1

07- 3003- cr U nit ed States v. Stew art UN ITED STA TES CO URT OF AP P EALS F OR TH E S ECO N D CI RCU IT Aug us t T er m, 200 7 (A rgue d: J un e 24 , 20 08 Dec id ed: J anu ary 8, 200 9) Do cket No . 07 -3 003 -c r U NI T ED S TATES O F A M ERI CA ,

Appella nt , v. B RE TT S TEWART ,

Defenda nt-App ellee
. B ef or e: WI NT ER , M I NER , and C AB R ANES , Circuit Jud ges . App eal f r om an o r der

of th e Unit ed S tat es Di s tr

ict Cou r t f or th e So uthern D is tr

ict of New Yor k ( Alv inK. Heller s te in , Judge

) granting defendant’s motion to suppr ess evidence seiz ed pursuant to a traffic stop. T he District Court held that, for a traffic stop t o withstand scrut iny under the Fourth Amendment, a law e nforcement officer mus t have (a) probable cause to belie ve that a traffic viola tion
occ ur r ed o r

(b ) r eas on abl e s us pi cio n that “cr im in al act ivi ty ,” d ef in ed t o ex clu de tr af

fi c vi ol ati on s , “m ay be a foo t. ” Th e D ist ric t C ou rt e rre d b ec a use re a son a bl e su spi ci on of a tra ffi c vio la ti on pro vi de s a suff icient ba sis under the Fourth Amendment to make a traffic stop. Vacat ed an d Rem and ed. D A V I D A. O’ N E IL , Assis tant United States Attorney (Michael J. Gar cia, Unit ed S tat es At to r ney , on the brief , Katherine Po lk F ailla, As s is tan t U ni te d S tat es At to r ney , of counsel ), Unit ed S tat es At to r ney ’s Of fi ce f or th e So uthern D is tr

ictThe f act s des cr i bed i n t hi s s ect i on e i t her ar e undi s put ed or were f ound by t he D i s t r i ct C our t af t er an 1 e v id e n tia r y h e a r in g h e ld o n M a r c h 2 8 , 2 0 0 7
. S ee U nite d S tates v. S tew a rt

, 4 9 1 F . S u p p . 2 d 4 2 3 , 4 2 5 (S .D .N .Y . 2 0 0 7 ). T h e D istr ic t C o u r t’s O p in io n a n d O r d e r re fe r s to th e liv e r y c a b a s a “ ta x ic a b .” S ee S tew a rt , 491 F. Supp. 2d at 2 425. 2 of New Yor k, N ew Yo r k, N Y, for Appellan t United Sta tes o f A mer ic a. E DWA R D S. Z AS , F ede r al D ef end er s of New Yor k, I nc. , N ew Yor k, N Y, for Defendant-Ap pellee Brett Stewart. J OS É A. C AB R ANES , Circuit Jud ge : The government appea ls fr om a June 13, 2007 order of the United Sta tes Dis trict Court for the So uthern D is tr

ict of New Yor k ( Alv inK. Heller s te in , Judge

) gr ant in g de fe nd ant -a pp ell ee B r et t S tewar t’ s motion to s uppress evidenc e from his trial for violating 18 U.S.C . § 922(g), w hich prohibits a felon fr om po s s es s in g a f

ir ear m. See United States v. Stewart , 49 1 F . Supp . 2d423 , 43 0 ( S.D .N .Y. 200 7) . T hi s appea l requires us to determine whether the District Court err ed by suppress ing evide nce seize d by the po lic e pu r s uan t t o a tr af

fi c s to p b ecau s e (a) the p ol ice l acke d p r ob abl e cau s e t o b eli eve that a tr af fi c vio lat io n h ad o ccu r r ed o r , inth e alt er nat ive , ( b) lack ed r eas on abl e s us pi cio n that “cr im in al act ivi ty may be af oo t” bec aus e t r af

fi c vi ol ati on s ar e no t “ cr

im in al act ivi ty .” A s s et

fo r thmo r e f

ully b elo w, we
co nc lu de tha t th e D ist ric t C ou rt e rre d b ec a use re a son a bl e su spi ci on of a tra ffi c v io la ti on pro vi de s a suff icient ba sis under the Fourth Amendment for law e nforcement officers to make a traffic s top. BAC KGROUND 1 I n the e arly m orni ng o f A ugu s t 2 9, 2 006 , B r et t S tewar t r od e as a pas s eng er ina li ver y cab 2 dr ive n b y Wil fr edo J im ene z, b ou ndfo r a des ti nat io n i n the B r on x. A t the i nt er s ect io n o f 1 65th S tr eet and Brook Avenue, the l ivery ca b stopped at a red light. From the opposit e direction, two officers of the New Y ork City Police Department (“NYPD”), Robert Re gnier and A ngel Torres , approache d the in te r s ect io n i n anun mar keds edan . T he o ff icer s te s ti fi ed that , as th ey cr os s ed the i nt er s ect io n, th ey s aw3

th e li ver y cab ’s fr on t whee ls unlawf ully en cr oachin g onth e cr os s walk
. See N. Y. Ve h. & T r af

. L aw § 1172(a ) (“[E]very driver of a vehic le approac hing a stop sign . . . shall stop befor e entering the
cr os s walk onth e ne ar

s id e of th e in te r s ect

io n. ”) . I n r es po ns e, Reg

ni er andT orr es mad e a “u -turn, ” pulled up behi nd the cab, turned on their police lights, and ordered the ca b to pull over. The officers app r oach ed the c ar , an d T or r es as kedJ im ene z wh ether “ev erythi ng w as alr

igh t. ” Stewart

, 491 F. Supp. 2dat 4 25- 26. Regnier , m eanwhile, walk ed t o the b ack o f the c ab, whe r e St ewar t w as s it ti ng, andas ked
to s ee St ewar t’ s han ds . St ewar t c om pl iedat f ir s t, pu tt in g bo thhan ds onhi s lap , b ut th en h e hi d his right hand behind his right buttock. Reg nier then ordered Stewart out of the car, and Stew art exited, bu t o nce ou ts id e the c ar , h e turnedhi s bo dy s uchth at his r igh t s id e was s hi eld ed f

r omRegnier ’s view. Id
. at 4 26. Regnier

r es po nd ed b y in s truct

in g St ewar t t o p lace hi s han ds onth e tr un k o f the l ive ry cab
. WhenSt ewar t f

ail ed t o co mp ly p r om pt

ly, Regnier

s eize d S tewar t, tu r nedhi m ar ou nd , an d f or cedhi s han ds onth e t r un k o f the c ab. St ewar t r es po nd ed, acco r di ng t o the p ol ice o ff icer s : “T ake i t e as y, of fi cer ; I only h ave a l

it tl e thi r ty -e igh t. ” Id

. Reg nier recovered a “.25 ca liber Raven Arms
s emi aut om ati c han dgu n” f r om St ewar t’ s r

igh t r ear po cket andar r es te d him
. Id

. St ewar t w as char

gedwith p os s es s io n o f afi r ear m af te r a pr io r con vic ti onof a cr im e pu ni s hab le by a term of imprisonm ent that exce eds one yea r, in violation of 18 U.S.C . § 922(g). He moved to
s up pr es s th e evi den ce again s t him onFo ur thAme nd men t gr ou nd s , an d o n M ar ch 2 8, 2 007 , the D is tr ict Cou r t h eldan ev

id ent iar y he ar in g, af te r whi ch i t gr ant ed S tewar t’ s mo ti on . O n the ques ti onof whe th er the livery c ab enc roached on the c ros swalk, the District Court found J imenez ’s test imony more pe rsua siv e t ha n th a t of

the po li ce off

ic er s: While Tor res and Regni er both test ified that they observed that the front wheels and front po r ti onof th e t axi cab w er e onor

ov er th e cr os s walk

lin e( s ) an d, th er ef

or e, i n the i nt er s ect

io n as they passed through in the patrol car, Jimenez insisted that he had c ome to a full and c omplete stop befor e the intersection, and tha t the wheel s and front end of his vehicle ha d not passed the lines of the cross walk . Jimenez testified that he kne w this because he ha d noticed the red lig ht4

from a dist ance as he approac hed, and tha t he had dec elerated w ell before arriving a t the in te r s ect io n. Both of ficers tes tified that their focus was upon Stewart, seated in the rear right corner of the vehicl e, the seat furthest f

rom both the taxic ab’s front left wheeland the officers’ vantage point as th ey d r ov e thr ough the i nt er s ect io n an d the r ed l

igh t. T he o ff

icer s te s ti fi ed al s o that

th ey did not observe the tr affic infraction until they w ere at lea st midway through the intersection and observing the vehicle from a “close [ ] . . . side angle .” In light of this t estimony, and taking no ti ce of t he fa cttha t a sta ti on a ry ob je ctma y sh iftin on e’ s vi sua l p er ce pti on a s on e m ov es p a st it —that an o bj ect abu tt in g a s tr aigh t l

in e may app ear

to be o ver

th at l in e as an o bs er

ver mo ves past and awa y from that line—[the Distr ict Court] find[s] Jimenez’s testimony regarding the location of his vehicl e in relation to the line to be more credible. Mr. Jimenez ha d been driving a ta xic ab f or clo s e t o a d ecad e, h ad n o cr im in al r eco r d, andhadnev er bee n arr es te d. He g ave a calm , cl ear , an d co ns is te nt acco un t o f the e ven ts of

th e ear ly m orni ng h ou r s of

Aug us t 2 9, 2 006 , and his testimony was persuasive. [The Court] f ind[s], for the purposes of Stewart’s s uppress ion mo ti on , that

J im ene z di d n ot

vio lat e Sec ti on117 2(a) o f N ew Yo r k Vehicl e andT r af fi c L aw. Id
. at 426-27 (internal ci tations omitted) ( firs t alteration in original ). While the Distr

ict Court found Jimenez’s testimony on this is sue more pers uasive than that of the officers, it did not dis miss the officers’ t estimony as false. Ins tead, the District Court concluded tha t an opticalillusion or dis traction may hav e cau s ed the o ff

icer s to bel

iev e that th ey h ad s eenth e li

ver y cab ’s whe els ent er

th e cr os s walk
. The Di stri ctC ou rt a lso sta te d th a t “ [w ]i th r esp ec t to the re ma in de r of t he re le va nt f a ct s, [ it ] a cc ep t[s] th e acco un ts of

th e po lic e of

fi cer s .” Id
. at 4 27. Hav in g de te r mi nedth at the c ab didno t e ncr oachonth e cr os s walk , the D is tr ict Cou r t e xp lai ned that the traffic st op would neve rtheless be val id if: (1) the police ha d probable ca use to believe tha t the liv er y cab vio lat ed N ew Yo r k’s mo to r vehicl e co de, or

(2) the p ol

ice h ad a r eas on abl e s us pi cio n that “cr im in al act ivi ty may be af oo t. ” Id
. at 4 28. I n the D is tr

ict Cou r t’ s view, n either

was th e cas e. Firs t, the Distr

ict Court held that the polic e lac ked probable c ause for the tr affic stop “[i]n light of the relative moveme nts of the two vehic les, the focus of attention by the police officers on the passenger in the rear seat, and the fac t that the officers did not detect an i ncursion into the inters ection
un til they wer e eve n wi thth e s to pp ed t axi cab a ndpas s in g by it .” Id
. Fr omth e Di s tr

ict Cou r t’ sT h e D istr ic t C o u r t fu r th e r c o n c lu d e d th a t S te w a r t’s b e h a v io r in th e b a c k se a t o f th e c a b

— “ w a tc h in g . . . 3 cl osel y as t he[ ] unm arked pol i ce car . . . drove t hrough a r ed l i ght and past t he t axi cab, ” S tew a rt , 491 F. Supp. 2d at 429— di d not cr eat e a r eas ona bl e s us pi ci on o f cr i m i nal ac t i vi t y under t he c i r cum s t anc es . Accor di ng t o t he D i s t r i ct C o u r t, “[ t]h a t . . . is n o r m a l b e h a v io r fo r a n y o n e in a sto p p e d c a r a t 3 a .m . i n a c r im e -f ille d a r e a . A n d , e v e n if S te w a r t’s i nt er es t i n t he o ff

i cer s was s om ewhat s us pi ci ous , t hi s al one f al l s s hor t of

t he p ar t i cul ar i z ed and ob j ect i ve b as i s , t aki ng i nt o accou nt t he t ot al i t y of t he ci rcum s t ances, requ i red t o s at i s fy t he reas onabl e s uspi ci on st and ard. ” Id
. (i nt er nal quo t a t i on m a r ks o m i t t ed)
. 5 per s pec ti ve, “anob ject

ive ly r eas on abl e po lic e of

fi cer wouldno t h ave b eli evedth at the t axi cab v io lat ed New Yor k’s mo to r

vehicl e co de” bas ed o n the f leet in g ob s er vat io ns mad e by

th e of fi cer s her e. Id

. Seco nd , the D is tr

ict Cou r t c on clu dedth at “ th e of fi cer s couldno t h ave h ad a r eas on abl e
s us pi cio n that

‘cr imin al act ivi ty may be af oo t, ’” id. at 428, be cause “a traffic violation for infr inging on an i nt er s ect

io n d oes no t qual

if y as ‘cr im in al act ivi ty ,’” id. at 4 29. I n s up po r t o f i ts det er mi nat io n that
tr af fi c vi ol ati on s fall o ut s id e the s cop e of “cr im in al act ivi ty ,” the D is tr

ict Cou r t r ef er r ed t o the p r act

ice commentaries for s ection 225 of the NewYork Vehic le and Traffic Law, w hich state that the pr os ecu ti onof

a tr af fi c in fr act io n i s per fo r medadminis tr ati vely, u nd er

a “cl ear andcon vin cing”
s tan dar d o f p r oo f, andr eme di ed b y mo net ary pe nal ti es only. Se e i d . at 429
. 3 Acc ordingly, the District Court held that the stop violated Stewa rt’s right to be fr ee of unreasonable searche s and seizures under the Four th Amendment, and i t granted Stewa rt’s motion to
s up pr es s evi den ce o bt ain ed f r om th e s ear ch. T he g ov er nm ent th en ap peal ed the o r der

th at g r ant ed Stewa rt’s suppr ession mot ion, arguing tha t the Distr ict Court applie d the wrong lega l standard to det er mi ne the v ali di ty

of th e t r af fi c s to p. DISCUSSI ON When c onsidering a cha llenge to the resolution of a suppress ion motion, we revie w findings of fa ctfor c le a r e rror a nd le ga l q ue sti on s de novo
. See, e.g. , Uni te d St ate s v . J en ki ns , 45 2 F .3d207 , 21 1- 12 (

2d Cir . 20 06) . F or

th e r eas on s th at f

ollo w, we con clu de that

th e Di s tr ict Cou r t ap pl

iedth e wr ong le gal6

standard to determine the permiss ibility under the Fourth Amendment of searches conducted pursuant
to t ra ffi c st op s. As n ote d, the Di stri ctC ou rt h el d th a t a tra ffi c st op co mp ort s wi th t he Fou rth Am en dm en t so lo ng a s (1 ) p ol

ice o ff icer s hav e pr ob abl e cau s e t o b eli eve that a tr af fi c vi ol ati onocc urr ed, or

(2) p ol ice officers have a reasonable sus picion of criminal a ctivity, but mere traffic violations do not constitute
cr im in al act ivi ty . See Stewart

, 49 1 F . Supp . 2dat 4 28- 29. T hi s ho ldin g is inte ns io n wi th—i f n ot di r ect ly
con tr adi ct or

y t o— ou r pr eced ent s . We h ave h eldr epe ate dly that a tr af fi c s to p b as ed o n a r eas on abl e
sus picion of a traffic viola tion comports with the Fourth Amendment. In Uni te d St ate s v . J en ki ns , for example , we pe rceived “ no error in the Distr

ict Court’s determination that the initial ba sis for the stop of th e SU V was val

idbec aus e the o ff

icer s r eas on ably be lie vedth at the S UV l acke d l icen s e pl ate s , which
wouldhav e be en a v

io lat io n o f V T L § 402 (1 )(a). ” 45 2 F .3dat 2 12; se e al so id. (“[B]ecause the officers hada r eas on abl e bu t mis tak en b eli ef th at the S UV l acke d l

icen s e pl ate s , s to pp in g the v ehi cle w as ‘ju s ti fi ed at

it s in cep ti on .’” (quo ti ng T er ry v. Ohi o , 392 U.S. 1 , 20 (1968))). Similarly, i n Holeman v. Ci ty of New London , we e xplaine d that “[t]he Fourth Amendment requires that an officer making [a traffic] s top hav e pr ob abl e cau s e or reasonab le suspicion that the person s topped has committed a tr aff ic v io lat io n or is other wis e en gage d i n o r

abo ut to be e ngagedincr

im in al act ivi ty .” 4 25 F .3d184 , 18 9 ( 2dCir . 20 05) (e mp has is add ed)
. The majority of our s ister circuits have a lso found no F ourth Amendment violation a rising fr om a tr af

fi c s to p s up po r te d b y a r eas on abl e s us pi cio n that a tr af fi c vi ol ati onhas occ urr ed. See, e.g. , Uni te d St ate s v . S o uth er land , 486 F.3d 1355, 1 358-59 (D.C. C ir. 2007) (“Whethe r a stop is reasonable turns on whether the facts view ed from the s tandpoint of an objec tively rea sonable police officer, amount to reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation ha s occurred. The police may initiate a stop even if the
tr af fi c vi ol ati onis a mi no r

on e.” (i nt er nal

cit ati onandqu ot ati onmar ks om it te d) ); United Sta tes v.C u ri ou sl y, t he D i st ri ct C ou rt reli ed on t his d ec i si on of t he E i gh t h C i rcu i t , as w ell as U nite d S tates v. S m a rt

, 393 4 F .3 d 7 6 7 (8 th C ir. 2 0 0 5 ), fo r th e p r o p o sitio n th a t, w ith re sp e c t to tra ff ic sto p s, th e F o u r th A m e n d m e n t re q u ire s p r o b a b le c a u se to b e lie v e — a n d n o t m e r e re a so n a b le su sp ic io n — th a t a tra ff ic v io la tio n h a s o c c u r r e d
. S ee S tew a rt , 491 F. Supp. 2d at 42 8. T he se E i gh t h C i rcu i t d ec i si on s m ak e c l ea r, ho w ev er, t ha t eit he r pro ba ble ca u se o r rea son ab l e su spici on of a tr a ff ic v io la tio n is su ff

ic ie n t to sa tisf

y th e F o u r th A m e n d m e n t’s r e q u ire m e n t o f r e a so n a b le n e ss . S e e , e .g. , S m a rt

, 393 F. 3d at 770 ( “[T he p ol i ce o ff i cer ] ha d an o bj ect i vel y r eas ona bl e ba s i s t o s t op [ def endant ’ s ] veh i cl e i f

he reasona b l

y susp ecte d

t hat [ def endant ] was ope r at i ng a vehi cl e t hat di d not com pl y wi t h I o wa t r a f f ic l a ws .” (e m p h a se s a d d e d )). Y e t m o r e re m a r k a b le i s t he deci s i on o f

t he D i s t r i ct C our t t o l ook t o t he p r eceden t s of t he Ei gh t h C i r cui t f

or r es ol ut i on o f

a l eg al ques t i on ad d ressed by t his C ou rt on m ore t ha n o ne oc ca si on w i t hin the last fou r ye ars. 7 Delfi n-Co lin a , 46 4 F .3d392 , 39 7 ( 3dCir . 20 06) (“ [T ]h e Terr y reasonable suspicion standard applies to
r ou ti ne tr af

fi c s to ps .”) ; Uni

te d St ate s v . Lo pez -M o re no , 42 0 F .3d420 , 43 0 ( 5th Ci r . 20 05) (“ Fo r a tr af fi c stop t o be justified at its inception, an officer must have an obje ctively reasonable suspicion that some
sor t of illegal a ctivity, such as a traffic viola tion, occurred, or is about to occur, before s topping the vehicl e.”); Uni

te d St ate s v . M art in , 411 F.3d 998, 10 01 (8th Cir. 2005) (“The determinative question is not whe th er [d ef end ant ] ac tu ally vi ol ate d the M ot or Vehicl e Cod e by

op er ati ng avehicl e with o ne d ef ect ive br ake l igh t, bu t whether

an o bj ect ive ly r eas on abl e po lic e of

fi cer couldhav e f

ormeda r eas on abl e
sus picion that [defenda nt] was committing a code violation.” ); United Sta tes v. Lopez-Soto , 20 5 F .3d 4 1101, 1105 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he Four th Amendment requires only reasonable suspicion in the
con te xt of inves tigat ive tr af fi c s to ps .”)
. In su pp ortof t he pro po sitio n th a t “ re a son a bl e su spi ci on is n ot e no ugh; ra the r, p rob a bl e c a use is nec es s ary t o s to p a ca r

fo r an alleg ed tr af

fi c in fr act io n that is mi no r , co mm on pl ace, andno t a c r im e,” Stewa rt r elies hea vily on Whren v. Uni ted States, 51 7 U. S. 8 06 ( 199 6) . Ap pellee’ s B r . 13 -1 4, 1 5, 1 9- 26. In Whren , the S up r eme Cou r t o bs er vedth at “ [a] s a gen er al m att er , the d ecis io n t o s to p anaut om ob ile is
r eas on abl e wh er e the p ol

ice h ave p r ob abl e cau s e t o b eli eve that a tr af fi c vi ol ati onhas occ urr ed. ” 51 7 U.S. at 810 . We see nothing in this obser vation that contradic ts the holding of this Court—and the overwhelming

majority of our s ister circuits —that traffic s tops are reasonable when the y arise from the reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation. The WhrenCou r t didno t s tat e that a dec is io n t o s to p an8

aut om ob ile is r eas on abl e o nly whe n the p ol

ice h ave p r ob abl e cau s e t o b eli eve that a tr af fi c vi ol ati onhas
oc cu rre d. The C ou rt n ote d i nste a d th a t pr ob a bl e c a use wa s su ffi ci en t to r end er th e s to p r eas on abl e. Whether r eas on abl e s us pi cio n wo ul d al s o p er mi t the s to p t o s ati s fy th e F ou r thAme nd men t’ s
r equ ir eme nt of r eas on abl ene s s was no t ad dr es s ed b y the Co ur t. Acco r di ngl y, we id ent

if y no thin g in Whrenthat casts doubt on our understanding that either

pr ob abl e cau s e or

reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation ca n suppor t a traffic st op. Stewa rt also points to a recent dec ision of the Sixth Circuit, recogniz ing that “[w]he ther the police ma y stop a vehicl e based on mere rea sonable suspicion of a civil traffic viola tion is the s ubject of
a con fl ict inou r cas e law .” Uni

te d St ate s v . B lai r , 524 F.3d 740, 74 8 n.2 (6th Cir. 2008). The Sixth Circuit did not, howe ver, seize the opportunity in Bl air to r es ol ve that con fl ict
. Se e i d. (“ B ecau s e we di s po s e of this cas e onother

gr ou nd s , . . . . w e will n ot r es ol ve the dis cr epan cy b et

weenth e pr ob abl e
cause a nd reasonable suspicion standards at this time.”). It is true that the jurisprudence of the Sixth Circuit in this area is unsettled, and it might be tha t, in the Sixth Circuit, a n investigatory stop for a tr af fi c vi ol ati oncan b e ju s ti fi ed o nly by pr ob abl e cau s e. See United Sta tes v. Simpson , 52 0 F .3d531 , 53 9 (6 thCir . 20 08) . B ut

at l eas t o ne p anel

of th e Si xth Ci r cui t h as r ecen tly r eco gni zedth at ( 1) “vi r tu ally every other circuit court of appea ls has held that reasonable suspicion suff ices to justify an investigatory
s to p f or a tr af fi c vi ol ati on ,” id. at 540; (2) the majority position “appe ar[s] cons istent with the Supreme Court’s s tatement that a routine traffic stop is a relative ly brief encounter and i s mor e ana logous to a so-called Terr

y s to p than to a f or mal ar r es t, ” id. (internal quotation marks omitted); and (3), in light of th e “o ver whe lm in g pr eced ent ” t o the c on tr ary, the “ corr ectnes s ” of th e Si xth Ci r cui t’ s po s it

io n i s in “gr ave d ou bt [ ] ,” id. For these reasons, we are not persuaded that the position of the Sixth Circuit, insofar as it

has one, offers a better standard than the one a dopted by the maj ority of circuits—including our own.Purs uant t o Local R ul e 36

- 2 of t he U
. S. C our t of

A ppea l s f

or t he El even t h C i r cui t , “ [ u] npubl i s hed opi ni ons 5 a r e n o t c o n sid e r e d b in d in g p r e c e d e n t, b u t th e y m a y b e c ite d a s p e r su a siv e a u th o r ity .” 9 Fi nally, St ewar t as ks this Cou r t t o co ns id er an u np ub lis hedop inio n o f the El even thCir cui t
s tat in g, w itho ut elab or ati on , that

“anaut om ob ile s to p i s r eas on abl e andcon s ti tu ti on al . . . i f i t i s bas ed on either probable ca use to believe tha t a traffic violation has occ urred or reasonable suspicion that a
cr im e has bee n o r

will b e co mmit te d. ” United Sta tes v. Allen , 27 4 F . Ap p’ x 81 1, 8 17- 18 ( 11th Ci r . 20 08) (u np ub lis hed

). I n that cas e, the El even thCir cui t c on clu dedth at the p ol ice o ff icer s hadr eas on abl e
s us pi cio n t o b eli eve that

th e de fe nd ant

was dr ivi ng acar witho ut a li cen s e, a c r

im e un der app lic abl e law , andit th er ef or e co ncl ud ed that

th e t r af fi c s to p didno t v

io lat e the F ou r thAme nd men t. Id
. at 818. The Elev enth Circuit did not reac h—or discus s in any detai l whatsoever—whe ther reasonable suspicion of
a tr af fi c vi ol ati onwoulds up po r t the s to p. Acco r di ngl y, ther e is no r eas onin g inthis un pu bl is hed opinion that counsels in favor of adopting a str ict probable c ause standard for traffic st ops aris ing 5 fr om tr af fi c vi ol ati on s . We the refore hold that the District Court erred by requiring the police officers in this case to ju s ti fy th eir tr af fi c s to p b y de mo ns tr ati ng e ither pr ob abl e cau s e t o b eli eve that a tr af fi c vi ol ati onhad occurred or reasonable suspicion of a crime more serious than a traffic viola tion. Ins ofar as our previous rejection of this s tandard might have been a mbiguous, we now hold una mbiguously that the reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation provides a sufficient basis under the Fourth Amendment for law e nf or cem ent of fi cer s to mak e a tr af

fi c s to p. On remand, the District Court s hall de termine whether Officers Regnier and Torres had a reasonable suspicion that the livery c ab driven by Jimene z committed a traffic viola tion. In connection with thi s in quir

y, we no te th at ami s tak e of fa ct do es no t u nd er mi ne the e xis te nce of r eas on abl e
s us pi cio n. See Je nki

ns , 45 2 F .3dat 2 12 ( “T he c on s ti tu ti on al v ali di ty of a s to p i s no t u nd er mi neds im ply10

bec aus e the o ff

icer s who mad e the s to p we r e mi s tak en ab ou t r elev ant fa ct s .”) . F r omwhat ever

fi nal decision the District Court makes on this remand, the jurisdiction of this Court to consider a
s ub s equ ent

app eal— onth e is s ue o f the s up pr es s io n o f e vid enc e ob tai neddu r in g the tr af

fi c s to p—may be i nv ok ed b y any

par ty by n ot if icat io n t o the Cl er k o f Co ur t w ithi n t en d ays of

th e Di s tr ict Cou r t’ s dec is io n, see United States v. Jacobson , 15 F. 3d19, 21- 22 ( 2dCir . 19 94) , inwhi ch e ven t the r enewedapp eal will b e as s ign ed t o thi s pan el. CONCLUSI ON The Jun e 1 3, 20 07 ord erof t he Di stri ctC ou rt i s VAC ATED andth e cau s e is REMAN DE D fo r fu r th er pr oce edi ngs con s is te nt

with thi s op inio n.