1. The Honorable Pamela T. G reenwoo d, Se nio r Judge, sat by speci al ass i gnment as authorized by law

. See ge n eral lyUtah Co de Jud. Adm i n. R. 11-201(6)

. 2014 UT App 185

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### T HE 

### U T AH 

### C OU RT O F 

### A PPEALS

S TA TE O F U T AH , P la i nti ff an d A pp el le e,
v. R O GE R E L L IS , D efen da nt a nd Ap pe ll an t. Opini on No. 20 12 04 44 -C A Filed Au gust 7, 2014

Thi rd Di stric t Co urt, S alt Lake Depart ment The Honorable Randall N. Skanchy

No. 101906502 Ronald Fuj i no, Att or ney for Appellant
Sea n D . Re yes an d RyanD . T enne y, A ttorn eys

fo r Ap pe ll ee

S EN I O R J UDG E P AMEL A T. G R E E NWOO D a ut ho r e d this O p inio n, in whi ch J UD GE S S T EP HEN L. R OTH and J OHN A. P EA R CE concu rr ed. 1

GR EE NW OOD , Se ni or J ud ge:
¶1 Roge r El li s ap pe al s fro m h i s c onvi c ti o ns of aggra vate d kidn apping, i ntentional abu se of a v ulnerable adult, and dam agin g or i nterr upti ng a commun i cati on device. We affi rm.St a tev. El lis

2. We rec i te th e f ac ts i n ali ghtmo s t f avorabl e to th e ju ry’s verd i c t. St a tev. Krug er

, 2000 UT 60, ¶ 2, 6 P.3d 1116.

20120444-CA 2 2014 UT App 185 BACKGRO UND
¶2 The acts leadi ng to Ellis ’s convi cti ons occu rr ed on August 8, 201 0 , i nth e h ou s e h e s h a re d w i thh i s th e n - e i gh ty

- s i x- ye a r- old
mo the r (M oth er)

. Th rou gho utmo s t of tha t day , Elli s fo ll ow ed 2 Moth er arou nd the hou s e s aying “n as ty th i ngs ” to h er, tel ling h er s he w as “n o good ,” ob s tru c ti ng he r mo vem en t, and w ai ti ng f or he r ou ts i de the door o f the ba thro om . Atone point , he c al le d Mothe r a “lyin g bi tch” and pu nched h e r o n t he si de of her head. Ar ound fo ur tha t aftern oon, Ell i s grab be d a bu tc he r kni fe fro m the ki tc he n an d b ega n s la s hing the ai r w i th i t, a pp are ntl y atte mp ti ng t o era di c ate the “m ons ters ” th at h e a c c us ed Moth er of bringing into the ho us e
. M o the r l a t e r e x p l a ine d in h e r t r ia l t e st imo ny tha tE l l is
sus tain ed permanent and degener ative brai n damage from a head i njury that o ccu rr ed more t han thi rt y y ears before t he August 8, 2010 i nci dent. In addi tion, Mother explain e d that Ellis “had strugg led wi th [drugs] for a long t i me” and that wh e n he was
un de r the i nflu en c e of

“d ope ,” he w ou ld “s ee[ ] m ons ters or s pi ri ts i n the house” and b ecome “ver y agitated.”
¶3 Also on August 8 , 2010, under the pret ense of sh ooing the monste r s out o f the house, Mother twi ce attempted t o ex i t the house through t he front do or . Both t i mes, E l l is pu lled her back i ns i de an d h i t he r; after he r fi rs t atte mp t, h e h i t he r on the s hou ld er, and after the second attempt, he hi t her in the head. Around 9:19 p.m., after the sec ond blow, Elli s i nstructed Mot her to go t o bed at whi ch ti me Mot her pu shed the alarm on a medi cal alertdevic e she
wore ar ound her neck. Elli s answered the t elephone call from the di spatcher sig na l ed by the medi cal alert dev i ce and told the di spatcher that M other i nadvert ently pr essed the alarm bu tto n.
¶4 El li s the n f oll ow ed Moth er into he r be droom, l aid ne xt to he r on the be d w i th the bu tc he r kni fe i n h i s ha nd s , a nd thre ate ne d to ki llhe r. Ab ou t anho ur la t er , El li s le ftthe be droomto h ave a c i gare tte in a nothe r pa rt of the hou s e, at whi c h ti me Moth er u s edSt a tev. El lis

20120444-CA 3 2014 UT App 185 the c el l ph one i n he r poc ket to c al l 91 1. P ara me di c s arri ved un de r the im pressi on that Mot her w as exper i encing chest pains. Once s he was l oaded in to t he ambu lance, Mother explain ed what had actually transpi red.
¶5 Durin g a two-day j ury t rial, the Stat e presented t esti mony from Mo ther, t he respondi ng paramedic s, and s ever al poli ce offi cers involv ed i n the i nvestigati on. Becaus e the S tate alleged that the charges of agg rav ated kidnapping and i nterfer ence wi th a
communi cati on device we r e bo th d o me st ic v io l e nc e o ff e ns e s, i t was al s o r equi red to pro ve th at E ll i s w as Moth er’s c ohabi tan t. E ll i s ’s de fe ns e res ted o n

d i s c r e d i ti ng M oth er, pointing o uti nc ons i s ten c i es an d a mb i gu i ti es i n her tes ti mo ny, i mp lying tha t s he s uffe red fro m dementi a, and suggesti ng that she may have injured her self in a fall a fewda ys pri or to th e Au gu s t 8 i nc i de nt. At th e c los e of the State ’s case, defense coun sel moved to di smi s s the a ggr avat ed kidn apping c ha rge ongrou nd s of

i ns uffi c i en t evide nce, b utthe tri al c ou rt d e nie d the mo t io n. Th e j ur y co nv ict e d E l l is o n a l l co un t s. E l l is appeals.

ISS UES AND STANDARDS O F REVIEW
¶6 Elli s fi rst ar gues that the t rial c ourt err ed by not dis mi ssing the agg rav ated kidnapping charge. “A t rial c ourt ’s grant or deni al of a motion to di smi ss i s a ques tion of law. . . [the court] re view [s] for cor r ectness, gi ving no deference to t he deci si on of the t rial court.” State v. Ara ve, 2011 UT 84, ¶ 25 , 2 6 8 P.3d 163 (al ter ations
an d om i s s i on in ori gi na l) (c i tati on a nd i nte rna l quo tati on m arks omi tte d).
¶7 Elli s next contends that he r ecei ved ineffecti ve assi stance fro m h i s tri al c ou ns el ba s ed on c ou ns el ’s fa i lu re to objec t to th e ju ry i nstructi ons explai ning t he reasonable doubt standard and to t he jury ins tru c ti on d efini ng the term“c ohabi tan t.” “Ani ne ffec ti ve assi stance of couns el clai m rais ed for the fi rst ti me on appeal presents a questi on of law.” St a tev. Cla rk , 2004 UT 25, ¶ 6, 89 P.3d 162.St a tev. El lis

3. Becaus e the relev ant prov i si ons o f t he Utah Code in effect at t he ti me of the i nci de nt u nd erl yi ng thi s ap pe al do n ot di ffer s ub s tan ti vel y f rom the c urre nt versi on o f the Uta h C ode , w e c i te the c urre nt ve rs i on f or th e rea de r’s c onve ni en c e.

20120444-CA 4 2014 UT App 185 AN AL YSIS I. Ag gr avat ed Kidn apping
¶8 El li s co nt en ds tha t i t w as error f or th e tri al c ou rt no t to di smis s the aggr avat ed kidn apping charge because he c lai ms the evidenc e wa s insu ffi ci ent to show that a detention independent from the facts supp o r t ing the abuse of a vulnerable adult
c o nvi c ti on h ad oc c urre d. “A d efen da nt’ s mo ti on t o di s mi s s fo r i ns uffi c i en t evi de nc e a t th e c onc lu s i on o f the State ’s c as e in chi ef requires the trial c ourt to det ermin e whet he r the defendant mus t proceed wi th the i ntro ducti on of evidenc e i n hi s defens e.” State v. Hamilton , 2003 UT 22, ¶ 40, 70 P. 3 d 1 1 1 (ci tation and internal quotat i on m ark s omi tte d). “If the Stat e fai ls to pro duce b eli evable
e v i d e n c e o f a l l th e e l e m e n t s o f th e c r i m e c h a r g e d , th e tri al c ou rt
mus t dis mi ss the charges.” Id. (c i tati on an d inte rna l quo tati on marks omitted).
¶9 Thus, in re vi ew i ng the tri al c ou rt’s de ni al of El li s ’s mo ti on to dis mi s s , “ w e a pp ly th e s am e s tan da rd u s ed w he n re vi ew i ng a jury ve rdi c t” a nd w i llup hol d th e d en i al of the mo ti on “ i f u pon rev i ewing the ev i dence and al l i nfere nc e s that can be reasonably dra w n from i t, [ we] c onc lu de [] tha t s om e evi de nc e ex i s ts fro m whi ch a reasonable jury co ul d find that the elements of the crime had been prov en beyond a reasonable doub t.” See id. ¶ 41 (c i tati on an d i n t e r n a l qu o t a t i o nm a r k s o m i t t e d )

. T h e S t a t e ’ s th e o r y of aggr avat ed kidn apping i n thi s cas e required i t to demonstrate that El li s , “ i n th e c ou rs e of c om mi tting u nl aw fu l d ete nti on o r ki dn ap ping: (a ) p os s es s e[ d] , u s e[ d] , or th rea ten [ed] to u s e a dangero us w eapon . . . or (b) act[ed] w i th i ntent

. . . to infl i ct bodi ly i njury on or to t err or i ze the v i cti m or anot her.” See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302( 1)(a) , (1)(b)( i v) (Lexi sNexi s S upp. 2013). In accordance 3 wi th the c o r r e sponding statutes, the j ury was instructed thatSt a tev. El lis

20120444-CA 5 2014 UT App 185 “u nl aw fu l d ete nti on” oc c urs w he n a pe rs on “ i nte nti ona ll y or knowi ngly, wi thout autho rity of law, and agai nst th e wil l of the vic tim, detain s or r estr a ins the victi m,” see id. § 76-5-304( 1) (L exi s Ne xi s 20 12 ), an d th at “ ki dn ap ping” o ccurs w he n ape rs on “i ntentionally or k nowingly, wi thout autho rity of law, and agai nst the wi ll of the victi m[,] . . . detain s or r est r a i ns the vi cti m for any
su bs t a nt ia l p e r io d o f t ime ; [o r ] .

. . d e t a ins o r r e st r a ins the v ict im in ci rcums tances ex posi ng the vic tim to r i sk of bodi ly in jury ,” see id. § 76-5-301( 1)(a) –(b)

. ¶10 El li s spe cifi c al ly a rgu es tha t th e Sta te d i d n ot m eeti ts burden on the detent i on element of the kidn apping charge because the ev i dence indi sputably sh ows that “the ev ents occurred entirely i n [ Moth er’s ] h om e, ” w he re s he w as abl e to m ove a rou nd fre el y, and that she was left alone at least once whi le Elli s sm oke d a ci gar ett e. Thi s ass ert i on, however , focus es on the wei ght o f the evi de nc e, not the s uffi c i en c y. He re, the tri al c ou rt c orrec t ly r ul ed that t he Stat e had presented “some evidenc e . . . from whi ch a
rea s onabl e ju ry c ould fi nd tha t th e el em en ts of ” a ggrava ted kidn apping “had been prov en beyond a reasonable doubt.” See Hamilton , 2 00 3 UT22 , ¶ 4 1 ( c i tati on a nd i nte rna l quo tati on m arks omi tte d). We agr ee w i th the St ate’s s umm ation tha t a reasonable jury c ou ld ba s e a n a ggrava ted ki dn ap ping c onvi c ti on o n Mo the r’s testim ony t hat Elli s had “f ollowed her ar ound the house thro ughout the day —even following he r to t he bathroo m,” prev ented her fr om using the t el e p ho ne , “twi ce physi cally pre ven ted he r fr o m le aving the hom e, fo i le d h er a ttem pt to get he lp byc al ling the me di c al al ert c om pa ny, an d l ai d d ow n n ext to her on a bed wi th a knife.”
¶ 1 1 E l l is a l so a r g u e s t h a tthe t r ia l co ur te r r e d in d e ny ing his
mo ti on t o di s mi s s the ki dn ap ping cha rge b ec au s e th e cha rge merged with the abuse o f a vulnerable adult charge. “Mer ger i s a jud i c i al ly- c rafted doc tri ne ava i labl e to p rotec t c ri mina l d efen da nts from bei ng twi ce pun i shed f or commi ttin g a single act that may violate more than one crim i nal statute.” See S tat e v. Diaz , 2 00 2 UT Ap p 2 88 , ¶ 1 7, 55 P .3 d 1 13 1 ( c i ti ng State v. Finlayson , 2 0 0 0 U T 10, ¶ 19, 994 P.2d 1243); see also id. (“ Merge r i s mo s t c om mo nl y ap pl i ed to s i tu ati ons i nvol vi ng ade fe nd an t w ho h as bee n charged w i thSt a tev. El lis

4

. F ur the r mo r e , e v e n ifthis iss ue ha d b e e n p r o p e r l y p r e se r v e d , it i s w i tho utme ri t. U nd er th e f ac ts of thi s c as e, the c ha rges c ou ld not have been merge d becau se the acts cons tit ut ing kidn apping, as pre vi ou s ly des c ribe d, w ere i nd ep en de nt of a nd i nte rs pe rs ed w i th several acts of assault. See Stat e v. Fin layson , 2000 UT 10, ¶ 19, 994 P.2d 1243 (explai ning that separate convi cti ons for kidnapping and sexual ass a ult can b e sus tain ed where the ev i dence “s how[s ] that the ki dn ap i ng d ete nti on w as lon ger th anthe necessa ry de ten ti on i nvol ved i n th e c om mi s s i on o f t he sexu al as s au lt” or, in othe r words, “the facts establi shing the kidn api ng d etention mus t not be merely inc i de nt a l to t he sexual ass ault, but separate and i ndependent therefr om”).

20120444-CA 6 2014 UT App 185 c om mi tting b otha vi ole nt cri me , i n whi c h ade ten ti on i s i nh eren t,
an d th e c ri me of ki dn ap i ng ba s ed s ole ly on the de ten ti on n ec es s ary to t he commi ssi on of the compani on crim e.”).
¶12 A “tr i al court cannot assess whether, under the pa r t i cular facts of the cas e, one charge mer ges i nto anot her untilthe pro se cu t ion has presented i ts case an d the jur y has convi cted the defendant of mul tipl e charges.” St a tev. Lo pez , 2 0 04 UT App 410, ¶¶ 8–9 , 103 P .3 d 153 (“ [T ]h e defen s e c anobjec t th at cha rges me rge at any t i me, e i ther dur i ng tr i al, or fo llowing the convicti on on a mo ti on to v aca te, bu t th e tri al c ou rt s hou ld rul e onthe objec ti on only if the j ury r eturns co nv ict i ons.” (c i tations and internal quotat i on marks omitted)); seea lso St a tev. Ha wa tm eh , 2001 UT 51, ¶ 17 n. 3, 26 P .3 d 223 (ind i c ating tha t th e d oc tri ne of me rger a pp li es to conv i cti ons, not charges); Co mmo nwe a lt h v . Lo wr y, 394 A.2d 1015, 1018 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978) (explai ning th a t “a defendant may be
c onvi c ted of tw o me rged c ri me s ” bu t “c an be s en ten c ed [o nly]
o nc e ” ). A s a r e su l t, t o the e x t e nt he so ug ht d ism iss a l o f h is kidn apping charge on t he basi s of merger , Elli s’s m otion was pre ma tu re, an d h e f ai le d to ra i s e th e i ssue aga i n a ft er th e ju ry s ub mi tted i ts verd i c t or oth erw i s e reque s t th at t he tri al c ou rt reconsi der t he matter . Thus, E l l is has not pr oper ly preser ved t he i ssu e of whether th e tr i a lc ou rtshould h ave mer ged the k i dnapping charge in to t he abus e charge and we do not addr ess the argument fu rthe r. See generally Pra tt v. Nelson , 2007 UT 41, ¶ 15, 164 P.3d 366

4 (“Generally, i n o rder to preserv e an i ssu e for appeal t he i ssu e mus tSt a tev. El lis

20120444-CA 7 2014 UT App 185 be presented to the tr i al court in s ucha way that t he trial court has an oppor tuni ty t o r ule on th a t iss ue.” (ci tation and internal quotat i on marks omitted)).

II. In effe c ti ve As s i s tan c e of Tri al Cou ns el
¶13 El li s ne xt argu es tha t he rec ei ved i neffec ti ve a s s i s tan c e of
couns el. Elli s cl ai ms that hi s tr i al couns el was ineffec tive for fai li ng to o bject to the explanation of the reasonable doubt standard in the jury ins tru c ti ons an d th e d efini ti on o f “ c o hab itan t” in th e ju ry i nstructi ons.
¶14 “To pro ve ineffecti ve a ss ist ance of coun sel, [a] defendant
mus t show: (1) that couns el’s perfor manc e wa s objectively de fi c i en t, a nd (2 ) [ tha t] a re as onabl e p rob ab i li ty exi s ts tha t b utfo r the de fi c i en t c ond uc t [ the ] d efen da nt w ou ld ha ve ob taine d a mo re favor able outcome at tr i al.” St a tev. Cla rk , 2004 UT 25, ¶ 6, 89 P.3d 16 2 ( c i ti ng Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)) . “To sati sfy the fi rst par t of t he test, [a ] d e fe ndantmus t ov ercome the
s tron g pre s um pti on tha t [ hi s ] t ri al c ou ns el ren de red ad equa te assi stance, by persuading the court that there was n o concei vable ta c ti c a l b a s i s f or c ou n s e l ’s a c ti on s .” Id. (s e co nd a l t e r a t io n in ori gi na l) (c i tati ons, e mp ha s i s , a nd in tern al qu otati on m arks omi tte d). To demonstrate prejudic e, a defendant mu st show “that
couns el’s err or s were so se r ious as to deprive the defendant of a fai r t rial, a tri al whose result i s reli able.” St ric k la nd, 466 U.S. at 687. “[ D ]e fe nd an ts c la i ming ine ffec ti ve a s s is tan c e of c ou ns el [a re requi red ] to affi rma ti vel y prove bo th p rong s of the St ric k la ndtest to pre vai l. As a re s ul t, i t i s notne c es sar y fo r us to ad dre s s bo th components of the i nqui ry if we deter mine that a defendant has made an insu ffi ci ent showing on one.” Archule ta v. Galetka, 20 11 UT 73 , ¶ 4 1, 26 7 P .3 d 2 32 (c i tati ons an d inte rna l quo tati on m arks omi tte d).

A. Reasonable Doubt Instructi ons
¶15 Elli s contends that the jur y in structi ons that defi ned the
rea s onabl e d oubts tan da rd— In s tru c ti ons 16 , 1 7, an d 1 8— fra me d the State ’s bu rde n as “n o di fferen t f rom the s tan da rds ap pl i c ab le toSt a tev. El lis

20120444-CA 8 2014 UT App 185 a c i vi l tri al ” a nd tha t hi s tri al c ou ns el w as i ne ffec ti ve fo r fa i ling t o object t o these mi ss t a t e ments of law. E lli s contends that hi s trial
c ou ns el s hou ld ha ve reque s ted tha t the c ou rt us e the “s afe h arb or”
rea s onabl e doubt i ns tru c ti on ad opte d by the Uta h Sup rem e Co urt i n St a tev. Rey es , 2005 UT 33, 116 P.3d 305.
¶16 The instructi on pro mulgated i n Rey es reads,
“The [State] has the burden of prov i ng the defendant gui lty bey ond a reasonable doubt. So me of you may ha ve serve d as jurors i n c i vi l c as es , w he re you w ere t o l d tha ti t i s o nl y ne ce ss a r y t o p r o v e tha ta fa ct is more likely tr ue than not t rue. In crim i nal cas es, the [St ate ’s ] p ro o f must b e m ore p ow erf ultha n th at. It
mu s t b e b eyon d a rea s onabl e d oubt

.
P roof be yon d a rea s onabl e d oubti s proof tha t le ave s you fi rml y c onvinc ed of the de fe nd an t’s gu i lt. Th ere are very fewthings i n th i s w orld tha t w e kn oww i th ab s olu te c erta i nty, an d i n c ri mina l c as es the la w doe s not r equi re pr oof t hat ov ercomes ever y possible doubt. If, ba sed on your consi derat i on of the evidenc e, yo u are fir mly convin ced that the defendant is g uil ty o f the cri me charged, yo u mu st find hi m gui lty. If

on the oth er han d, you think the re i s a real possi

bi li ty t hat he i s not guil ty, y ou mus t gi ve h i m the be ne fi t of the doubtan d fi nd h im n ot gui lty.”

Id. ¶ 37 (al tera ti ons i n ori gi na l) (quo ti ng Victor v. Nebraska, 5 11 U.S. 1, 27 (1994) ( Ginsb urg, J., concurrin g inpart and concurring in the judgment)).
¶17 Whi le the Utah Supreme Court endorsed the u se o f t he
abo v e -quo t e d l a ng ua g e in a r e a so na bl e d o ub tins t r uc t io n, it explic i tly di d not require t hat tr i al courts use thi s language, statin g i n a subsequ ent case, “‘[T]h e Constituti on does not r equi re t hat any particu lar for m of wor d s be used in advi sing the j ury o f the gov ernment’s burden of proo f.’” See St a tev. Aus ti n , 2007 UT 55, ¶ 6,St a tev. El lis

5. El li s al s o c la i ms tha t th e erro rs i n th e r ea so nabl e d oubtjury i nstructi ons amount to str uctural err o r s upon whi ch hi s trial
couns el’s pr ejudic e should be presumed. See St a te v. Cruz, 2 00 5 UT 45, ¶ 17, 122 P.3d 543 (“Err oneous reasonable doubt i nstructi ons . . . give ris e to structural er ro rs, whi ch are di fferent than gar denvari ety tri al errors . Stru c tu ral errors are fl aw s i n th e fram ew ork wi thi n whi ch the tr i al proceeds, rat her than si mply an erro r in the tri al proc es s i ts el f.

. . . [ A] s tru c tu ral error a na ly sis pre s um es p r ej ud ice

. ” (c it a t io ns a nd int e r na l quo t a t io n ma r k s o mit t e d ))

. Th is (conti nued...)

20120444-CA 9 2014 UT App 185 16 5 P .3 d 1 19 1 ( qu oting Victor, 511 U.S. at 5); see also Victor , 5 11 U.S. at 5 (recog ni zi ng that “t he Consti tution nei ther pr ohibi ts tr i al courts from defining reasonable doub t nor requires them to do so
as a m atte r of

c ou rs e” ). Ra t he r, ou r s up rem e c ou rt ha s requi red “only t hat the ins tr ucti on s, take n as a whole, corr ectly
c om mu ni c ate the princ i pl e of rea s onabl e d oubt

, n am el y, th at a de fe nd an t c annot be con vi c ted of a c ri me exc ep t u ponproof beyond a re asonable doubt of ev ery fact neces sary t o consti tute t he cri me wi th whi ch he i s ch arg ed.” Aus ti n, 20 07 UT 55 , ¶ 6 ( c i tati on and internal quot ation marks omi tte d).
¶18 Here, t he jury i nstru cti ons read as a whole proper ly and adequately conve y the concept of reasonable doubt. Instruction 15 explains that i t is the pro secu tion’s b urden to pr ov e Elli s’s gui lt be y o nd a r e a so na bl e d o ub t, tha tE l l is is no tr e quir e d t o p r o v e his i nnocenc e, and that the j ury mu st presume hi s innocenc e from the start . Instruction 16 then explains that the j uror s c a nn o t “give up [the ] a s s um pti on the de fe nd an t i s i nn oc en t [ un le s s the y are ]
c onvin c e d th a t th e d e f e n d a n t’ s gu i l t h a s b e e np ro ve nb e yond a
rea s onabl e d oubt .” In s tru c ti ons 16 , 17, a nd 18 exp la i n in gre ate r de tai l wha t m ake s a d oubt“re as onabl e, ” a nd t he el em en ts i ns tru c ti on f or ea c h cha rged offe ns e rei tera tes tha t b ef ore the ju ry can fi nd El l is g uilty of the o ffens e, i t “must find from all of the evidenc e and beyond a reasonable doubt each and ever y one of the

. . . e l e me nt s of that offense.” Acc or di ngly, any o bjection to the i nstructi ons bas ed on the “safe harbor” lang uage from Rey es would have been futi le. Tri al c oun s e ld i d n ot per form defi ci ently by failing to rais e a fut ile o bj ecti on. SeeSt a tev. Kel ley , 2000 UT 41, ¶ 26, 1 5St a tev. El lis

5. (...conti nued) arg ument neces sari ly fai ls in l ig ht of our det ermin ation that the reasonable doubt jur y in structi ons were not flawed.

20120444-CA 10 2014 UT App 185 P .3 d 5 46 (“ Fai lu re to r aise fu ti le objec ti ons doe s notc ons ti tu te i neffec tive ass i stance of coun sel.”).

B. Coh ab i tan t In s tru c ti on
¶19 La s t, E ll i s argu es tha t hi s tri al c ou ns el w as i ne ffe ct ive fo r fai li ng to object t o the defin i tion of “cohab i tant” contained in the jury i nstructi ons. Elli s contends that because the jury i nstructi ons i n hi s “case i ncorpor ated the same ty pe of cohabi tant defin i tions ” as the jury i nstructi ons in St a tev. W a tk ins , 2013 UT 28, 309 P.3d 209, the supreme court’s “concern” expr essed in W a tk ins al s o exi s ts he re.
¶20 In W

a tk ins , th e d efen da nt w as c onvi cted of aggra vate d sexual abu se of a chi ld under Utah Code section 76- 5 -4 0 4

. 1(4)( h). W a tk ins , 2 01 3 UT28 , ¶ 1. Th e aggrava ted c om pon en t w as ba s ed on the defendant being an adult cohabi tant o f the v i cti m’s father by virtue of hi s “temporar i ly staying in the spar e bedroo m of [the vi c ti m ’s ] f a th e r’ s h ou s e .” Id. The Stat e theor i zed that t he defendant’s “s tatus as an adult cohabi tant o f [the vi cti m’s father]” placed hi m in “a posi tion of sp eci al trust” in relati on to the chi ld vic tim

. Id. ¶ 7 (ci tation and i nternal quotation marks omitted). The ter m “cohabi tant” was not defin ed i n the statute under whi ch the defendant was charged, and a s a result, the j ury ins tr ucti ons employed the defin i tion provided i n the Cohabitant Abus e Act. Id. ¶ 32 n. 2. Th e Uta h Su pre me Cou rt, in va cating the de fe nd an t’s convic tion, noted that t he defini tion of cohabi tant found i n the Cohabi tant Abuse Act, “has been s peci fi cally rej ected by case law in oth e r c ontex ts.” Id. Th e co ur tthe n s t a t e d , “ [T he d e fe nd a nt ’ s t r ia l]
couns el’s fai lure to di spute the jury i ns t r uc tion’s defi ni tion of a cohabi tant r ai ses poss ible conc erns about hi s e ffe c tive n e s s
. ” Id. E l l is relies on the supreme court’ s observation of “possi ble conc erns about [couns el’s] effecti veness” in W a tk ins as proof tha t hi s c ou ns el i n th i s c as e w as i ne ffec ti ve.St a tev. El lis

20120444-CA 11 2014 UT App 185 ¶21 W a tk ins i s inapposi te. Her e, we ar e faced w i th an
enha nc em en t of

a d o mes t i cvi ole nc e cha rge b as ed on E ll i s ’s relat i onshi p a s a cohabi tant o f Mot her pursuant to U tah Code
s ec ti on 7 7- 36 -1 , w hi c h s pe c i fi c al ly inc orpora tes the de fini ti on o f cohabi tant fro m the Cohabi ta nt Abuse Ac t. SeeUtah Co de Ann. § 77-36-1( 1) (Lexi sNexi s 2012) ( “‘Co h ab i tant’ has the same meaning as in Section 78B- 7-102 [of the Cohabi tant Abuse Act].”). Wi thout
mor e , we fai l to see how these statements fro m W a tk ins ext end be yon d th e p arti es i n th at c as e. El li s ha s don e li ttle mo re th annot e the s i mi la ri ti es be tw eentha t c as e a nd hi s ow n. He has not demonstrat ed how the supreme court’s observ ation in W a tk ins
e st abl ish e s h is o wn co un se l ’ s d e fic ie nt p e r fo r ma nc e
. I nd e e d , E l l is admi ts that the language he relies on from W a tk ins i s di cta and that the W a tk ins c ou rt di d n ot ad opt ade fini ti o n o f c o h ab i tan t. L i kew i s e, El li s ’s rec ogn i ti on tha t c ohabi tati on c ons ti tu tes a “c ri ti c al el em en t” i n tw o of th e c h a rg e s a ga i n s t h i m d oe s n ot p ro ve th a t he was actually prej udi ced by the defi ni tion of cohabi tant pr ov i ded to t he jury . Accordi ngly, because El li s has not demonstr ated either pro ng of the St ric k la ndtest her e, we rej ect hi s arg um e nt t hat hi s trial
c ou ns el w as i ne ffec ti ve f or f ai ling t o objec t to t he j uryi ns tru c ti on defining “cohabi tant.”

CON CL USION
¶22 Th e tri al c ou rt did no t err b y de nying E ll i s ’s mo ti on t o di s mi s s the aggra vate d ki dn ap ping cha rge, and El li s ha s not demonstrate d that his tr i al couns el prov i ded i neffec tive ass i stance by fai li ng to object t o the r easonable doubt jury i nstructi ons and the jury i nstructi on defi ning the t erm “cohabi tant.” We affi rm.