United States General Accounting Office 

GAO Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, 

Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, 

Committee on Armed Services, House of 

Representatives 

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 9 a.m. EST 

Thursday, October 30, 2003 CHEMICAL WEAPONS 

Better Management Tools 

Needed to Guide DOD’s 

Stockpile Destruction 

Program 

Statement of Henry L. Hinton, Jr., Managing Director, 

Defense Capabilities and Management 

GAO-04-221T 

Highlights of GAO-04-221T, a testimony 

to the Subcommittee on Terrorism, 

Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, 

Committee on Armed Services, House of 

Representatives 

Since its inception in 1985, the 

Chemical Demilitarization 

(Chem-Demil) Program has been 

charged with destroying the 

nation’s large chemical weapons 

stockpile. After years of planning 

and building new facilities, the 

program started destroying the 

stockpile in 1990. As of October 

2003, the program had destroyed 

26 percent of the 31,500-ton agent 

stockpile, and its total estimated 

cost to destroy the entire stockpile 

is more than $25 billion. 

This testimony summarizes GAO’s 

September 2003 report and 

addresses the following issues: 

(1) the status of schedule 

milestones and cost estimates, 

(2) the impact of the current 

schedule on the Chemical Weapons 

Convention (CWC) deadlines, 

(3) the challenges associated with 

managing the program, and (4) the 

status of the Chemical Stockpile 

Emergency Preparedness Program 

(CSEPP). 

GAO recommended in its 

September 2003 report that the 

Department of Defense (DOD) and 

the Army develop an overall 

strategy and implementation plan 

for the program and implement a 

risk management approach, and 

DOD concurred. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-221T. 

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Henry L. 

Hinton, Jr. at (202) 512-4300 or 

hintonh@gao.gov. 

October 30, 2003 

CHEMICAL WEAPONS 

Better Strategic and Risk Management 

Tools Needed to Guide DOD’s Stockpile 

Destruction Program 

The Chem-Demil Program faces schedule delays and higher costs, but it has 

improved emergency preparedness in communities near the sites. In 2001, 

the Chem-Demil Program extended its schedule milestones and increased its 

cost estimates from $15 billion to about $24 billion. Since then nearly all 

sites have experienced delays, stemming from problems such as: plant safety 

issues, environmental requirements, approving emergency preparedness 

plans, and funding shortfalls. The program needs a risk management plan to 

mitigate problems affecting program schedules, costs, and safety. Program 

officials say the delays have raised the cost estimates by an additional 

$1.4 billion, to more than $25 billion as of September 2003. Based on current 

schedule slippages, GAO believes that costs will grow higher and further 

delays will occur. (See figure.) 

Because of schedule delays, the United States will not meet CWC’s April 

2004 deadline to destroy 45 percent of the stockpile and it risks not meeting 

the original 2007 deadline to complete destruction of the entire stockpile. 

Unless the program fixes the problems causing delays, the United States also 

risks not meeting CWC’s deadline of 2012, if extended. 

The program has suffered from several long-standing management and 

organizational issues. The lack of sustained leadership has undercut 

decision-making authority and obscured accountability. The program’s 

complex structure, with multiple lines of authority, has left roles and 

responsibilities unclear. It does not have an overarching, comprehensive 

strategy to guide and integrate its activities and monitor its performance. 

The Army and the Federal Emergency Management Agency have helped 

state and local communities become better prepared to respond to chemical 

emergencies. Despite these gains, CSEPP costs are rising because some 

states have expanded their preparedness requests beyond the approved 

budgets. These requests amount to $88 million for fiscal years 2004 and 2005. 

Comparison of 1998, 2001, and 2003 Cumulative Program Cost Estimates 
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I appreciate the opportunity to participate in this hearing today on the 

Department of Defense’s (DOD) Chemical Demilitarization (Chem-Demil) 

Program. Since its inception in 1985, this program has been charged with 

destroying the nation’s large chemical weapons stockpile, second only to 

Russia’s in terms of its size. After years of planning and building new 

facilities, the program started destroying the stockpile in 1990. 

As you requested, my statement focuses on the following issues: (1) the 

status of schedule milestones and costs at the sites, (2) the impact that the 

current schedule may have on the Chemical Weapons Convention1

 (CWC) 

deadlines, (3) the challenges associated with managing the program, and 

(4) an update on the status of the Chemical Stockpile Emergency 

Preparedness Program (CSEPP). 

As of October 2003, the Chem-Demil Program had destroyed an estimated 

8,210 tons (26 percent) of the total 31,500 tons of the original agent 

stockpile stored at nine sites in the United States and the Pacific Ocean 

at Johnston Atoll. Of the four sites that have begun agent destruction 

operations, Johnston Atoll has destroyed all of its stockpile; Tooele, Utah, 

has reduced its stockpile by about 44 percent; Anniston, Alabama, has 

destroyed about 2 percent of its stockpile; and Aberdeen, Maryland, has 

eliminated over 3 percent of its stockpile. Current schedule estimates 

show that the Army will not complete destruction of the entire stockpile 

until after the year 2012. 

Since 1990, we have issued more than 25 reports on the Chem-Demil 

Program. Nearly half of the reviews have raised questions about the 

program’s growing costs, its inability to meet its schedule milestones, 

and its management weaknesses. 

1

 In April 1997, the United States Senate ratified the Convention on the Prohibition of 

the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their 

Destruction, commonly known as the Chemical Weapons Convention. S. Res. 75, 

April 24, 1997. 

Page 1 GAO-04-221T Chemical Weapons 
My testimony today draws heavily from our most recent report, which was 

issued in September 2003.2

 In summary, we found the following: 

• 	 While the Chem-Demil Program has revised its schedule milestones and 

increased its cost estimates several times, with the latest revision in 2001, 

the program still cannot meet them. According to current Army schedules 

for destruction, five sites will miss their 2001 schedule milestones, less 

than 2 years after they were reset. The other four sites have not yet missed 

schedule milestones, but they too have experienced delays. Most of the 

substantial delays have stemmed from problems that DOD and the Army 

have been unable to anticipate or influence. These include plant safety 

issues, difficulties in meeting environmental permitting requirements, 

public concerns about emergency preparedness plans, and funding 

shortfalls. Neither DOD nor the Army has adopted a comprehensive risk 

management approach that could help mitigate potential problems that 

affect program schedules, costs, and safety by anticipating problems and 

developing mitigation plans. Army officials told us they are now 

developing such an approach. According to program officials, the delays 

that have occurred since the 2001 schedule revisions, along with the 

resolution of emergency preparedness issues, have raised the program’s 

cost estimates by $1.4 billion, to a current total of more than $25 billion. 

We expect this amount will grow substantially before the destruction of 

the stockpile is complete if these delays continue. 

• 	 Because of schedule delays, the United States will not meet CWC’s 

April 2004 deadline to destroy 45 percent of the chemical stockpile. The 

United States recently asked the governing body of the convention for an 

extension beyond the April 2004 deadline. If the delays that the program 

has experienced continue, the United States also risks not meeting the 

2007 deadline to destroy 100 percent of the stockpile. Unless the 

Chem-Demil Program is able to fix the problems that have caused these 

delays, the United States also risks not meeting CWC’s deadline, if 

extended to 2012, to destroy the entire stockpile. The CWC allows 

extensions of up to 5 years to the 2007 deadline. 

• 	 Despite recent efforts to improve the management and streamline the 

organization of the Chem-Demil Program, the program has suffered from 

several long-standing and unresolved leadership, organizational, and 

strategic planning issues. The program has lacked sustained leadership at 

2

 U.S. General Accounting Office, Chemical Weapons: Sustained Leadership, Along 

with Key Strategic Management Tools, Is Needed to Guide DOD’s Destruction Program, 

GAO-03-1031 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 5, 2003). 

Page 2 GAO-04-221T Chemical Weapons 
both the upper levels of oversight and at the program-manager level, 

which undercuts decision-making authority and obscures accountability.3 

In addition, the program’s complex management structure, with multiple 

lines of authority within the Army and the separation of program 

components among the Army, DOD, and the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA), has left roles and responsibilities for the 

different parts of the program unclear. FEMA manages the emergency 

preparedness program (CSEPP) for communities near the storage sites. 

Finally, the absence of an overarching, comprehensive strategy has 

resulted in a program without a clear road map to closely guide and 

integrate all of its activities and monitor its performance. 

• 	 Since our 2001 report,4 the Army and FEMA have helped state and local 

communities become better prepared to respond to chemical emergencies. 

Based on the states’ self-assessments and FEMA’s reviews, all of the states 

with nearby chemical storage sites are considered close to being fully 

prepared for emergency issues. However, despite these accomplishments, 

CSEPP costs continue to rise because some state and local communities 

have expanded their emergency preparedness requests beyond their 

approved budgets, exceeding them by $88 million for fiscal years 2004 and 

2005, especially as they move closer to agent operations phase. FEMA and 

the Army have implemented a number of recommendations we made to 

improve technical assistance and guidance, training, and compliance 

measures to assess preparedness. 

Most Sites Will Miss 

Schedule Milestones 

due to Program’s 

Inability to Anticipate 

and Influence Issues 

Despite several revisions to schedule milestones since the program’s 

inception, the Chem-Demil Program still is unable to meet these 

milestones because of unanticipated delays. Most incineration sites have 

missed important milestones established in 2001. Delays at Anniston, 

Umatilla, and Pine Bluff have already resulted in their missing the 

2001 schedule milestones to begin chemical agent destruction operations 

(operations phase).5

 Johnston Atoll has missed its schedule milestone 

for shutting down the facility (closure phase).6

 Although Tooele has not 

3

 Upper level refers to the offices of the assistant secretary or above in the Departments of 

the Army and Defense. 

4 Chemical Weapons: FEMA and Army Must Be Proactive in Preparing States for 

Emergencies, GAO-01-850 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 13, 2001). 

5

 At the time of the 2001 schedule revision, all three of these sites were in the systemization 

phase; thus, their next milestone was to begin agent destruction operations. 

6

 At the time of the 2001 schedule revision, agent destruction operations had been 

completed and its next milestone was to complete closure of the facility. 

Page 3 GAO-04-221T Chemical Weapons 
missed any milestones since the 2001 schedule was issued, the site has 

undergone substantial delays in destroying its stockpile primarily because 

of a safety-related incident in July 2002. If additional delays occur at the 

Tooele site, it could also exceed its next milestone as well. Table 1 shows 

the status of the incineration sites that will miss 2001 schedule milestones. 

Table 1: Slippage of 2001 Scheduled Milestone Dates, by Incineration Site 

Difference 

between 

2001 schedule 2001 schedule 

Next schedule date to begin Date to begin and estimate 

Site milestone next milestone next phasea (no. of months) 

Anniston Operations July 2002 Aug. 2003 +13 

Umatilla Operations July 2003 Mar. 2004 +8 

Pine Bluff Operations Oct. 2003 Apr. 2004 +6 

Johnston Atoll End of closure Sept. 2003 Nov. 2003 +2 

Sources: DOD and the U.S. Army. 

a

Program manager’s official estimates for Pine Bluff, Umatilla and Johnston Atoll. 

Many of the recent delays at the incineration sites have resulted from 

operations incidents, from environmental permitting problems, 

community protection concerns, and funding issues—a trend that we 

identified in previous reports on the program. Among the events that have 

caused delays at incineration sites since 2001 are the following: 

• 	 Incidents during operations. At Tooele, a chemical incident involving a 

plant worker who came into contact with a nerve agent while performing 

routine maintenance led to the suspension of agent destruction operations 

from July 2002 to March 2003. An investigation attributed the incident to 

inadequate or poorly followed worker safety procedures, and a corrective 

action plan, including an improved safety plan, was instituted before 

operations resumed. Since operations restarted in March 2003, Tooele has 

experienced several temporary shutdowns. 

• 	 Environmental permitting. Several environmental permitting issues have 

delayed the start of agent destruction operations at sites at Umatilla and 

Anniston.7

 At Umatilla, the delays stemmed from several unanticipated 

7

 We have reported on permitting delays in Chemical Weapons And Materiel: Key 

Factors Affecting Disposal Costs and Schedule, GAO/NSIAD-97-18 (Washington, D.C.: 

Feb. 10, 1997). 

Page 4 GAO-04-221T Chemical Weapons 
engineering changes related to reprogramming software and design 

changes that required permit modifications and to a shutdown by state 

regulators because furnaces were producing an unanticipated high amount 

of heavy metals during surrogate agent testing. At Anniston, delays 

occurred because state environmental regulators did not accept test 

results for one of the furnaces because the subcontractor did not follow 

state permit-specified protocols. 

• 	 Community protection. Concerns about emergency preparedness for 

local communities have led to additional delays at Anniston. These 

concerns included the inadequacy of protection plans for area schools and 

for special needs residents (e.g., elderly and disabled individuals) who 

would have difficulty in an evacuation. Although we reported on this issue 

in July 19968

 and again in August 2001, and a senior DOD official identified 

it as a key concern in September 2001, the Army had difficulty 

satisfactorily resolving the issue with key state stakeholders. As a result, 

operations did not begin until August 2003. 

• 	 Funding. Delays at Pine Bluff and Johnston Atoll occurred because 

DOD redirected fiscal year 2002 destruction program funds to acquire 

$40.5 million worth of additional emergency protection equipment for 

Anniston. To cover this unfunded budget expense, the Army reduced 

Pine Bluff’s budget by $14.9 million and Johnston Atoll’s budget by 

$25.1 million, leading to systemization and closure milestone slippages, 

respectively, at these sites. Program officials told us that the total cost of 

this schedule slip would ultimately be $116 million due to the extended 

period before closure. The program is likely to face unfunded 

requirements as programwide funding requests continue to exceed 

budgeted amounts. As of October 2003, according to preliminary 

estimates from FEMA, unfunded CSEPP requirements for all sites are 

expected to amount to $39.4 million and $49.0 million for fiscal years 2004 

and 2005, respectively. 

Unlike the incineration sites, the two bulk-agent only sites, Aberdeen and 

Newport, have experienced delays but have not breeched their schedule 

milestones. In 2002, DOD approved using an alternative technology 

(neutralization), instead of incineration, at these two sites. This technology 

is expected to accelerate the rate of destruction at these two sites. The 

8

 See U.S. General Accounting Office, Chemical Weapons Stockpile: 

Emergency Preparedness in Alabama Is Hampered by Management Weaknesses, 

GAO/NSIAD-96-150 (Washington, D.C: July 23, 1996). 

Page 5 GAO-04-221T Chemical Weapons 
Army estimated that this process would reduce the scheduled end of 

operations at both sites by 5 years, from 2008 to 2003 at Aberdeen and 

from 2009 to 2004 at Newport. However, Aberdeen has encountered 

unanticipated problems with the removal of residual agent from bulk 

containers and has extended its planned completion date by 6 months, 

from October 2003 to March 2004. In addition, Newport has faced 

construction delays and community resistance to offsite treatment of 

waste byproducts. As a result of these delays, Newport has extended its 

planned start date for agent operations by 5 months, from October 2003 to 

February 2004. 

At two sites, Pueblo, Colorado, and Blue Grass, Kentucky, no milestones 

were set in the 2001 schedule because DOD had not yet selected a 

destruction technology. DOD has now selected a destruction technology 

for these sites, but it made decisions several months later than estimated. 

More importantly, DOD has set initial schedule milestones for these 

two sites that go beyond the extended April 2012 CWC deadline. 

According to DOD officials, these milestones are preliminary and will be 

reevaluated once contractors finish initial facility designs. 

The Chem-Demil Program has faced continued delays with the program 

largely because DOD and the Army have not yet developed a risk 

management approach to proactively anticipate and address potential 

problems that could adversely affect program schedules, costs, and safety. 

Such an approach could also leverage knowledge of potential problems 

gained at other sites. Instead, according to a DOD official, the program has 

used a crisis management approach, which has forced it to react to, rather 

than control, issues. The program had drafted a plan in June 2000 that was 

intended to address these issues. However, according to a program 

official, this plan was never approved or implemented because of a change 

in management in 2001. 

The delays and schedule extensions9

 have contributed directly to program 

cost growth, according to program officials. As a result, DOD’s total 

program cost estimate grew from $15 billion to $24 billion between 1998 

and 2001. (See fig. 1.) Because of delays encountered since the 2001 

revisions, the Army is now in the process of developing new milestones 

that will extend beyond those adopted in 2001. According to an Army 

9

 Schedule extensions are caused largely by actual destruction rates being lower 

than planned. 

Page 6 GAO-04-221T Chemical Weapons 
official, the program will use events that have occurred since 2001 in 

presenting new cost estimates to DOD for preparation of the fiscal year 

2005 budget submission. Program officials told us that they estimate new 

costs had increased by $1.4 billion as of October 2003, and this estimate is 

likely to rise further as additional factors are considered. 

Figure 1: Comparison of 1998, 2001, and 2003 Cumulative Program Cost Estimates 

Although the United States met the first two chemical weapons treaty 

deadlines, the continuing delays jeopardize its ability to meet the final 

two deadlines. (See table 2.) Since reaching the 2002 deadline to destroy 

20 percent of the stockpile in July 2001, the Chem-Demil Program has been 

able to destroy only an additional 3 percent of the stockpile. In order to 

meet the April 2004 CWC deadline to destroy 45 percent of the stockpile, 

the program would have to eliminate an additional 22 percent of the 

stockpile within the next 6 months. Because the program will likely not be 

able to achieve this rate of destruction, the United States has asked for an 

extension of the 2004 deadline. 

According to current destruction schedules, the United States will not 

meet the 2007 deadline to eliminate 100 percent of the stockpile. As a 

result, the United States will likely have to ask for an extension of the 2007 

deadline to complete the destruction of the entire stockpile. The CWC 

allows extensions of up to 5 years beyond the 2007 deadline. Unless the 

Schedule Delays 

Jeopardize Ability 

of Program to Meet 

CWC Deadlines 

Page 7 GAO-04-221T Chemical Weapons 
program fixes the problems that are causing schedule delays, the United 

States also risks not meeting this deadline, if extended to 2012. 

Table 2: CWC Deadlines 

Required percentage of Deadlines for Date United States 

agent destroyed destruction met deadline 

1 April 29, 2000 September 1997 

20 April 29, 2002 July 2001 

45 April 29, 2004 Will not meet 

100 April 29, 2007 Will not meet 

Long-standing 

Management and 

Organizational 

Weaknesses Hamper 

Program Progress 

Sources: CWC and U.S. Army. 

Despite recent efforts to improve the management and streamline the 

organization of the Chem-Demil Program, the program continues to falter 

because several long-standing leadership, organizational, and strategic 

planning weaknesses remain unresolved. The lack of sustained leadership 

has undercut decision-making authority and obscured accountability. The 

program’s complex structure, with many lines of authority, has left roles 

and responsibilities unclear. Finally, the program lacks an overarching, 

comprehensive strategy to guide and integrate its activities and monitor 

performance. 

Leadership Shifts The Chem-Demil Program’s lack of sustained leadership above the 

Affect Continuity in program level is underscored by the multiple shifts in oversight 

Decision Making responsibilities that have occurred three times between DOD and the 

Army during the past two decades. The most recent change took place in 

2001 when oversight responsibility for the program shifted back to DOD’s 

Office of the Secretary of Defense. Table 3 summarizes the changes. 

Page 8 GAO-04-221T Chemical Weapons 
Table 3: Transfer of Program Oversight Responsibilities between DOD and 

the Army, 1986-Present 

Year Oversight authority Action 

1986 Army 	 DOD designates the Army as the executive 

agent for the Chem-Demil Program. 

1994 DOD 	 DOD makes the program a major defense 

acquisition program and oversight is elevated to 

control cost and schedule increases and to 

raise program visibility. 

1998 Army 	 DOD delegates decision-making authority to the 

Army, primarily as part of its overall effort to 

reduce responsibilities and staffing of its offices. 

2001 DOD 	 DOD reinstates its position as the program’s top 

decision maker. According to DOD, this was 

done to streamline decision making, which is 

consistent with the cost of the program and 

national and state interest in the safe and timely 

destruction of the stockpile. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

These shifts in oversight responsibilities affected the continuity of 

program decision making and obscured accountability. As a different 

office assumed major decision authority, the program’s emphasis 

shifted and initiatives that had been started were often not completed. 

For example, when the Army had oversight responsibility for the program, 

it established a memorandum of understanding with FEMA to clarify each 

of their roles and responsibilities related to CSEPP.10 However, after DOD 

assumed the program’s oversight responsibilities in 2001, DOD did not 

follow the protocols for coordination that had been established in the 

memorandum, according to FEMA and DOD officials. As a result, DOD 

provided funds for emergency preparedness items without having 

adequate plans for distribution, which delayed the process. This shift in 

oversight responsibilities from the Army to DOD also left state and local 

community officials and other stakeholders uncertain as to the credibility 

of federal officials. According to FEMA and Army officials, coordination 

between the two agencies has improved in the last few months and efforts 

are being made to repair relationships with community and state 

stakeholders. 

10 U.S. General Accounting Office, Chemical Weapons: FEMA and Army Must 

Be Proactive in Preparing States for Emergencies, GAO-01-850 (Washington, D.C.: 

Aug. 13, 2001). 

Page 9 GAO-04-221T Chemical Weapons 
Similar problems have also occurred within the Army as program 

leadership has changed. Three different officials at the Assistant Secretary 

level have held senior leadership positions since December 2001. In 

addition, five officials have served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the 

Army (Chem-Demil) during that time.11 From April 2002 to February 2003, 

the program manager’s position remained vacant for nearly 1 year, before 

being filled. However, after only 4 months, the program manager resigned 

and the Army named a replacement. 

Frequent shifts in key leadership positions have led to several instances 

where the lack of continuity affected decision making and obscured 

accountability. For example, in June 2002, a program official promised to 

support future funding requests for emergency preparedness equipment 

from one community, but his successor did not fulfill this promise. Other 

communities viewed the agreement with one community as an opportunity 

to substantially expand their own funding requests. The lack of sustained 

leadership makes it unclear who is accountable when program 

commitments are made and not fulfilled. Moreover, when key leaders do 

not remain in their positions to develop the needed long-term perspective 

on program issues and effectively implement program initiatives, it is 

difficult to maintain program progress and ensure accountability for 

leadership actions. 

Program Management 

Structure Remains 

Complex 

As our 2003 report documents, the Army recently reorganized the 

program. But this change in management structure has not streamlined 

the program’s complex organization nor clarified roles and 

responsibilities. The establishment of the Chemical Materials Agency 

(CMA) in January 2003 has left the Director reporting to two different 

senior Army organizations, which is one more than under the previous 

structure. This divided reporting approach is still not fully developed, 

but has the potential to adversely affect program coordination and 

accountability. The reorganization has also divided the responsibility 

for various program phases between two offices within CMA. One 

organization, the Program Manager for the Elimination of Chemical 

Weapons, will manage the first three phases (design, construction, and 

systemization) for each site, and a newly created organization, the 

Director of Operations, will manage the final two phases (operations and 

11 This position is now the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Elimination of 

Chemical Weapons). 

Page 10 GAO-04-221T Chemical Weapons 
closure). This reorganization changes the cradle-to-grave management 

approach that was used to manage sites in the past and has blurred 

responsibilities for officials who previously provided support in areas 

such as quality assurance and safety. Moreover, the reorganization did 

not address two program components—Assembled Chemical Weapons 

Alternatives (ACWA) program and community-related CSEPP. DOD will 

continue to manage ACWA separately from the Army, as congressionally 

directed. In addition, the Army will continue to manage CSEPP jointly 

with FEMA. 

Program Lacks Strategy 

and Implementation Plan 

While DOD and the Army have issued numerous policies and guidance 

documents for the Chem-Demil Program, they have not developed an 

overarching, comprehensive strategy or an implementation plan to guide 

the program and monitor its progress. This is contrary to the principals 

that leading organizations embrace to effectively implement and manage 

programs. Some key aspects of an approach typically used to effectively 

manage programs include promulgating a comprehensive strategy that 

includes a clearly stated mission, long-term goals, and methods to 

accomplish these goals. An implementation plan that includes annual 

performance goals, measurable performance indicators, and evaluation 

and corrective action plans is also important. According to DOD and Army 

officials, the Chem-Demil Program has relied primarily on guidance and 

planning documents related to the acquisition process.12 However, in 

response to our recent recommendation that they prepare such a strategy 

and plan, DOD stated that it is in the initial stages of doing so and 

estimates completion in fiscal year 2004. 

Emergency 

Preparedness 

Program Is Improving, 

but Costs Are Rising 

Since our 2001 report, the Army and FEMA have assisted state and 

local communities to become better prepared to respond to chemical 

emergencies. Based on the states’ self-assessments and FEMA’s reviews, 

all 10 states with chemical storage sites located within them or nearby are 

now considered close to being fully prepared to respond to a chemical 

emergency. This is a marked improvement from the status we reported in 

200113 when 3 states reported that they were far from being prepared. Now, 

6 of the 10 states are reporting that their status is fully prepared and the 

12 Acquisition programs establish program goals for cost, schedule, and performance 

parameters over the program’s life cycle. 

13 GAO-01-850. 

Page 11 GAO-04-221T Chemical Weapons 
remaining 4 are close to being fully prepared. However, these statuses are 

subject to change because the states and communities themselves can 

revise or expand their agreed-upon emergency preparedness needs. They 

can make these changes because the “maximum protection” concept that 

governs CSEPP is open to interpretation. As a result, they can appear to be 

less prepared than before. For example, Oregon certified that it was fully 

prepared, but now has requested additional emergency equipment. This 

request has changed Oregon’s self-reported preparedness status from fully 

prepared to incomplete. 

Despite these accomplishments, CSEPP costs continue to rise because, 

according to Army and FEMA officials, state and local communities may 

add to their emergency requirements beyond approved requests. Army and 

FEMA officials explain that the states often identify and expand their 

requirements, especially as destruction facilities move closer to the start 

of the operations phase. For example, the states of Colorado, Alabama, 

and Oregon have all requested funds for infrastructure, including roads 

and bridges. In June 2002, Oregon certified that its community readiness 

was adequate and recommended permit approval to allow test burns at 

Umatilla. Since that time, Oregon has asked for additional emergency 

preparedness support that exceeds its CSEPP budget. This request follows 

a pattern of substantially increasing funding requests at the start of the 

operations phase, as occurred at Anniston in 2001 when it received 

$40.5 million for additional CSEPP items. Programwide, new requirements 

continue to exceed approved CSEPP funding levels. FEMA has little 

control over the additional funding requests made by the states. As of 

October 2003, FEMA had identified $39.4 and $49.0 million in unfunded 

requirements for fiscal years 2004 and 2005, respectively. (See table 4.) 

Page 12 GAO-04-221T Chemical Weapons 
Table 4: CSEPP Unfunded Requirements (UFR) for Fiscal Years 2004 and 2005, as of October 2003 

Dollars in millions 

FY2004 unfunded requirements FY2005 unfunded requirements 

FY2004 FY2005 

Funding entity FY2004 funded requirements FY2004 UFRs FY2005 funded requirements FY2005 UFRs 

Alabama 21.0 41.9 21.0 19.7 36.7 

Arkansas 16.9 24.7 7.8 3.6 13.1 

Colorado 3.1 2.8 -0.3 2.5 4.5 

Confederated 

Tribes 0.2 3.7 3.5 0.2 0.9 

Illinois 0.9 0.8 -0.1 0.8 0.7 

Indiana 3.9 4.7 0.8 2.3 6.0 

Kentucky 4.3 5.3 1.0 3.7 4.4 

Maryland 2.3 1.5 -0.8 1.8 2.0 

Oregon 5.7 12.4 6.7 4.5 13.9 

Utah 5.6 5.6 0.0 7.1 7.0 

Washington 5.9 5.8 -0.1 3.1 5.3 

FEMA support 18.7 18.7 0.0 22.6 26.5 

Total 88.5 127.9 39.4 72.0 120.9 

Source: FEMA data. 

In our August 2001 report, we recommended that the Army and FEMA 

(1) provide technical assistance, guidance, and leadership to the three 

states (Alabama, Indiana, and Kentucky) with long-standing emergency 

preparedness issues to resolve their concerns; (2) provide all states and 

their communities with training and assistance in preparing budget and 

life-cycle cost estimates and provide guidance and plans on reentry; and 

(3) establish specific measures of compliance with the benchmarks to 

more evenly assess performance and to correctly identify requirements. 

The Army is continuing to provide assistance to CSEPP states and 

communities as requested by FEMA. FEMA now participates more often 

in local community CSEPP activities and sponsors an annual CSEPP 

conference in an effort to improve its working relationships. FEMA 

has also provided software to simplify development of CSEPP financial 

reporting documents and has published a Reentry and Recovery 

Workbook. The workbook fills a void in state and local guidance for 

emergency responders to follow in the event of a chemical emergency. 

Lastly, FEMA expanded its capability assessment readiness tool to assist 

local communities in quantifying benchmark scores. 

Page 13 GAO-04-221T Chemical Weapons 

17.0 

9.6 

1.9 

0.7 

0.0 

3.7 

0.7 

0.2 

9.4 

-0.1 

2.2 

3.9 

49.0 
Agencies’ Actions to 

Implement Prior GAO 

Recommendations 

(350462) 

We recommended in our September 2003 report that the Secretary of 

Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology and Logistics, in conjunction with the Secretary of the Army, 

to (1) develop an overall strategy and implementation plan for the 

chemical demilitarization program and (2) implement a risk management 

approach that anticipates and influences internal and external factors that 

could adversely impact program performance. DOD concurred with our 

recommendations. It said that it was in the initial stages of developing an 

overall strategy and implementation plan and estimated that it would be 

completed in fiscal year 2004. It also said that CMA will review the 

progress of an evaluation of several components of its risk management 

approach within 120 days and then that DOD would evaluate the results 

and determine any appropriate action. In our 2001 report, we 

recommended that the Army and FEMA make improvements to the 

program, and they have implemented those recommendations. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to respond 

to any questions that you or members of the Subcommittee may have. 

Contacts and Acknowledgments 

For future questions regarding this testimony, please contact me at (202) 

512-4300. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony include 

Donald Snyder, Rodell Anderson, Bonita Oden, John Buehler, Nancy 

Benco, and Mike Zola. 

Page 14 GAO-04-221T Chemical Weapons 
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