the trust, and financed by Mr. Blue, be attributed to both the 

trust and to Mr. Blue.

Respectfully submitted, 

Brendan Fischer

many millions to Republicans as Democrats, but didn’t publicize it because reporters would ‘freak the 

f–k out’, FORTUNE (Nov. 29, 2022), https://fortune.com/crypto/2022/11/29/sam-bankman-friedpolitical-donations-democrats-republicans-dark-money/. 

12 See, e.g, Debbie Cenziper, Will Fitzgibbon & Salwan Georges, Foreign Money Secretly Floods U.S. 

Tax Havens. Some of It Is Tainted., WASH. POST (Oct. 4, 2021), 

https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/interactive/2021/booming-us-tax-haven-industry/; David 

Pegg & Dominic Rushe, Pandora Papers Reveal South Dakota’s Role as $367Bn Tax Haven, 

GUARDIAN (Oct. 4, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/news/2021/oct/04/pandora-papers-revealsouth-dakotas-role-as-367bn-tax-haven. 13 See, e.g., Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy, Delaware: An Onshore Tax Haven (Dec. 10, 

2015), https://itep.org/delaware-an-onshore-tax-haven/.