T.C. Memo. 2003-226

UNITED STATES TAX COURT

DAVID J. PRICE, Petitioner v.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent

Docket No. 10571-02. Filed July 30, 2003.

David J. Price, pro se.

A. Gary Begun and Timothy S. Murphy, for respondent.

MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION

LARO, Judge: Petitioner petitioned the Court under section

6015(e) to redetermine respondent’s determination that he is not

entitled to equitable relief under section 6015(f) for 1994 and

1995. We decide whether petitioner is entitled to such relief. 

We hold he is not. Section references are to the applicable
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1 At trial, petitioner testified in support of his claim for

equitable relief. On the basis of the record as a whole,

including our observation and perception of petitioner when he

testified, we find petitioner’s testimony incredible and decline

to rely upon it to support his position herein. Neonatology

Associates, P.A. v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 43, 84 (2000), affd.

299 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2002).

versions of the Internal Revenue Code. Dollar amounts are

rounded.

FINDINGS OF FACT1

Some facts were stipulated. The stipulated facts and the

accompanying exhibits are incorporated herein by this reference. 

We find the stipulated facts accordingly. Petitioner resided in

New Baltimore, Michigan, when his petition was filed.

In 1992, petitioner married Lisa M. Price (Ms. Price)

(collectively, the Prices). They experienced marital disputes

during 1996, separated in or about 1997, and divorced on November

19, 1998. The Prices were represented by separate legal counsel

during the course of their divorce proceeding.

The Michigan circuit court (circuit court) that presided

over the divorce proceeding entered a judgment of divorce that

ordered and adjudged that the Prices file joint Federal, State,

and local income tax returns for 1992 through 1996. The judgment

also stated that 100 percent of any tax refund as to those years

would go to Ms. Price and, should Mr. Price fail to sign releases

or cooperate in the referenced joint filings, that Ms. Price had

the exclusive right to file those joint returns on their behalf.
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The Prices filed joint 1994 and 1995 Federal income tax

returns with the Commissioner on May 6, 1999. Those returns,

which were signed by both of the Prices, reported that the Prices

owed tax. As of January 8, 2003, the Commissioner’s records

reflect that the Prices’ liabilities as to those returns are

$1,892 and $1,159, respectively, exclusive of interest.

On May 15, 2000, respondent received from petitioner a

request for equitable relief under section 6015(f) as to 1994 and

1995. On or about November 21, 2001, Appeals Officer Bonnie Boak

(Boak) met with petitioner regarding his claim for equitable

relief under section 6015(f). Afterwards, following her research

and analysis of that claim, Boak issued to petitioner a notice of

determination denying it.

OPINION

Section 6015(f) generally affords a spouse equitable relief

from liability for tax owed as to a joint return where the facts

and circumstances of the case establish that it would be

inequitable to hold that spouse liable for that tax. Petitioner

argues that the Commissioner should have afforded him such

equitable relief for 1994 and 1995. According to petitioner, he

filed his 1994 and 1995 joint returns under duress in that the

judgment of divorce ordered that the Prices file joint income tax

returns for 1994 and 1995 and he was afraid of the consequences

of not filing joint returns for those years. Petitioner makes no
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other claim of entitlement to equitable relief under section

6015(f).

We disagree with petitioner that he is entitled to equitable

relief on account of his claim of duress. In Berger v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-76, the taxpayer signed a joint

income tax return pursuant to a divorce settlement and court

order. We concluded that the taxpayer did not sign that return

under duress. We held that the taxpayer’s allegations that she

was “afraid of the ‘consequences’ of defying a court order” did

not constitute duress under State law.

Our holding in Berger is equally applicable here. Under

Michigan law, i.e., the law which applies to the Prices’ divorce

proceeding, petitioner’s allegations, even if true, do not

constitute duress. The Supreme Court of Michigan has explained

that duress under Michigan law is present “when one by the

unlawful act of another is induced to make a contract or perform

some act under circumstances which deprive him of the exercise of

free will.” Hackley v. Headley, 8 N.W. 511, 512-513 (Mich.

1881); see also Beachlawn Bldg. Corp. v. St. Clair Shores,

121 N.W.2d 427, 429-430 (Mich. 1963) (same definition quoted);

Norton v. Mich. State Highway Dept., 24 N.W.2d 132, 135 (Mich.

1946) (same definition quoted). In that the circuit court did

not by an unlawful act induce petitioner to file joint returns

for 1994 and 1995 against his free will, we conclude that he did
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2 In fact, the circuit court contemplated that petitioner

might disobey its order to file joint returns with Ms. Price. 

The circuit court’s judgment provides specifically that Ms. Price

has the exclusive right to file 1994 and 1995 joint returns on

behalf of the Prices should petitioner fail to cooperate in the

filing of those returns.

not file his 1994 and 1995 joint returns under duress.2 We

sustain respondent’s determination that petitioner is jointly and

severally liable for the Prices’ 1994 and 1995 Federal income tax

liabilities.

Decision will be entered

for respondent.