SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1887-19

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v. 

CHINAZA D. OKEKE,

Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________

Argued September 29, 2021 – Decided March 18, 2022

Before Judges Fuentes, Gilson, and Gummer.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 17-11-3255. 

Michele E. Friedman, Assistant Deputy Public 

Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. 

Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Michele E. 

Friedman, of counsel and on the briefs). 

Matthew E. Hanley, Special Deputy Attorney 

General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause 

for respondent (Theodore N. Stephens II, Acting Essex 

County Prosecutor; attorney; Matthew E. Hanley, of 

counsel and on the briefs).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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A-1887-19

PER CURIAM

In connection with an incident involving his former girlfriend, a jury 

convicted defendant Chinaza Okeke of third-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 

2C:12-1(b)(12), and acquitted him of third-degree terroristic threats, N.J.S.A. 

2C:12-3(a). He was sentenced to two years of probation. 

Defendant appeals, arguing that during the trial repeated references were 

made to a temporary restraining order (TRO) that the victim had obtained 

against him. All three witnesses who testified at trial were asked about and 

discussed the TRO. Defense counsel and the prosecutor also referenced the 

TRO in their closing arguments. Even though defendant did not object to the 

testimony or arguments about the TRO, the trial court should have given curative 

instructions. Because the trial court failed to give those instructions, we are 

constrained to hold that the repeated inadmissible references to the TRO 

constituted plain error and deprived defendant of a fair trial. We vacate his 

conviction and remand this matter.
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I.

Defendant was convicted following a jury trial involving two days of 

testimony and evidence.1 Three witnesses testified: the former girlfriend, E.E. 

(Erica),2a police officer, and defendant. 

Erica testified that she had dated defendant for about six months before 

the incident. She explained that she would occasionally stay at defendant's 

apartment, and she kept certain personal items there, including clothing and her 

computer. According to Erica, on the evening of May 10, 2017, she told 

defendant she was breaking up with him and that she would be leaving the next 

morning. She then packed her belongings, placed them by the door, and slept 

on the couch.

The next morning, defendant woke Erica, wanting to talk about their 

conversation the previous night. When Erica responded that they could talk 

when she completely woke up, defendant poured a bottle of water on her and 

threw the bottle at her. Erica then got up, and defendant began going through 

1 While there were several other days of trial, the testimony and evidence were

presented on only two days and the other days involved jury selection and 

delivery of the jury verdict.

2 We use initials and a fictitious name for the victim to protect her privacy 

interests. See R. 1:38-3(c)(12).
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her belongings. When she pulled defendant's hand away from her clothes, 

defendant started punching her. Erica retreated, but defendant continued to 

punch her as she laid "cuddled" up on the floor. Erica explained that defendant 

then walked away, grabbed her cell phone, and went into the kitchen. She took 

that opportunity to run out of the apartment, she encountered the building's 

superintendent, and the police were called. When the police arrived, they 

retrieved her cell phone and took Erica to the police station so that she could 

make a statement. Thereafter, Erica was taken to the hospital where she was 

treated for a fractured nose. 

On her direct examination, the prosecutor asked Erica about obtaining a 

TRO. The prosecutor and Erica had the following exchange:

[Prosecutor:] And when you went to the police 

precinct, did the police offer you—say if you would 

wish to get a temporary restraining order?

[Erica:] Yes, but I was in pain at the point, so I asked 

them if I could do it when I come back from the 

hospital. They agreed.

[Prosecutor:] And so did you get a temporary 

restraining order immediately at the police precinct that 

day?

[Erica:] No. When I got back from the hospital, so I 

came the next day to do it.
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Defense counsel did not object. Instead, on cross-examination, defense 

counsel questioned Erica about the TRO:

[Defense counsel:] Now you—you said you did not get 

a restraining order when you were at the police station?

[Erica:] No.

[Defense counsel:] You said you were in too much 

pain?

[Erica:] Yes.

[Defense counsel:] But you eventually did get a 

restraining order?

[Erica:] Yes.

[Defense counsel:] And didn't you drop the restraining 

order?

[Erica:] No.

[Defense counsel:] It's still in effect?

[Erica:] Yes.

[Defense counsel:] You didn't drop it and have it 

dismissed?

[Erica:] No.

[Defense counsel:] And basically tell the judge that you 

weren't afraid of him?

[Erica:] No. I never told the judge I wasn't afraid of 

him.
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. . . .

[Defense counsel:] Now[,] did you have a restraining 

order out of [] County?

[Erica:] Yes.

[Defense counsel:] And I'm going to show you what's 

been marked D-1. Are you able to identify that 

document?

[Erica:] Yes.

[Defense counsel:] And what is that document?

[Erica:] It says that it was dismissed.

[Defense counsel:] The restraining order.

[Erica:] Yes.

At that point, the State objected, and the trial court sustained the objection. 

The record is not clear whether the order dismissing the restraining order was 

entered into evidence. Defense counsel, however, continued to question Erica 

about the TRO:

[Defense counsel:] And you do remember the police 

asking you if you wanted a temporary restraining order, 

correct?

[Erica:] Yes.

[Defense counsel:] And wasn't your response to them 

that you'll just stay away from him, that you don't need 

a restraining order? Isn't that what you told the police?
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[Erica:] No. I said I would come back in to make one.

[Defense counsel:] So it's your testimony that you did 

not say that you would just stay away from him, that 

you didn't need a restraining order, correct?

[Erica:] No. I said I would come back in to make one.

Defense counsel then shifted his focus and began to ask Erica about a 

computer. The following exchange was heard by the jury:

[Defense counsel:] Now[,] as far as the computer, isn't 

it true that [defendant] bought that computer for you?

[Erica:] Yes.

[Prosecutor:] Objection, your Honor. There has been 

no reference to any computer before and I don't see how 

it's relevant to the facts at issue in this case.

[The Court:] Well, I'll overrule the objection, but this 

case is not about what [defendant] bought for [Erica], 

it's about allegations of evil[], not about buying things. 

You asked a lot of questions about that. Please stay 

away from it.

On redirect, the prosecutor asked additional questions concerning the 

TRO:

[Prosecutor:] As far as the TRO. You applied for a 

TRO. Is that right?

[The Court:] Do you know what a TRO—a TRO is?

[Erica:] No.
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[The Court:] Do you know what that is?

[Prosecutor:] It's a temporary restraining order.

[Erica:] Yeah.

. . . .

[The Court:] The jurors may not know either.

[Prosecutor:] Did you apply for a temporary restraining 

order?

[Erica:] Not on the day of.

[Prosecutor:] But you [did].

[Erica:] Yes.

[Prosecutor:] And was that restraining order granted?

[Erica:] I really can't remember, but, yes, I think it was, 

yeah.

The State then called Police Officer Joseph Lane, who was one of the 

officers who responded to defendant's apartment building and met with Erica. 

During his direct testimony, the State questioned the officer about the TRO:

[Prosecutor:] And what was the alleged victim's 

decision regarding a TRO?

[Officer:] She said that she didn't want one at this time.

[The Court:] What's a TRO?

[Officer:] TRO, a temporary restraining order, sir.
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[Prosecutor:] And are you aware she obtained a TRO 

after the—

[Defense counsel:] Objection.

[The Court:] Overruled. If you know whether she 

obtained—of your own knowledge whether she 

obtained a temporary restraining order afterwards, you 

can tell us. If you don't know, tell us you don't know.

[Officer:] I don't know.

On cross-examination, defense counsel asked the officer if Erica had told 

him that she did not need a TRO and that she would stay away from defendant. 

The officer responded that Erica had said she did not want a TRO at the time 

that she was at the station, and he did not recall Erica stating that she did not

need one.

When defendant testified, he offered a different version of events. 

According to defendant, he was home with Erica on the night before the police 

were called. He told her that he no longer wanted to be with her, and she began 

to pack her things. While packing, Erica took defendant's money and tried to 

put it in her bag. Defendant attempted to grab the money back and Erica began 

hitting and kicking him. Eventually, defendant pushed Erica out of the bedroom, 

closed the door, and went to bed.
10 A-1887-19

The next morning, defendant woke up and was surprised to find Erica 

sleeping on his couch. He asked her to talk about the events of the night before. 

They then began to argue, and he asked Erica to leave. When defendant 

attempted to retrieve his laptop and money, Erica kicked him and started to 

punch him. Defendant pushed Erica away, she threw mouthwash at him, and he 

tried to hold her back. Defendant went on to explain that he felt "like I needed 

to defend myself because if you—if you bring her right now, there's a mark here, 

she tried to stab me one day and it got hooked up[.]" At that point in his 

testimony, the State objected, and the court sustained that objection. Defendant 

then went on to testify that he had tried to calm Erica down, but she ran out of 

the apartment. Thereafter, the police arrived, and he was arrested and jailed.

On cross-examination, the State questioned defendant about the TRO:

[Prosecutor:] And you're aware that a temporary 

restraining order was filed against you, correct?

[Defendant:] Yes. No—not until—

[Prosecutor:] One was filed against you, correct?

[Defendant:] I don't know. She, like, I think two or 

four weeks later when I came to court, that's when she 

gave me the—

[Prosecutor:] You were served with the temporary 

restraining order, correct?
11 A-1887-19

[Defendant:] Yes. But not right—no, like a week or 

two, it was later.

The prosecutor then marked the temporary restraining order as an exhibit. 

He showed defendant the TRO and the following exchange took place:

[Prosecutor:] So a temporary restraining order had 

been filed and then you were later served with a 

continuance order. Is that correct?

[Defendant:] That's what I'm seeing here.

[Prosecutor:] And this was served to you in court, 

correct? By a sheriff officer?

[Defendant:] Yeah.

[Prosecutor:] And you're aware the restraining order 

expired, correct?

[Defendant:] Yes. I mean, she didn't show up in court, 

they dismissed it. They [gave] me the paper for 

dismissal.

[Prosecutor:] But you're also aware that there's a 

separate judicial order requiring that you have no 

contact with [Erica]. Is that correct?

[Defendant:] Yes.

The TRO was also discussed in closing arguments both by defense counsel 

and the prosecutor. During his closing arguments, defense counsel made the 

following remarks about the TRO:
12 A-1887-19

Now the other thing going to credibility, if she was 

really, really afraid of him, why would she not get a 

restraining order the second that she could. I mean, 

basically, she could have told the cops, yeah, I want a 

restraining order. It was that simple. But she's like, no, 

no, I'm—you know, I don't want one. And then they 

have this thing called a Domestic Violence Response 

Team. She refused to meet with them. So at this point, 

it doesn't look like that she's a victim, she looks like 

somebody who is, you know, basically, you know, had 

a fight with him, realized it was a fight and wanted to 

just move on.

And that's probably why she didn't show up for the final 

restraining order hearing because she—she wanted to 

be done with this. And frankly, [defendant] is fine with 

that. He wants to be done with her.

In his closing, the prosecutor made the following comments concerning 

the TRO:

Now there was all this stuff about the temporary 

restraining order. And that's—it's a side show. This 

case is about the terroristic threat and assault. But we 

know that she did obtain that temporary restraining 

order. She didn't obtain it immediately because she was 

injured. She was going to the hospital. She got it after 

the event and that's consistent with what the officer 

testified. He said her statement was ["]I don't want to 

get a temporary restraining order at this time.["] It was 

just obtained. The officer described the injuries that he 

saw, we saw the photos, it all lines up.

At no time during the trial did the court give the jury any instructions 

regarding the testimony and arguments concerning the TRO. After hearing the 
13 A-1887-19

evidence, the jury acquitted defendant of the charge of terroristic threats and 

convicted him of third-degree aggravated assault. Defendant now appeals from 

his judgment of conviction.

II.

On appeal, defendant makes three arguments, which he articulates as 

follows: 

POINT I - THE COURT'S FAILURE TO PROVIDE 

INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING THE ISSUANCE OF 

THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND 

THE JUDGE'S OWN STATEMENT THAT THE 

CASE INVOLVED ALLEGATIONS OF "EVILRY"

NECESSITATE REVERSAL OF THE SINGLE 

CONVICTION IN THIS CASE. (NOT RAISED 

BELOW)

A. The Court’s Failure to Issue a 

Limiting Instruction Regarding the 

Temporary Restraining Order Warrants 

Reversal of the Conviction.

B. The Jury’s Exposure to the Trial 

Judge’s Statement that the Case Was About 

"Allegations of Evil[]," In Conjunction 

With the Court’s Failure to Cure the 

Prejudice Exuding from this Error, 

Warrants Reversal.

C. The Cumulative Effect of the 

Instructional Errors Necessitates Reversal 

of [Defendant's] Conviction.

POINT II - THE COURT COMMITTED 

REVERSIBLE ERROR IN EXCLUDING THE 
14 A-1887-19

DEFENDANT'S TESTIMONY REGARDING THE 

VICTIM'S PRIOR VIOLENCE, WHICH WOULD 

HAVE SUPPORTED THE DEFENDANT'S CLAIM 

THAT HE ACTED IN SELF-DEFENSE.

POINT III - IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE 

JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION MUST BE 

AMENDED, SO AS TO REFLECT THE THIRDDEGREE OFFENSE. 

We hold it was plain error to allow testimony and arguments about the 

TRO and that error denied defendant a fair trial. We, therefore, vacate 

defendant's conviction and remand for further proceedings.

1. The Testimony and Arguments About the TRO.

Evidence that a restraining order has been issued against a defendant is

generally inadmissible in a criminal trial. State v. Chenique-Puey, 145 N.J. 334, 

343 (1996) (finding restraining order inadmissible in criminal trial except "for 

the limited purpose of impeaching the defendant's testimony" if defendant 

testifies). Evidence of a restraining order "suffer[s] from similar infirmities to 

those inherent in other-crimes evidence," State v. Vallejo, 198 N.J. 122, 133 

(2009), and "creates the inference that if a court found defendant guilty of 

domestic violence in a prior proceeding, that defendant is more likely guilty of 

the present [offense]." Chenique-Puey, 145 N.J. at 343; see also N.J.R.E. 404(b) 

(prohibiting evidence of other crimes or wrongs except for limited purposes); 
15 A-1887-19

State v. G.S., 145 N.J. 460, 468 (1996) (cautioning that other-crimes evidence 

risks "distract[ing] a jury from an independent consideration of the evidence that 

bears directly on guilt itself"). Further, admitting a restraining order can bolster 

a victim's testimony and unduly prejudice a defendant's right to a fair trial. See

Chenique-Puey, 145 N.J. at 343 (noting that a "jury could interpret the order as 

a judicial imprimatur on the victim's testimony").

Evidence of a restraining order issued in connection with the pending 

offense is even more harmful. Vallejo, 198 N.J. at 133-34. In that situation,

evidence of a restraining order impermissibly tells the jury that a judge had 

"found defendant guilty of domestic violence in this matter." Id. at 133. 

Accordingly, that evidence "not only foster[s] the suggestion that defendant [is]

guilty of that which was charged, but [tells] the jury that a judicial officer 

believed the victim, thus bolstering [his or] her credibility." Ibid.

When inadmissible evidence of a restraining order is presented to a jury, 

the trial court must give a curative instruction "to alleviate potential prejudice 

to a defendant," or defendant is entitled to reversal of his or her conviction. Id.

at 135. The instruction, moreover, must generally "be firm, clear, and 

accomplished without delay." Id. at 134; see also State v. Prall, 231 N.J. 567, 
16 A-1887-19

586 (2018) (explaining that "a curative instruction may sometimes be a 

sufficient remedy"). 

At defendant's trial, every witness who testified was questioned about the 

TRO. Credibility was a critical issue because Erica and defendant presented 

divergent descriptions of the incident. Consequently, testimony about the TRO 

was highly prejudicial because the jurors could have reasonably assumed that a 

judicial officer had reviewed the conduct at issue before them and concluded 

that Erica was credible. Vallejo, 198 N.J. at 133.

Just as critically, the trial court gave no curative instruction. The court 

gave no immediate instruction about the TRO when the references were made 

and no instruction about the TRO in the final charge.3 To the contrary, the 

comments by the trial court suggested that the jury should consider the TRO. 

Twice, the trial court clarified that a "TRO" was a temporary restraining order. 

The court's comments made it clear that it wanted the jury to understand what a 

TRO was.

The State accurately points out defendant did not object to the references 

to the TRO and did not request a curative instruction. Therefore, we review the 

3

 Because there are currently no model charges regarding refences to domestic 

violence restraining orders, we respectfully refer our opinion to the Model 

Criminal Jury Charges Committee for its consideration.
17 A-1887-19

improper references to the TRO for plain error. See R. 2:10-2. Under the plain 

error standard, we reverse if the error is "clearly capable of producing an unjust 

result." State v. Rose, 206 N.J. 141, 157 (2011) (quoting R. 2:10-2). 

All three witnesses testified within two days. The trial was a short trial,

like the trial in Vallejo. 198 N.J. at 124. Also, like Vallejo, the trial "was 

poisoned . . . by reference[s] to the domestic violence restraining order against 

[defendant]." Ibid. Unlike Vallejo, there was no curative instruction in 

defendant's trial. Consequently, the error here was even clearer than the plain 

error in Vallejo.

The error here was also not an invited error. When reviewing for plain 

error, "trial errors that 'were induced, encouraged or acquiesced in or consented 

to by defense counsel ordinarily are not a basis for reversal on appeal.'" State 

v. A.R., 213 N.J. 542, 561 (2013) (quoting State v. Corsaro, 107 N.J. 339, 345 

(1987)). A "defendant cannot beseech and request a trial court to take a certain 

course of action, and upon adoption by the court, take his [or her] chance on the 

outcome of the trial, and if unfavorable, then condemn the very procedure he [or 

she] sought and urged, claiming it to be error and prejudicial." State v. Jenkins, 

178 N.J. 347, 358 (2004) (quoting State v. Pontery, 19 N.J. 457, 471 (1955)).
18 A-1887-19

At defendant's trial, the inadmissible testimony concerning the TRO was 

first introduced by the State on the direct examination of Erica. Thereafter, 

defense counsel did question Erica about the TRO and even tried to use the delay 

in obtaining the TRO to undercut her credibility. Nevertheless, the defense 

tactic did not rise to the level of invited error or opening the door because the 

State already had introduced testimony concerning the inadmissible TRO. See

State v. Vandeweaghe, 177 N.J. 229, 238 (2003) (explaining that the openingthe-door doctrine has limits and cannot be used to inject prejudice into a trial). 

In summary, just as the Supreme Court did in Vallejo, we are constrained 

to reverse defendant's conviction and remand for further proceedings. Given 

that holding, we do not need to reach defendant's other arguments. Nevertheless, 

because we are remanding the matter, we add some limited guidance concerning 

those arguments.

2. Defendant's Other Arguments. 

At defendant's trial, the State moved to amend the charge of aggravated 

assault from a second-degree to a third-degree charge. Indeed, the State 

concedes that the judgment of conviction incorrectly stated that defendant was 

convicted of a second-degree charge. On remand, defendant can face only a 

third-degree charge of aggravated assault.
19 A-1887-19

Although we need not fully address defendant's arguments about the trial 

court's comment concerning "allegations of evil[]," we are confident that the 

trial court would avoid such a comment if there was a retrial. The comment 

about "evil[]" was made during a ruling on an objection and appears to have 

been inadvertent. We are confident that the trial court understands its important 

role and the need to constantly remain impartial. See State v. O'Brien, 200 N.J. 

520, 523 (2009) (explaining that a trial judge "holds a powerful symbolic 

position vis-à-vis jurors . . . and must refrain from any action that would suggest 

that he [or she] favors one side over the other").

Finally, the issue of whether defendant could introduce testimony 

concerning Erica's prior conduct towards him should be addressed in pretrial 

proceedings to determine whether her alleged actions are relevant to defendant's 

claim of self-defense. See State v. Jenewicz, 193 N.J. 440, 459 (2008); N.J.R.E. 

405; N.J.R.E. 404; N.J.R.E. 403. We express no view on that issue.

Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.