[Cite as State v. Ingram, 2019-Ohio-2438.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

STATE OF OHIO, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

 Nos. 107587 and 107588 

 v. : 

 

DARNELL D. INGRAM, : 

 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: June 20, 2019 

 

Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case Nos. CR-17-615726-A and CR-18-625763-A 

 

Appearances: 

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting 

Attorney, and Jonathan Block, Assistant Prosecuting 

Attorney, for appellee. 

Jonathan A. Good, for appellant. 

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J.: 

In this consolidated appeal, defendant-appellant, Darnell D. Ingram, 

appeals his conviction for escape and the imposition of consecutive sentences. For 

the reasons that follow, we find no merit to the appeal and affirm. 
In June 2017, Ingram pleaded guilty in Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-17-

615726 to receiving stolen property. He was sentenced to a term of community 

control at a community-based correctional facility (“CBCF”). However, due to a 

sanction by the adult parole authority, Ingram was not placed into the CBCF 

program until November 2017. While at the facility, he was discovered with a cell 

phone, which was a violation CBCF policy. Ingram verbally confronted CBCF staff, 

kicked open one of the locked doors, and proceeded to kick the next door that led 

directly to the outside of the facility. Out of fear that Ingram would break the door, 

which would allow all residents unrestricted access to leave the facility, a staff 

member unlocked the outside door and Ingram fled from the facility. As a result, 

Ingram was charged in February 2018 in Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-18-625763 with 

escape and vandalism. 

In July 2018, Ingram appeared in court for a probation violation 

hearing in Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-17-615726 and for a plea hearing in Cuyahoga C.P. 

No. CR-18-625763. He pleaded guilty to escape; the vandalism charge was nolled. 

The court imposed a three-year prison sentence. Ingram was also found to be a 

probation violator and sentenced to 18 months in prison. The trial court ordered 

that both sentences be served consecutively for a total prison term of four and onehalf years. 

Ingram now appeals, raising three assignments of error for our 

review. 

 
I. Competency Evaluation 

Ingram contends in his first assignment of error that the trial court 

erred when it failed to sua sponte order a competency examination when the record 

shows that he struggled to rationally follow the events of the hearing. Specifically, 

he contends that he was not thinking rationally when he committed the offenses at 

CBCF, and then was unable to pay attention during the plea hearing. Accordingly, 

he argues on appeal that the trial court should have ordered a competency 

evaluation. 

A defendant is presumed to be competent and has the burden of 

proving his incompetency by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Williams, 

23 Ohio St.3d 16, 28, 490 N.E.2d 906 (1986). A defendant is incompetent if he “is 

incapable of understanding the nature and objective of the proceedings against 

[him] or of assisting in [his] defense.” R.C. 2945.37(G). 

“Fundamental principles of due process require that a criminal 

defendant who is legally incompetent shall not be subjected to trial.” State v. Berry, 

72 Ohio St.3d 354, 359, 650 N.E.2d 433 (1995). “The competency standard for 

pleading guilty is the same as competency to stand trial.” In re K.A., 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 104938, 2017-Ohio-6979, ¶ 11, citing State v. Bolin, 128 Ohio App.3d 

58, 713 N.E.2d 1092 (8th Dist.1998). As such, an incompetent defendant may not 

agree to and enter a guilty plea. State v. Cruz, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 93403, 2010-

Ohio-3717, ¶ 17. 
Trial courts must hold competency hearings when the issue is raised. 

R.C. 2945.37. The right to a competency hearing, however, only rises to the level of 

a constitutional guarantee where the record contains sufficient indicia of 

incompetency such that inquiry into competency is necessary to ensure a 

defendant’s right to a fair trial. State v. Ahmed, 103 Ohio St.3d 27, 2004-Ohio-4190, 

813 N.E.2d 637, ¶ 64. 

In this case, there is nothing in the record to suggest that Ingram was 

incompetent to stand trial or enter a plea. First, the record does not support 

Ingram’s argument that he was unable to pay attention during the plea hearing. On 

two different occasions, the trial court asked for Ingram’s attention — once to “pay 

attention” while counsel was discussing restitution with the court and then again 

when the trial court was about to engage in the requisite Crim.R. 11 plea colloquy 

with Ingram. However, during the plea colloquy, Ingram answered the trial court’s 

questions appropriately and without any signs of confusion or misunderstanding. 

Additionally, he stated he was thinking clearly and asked a relevant question about 

jail time. Nothing in the record demonstrates that Ingram was struggling to 

understand what was occurring at the plea hearing so as to put the trial court on 

notice that a competency evaluation was warranted. 

Moreover, the record demonstrates that Ingram knew his possession 

of the cell phone was in violation of CBCF’s policy, and he clearly stated that he 

escaped from the facility because the “last time I was in front of [the trial judge], you 

told me if I messed up I was going to go to prison. That was in the back of my mind, 
so I attempted to try to escape and they opened the door for me and I left.” (Tr. 19.) 

His statements prove that he was thinking rationally when he decided to leave. 

Accordingly, Ingram did not display sufficient indicia of incompetence to warrant 

the trial court to sua sponte order a competency evaluation. 

His first assignment of error is overruled. 

II. Consecutive Sentences 

In his second assignment of error, Ingram contends that the trial 

court erred when it ordered the probation violation sentence and the escape 

sentence to be served consecutively. 

Consecutive sentences may be imposed only if the trial court makes 

the required findings pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio 

St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177, 16 N.E.3d 659, ¶ 20-22. Under the statute, consecutive 

sentences may be imposed if the trial court finds that (1) consecutive sentences are 

necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender, and (2) 

consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s 

conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public. In addition, the court 

must find that any one of the following applies: 

(1) the offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while 

awaiting trial or sentencing, while under a sanction, or while under 

postrelease control for a prior offense; 

(2) at least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one 

or more courses of the conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of 

the offenses was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any 

of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct 

adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s conduct; or 
(3) the offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that 

consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future 

crime by the offender. 

In order to impose consecutive terms of imprisonment, a trial court 

must both make the statutory findings mandated for consecutive sentences under 

R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) at the sentencing hearing and incorporate those findings into its 

sentencing entry. Bonnell at the syllabus. 

In this case, the trial court found at the sentencing hearing that the 

imposition of consecutive sentences was “necessary to punish you and not 

disproportionate to the danger you posed to the public, especially given your 

criminal history, and while waiting — the very nature of this offense shows that you 

cannot be supervised. You were on community control at the time of the 

commission of this, obviously, and your history of criminal conduct demonstrates 

consecutive terms are necessary to protect the public.” (Tr. 20-22.) Additionally, 

pursuant to Bonnell, the trial court properly incorporated those findings into the 

sentencing entry. 

Ingram contends that the imposition of consecutive sentences was 

disproportionate to the crime because no one was physically hurt. We disagree 

because our review of the record demonstrates that the trial court’s findings were 

supported by the record. First, although no one was physically harmed during 

Ingram’s conduct at the facility, his actions created financial harm by damaging the 

facility’s doors. In fact, Ingram agreed to pay restitution for the damaged doors in 

the amount of $2,500.36. 
Ingram also maintains that he was sentenced to consecutive 

sentences out of punishment for the trial court’s frustration with the staff at CBCF 

for voluntarily opening the door, allowing Ingram to leave the facility. We disagree. 

Although the trial court was appalled that the staff at CBCF voluntarily opened the 

exterior door, allowing Ingram to leave the facility, the court imposed consecutive 

sentences based on Ingram’s conduct and his inability to be rehabilitated. 

The court noted that Ingram’s criminal history dated back to when he 

was 16 years old and sentenced as an adult to serve a five-year prison term. 

Additionally, he was on postrelease control when he committed the receiving stolen 

property offense in 2017, and when the trial court gave him a chance to serve his 

sentence on the new offense at CBCF, Ingram repeatedly violated the policies at the 

facility, including vandalizing the facility and ultimately escaping. Additionally, 

even after he escaped from CBCF, he stayed at large for seven months until he was 

apprehended by the Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority. Accordingly, the 

imposition of consecutive sentences is supported by the record. 

The second assignment of error is overruled. 

III. Effective Assistance of Counsel 

Having found no error in his first and second assignments of error, 

Ingram’s third assignment of error raising an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 

for failing to request a competency evaluation and object to the imposition of 

consecutive sentences, is hereby summarily overruled. His counsel cannot be 

declared to have rendered ineffective assistance when the record reveals that no 
error occurred during the plea and sentencing stages. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 

5th Dist. Licking No. 08-CA-23, 2008-Ohio-6842, ¶ 34 (if no error exists on the 

underlying claims, a court need not go through each claim again in an ineffective 

assistance analysis). 

Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue of this court directing the common 

pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s convictions 

having been affirmed, any bail pending is terminated. Case remanded to the trial 

court for execution of sentence. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, JUDGE 

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, P.J., and 

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR