IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Donald Franklin Dowd, Jr., :

: No. 2113 C.D. 2016

Petitioner : Submitted: July 14, 2017

:

v. :

:

Dominic J. Rossi, Esquire, :

:

Respondent :

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

PER CURIAM FILED: September 1, 2017

Donald Franklin Dowd, Jr. petitions pro se for review of the order of 

an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) with the Office of Attorney General (OAG) 

denying his appeal of the decision of Dominic J. Rossi, Esquire, Deputy Court 

Administrator of the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas (trial court) that 

had denied Dowd’s challenge to the accuracy of his criminal history record under 

the Criminal History Record Information Act (CHRIA).1 We affirm.

On July 1, 2015, Dowd filed a challenge to the accuracy of his 

criminal history record information under Sections 9151(a) and 9152(c) of 

CHRIA,2alleging: a violation of the Supremacy Clause of the United States 

 

1

18 Pa. C.S. §§9101-9183.

2

18 Pa. C.S. §§9151(a), 9152(c). Section 9151(a) states, in relevant part, that “[a]ny 

individual . . . has the right to review, challenge, correct and appeal the accuracy and 

completeness of his criminal history record information.” In turn, Section 9152(c) states:

(Footnote continued on next page...)
2

Constitution depriving the trial court of jurisdiction based on the omission of the 

statutory authority by the General Assembly to extradite and prosecute him for the 

crimes of first degree murder and criminal conspiracy;3fraud by the Clerk of 

 

(continued...)

The individual may challenge the accuracy of his or her criminal 

history record information by specifying which portion of the 

record is incorrect and what the correct version should be. Failure 

to challenge any portion of the record in existence at that time will 

place the burden of proving the inaccuracy of any part 

subsequently challenged upon the individual. Information 

subsequently added to such record shall also be subject to review, 

challenge, correction or appeal.

3

The circumstances underlying Dowd’s convictions in the trial court and his direct 

appeals of the judgment of sentence have been summarized by the Superior Court as follows:

The Commonwealth charged [Dowd] with the executionstyle killing of R.M. The homicide transpired on November 22, 

1970, and the underlying convictions in this case, murder and 

criminal conspiracy to commit murder, occurred in September 

1973. [Dowd] and R.M. had been members of the People’s 

Liberation Army (“PLA”), a radical revolutionary group. R.M., 

along with another member of the group, Philip Wormley, 

allegedly perpetrated a robbery to benefit the PLA. Both R.M. and 

[] Wormley purportedly retained some proceeds from that robbery 

and the PLA considered them a security risk. A member of the 

PLA testified that the group, including [Dowd], agreed to execute 

both R.M. and [] Wormley. R.M. suffered twelve gunshot wounds, 

which eventually resulted in his death. R.M.’s attackers shot him 

with a .38 caliber weapon and a .44 caliber firearm. In addition, a 

.9 mm casing was located at the scene. Prior to his death, R.M. 

identified four men, including [Dowd], as his assailants. Although 

the Commonwealth did not charge [Dowd] with the crime, []

Wormley was murdered contemporaneously in the same area and 

with the exact weapons utilized on R.M.

(Footnote continued on next page...)
3

 

(continued...)

[Dowd] fled the Commonwealth after the shooting only to 

be apprehended in Georgia in December 1970, for carrying a .9 

mm firearm without a permit. A grand jury in Pennsylvania 

indicted [Dowd] in abstentia on December 16, 1970. In February 

1971, [Dowd] was extradited to Philadelphia, where trial was 

delayed for thirty-one months.

During [Dowd]’s trial, the Commonwealth introduced two 

separate dying declarations by the victim that identified [Dowd] as 

one of his attackers. In addition, the Commonwealth introduced 

evidence that Philip Wormley was murdered in order to 

demonstrate a common scheme between the two killings. 

Evidence of the robbery that R.M. and [] Wormley committed was 

offered to prove motive for the crime. The jury convicted [Dowd] 

of both first degree murder and criminal conspiracy to commit 

murder and the trial court sentenced [Dowd] to life imprisonment. 

[Dowd]’s trial counsel neglected to file a direct appeal and [Dowd] 

filed a pro se motion to reinstate his appellate rights nunc pro tunc, 

which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted.

Thereafter, our Supreme Court affirmed [Dowd]’s 

conviction, holding that the delay in [Dowd]’s case did not deny 

him his speedy trial rights, that the victim’s second dying 

declaration was admissible, and evidence that [Dowd] belonged to 

a revolutionary group that took part in a robbery was admissible. 

Commonwealth v. Dowd, 372 A.2d 705 (Pa. 1977). The 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied [Dowd]’s petition for a 

rehearing and he petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the United 

States Supreme Court. That petition was denied.

Commonwealth v. Dowd, (Pa. Super., No. 2261 EDA 2005, filed October 27, 2010), slip op. at 1-

3 (citations to trial transcript omitted). See also Commonwealth v. Riggins, 386 A.2d 520, 523 

(Pa. 1978) (“To accept appellant’s present contention that where the link establishing the identity 

of the perpetrator of the crime[s of first degree murder and criminal conspiracy] is supplied by an 

uncorroborated dying declaration the evidence must be deemed insufficient as a matter of law, 

requires a determination that dying declarations must be accorded less weight than other types of 

admissible evidence. This we decline to do. The jury was properly instructed that [it] could 

consider these statements of the deceased in determining whether the appellant was one of the 

(Footnote continued on next page...)
4

Courts in the trial court for changing the docket to read that he was arrested, 

charged, indicted, tried, convicted and sentenced pursuant to Section 2502 of the 

Crimes Code4because that statute did not exist at the time that he was charged with 

and convicted of first degree murder; and that the new docket in his case is 

fraudulently altered, incomplete, and inaccurate so that there is no valid judgment 

of sentence supporting his incarceration that comports with the Full Faith and 

Credit Clause of the United States Constitution. Certified Record (C.R.) Appendix 

 

(continued...)

killers. This evidence alone, if believed (and it apparently was believed by the jury) was 

sufficient in law to sustain the verdict.”) (footnote omitted).

4

18 Pa. C.S. §2502. As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained:

The Crimes Code in Chapter 25, for the first time in 

Pennsylvania, establishes an offense known as “criminal 

homicide”. A person is guilty of this crime “if he intentionally, 

knowingly, recklessly or negligently causes the death of another 

human being.” 18 Pa. C.S. §2501(a). The Code then states that 

“[c]riminal homicide [is] classified as murder, voluntary 

manslaughter, or involuntary manslaughter.” Ibid. §2501(b). 

(Emphasis supplied.) Murder is in turn divided into three 

categories: murder of the first degree, murder of the second 

degree, and murder of the third degree. Ibid. §2502. Murder of 

the first degree and of the second degree under the Crimes Code 

together correspond to murder in the first degree under prior law[, 

the former Penal Code, Act of June 24, 1939, P.L. 872, as 

amended, 18 P.S. §4701 repealed by the Act of December 6, 1972, 

P.L. 1482]; the new murder of the first degree is an intentional 

killing, while the new murder of the second degree is felonymurder. Murder of the third degree is comprised of “all other 

kinds of murder,” 18 Pa. C.S. §2502(c) (Supp. 1977-1978), thus 

taking the place of the former murder in the second degree, which 

the Penal Code described in the same words.

Commonwealth v. Polimeni, 378 A.2d 1189, 1194 (Pa. 1977) (footnotes omitted).
5

(Appx.) 15 at Exhibit (Ex.) 1. As a result, Dowd directed the Clerk of Courts to: 

correct his criminal history record information to reflect the enumerated omissions, 

deficiencies, and alterations and find that the trial court never had subject matter 

jurisdiction over his criminal case; notify all other criminal justice agencies of the 

correct, accurate, and complete records; issue an affidavit that there is no valid 

judgment of sentence supporting his incarceration; and conduct a hearing to review 

his challenge. The Clerk of Courts forwarded Dowd’s challenge to Rossi.

On August 12, 2015, Rossi sent Dowd a letter stating “that upon 

review of the dockets we have determined that they are correct.” C.R. Appx. 15 at 

Ex. 2. As a result, on September 7, 2015, Dowd appealed Rossi’s decision to the 

OAG pursuant to Section 9152(e)(1) of CHRIA.5 C.R. Appx. 1.

On June 23, 2016, the ALJ conducted a hearing6at which Dowd 

appeared and presented evidence in support of his claims; Rossi did not appear at 

the hearing.

7

 On December 7, 2016, the ALJ issued the instant disposition and 

order denying Dowd’s appeal of Rossi’s decision stating, in relevant part:

[Dowd] does not appear to dispute that he was 

convicted of murder and conspiracy to commit murder. 

 

5

18 Pa. C.S. §9152(e)(1). Section 9152(e)(1) states that “[i]f the challenge is ruled 

invalid, an individual has the right to appeal the decision to the [OAG] within 30 days of 

notification of the decision by the criminal justice agency.”

6

Section 9152(e)(2) of CHRIA states that OAG “shall conduct a hearing de novo in 

accordance with the Administrative Agency Law[, 2 Pa. C.S. §§501-508]. The burden of proof 

shall be upon the party bearing the burden of proof on the challenge.” 18 Pa. C.S. §9152(e)(2).

7

In November 2015, Dowd filed an Affidavit of Truth with the Pennsylvania State Police 

(PSP) and OAG and a Notice of Intent to file a Praecipe for Entry of Default against PSP due to 

the delay in responding to his appeal. C.R. Appx. 6, 8, 10. In December 2015, PSP’s request to 

be removed from the caption of the OAG appeal was granted because PSP was not a party to the 

action. C.R. Appx. 9, 16 at 2.
6

[Dowd] alleges that the initial charging decision and his 

extradition from the State of Georgia were defective. An 

appeal pursuant to Section 9152 of [CHRIA], 18 Pa. C.S. 

§9152, is limited to the accuracy of one’s criminal 

history record as it exists within the criminal justice 

system. Dunbar v. Pennsylvania, 902 A.2d 1002 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2006)[, appeal denied, 916 A.2d 635 (Pa. 

2007)]. Based upon the records provided by [Dowd], 

including the sentencing sheet and other court 

documents, [and] his testimony, the records as 

maintained by the Court Administrator of Philadelphia 

accurately reflect the conviction for murder and 

conspiracy. Those records, as reported to [PSP] for 

inclusion in [Dowd]’s criminal history, are accurately 

reflected in Docket number CP-51-CR-1205511-1970 as 

maintained by the Administrative Office of Pennsylvania 

Courts.

C.R. Appx. 16 at 4-5. Dowd then filed this appeal of the ALJ’s order.8

On appeal,9 Dowd argues that the ALJ’s disposition and order are 

arbitrary and capricious because he disregarded the evidence that Dowd presented 

and did not fully address the alteration and tampering with Dowd’s criminal 

history record information; Rossi did not meet his burden of proving the accuracy 

of Dowd’s criminal history record information in violation of Dowd’s due process 

and equal protection rights; and Rossi’s failure to maintain an accurate criminal 

history record information violated his duty under the United States and 

Pennsylvania Constitutions, international law, his fiduciary responsibility and oath 

of office and as an attorney, and the Code of Professional Responsibility.

 

8

Section 9152(e)(3) of CHRIA states that “[t]he decision of [OAG] may be appealed to 

the Commonwealth Court by an aggrieved individual.” 18 Pa. C.S. §9152(e)(3).

9

This Court’s review of the ALJ’s order is limited to determining whether constitutional 

rights were violated, whether an error of law was committed or whether necessary findings of 

fact are supported by substantial evidence. Dunbar, 902 A.2d at 1004 n.2.
7

However, to the extent that Dowd raises issues on appeal that were 

not raised in his challenge to the accuracy of his criminal history record 

information under CHRIA, such claims are waived for purposes of appeal. 

Pa. R.A.P. 1551(a) (“No question shall be heard or considered by the court which

was not raised before the government unit . . . .”); Laundry Owners Mutual 

Liability Insurance Association v. Insurance Commissioner of Pennsylvania, 91 

A.3d 747, 753 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) (holding that an issue is waived where the party 

fails to raise it before the governmental unit).

With respect to his remaining claims, seeking a determination that the 

trial court was without jurisdiction in the underlying criminal proceeding and 

associated ancillary relief, it is well settled that a request to correct a record under 

CHRIA cannot be used to attack the underlying criminal proceedings.10 As this 

Court has explained:

To the extent that Lindsey seeks to challenge the 

authority of the charges originally brought against him, 

and/or seeks to challenge the legal sufficiency and/or 

constitutionality of the judicial proceedings that flowed 

from those charges, the criminal proceedings in the Court 

of Common Pleas on those charges is and was the sole 

avenue for the address of, and appeal from, such 

challenges. The underlying charges and judicial 

 

10 Contrary to Dowd’s assertions, the ALJ did not act arbitrarily or capriciously disregard 

evidence in denying the requested relief. Rather, the evidence that Dowd presented at the ALJ’s 

hearing demonstrates that there are both a written judgment of sentence signed by the trial court 

judge and a written order of commitment signed by the clerk of the trial court supporting his 

incarceration. C.R. Appx. 15 at Ex. B, Ex. J-7. Moreover, the Department of Corrections retains 

detention authority even in the absence of a written sentencing order. See, e.g., Joseph v. Glunt, 

96 A.3d 365, 372 (Pa. Super.), appeal denied, 101 A.3d 787 (Pa. 2014) (“[C]ourts confronting 

this issue in the past have deemed a record of the valid imposition of a sentence as sufficient 

authority to maintain a prisoner’s detention notwithstanding the absence of a written sentencing 

order under [Section 9764(a)(8) of the Sentencing Code,] 42 Pa. C.S. §9764(a)(8).”).
8

proceedings that form the foundation of Lindsey’s

criminal history record contained within the PSP Central 

Repository are beyond the scope of the CHRIA’s 

provisions. Clark [v. Pennsylvania State Police, 760 

A.2d 1202, 1205 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000)].

Lindsey v. Pennsylvania State Police, (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 495 C.D. 2011, filed 

November 14, 2011), slip op. at 7.11 See also Clark, 760 A.2d at 1205 (“We would 

first observe, however, that we are in agreement with the ALJ that, even if his birth 

date as maintained by the central repository is inaccurate, Clark would not be 

entitled to expungement of the record. First, there is no dispute that the record 

accurately reflects Clark’s 1973 arrest and subsequent conviction. To order 

expungement of this conviction would only thwart the purpose of the criminal 

history record information and mislead law enforcement officials as to Clark’s 

criminal activities. Clark cannot utilize the Act as a means to attack collaterally his 

valid 1973 arrest and subsequent conviction.”); Neal v. Pennsylvania State Police,

(Pa. Cmwlth., No. 513 C.D. 2012, filed March 5, 2013), slip op. at 5 n.7 (“Neal 

misunderstands the purpose of the CHRIA, which is to ensure the accuracy of an 

individual’s criminal history record information, not to ensure the validity of the 

underlying criminal proceedings from which an individual’s criminal history 

record information is derived. See Clark, 760 A.2d at 1205. Thus, Neal cannot 

bring his challenge to the underlying prohibited offensive weapons and burglary 

charges under the CHRIA, as the ALJ and this Court have jurisdiction only over a 

challenge to the accuracy of Neal’s criminal history record information.”).

 

11 This Court’s unreported memorandum opinions may be cited “for [their] persuasive 

value, but not as a binding precedent.” Section 414(a) of the Commonwealth Court’s Internal 

Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code §69.414(a).
9

As noted above, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed on direct 

appeal the judgment of sentence imposed on Dowd’s first degree murder 

conviction.12 See Commonwealth v. Dowd, 372 A.2d 705 (Pa. 1977). His attempt 

to invalidate either the judgment of sentence or his criminal conviction under 

CHRIA in the instant proceeding is unavailing.

Finally, Dowd’s assertion that the computerized docket entries in the 

Common Pleas Case Management System (CPCMS) regarding his criminal 

conviction for first degree murder listing a new docket number and the current 

section of the Crimes Code within its database somehow invalidates his conviction 

or the judgement of sentence is likewise unavailing. It is undisputed that he was 

convicted of first degree murder and sentenced therefor. As explained above, 

“[m]urder of the first degree and of the second degree under the Crimes Code 

together correspond to murder in the first degree under prior law[, the former Penal 

Code, Act of June 24, 1939, P.L. 872, as amended, 18 P.S. §4701 (repealed)] . . . .” 

Commonwealth v. Polimeni, 378 A.2d 1189, 1194 (Pa. 1977). The computerized 

docket entries accurately reflect the crime for which he was convicted and upon 

which the judgment of sentence was imposed. As a result, the listing of a new 

docket number and the current section of the statute for that crime within the 

computer’s database does not provide a basis upon which to attack his underlying 

criminal conviction or judgment of sentence. See 204 Pa. Code §213.81, Section 

11.0 Commentary (“Case records are as susceptible to clerical errors and omissions 

as any other public record. The power of the court to correct errors in its own 

 

12 Dowd did not contest the accuracy of the criminal conspiracy charge in the challenge 

to the accuracy of his criminal history record information under Sections 9151(a) and 9152(c) of 

CHRIA. See C.R. Appx. 15 at Ex. 1. 
10

records is inherent. E.g., Jackson v. Hendrick, 746 A.2d 574 (Pa. 2000). It is 

important to emphasize that this section does not provide a party who is 

dissatisfied with a court’s decision, ruling or judgment a new avenue to appeal the 

same by merely alleging there is an error in the court’s decision, ruling or 

judgment. Rather, this section permits a party to ‘fix’ information that appears in a 

case record which is not, for one reason or another, correct.”).13

Accordingly, the ALJ’s order is affirmed.

Judge Cosgrove concurs in result only.

 

13 Moreover, review of the custodian’s response to a request to correct a CPCMS record 

is vested in the trial court judge and not the OAG under CHRIA. See 204 Pa. Code §213.81, 

Section 10.0(F) (“A requestor may seek review of the custodian’s response under Subsections 

E(1)-(4) within 10 business days of the mailing date of the response. 1. The request for review 

shall be submitted on a form that is designed and published by the Administrative Office of 

Pennsylvania Courts. 2. The request shall be reviewed by the judge(s) who presided over the 

case.”).
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Donald Franklin Dowd, Jr., :

: No. 2113 C.D. 2016

Petitioner : 

:

v. :

:

Dominic J. Rossi, Esquire, :

:

Respondent :

PER CURIAM

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 1

st day of September, 2017, the order of the 

Administrative Law Judge with the Office of Attorney General dated December 7, 

2016, is AFFIRMED.