This project was supported, in whole or in part, by cooperative agreement number 2014-CK-WX-K023 


awarded by the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. The 


opinions contained herein are those of the author(s) or contributor(s) and do not necessarily represent 


the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. References to specific individuals, 


agencies, companies, products, or services should not be considered an endorsement by the author(s) 


or contributor(s) or the U.S. Department of Justice. Rather, the references are illustrations to supplement 


discussion of the issues.
 

The internet references cited in this publication were valid as of the date of publication. Given that URLs 


and websites are in constant flux, neither the author(s) or contributor(s) nor the COPS Office can vouch 


for their current validity.
 

Recommended citation:
 

Langman, Peter, and Frank Straub. 2019. A Comparison of Averted and Completed School Attacks from 


the Police Foundation’s Averted School Violence Database. Washington, DC: Office of Community 


Oriented Policing Services.
 

Published 2019
 


 

Contents
 

Letter from the Director of the COPS Office ............................................................. .

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v
 

Introduction 1
 

Statistical Analyses 3
 

Basic information 3
 

School information 3
 

Event information—completed attacks 6
 

Plotter and perpetrator information 8
 

Assessment .......................................................................................... 

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17
 

Recommendations for schools ....................................................................... 

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............................................................... 

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18
 

Recommendations for home 22
 

Recommendations for law enforcement 23
 

General recommendations 23
 

Case Studies 25
 

Averted attack 25
 

Completed attack 26
 

Conclusion 27
 

References 29
 

About the Police Foundation 31
 

About the COPS Office 32
 

A Preliminary Report on the Police 

Foundation’s Averted School Violence Database iii 

Letter from the Director 

of the COPS Office 

Colleagues: 

It is essential that our children’s schools be safe and supportive learning environments. 

Unfortunately, communities across the country have been shattered by school violence for far too 

long. Leaders of government, school administrations, law enforcement agencies, and community 

stakeholders are diligently working to protect children and education personnel from school 

attacks. The Police Foundation, in collaboration with the COPS Office, implemented the Averted 

School Violence (ASV) database in 2015 as a platform for law enforcement, school staff, and 

mental health professionals to share information about ASV incidents and lessons learned with 

the goal of mitigating and ultimately preventing future injuries and fatalities in educational institutions. The database was begun with accounts of past incidents—starting with Columbine High 

School (1999)—and is available for submission of further incidents as they continue to occur. 

The reports in the database can document “close calls” with weapons—guns, knives, improvised 

explosive devices—and can include information about incidents that were thwarted in the planning stages and incidents that were contained as well as what we know about incidents that were 

completed. Users can submit reports anonymously; the reports are never used for punitive 

measures but rather as a research tool and information resource for stakeholders. 

The Police Foundation has completed a comprehensive analysis of the information collected from 

the ASV database as well as interviews with law enforcement and stakeholders to write two 

companion reports. The first is a preliminary analysis of the ASV database and detailed case 

study of an averted attack, and the second is a comparison of averted and completed school 

attacks. The reports provide a detailed picture of school-based violence, including the type of 

attacks, student demographics and type of school, and security measures in place on campus at 

the time of the averted incidents. The case study of one averted attack details lessons learned, 

including the code of silence—students’ reluctance to trust school staff with information about a 

peer who may want to harm themselves or others. The reports provide findings and recommendations for schools to increase the safety and well-being of all the students on campus. Ultimately, we want teens and children to be happy and successful in their school careers. Through 

the information in these reports, communities can learn about best practices and methods to 

improve school safety. 

A Preliminary Report on the Police 

Foundation’s Averted School Violence Database v 
On behalf of the COPS Office, I thank all the law enforcement, school staff, and mental health 

professionals who have submitted reports and work each day with teens and children in our 

schools. We applaud their commitment to making a difference in their communities and the lives 

of children. I urge everyone to continue to use the ASV database to report incidents of school 

violence, both completed and averted, in the hope that school shootings will soon be a thing of 

the past. I also thank the staff and leadership of Police Foundation for their work on the ASV 

database and these companion publications on averted school violence. 

Sincerely, 

Phil Keith 

Director 

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services 

A Comparison of Averted and Completed School Attacks 

from the Police Foundation’s Averted School Violence Database vi 
 

 

Introduction
 

IN 2014, the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services 

(COPS Office) and the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) provided funding to the Police Foundation to initiate the Averted School Violence (ASV) project. Through this project, the Police 

Foundation developed a database (Police Foundation 2018) to collect, analyze, and publish 

(in an online library [Police Foundation 2018b]) incidents of averted and completed acts of 

school violence that have occurred since the attack on Columbine High School in Littleton, 

Colorado, on April 20, 1999. The data are drawn from the public domain as well as from law 

enforcement, school officials, and others entering reports into the database. The database 

is intended to serve as a resource to law enforcement, schools, mental health professionals, 

and others involved in preventing school violence by sharing ways in which other school 

attacks across the country have been identified and prevented. 

In this report, 51 completed and 51 averted incidents of school violence, drawn from the 

ASV database, were analyzed to help further our understanding of averted and completed 

school attacks. The report also seeks to provide important lessons about how school violence can be prevented. 

ASV Project Definitions of Averted and 

Completed School Violence 

Completed. A violent attack completed, with or without the use 

of a firearm, that took place on school grounds and resulted in 

any injury or loss of life. 

Averted. A violent attack planned, with or without the use of a 

firearm, that was prevented either before or after the potential 

perpetrator arrived on school grounds but before any injury or 

loss of life occurred. 

1 
The 51 completed attacks1

 do not constitute every 

incident of school violence that has occurred in the 

United States since the attack at Columbine High 

School in Littleton, Colorado, on April 20, 1999. They 

have been chosen as a data set that can be compared to 51 averted incidents of school violence that 

have occurred since the attack at Columbine. As with 

the actual attacks, the 51 averted attacks do not 

constitute all the averted attacks that have occurred 

since Columbine, nor do they constitute a representative sample. The averted attacks (those that were 

identified from open sources) were selected based on 

the amount of information available in open sources 

and with an effort made to find reports in a wide range 

of states. 

Information collected on each averted and completed 

incident consisted of the following categories as displayed in the database: basic information (about the 

person submitting the report); school information 

(about school security procedures, size, education 

level, etc.); event information (about the planned 

attack and its discovery or the actual attack and its 

impact); suspect information (about the plotters’ or 

perpetrators’ behavioral history, background, warning signs exhibited, etc.); and assessment (lessons 

learned from the attack or planned attack and recommendations on how to prevent future attacks or 

planned attacks of a similar nature.) Because the 

majority of the data on averted and completed 

attacks came from open sources, it was not always 

possible to gather data for all the categories under 

consideration from the database.2 Thus, in some 

areas, the data cannot be assumed to be complete. 

1.	 Information on these attacks was gathered using Dr. Peter Langman’s schoolshooters.info, an online repository of information on 

school attacks and perpetrators. 

2.	 For example, whether or not a perpetrator had ever received mental health treatment or what kind of emergency preparedness plans 

a particular school had in place at the time of the attack was not always available. 

A Comparison of Averted and Completed School Attacks 

from the Police Foundation’s Averted School Violence Database 2 
 

 

Statistical Analyses 

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICAL ANALYSES were conducted on 51 completed and 51 

averted acts of school violence in the ASV database that occurred between 1999 (postColumbine) through 2017. The results are presented in five sections, corresponding with the 

five sections of the database: basic information, school information, event information, perpetrator information, and assessment. 

Basic information 

The information provided in the database on averted and completed attacks was drawn 

from a variety of sources. Police Foundation staff gathered and input all information on completed attacks into the database from news articles, websites of the involved schools, 

schoolshooters.info, and court documents (if available). 

The information used to develop most of the reports on averted attacks (49, or 96.1%) was 

gathered by Police Foundation staff and project subject matter experts from open sources 

including news reports, websites of the involved schools, Campus Safety magazine, and 

court documents. Two reports (3.9%) were entered by a law enforcement officer and a 

school administrator directly involved in the incidents of averted violence. 

School information 

School safety features 

Information regarding physical security measures, emergency preparedness, threat assessment procedures, and related items was often unavailable either because the information 

was not publicly available or the information was not reported by the person who made the 

entry into the database. As a result, these data fields are too incomplete to be meaningful. 

A few items, however, will be noted, along with the number of times they were identified or 

reported. In the 51-incident sample of completed school attacks, the following people and 

protocols were present at the schools: school counselors (41), controlled access to buildings (9), controlled access to grounds (4), locked entrance and exit doors (7), and on-site 

3 
Other schools

3 Other schools 

Figure 1. States with averted (n=49) and completed (n=50) school attacks analyzed in this study 

Figure 2. Completed (n=51) and averted (n=51) attacks in public versus private schools 

Public schools 

44 

Public schools 

48 

COMPLETED ATTACKS AV E R T E D AT TA C K S 

A Comparison of Averted and Completed School Attacks 

from the Police Foundation’s Averted School Violence Database 4 

7 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

College/university 

High school 

Middle school/ 

junior high 

Elementary 

school 

security or police officers (37). In the 51-incident sample of averted school attacks, the following people 

and protocols were present at the schools: school 

counselors (43), controlled access to buildings (9), 

controlled access to grounds (7), locked entrance 

and exit doors (5), and on-site security or police officers (30). Because of the difficulty in obtaining this 

information, these numbers are likely underestimates. 

Geography 

The 51 completed school attacks and the 51 averted 

school attacks analyzed occurred in 33 states, as 

shown in figure 1 on page 4. (Sixteen states had both 

an averted and completed attack). 

Comparing the states with more than one completed 

attack to those states with more than one averted 

attack, there are several states that appear in both 

categories: California, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Washington, Oregon, and Virginia (Daniels 2018). 

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 

Number of schools 

8 

35 

21 

6 

20 

Type of school 

The vast majority of schools that experienced school 

attacks were public schools. The finding, shown in 

figure 2 on page 4, that 86.3% of completed attacks 

occurred in public schools is similar to that for the 

averted attacks, in which 94.1% of averted incidents 

occurred in public schools. 

Education level of the schools 

More than 80% of the completed and averted attacks 

occurred in the two highest levels of education—high 

schools and colleges or universities. These data are 

presented in figure 3. 

The results in figure 2 show a substantial difference 

with regard to the college or university category. In 

the data, only 11.8% of the averted attacks occurred 

in institutions of higher education, while 39.2% of the 

completed attacks took place in institutions of higher 

education. The reason for this difference is unknown. 

Number of averted attacks 

Number of completed attacks 

Statistical Analysis 5 

Figure 3. Education level of schools experiencing completed attacks (n=51) and averted attacks (n=51) 

5

2

5
A Comparison of Averted and Completed School Attacks 

from the Police Foundation’s Averted School Violence Database 

One possibility is that adult perpetrators provide less 

“leakage”3

 of their intentions and are thus harder 

to detect, making prevention more difficult with 

adult perpetrators. 

Also, only 3.9% of averted attacks involved elementary schools, while more than twice as many actual 

attacks (9.8%) took place in elementary schools. 

The numbers involved, however, are so small (2 and 

5, respectively) that this may not be a meaningful 

result. It is worth noting that none of the potential perpetrators or actual perpetrators were elementary school students (this will be discussed further in 

later sections). 

As shown in table 1, while only 11.1 percent of 

averted attacks occurred in schools with fewer than 

500 students, 32.3 percent of completed attacks 

occurred in this category of schools. 

The results presented in figure 4 on page 7 demonstrate that the same number of averted and 

completed attacks (35 out of 51) involve suburban 

schools. More urban schools experienced completed 

attacks (7) than averted attacks (3). Conversely, 

more rural schools had averted attacks (13) than 

completed attacks (9). 

Table 1. Size of student body in K–12 schools experiencing completed attacks (n=31) 

and averted attacks (n=45) 

Size of school 

Averted 

attacks (N) 

Percent (%) of 

averted attacks Size of school 

Completed 

attacks (N) 

Percent (%) of 

completed attacks 

500 or fewer 5 11.1% 500 or fewer 10 32.3% 

501–1000 18 40.0% 501–1000 8 25.8% 

1001–2000 15 33.3% 1001–2000 11 35.5% 

2001 or more 7 15.6% 2001 or more 2 6.5% 

All schools 45 31 

3. “Leakage” means disclosing violent intentions to other people. 

6

Event information—completed attacks 

Age of perpetrators and number of victims 

Previous studies (Langman 2015b; Langman 2016a) 

have found a correlation between the age of the perpetrators and the number of victims in their attacks. 

The results from the present study are presented in 

figure 5 on page 7. 

These data indicate that increasing age is correlated 

with increasing dangerousness through early adolescence into late adolescence and then into young 

adulthood, with young adults (ages 20 to 27) being 

by far the most dangerous perpetrators in terms of 

the number of people killed and wounded. After age 

27, however, there is a dramatic decrease in dangerousness. This finding is consistent with other studies 

(Langman 2015b; Langman 2016a). 

As noted earlier, there is a correlation between the 

perpetrator’s age and the number of victims. In light 

of this, the results in figure 6 on page 9 may be surprising. The high number of victims among attacks at 

elementary schools can be attributed to the age of 

the perpetrators. In four of the five elementary school 

attacks, the perpetrator was an adult (ages 20, 32, 

41, and 56). The fifth perpetrator was 14 years old. 

Thus, none of the perpetrators in these attacks was a 

student in the school that was attacked. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Figure 4. Population classification of communities with schools experiencing 

completed attacks (n=51) and averted attacks (n=51) 

3 

7 

35 

35 

13 

9 

Rural 

Suburban 

Urban 

0 10 20 30 40 

Number of schools 

Number of averted attacks 

Number of completed attacks 

Figure 5. Average number of victims by age of perpetrator of completed school attacks 

1 

2 

2 

4 

11 

8 

2 

2 

Age of perpetrator 

28 and 

above 

20 to 27 

15 to 19 

12 to 14 

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 

Number of victims 

Number of victims killed
 

Number of victims wounded
 

Note: Averages have been rounded to whole numbers. 

Statistical Analysis 7 
Large-scale completed attacks 

Eleven of the 51 completed attacks had 10 or more 

victims. These attacks are considered large-scale. 

The distribution of large-scale attacks across the four 

levels of schools is seen in table 2. 

The number of victims in attacks is often related to 

the type of attack, whether random or targeted (Newman 2004; and Langman 2015b). Random attacks 

tend to have a larger number of victims, while targeted attacks are often limited to a few specific individuals. Because the attacks at the elementary 

schools were committed by outsiders (i.e., people 

with no connection to the schools), these were largescale attacks. In the case of the 14-year-old perpetrator who attacked an elementary school, he had 

intended to kill “50 to 60” people; fortunately, his gun 

jammed after shooting five people. 

Targeted attacks occurred a number of times among 

high school and college or university attackers, 

reducing the frequency of large-scale attacks in these 

settings. Thus, though perpetrator age is correlated 

with number of victims, this factor is mediated by the 

type of attack being committed. Attackers in their 

30s, 40s, 50s, and 60s often committed targeted 

attacks and thus had fewer victims on average. 

Table 2. Percent of completed attacks that were large-scale (n=11) by education level of school 

Education level 

Number of large-scale 

completed attacks 

Total number of 

completed attacks 

Percent of 

completed attacks that 

were large scale 

Elementary school 3 5 60.0% 

Middle school / junior high 0 5 0.0% 

High school 3 21 14.3% 

College/university 5 20 25.0% 

Plotter and perpetrator information 

All 51 completed attacks were carried out by single 

individuals. This is dramatically different from the incidents of averted violence, where only 30 (58.8%) of 

the attacks were planned by single individuals. As 

shown in figure 7 on page 9, among the averted incidents, 12 involved two people, 3 involved three, 

and 6 involved four or more would-be perpetrators 

(Daniels 2018). This difference may indicate that the 

presence of additional perpetrators increases the 

likelihood of the plot being discovered. 

Gender 

The attackers in both completed and averted attacks 

are overwhelmingly male.4

 This study found that in 

47 of 51 completed attacks (92.2%), the perpetrator 

was male, and in four completed attacks (7.8%), the 

perpetrator was female. Similarly, 48 of 51 averted 

attackers (94.1%) were male, and three (5.9%) were 

female. The results in this study are comparable to 

those found elsewhere (Langman 2016a), where a 

study of 64 shooters over a 50-year period in the 

United States found 95.3% were male and 4.7% 

were female. 

4.	 Information in this and the following sections on plotter and perpetrator information relates only to the primary plotters of averted 

attacks and the perpetrators (as noted, always single individuals) of completed attacks. 

A Comparison of Averted and Completed School Attacks 


from the Police Foundation’s Averted School Violence Database
 8 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Figure 6. Average number of victims by education level of school in completed attacks Education level 

7 

4 

1 

2 

2 

3 

5 

4 

Number of victims killed 

Number of victims wounded 

Note: Averages have been rounded to whole numbers. 

College/ 

university 

High school 

Middle school/ 

junior high 

Elementary 

school 

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 

Number of victims 

Number of schools 

One person 

Two people 

Three people 

Four or 

more people 

6 

3 

12 

0 

0 

0 

30 

51 

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 

Number of averted attacks 

Number of completed attacks 

Statistical Analysis 9 

Figure 7. Number of plotters or perpetrators involved in completed school attacks (n=51) 

versus averted school attacks (n=51) 
The finding is also consistent with data reported in a 

2018 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) report 

regarding active shooter incidents in the United 

States in 2016 and 2017, in which the perpetrators in the seven education-based incidents were 

male (FBI 2018). 

Racial or ethnic identity 

Though one of the stereotypes of school attackers 

is that they are virtually all Caucasian, the data from 

this study (see table 3) indicate that although Caucasians represent a plurality of attackers, they are nevertheless less than half the perpetrators of completed 

attacks.5 This is consistent with other findings on 

post-Columbine school attackers (Langman 2016a). 

In addition, in the dataset of completed attacks, the 

distribution of racial and ethnic diversity appears to 

be correlated with the education level of the institution attacked. While 71% of the perpetrators who 

attacked K–12 settings were Caucasian, only 10% of 

those who attacked colleges and universities were 

Caucasian; the other 90% were either non-White or 

of mixed heritage. 

5.	 Of the six mixed heritage perpetrators in the completed attacks, the breakdown was as follows: Asian American/Caucasian (2), 

African American/Caucasian (2), Native American/Caucasian (1), and Asian American/Latinx (1). 

A Comparison of Averted and Completed School Attacks 


from the Police Foundation’s Averted School Violence Database
 10 

Age of perpetrators 

The age of the primary perpetrators in completed 

attacks ranged from 12 to 62. Designating perpetrators up to age 18 as juveniles and those 18 and older 

as adults yields two groups that are virtually equal 

in frequency (juveniles = 49%, adults = 51%). This 

finding is consistent with other data (Langman 2016). 

In averted attacks, the ages of primary plotters 

ranged from 12 to 47. Though school attackers may 

often be thought of as juveniles, these data confirm 

that approximately half the time they are adults. Thus, 

school attacks are not simply an issue among youth 

but an issue that involves a much broader range of 

the population. 

In completed attacks, among juvenile perpetrators 

the most common ages were 14 and 15. Among 

adult perpetrators the most common decades were 

20s and 40s. In averted attacks, among juvenile perpetrators the most common ages were 16 and 17. 

Among adult perpetrators the most common decade 

was the 20s. See figure 9 on page 11. 

Table 3. Racial and ethnic identity of perpetrators in averted school attacks (n=22)* 

and completed school attacks (n=51) 

Race or ethnicity of 

plotter of averted attack N Percent 

Race or ethnicity of perpetrator 

of completed attack N Percent 

Black or African American 1 4.5% Black or African American 5 9.8% 

Asian or Asian American 1 4.5% Asian or Asian American 8 15.9% 

White or Caucasian 19 86.4% White or Caucasian 24 47.1% 

Latinx 1 4.5% Latinx 3 5.9% 

Middle Eastern 0 0.0% Middle Eastern 2 3.9% 

Mixed heritage 0 0.0% Mixed heritage 6 11.8% 

Native American 0 0.0% Native American 3 5.9% 

* Data were limited on plotter race and ethnicity in the averted attacks dataset; information was only available for 22 of 51 plotters. 
White 

2/10% 

 

 

Figure 8. Racial and ethnic identity of perpetrators of completed attacks on K–12 schools (n=31) 

and colleges and universities (n=20) 

*Other: Black, Asian, 

Latinx, Middle Eastern, 

Other* 

9/29% 

Native American, or 

mixed race. 

White Other* 

22/71% 18/90% 

COMPLETED ATTACKS COMPLETED ATTACKS 

K–12 SCHOOLS COLLEGE/UNIVERSITY 

Figure 9. Age of perpetrators of completed school attacks (n=51) and plotters 

of averted school attacks (n=47)* Number of perpetrators/plotters 

1 

2 

5 

12 

8 

12 

15 

10 

14 

6 

2 

1 

10 

1 

1 

3 

1 

6 9 

5 

6 

1 

13 

1 

1 

2 

5 

6 

3 

5 

8 

9 

2 2 

1 

7 

16

14 

12 

10 

8 

6 

4 

2 

0 

12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20s 30s 40s 50s 60s 

Age of perpetrators 

* The exact age was unknown for four plotters of averted attacks. However, based on other information, the grade levels for these 

individuals was grade 8 (2), grade 7 (1), and high school (1). 

Statistical Analysis 11 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The average age of the perpetrators in completed 

attacks across the four levels of education reveals 

an unusual pattern. Perpetrators of middle school 

attacks were an average age of 16.8 years old; high 

school attackers were on average 17.5; and college 

or university attackers were on average 35.2. However, and as noted earlier, four of the five perpetrators 

of elementary school attacks were adults and one 

was a teenager, which means the average age of 

these perpetrators was 32.6. It is interesting that for 

the two averted attacks that targeted elementary 

schools, the would-be perpetrators were also adults 

(ages 20 and 35). 

Relationship between perpetrator or plotter 

and school 

As shown in figure 10, the relationship of the perpetrator to the school current or former student (or 

employee) in 42 of the completed attacks (82.4%) 

and in 46 of the averted attacks (90.2%). The other 

perpetrators had no prior connection to the schools 

they attacked. Put another way, most attacks were 

committed by “insiders” rather than “outsiders.” The 

implications of insider versus outsider threats will be 

discussed in the Assessment section. 

Figure 10. Relation of perpetrator to school in averted attacks (n=51) and completed attacks (n=51) 

Current student 

Former student 

No prior affiliation 

School Official 

7 19 

5 13 

30 

12 

8 

1 1 

39 69 

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 

Number of incidents 

Number of averted attacks 

Number of completed attacks

A Comparison of Averted and Completed School Attacks 

from the Police Foundation’s Averted School Violence Database 12 

Bullies and victims of bullying 

Determining whether or not the perpetrators were 

either bullies or victims of bullies is challenging 

because of incomplete or contradictory information. 

Though the presumed connection between bullying 

and school attacks has received significant attention 

in the media (STOMP Out Bullying 2018), research 

(Blad 2018, StopBullying.gov 2018) and the results 

here indicate that the majority of attackers and 

averted attackers were not victims of bullying. In fact, 

more attackers reportedly bullied their peers (10) than 

were bullied by them (8). Only nine averted attackers 

were reportedly bullied. 
 

 

Life-changing events 

There was evidence for almost all the perpetrators of completed attacks (48, 94.1%) that they 

experienced or witnessed some kind of life changing events. Significantly less information in these 

categories was available for perpetrators of averted 

attacks (9, 17.6%) because of limited information in 

open sources. 

Perpetrators of completed attacks and plotters of 

averted attacks experienced life-changing events in 

their own lives, as shown in table 3. 

Perpetrators of completed attacks and plotters of 

averted attacks witnessed life-changing events in the 

lives of those close to them, as shown in table 4. 

These data are likely incomplete for both averted and 

completed incidents. In addition, there was often no 

way to know the impact of these events on the perpetrators or plotters. Though some left written 

records, many did not. Nonetheless, the significance 

and frequency of these events shed light on the life 

histories of the perpetrators. 

Table 3. Life-changing events in the lives of perpetrators of completed attacks and plotters 

of averted attacks 

Life event 

Cited by number of perpetrators of 

completed attacks 

Cited by number of plotters of 

averted attacks 

Breakup, separation, or divorce 15 — 

Move 12 3 

Abuse 9 — 

Financial stress or job loss 8 2 

Substance abuse — 1 

Other 17 4 

Table 4. Life-changing events in the lives of those close to perpetrators of completed 

attacks and plotters of averted attacks 

Life event 

Cited by number of perpetrators of 

completed attacks 

Cited by number of plotters of 

averted attacks 

Parents’ breakup, separation, 

or divorce 21 1 

Domestic violence 7 — 

Incarceration or illegal behavior 4 1 

Financial stress or job loss 3 1 

Death 2 1 

Illness 1 — 

Other 12 2 

Statistical Analysis 13 

Perpetrator and plotter characteristics 

Data were collected on a variety of perpetrator and 

plotter characteristics. There is subjectivity in determining who possessed what traits. Also, because of 

the difficulty in accessing this information, these 

results may be underestimates for both averted and 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Personality characteristics 

Depressed mood 

Impaired social/emotional functioning 

Hypersensitivity (to criticism, failure, etc.) 

Social withdrawal/isolation from peers 

Easily enraged 

Disregard for authority/rules 

Does not take responsiibility for consequences 

Lacking empathy, guilt, or remorse 

Extreme narcissism 

7 

7 

7 

6 

11 

10 3

18 

16 

16 2

5 16 

13 

5 23 

4 20 

18 

0 5 10 15 20 25 

Number of perpetrators with specific characteristics 

Number of averted attacks 

Number of completed attacks 

completed attack datasets. Finally, many perpetrators possessed more than one of the traits, as shown 

in figure 11. 

Figure 11. Characteristics of perpetrators of averted school attacks and completed school attacks 

History of mental health or other treatment 

A majority of perpetrators who completed attacks 

had a history of being treated for one or more mental 

health issues or development disorders, including 

 depression;
 

 schizophrenia;
 

 anxiety;
 

 post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD);
 

 delusions;
 

 suicidal thoughts or behavior;
 

 attention deficit hyperactive disorder (ADHD); 

 autism spectrum disorder (ASD); 

 others. 

Many of the individuals involved in averted attacks 

were also treated for mental health issues, including 

depression and anxiety. 

Eleven perpetrators of completed attacks (21.6%) 

and three plotters of averted attacks (5.9%) had 

histories of substance abuse or addiction. Nineteen of the perpetrators of completed attacks (37.3%) 

and nine of the plotters of averted attacks (17.6%) 

were known to the criminal justice system prior to 

their attacks. 

A Comparison of Averted and Completed School Attacks 

from the Police Foundation’s Averted School Violence Database 14 
 

 

Seventeen perpetrators of completed attacks (33.3%) 

and 21 plotters of averted attacks (41.2%) were 

known to have an interest in or obsession with violent 

media or violent materials. 

Discerning the motivations for their rampages was 

not always possible. The following results indicate 

motivations that were claimed by the completed and 

averted attackers. It must be noted that motivation 

for violence is usually complicated and multidetermined. Thus, the reasons these individuals gave for 

their attacks may not be the sole or the true reasons. 

Also, some reported more than one motivation. Motivations for completed attacks, when the reason was 

given, included the following: 

 Hates people 

 Grudge or seeking revenge 

 Bullying 

 Envy 

 Resentment 

 Rivalry 

 Paranoid delusions or command hallucinations 

Motivations for averted attacks, when the reason was 

given, included the following: 

 Hates people 

 Grudge or seeking revenge 

 Bullying 

 Envy 

 Resentment 

 Rivalry 

Statistical Analysis 15 

 

 

Assessment
 

THE ASSESSMENT SECTION OF THE DATABASE is where both lessons learned and 

recommendations were recorded. These two categories contained significant overlap and 

thus will be combined here. The purpose of this section is to learn from past incidents to 

help prevent future incidents. The goal is not to find fault with people or institutions but to 

educate communities about what they can do to increase safety. All recommendations 

might not be relevant for all schools, and some present logistical and financial challenges. 

Taken together, however, they cover a wide range of concerns and present numerous 

options for improving school safety. 

Also, though school attacks are often discussed as if they constituted a homogeneous 

group of incidents, the study of completed and averted attacks makes clear that there are 

many different types of school attacks. These different types of attacks pose different challenges in terms of prevention. Several variations of school attacks include the following: 

 Large-scale random attacks that are usually planned well in advance 

 Small-scale targeted attacks against specific people, against whom the attacker has a 

grievance; some have been planned well in advance while others have occurred the same 

day as the incident that was the source of the grievance 

 Unplanned attacks in which the perpetrator had a gun at school but no intention of using 

it until unexpected circumstances occurred 

In addition, the difference between attacks by insiders (current or recent students or employees) and those by outsiders (no current or recent connection to the school) needs to be 

considered. With insider attacks, schools have the chance to pick up on warning signs and 

intervene. When the perpetrator is someone with no connection to the school, the school 

usually has no way of anticipating the attack. 

17 
To distill the lessons and recommendations into 

meaningful sections, the following categories will be 

used: School, Home, Law Enforcement, and General. Finally, the recommendations from five afteraction reports on specific attacks were reviewed and 

will be referenced in the sections that follow. These 

incidents occurred at one elementary school (Jackson 2015, on Sandy Hook Elementary School in 

Newtown, Connecticut, December 14, 2012), two 

high schools (Erickson 2001, on Columbine; Goodrum and Woodward 2016, on Arapahoe High School 

in Centennial, Colorado, December 13, 2013), and 

two universities (Virginia Tech Review Panel 2007 

on Virginia Tech University in Blacksburg, Virginia, 

April 16, 2007; Northern Illinois University 2008, on 

Northern Illinois University in DeKalb, Illinois, February 

14, 2008). Though these reports contain numerous 

recommendations regarding emergency response, 

which is beyond the scope of this report, they also 

include recommendations on preventing attacks. 

Recommendations for schools 

The importance of preparation 

For all educational institutions, there was repeated 

emphasis on the need to establish threat assessment 

procedures with trained personnel who can investigate potential threats, to train the staff and students 

in warning signs, and to provide multiple channels of 

communication for employees and students to report 

their concerns. The need for well-trained threat 

assessment teams was also emphasized by four 

of the five after-action reports (Columbine, Virginia 

Tech, Northern Illinois, and Arapahoe). The one that 

did not recommend this involved an attack at an elementary school by an adult outsider (Sandy Hook). 

In this case, a threat assessment system would 

not have prevented the attack. Two of the reports 

highlighted the need for anonymous tip lines (Columbine, Arapahoe). 

In addition, preparedness includes training for attacks 

with lockdown procedures and active shooter drills 

so that people know what to do in an emergency 

situation. This also includes having emergency notification systems in place to communicate effectively in 

the event of a crisis. 

In several incidents, people reported that their training and preparation helped them to respond quickly 

and effectively to mitigate the loss of life. 

The need to check in and maintain trusting 

relationships with students 

Even in the absence of direct warning signs of violence, multiple recommendations from the afteraction reports and the ASV database highlighted the 

importance of checking in with students and employees when it is clear they are in distress. Signs of distress include angry outbursts, verbal or physical 

aggression, inappropriate behavior, dropping out of a 

program, losing a job, or suing the institution. 

Recommendations addressing students’ emotional 

needs appear in various forms among the afteraction reports, including calling for a focus on improving school climate, engaging anti-bullying programs, 

strengthening relationships among students and 

staff, better integrating students into campus life, and 

increasing communication regarding students of 

concern (Columbine, Virginia Tech, Northern Illinois, 

Arapahoe, Sandy Hook). 

In situations of harassment and stalking, institutions 

need to be aware that this behavior could be the prelude to violence that might be much larger than an 

assault against the one person of interest. 

In several cases, students and employees with a 

well-known grievance against their institutions and 

no history of firearm use suddenly purchased firearms and began practicing with them. In the context of a hostile relationship with an institution that in 

some cases had escalated to a lawsuit, as well as 

other warning signs, the purchase of a gun by someone who has never owned or used a gun previously 

needs to be considered a possible warning sign of 

violence. If this behavior is observed by friends, classmates, colleagues, faculty, administrators, or other 

staff, it should be reported as a possible warning sign 

of violence. 

A Comparison of Averted and Completed School Attacks 

from the Police Foundation’s Averted School Violence Database 18 
 

 

Financial distress 

For several university students and employees, financial distress was a significant stressor that contributed to their hopelessness and rage against the 

university. These attackers were generally middleaged people for whom the inability to support themselves or their families had dire consequences. When 

financial distress is blamed on the university and 

occurs in the midst of a hostile relationship with the 

institution, especially when there are warning signs of 

potential violence, administrators should consider multiple ways of assisting the person in question. 

Depending on the situation, this could involve tuition 

remission, forgiveness of debt, or (for employees) 

financial assistance for a designated period of time. 

For people who feel they have suffered at the hands 

of the university and may be harboring thoughts of 

revenge against those they blame for their financial 

hardship, reaching out with compassion may go a 

long way to defusing their hostility. Though it is understandable that at times institutions are so uncomfortable with someone’s behavior that they want to make 

a clean break as quickly as possible and either expel 

a student or fire an employee, this can aggravate the 

situation. 

Any assistance that can be given to help someone 

in this situation move forward academically or occupationally may prevent their rage from escalating 

into violence. Thus, rather than cutting ties with 

someone who is hostile and accuses the institution 

of having treated them unfairly, it may be safer and 

more productive to reach out to the person. To do 

otherwise might add to their feeling of having suffered 

an injustice. 

Building security 

Several attacks were committed by people who had 

no recent or current connection to the schools they 

attacked. Despite having no reason to be in the 

schools, they were able to enter the buildings either 

because the doors were not locked or someone 

allowed them to enter. These attacks by outsiders to 

the school community cannot be prevented through 

early detection because the schools do not even 

know that the people exist. The only prevention 

measure schools can put in place for this type of 

attack is to increase physical security. Increased 

scrutiny regarding outsiders might have prevented 

these attacks. 

The only after-action report to address school safety 

through architectural design was the one following the attack at Sandy Hook, in which the perpetrator was an outsider to the school. In this case, the 

assailant was unable to enter the school because 

of a locked door, so he shot his way through a fulllength window. Preventing this kind of attack involves 

a consideration of building design. As noted earlier, 

averting attacks by outsiders depends in part on 

physical security measures and keeping intruders out 

of the building. 

Metal detectors 

In the situations noted earlier, the known presence of 

a metal detector might have deterred the perpetrator 

from attempting to enter the school. In general, however, the effectiveness of metal detectors to prevent 

rampage attacks is limited, as rampage attacks have 

occurred at schools where metal detectors were 

used (e.g., Red Lake High School in Red Lake, Minnesota, March 21, 2005). 

Because rampage school attackers are not trying to 

get away with their crime and often expect to die in 

their attacks, they are not deterred by a metal detector. First, if they really are determined to get a gun in 

the building, they may find a way to bypass the 

detector. Second, even if they have to walk through 

the detector, they may be willing to do so, not caring 

if they set off an alarm or signal. One of the afteraction reports (Columbine) even recommends against 

the use of metal detectors. 

In some cases, however, a metal detector might have 

prevented an attack. For example, in one incident 

(Campbell County High School in Jacksboro, Tennessee, November 8, 2005), a student brought a gun 

Assessment 19 
to school with no intention of using it. When confronted by three administrators, however, he apparently panicked and opened fire. A metal detector 

could have resulted in the weapon being discovered 

and confiscated. 

Similarly, for schools that have an ongoing issue with 

guns and knives being smuggled into the building, a 

metal detector could reduce the problem. 

Security or school resource officers 

Several recommendations supported the use of security guards or school resource officers. These individuals, if properly trained and equipped, may serve as a 

deterrent—but even if they do not deter an attack, 

their presence on site can allow for a much quicker 

intervention than waiting for local police to arrive. 

Take threats seriously 

Though it may seem like common sense that threats 

of violence need to be taken seriously, in multiple situations people reported their concerns only to have 

them dismissed. Not every threat is meant seriously, 

but every threat needs to be taken seriously. 

Understanding FERPA 

The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act 

(FERPA) is a federal law that governs the confidentiality of student records. In at least one incident (Arapahoe), the school was aware of a student’s homicidal 

threat but kept communication to a minimum among 

their personnel and did not reach out at all to law 

enforcement because they believed that FERPA prohibited this. FERPA does not prohibit communication 

related to student threats. To clarify this issue, the 

U.S. Department of Education has released two 

FERPA guides, one for elementary and secondary 

schools and one for colleges and universities (U.S. 

Department of Education 2007a; U.S. Department of 

Education 2007b). Two of the after-action reports 

(Northern Illinois University, Arapahoe) cite the importance of having staff be properly trained in FERPA in 

order to avoid having them withhold information that 

should be communicated and shared among persons responsible for school safety and security. 

Grounds security 

Though most school attacks occur inside a building, 

not all of them do. Some happen outdoors as students are arriving at or departing from school. Others 

occur at recess while children are playing outside. 

Still others have involved the perpetrator standing 

outside and shooting through windows into classrooms. With this in mind, some recommendations 

involved a consideration of what can be done to protect children from these threats, including walls rather 

than fences around playgrounds, stationing security 

guards outdoors with the students, and using bulletproof glass in ground floor doors and windows. 

Suspension and expulsion 

An important point for administrators is that punishment is not prevention. In several incidents, students 

have been suspended or expelled and returned to 

school with a gun and committed murder (e.g., SuccessTech Academy in Cleveland, Ohio, October 10, 

2007; Weston High School in Cazenovia, Wisconsin, 

September 29, 2006; Townville Elementary School in 

Townville, South Carolina, September 28, 2016). 

Though punishment may be necessary, if there is any 

concern about violence, simply trying to remove the 

student from the school does not lead to safety. 

On a different note, twice students who were suspended for reasons other than potential violence 

returned the same day they were suspended and 

killed people at school (Lake Worth Middle School in 

Lake Worth, Florida, May 26, 2000; Millard South 

High School in Omaha, Nebraska, January 5, 2011). 

In neither of these cases, however, did the administration have any reason to suspect that the student 

was at risk of committing violence. Even so, the lesson here is that when students are suspended and 

prohibited from being on school property and this is 

A Comparison of Averted and Completed School Attacks 

from the Police Foundation’s Averted School Violence Database 20 
 

 

not communicated to school personnel, the students 

can return to the school, enter, and commit acts of 

violence. This possibility highlights the need for communication among school staff to ensure that everyone is properly notified and access to the school is 

carefully monitored. 

Promote reporting mechanisms 

Some schools have systems in place for students 

and staff to report safety concerns, but these are 

useless if nobody knows about them or how and 

when to use them. Thus, it is essential that there be 

programs, trainings, advertising, and so on to make 

sure that everyone in the school community is aware 

of the reporting systems, when the systems should 

be used, and how they are used. Sandy Hook Promise (www.sandyhookpromise.org), for example, has 

developed an anonymous reporting system as well 

as extensive training to assist students, parents, 

teachers, staff and community members regarding 

signs and warnings. This issue is also addressed in 

an after-action report (Arapahoe). 

Record keeping 

Schools need a system for keeping track of safety 

concerns and making this information accessible to 

anyone who has a need to know. It should be possible for employees to log their concerns in a database 

and also to see what others have documented about 

a student. Communication is essential, and often different people have different pieces of the puzzle; a 

comprehensive, accessible, and user-friendly system 

is necessary to facilitate putting the pieces together. 

Educate teachers about warning signs 

Several school attackers have handed in assignments in which they mentioned homicidal intentions. 

In some cases, fictional pieces by students have foreshadowed their rampage attacks. Teachers need to 

be aware that student projects and papers, whether 

fiction or nonfiction, can contain clues of impending violence. 

Educate students about warning signs 

Students need to know the warning signs of violence 

and what to do when they encounter them. In many 

cases, students heard the perpetrators talking about 

their plans but either did not take the threat seriously 

or did not know what to do with the information. They 

need to be taught the difference between snitching 

and reporting a safety concern and the ramifications 

of their decisions. The importance of educating both 

students and school personnel in the warning signs 

of potential violence is noted in multiple after-action 

reports (Columbine, Virginia Tech, Northern Illinois 

University, Arapahoe). 

Develop relationship with law enforcement 

Schools should work closely with the local police 

department to improve safety. Ideally, police not only 

have diagrams of schools but also do walk-throughs 

to familiarize themselves with the buildings. In addition, administrators need to know what level of 

threat reaches the threshold for notifying the police. 

Two of the after-action reports (Columbine, Northern 

Illinois University) recommend greater communication between educational institutions and local law 

enforcement agencies. 

Seeking student safety concerns 

One school (Red Lion Area Junior High School in 

York County, Pennsylvania, April 24, 2003), in the 

wake of a shooting, asked students to report any 

safety concerns they had and then passed the information on to police. As a result of these student 

reports, a 17-year-old student’s car was searched at 

home. Police found a handgun, a sawed-off shotgun, 

a rifle, ammunition, and pipe bomb materials. In the 

home of an 18-year-old student, police found several 

firearms, ammunition, and narcotics. In another 

18-year-old student’s home, a handgun was found 

concealed in a drainage pipe. Police reported that the 

weapons were stolen. Even if the students in possession of these weapons were not planning school 

Assessment 21 
attacks, they were still potential risks for violence. 

Thus, simply seeking student input about peers they 

perceive as potentially violent can be an effective 

method of intervention. 

Recommendations for home 

Firearm security 

The most frequent recommendation for the home 

was that older family members (parents, siblings, 

grandparents, etc.) need to properly secure their firearms. The vast majority of juvenile attackers obtained 

their guns from their own homes. 

Though some adults took steps to keep their guns 

safe, these steps do not mean the guns really were 

secure. Adolescents can be very resourceful and 

may know where keys are kept or even figure out 

the combinations to locks. One 14-year-old tried to 

use his cell phone to surreptitiously film his father putting in the combination for the box where his guns 

were kept. In many instances of school attacks by 

juveniles, firearms that belonged to their parents or 

other relatives were accessible to the perpetrators 

(Langman 2016b). True firearm security means that 

even with all the tools available, the guns cannot 

be accessed. 

Even in cases where the attacker was not a juvenile, 

there were often reasons to deny them access to firearms. In one case, both the 26-year-old attacker and 

his father had made suicide attempts, but there were 

still guns in the home that were easily accessible 

(Langman 2015a). Keeping guns out of the hands of 

people who are dangerous to themselves or others 

is essential. 

For example, in one case, the perpetrator’s mother 

was acutely aware that her son had significant mental 

health issues as well as an anger problem, yet she 

encouraged his interest in guns and knew he had 

weapons available in the home. She even reported to 

the police after the attack that he once pointed a 

shotgun at her, but she did not call the police at that 

time or have his guns removed. Though the suspect 

was old enough to legally own guns, given his mental 

and emotional instability his mother could have 

insisted that no firearms be allowed in the home (Oregon State Police 2017). 

Parents need to know warning signs 

In some cases, parents were aware that their children 

had significant mental health issues and also knew of 

their obsession with school attackers but did not 

intervene. In one case, the perpetrator had tried to kill 

himself on the anniversary of the Columbine shooting. Though he survived this attempt, he was so 

obsessed with Columbine that he convinced his 

mother to drive him across the country, from North 

Carolina to Colorado, so he could see Columbine 

High School and the home of one of the Columbine 

killers. Despite knowing that he was suicidal and 

obsessed with Columbine and owned firearms, she 

apparently did not recognize these factors as warning signs for violence (Langman 2015b). 

Privacy 

The attacker who made a pilgrimage to Columbine 

High School also wrote a journal about his plans for 

the upcoming attack. If his parents had searched his 

room, the journal could have been discovered and 

the attack prevented. Similarly, other attackers have 

kept journals as well as guns and bombs hidden in 

their rooms. 

This does not mean that teenagers should not be 

allowed any privacy, but in multiple cases there have 

been reasons for parents to be concerned enough 

about their children to search their rooms. These reasons have included discovering that their teens have 

been building bombs, that they are suicidal, that they 

are homicidal, and so on. In these situations, parents 

need to do what they can to keep their children safe, 

and this can mean conducting room searches. 

In one particularly tragic case, the perpetrator did not 

want his mother in his room, and she accepted this. 

Not long before the attack, however, she did go into 

his room and was disturbed to find gory drawings, 

A Comparison of Averted and Completed School Attacks 

from the Police Foundation’s Averted School Violence Database 22 
 

 

including “a woman clutching a religious item, like 

rosary beads, and holding a child, and she was getting all shot up in the back with blood flying everywhere.” (Lysiak 2013) Because she was not supposed 

to be in his room, however, she never questioned him 

about this. Their relationship was extremely tenuous, 

and she did not want to cause a complete break. 

Shortly after this, he killed his mother and committed 

a massacre at his former school. 

Recommendations for law enforcement 

Most recommendations were directed to schools 

and parents, with just a couple considerations for 

police. First, some attackers used chains to lock 

doors or find other ways to impede the police in their 

response. Officers should carry door-breaching 

equipment in their cars to facilitate their entry when 

necessary. Also, some attacks end up in hostage situations, so local law enforcement needs to have people trained in negotiating hostage release. Finally, as 

noted earlier, police should have school floor plans 

and be familiar with the buildings by doing walkthroughs. They should also work with local schools 

so administrators know when it is appropriate to call 

them with safety concerns. 

General recommendations 

Suicide 

Though most people who are suicidal are not homicidal, many homicidal people are also suicidal. This is 

true of school attackers, approximately half of whom 

intend to die in their attacks (Langman 2015b; Langman 2016a). Keeping this fact in mind, mental health 

professionals should routinely ask about homicidal 

thoughts when dealing with suicidal students. 

Social media 

Social media is addressed in two ways. First, social 

media posts may indicate risk of violence. Such posts 

need to be reported; they may be the earliest warning 

signs that an individual is considering committing violence. Second, for an individual who has come to the 

attention of authorities as a potential violence risk, searching through their social 

media activity may provide further evidence of their 

violent intentions. 

Child Protective Services 

Several attackers came from highly dysfunctional and 

violent households (Langman 2009; Langman 

2015b). In some cases, multiple reports to child protective services had been made, and in a couple of 

cases, criminal charges had been filed against one or 

more of the parents. Nonetheless, the children were 

not removed from these homes and their abuse continued. Increased funding for children’s protective 

services and mental health interventions for both children and adults should be a national priority. 

Mental health treatment 

Increased knowledge about mental health and the 

signs of psychological distress could have resulted in 

better intervention by parents, teachers, and others. 

In addition, the stigma regarding mental health treatment has been a barrier that has kept people from 

getting help. Efforts to destigmatize mental health 

treatment should be a national priority, along with 

increasing available services and making sure they 

are accessible and affordable to all who need them. 

After-action reports include similar recommendations. For example, the Virginia Tech report recommended changing laws related to temporary detention 

and involuntary commitment of potentially dangerous 

people, as well as increasing the capacity of crisis 

stabilization units so that people at risk of violence do 

not have to wait to receive treatment. The Northern 

Illinois University report emphasized the importance 

of destigmatizing mental illness and integrating all 

students into campus life. The Sandy Hook report 

recommended improving the mental health system 

and increasing the accessibility of services. 

Assessment 23 
Laws regarding threats 

Many states have laws against threatening behavior. 

The laws may refer to “terroristic threats” or “menacing” or use other terminology. Regardless of the terms 

used, however, educators, mental health professionals, and others should be familiar with the laws 

in their states and report threatening behavior to 

law enforcement. 

Other recommendations from 

the after-action reports 

Two after-action reports (Virginia Tech Review Panel 

2007; Sandy Hook Advisory Commission 2015) 

include recommendations on changing state or federal laws. One domain these recommendations 

address includes background checks for all long gun 

sales or transfers of ownership and the reporting of 

information to the background check system so that 

individuals prohibited from owning firearms can be 

identified. Other recommendations address laws 

relating to the temporary detention of potential perpetrators of violence, involuntary commitment, privacy and confidentiality, and access to information. 

A Comparison of Averted and Completed School Attacks 

from the Police Foundation’s Averted School Violence Database 24 
 

 

Case Studies
 

Averted attack 

THIS CASE TAKEN FROM THE ASV DATABASE involved a 17-year-old boy, his brother, 

and perhaps several friends. It was not clear how many were truly involved in the planned 

attack and how many simply were part of the conversations about it. There is little information available about the two primary suspects regarding family and educational histories. 

The attack plan included blowing up the school and shooting any surviving teachers and 

students as they fled. The group of students called themselves the Trench Coat Mafia in 

imitation of a group of students at Columbine (it was originally believed that the two Columbine killers belonged to this group, but this was a mistake). 

The potential attack was foiled by one of the conspirators, who disclosed what she knew to 

the one teacher with whom she felt most connected. The teacher than passed the information along to a school resource officer, who notified the local police. In addition, a custodian found and reported a letter that mentioned the attack plans. A local landlord found and 

reported bomb-making materials in the attic of one of his buildings. The police obtained a 

search warrant for the home of the two brothers and found ammunition, bomb-making 

instructions, and photographs of the boys holding handguns. As a result of the investigation, five youths were arrested. 

This case highlights the importance of students coming forward with their concerns as 

well as the importance of establishing meaningful relationships between school staff and 

students that can foster a higher level of communication, particularly regarding safety concerns. In addition, the case makes clear that safety is a community concern and when 

more people take action to maintain safety, the more likely a community is to prevent an 

act of violence. 

25 
Completed attack 

The case from the database selected as an example 

involved a 15-year-old boy (who will be referred to as 

AW). His parents were divorced and lived in different 

states, and he lived with his father. The boy reportedly 

was bright, but his grades dropped and he began 

having disciplinary issues at school. He was given 

multiple detentions for tardiness and truancy. When 

the school left voicemail messages for his father, 

AW would make sure he arrived home before his 

father to erase the messages. He also intercepted his 

report card so his father would not see his poor 

grades. In this way he was able to ensure neither the 

school nor his father had any reason to be concerned 

about violence. 

AW’s friends, however, had plenty of reasons to be 

concerned. He talked repeatedly about “pulling a 

Columbine.” For weeks, if not months, he told his 

friends he was going to bring a gun to school and kill 

people. Sometimes they dismissed this as a joke. 

Other times, someone would be concerned enough 

to ask if he were serious, and then AW himself 

would dismiss it as a joke. Once he said that he was 

going to use his father’s guns, but when his friends 

questioned him further, he told them that the guns 

were locked up and he did not have access. At one 

point, a father figure to one of his friends heard about 

this and reportedly called AW and talked to him. At 

another point in time, AW invited his friends to join 

him in the attack. The day before the attack, he 

announced to a friend, “tomorrow I’m going to bring 

a bunch of guns and I’m going to shoot a bunch of 

people. I’m going to shoot people down and you’re 

going to watch.” 

The morning of the attack, some of his friends were 

concerned enough that they patted him down to 

check for a gun. When they did not find one, they 

apparently thought it had all been a joke. However, 

they failed to search his backpack, which contained 

the gun. He entered the school and shot 15 people 

(Langman 2014). 

This case highlights the need for students and adults 

to know what to do when they encounter warning 

signs of violence. Even though AW’s friends suspected that he might be serious, questioned him, 

and even searched for a gun, nobody that knew 

about his threats reported their concerns to the 

school or to police. 

Commentary on Case Studies 

The primary difference between the two case examples is that in the averted 

shooting, multiple people reported their concerns, but in the completed shooting, 

no one who was concerned about a possible attack contacted either the school 

or local law enforcement. Communication is the key to preventing mass attacks. 

To improve communication, communities need to be trained to recognize warning 

signs and to know what to do when they encounter them. 

A Comparison of Averted and Completed School Attacks 

from the Police Foundation’s Averted School Violence Database 26 
 

 

Conclusion 

THIS REPORT PRESENTED DATA on 51 completed and 51 averted school attacks that 

occurred in the United States since the attack at Columbine High School on April 20, 1999. 

It also presented recommendations on multiple ways to prevent school attacks, including 

large-scale social changes as well as specific strategies for schools to use. This report is 

part of the Police Foundation’s ongoing Averted School Violence project. The Police Foundation will continue to gather information on both completed and averted school attacks 

from open sources as well as from individuals that submit reports of violence to the ASV 

database to further our understanding of the causes of these attacks and to refine our 

knowledge of how they can be prevented. 

27 

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University. DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University. 

https://schoolshooters.info/sites/default/files/ 

Northern%20Illinois%20University%20Official 

%20Report.pdf. 

A Preliminary Report on the Police 

Foundation’s Averted School Violence Database 29 
Oregon State Police. 2017. Incident: SP15312489. 

Oregon State Police. https://schoolshooters.info/ 

sites/default/files/Umpqua_Investigation.pdf. 

Sandy Hook Advisory Commission. 2015. Final 

Report of the Sandy Hook Advisory Commission. 

Harford, CT: Sandy Hook Advisory Commission. 

http://www.shac.ct.gov/SHAC_Final_ 

Report_3-6-2015.pdf. 

STOMP Out Bullying. 2018. “STOMP Out Bullying Supports Young Activists to End School 

Shootings.” Last modified February 21, 2018. 

https://www.stompoutbullying.org/blog/ 

stomp-out-bullying-supports-young-activistsend-school-shootings. 

StopBullying.gov. 2018. “Stop Bullying on the 

Spot.” U.S. Department of Health and Human 

Services. Accessed September 28, 2018. 

https://www.stopbullying.gov/. 

Virginia Tech Review Panel. 2007. Mass Shootings 

at Virginia Tech, April 16, 2007: Report of the 

Review Panel. Washington, DC: Police Foundation. http://www.policefoundation.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/08/Mass-Shootingsat-Virginia-Tech.pdf. 

U.S. Department of Education. 2007a. Balancing 

Student Privacy and School Safety: A Guide 

to the Family Educational Rights and Privacy 

Act for Elementary and Secondary Schools. 

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Education. 

https://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/ 

brochures/elsec.html. 

–––. 2007b. Balancing Student Privacy and School 

Safety: A Guide to the Family Educational Rights 

and Privacy Act for Colleges and Universities. 

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Education. 

https://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/ 

brochures/postsec.html. 

A Comparison of Averted and Completed School Attacks 

from the Police Foundation’s Averted School Violence Database 30 
About the Police Foundation
 

The Police Foundation is a national, nonpartisan, 

nonprofit organization dedicated to advancing innovation and science in policing. As the country’s oldest 

police research organization, the Police Foundation 

has learned that police practices should be based on 

scientific evidence about what works best, the paradigm of evidence-based policing. 

Established in 1970, the foundation has conducted 

seminal research in police behavior, policy, and procedure and works to transfer to local agencies the 

best new information about practices for dealing 

effectively with a range of important police operational and administrative concerns. Motivating all of 

the foundation’s efforts is the goal of efficient, humane 

policing that operates within the framework of democratic principles and the highest ideals of the nation. 

To learn more, visit the Police Foundation online at 

www.policefoundation.org. 

A Preliminary Report on the Police 

Foundation’s Averted School Violence Database 31 
 

About the COPS Office
 

The Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) is the component of the U.S. 

Department of Justice responsible for advancing the 

practice of community policing by the nation’s state, 

local, territorial, and tribal law enforcement agencies 

through information and grant resources. 

Community policing begins with a commitment to 

building trust and mutual respect between police and 

communities. It supports public safety by encouraging all stakeholders to work together to address our 

nation’s crime challenges. When police and communities collaborate, they more effectively address 

underlying issues, change negative behavioral patterns, and allocate resources. 

Rather than simply responding to crime, community 

policing focuses on preventing it through strategic 

problem-solving approaches based on collaboration. 

The COPS Office awards grants to hire community 

policing officers and support the development and 

testing of innovative policing strategies. COPS Office 

funding also provides training and technical assistance to community members and local government 

leaders, as well as all levels of law enforcement. 

Since 1994, the COPS Office has invested more 

than $14 billion to add community policing officers to 

the nation’s streets, enhance crime fighting technology, support crime prevention initiatives, and provide 

training and technical assistance to help advance 

community policing. Other achievements include 

the following: 

 To date, the COPS Office has funded the hiring of 

approximately 130,000 additional officers by more 

than 13,000 of the nation’s 18,000 law enforcement agencies in both small and large jurisdictions. 

 Nearly 700,000 law enforcement personnel, community members, and government leaders have 

been trained through COPS Office–funded training organizations. 

 To date, the COPS Office has distributed more 

than eight million topic-specific publications, training curricula, white papers, and resource CDs and 

flash drives. 

 The COPS Office also sponsors conferences, 

round tables, and other forums focused on issues 

critical to law enforcement. 

COPS Office information resources, covering a wide 

range of community policing topics such as school 

and campus safety, violent crime, and officer safety 

and wellness, can be downloaded via the COPS 

Office’s home page, www.cops.usdoj.gov. This website is also the grant application portal, providing 

access to online application forms. 

32 

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The Police Foundation, in collaboration with the COPS Office, implemented the Averted 

School Violence (ASV) database to provide a platform for sharing information about averted 

incidents of violence in institutions of elementary, secondary, and higher education. As a 

companion to the preliminary report on the ASV database (Daniels 2018), this report com 

pares 51 completed with 51 averted incidents of school violence from the ASV database 

and analyzes both sets. It includes findings on the demographics of individuals who plan 

attacks, victims’ demographics in completed attacks, and community characteristics; it 

also provides important recommendations to minimize school violence and improve student and school safety. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services 

145 N Street NE 

Washington, DC 20530 

To obtain details on COPS Office programs, call 

the COPS Office Response Center at 800-421-6770. 

Visit the COPS Office online at www.cops.usdoj.gov 

Police Foundation 

1201 Connecticut Ave NW 

Suite 200 

Washington, DC 20036 

Visit the Police Foundation online 

at www.policefoundation.org 

e071803885b 

Published 2019