Presidential Documents

57865 

Federal Register 

Vol. 71, No. 189 

Friday, September 29, 2006 

Title 3— 

The President 

Presidential Determination No. 2006–24 of September 15, 2006 

Presidential Determination on Major Drug Transit or Major 

Illicit Drug Producing Countries for Fiscal Year 2007 

Memorandum for the Secretary of State 

Pursuant to section 706(1) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY03 

(Public Law 107–228) (FRAA), I hereby identify the following countries 

as major drug transit or major illicit drug producing countries: Afghanistan, 

The Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, India, Jamaica, Laos, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela. 

A country’s presence on the Majors List is not necessarily an adverse reflection of its government’s counternarcotics efforts or level of cooperation with 

the United States. Consistent with the statutory definition of a major drug 

transit or drug producing country set forth in section 481(e)(2) and (5) 

of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (FAA), one of the reasons 

that major drug transit or illicit drug producing countries are placed on 

the list is the combination of geographical, commercial, and economic factors 

that allow drugs to transit or be produced despite the concerned government’s 

most assiduous enforcement measures. 

Pursuant to section 706(2)(A) of the FRAA, I hereby designate Burma and 

Venezuela as countries that have failed demonstrably during the previous 

12 months to adhere to their obligations under international counternarcotics 

agreements and take the measures set forth in section 489(a)(1) of the FAA. 

Attached to this report (Tab A) are justifications for the determinations 

on Burma and Venezuela, as required by section 706(2)(B). 

I have also determined, in accordance with provisions of section 706(3)(A) 

of the FRAA, that support for programs to aid Venezuela’s democratic institutions is vital to the national interests of the United States. 

Although President Karzai has strongly attacked narcotrafficking as the greatest threat to Afghanistan, one third of the Afghan economy remains opiumbased, which contributes to widespread public corruption. The government 

at all levels must be held accountable to deter and eradicate poppy cultivation; remove and prosecute corrupt officials; and investigate, prosecute, or 

extradite narcotraffickers and those financing their activities. We are concerned that failure to act decisively now could undermine security, compromise democratic legitimacy, and imperil international support for vital 

assistance. 

My Administration is concerned with the decline in Bolivian counternarcotics cooperation since October 2005. Bolivia, the world’s third largest 

producer of cocaine, has undertaken policies that have allowed the expansion 

of coca cultivation and slowed the pace of eradication until mid-year, when 

it picked up. The Government of Bolivia’s (GOB) policy of ‘‘zero cocaine, 

but not zero coca’’ has focused primarily on interdiction, to the near exclusion 

of its necessary complements, eradication and alternative development. However, the GOB has been supportive of interdiction initiatives and has had 

positive results in seizing cocaine and decommissioning rustic labs. We 

would encourage the GOB to refocus its efforts on eliminating excess coca, 

the source of cocaine. This would include eradicating at least 5,000 hectares, 

including in the Chapare region; eliminating the ‘‘cato’’ exemption to Bolivian 

law; rescinding Ministerial Resolution 112, Administrative Resolution 083, 


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and establishing tight controls on the sale of licit coca leaf for traditional 

use; and implementing strong precursor chemical control measures to prevent 

conversion of coca to cocaine. My Administration plans to review Bolivia’s 

performance in these specific areas within 6 months. 

The Government of Canada (GOC) continued to effectively curb the diversion 

of precursor chemicals that are required for methamphetamine production 

to feed U.S. illegal markets. The GOC also continued to seize laboratories 

that produce MDMA/Ecstasy consumed in both Canada and the United 

States. The principal drug concern was the continuing large-scale production 

of high-potency, indoor-grown marijuana for export to the United States. 

The United States enjoyed excellent cooperation with Canada across a broad 

range of law enforcement issues and shared goals. 

The Government of Ecuador (GOE) has made considerable progress in combating narcotics trafficking destined for the United States. However, a dramatic increase in the quantity of cocaine transported toward the United 

States using Ecuadorian-flagged ships and indications of increased illegal 

armed group activity along Ecuador’s northern border with Colombia remain 

areas of serious concern. Effective cooperation and streamlined maritime 

operational procedures between the U.S. Coast Guard and the Ecuadorian 

Navy are resulting in an increase in the amount of cocaine interdicted. 

Building on that cooperation, we will work with Ecuador to change the 

circumstances that make Ecuadorian-flagged vessels and Ecuadorian citizenship so attractive to drug traffickers. 

As a result of the elections in Haiti, the new government now has a clear 

mandate from the Haitian people to bring crime, violent gangs, and drug 

trafficking under control. We urge the new government to strengthen and 

accelerate ongoing efforts to rebuild and reform Haiti’s law enforcement 

and judicial institutions and to consult closely with the United States to 

define achievable and verifiable steps to accomplish these goals. 

While the Government of Nigeria continues to take substantive steps to 

curb official corruption, it remains a major challenge in Nigeria. We strongly 

encourage the government to continue to adequately fund and support the 

anti-corruption bodies that have been established there in order to fully 

address Nigeria’s ongoing fight against corruption. We urge Nigeria to continue improving the effectiveness of the National Drug and Law Enforcement 

Agency and, in particular, improve enforcement operations at major airports/ 

seaports and against major drug kingpins, to include targeting their financial 

assets. We look forward to working with Nigerian officials to increase extraditions and assisting in drug enforcement operations. 

Although there have not been any drug seizures or apprehensions of drug 

traffickers with a connection to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 

(DPRK) since 2004, we remain concerned about DPRK state-directed criminal 

activity. The United States Government has made clear to the DPRK that 

an end to all involvement in criminal activity is a necessary prerequisite 

to entry into the international community. 

Under provisions of the Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act (CMEA), 

which modified section 489(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as 

amended, and section 490(a) of the FAA, a report will be made to the 

Congress on March 1, 2007, naming the five countries that legally exported 

the largest amount of methamphetamine precursor chemicals, as well as 

the top five methamphetamine precursor importers with the highest rate 

of diversion for illicit drug production. This report will be sent concurrently 

with the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, which will also 

contain additional reporting on methamphetamine precursor chemicals pursuant to the CMEA. 


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You are hereby authorized and directed to submit this report under section 

706 of the FRAA, transmit it to the Congress, and publish it in the Federal 

Register. 

W 

THE WHITE HOUSE, 

Washington, September 15, 2006. 

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MEMORANDUM OF JUSTIFICATION FOR PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION ON MAJOR DRUG TRANSIT OR ILLICIT DRUG PRODUCING COUNTRIES FOR FY 2007 

Burma 

Burma failed demonstrably to make sufficient efforts during the last 12 

months to meet its obligations under international counternarcotics agreements and U.S. domestic counternarcotics requirements as set forth in section 

489(a)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. 

Burma remains the world’s second largest producer of illicit opium. Burmese 

opiates continue to pose a threat in Asia. Additionally, amphetamine-type 

stimulants (ATS) produced and trafficked from Burmese territory continue 

to threaten the entire region. Burma has not taken decisive action against 

drug gangs, such as the United Wa State Army (UWSA), which continue 

to operate freely along Burma’s borders with China and Thailand. These 

criminal organizations increasingly threaten Asia with the crystalline form 

of methamphetamine called ‘‘Ice’’. 

The efforts of the Government of Burma (GOB) to combat the production 

and trafficking of methamphetamine have been unsatisfactory. Even as methamphetamine production and trafficking have increased in recent years, 

seizures continue to be disappointing, and the GOB has not been forthcoming 

with verifiable statistics. It failed to establish a mechanism for the reliable 

measurement of ATS production and, once again, did not cooperate in 

the joint United States/Burma crop survey. 

The GOB continued to take no action in response to the indictments in 

January 2005 by the U.S. Justice Department against eight leaders of the 

UWSA. The failure to take action against these accused ringleaders, responsible for a good deal of human misery in Asia and beyond, demonstrates 

the Burmese Government’s failure to take serious action against drug activity 

on its territory. 

The Government of Burma has failed to indict and prosecute any Burmese 

military official above the rank of colonel for drug-related corruption. 

Burma has failed to expand demand-reduction, prevention, and drug-treatment programs to reduce drug use and control the spread of HIV/AIDS. 

The Global Fund for Aids, TB and Malaria had approved grants totaling 

$98.5 million for Burma but withdrew in late 2005 due to the Government’s 

onerous restrictions and lack of full cooperation. 

The international Financial Action Task Force (FATF) continues to list Burma 

as one of only two ‘‘Non-cooperative Countries.’’ At the heart of Burma’s 

problems with international financial authorities is its weak implementation 

of anti-money laundering controls, with the result that narcotics traffickers 

and other criminal elements are still able to launder the proceeds of their 

crimes through Burmese financial institutions. 

While the picture of Burma’s counternarcotics efforts remains overwhelmingly negative, there were some positive aspects. The GOB, with the U.S. 

Drug Enforcement Administration and the Australian Federal Police, disrupted two international trafficking syndicates that are associated with the 

United Wa State Army (UWSA), a kingpin organization, and have ties 

throughout Asia, India, and North America. In September 2005, the GOB 

seized a UWSA-related shipment of approximately 496 kilograms of heroin 

bound for China via Laos. The seizure led to the arrest of 80 suspects, 

including two of UWSA Chairman Bao Yu Xiang’s family members, and 

the seizure of assets, including $1.3 million in cash. A second, related 

investigation from December 2005 through April 2006 culminated in the 

arrest of 30 subjects and the seizure of $2.2 million in assets and significant 

quantities of morphine base, heroin, opium, weapons, methamphetamine 

tablets and powder, crystal methamphetamine, pill presses, and precursor 

chemicals. 


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MEMORANDUM OF JUSTIFICATION FOR PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION ON MAJOR DRUG TRANSIT OR ILLICIT DRUG PRODUCING COUNTRIES FOR FY 2007 

Venezuela 

Venezuela failed demonstrably to make sufficient efforts during the last 

12 months to meet its obligations under international counternarcotics agreements and U.S. domestic counternarcotics requirements as set forth in section 

489(a)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. 

This determination comes as the result of Venezuela’s lack of effective 

response to specific United States Government requests for counternarcotics 

cooperation as well as the country’s continued lack of action against drug 

trafficking within and through its borders commensurate with its responsibilities to the international community. 

Venezuela’s importance as a transshipment point for drugs bound for the 

United States and Europe has continued to increase in the past 12 months, 

a situation both enabled and exploited by corrupt Venezuelan officials. 

The Venezuelan media provided an example of this corruption when they 

reported that Venezuelan police re-sold the vast majority of a 9,400 kilogram 

cocaine seizure to drug traffickers in July of this year (Venezuela does 

not allow independent verification of seizure amounts). Seizures of illegal 

drugs transiting the country have fallen, according to DEA estimates. The 

volume of cocaine transiting the country is expected to continue to rise 

substantially in 2006. The most dramatic increase in cocaine departing Venezuela was to non-U.S. destinations, primarily Europe. The vast majority 

of cocaine going to the United States or Europe goes by sea. However, 

an increasing proportion is being moved by non-commercial air through 

the Caribbean toward the United States. The number of suspected drug 

flights departing Venezuela and going to Hispaniola and the Caribbean more 

than doubled in 2005 and has continued that rising trend in the first half 

of 2006. 

Venezuela has not used available tools to counter the growing drug threat. 

It has not strengthened inspections or security along its border with Colombia; 

it has not utilized judicial wiretap orders to investigate drug cases; it has 

not attempted meaningful prosecution of corrupt officials; and it has not 

renewed formal counternarcotics cooperation agreements with the United 

States Government. The role and status of the DEA in Venezuela remains 

in limbo since the host country refuses to sign a memorandum of understanding authorizing Drug Enforcement Administration presence, even after 

successfully concluding a lengthy process of negotiation with U.S. officials. 

Venezuela also has not signed a letter of agreement that would make nearly 

$3 million from FY 2005 available for United States Government cooperative 

counternarcotics efforts. 

Last year Venezuela was found to have ‘‘failed demonstrably’’ as a partner 

in the war on drugs, in part because it ended most air interdiction cooperation, refused to grant U.S. counternarcotics overflights of Venezuela, curtailed 

most military and law enforcement counternarcotics cooperation, replaced 

its most effective counternarcotics officials, and failed to effectively implement its own money laundering and organized crime legislation. All of 

these issues remain outstanding in 2006. 

The United States is very concerned about the continued deterioration of 

democratic institutions in Venezuela as reflected in the increased executive 

control over the other branches of government, threats to judicial independence and human rights, and attacks on press freedoms and freedom of 

expression. 


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A vital national interests certification will allow the United States Government to provide funds that support programs to aid Venezuela’s democratic 

institutions, establish selected community development projects, and 

strengthen Venezuela’s political party system. 

[FR Doc. 06–8302 

Filed 8–28–06; 9:04 am] 

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