J-S09044-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: N.S., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: R.M., NATURAL MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1594 WDA 2018

Appeal from the Order Entered October 9, 2018

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Orphans’ Court at No(s): CP-02-AP-0000109-2018

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., LAZARUS, J. and STRASSBURGER, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED APRIL 26, 2019

R.M. (Mother) appeals from the order entered October 9, 2018,1in the 

Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, which terminated involuntarily 

her parental rights to her minor son, N.S. (Child), born in January 2017.2

We affirm. 

The orphans’ court summarized the factual and procedural history of 

this matter as follows. 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 The order is dated September 14, 2018, but it was filed on October 9, 

2018.

2 The order also terminated involuntarily the parental rights of Child’s father, 

N.S. (Father). The next day, the orphans’ court entered orders withdrawing 

the involuntary termination petition as to Father, confirming Father’s consent 

to Child’s adoption, and terminating his parental rights on that basis. Father 

did not appeal the termination of his parental rights, nor did he participate in 

this appeal.
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On March 24, 2017, [Child] was admitted to UPMC Children’s 

Hospital with a bucket handle fracture of his right tibia. The 

injury was diagnostic of physical child abuse and it was reported 

that medical staff determined that it could not have been caused 

by routine care of an infant. [The Allegheny County Office of 

Children, Youth and Families (CYF)] and law enforcement were 

contacted after the parents failed to provide a reasonable 

explanation for [Child]’s injury. Based upon the parent[s’]

responses or lack thereof, []CYF sought and was granted an 

emergency custody authorization for [Child] on March 24, 2017. 

[Child] was discharged from the hospital on March 26, 2017, and 

placed in the care of his maternal aunt and maternal

grandmother. []CYF conducted further investigation into the 

family and discovered that the parents did not have stable 

housing and that [Father] was a recovering heroin addict.

A shelter hearing was held on March 27, 2017[,] and the 

court ordered [Child] remain in placement. []CYF filed a 

dependency petition that day. An adjudicatory hearing was held 

on May 31, 2017 and [Child] was adjudicated dependent 

pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 6302(1). Mother was ordered to 

undergo a forensic evaluation, a drug and alcohol evaluation and 

comply with any recommendations, to attend parenting classes, 

to work with in-home services, and to engage in mental health 

services. Throughout the next month and a half, Mother visited 

[Child] regularly. 

On July 18, 2017, Mother was charged with endangering 

the welfare of children as a result of the injury inflicted upon 

[Child]. As a condition of Mother’s bail, she was ordered to have 

no contact with [Child] and all visitation ceased.

A permanency hearing was held on September 7, 2017[,]

and the court ordered that [Child] remain in placement. The 

court ordered Mother to engage in mental health treatment and 

trauma therapy at Pittsburgh Action Against Rape, hereinafter 

PAAR. Mother reported that she had received services for her 

intellectual disabilities as a child and as a result, []CYF 

recommended that she be court ordered to undergo an 

evaluation at Achieva. The court agreed and ordered Mother to 

undergo an evaluation at Achieva. 

A permanency hearing was held on October 5, 2017[,] and 

Mother was ordered to engage in mental health treatment, 
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PAAR, and Achieva. [Child] was placed in the foster home of 

S.C. and M.C.[] A permanency hearing was held on January 4, 

2018[,] and the court ordered Mother to follow through with 

West Penn Hospital for mental health treatment, medication 

management, and to follow through with PAAR and Achieva. 

Mother was engaged in trauma therapy at PAAR at the time of 

the hearing. A permanency hearing was held on April 19, 

2018[,] and the court ordered Mother to continue treatment at 

PAAR, to contact Achieva, and to get into mental health 

treatment.

The no-contact order imposed in the criminal case was 

lifted in February of 2018. The court had concerns about 

initiating visitation immediately as Mother had not seen [Child] 

in over six months. The hearing officer presiding over the case 

ordered Mother to undergo an individual psychological evaluation 

and an interactional psychological evaluation in hopes that it 

would provide the court with guidance on how to [structure 

appropriately] the visitation.[3]

Clinical psychologist Neil Rosenblum[, Ph.D.] conducted an 

individual psychological evaluation of Mother ... and an 

interactional psychological evaluation of [Child] and [] [M]other.

During the individual evaluation, [Dr. Rosenblum] assessed 

Mother’s IQ to be 68, which was at the upper end of the mild 

range of intellectual disability. During her evaluation, Mother 

reported that Father had caused the injury to [Child] and that 

she did not take [Child] to the hospital for several days despite 

knowing [Child] was seriously injured....

[]CYF filed the petition to [terminate involuntarily] 

Mother’s parental rights on May 15, 2018. On June 11, 2018, 

Mother pled guilty to one count of endangering the welfare of 

children and was sentenced to two years of probation.

____________________________________________

3 Mother did not visit with Child until an interactional evaluation on April 13, 

2018, and her regular visits did not resume until May 2018. N.T., 

9/14/2018, at 17; CYF Exhibit 3 (Dr. Rosenblum’s evaluation).
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Orphans’ Court Opinion, 12/7/2018, at 2-5 (footnotes omitted and some 

capitalization altered). 

The orphans’ court conducted a termination hearing on September 14, 

2018, after which it took the matter under advisement.4 On October 9, 

2018, the court entered the order terminating Mother’s parental rights to 

Child involuntarily. Mother timely filed a notice of appeal and concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal on November 7, 2018. She 

filed an amended notice of appeal and concise statement on November 13, 

2018, to correct a typographical error. 

Mother now raises the following claim on appeal. “Did the [orphans’] 

court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter of law in concluding that 

termination of [] Mother’s parental rights would serve the needs and welfare 

of the child pursuant 23 Pa.C.S. §[]2511(b)?” Mother’s Brief at 6. 

We review Mother’s claim mindful of our well-settled standard of 

review.

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

____________________________________________

4 Child was about 11⁄2 years old as of the date of the hearing, and Franklin 

McWilson, Esquire, served as Child’s legal counsel. At the conclusion of the 

hearing, Attorney McWilson argued in support of terminating Mother’s 

parental rights. N.T., 9/14/2018, at 96-98. He also filed a brief on appeal 

supporting termination.
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or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an 

abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely

because the record would support a different result. We have 

previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often 

have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple 

hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). 

Section 2511 of the Adoption Act governs involuntary termination of 

parental rights. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511. It requires a bifurcated analysis. 

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory 

grounds for termination delineated in [subs]ection 2511(a). 

Only if the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in 

the second part of the analysis pursuant to [subs]ection 

2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of the child....

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).

Here, the orphans’ court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant 

to subsections 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). In her brief on appeal, Mother 

concedes that CYF presented clear and convincing evidence that her parental 

rights should be terminated pursuant to subsection 2511(a)(2). See 

Mother’s Brief at 13 (“CYF, the petitioner, did clearly and convincingly 

establish threshold grounds for termination pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. 

§[]2511(a)(2).”). We need only agree with the court as to any one 

subsection of 2511(a), as well as subsection 2511(b), to affirm. In re 
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B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). Therefore, we 

need only consider whether the orphans’ court abused its discretion by 

terminating Mother’s rights pursuant to subsection 2511(b), which provides 

as follows. 

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b).

The requisite analysis is as follows.

S[ubs]ection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental 

rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and 

emotional needs and welfare of the child. As this Court has 

explained, [subs]ection 2511(b) does not explicitly require a 

bonding analysis and the term ‘bond’ is not defined in the 

Adoption Act. Case law, however, provides that analysis of the 

emotional bond, if any, between parent and child is a factor to 

be considered as part of our analysis. While a parent’s 

emotional bond with his or her child is a major aspect of the 

subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is nonetheless only 

one of many factors to be considered by the court when 

determining what is in the best interest of the child.

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court 

can equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, 

and should also consider the intangibles, such as the 

love, comfort, security, and stability the child might 

have with the foster parent. Additionally, this Court 

stated that the trial court should consider the 

importance of continuity of relationships and whether 
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any existing parent-child bond can be severed 

without detrimental effects on the child.

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting 

In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011)) (quotation marks and 

citations omitted). 

In conducting its subsection 2511(b) analysis, the orphans’ court 

found that Mother’s intellectual disability and extensive history of trauma 

interfere with her parental capacity, and render her unable to meet Child’s 

basic needs. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 12/7/2018, at 6-7. Further, Mother is 

unable to meet Child’s special medical needs. Id. The court found Mother 

“lacked insight” into and knows little about Child’s neurological and other 

medical issues. Id. Concerning Child’s relationship with Mother, the court 

found that “very little to no bond” exists between them. Id. 

The orphans’ court further reasoned that Child shares a bond with his 

pre-adoptive foster parents, Child seeks them out for comfort and support, 

and Child has formed a “very strong, primary attachment” to them. Id. at 

7. It determined that Child’s foster parents are “exceptionally proactive and 

attentive” to his basic and special medical needs. Id. Accordingly, the court 

concluded that terminating Mother’s parental rights would best serve Child’s 

needs and welfare. Id.

Mother challenges the findings of the orphans’ court, contending that 

the court committed an abuse of discretion and error of law by conducting a 

“fault-based and comparative” analysis of subsection 2511(b). Mother’s 

Brief at 18. Specifically, Mother contends that the court focused improperly 
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on her failings as a parent and on the benefits that Child would receive by 

remaining with his foster parents when assessing his needs and welfare. Id. 

The record supports the orphans’ court’s findings and we discern no 

abuse of discretion or error of law. During the termination hearing, CYF 

presented the expert testimony of Dr. Rosenblum. Dr. Rosenblum testified 

that he conducted evaluations of Mother, Child, and Child’s foster parents. 

N.T., 9/14/2018, at 66. In Dr. Rosenblum’s opinion, Mother’s intellectual 

disabilities and mental health issues interfere with her ability to parent Child. 

Id. at 69-70. As Dr. Rosenblum reported, Mother “has trouble making 

appropriate decisions” and her decisions “place[ Child] at risk.” Id. at 72. 

Significantly, this was established when Mother failed to obtain medical care 

for Child immediately after she became aware of Child’s injuries “because 

she was influenced by [Father] not to do so.” Id. Dr. Rosenblum opined 

that Mother “has never been able to maintain any degree of independence” 

and lacks stability necessary to care for Child. Id. at 71-72, 76. When Dr. 

Rosenblum evaluated Mother, she “was not even close to being able to 

stabilize her own personal functioning,” “let alone provide for the stability of 

[Child.]” Id. at 76. She failed to avail herself of Achieva’s comprehensive 

services, including independent living, parenting, and decision-making skills;

mental health intervention and counseling; vocational training; and housing. 

Id. at 73-74, 87. Moreover, Dr. Rosenblum opined that Mother does not 

have a good support system, and she has never been able to maintain her 

own housing. Id. at 70-71, 75. Mother has endured a series of troubled 
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and traumatic relationships where she relies on her boyfriends or their 

families for housing and support. Id.

Dr. Rosenblum explained that Child also exhibits special needs, 

including developmental delays and a progressive neurological disorder for 

which he is receiving ongoing evaluation and treatment.

5 Id. at 78-79. Dr. 

Rosenblum opined that Child is in need of stable and reliable caregivers who 

can provide him with appropriate medical treatment, including initiating 

appropriate medical care, coordinating medical services, and following 

through with appointments and medical recommendations; he believes that

Mother would be “very compromised and challenged” to do so. Id. at 79-

80. 

Addressing Child’s emotional well-being, Dr. Rosenblum testified that 

Child “didn’t seem to necessarily be that familiar” with Mother during their 

interactional evaluation.6 Id. at 77. Indeed, at the time of the evaluation, 

____________________________________________

5 Child’s café au lait spots suggest a diagnosis of the progressive 

neurological disorder neurofibromatosis (NF1), which results in lifelong 

concern for tumors along the nerve pathways of his body, eye lesions, and 

developmental delays. Id. at 55-57. NF1 requires close neurological 

observation and regular ophthalmic screenings. Id. at 25-27, 56, 62. Child 

also suffers from asthma, multiple allergies, and has had surgery for chronic 

ear infections. Id.

6 Dr. Rosenblum acknowledged that Child’s lack of familiarity with Mother 

was not surprising, given that he had not seen her recently. N.T., 

9/14/2018, at 77. As explained supra, the no-contact order in Mother’s 

criminal case lasted from July 2017 until February 2018. Id. at 17.

Mother’s evaluation with Child occurred on April 13, 2018, and regular visits 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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he believed that it was important for Mother to “start building a relationship” 

with Child.7 Id. at 82. Mother had difficulty providing Child with ageappropriate cognitive or developmental activities. Id. at 77-78. 

In contrast, Dr. Rosenblum testified that Child displays a very strong 

attachment to his pre-adoptive foster parents and appears to be thriving in 

their care. Id. at 80-81. Child’s foster parents are both social workers who 

have significant experience working with special needs children, and

according to Dr. Rosenblum, they are “extremely conscientious[ and] very 

well-trained in being able to interact with young children.” Id. at 80. They 

are doing an “outstanding job” and are attentive to all of his needs, and 

specifically, his medical needs.

8 Id. at 44, 55, 80-81. Dr. Rosenblum 

opined that adoption by the foster parents would best serve Child’s needs 

and welfare, explaining that it would allow Child to “remain in a home that 

[is] consistently supportive, stable and responsive to his developmental

needs, his at-risk medical needs.” Id. at 81. 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

did not resume until May 2018. Id.; CYF Exhibit 3 (Dr. Rosenblum’s 

evaluation).

7 Dr. Rosenblum reports that foster parents want Mother to have contact and 

visitation with Child and have “gone out of their way” to maintain contact 

with Mother’s extended family, including inviting them to Child’s first 

birthday party and Christmas. N.T., 9/14/2018, at 82-84. 

8 Child requires monthly doctor’s appointments, and sometimes he has two 

or three appointments per month. N.T., 9/14/2018, at 55. 
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CYF presented also the testimony of caseworker Leah Massey, who 

confirmed that foster parents are a non-kin, adoptive resource, and that 

Child is “very attached and bonded” with his foster parents. Id. at 44. 

Foster parents give Child a lot of affection, and Child likes to be held by, 

responds well to, and goes to his foster parents for support. Id. at 43. Ms. 

Massey has no concerns about Child’s care with foster parents. Id. at 44. 

Accordingly, the record supports the findings of the orphans’ court with 

respect to subsection 2511(b). The effect of Mother’s inability to provide

adequate parental care for Child is that Child’s needs and welfare cannot be 

met in Mother’s care. Mother’s parenting deficits are especially problematic 

given Child’s ongoing medical needs and her failing to seek immediate 

medical care for Child when he was the victim of child abuse at two months 

of age. Moreover, Child has had little recent interaction with Mother due to 

the no-contact order in her criminal case, and it is clear that he does not 

share a necessary and beneficial bond with her. Child is thriving in the 

home of his foster parents. They are addressing successfully all of his 

needs, he is bonded to them, and they can provide him permanency, safety, 

and security through adoption.

In reaching this conclusion, we reject Mother’s claim that the orphans’

court placed an undue emphasis on her failings as a parent. In re G.M.S., 

193 A.3d 395, 403 (Pa. Super. 2018) (rejecting mother’s “assertion that the 

orphans’ court placed an undue emphasis on her failings as a parent” in its 

subsection 2511(b) analysis). Mother is correct that subsection 2511(b) 
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focuses on Child’s needs and welfare, rather than her parental incapacity. 

In re G.M.S., 193 A.3d at 403. However, it is clear in this case that 

Mother’s parental incapacity, and the likelihood that she will never remedy 

that incapacity, is an important consideration when determining what is best 

for Child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare under 

subsection 2511(b). Id., citing C.D.R., 111 A.3d at 1220 (“Clearly, it would 

not be in Child’s best interest for his life to remain on hold indefinitely in 

hopes that Mother will one day be able to act as his parent.”) (citation 

omitted). In essence, the orphans’ court is permitted to consider the effect 

of Mother’s incapacity on Child. This is particularly the case because Child’s 

safety is at issue in Mother’s care. See In re Adoption of J.N.M., 177 A.3d 

937, 946 (Pa. Super. 2018) (holding a court may prioritize a child’s safety 

and security needs).

Further, the law permits the orphans’ court to consider the totality of 

the circumstances when examining a child’s needs and welfare. “[V]iewing 

the totality of the circumstances is entirely proper and is not the same thing 

as applying a balancing analysis.” In Interest of Coast, 561 A.2d 762, 771

(Pa. Super. 1989) (en banc) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

At the point the orphans’ court looks at a child’s needs pursuant to 

subsection 2511(b), it has already determined that the parent is unfit under 

subsection 2511(a). Id. at 770. Therefore, as part of the needs and welfare 

analysis, the law permits the orphans’ court to consider the relationship a 
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child has with his or her foster parents and to examine whether a child’s 

needs are met by the foster parents. C.D.R., 111 A.3d at 1219.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the orphans’ court did not 

abuse its discretion or commit an error of law by terminating involuntarily 

Mother’s parental rights to Child. Therefore, we affirm the court’s October 9, 

2018 order. 

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/26/2019