THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Court of Appeals 

Steven Newbern and Claudia Newbern, Appellants, 

v. 

Ford Motor Company, Respondent. 

Appellate Case No. 2016-002209 

Appeal From Charleston County 

J. C. Nicholson, Jr., Circuit Court Judge 

Opinion No. 5680 

Heard June 4, 2019 – Filed August 21, 2019 

AFFIRMED 

William E. Applegate, IV, of Yarborough Applegate, 

LLC, of Charleston, Kathleen Chewning Barnes, of 

Barnes Law Firm, LLC, of Hampton, and Stephen E. Van 

Gaasbeck, of Law Offices of Stephen E. Van Gassbeck, 

of Helotes TX, for Appellants. 

Joseph Kenneth Carter, Jr. and Carmelo Barone 

Sammataro, both of Turner Padget Graham & Laney, PA, 

of Columbia, Bettis Cantelou Rainsford, Jr., of Raymond 

J. Doumar, P.C., of Augusta GA, and Robert L. Wise, of 

Bowman & Brooke, LLP, of Richmond VA, for 

Respondent. 

LOCKEMY, C.J.: Steven and Claudia Newbern sued Ford Motor Company 

alleging strict liability and negligence claims against Ford because of injuries Mr. 
Newbern suffered when the airbag in their vehicle deployed during an accident. 

On appeal, the Newberns argue the trial court erred in granting Ford's motion for 

directed verdict. Finding a lack of evidence in the record to support the Newberns' 

claims, we affirm. 

FACTS

On December 28, 2012, the Newberns were involved in an accident with another 

vehicle driven by Stephen McGee. Claudia Newbern was diving the couple's 2009 

Ford Focus and Steven Newbern was riding in the passenger seat when McGee's 

vehicle hit the right front passenger side of the Newberns' Focus. The Newberns' 

driver and passenger airbags deployed during the accident. Mr. Newbern suffered 

severe injuries to his face and eye resulting in loss of his right eye. The Newberns 

filed suit against Ford in May 2013 claiming these injuries were the result of a 

defective airbag system. The Newberns claim Ford should be held responsible 

under strict liability and negligence theories. 

During the trial before a jury, the Newberns called Ramaniyam Krishnaswami, a 

Ford employee, as an adverse witness to testify as to the design of the airbag 

sensing system. At the close of the Newberns' case, Ford moved for a directed 

verdict arguing the Newberns did not prove the existence of a design defect and 

did not present expert testimony on the defectiveness of the design or a feasible 

alternative design. The next day, September 16, 2016, the trial court granted Ford's

motion. The Newberns filed a motion for a new trial, which the trial court denied. 

This appeal followed. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When ruling on a motion for directed verdict, "the trial court is required to view 

the evidence and the inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom in the light 

most favorable to the party opposing the motions and to deny the motions where 

either the evidence yields more than one inference or its inference is in doubt." 

Law v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 368 S.C. 424, 434, 629 S.E.2d 642, 648 (2006). The 

appellate court applies the same standard in reviewing the trial court's grant or 

denial of a motion for directed verdict. Allegro, Inc. v. Scully, 418 S.C. 24, 32, 791 

S.E.2d 140, 144 (2016). "An appellate court will reverse the trial court's grant of a 

directed verdict when any evidence supports the party opposing the directed 

verdict." Graves v. Horry-Georgetown Tech. Coll., 391 S.C. 1, 7, 704 S.E.2d 350, 

354 (Ct. App. 2010). 
LAW/ANALYSIS 

The Newberns claim the airbags in their 2009 Ford Focus deployed when they 

should not have due to a defectively designed airbag system. The Newberns 

brought this cause of action under the crashworthiness doctrine. As explained by 

our supreme court in Donze v. General Motors, LLC, 420 S.C. 8, 19, 800 S.E.2d 

479, 485 (2017), the underlying premise of the crashworthiness doctrine is that 

"manufacturers are only liable for enhanced damages caused by a design defect 

when the defect does not cause the initial collision . . . ." "Liability for a design 

defect may be based on negligence, strict liability or warranty." Priest v. Brown, 

302 S.C. 405, 411, 396 S.E.2d 638, 641 (Ct. App. 1990). The Newberns alleged 

strict liability and negligence as the bases of their claims. 

Under South Carolina law, in order to recover in a products liability action, a 

plaintiff must prove: "(1) he was injured by the product; (2) the injury occurred 

because the product was in a defective condition, unreasonably dangerous to the 

user; and (3) that the product at the time of the accident was in essentially the same 

condition as when it left the hands of the defendant." Bragg v. Hi-Ranger, Inc., 

319 S.C. 531, 539, 462 S.E.2d 321, 326 (Ct. App. 1995). If the product liability 

action is based on strict liability when a design defect is alleged, "the plaintiff must 

prove the product, as designed, was in an unreasonably dangerous or defective 

condition. The focus here is on the condition of the product, without regard to the 

action of the seller or manufacturer." Id. at 540, 462 S.E.2d at 326 (citations 

omitted). See also S.C. Code Ann. § 15-73-10 (2005) (imposing liability on seller

for defective products). In Branham v. Ford Motor Company, 390 S.C. 203, 220, 

701 S.E.2d 5, 14 (2010), our supreme court adopted the risk-utility test as the 

exclusive test in products liability design cases. Under the risk-utility test, a 

product is "unreasonably dangerous and defective if the danger associated with the 

use of the product outweighs the utility of the product." Bragg, 319 S.C. at 543, 

462 S.E.2d at 328. In order to satisfy this test, the plaintiff must present proof of a 

feasible alternative design that would have made the product safer. Miranda C. v. 

Nissan Motor Co., 402 S.C. 577, 591, 741 S.E.2d 34, 42 (Ct. App. 2013). 

If the design defect claim is brought under a negligence theory, the plaintiff bears 

the additional burden of demonstrating the defendant "failed to exercise due care in 

some respect, and, unlike strict liability, the focus is on the conduct of the seller or 

manufacturer, and liability is determined according to fault." Bragg, 319 S.C. at 

539, 462 S.E.2d at 326. 

At trial and on appeal, Ford argued the Newberns failed to provide evidence of the 

design defect and under the required risk-utility test, the Newberns failed to 
 

provide evidence of a safer alternative design. During the trial, the Newberns did 

not call their own automotive design expert. Instead, the Newberns called

Krishnaswami, who Ford designated as its representative and airbag design expert 

prior to the trial, to prove both negligent design and strict liability. 

Krishnaswami began working for Ford in 1993 and at the time of the trial, Ford 

employed him as a design analysis engineer, but he was not involved in the design 

of the 2009 Ford Focus. Krishnaswami testified as to Ford's design process. He 

explained Ford performs hundreds of crash tests during the design of a new car. 

Ford uses the crash test data to determine how to calibrate and where to put the 

airbag sensors, which tell the vehicle's restraint system it has been in a crash and 

whether an airbag should deploy. Krishnaswami testified to the jury that Ford 

purchases its sensors from Bosch. Ford sends Bosch requirements for the sensors 

based on the crash tests it performed. The Newberns asked Krishnaswami about a 

specific crash test, 15978, which they purport and Krishnaswami agreed is the 

most similar to the Newbern's crash. Based on this crash test, Krishnaswami 

testified that if the passenger is wearing a seatbelt, the airbag should be suppressed 

– meaning not deployed. The calibration report for this crash also indicates no 

airbag deployment. Ford sent this information to Bosch. However, Bosch's 

calibration resulted in deployment for this type of crash. Krishnaswami 

acknowledged, "[Bosch] did not - - they were not able to achieve the initial targets 

. . . ." 

Krishnaswami also conceded airbags can cause injuries, including eye injuries. He 

acknowledged no one wants to have an airbag deploy when it is not necessary. 

Lastly, Krishnaswami testified as follows while being examined by the Newberns' 

counsel: 

Q. Would it be unreasonably dangerous to provide a 

person with a system that will deploy airbags when 

they are not needed? 

A. Yes. It depends on the occupant kinematics.

The Newberns assert Krishnaswami's testimony along with the supporting 

calibration report provide evidence of a design defect because the airbag deployed 

when Ford's own data indicated that it should not deploy. We disagree. 

Krishnaswami's testimony centered on Ford's design process. Krishnaswami did 

not offer testimony opining on the dangerousness or defectiveness of the 2009 

Focus's airbag system. Krishnaswami explained the requirements Ford sent to 
Bosch were "initial targets," rather than requirements. If the targets sent to Bosch 

are not met, then Ford studies those targets and determines whether it can accept 

the calibration. Krishnaswami acknowledged design changes could be made if the 

calibration does not meet the target, but he advised the calibration has to take into 

account many crash modes. Krishnaswami stated the crash modes are 

interconnected. The calibration in one crash mode can affect the airbag's 

performance in another crash mode. Krishnaswami explained as follows: 

The thing is if you delay the airbag for a certain crash 

mode you may end up delaying for other modes too. 

That's why the system has to be optimized. Then we go 

back and study is it okay or is it absolutely okay to 

deploy an airbag in this crash mode based on the studies 

and tests and then we can accept it. 

He added, 

[Y]ou cannot look at one crash test in isolation and that's

what I was trying to say. What you do in one crash 

affects other crashes because the system is tied together. 

One crash mode is not independent of another crash 

mode. The signal pattern, even though it varies, it is very 

important to bring all the data together and look as [sic] a 

system as a whole. And that's why we would deploy in 

some modes where the initial target was not to deploy to 

begin with. 

Ford accepted what it found to be the optimal calibration as Ford was satisfied with 

the overall target. Krishnaswami described the calibration accepted by Ford as 

"good." Krishnaswami's testimony does not indicate that the restraint system was 

defective. To the contrary, his testimony serves to explain how Ford came to the 

calibration it adopted for the 2009 Focus. In our review of Krishnaswami's 

testimony, in addition to the record as a whole, we did not find any evidence to 

support the Newberns' allegations that the airbag system was unreasonably 

dangerous or defective. 

In addition, we do not find evidence of an alternative design that would have made 

the airbag system safer as required by Branham. See Branham, 390 S.C. at 225, 

701 S.E.2d at 16 ("[I]n a product liability design defect action, the plaintiff must 

present evidence of a reasonable alternative design. The plaintiff will be required 
to point to a design flaw in the product and show how his alternative design would 

have prevented the product from being unreasonably dangerous."). 

 Krishnaswami testified that if Ford found the exceptions in the calibration report 

unacceptable, Ford could move the position of the sensor, add reinforcement to the 

crash path, or increase the crash threshold. The Newberns rely on this testimony to 

support a claim of a feasible alternative design. However, Krishnaswami did not 

offer any testimony as to how employing these alternatives would have made the 

airbag system safer or otherwise satisfied a risk-utility analysis. Furthermore, his 

testimony indicates that because the crash modes are interconnected—redesigning 

the sensing could result in an airbag not deploying when Ford determined it should 

deploy. Therefore, modifications to the airbag system could result in a more 

dangerous product rather than a less dangerous product. 

After reviewing the record, and more specifically Krishnaswami's testimony, we 

fail to find evidence of both defective design and a feasibly alternative design that 

would have made the airbag system safer. Therefore, the trial court did not err in 

granting Ford's motion for a directed verdict on the strict liability cause of action. 

The Newberns also alleged Ford is liable due to its negligent design of the airbag 

system. However, the Newberns failed to present evidence of Ford's failure to 

exercise due care. 

The Newberns assert Ford's deviation from its own internal policies demonstrates 

its deviation from the standard of care. They cite to Ford's haste in getting the 

Focus into production as the reason Ford was willing to make exceptions in the 

sensor calibration. Several South Carolina cases support the Newberns' position 

that deviation from a company's own policies is relevant to show the company 

deviated from the standard of care. See Madison ex rel. Bryant v. Babcock Ctr., 

Inc., 371 S.C. 123, 140, 638 S.E.2d 650, 659 (2006) ("The standard of care in a 

given case may be established and defined by the common law, statutes, 

administrative regulations, industry standards, or a defendant's own policies and 

guidelines."); Peterson v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 365 S.C. 391, 397, 618 

S.E.2d 903, 906 (2005) ("Although federal regulations provide the standard of 

care, Respondents' deviation from their own internal policies is, nevertheless, 

admissible as evidence that Respondents deviated from that standard of care."). 

The record provides little evidence of Ford's actual policies. The Newberns did not 

offer any experts to testify that Ford violated any policies or breached any standard 

of care. While Krishnaswami stated modifications are possible, he did not testify 

about a Ford policy requiring modifications when it did not meet the initial targets. 
 

 

Moreover, the Newberns did not offer any evidence as to how Ford violated its 

policies in the design of the 2009 Ford Focus. Therefore, the trial court correctly 

granted Ford's motion for a directed verdict on the Newberns' negligence cause of 

action.1

CONCLUSION 

Based on our review of the record, and more specifically Krishnaswami's 

testimony, we are unable to find any evidence in the record to support a finding 

that the airbag system in the Newberns' Ford Focus was unreasonably dangerous 

and defective to the point that the use of the product outweighs its utility. 

Therefore, the trial court correctly granted the directed verdict and its order is 

AFFIRMED. 

SHORT and MCDONALD, JJ., concur. 

1

 Ford also argued the lack of expert testimony as an additional ground for its 

motion for directed verdict. Specifically, Ford argued that expert testimony is 

required to prove defective design, citing to our supreme court's decision in Watson 

v. Ford Motor Company, 389 S.C. 434, 445, 699 S.E.2d 169, 175 (2010). In light 

of our disposition of the case, it is not necessary to address this issue. See Futch v. 

McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 

(1999) (holding an appellate court need not address remaining issues when 

disposition of a prior issue is dispositive).