* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined th a t

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________

No. 98-40290 Summary Calendar

_____________________

ALLEN A. MOTEN, JR.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

WASTE MANAGEMENT OF TEXAS, INCORPORATED,

Defendant-Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Texas, Beaumont

(1:97-CV-610)

_________________________________________________________________

October 6, 1998

Before JOLLY, SMITH, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

This appeal comes from the district court’s entry of summary

judgment against a pro se Title VII plaintiff. Allen A. Moten, Jr.

brought an action, pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq
., against his former employer, Waste

Management of Texas, Inc. (“Waste Man agement of Texas”). Moten

alleged that he was terminated because of his color. The district

cou rt granted Waste Management of Texas’s motion for summary

judgment on the basis that Moten’s admi ssions negated his entire2

cause of action and left no fact issues to be decided.

Pursuant to the district court’s local rules, this case was

a ssigned “track three” status for discovery purposes. This case

status allows (among other discovery devices) for 25 requests for

admission. Subsequent to the track three status assignment, Waste

Management served Moten with fifteen requests for admission. A

party has thirty days in which to respond to such requests. F E D

.

R. C IV

. P. 36(a). The matter of each request is admitted if a party

fails to respond within this time limit. Moten failed to respond

to the requests for admission within the thirty days, or even by

the time the district court issued its order granting the motion

for summary judgment.

Important to his Title VII claim, the admissions included:

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 11:

Admit that WMT [Was te Management of Texas] terminated

your employment on June 13, 1996, based solely on receipt

of disciplinary actions prior to termination, rudeness to customers, and unacceptable performance.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 12:
Admit that Defendant terminated your employment on

June 13, 1996, solely for legitimate, non-discriminatory

reasons.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 15:
Admit that WMT never discriminated agai nst you in any manner based on your race and/or color.

The district court appropriately decided that these admissions by

a Title VII plaintiff justify granting a Title VII defendant’s

motion for summary judgment. S ee, e.g.
, Walton v. Bisco

Industrie s, Inc. , 119 F.3d 368, 370 (5th Cir. 1997) (discussing1 The abuse of discretion standard of review is used in

reviewing, for example, a district court’s decision whether to

grant a F ED

. R. C IV

. P. 15(a) motion to amend pleadings. J acobsen

v. Osborne

, 133 F.3d 315, 318 (5th Cir. 1998). We find this

standard of review appropriate in revie wing the district court’s ruling on Waste Management of Texas’s Motion to Change Party Name.

3 standards that a Title VII plaintiff must meet to overcome a

defendant’s motion for summary judgment).

Moten’s only argument on appeal is that the district court

erred in granting Waste Management of Texas’s earlier “Motion to

Correct Party Name.” By granting this motion, the district court

recognized that “the proper defendant in this case is Waste

Management of Texas, Inc., not Waste Management, Inc.” Moten

argues, however, that he worked for Waste Management, Inc., rather

than Waste Management of Texas, Inc.

We will review the district court’s grant of a motion to

change a party’s name for abuse of discretion. 1 Important to

Moten’s argument on appeal, the request for admissions (discussed

above) included:

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 1: Admit that you did not work for Waste Management, Inc.,

b ut rather, you worked for Waste Management of Texas,

Inc.

Moten consented to this admission, along with the others, by

default. F E D

. R. C IV

. P. 36(a). Waste Management of Texas

introduced evidence that it was the entity served by Moten in this

cas e, and that it was the entity that owned the facility where2 Apparently, Waste Management, Inc. is a pa rent company of

Waste Management of Texas, Inc. In its brief, and pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 26.1, Waste Management of Texas, Inc. has listed Waste Management, Inc. in its Corporate Disclosure Statement.

4 Moten was employed. 2 Given the admission and the evidence, we hold

that the district court did not abuse its discretion in correcting

the defendant party’s name.

For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s order granting

Waste Management of Texas, Inc.’s motion for summary judgment is

A F F I R M E D.