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91–037 PDF 2004

S. HRG. 108–255

IRAQ: STATUS AND PROSPECTS FOR

RECONSTRUCTION—RESOURCES

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JULY 29, 2003

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island

GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas

MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio

LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware

PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

BARBARA BOXER, California

BILL NELSON, Florida

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia

JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Staff Director

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Democratic Staff Director

(II)

CONTENTS

Page

American Association of Engineering Societies, prepared statement submitted

for the record ........................................................................................................ 96

Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening statement ... 10

Bolten, Hon. Joshua B., Director, Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC ............................................................................................................. 11

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 14

‘‘Ninety Day Update Report on United States Strategy for Relief and

Reconstruction of Iraq,’’ submitted by OMB, dated July 14, 2003 ........... 76

Boxer, Hon. Barbara, U.S. Senator from California, submissions for the

record:

‘‘Countries Where al Qaeda Has Operated’’ ................................................... 57

Excerpts of Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz’s testimony before the House

Budget Committee on February 27, 2003 ................................................... 58

Chafee, Hon. Lincoln D., submission for the record:

New American Century, letter to President William J. Clinton, dated

January 26, 1998 .......................................................................................... 50

Feingold, Hon. Russell D., U.S. Senator from Wisconsin, prepared statement .. 54

Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening statement ........... 4

Wolfowitz, Hon. Paul D., Deputy Secretary of Defense; accompanied by: General John M. Keane, Acting Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Department of

Defense, Washington, DC .................................................................................... 17

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 29

Articles and op ed on Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz’s trip to Iraq:

‘‘Roots Of Hope In A Realm Of Fear,’’ op ed by Paul Wolfowitz, The

Washington Times, July 28, 2003 ............................................................ 88

‘‘Getting to Know the Iraqis,’’ article by Jim Hoagland, The Washington

Post, July 20, 2003 .................................................................................... 89

‘‘Wolfowitz Visits Mass Graveyard of Hussein’s Victims and Promises

Help in Hunting Killers,’’ article by Eric Schmitt, The New York

Times, July 20, 2003 ................................................................................. 90

‘‘This Was a Good Thing to Do,’’ article by Paul A. Gigot, The Wall

Street Journal, July 28, 2003 ................................................................... 91

‘‘Of Prisons and Palaces—Notes from Liberated Iraq,’’ article by Stephen F. Hayes, The Weekly Standard, August 4-11, 2003 .................... 93

(III)

(1)

IRAQ: STATUS AND PROSPECTS FOR

RECONSTRUCTION—RESOURCES

TUESDAY, JULY 29, 2003

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,

Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m., in room

SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar

(chairman of the committee), presiding.

Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Chafee, Allen, Brownback,

Voinovich, Coleman, Biden, Dodd, Feingold, Boxer, Bill Nelson,

Rockefeller and Corzine.

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee is called to order. We are awaiting the completion of our

witness panel. In the interest of time, I will give my opening statement. We will then call upon the distinguished ranking member to

give his.

We know that our hearing may be interrupted by rollcall votes

on the energy bill that will be proceeding on the Senate floor. We

want to utilize each moment for our witnesses and for Senators

who will have questions of the witnesses.

It is our pleasure today to welcome back Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, accompanied by General John Keane, Acting

U.S. Army Chief of Staff, and to welcome for the first time before

the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Joshua Bolten, the new

Director of the Office of Management Budget.

Today the committee will continue its examination of Iraq reconstruction and how sufficient resources can be provided to ensure

that we achieve our goals. Secretary Wolfowitz is now approaching

the podium. I give this greeting personally to you.

Secretary Wolfowitz, we are particularly pleased to have the opportunity to discuss your assessment of our reconstruction efforts

based on your recent visit to Iraq. When you were here with us in

May, your testimony added greatly to this committee’s understanding of the resource requirements in Iraq at that time. In subsequent hearings on Iraq, we have heard of many successes on the

ground. Yet overall, the United States mission in Iraq continues to

hang in the balance. If we succeed in rebuilding Iraq, it may set

off a positive chain of events that could usher in a new era of stability and progress in the Middle East.

By contrast, failure could set back American interests for a generation, increasing anti-Americanism and multiplying the threats

from tyrants and terrorists and reducing our credibility.

2

Having visited Iraq 4 weeks ago with my colleagues, Senator

Biden and Senator Hagel, who are with me on both sides this

morning, I can attest that the troops and officials in Iraq understand this urgency. I believe that most high-ranking officials and

Members of Congress understand the stakes as well.

Yet because of some combination of bureaucratic inertia, political

caution, and unrealistic expectations left over from before the war,

we do not appear to be confident about our course in Iraq. Our national sense of commitment and confidence must approximate what

we demonstrated during the Berlin Airlift, a sense that we could

achieve the impossible despite short-time constraints and severe

conditions of risk and consequence.

We know, for example, that coalition efforts in Iraq must undergo further internationalization to be successful and affordable. We

know that the key to most problems in Iraq is establishing security. We know that we must have far more effective means of delivering honest information to the Iraqi people. We know that our

credibility with the international community and the Iraqi people

will be enhanced by a multi-year budgetary commitment.

Yet we have taken inadequate policy steps toward realizing these

objectives. We still lack a comprehensive plan for how to acquire

sufficient resources for the operations in Iraq and how to use them

to maximum effect.

Last week, similar concerns were outlined clearly by Dr. John

Hamre and his team of experts commissioned by the Department

of Defense to assess reconstruction efforts in Iraq. Their excellent

report offers 32 recommendations to help solve many problems. We

understand the Department of Defense has praised this report and

is beginning to implement some of these recommendations.

A major untapped resource with the potential for changing the

dynamics on the ground is the international community. The

United States needs to build a new coalition to win the peace. Involving other nations in Iraq will help reassure the Iraqi people

that the results of our nation-building efforts are legitimate.

At the same time, international involvement will reduce the burden on the United States taxpayer and help maintain the American

people’s political support. Just as we called upon our military

strength to win the war, we need to call on the strength of our diplomacy to overcome pre-war disagreements with allies and reach

a new consensus on how to ensure that Iraq emerges as a peaceful

and stable nation. We may need a new United Nations Security

Council resolution or some other form of international commitment

to increase assistance to Iraq.

We look forward to the pledging conference in October as an opportunity for all nations to commit to rebuilding Iraq, but the

United States diplomatic offensive must be in full force now.

Another idea that the administration should explore is the prospect of opening a ‘‘backstopping’’ coordinating office in Washington

that mirrors the effort in Baghdad. Such an office must be structured to help cut through micro-management and bureaucratic

delays in the decisionmaking process. The Hamre report states,

and I quote, ‘‘The Coalition Provisional Authority is badly handicapped by a business-as-usual approach to the mechanics of govVerDate 11-MAY-2000 17:31 Jan 20, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 91037 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
3

ernment, such as getting permission to spend money or enter into

contracts.’’

Dr. Bolten, we will look to you today to explain how resources

for Iraq are being managed, and how they can be better managed.

Our committee wants to be helpful to you in ensuring the most effective use of resources possible.

Finally, I will reiterate my observation from last week’s hearing

that Congress, as an institution, is failing to live up to its own responsibilities in foreign affairs even as we have cited shortcomings

of administration policy in responding to the extraordinarily difficult circumstances in Iraq, the Senate has allowed unrelated domestic legislative objectives to delay the far simpler task of passing

the Foreign Relations Authorization bill, for example.

This bill includes new initiatives and funding authority related

to the security and productivity of our diplomats, our outreach to

the Muslim world, our nonproliferation efforts, our foreign assistance, and innumerable other national security priorities. Yet politically motivated obstacles have been thrown in the path of the bill

almost cavalierly, as if Congress’s duty to pass foreign affairs legislation has little connection to our success in Iraq or in our war

against terrorism.

Congress has also been a co-conspirator with the administration

in failing to advance a predictable multi-year budget for operations

in Iraq that would demonstrate American vision and commitment,

attract allied support, and clarify the scope of our mission to the

American people.

Many Members of Congress have called for short-term cost estimates from the administration, but few seem willing to offer the

White House a true partnership in constructing a 4- or 5-year

budget plan that would provide a sober accounting of the needs in

Iraq and the means to fund them. Congress must focus on how we

can help the administration, or we will bear a large share of the

responsibility for whatever failures occur.

Even in this political season, the President and Members of Congress of both parties must set aside at least some of the political

opportunities that are inherent in this war and its aftermath. The

Founders structured Congress to be a political body, but they also

expected that Congress would be able to rise above excess partisanship to work with the President on national security issues.

We can start by making it clear that Congress will join with the

administration in doing our duty and accepting the political risks

in constructing a 4-year budget for Iraq.

We are grateful for the participation of our witnesses today. We

look forward to an enlightening discussion. We urge you to suggest

ways in which we can help you achieve American objectives in Iraq.

Now let me say at the outset, before I yield to my colleague from

Delaware, that I have indicated to Secretary Wolfowitz that his

statement and the statements of Mr. Bolten and General Keane, if

they have them, will be made a part of the record in full. Nonetheless, less, I have also urged Secretary Wolfowitz that he should be

complete in the statement he makes to the committee today. That

is, he should take the time that is required to comprehensively give

the experiences that have formed his views and that move at least

4

along the lines of some suggestions that I have made, as well as

those that I am sure the distinguished ranking member will make.

The purpose of this hearing is not to cutoff our witnesses at 5

minutes, 10 minutes, or with the time gone. It really is to hear

from them, to hear fully, and to have an opportunity for the American people to hear this message from all of you, which is very important.

[The opening statement of Senator Lugar follows:]

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

It is our pleasure to welcome back Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz,

accompanied by General John Keane, Acting U.S. Army Chief of Staff, and to welcome for the first time before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Joshua

Bolten, the new Director of the Office of Management and Budget. Today the committee will continue its examination of Iraq reconstruction and how sufficient resources can be provided to ensure that we achieve our goals.

Secretary Wolfowitz, we are particularly pleased to have the opportunity to discuss your assessment of our reconstruction efforts based on your recent visit to Iraq.

When you were here in May, your testimony added greatly to this committee’s understanding of resource requirements in Iraq at the time.

In subsequent hearings on Iraq, we have heard of many successes on the ground.

But overall, the U.S. mission in Iraq continues to hang in the balance. If we succeed

in rebuilding Iraq, it may set off a positive chain of events that could usher in a

new era of stability and progress in the Middle East. By contrast, failure could set

back American interests for a generation, increasing anti-Americanism, multiplying

the threats from tyrants and terrorists, and reducing our credibility.

Having visited Iraq four weeks ago with Senator Biden and Senator Hagel, I can

attest that the troops and officials in Iraq understand this urgency. I believe that

most high-ranking officials and Members of Congress understand the stakes, as

well. Yet because of some combination of bureaucratic inertia, political caution, and

unrealistic expectations left over from before the war, we do not appear to be confident about our course in Iraq. Our national sense of commitment and confidence

must approximate what we demonstrated during the Berlin Airlift—a sense that we

could achieve the impossible, despite short time constraints and severe conditions

of risk and consequence.

We know, for example, that Coalition efforts in Iraq must undergo further internationalization to be successful and affordable. We know that the key to most problems in Iraq is establishing security. We know that we must have far more effective

means of delivering honest information to the Iraqi people. We know that our credibility with the international community and the Iraqi people will be enhanced by

a multi-year budgetary commitment. Yet we have taken inadequate policy steps toward realizing these objectives. We still lack a comprehensive plan for how to acquire sufficient resources for the operations in Iraq and how to use them to maximum effect.

Last week, similar concerns were outlined clearly by Dr. John Hamre and his

team of experts commissioned by the Department of Defense to assess reconstruction efforts in Iraq. Their excellent report offers 32 recommendations to help solve

many problems. We understand that the Department of Defense has praised this

report and is beginning to implement some of these recommendations.

A major untapped resource with the potential for changing the dynamics on the

ground in Iraq is the international community. The United States needs to build

a new coalition to win the peace. Involving other nations in Iraq will help reassure

the Iraqi people that the results of our nation-building efforts are legitimate. At the

same time, international involvement will reduce the burdens on the U.S. taxpayer

and help maintain the American people’s political support.

Just as we called upon our military strength to win the war, we need to call on

the strength of our diplomacy to overcome pre-war disagreements with allies and

reach a new consensus on how to ensure that Iraq emerges as a peaceful and stable

nation. We may need a new U.N. Security Council Resolution, or some other form

of international commitment to increase assistance to Iraq. We look forward to the

pledging conference in October as an opportunity for all nations to commit to rebuilding Iraq, but the U.S. diplomatic offensive must be in full force now.

Another idea that the administration should explore is the prospect of opening a

‘‘backstopping’’ coordinating office in Washington that mirrors the effort in Baghdad.

Such an office must be structured to help cut through micromanagement and buVerDate 11-MAY-2000 17:31 Jan 20, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 91037 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
5

reaucratic delays in the decisionmaking process. The Hamre report states: ‘‘The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) is badly handicapped by a ‘business as usual’ approach to the mechanics of government, such as getting permission to spend

money or enter into contracts.’’ Dr. Bolten, we will look to you today to explain how

resources for Iraq are being managed. Our committee wants to be helpful to you in

ensuring the most effective use of resources possible.

Finally, I would reiterate my observation from last week’s hearing that Congress,

as an institution, is failing to live up to its own responsibilities in foreign affairs.

Even as we have cited shortcomings of administration policy in responding to the

extraordinarily difficult circumstances in Iraq, the Senate has allowed unrelated domestic legislative objectives to delay the far simpler task of passing the Foreign Relations Authorization bill. This bill includes new initiatives and funding authority

related to the security and productivity of our diplomats, our outreach to the Muslim world, our non-proliferation efforts, our foreign assistance, and innumerable

other national security priorities. Yet politically motivated obstacles have been

thrown in the path of the bill almost cavalierly, as if Congress’s duty to pass foreign

affairs legislation has little connection to our success in Iraq or in our war against

terrorism.

Congress also has been a co-conspirator with the administration in failing to advance a predictable multi-year budget for operations in Iraq that would demonstrate

American vision and commitment, attract allied support, and clarify the scope of our

mission to the American public. Many Members of Congress have called for shortterm cost estimates from the administration, but few seem willing to offer the White

House a true partnership in constructing a four- or five-year budget plan that would

provide a sober accounting of the needs in Iraq and the means to fund them.

Congress must focus on how we can help the administration, or we will bear a

large share of the responsibility for whatever failures occur. Even in this political

season, the President and Members of Congress of both parties must set aside at

least some of the political opportunities that are inherent in this war and its aftermath. The Founders structured Congress to be a political body. But they also expected that Congress would be able to rise above excessive partisanship to work

with the President on national security issues. We can start by making it clear that

Congress will join with the administration in doing our duty and accepting the political risks in constructing a four-year budget for Iraq.

We are grateful for the participation of our witnesses today. We look forward to

an enlightening discussion, and we urge you to suggest ways that we can help you

achieve American objectives in Iraq.

The CHAIRMAN. I call now upon Senator Biden for his statement.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I, too,

welcome our three distinguished witnesses. We are anxious to hear

from them. And I am glad to hear you say that, as usual, we want

to hear from you. So do not truncate your statements. We are in

need of information. We are in need, I am, at least, in need of information and plans of the administration.

I will try not to repeat some of what the chairman said. But we

heard from Dr. Hamre and his colleagues last week. Both the committee, as well as the Defense Department, I am told, thought it

was a solid report. But in my view, the most critical finding, and

I quote, is ‘‘the Iraq population has exceedingly high expectations

and the window for cooperation may close rapidly if they do not see

progress on delivering security, basic services, opportunities for political development and economic opportunity.’’

The report went on to say, and I quote, ‘‘The next 3 months are

crucial to turning around the security situation.’’

Now I personally think this job is doable or I would not have

voted for us going into Iraq in the first place. I think it is doable.

But I think it is going to require a much more intensified and urgent commitment of resources. And beyond that, I think it is going

to take a lot of time, a lot of troops, and a lot of money.

Now when we ask you guys about how many troops and how

much time and how much money, we are not naive. We are not

6

looking for 1 year, 7 days, and 3 hours. We are not looking for

somewhere over x billion dollars. We are looking for an honest assessment. And you all know, you all know, that we are talking tens

of billions of dollars, tens of thousands, if not initially well over

100,000 troops, and more than that the next year.

So we would like to get some honest assessment from you as to

what you are thinking. Because if you are not thinking in those

terms, then none of you should have your job, with all due respect.

If you are not thinking ahead as to what it is going to look like

in a year, a year and a half from now, and what contingency plans

are going to be required when you come to ask us for more money,

more support, and more time, then we are going to be put in a very

difficult position.

We know everything changes. I love hearing you guys in the administration always say things change rapidly. We got that. We

know that. We understand that. But what do you think? What do

you think? What are you planning?

Unfortunately, right now we are the only game in town. I know

we have a coalition of 19 countries. But that coalition is a coalition

of the hopeful, because 90 percent of the forces on the ground are

ours. Ninety percent of the casualties are ours. And we are paying

a vast majority of the costs of reconstruction after you discount the

Iraqi funds that exist and existed before and what may come from

oil revenues.

And I might add, I misspoke the other day in a hearing when I indicated that it would cost $5 billion to get to a million barrels

a day. The number was $5 billion to get to 3.5 million barrels a

day. But the point is that there is not enough money at the front

end from Iraqi oil to pay for this reconstruction.

By contrast, in Desert Storm, under Bush one, there was a real

coalition. There were several hundred thousand boots on the

ground that were not wearing American uniforms. And the cost in

today’s dollars is about $75 billion. And roughly four-fifths of that

cost was paid by other people. That is what I call a coalition. That

is what I call a coalition.

Now I am not suggesting we are going to be able to do that. But

I am suggesting that what we have now is something vastly different than what the American people, I think, anticipated.

I would like to hear from the Secretary about what the administration is going to do to address the situation on the ground before,

as the Hamre report says, the window closes or whether or not

anyone in the administration thinks the Hamre report is right

about the sense of urgency, whether or not the window is closing.

I guess that is going to be my fundamental question.

We all acknowledge the No. 1 job is security. And ultimately,

only the Iraqis are going to be able to provide for their own security through a new Iraqi police force and a new Iraqi army. But it

is going to take time to stand up to those forces. In fact, it is going

to take a lot longer time, in my view, than most Americans think

it is going to and clearly longer than you all predicted it would at

the front end.

And that is OK. We all make predictions wrong. I have made

plenty that are wrong. But the question is: What are we going to

do about it?

7

I saw and op ed piece yesterday, Mr. Secretary, that you had visited the Baghdad police academy. I hope they told you the same

thing they told me. I have known all those guys since Bosnia. They

are the best team we could put together. You put together a firstclass team. These are serious people with vast experience, vast experience. And I hope they told you what they told Senator Lugar

and told Senator Hagel and told me. And that was that they need

about 5,000 additional international police forces now, not next

year, now. And they need those forces to train and to patrol with

new Iraqi police forces.

I hope you saw the same display that we saw of well-intended

Iraqis, who are signed up to come back, that almost look like the

Katzenjammer Kids, as they tried to parade for us. They are wellmeaning. They are trying hard. But, boy, do they need a lot of

work, a lot of work.

You probably heard that it is going to take over a year to recruit

and train a minimal force of 40,000. And while Ambassador

Bremer hopes to recruit another 35,000 within another year, we

were told in Baghdad that fully training a force to professional

standards is going to take several years.

And similarly, we are talking about 3 years to build an Iraqi

army of 40,000 strong. That should not surprise us, based on our

past experience. I am not being critical. But there are parameters

in which at least I am dealing, when I look at what the costs are

going to be, what kind of help we need, what kind of timeframe we

are talking about.

When can Iraqis expect to have law order? When can women

leave their homes? When can people drop their daughters off at

school and not sit outside the school for the entire 7 hours that

they are in school in an automobile waiting for school to be released for fear of their daughters being kidnaped or raped?

Now these are rhetorical questions. You cannot have answers for

them. But what conditions do we have to have existing to be able

to meet and give reasonable answers to those questions?

And when will Iraqi essential services be restored? Those are the

questions we got asked constantly when we were there on the

ground. When will we hear a message effectively communicating to

the Iraqis?

When I was in Baghdad, we were on the air just 4 hours a day.

I am told now we are doing a lot better than that. But the programming still makes public access broadcasts seem exciting.

Meanwhile, al Jazeera and the Iranians are on 24–7 with very sophisticated programming, very sophisticated programming.

We heard from the Hamre report that we have a very, very

under-funded and under managed operation as to how to get up in

the air and actually communicate with the Iraqi people. And how

can the greatest communication power in the world be on the short

end of this stick here?

I ask these questions because of the yardsticks by which Iraqis

are measuring us, in my opinion. The longer it takes, the more

Iraqis begin to question our ability to improve their lives, the more

frustration will grow toward the United States, and more difficult

it is going to be for us to stand up an Iraqi government that has

legitimacy.

8

Like it or not, we are now perceived as the government of Iraq

by ordinary Iraqis. And we are going to be judged by our ability

to deliver on basic things that people all over the world expect their

governments to do: Security, services, and an economy that begins

to create jobs.

I thought it was an interesting poll I saw about 10 days ago,

where the Iraqi people in the poll indicated that they are prepared

to have American forces there from 6 months to 2 years by numbers well in excess of 50 percent in order to restore order. But

there is a direct correlation between the lack of order, the lack of

control, the lack of services, and their sufferance of having us

around.

The vast majority of the Iraqi people expect us to stay, and want

us to stay. And they want us to get them up on their feet. But the

Iraqis have a hugely unrealistic expectation about the United

States.

General, your guys did so well. They did so well so quickly that

the Iraqis cannot fathom how we could take away this vast evil

that existed there, that they viewed as all powerful and omniscient

and not get the lights on.

Now that is unrealistic. We pay a price for being so good at some

things and for having inherited an infrastructure that is so bad

and so damaged and with actions of sabotage that every time we

get something up and running, it gets whacked.

And so the fact of the matter is, though, that these are the expectations. It all goes back to this issue of whether or not that window

is wide open or it is closing, because the moment the Iraqi people

conclude we are not in their interest, our whole circumstance

changes even more drastically than it does today, in my view.

So I hope that you guys will lay out a specific plan about how

we plan on making progress in the coming weeks and coming

months. I also hope that you will tell us specifically what requests

you have made for international assistance and what expectations

are of contributions that might be forthcoming, how many forces,

what type, how many dollars.

I note that General Myers in testimony last week said that the

30,000 troops promised by other countries, ‘‘It needs to be higher

than that.’’ What are we doing to make that number higher?

I thought it was really important, quite frankly, the Japanese decided that they were going to vote to send forces. I thought that

was—they are only talking about 1,000 forces. But the symbolism

of that, I thought, was consequential. And I congratulate the administration.

But what else are we going to do? Who have we made requests

to? Are we considering a second U.N. Security Council resolution?

Are we considering asking NATO formally to take over a U.S. command?

I understand, from my discussions with NATO, that the likelihood of them being able to free up even 20,000 troops is highly unlikely. I am not looking for large numbers of troops. I am looking

for what you are asking for. What are you asking for? Are we trying to change the profile of the forces on the ground.

And Mr. Bolten, I am pleased you have joined us today. For almost a year the committee has tried to get a reasonable estimate

9

as to what the operation is going to cost or what, at least, the administration thinks it is going to cost in Iraq, in terms of securing

the country, administering it and rebuilding it. I know the World

Bank is coming in shortly with their estimates. But I know you

have to be making your own estimates here. And we want to know

what is it, what are you planning for.

I hope that you can offer some answers today. And again, please

do not waste our time and yours by saying the future is simply unknowable. We know the future is unknowable. But you cannot plan

a great nation’s steps based on everything ‘‘being unknowable.’’

Pick a number. Pick an idea. Pick a notion. Give us an idea what

you are thinking.

We do not expect you to give us specific figures. But as the Government’s chief budget officer, you have to have some numbers that

you are using for your planning. And we would like you to share

them with us.

I am glad to see that the interim Iraqi budget for the remainder

of the calendar year has been issued. And in my judgment, it does

not make the scale of investments that are urgently needed to turn

things around before that window of opportunity closes. Yet it has

a $2.2 billion deficit that we financed from vested and seized Iraqi

assets.

Ambassador Bremer announced last week that next year’s budget will have a projected $4 billion deficit. That means you must

have an idea of revenues and expenditures. I hope you will share

that information with us. And I hope that you can lay out a plan

for making the massive investment that Ambassador Bremer says

will have to be made.

He says that it is going to cost us over 5 or 6 years $13 billion

to keep electric production with pace of demand. International

groups have said it is going to cost $21 billion. I do not know who

is right. He indicated $16 billion over that same period of time to

provide potable water and investments to improve healthcare and

use expenses in building a reliable social safety net. Again, I do not

know whether that is accurate. But I want to know are they figures

you all are thinking about?

Mr. Chairman, it strikes me that we have three options in Iraq.

First, we continue as we are, paying the lion’s share of the costs,

providing the lion’s share of the troops, and taking nearly all of the

casualties and all of the blame. And the second is to leave and

quickly let the U.N. deal with the ensuing chaos and let Iran and

other neighbors intervene. That, in my view, would not only undermine our credibility but would leave us far less secure than we

were prior to the war.

And the third option seems to me to be the only reasonable one,

and that is to bring in more countries, if necessary, by giving them

more say. It strikes me that this is the most sensible option. I realize the devil is always in the details. But it seems to me we should

go to NATO, go to the NAC and make this a NATO operation, even

if it is a very few NATO forces.

We should go to the U.N. We should go to our Arab allies. And

we should go to the EU and say that we genuinely want their help

and that they have just as much, if not more, at stake in how this

10

turns out. The New York Times today has an article about Chirac

and the French acknowledging how much they have at stake here.

Are we willing to give them—not just the French, all these folks

we are talking about—more than a ceremonial role? And do we

want them to genuinely share the burden? I think we do. But I

look forward to the testimony. We all have a lot of questions. You

have a full panel here. And it is because we know you folks are the

ones we should be talking to. And we are anxious to hear what

your plans are and to give us some insight.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The opening statement of Senator Biden follows:]

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Last week the committee heard from several distinguished witnesses from the

Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Council on Foreign Relations

and other esteemed institutions, who recently assessed the situation in Iraq at the

request of Secretary Rumsfeld.

In my view, their most critical finding was that ‘‘Iraqis uniformly expressed the

view that the window of opportunity for the CPA to turn things around in Iraq is

closing rapidly.’’ Their report went on to say ‘‘the next three months are crucial to

turning around the security situation.’’

I personally think the job is doable, but it is going to require an intensified and

urgent commitment of resources. Beyond that, it is going to take a lot of time, a

lot of troops, and a lot of money. We all know it will require tens of billions of dollars, tens of billions of troops and well over thousands now are probably there for

over five years. We’re not asking you for precise numbers, but, we need to know

your best analysis.

Unfortunately, we are left holding the bag because of the failure to make Iraq the

world’s problem. Please spare me the rhetoric that we have a true coalition because

19 countries are with us on the ground. We all know that we have roughly 90% of

the forces on the ground, that we are taking more than 90% of the casualties, and

that we are paying the vast majority of the costs of reconstruction. If this is a true

coalition, I’m afraid to ask what a largely unilateral effort looks like.

By contrast, in Desert Storm, then President Bush built a coalition of nations that

contributed almost 300,000—troops, and paid about $75 billion in today’s money, or

roughly four-fifths of the cost.

I’d like to hear from Secretary Wolfowitz about what the administration is doing

to address the situation on the ground before the window closes.

Job number one is security. Ultimately, only the Iraqis themselves can provide

for their own security, through a new Iraqi police force and a new Iraqi army. But

it will take time to stand up these forces—in fact a lot longer time than most Americans have been led to believe.

I saw in your op-ed yesterday that you visited the Baghdad police academy. I hope

that while you were there that you received the same briefing that Senators Lugar,

Hagel, and I did from the first rate police assessment team we have on the ground.

If so, you probably heard the pleas to recruit over 5,000 international police forces

to train and patrol with a new Iraqi police force. Where does that effort stand? You

probably also heard that it will take over a year to recruit and train a minimal force

of 40,000. And while Ambassador Bremer hopes to recruit another 35,000 within another year, we were told in Baghdad that fully training the force to professional

standards could take several years. Similarly, it will take about three years to build

an Iraqi army 40,000 strong. Meanwhile, we’re filling the vacuum.

When can Iraqis expect to have law and order improve? When can women leave

their homes without fear of rape?

When will Iraqis have essential public services restored?

When will they hear a message effectively communicated to them? When I was

in Baghdad, we were on the air just 4 hours a day. I’m told we’re doing better, but

that the programming still makes public access broadcasts seem exciting. Meanwhile, Al Jazeera and the Iranians are on the air 24/7, with sophisticated programming. How can the greatest communications power in the world be on the short end

of the stick here?

I ask these questions because they are the yardsticks by which lraqis are measuring our efforts.

11

The longer it takes, the more Iraqis begin to question our ability to improve their

lives and the more their frustration will grow toward the United States. And the

more difficult it will be for us to create an Iraqi government that has legitimacy.

Like it or not, we are now perceived as the government of Iraq by ordinary Iraqis

and we will be judged by our ability to deliver the basic things that people all over

the world expect of a government—security, services, and an economy that creates

jobs. And in the case of Iraq, there is a huge expectations gap—Iraqis had unrealistic expectations about what the United States would deliver, but that is a reality

we have to live with.

So I hope Secretary Wolfowitz, that you can lay out a specific plan about how we

will make progress in the coming weeks and months.

I also hope you will tell us specifically what requests you have made for international assistance and what your expectations are of the contributions will be

forthcoming—how many forces, what type, and how many dollars?

I note that General Myers in testimony last week said of the 30,000 troops promised by other countries—‘‘it needs to be higher than that.’’ What are we doing to

make that number higher? Who have we made a request to? Are we considering a

second UN Security Council resolution? Are we considering asking NATO to formally take over under U.S. command?

Mr. Bolten, I am pleased you have joined us today. For almost a year, the committee has tried to get reasonable estimates on what the operation is going to cost

in Iraq—in terms of securing the country, administering it and rebuilding it. I hope

that you can offer some answers today. And again, please don’t waste our time and

yours by saying the future is simply ‘‘unknowable.’’ We do not expect you to give

us a precise figure, but as the government’s chief budget officer, you must have

some numbers that you are using for planning. Please share them with us. The

American people have a right to know. And so does Congress.

I am glad to see that an interim Iraqi budget for the remainder of this calendar

year has been issued. In my judgment, it does not make the scale of investments

that are urgently needed to turn things around before the ‘‘window of opportunity’’ closes. Yet, it has a $2.2 billion deficit that will be financed from vested and seized

Iraqi assets.

Ambassador Bremer announced last week that next year’s budget will have a pro- jected $4 billion deficit. That means that you must have an idea of revenues and

expenditures. I hope that you will share that information with us. And I hope that

you can lay out a plan for making the massive investments that Ambassador

Bremer said will have to be made—over five years $13 billion to keep electricity pro- duction apace with demand, $16 billion to provide potable water, investments to improve health care, and huge expenses in building a reliable social safety net.

Mr. Chairman, it strikes me that we have three options in Iraq. The first is to

continue as we are now—paying the lion’s share of the cost, providing the lion’s

share of the troops, and taking nearly all the casualties and the blame.

The second is to leave quickly and let the UN deal with the ensuing chaos and

let lran and other neighbors intervene. That, in my view, would not only undermine

our credibility but it would leave us far less secure than we were prior to the war.

The third option is to bring in more countries, if necessary by giving them more

of a say. This strikes me as the most sensible option. We should go to NATO, we

should go to the UN, we should go to our Arab allies, and we should go to the EU

and say that we genuinely want their help, that they have just as, if not more, at

stake as we do. And that we are willing to give them more than a ceremonial role

and that we genuinely want them to share the burden.

I look forward to your testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Biden.

In consultation with the witnesses, we understand the order that

all of us have determined is that Mr. Bolten would testify first,

then Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz, that General Keane would not

testify but is available to respond to questions. So we are grateful

for that.

Mr. Bolten, would you please proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOSHUA B. BOLTEN, DIRECTOR, OFFICE

OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET [OMB], WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. BOLTEN. Mr. Chairman, thank you. And thank you for the

warm welcome, Senator Biden, members of the committee. I appreVerDate 11-MAY-2000 17:31 Jan 20, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 91037 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
12

ciate the opportunity to appear here today, along with Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz and General Keane, to testify on the status of and

prospects for reconstruction in Iraq.

Two weeks ago, I submitted to Congress on behalf of the administration the second in a series of reports required under section

1506 of the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act

2003. That report provides an update through June 30 on U.S. activities and our strategy related to reconstruction in Iraq.

Before I discuss highlights of that report, I would like to review

briefly some of the planning done prior to combat operations in

Iraq, which prepared the way for our current relief and reconstruction operations.

Beginning last October, a senior interagency team was convene

to develop a baseline assessment of conditions in Iraq and to define

sector-by-sector relief and reconstruction plans in the event of regime change in Baghdad. The group included representatives from

the Departments of Defense, State, and Treasury; USAID; CIA;

and, from the White House, staff of the National Security Council

and the Office of Management and Budget. Additional agencies

were called upon as expertise was needed.

The teams developed plans for immediate relief operations and

longer term reconstruction in ten sectors: Health, education, water

and sanitation, electricity, shelter, transportation, governance and

rule of law, agriculture and rural development, telecommunications, and economic and financial policy.

Each sector was assigned a lead agency that produced an action

plan with benchmarks to be achieved within 1 month, 6 months,

and 1 year. The President’s guidance was clear: He expected defined milestones by which we could measure progress in improving

the lives of the Iraqi people. As these plans evolved, administration

officials briefed your staffs on this committee, who I understand

made valuable contributions. As finally developed, these plans laid

the foundation for the work underway today.

Consistent with our early planning, the U.S. and our coalition

partners in Iraq have moved now from an emphasis on immediate

relief operations to a wide variety of reconstruction activities.

These activities are detailed in the section 1506 report submitted

to Congress 2 weeks ago and amplified and updated in excellent remarks last week by Ambassador Bremer in briefings here in the

Congress. Ambassador Bremer being the Presidential Envoy to Iraq

and Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority, the CPA.

The section 1506 report and Ambassador Bremer’s remarks reflect, first, a situation in Iraq in which, although security problems

persist, widespread humanitarian disaster has thus far been averted. There is no food crisis, no refugee crisis, and no public health

crisis.

While disaster has been averted, enormous challenges remain, as

both the chairman and Senator Biden have alluded to. Most of

those challenges are the product of three decades of devastation inflicted by Saddam’s regime on Iraq’s physical, social, and economic

infrastructure. To address these challenges and restore sovereignty

to the Iraqi people, the section 1506 report and Ambassador

Bremer’s remarks lay out a plan with four core missions.

13

First, security, establishing a safe and secure environment. Second, essential services, restoring basic services to an acceptable

standard. Third, economy, creating the conditions for economic

growth. And fourth, governance, enabling the transition to transparent and inclusive democratic governance.

Let me highlight just a few specific areas of important progress.

In public safety, the CPA is vetting, hiring, and deploying an Iraqi

police force to restore order and safety. Thirty thousand policemen

have been recalled to duty. And police stations and training academies are being restored. Former New York City Police Commissioner Bernard Kerik leads a team whose mission is to promote

well-trained and responsible public safety forces in Iraq’s police,

fire, border, customs, and immigration organizations.

In the health area, consistent with plans developed before the

conflict, the health sector is being systematically evaluated. And a

national data base is being built to monitor and manage ongoing

needs. Medical facilities are under repair. More than 1,500 tons of

supplies are restocking medical shelves. And basic services have

been restored. Today, nearly all of Iraq’s 240 hospitals, 10 specialty

centers, and more than 1,200 clinics are open and receiving patients.

Power. Pre-war planning limited damage to the electrical system

during the conflict. But restoring electricity has been a major challenge because the pre-war infrastructure was so dilapidated and

because of continuing targeted sabotage. Nevertheless, much of

Iraq, with the exception of Baghdad, is now at or above pre-war

power availability. Ambassador Bremer expects to restore power

fully to pre-war levels within the next 60 days, though that will

still leave a substantial shortfall in Iraq’s projected power needs.

In the oil area, in addition to rebuilding critical infrastructure,

rapid restoration of Iraqi oil production is a high and crucial priority. Crude oil production already exceeds one million barrels per

day. Future production levels will depend on many variables, including the availability of adequate power and security of the oil

infrastructure, though Ambassador Bremer now expects by the end

of summer to have oil production at a level of around one-and-ahalf million barrels per day.

In the economy, Ambassador Bremer identified the CPA’s broader task in the current economic field as twofold. First, to stabilize

the current economic situation, which they are doing in part by

continuing payment of public sector salaries and pensions and by

funding a range of infrastructure construction projections. Second,

to promote long-term growth, which they are doing through measures designed, for example, to establish a sound currency, to create

an independent central bank, and to build a modern banking system.

To pursue these and other important ongoing efforts in Iraq, we

began with approximately $7.7 billion from a number of sources.

Approximately $600 million was provided from DOD accounts to

support CPA operations. Approximately $3 billion was appropriated

by Congress in the war supplemental, of which about $500 million

was provided to the Department of Defense for oil field repair.

Roughly $500 million was drawn early from appropriated 2003 foreign assistance accounts.

14

Added to these appropriated funds are the following: About $1.7

billion in Iraqi state frozen assets in the U.S., referred to as vested

assets; about $800 million in cash and other assets found in Iraq.

Those are referred to as seized assets. And finally over $1 billion

in oil receipts were transferred by the United Nations into a new

Development Fund for Iraq, the DFI. We expect additional resources frozen in other countries eventually to be transferred to the

DFI.

The recent section 1506 report provides Congress a status of

these funds as of June 30. I will highlight some of the key numbers, what we have spent so far and on what, the details of which

are available in the full report. Through the end of June, the U.S.

Government has allocated slightly more than $2.7 billion. Of that

$2.7 billion, approximately $750 million came from seized and vested Iraqi state assets, the remainder from funds appropriated by

Congress. The $2.5 billion allocated so far includes funding for the following activities: $730 million for relief efforts to reestablish food distribution, provide medical supplies, purchase fuels, and provide other

humanitarian efforts; $400 million for emergency payments and

salaries for civil servants and other workers in various sectors and

for pensioners; $1.37 billion for reconstruction activities, including

reestablishing critical services, ministries, oil production, and security forces; and $200 million for activities that support the operations of the CPA in Baghdad. Mr. Chairman, as a result of these allocations, roughly $5 billion

in funds remain. The picture as of June 30 looks like this: Of the

original $4.1 billion in funds appropriated by Congress, approximately $2.2 billion remained as of June 30. Of the original $2.5 billion in seized and vested Iraqi state assets, approximately $1.8 billion remained. And just over $1 billion remains in the DFI.

Mr. Chairman, thanks to the dedication, courage, and sacrifice of

our men and women in uniform, so ably represented here by Secretary Wolfowitz and General Keane, we have liberated Iraq. Now

our mission, in your words, Mr. Chairman, is to win the peace. The

President agrees.

After meeting with Ambassador Bremer last week, he reaffirmed

the coalition’s determination to help establish a free, sovereign, and

democratic Iraq. He understands that rebuilding Iraq will take a

sustained commitment if we are to improve security, restore essential services, generate economic development, and secure democracy for all Iraqis. Building on plans that were developed even before combat operations began in Iraq, the Coalition Provisional Authority is implementing a comprehensive strategy to move Iraq toward a future that is secure and prosperous. We look forward to

working with this committee and the rest of Congress to ensure

fulfillment of that vision.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bolten follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOSHUA B. BOLTEN, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF

MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

Chairman Lugar, Senator Biden, Members of the Committee: I appreciate the opportunity to appear here today, along with Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz and General

Keane, to testify on the status of and prospects for reconstruction in Iraq.

15

Two weeks ago, I submitted to Congress, on behalf of the Administration, the second in a series of reports required under Section 1506 of the Emergency Wartime

Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2003. That report provides an update through

June 30 on United States activities and our strategy related to reconstruction in

Iraq. Before I discuss highlights of that report, I would like to review briefly some

of the planning done prior to combat operations in Iraq, which prepared the way

for our current relief and reconstruction operations.

PRE-WAR PLANNING

Beginning last October, a senior interagency team was convened to develop a

baseline assessment of conditions in Iraq and to define sector-by-sector relief and

reconstruction plans in the event of regime change in Baghdad. The group included

representatives from the Departments of Defense, State, and Treasury; USAID;

CIA; and, from the White House, staff of the National Security Council and the Office of Management and Budget. Additional agencies were called upon as expertise

was needed.

The team developed plans for immediate relief operations and longer term reconstruction in ten sectors: health; education; water and sanitation; electricity; shelter;

transportation; governance and rule of law; agriculture and rural development; telecommunications; and economic and financial policy.

Each sector was assigned a lead agency that produced an action plan with benchmarks to be achieved within one month, six months, and one year. The President’s

guidance was clear: He expected defined milestones by which we could measure

progress in improving the lives of the Iraqi people. As these plans evolved, Administration officials briefed your staffs, who I understand made valuable contributions.

As finally developed, these plans laid the foundation for the work underway today.

PROGRESS AND CURRENT MISSION

Consistent with our early planning, the United States and our Coalition partners

in Iraq have moved from an emphasis on immediate relief operations to a wide variety of reconstruction activities. These activities are detailed in the Section 1506 Report submitted to Congress two weeks ago and amplified and updated in excellent

remarks last week by Ambassador Bremer, the Presidential Envoy to Iraq and Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA).

The Section 1506 Report and Ambassador Bremer’s remarks reflect, first, a situation in Iraq in which, although security problems persist, widespread humanitarian

disaster has thus far been averted. There is no food crisis, no refugee crisis, and

no public health crisis.

While disaster has been averted, enormous challenges remain—most of them the

product of three decades of devastation inflicted by Saddam’s regime on Iraq’s physical, social, and economic infrastructure. To address these challenges and restore

sovereignty to the Iraqi people, the Section 1506 Report and Ambassador Bremer’s

remarks lay out a plan with four core missions:

• Security: establishing a secure and safe environment;

• Essential services: restoring basic services to an acceptable standard;

• Economy: creating the conditions for economic growth; and

• Governance: enabling the transition to transparent and inclusive democratic

governance.

Let me highlight just a few specific areas of important progress:

Public safety. The CPA is vetting, hiring, and deploying an Iraqi police force to

restore order and safety. 30,000 policemen have been recalled to duty, and police

stations and training academies are being restored. Former New York City Police

Commissioner Bernard Kerik leads a team whose mission is to promote well-trained

and responsible public safety forces in Iraq’s police, fire, border, customs, and immigration organizations.

Health. Consistent with plans developed before the conflict, the health sector is

being systematically evaluated and a national data base is being built to monitor

and manage ongoing needs. Medical facilities are under repair, more than 1,500

tons of supplies are restocking medical shelves, and basic services have been restored. Today, nearly all of Iraq’s 240 hospitals, 10 specialty centers, and more than

1,200 clinics are open and receiving patients.

Power. Pre-war planning limited damage to the electrical system during the conflict, but restoring electricity has been a major challenge because the pre-war power

infrastructure was so dilapidated and because of continuing targeted sabotage. Nevertheless, much of Iraq, with the exception of Baghdad, is now at or above pre-war

16

power availability. Ambassador Bremer expects to restore power fully to pre-war

levels within the next 60 days, though that will still leave a substantial shortfall

in Iraq’s projected power needs.

Oil. In addition to rebuilding critical infrastructure, rapid restoration of Iraqi oil

production is a high priority. Crude oil production already exceeds one million barrels per day. Future production levels will depend on many variables, including the

availability of adequate power and security of the oil infrastructure.

Economy. Ambassador Bremer identified the CPA’s broader task in the economic

field as twofold: First, to stabilize the current economic situation—which they are

doing in part by continuing payment of public-sector salaries and pensions and by

funding a range of infrastructure construction projects. Second, to promote longterm growth—which they are doing through measures designed, for example, to establish a sound currency, to create an independent central bank, and to build a

modern banking system.

FUNDING FOR IRAQ RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCTION

To pursue these and other important ongoing efforts in Iraq, we began with approximately $7.7 billion from a number of sources: approximately $600 million was

provided from DoD accounts to support CPA operations; approximately $3 billion

was appropriated by Congress in the War Supplemental, of which about $500 million was provided to the Department of Defense for oil field repair; roughly $500

million was drawn from appropriated 2003 foreign assistance accounts. Added to

these appropriated funds are: about $1.7 billion in Iraqi state assets frozen in the

US (‘‘vested’’ assets); about $800 million in cash and other assets found in Iraq

(‘‘seized’’ assets); and finally over $1 billion in oil receipts were transferred by the

United Nations into a new Development Fund for Iraq (DFI). We expect additional

resources frozen in other countries eventually to be transferred to the DFI.

The recent Section 1506 Report provided Congress a status of these funds as of

June 30. I will briefly highlight some of the key numbers—what we’ve spent so far

and on what—the details of which are available in the report. Through the end of

June, the US Government has allocated slightly more than $2.7 billion. Of that $2.7

billion, approximately $750 million came from seized and vested Iraqi state assets;

the remainder from funds appropriated by Congress.

The $2.7 billion allocated so far includes funding for the following activities:

• $730 million for relief efforts to reestablish food distribution, provide medical

supplies, purchase fuels, and provide other humanitarian efforts.

• $400 million for emergency payments and salaries for civil servants and other

workers in various sectors and for pensioners.

• $1.37 billion for reconstruction activities including reestablishing critical services (such as water, sanitation, and electricity), ministries, oil production, and

security forces.

• $200 million for activities that support the operations of the CPA in Baghdad.

As a result of these allocations, roughly $5 billion in funds remain available. The

picture as of June 30 looks like this:

• Of the original $4.1 billion in funds appropriated by Congress, approximately

$2.2 billion remained.

• Of the original $2.5 billion in seized and vested Iraqi state assets, approximately $1.8 billion remained.

• Approximately $1 billion remained in the DFI.

CONCLUSION

Thanks to the dedication, courage and sacrifice of our men and women in uniform,

we have liberated Iraq. Now, our mission in your words, Mr. Chairman, is ‘‘to win

the peace.’’

The President agrees. After meeting with Ambassador Bremer last week, he reaffirmed the Coalition’s determination to help establish a free, sovereign, and democratic Iraq. He understands that rebuilding Iraq will take a sustained commitment

if we are to improve security, restore essential services, generate economic development and secure democracy for all Iraqis. Building on plans that were developed

even before combat operations began in Iraq, the Coalition Provisional Authority is

implementing a comprehensive strategy to move Iraq toward a future that is secure

and prosperous. We look forward to working with this Committee and the rest of

Congress to ensure fulfillment of that vision.

17

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Director Bolten, for

these specifics, as well as the outline of the planning. We appreciate your testimony.

I would like to call now upon a good friend of the committee. I

welcome you again, Secretary Wolfowitz. You were most generous

with your time and important testimony last month. We thank you

again for your willingness to reappear today.

Please proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL D. WOLFOWITZ, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE; ACCOMPANIED BY: GENERAL JOHN M.

KEANE, ACTING CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY, DEPARTMENT

OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity. I

think we should also thank Chairman Warner and the members of

the Senate Armed Services Committee for setting a good example

for all of us in not arguing about whether defense witnesses should

appear before your committee or vice versa.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the chairman.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I think there is unanimous agreement that

these issues are of such importance that we need to put those

kinds of differences behind us. And in sitting here and talking to

you, I recall, I think we really first got to know each other very

well 20 years ago, in fact almost literally 20 years ago, when we

began the process of a political transition in the Philippines that

led that country from a dictatorship to a democracy. The conditions

were very different. We did not need American troops.

You, Mr. Chairman, played an extraordinary role in making that

happen. I think it is the kind of thing we have seen unfold in Asia

over the last 20 years since then gives me a certain cautious hope

that maybe we can begin a process like that in the Middle East.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, on behalf of the

men and women who proudly wear the uniform of our country and

who serve our country so faithfully and so well, I want to say that

we are grateful to you and your colleagues in the Senate and in the

House for your continuing and unfailing support.

I just came back from a four-and-a-half day visit to northern,

central, and southern Iraq. We had incredible support from the

U.S. military. And as a result, I think in that four-and-a-half days

we were able to cover what would probably normally take about 2

weeks. We did it in 120 degree temperature, which I do not expect

any sympathy for. But it certainly gave me an understanding of

what our troops are living with day after day after day. And they

did not get to sleep in the places we slept in at night. Actually, I

think I would have preferred to be out in a tent than to be in one

of Saddam’s palaces, but that is the way the cookie crumbles, as

they say.

We had some remarkable members of the fourth estate with us.

And they have written some interesting pieces, including, I think,

quite a few that sort of summarize our trip certainly more eloquently than I can and perhaps more objectively. So if I might, I

would like to submit those for the record, an article by Jim

Hoagland, an article by Eric Schmitt, an article by Paul Gigot, and

an article by Stephen Hayes. And just to try to compete a little, I

18

1The articles and op ed piece submitted by Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz for the record can be

found beginning on page 88.

will add my op ed piece from yesterday’s Post,1 if I may do so, Mr.

Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. It will all be included in the record in full.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your offering me the opportunity to

speak at some length here, because I think we learned a lot. And

I think it is important to share it, not only with the committee but

with the American people. So I will summarize parts of my written

statement, but I will be delivering quite a bit of it.

I would like to start with the police academy, which Senator

Biden mentioned you visited when you were there. I visited—between the time that you visited and the time we arrived, a rather

appalling discovery had been made. Behind that police academy

stands the forked trunk of a dead tree. It is unusual for the fact

that on each fork of that trunk the bark is permanently marked

by two sets of ropes, one high enough to tie a man and the other

a woman.

Near the tree is a row of small cells where special prisoners were

held. Our guide on the tour of the academy was the newly appointed superintendent. I guess he is called the dean. I think you

met him, also. He himself had spent a year in jail for having denounced Saddam Hussein. I expressed some surprise that he

seemed like a sensible man, how could he have been so foolish as

to denounce Saddam Hussein. He said, ‘‘Well, I just said it to my

best friend.’’ That was enough to get him in jail for a year.

He told us of unspeakable things that once happened to men and

women tied to that tree and held in those cells right behind the police academy, unknown to visitors, unknown to the police who were

training there.

Beyond that torture tree and the cells, a small gate leads to the

Olympic Committee Headquarters run by Uday Hussein, who apparently would often slip through the back gate at night to torture

and abuse prisoners personally.

That is the same tree behind the police academy that was described in such gruesome detail in the Washington Post on July 23.

That article focused on the sad story of one Assyrian Christian

woman who was tied to that tree and made to endure unspeakable

torture. Her husband was executed at the academy. And his body

was passed through the steel gate to her, as the article described

it, like a piece of butcher’s meat, all because the couple had not received state approval for their marriage.

There is a positive aspect in the distressing story of Juman Michael Hanna. That is her courage in coming forward to offer U.S.

officials what is very likely credible information, information that

is helping us to root out Baathist policemen who routinely tortured

and killed prisoners.

Mr. Chairman, as I said, that is the same police academy that

you and Senator Biden and Senator Hagel visited. But as I said,

our understanding of the academy’s role in the regime has evolved

since your trip. That is due to Mrs. Hanna’s brave testimony about

crimes committed against her. And that one step in the evolution

19

of our understanding of what went on in the old regime points to

one of the most formidable challenges facing us today.

The people of Iraq have much valuable information that can help

us root out Baathists and help them find justice. But their willingness to tell us what they know will continue to take significant investments on our part, investments of time, of resources, of efforts

to build trust among the Iraqi people.

Mr. Chairman, like Ambassador Bremer, who I believe briefed

you in closed session, like John Hamre, who we sent over to do a

survey for us and came back with an excellent report, I, too, observed that there is an enormous need in Iraq for basic services to

be restored, for jobs to be restored. I think everywhere I went I

heard the plea for more electricity.

I also heard everywhere I went expressions of gratitude for being

liberated from one of the worst tyrants in modern history. But

what I also heard were continued expressions of fear, fear that has

not yet left the Iraqi people, fear that verges on paranoia.

In speaking with the city council in the holy city of Najaf, one

of the two most important for Shi’a Islam, one of the members of

the city council, an educated professional—I think he was either an

engineer or a lawyer—asked me what to Americans might seem an

incredible question. He said, ‘‘Are you Americans hold Saddam

Hussein as a trump card over our heads?’’ It is paranoid. And I was

categorical in saying to him that no one would like to get Saddam

Hussein more than we would. But after what they have been

through, after the way he has terrorized them, and after the experiences of 1991, they are paranoid.

And so I came away with two very important conclusions that I

would like to share with this committee about the linkages that

confront us in dealing with the problems of Iraq. We cannot take

these problems on piecemeal. We have to take them on simultaneously.

The first linkage is the connection between the past and the

present. You cannot separate what seems to be history in Iraq from

what goes on today. The people who suffered those tortures, the

people whose relatives are buried in those mass graves are not

going to come forward willingly with information until they are absolutely convinced that Saddam and his clique are gone and that

we are staying until the place is secure.

And it is connected also, I might add, to the issue of looking for

information about weapons of mass destruction. We have only just

recently learned that there are leaflets circulating in Baghdad

warning Iraqis that anyone who provides information about weapons of mass destruction programs to the coalition will suffer the

penalty of death. I take it whoever circulated those leaflets believe

there were such programs, by the way.

The second connection is the crucial connection between security

and reconstruction. In fact, let me qualify the word. What Iraq

needs is not reconstruction, which implies repairing wartime damage—that has largely been done with the important still remaining

work to do on the telecommunications system—what Iraq needs is

rehabilitation from 35 years of deliberate misuse of Iraqi resources.

You see palace after palace. We were in the mere guest house of

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palling. It is palaces and tanks and artillery pieces and weapons

of mass destruction and prisons and torture chambers that Saddam

invested the resources of his people in.

And to the extent he paid any attention to the basic infrastructure, there was a kind of punitive policy, at least since 1991, that

particularly affected those areas of the south and north that he regarded as particularly disloyal.

That rehabilitation effort cannot take place without security. And

security cannot progress without rehabilitation. Let me illustrate it

in simple terms. Part of our security problems is getting those

young men back at work, or at work for the first time in many

cases. That means getting the economy going. That means getting

electricity up and working.

To get electricity up and working, however, we have to do something about the deliberate sabotage that is bringing down long distance power lines. We can tell the difference between random theft,

where the thieves are very careful to take all the copper away from

them, and the increasing incidence of clear and deliberate sabotage

where all that is done is destruction. Indeed, the more we succeed,

the more the Baathists and the terrorists who are working with

them will target our success. But they will not win.

Mr. Chairman, for many years, the classic study of Saddam’s tyranny is a book called ‘‘Republic of Fear,’’ originally published under

a pseudonym because he feared for his life by a very brave Iraqi

named Kanan Makiya. And in that book he quotes a letter from an

former agent in the Iraqi secret police, ‘‘Confronting an experienced

criminal regime,’’ that former member of the regime said, ‘‘such as

the present one in Baghdad can be done only with truths that strip

off its many masks, bringing its demise closer.’’ Traveling through Iraq last week, we heard many accounts of unspeakable brutality on a scale Americans cannot imagine. We saw

truths that are stripping away masks of legitimacy that deadenders may yet cling to. And while these truths may be unpleasant

to face, doing so will help hasten the demise, once and for all, of

a truly criminal regime.

We visited a small village in southern Iraq near the Iranian border called Al Turabah, where we met remnants of one of the regime’s most horrific brutalities, the Marsh Arabs. These are people

for whom liberation came just barely in time to save a fragment

of a civilization that goes back several millennia. But for the Marsh

Arabs, the marches are no more.

For 10 years, Saddam drained their ancestral lands. Where there

was once a lush landscape of productive freshwater marshes the

size of the State of New Jersey, there is now a vast, nearly lifeless

void, which one reporter with us likened to the surface of the moon.

According to one estimate, the population of the Marsh Arabs in

1991 stood at half a million. But after Saddam’s humanitarian and

environmental crimes, it is believed that there are at most 200,000

left and less than 40,000 of those still in Iraq.

But at least there is still a Marsh Arab civilization capable of

being preserved and hopefully restored. It is not likely that it

would have lasted another 2 or 3 years, much less another twelve.

The children in Al Turabah mobbed us, greeted us with loud applause and cheers of ‘‘Salaam Bush’’ and ‘‘Down with Saddam.’’ But

21

their first request was not for candy or for toys. It was just a single

word, ‘‘Water.’’ In the case of the many tens of thousands who were killed at the

mass graves in Al Hilla or the prison of Abu Gharib, liberation did

not come in time. We heard stories about buses full of people that

villagers would watch pass by headed for a once public field that

had been closed by the government. They reported hearing gunshots, assuming that the people were celebrating, as is sometimes

customary. When the buses would pass by the villagers on the return trip with the buses completely empty, people began to suspect

that something was terribly wrong.

Of course we know now that thousands of women and children

were brought to places like the killing fields in Hilla, gunned down,

and buried dead or alive. Today, some of their bodies have been retrieved from the earth. They now lay wrapped in plastic bags in

neat rows on the dirt. They wait for someone to claim them. The

graveyard in Hilla is just one of dozens that have been discovered

to date in Iraq.

Indeed, while we were in the north with the 101st Air Assault

Division, General Petraeus told us that they had temporarily

stopped the excavation of a newly discovered mass grave site after

unearthing 80 remains, mostly women and children, some still with

little dresses and toys.

At the prison at Abu Gharib, we saw the torture chamber and

industrial-style gallows that conducted group executions regularly

twice a week. We were told that 30,000 people, and perhaps as

many as 100,000 were killed there over the years.

Mr. Chairman, I do not recite these in order to go over history.

I recite them because one of my strongest impressions is that the

fear of the old regime is still pervasive throughout Iraq. A smothering blanket of apprehension and dread, woven by 35 years of repression, where even the smallest mistake, the smallest whisper to

a friend, could bring imprisonment or torture or death. That will

not be cast off in a week’s time.

Iraqis are understandably cautious. And until they are convinced

that every remnant of Saddam’s old regime is being removed and

until a long and ghastly part of their history is put to rest, that

fear will remain. So the history of atrocities and the punishment

of those responsible are directly linked to our success in helping

the Iraqi people build a free, secure, and democratic future. And,

I might add, to our search for the weapons of mass destruction programs.

In that light, what happened to the miserable Hussein brothers

last week is an important step in making Iraqis feel more secure

that the Baathist tyranny will not return, an important step in our

efforts to restore order, to give freedom a chance, and to make our

own troops more secure.

Even in Baghdad, far from the Shi’a and Kurdish areas that we

commonly associate with Saddam’s genocidal murders, enthusiastic

and prolonged celebrations over the news of their deaths erupted

almost at once, suggesting something else that we observed, Mr.

Chairman, Saddam and his sons were equal opportunity oppressors. His victims included Sunni as well as Shi’a, Arabs as well as

Kurds, Muslims as well as Christians. And in fact, the Turkish

22

Foreign Minister, who was here last week, asked us to please stop

referring to it as the Sunni triangle. The Sunnis were victims as

well.

The same day Uday and Qusay were killed, we also captured

number 11 on the list, the commander of the Special Republic

Guard. That is the unit whose job it was to spy on the Republican

Guard. The purpose of the Republic Guard was to ensure the loyalty of the regular army. And, of course, there was something call

the Special Security Organization that kept an eye on the Special

Republican Guard. That was the system of checks and balances in

Saddam’s Iraq.

So the roots of that regime go deep, burrowing into precincts and

neighbors like a huge gang of organized criminals. And it is the

coalition’s intensified efforts on finding capturing mid-level

Baathists that we believe will yield increasing results in apprehending the contract killers and dead-enders who are now targeting our soldiers and targeting our success.

Major General Ray Odierno, the commander of the 4th Infantry

Division, told us that tips are on the rise. And that was even before

the deaths of Uday and Qusay. The number of Iraqis providing information to our troops have been increasing over the last couple

of weeks. Those tips have led to significant seizures of weapons, including a week ago, over the course of a week, some 660 surface

to air missiles. It is important to remember that the people who

want the return of the old regime are just a tiny fraction of the

Iraqi people. But even if it is only 1 in 1,000, that is still 20,000.

And it is not a small number.

I think it is also important to note that this low intensity conflict

may be the first in history where contract killing has been the

principal tactic of the so-called guerrillas. In Nasiriyah, for example, Iraqis have told us about offers of $200 to attack a power line

and $500 to attack an American. Of course, that makes the point,

too, that dealing with unemployment is part of dealing with security.

Let me say a little bit about what we learned region by region.

And I will try to summarize what is in the written testimony. I

think, Mr. Chairman, that you and Senator Hagel and Senator

Biden can attest to the fact that there is more good news in Iraq

than is routinely reported. We saw quite a bit of that.

Significantly, the military commanders that I have talked to,

who have had experience in the Balkans, all said that in Iraqi we

are far ahead of where we were in Bosnia or Kosovo at comparable

times and, in some cases, even ahead of where we are today. Lieutenant General Rick Sanchez, the outstanding new commander of

Joint Task Force 7 responsible for all of Iraq, is a Kosovo veteran.

He was there during the first year. And during one of our briefings,

he commented that things are happening in Iraq after 3 months

that did not happen after 12 months in Kosovo.

I asked him to elaborate. And just off the top of his head, he

jotted down a list of 10 things, which I have provided in my written

testimony, including the fact that the judicial system is functioning, the fact that 90 percent of major cities have city councils.

I believe, unless I misread his handwriting, he said the police force

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is at about 80 percent of the requirement. I think that is a little

high, but it is definitely moving in that direction.

That schools were immediately back up, that media are available

across the country. I would note that not the media that we would

most like to see, but there is a free press in Iraq for the first time

in decades. Public services are nearly up to pre-war levels. I am

again quoting from his note. And again let me emphasize that prewar levels are nowhere near adequate. And we have to do a lot better. And in Baghdad, we are still not at pre-war levels on electricity. But that is real progress.

And number 10 on his list, and in my view most important, and

I want to come back to this later, recruiting for the new Iraqi army

has started with training to begin in a couple of weeks. In fact, the

entire north and south are impressively stable. And the center is

improving daily.

The public food distributions is up and running. We planned for

a food crisis, but there is not one. Hospitals nationwide are open.

Doctors and nurses are at work. Medical supply convoys are escorted to and from the warehouses. We planned for a health crisis,

but there is not one. Oil production has continued to increase and

for about the last week has averaged 1.1 million barrels per day.

And as Senator Biden noted, it did not cost $5 billion to get there.

We planned for the possibility of massive destruction of this resource of the Iraqi people. But our military plan, I believe, helped

to preserve the oil fields for the Iraqis. The school year has been

salvaged. There are local town councils in most major cities and

most major districts of Baghdad.

There is no humanitarian crisis. There is no refugee crisis. There

is no health crisis. There has been minimal damage, wartime damage, infrastructure. And there has been no—there has not been the

anticipated and much-feared environmental catastrophe either

from oil well fires or from dam breaks.

However, as I related in May and as I related earlier, Saddam’s

legacy of destruction and decay is another story entirely. And that

gives us major work to do.

We were particularly impressed in the south by the work of our

coalition partners led by the British in the Basr area and in the

Shi’a heartland with the two Shi’a holy cities of Najaf and Karbala

by U.S. Marines. Our Army civil affairs teams are equally impressive in that effort. They have created functioning local government

and councils free from Baathist influence. I would note we have

one Harvard-trained lawyer, an enlisted woman in the Army Reserves, who is now trying the previous government of Karbala,

whom we mistakenly appointed and is now in jail on corruption

charges.

The present Governor—excuse me. That is in Najaf. The Governor of Karbala captured the development best when he told us,

and I am quoting from him now, ‘‘We Shi’a have theological ties to

Iran, but we refuse to be followers of any country outside of Iraq.

I want to stress,’’ this Governor said, ‘‘we aspire to independence

and democracy. We want to heal the wounds from the past regime’s

atrocities. We want to build factories, bring in the Internet, practice our religious rights and freedom, have good relations with our

neighbors and the world. The marines in Karbala,’’ he said, ‘‘comVerDate 11-MAY-2000 17:31 Jan 20, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 91037 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
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manded by Lieutenant Colonel Lopez’’—that is Lieutenant Colonel

Matt Lopez for his parents—‘‘work day and night with our governing council to provide security and services.’’ I asked him if he would like to visit the United States. And he

beamed. He said, ‘‘I have not been allowed to leave Iraq for 35

years. I would love to visit your country.’’ Mr. Chairman, in the north we saw another success story led by

General David Petraeus and his troops of the 101st Air Assault Division, who arrived in Mosul on the 22nd of April, I would note,

after liberating Najaf and Karbala in the south. Over the next 30

days, they put together an impressive list of accomplishments. In

my written testimony, I have some 20 of them. I will not take your

time. You can read them.

What I would like to mention, though, is just one example of the

kind of imagination and ingenuity that his troops are doing. We

took a walking tour of the center of Mosul with an army company

responsible for security in that area. And security is a serious business. They, a few weeks ago, captured seven terrorists, I believe

mostly foreigners holed up in an apartment in the town square.

Since getting rid of those people, it has been stable. But they go

around in full body armor and guns at the ready.

But as we were passing a line of butcher shops, the company

commander, Captain Paul Stanton, told me a fascinating story

about how they had dealt with a problem involving the town’s meat

cutters. It seems that the butchers were slaughtering their animals

on the streets and dumping the carcasses in front of their shops.

To get this rather unsanitary problem under control, our soldiers

organized a civic association of butchers, so that they would have

an authoritative institution with which they could deal.

This was something unheard of in pre-war Iraq. In the old regime, organized associations were not allowed. For this purpose,

they were not necessary. If there was a problem dumping carcasses

in the street, you simply shot a few butchers, and the rest got the

point.

We deal differently. And when I heard this imaginative solution,

I jokingly asked Captain Stanton if they had taught him that at

West Point. And of course he said no. He said they had had to figure that out as they went along. But, of course, that is something

that Americans, including our wonderful soldiers, have in their fingertips, something that they bring from the civic culture in this

country to help build a civic culture in Iraq.

Mr. Chairman, the 4th Infantry Division in what I will now stop

calling the Sunni triangle, but is the Baathist triangle, the

Saddamist triangle, the 4th Infantry Division has a tougher task,

because the security problem is much more severe. General Ray

Odierno and his troops have done an impressive job in confronting

that challenge.

He briefed us on Operation Peninsula Strike, Operation Sidewinder, Operation Soda Mountain. Each in succession had been effectively rooting out mid-level Baathists, some senior Baathists,

capturing surface to air missiles, rocket propelled grenades, and

other horrendous devices. He said that as we continue to capture

and kill the foot soldiers, it is becoming increasingly more difficult

for the mid-level Baathist financiers to organize, recruit, and mainVerDate 11-MAY-2000 17:31 Jan 20, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 91037 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
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tain their force of hired killers. And they are also very good, after

any operation, going into the villages where they have been and

handing out chickens and soccer balls and making amends for any

damage they may have done.

General Odierno’s troops are also responsible for the city of

Kirkuk, which is a much more stable area, in fact, one of the most

stable in the country, I think. There, an interim governing counsel

has been established, whose members are working together. It is

a very multi-ethnic group, including Arabs, Sunni Arabs, Shi’a

Arabs, Sunni Turks, Sunni Kurds, Christians, including three

women.

My meeting with that council was one of the most heartening of

all in our trip. Many of the 18 members spoke of their gratitude

to President Bush and to Prime Minister Blair and to the coalition

troops for their liberation. The word liberation was used repeatedly.

Most stunningly, an old Arab member of the council spoke eloquently about the need to return Kurdish property to its rightful

owners. ‘‘All Iraqis were victims of the last regime,’’ he said. One

member of the council said, ‘‘Please tell President Bush thank you

for his courageous decision to liberate Iraq. Many American soldiers have volunteered their lives for our liberation.’’ Another member commended the tireless efforts of General

Odierno and his army. And finally, one, speaking in English, asked

me when the U.S. Government was going to ‘‘confront Arab television for their incitement to kill Americans.’’ Obviously, he pointed

to another challenge that we face.

Mr. Chairman, you recently said that our victory in Iraq will be

based on the kind of country we leave behind. Just 89 days after

the end of major combat operations, our forces and their coalition

partners are making significant progress in helping Iraqis build the

kind of country that will reflect their enormous talents and resources and that they can be proud of one day.

Getting rid of the Hussein regime for good is not only in the interest of the Iraqi people, it enhances the security of Americans

and of people throughout the Middle East. To those who question

American resolve and determination, I would remind them that we

are still playing our crucial role in Bosnia 8 years after the Dayton

Accord, long after some predicted we would be gone. And we continue to be the key to stability in Kosovo and in Macedonia. But

the stakes in Iraq for us are even greater than they are in the Balkans.

Mr. Chairman, the military and rehabilitation efforts now underway in Iraq are an essential part of the war on terror. In fact, the

battle to secure the peace in Iraq is now the central battle in the

war on terror.

General Abizaid met with some reporters over lunch with us

while we were on our visit. And he said something that I believe

is quite profound. I would like to quote it. And I would like to note

that General Abizaid is not only an outstanding commander and a

great soldier, he is a real expert on the Middle East. He is fluent

in Arabic. He served in Lebanon. He commanded a battalion in

northern Iraq in Operation Provide Comfort. He speaks from deep

experience. And this is what he said.

26

He said, ‘‘We all make mistakes by wanting to only examine Iraq

or only examine Afghanistan or examine the Palestinian-Israeli

theater. We look at things through a soda straw. And we seem to

think, well if we just focus our particular energies and efforts on

dealing with problems in Iraq, you know, we will solve the Iraq

problem. But the truth of the matter is,’’ he said, ‘‘that this whole

difficulty in the global war on terrorism is that it is a phenomenon

that is without borders. And the heart of the problem is in this particular region; i.e., the Middle East. And the heart of the region

happens to be Iraq. ‘‘And so,’’ he said, ‘‘it is not just a matter of somehow or other

fighting a global war on terrorism with special operations forces, it

is a matter of having a policy that aims to bring a certain liberalization in the way that people look at the world. And if we are successful here in Iraq, I believe it is a unique opportunity for the

whole region. I think I am pretty inarticulate on it,’’ he said. I

would disagree with that one part of his statement. He is very articulate, and I agree with him strongly. ‘‘But I guess it is to say

you cannot separate the global war on terrorism from what is happening here in Iraq. And you cannot separate the struggle against

Baathists from the global war on terrorism. And if we cannot be

successful here,’’ he said, ‘‘we will not be successful in the global

war on terrorism. And that means,’’ and this is important, ‘‘and

that means,’’ he said, ‘‘it is going to be long and it is going to be

hard and it is going to be sometimes bloody. But it is a chance,

when you combine it with initiatives in the Arab-Israeli theater

and initiatives elsewhere, it is a chance to make life better, to bring

peace to an area where people are very, very talented and resources are abundant, especially here in Iraq. ‘‘So I think the opportunity that is before us is quite, I think, ‘‘he

said, ‘‘incredible.’’ Mr. Chairman, what that statement says, and it says it quite eloquently, is that the war on terrorism is a global war, and it is a

two-front war. One front is killing and capturing terrorists. The

other front is building a better future, particularly for the people

of the Middle East. So the stakes in Iraq are huge. And there is

no question that our commitment must be equal to the stakes.

Last, President Bush said that our nation will give those who

wear its uniform all the tools and support they need to complete

their mission. Mr. Chairman, I applaud the determined dedication

of this committee, of you personally, in helping the American people understand the stakes that we have in securing success in Iraq.

Mr. Chairman, in my written statement I go on at some length

about the question of how many troops we need. We can get into

that in questions. But I would like to say something that is very

important here. Because the most—we do not need more American

troops. At least our commanders do not think we do. What we need

most of all, we need international troops, yes. We need actionable

intelligence, yes. But what we need most of all are Iraqis fighting

with us. The Iraqi people are part of this coalition. And they need

to be armed and trained to participate.

We have begun recruiting and training Iraqis for a national army

and are about to begin recruiting for a civilian defense force. That

force could take over some important tasks from our troops, such

27

as guarding fixed sites and power lines. There is no reason that

Iraqis could not be guarding the hospital from which someone

threw a grenade last week that killed three of our marines.

Mr. Chairman, your colleagues in the Senate and the House can

help. To accelerate this process, we urgently request that you support the Armed Services Committee in restoring, in conference, the

$200 million in authority that we requested from the Congress in

our budget this year, authority to equip and train indigenous forces

fighting with Americans in Iraq or Afghanistan or elsewhere.

It was dropped apparently because the Congress did not believe

it was necessary. I hope it is clear now that it is necessary. It is

much better to have Iraqis fighting and dying for their country

than to have Americans doing the job all by themselves. And there

is no shortage of Iraqis who are willing to help us. If there are

20,000 committed Baathists targeting our success, there are 19 million or more Iraqis who hate those people and would like to help

us. We should not find that we are held back by a shortage of authority or money to give them the proper training and equipment

to do the job.

One reason our commanders do not want more troops, Mr. Chairman, is that the function of American troops is to go after enemy

that have been identified through actionable intelligence. When it

comes to patrolling the streets of Iraqi cities, it is a disadvantage

to have Americans. It means that our people are colliding with ordinary Iraqis trying to go about their day-to-day business. We want

to get out of that posture as quickly as possible.

In fact, in Kirkuk the 4th Infantry Division has already managed

to turn the entire policing job of a multi-ethnic city, in which many

predicted there would be widespread ethnic conflict, and there has

not been, to an Iraqi police force.

As we place our investments in a larger context, we must realize

that greater stability in this critical region will save U.S. resources

in the long run. And I agree strongly with what I heard Senator

Biden saying and others have said, investments now that can deal

with problems on an urgent basis while the window of opportunity

is open, however long that may be. And I cannot predict how long

it may be, but we have a time now when investments that might

seem inefficient to someone trying to design the perfect scheme for

standing up power, the perfect scheme for training an army, doing

things rapidly, will have big payoffs.

But let us put it in some context. According to some estimates,

it costs us slightly over $30 billion to maintain the so-called containment of Saddam Hussein for the last 12 years. And it cost us

far more than money. The containment policy cost us American

lives, lives lost in Khobar Towers, on the USS Cole. It routinely put

Americans in danger in enforcing the no-fly zones. And it cost us

in even larger ways as well.

The American presence in the holy land of Saudi Arabia and the

sustained American bombing of Iraq, which were part of that containment policy, were principal grievances, the principal grievances, cited in Osama bin Laden’s notorious 1998 fatwa that called

for the killing of Americans.

So we should consider what we might spend in reconstruction in

Iraq against the billions that we have already spent elsewhere or

28

against the consequences, if we fail to win this global war on terror. We cannot fail.

But Iraq can contribute to its reconstruction and its rehabilitation. It is already doing so. And its share will increase as oil production increases and the Iraqi economy recovers. At this stage, it

is impossible to estimate what recovery actually will cost. What we

do know is that resources will come from a variety of resources.

And the costs of recovery in Iraq need to be shared widely.

The international community has a vital interest in successful recovery in Iraq and should share responsibility for it. The international community has recognized its responsibility to assist us in

peacekeeping efforts. Nineteen nations are now providing more

than 13,000 troops on the ground and more on the way. And we

are in active discussions with a number of very important countries, including Turkey and Pakistan, about further possibilities.

Mr. Chairman, when President Bush spoke in the Rose Garden

with Ambassador Bremer at his side, he said, ‘‘Our military forces

are on the offensive.’’ Indeed they are. And they are doing an incredible job. Everywhere I went, I found troops with heartwarming

stories about the reception they have received for Iraqis. They express some bewilderment about the news coverage they see.

One soldier asked, ‘‘Don’t the folks back home get it?’’ They understand that helping Iraqis build a free and democratic society

will make our children and grandchildren safer. Our troops are

brave when they have to fight, and they still have to fight. And

they are caring and clever, extraordinarily ingenious, when they

deal with humanitarian and political and civil military challenges.

Their relations with non-governmental organizations, form one

meeting I held with those groups, are going extremely well. And I

believe the Iraqi people understand that we are there to help.

Mr. Chairman, the mayor of Karbala said, ‘‘We want to establish

a national government and maintain relations with America.’’ The

people of northern Iraq, free from Saddam’s tyranny for the last 10

years, 12 years, have demonstrated to a remarkable degree what

Iraqis can do with freedom. And my meetings with newly freed

Iraqis tell me they are looking to do the same thing.

The mayor of Mosul, who is a Sunni Arab and a former army

commander who spent a year in prison because his brother, who

was executed, had been suspected of coup planning, said that life

under the old regime—this is a Sunni, I remind you, Sunni Arab—

‘‘was like living in a prison.’’ He described that regime as ‘‘a ruthless gang that mistreated all Iraqis.’’

His top priorities are investment and jobs. But he said to do that

we need security. He credited the wisdom of General Petraeus in

improving the security situation. And he added that jobs and investment will follow.

I asked the mayor if ethnic differences will prevent people from

working together. And the Turcoman assistant mayor immediately

said, ‘‘What caused this great ethnic gap here was Saddam.

Throughout our history, we have had no problems.’’ Slight exaggeration, but not too far. ‘‘This happened only in our recent history.

We consider ourselves,’’ this Turk said, ‘‘one garden with many

flowers of different colors.’’

29

So even though the enemy targets our success, we will win the

peace. But we will not win it alone. We do not need American

troops to guard every mile of electrical cable. The real center of

gravity will come from the Iraqi people themselves. They know who

and where the criminals are. And they have the most at stake,

namely their future.

We have shown them that we mean to stay until the old regime

is crushed and its criminals punished and that we are equally determined then to give their country back to them. They will know

they can truly begin to build a society and a government that is

of, by, and for the Iraqi people.

In many ways, they are like people who have been prisoners who

have endured many years of solitary confinement, without light,

without peace, without much knowledge of the outside world. They

have just emerged into the bright light of hope and the fresh air

of freedom. It may take awhile for them to adjust to this new landscape free of torture trees. But they are.

Last week, the President told us why it is so crucial that we succeed in Iraq. He said, and I quote, ‘‘A free, democratic, peaceful

Iraq will not threaten America or friends with illegal weapons. A

free Iraq will not be a training ground for terrorists or a funnel of

money to terrorists or provide weapons to terrorists who would be

willing to use them to strike our country or our allies. A free Iraq

will not destabilize the Middle East. A free Iraq can set a hopeful

example to the entire region and lead other nations to choose freedom. And as the pursuits of freedom replace hatred and resentment and terror in the Middle East,’’ the President said, ‘‘the

American people will be more secure.’’ Make no mistake, our efforts to help build a peaceful Iraq will

be equal to the stakes. We look forward to doing our part to work

with you, Mr. Chairman, members of your committee, and the

other Members of the Congress to help make America and her people more secure. Thank you for giving me so much time.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wolfowitz follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL D. WOLFOWITZ, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF

DEFENSE

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: On behalf of the men and women

who serve our country so faithfully and so well, I would first say that we are indeed

grateful for your continued and unfailing support.

I returned last week from a four-and-a-half-day visit to northern, central and

southern Iraq. With incredible support from the U.S. military, my staff and I were

able to cover a great deal of territory in a relatively short time. In fact, I think we

saw what would normally have taken a typical visitor two weeks to see—and in

temperatures that hovered near or above 120 degrees. In light of this, my gratitude

to our military men and women only deepened—not only for the support they gave

us, but in recognition of the fact that they do so much more—in grueling heat and

in conditions far less agreeable than those they provided for us—day after day,

without stopping. They are doing an absolutely stunning job, and I appreciate the

opportunity to discuss with you today their vital work, and offer you my firsthand

testimony on the current situation in Iraq.

Behind the police academy in Baghdad stands the forked trunk of a dead tree.

It is unusual for the fact that, on each branch, the bark is permanently marked by

two sets of ropes—one high enough to tie up a man, the other, a woman. Near the

tree is a row of small cells where special prisoners were held.

Our guide on our tour of the academy was the newly-appointed superintendent;

he himself had spent a year in jail for having made a disparaging comment about

Saddam—to his best friend. He told us of unspeakable things that once happened

to men and women tied to that tree and held in those cells. Beyond the torture tree,

30

a small gate leads to the Olympic Committee Headquarters, run by Uday Hussein,

who would often slip through the back gate at night to torture and abuse prisoners.

That is the same tree behind the police academy that was reported in such gruesome detail in the July 23th ‘‘Washington Post.’’ The article focused on the sad

plight of one Assyrian Christian woman who was tied to that tree and made to endure unspeakable torture. Her husband was executed at the academy and passed

through the steel gate, as the article described it, ‘‘like a piece of butcher’s meat’’—

all because they had not received state approval for their marriage.

There is a positive aspect in the distressing story of Juman Michael Hanna—that

is her courage in coming forward to offer U.S. officials what is very likely credible

information, information that will help root out Baathist policemen who routinely

tortured and killed prisoners. Bernard Kerik, senior policy advisor to the Iraqi ministry of the interior, is quoted as saying that that woman’s information ‘‘is an event

that will lead to closure for a lot of people’’—and, he added—‘‘justice.’’

Mr. Chairman, I believe that is the same police academy that you and Senators

Biden and Hagel visited during your trip to Iraq just a few weeks ago. But, I believe

that our understanding of the academy’s former role in the regime continued to

evolve after your trip to Baghdad. This, of course, is due to Mrs. Hanna’s brave testimony about crimes committed against her and countless others and who was responsible. This evolution in our understanding of but one aspect of the regime

points to one of the most formidable challenges facing us right now. The people of

Iraq have much valuable information that can help us root out Baathists and help

them find justice. But their willingness to tell us what they know will continue to

take significant investments on our part—investments in our time, of our resources,

and in our efforts to build trust among the Iraqi people. The military and rehabilitation efforts now under way in Iraq are an essential part of the War on Tenor. In

fact, the battle to secure the peace in Iraq is now the central battle in the global war

on tenor.

HISTORY OF ATROCITIES AND PUNISHMENT LINKED TO FUTURE SUCCESS

In Republic of Fear, Kanan Makiya writes about receiving a letter from an Iraqi

refugee in Europe who claims to have been an agent in the Iraqi secret police for

seven years. In the letter, the former agent draws this conclusion: ‘‘Confronting an

experienced criminal regime such as the present one in Baghdad can be done only

with truths that strip off its many masks, bringing its demise closer.’’

Traveling throughout Iraq last week, I heard many accounts of unspeakable brutality—on a scale unimaginable for Americans. I saw truths that strip away masks

of legitimacy that regime dead-enders may yet cling to. And while these truths may

be unpleasant to face, doing so will help hasten the demise, once and for all, of a

truly criminal regime.

While we were in the North, one of our commanders in the field told us they had

temporarily stopped the excavation of a newly discovered mass gravesite, after unearthing the remains of 80 women and children—some still with little dresses and

toys.

In the South, in the village of Al Turabah, we met other remnants of the regime’s

horrific brutality, the Marsh Arabs, for whom liberation came only barely in time

to save a fragment of this ancient civilization. But, for the Marsh Arabs, the

marshes are no more. For more than 10 years, Saddam drained their ancestral

lands—in one instance, diverting water to create artificial lakes around the lavish

palaces he built for himself near Babylon. Where there was once a lush landscape

of productive, fresh-water marshes the size of New Jersey, there is now a vast, nearly lifeless void, which one observer with us likened to the surface of the moon.

According to one estimate, the population of the Marsh Arabs once stood at half

a million; but after Saddam’s humanitarian and environmental crimes, it is believed

there are at most 200,000 left—and less than 40,000 of those were not driven from

their ancestral home. At least there is still a Marsh Arab civilization capable of

being preserved. But, it is likely it would not have lasted another two or three,

much less another 12 years. Children in Al Turabah greeted us with loud applause

and cheers of ‘‘Salaam Bush’’ and ‘‘Down with Saddam.’’ Their first request was not

for candy or toys. It was, instead, a single word: ‘‘Water?’’

In the case of many tens of thousands who were killed at Al Hilla and Abu

Gharib, however, liberation did not come in time. I’ve heard stories about buses full

of people that villagers would watch pass by, headed for a once-public field that had

been closed by the government. They reported hearing gunshots, assuming that the

people were celebrating, as is sometimes customary. When the buses would pass by

the villagers on the return trip—completely empty—people began to suspect that

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something was wrong. When this happened over and over, the villagers began to

fear the worst.

Of course, we know now that tens of thousands of men, women and children were

brought to places like the killing fields in Hilla, gunned down, and buried, dead or

alive. Today, some of their bodies have been retrieved from the earth—they now lay,

wrapped in plastic bags, in neat rows on the dirt. They wait for someone to claim

them. The graveyard in Hilla is only one of dozens that have been discovered to date

throughout Iraq.

At the prison at Abu Gharib, we saw the torture chamber and an industrial-style

gallows that conducted group executions regularly, twice a week. We were told that

30,000 people—and perhaps as many as 100,000—were killed there over the years.

(According to a variety of witnesses, in the spring of 1998, Qusay Hussein ordered

officials to kill thousands of prisoners to make room for more. As many as 3,000

prisoners were executed by the regime, as part of a larger program of ‘‘prison cleansing.’’)

One of my strongest impressions is that fear of the old regime is still pervasive

throughout Iraq. But, a smothering blanket of apprehension and dread woven by 35

years of repression—where even the smallest mistake could bring torture or death—

won’t be cast off in a few weeks’ time. Iraqis are understandably cautious. Until

they are convinced that every remnant of Saddam’s old regime is being removed,

and until a long and ghastly part of their history is put to rest and overcome, that

fear will remain. That history of atrocities and the punishment of those responsible

are directly linked to our success in helping the Iraqi people build a free, secure and

democratic future.

What happened to the Hussein brothers last week is essential to the process of

building that future. Their demise is an important step in making Iraqis feel more

secure that the Baathist tyranny will never return, in restoring order and in giving

freedom a chance. Even in Baghdad, far from the Shi’a and Kurdish areas that we

associate with Saddam’s genocidal murders, enthusiastic and prolonged celebrations

over the news of their deaths erupted almost at once—suggesting something else I

observed: Saddam and his sons were equal opportunity oppressors.

It was a significant step forward to get Numbers 2 and 3 on our most-wanted list

of regime criminals. That same day, we captured Number 11 on the list, the commander of the Special Republican Guard, the unit whose job was to spy on the Republican Guard. But, we’ve learned in our days on the ground that the roots of that

regime go deep—burrowing into precincts and neighborhoods, like a huge gang of

organized criminals. So, it is the coalition’s intensified focus on mid-level Baathists

that we think will yield even greater results in apprehending the contract killers

and dead-enders who now target our soldiers and our success. Recently captured

functionaries have revealed new and helpful information, and we are working to encourage this trend.

According to Major General Ray Odierno, commander of the 4th Infantry Division,

tips are on the rise following the deaths of Uday and Qusay. But, even before that

happened, he said that the number of Iraqis providing information to our troops had

been increasing in the last couple of weeks. He thinks the rise is because they feel

confident that we will act on the information. Tips have led to the seizure of significant weapons caches, as well, to include some 660 surface to air missiles. It is important to remember that the people who want the return of the old regime are a

small fraction of the Iraqi people.

As Ambassador Bremer pointed out when he was here last week, ongoing and aggressive military operations pick up a number of detainees every day, following up

on information provided by Iraqis. They are pursuing Fedayeen Saddam and midlevel Baathists. They are arresting them and interrogating them. In fact, during one

of our briefings, we saw an impressive 4th Infantry Division flow chart that goes

from the mid-level Baathists through the facilitators down to the individual perpetrators.

And it’s important to remember that before the start of military operations in

Iraq, Saddam released tens of thousands of prisoners who have also been part of

the violence. In Nasiriyah, for example, Iraqis have told us about offers of $200 to

attack a power line and $500 to attack an American.

SUCCESSES, REGION BY REGION

While many Iraqis may still remain in the grip of fear, our troops, our coalition

allies and the new national and local Iraqi councils are making significant progress

in lessening its iron hold. Mr. Chairman, I think you and Senators Hagel and Biden

can attest to the fact that there is far more good news in Iraq than is routinely reported. I’d like to give you a snapshot tour of what I saw and heard last week.

32

One interesting thing I would note first is that the military commanders I talked

with who have experience in the Balkans uniformly agreed that, in Iraq, we are far

ahead of where we were in Bosnia and Kosovo at comparable times, and in some

cases, we are ahead of where those places are today. Lieutenant General Rick

Sanchez, the outstanding new commander of Joint Task Force 7, is a veteran of

Kosovo. During one of our briefings, he commented that things are happening in

Iraq after three months that didn’t happen after 12 months in Kosovo. I asked him

to elaborate, and off the top of his head, he jotted down a list of 10 things. I’d like

to share General Sanchez’s list with you.

1. The judicial system is functioning at a rudimentary level. Investigative

judges are working and misdemeanor trials are ongoing with convictions.

2. The political infrastructure is functioning. Neighborhood, district and city

councils have been stood up. Over 90% of major cities have city councils and

there is a National Level Interim Governing Council.

3. The police force is at about 80% of the requirement. Police are conducting

joint and unilateral effective operations.

4. Customs, fixed site security are all well on the way to being stood up.

Multiple ports of entry are being operated by the Iraqis.

5. Schools were immediately stood back up. At all levels the school year was

salvaged.

6. The medical system is operating.

7. The media, all types, are available across the county.

8. The local economies are bustling—oil, agriculture and small business.

9. Public Services—electrical, water, sewage are nearly up to pre war levels.

10. Recruiting for the New Iraqi Army has started with training to begin

within a couple of weeks.

In fact, the entire south and north are impressively stable, and the center is improving day by day. The public food distribution is up and running. We planned for

a food crisis, but there isn’t one. Hospitals nation-wide are open. Doctors and nurses

are at work. Medical supply convoys are escorted to and from the warehouses. We

planned for a health crisis, but there isn’t one. Oil production has continued to increase, and for about the last week, has averaged 1.1 million barrels per day. We

planned for the possibility of massive destruction of this resource of the Iraqi people,

but our military plan helped preserve the oil fields for the Iraqis.

The school year has been salvaged. Schools nationwide have reopened and final

exams are complete. There are local town councils in most major cities and major

districts of Baghdad, and they are functioning free of Baathist influence.

There is no humanitarian crisis. There is no refugee crisis. There is no health crisis. There has been minimal war damage to infrastructure. There has been no environmental catastrophe, either from oil well fires, or from dam breaks.

However, as I related to this Committee in May, Saddam’s legacy of destruction

and decay is another story entirely.

South: In the South, the Marines are making wonderful progress. Major General

Jim Mattis, commander of the First Marine Expeditionary Force, told us how effective his battalion commanders—typically lieutenant colonels—have been at the hub

of activity in the cities. They have stressed creating a supportive environment, by

parking their tanks out of sight, and getting in among the people to win their trust

and confidence. In one example, the Marines gave out chilled water—a precious

commodity as you can imagine—to demonstrators at political rallies. Whenever the

Marines have rebuilt a school—and in Karbala alone there are nine such schools—

they present a brass bell with the inscription: ‘‘To the children of Iraq from the First

Marine Division.’’

Our Army Civil Affairs teams are equally impressive. They have created functioning local governing councils free from Baathist influence. The governor of

Karbala captured this development best when he told me: ‘‘We Shia have theological

ties to Iran, but we refuse to be followers of any country outside Iraq. I want to

stress, we aspire to independence and democracy. We want to heal the wounds from

the past regime’s atrocities. We want to build factories, bring in the Internet, practice our religious rites in freedom, have good relations with our neighbors and the

world. The Marines in Karbala—Commanded by LtCol Lopez—work day and night

with our Governing Council to provide security and services.’’

North: Stability in the north is another success story. General Dave Patraeus and

his troops of the 101st Airborne arrived in Mosul on 22 April and over the next 30

days they put together this impressive list of accomplishments:

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• Met with community leaders;

• Agreed on an election plan;

• Established an elected interim city council;

• Re-opened hospitals, schools, banks and businesses;

• Set up a Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC);

• Repaired the strategic bridge on the Mosul-Irbil road;

• Fixed the benzene and propane shortages;

• Opened the airport to humanitarian assistance flights;

• Signed the Makhmur harvest accords between Kurds and Arabs;

• Completed the wheat harvest;

• Re-opened the border with Syria so trade could resume;

• Set up the new Mosul newspaper;

• Paid government workers;

• Re-established train service;

• Established Task Force Neighborhood and Task Force Graffiti and helped clean

up the city; Task Force Pothole employs Iraqis and improves the roads;

• Conducted joint police patrols;

• Began training a new police force;

• Diplomatically removed Peshmerga forces from disputed areas to back above

the green line;

• Average 300 day, 300 night, and 90 joint sector security patrols (U.S. with local

police); and have established air and ground quick reaction forces to respond to

Baathist attacks.

• They are currently supporting 10 major CPA funded reconstruction projects.

General Petraeus said they have invested in water, electricity, roads, schools, hospitals, banks, agriculture, summer youth leagues, community swimming pools, orphanages, and kids amusement park projects. He believes there are reasons for continued optimism in the north. They include: the quality of interim government leadership; citizen trust and confidence in Coalition forces; a good university and school

system; functioning food and fuel distribution systems; access to trade with Turkey

and Syria; relatively good infrastructure; natural resources (water, oil, farm land);

growth of small businesses; educated, hard-working, entrepreneurial populace; and

as the locals have said, there is a ‘‘thirst for democracy.’’ Center (4th Infantry Division): General Ray Odierno has a more difficult security

challenge in the predominately Sunni areas and in areas close to the Iranian border.

He understands the nature of the Baathist and foreign terrorist threat and how that

interacts with and affects his civil-military programs. He said they have incredible

tactical intelligence on the reactionary cells and are making solid progress in defeating this threat. He cites Operation Peninsula, Operation Sidewinder, and Operation

Soda Mountain as effective in rooting out these forces. He said as we capture or kill

the foot soldiers, it is becoming increasingly more difficult for the mid-level Baathist

financiers to organize, recruit and maintain an effective force.

As he deals more and more effectively with the Baathist forces, he too has been

able to complete an impressive array of civil-military projects in his area of responsibility. As in the north and south, they have established Battalion Commander

‘‘safe houses’’ throughout Kirkuk to more effectively interact with the population.

They have stood up and are training a police force. An interim Governing Council

has been established whose members are reportedly working effectively together— and, like in the north, are multi-ethnic. And three are women. In two weeks Council

members will be taking phone-in callers on local radio shows. Contractors are busy

repairing the oil infrastructure in the Kirkuk oil fields. And the Badr Corps influence has calmed down considerably.

My meeting with the Kirkuk Interim Governing Council members was perhaps

the most heartening of all. Many of the 18 members spoke of their gratitude to

President Bush and our troops for their liberation. The word ‘‘liberation’’ was used

repeatedly by the members. An Arab member spoke eloquently of the need to return

Kurdish property to their rightful owners. ‘‘All Iraqis were victims of the last regime,’’ he said. Others spoke of American troops working with us ‘‘in a nice way to

help solve our problems,’’ that ‘‘doors are always open to us’’ and that ‘‘we found

out the Americans are our brothers who came as liberators not as conquerors.’’ One member said: ‘‘Please tell President Bush thank you for his courageous decision to liberate Iraq. Many American soldiers have volunteered their lives [for liberation].’’ The Turcoman member asked that I convey to President Bush the

34

Turcoman communities thanks for liberation. Another member commended the

‘‘tireless efforts of General Odierno and his army’’ in helping the Iraqi people. And

finally, a member, speaking English, asked me when the U.S. government was going

to ‘‘confront Arab television for their incitement to kill Americans?’’ Obviously, he

pointed to another challenge we must face.

Mr. Chairman, you recently said that our victory in Iraq will be based on the

‘‘kind of country we leave behind.’’ Just 89 days after the end of major combat operations, our forces and their coalition partners are making significant progress in

helping Iraqis build the kind of country that will reflect their enormous talents and

resources, and that they can be proud of one day.

RESOURCES TO GET THIS JOB DONE

Getting rid of the Hussein regime for good is not only in the interest of the newly

liberated Iraqi people, it enhances the security of Americans and of people throughout

the Middle East. We will not conclude our efforts until the Baathist regime is dead,

and the Iraqi people have begun to build an Iraq that is, whole, free, and at peace

with itself and its neighbors. To those who question American resolve and determination, I would remind them that we are still playing a crucial role in Bosnia

eight years after the Dayton Accord, long after we predicted we would be gone. And

we continue to be the key to stability in Kosovo and in Macedonia. But the stakes

in Iraq for us are even greater than they are in the Balkans.

And if the stakes are huge in Iraq—and they are, since tyranny breeds terror—

there is no question that our commitment to secure a peaceful Iraq must be at least

equal to the stakes—it is related to nothing less than our security and the peace

of the world. As the Vice President said last week, ‘‘a more peaceful, stable Middle

East will contribute directly to the security of American and our friends.’’

I applaud the determination and dedication of this Committee, Mr. Chairman, in

helping the American people understand the stakes we have in securing success in

Iraq.

Also last week, President Bush said that ‘‘our nation will give those who wear its

uniform all the tools and support they need to complete their mission.’’ It is vital

that our commanders in the field and Ambassador Bremer get what they need. The

payoff will be much greater than the investments we make now.

Mr. Chairman, I would add that there is no artificial ceiling on the number of

troops that we will deploy to Iraq to defeat this enemy. Our commanders have been

asked repeatedly whether they need more troops, and the answer from General

Abizaid, as well as his subordinate commanders, has repeatedly been, not only don’t

they need more, they don’t want more. What they do want more of is this:

• Forces from other countries. We’re making some substantial progress in that regard. I visited the Polish general who will be commanding the multinational division in southern Iraq. The Polish brigade in that division will have responsibility for the Province of Karbala, one of the most important cities in the Shi’a

heartland that many people predicted would be difficult to manage. It has not

proven difficult, and the Poles are enthusiastic about taking on the assignment.

In that same multinational division, the Spanish brigade will be taking charge

of the other major holy Shi’a city, Najaf. Further south, under the British multinational division, an Italian infantry brigade—which will include some 400

carabinieri—will be performing security and stability operations.

• The second thing they need more of is actionable intelligence. And the key to

getting more intelligence is cooperation from Iraqis, as I mentioned earlier in

my statement. That cooperation has been increasing substantially. One product

of that cooperation, of course, was the Iraqi who turned in the two miserable

brothers who were killed last week. That event itself has led to a large increase

in the amount of intelligence that Iraqis are bringing to us,—indeed such a

large increase that we now have the challenge of sorting out the wheat from

the chaff.

• Third and most important, what we need are Iraqis fighting with us. We’ve

begun recruiting and training Iraqis for an Iraqi civilian defense force that

would take over some important tasks from our troops such as guarding fixed

sites and power lines. There is no reason that Iraqis could not be guarding the

hospital from which someone threw a grenade that killed three of our Marines

last week. To accelerate this process, we urgently request that you assist the

Armed Services Committee to restore in conference the $200 million in authority that we requested from the Congress in our budget this year. It was

dropped, apparently because the Congress in its wisdom did not believe that it

was necessary. I hope that it is clear now why it is necessary. It is much better

35

to have Iraqis fighting and dying for their country than to have Americans

doing the job all by themselves. There is no shortage of Iraqis who are willing

to help us. We should not find that we are held back by a shortage of authority

and money to give them the proper training and equipment to do the job.

I urge you and your colleagues on the Armed Services Committee to understand

that this is an extremely urgent need, and special consideration must be given to

provide this critical training and equipping authority to the Department.

One reason our commanders don’t want more troops is that the function of American troops is to go after enemy that have been identified through actionable intelligence. When it comes to patrolling the streets of Iraqi cities, it is a disadvantage

to have American troops. It means that our people are colliding with ordinary Iraqis

trying to go about their day-to-day business. We are trying to get out of that posture

as quickly as possible. In fact, the 4th Infantry Division in the city of Kirkuk has

already managed to turn the entire policing job over to Iraqi police for that crucial

city of mixed ethnic population. Where we have to use American troops, we will do

so, but no one should think that it is the desirable solution.

As we place our investments into a larger context, we must realize that greater

stability in this critical region will save our resources in the long run. We must not

forget that containing Saddam and his regime was the goal. According to some estimates, it cost the United States slightly over $30 billion to maintain the containment of Saddam Hussein for the last 12 years.

And, of course, it cost us far more than money. It cost us American lives—in

Khobar Towers, in the USS Cole, for example—and routinely put Americans in danger in enforcing the no fly zones.

And it cost us in an even larger way as well. The American presence in the holy

land of Saudi Arabia, and the sustained American bombing of Iraq as part of that

containment policy, were principal grievances cited in Osama bin Laden’s notorious

1998 fatwa that called for the killing of Americans.

It is also worthwhile to consider what we might spend on reconstruction in Iraq

against the billions that we’ve already spent in Bosnia and Kosovo. I think most

would agree that those investments have been a worthwhile expenditure. But, stability in Iraq is vastly more important. It is directly related to the future of one of

the most important regions in the world and to our own security. When we completely defeat Saddam’s brutal regime, it will be a defeat for terrorists globally. The

value of that victory is incalculable.

Iraq is already contributing to its own reconstruction and rehabilitation, and

Iraq’s share will increase as oil production and the Iraqi economy recover. At this

early stage, it is impossible to estimate what recovery in Iraq actually will cost.

What we do know is that resources will come from a variety of sources. The costs

of recovery in Iraq will be shared widely. The international community has a vital

interest in successful recovery in Iraq and must share responsibility for it.

The international community has recognized its responsibility to ensure that Iraq

can take its place among peace-seeking nations. In fact, 19 nations are now providing more than 13,000 troops on the ground.

Coalition support is significant, and it continues to increase. Our continued

progress will depend on international assistance, including that of the United Nations. As we proceed, there should be no underestimating the task before us, and

there should be no underestimating its importance.

TROOPS

When President Bush spoke in the Rose Garden last week with Ambassador

Bremer at his side, he encapsulated what I’ve tried to sketch out for you with these

simple words. He said, ‘‘our military forces are on the offensive.’’ Indeed they are.

They are doing an incredible job. Because they are so aggressively rooting out the

dead-enders who are targeting the successes of the Iraqis and the coalition, we must

be prepared for more American casualties and possibly even more dramatic attacks.

Our troops understand what they face, and I can tell you that their morale is almost uniformly high. They are committed to their mission. They know exactly how

important it is—to the people of Iraq and to America. And their obvious commitment to getting the job done right is having a positive effect on the people of Iraq.

Everywhere I went, I found troops with heartwarming stories about the reception

they have received from Iraqis, how wonderful it felt for them to get that kind of

welcome. They expressed some bewilderment about the news coverage they see. One

person asked, ‘‘don’t the folks back home get it?’’ They understand that helping

Iraqis build a free and democratic society will help make our children and grandchildren safer.

36

Our troops are brave when they have to fight—and they still have to fight. And

they are caring and clever—extraordinarily so—when they deal with humanitarian

and political and civil military challenges. What they do in a day’s work is inspiring,

and it’s a great tribute to the superb quality of people who serve this country. They

are, quite literally, soldiers and statesmen.

In Mosul, we took a walking tour of the center of town with the Army company

responsible for that area. As we were passing a line of butcher shops, the Company

Commander told me a remarkable story about how they dealt with a problem involving the town’s meat cutters. It seems that they were slaughtering the animals

on the street and dumping the carcasses in front of their shops. To get this rather

unsanitary problem under control, our soldiers organized an association of the

butchers, so they would have an authoritative institution they could interact with.

This was a new development for the butchers, of course. In the old regime, organized associations weren’t allowed—they simply shot people who dumped things in

the streets. When I heard their solution, I jokingly asked the young captain if they’d

taught him that at West Point. He said, no. He said, they’d had to figure it out as

they went along. Of course, that is something our troops are repeating throughout

Iraq on a daily basis.

I also met with a group of non-government organizations, who also uniformly

praised the work of our military. They said the conditions created by our military

allowed them to get on the ground fast and that has helped their programs. The

USAID representative said civil-military operations are ‘‘smooth as silk.’’

One of the big impressions I came away with is that the Iraqi people understand

that our people are there to help. I sensed an enormous gratitude on their part for

what has been done to bring about the liberation of the Iraqi people. That gratitude

was obvious across all the communities we encountered.

IRAQI PEOPLE ARE WITH US

The mayor of Karbala expressed his personal gratitude, telling us ‘‘they would

never forget that America saved us and delivered us from the regime.’’ He went on

to say, ‘‘We want to establish a national government and maintain relations with

America.’’

The people of Iraq are not only looking ahead to the day when they have their

own representative government, they are taking active steps to make that happen

now. There are some who still ask the question: Is democracy possible in Iraq?

There are even some who doubt that democracy could ever take root in the Arab

world. But, the people of northern Iraq, beyond the reach of Saddam Hussein and

his regime for a decade, demonstrated an impressive ability to manage longstanding

differences and develop relatively free and prospering societies.

My meetings with newly-freed Iraqis tell me that they are looking to do the same

thing. We attended a meeting of the Mosul city council, which was instructive in

debunking the myth that Arabs, Kurds, Turcomen, Assyrian Christians and Yezidi

cannot live and work together. The mayor of Mosul—who is a Sunni Arab and

former Army commander who spent a year in prison and whose brother and cousin

were murdered by the regime—said life under the regime ‘‘was like living in a prison.’’ He described the regime as ‘‘a ruthless gang that mistreated all Iraqis.’’ Investment and jobs, he said, are their top priorities. He credited the wisdom of General

Patraeus in improving the security situation. He added that, jobs and investment

will follow.

When I asked the mayor if ethnic differences will prevent people from working

together, the Turcoman assistant mayor immediately said: ‘‘We have never had ethnic problems in the past. Saddam created them. We have always considered ourselves members of the same family. It never crossed our minds that the next person

is different.’’ To that, the mayor added: ‘‘What caused this great gap was Saddam.

Throughout our history we have had no problems. This has happened only in our

recent history. We consider ourselves one garden with many flowers of different colors.’’

Even though the enemy targets our success, we will win the peace. But, we won’t

win it alone. We don’t need American troops to guard every mile of electrical cable.

The real center of gravity will come from the Iraqi people themselves—they know

who and where the criminals are. And they have the most at stake—their future.

When inevitable challenges and controversies arise, we should remind ourselves

that most of the people of Iraq are deeply grateful for what our incredibly brave

American and coalition forces have done to liberate them from Saddam’s Republic

of Fear.

When we’ve shown Iraqis we mean to stay until the old regime is crushed, and

its criminals punished—and that we are equally determined to give their country

37

back to them—they will know they can truly begin to build a society and government of, by and for the Iraqi people.

In many ways, the people of Iraq are like prisoners who endured years of solitary

confinement—without light, without peace, without much knowledge of the outside

world. They have just emerged into the bright light of hope and fresh air of freedom.

It may take a while for them to adjust to this new landscape free of torture trees.

Last week, the President told us why it is so crucial that we succeed in Iraq. He

said: ‘‘A free, democratic, peaceful Iraq will not threaten America or our friends with

illegal weapons. A free Iraq will not be a training ground for terrorists, or a funnel

of money to terrorists, or provide weapons to terrorist who would be willing to use

them to strike our country or our allies. A free Iraq will not destabilize the Middle

East. A free Iraq can set a hopeful example to the entire region and lead other nations to choose freedom. And as the pursuits of freedom replace hatred and resentment and terror in the Middle East, the American people will be more secure.’’

Make no mistake: our efforts to help build a peaceful Iraq will be equal to the

stakes. We look forward to doing our part to work with the members of Congress

to help make America and her people more secure. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Secretary Wolfowitz,

for a very eloquent and comprehensive statement that we requested you to make. You have fulfilled our hopes for you.

Let me say that we have many members here. We know that we

are likely to be interrupted by rollcall votes at some time that will

be inopportune. So I would suggest we try for a 5-minute limit on

a first round. And that may be the only round. But we will try to

economize time and recognize as many members as we can.

Let me begin my 5 minutes by saying, Secretary Wolfowitz, that

I think all of us will want to look into the $200 million that you

have suggested is needed for the training of Iraqis so that they can

do the patrol duty and fill in on the ways that you have suggested.

I think that is a very important suggestion.

Likewise, you mentioned that the $30 billion policy to contain

Saddam was not inexpensive. This could lead to an interesting

hearing all by itself on the reasons for fighting the war and the

containment policy and what have you. I will not go there, but I

noted that in passing.

Let me ask once again, my quest here is to try to think through

the next 5 years. If you can, please see in your own mind’s eye five

blank sheets of paper. Now we heard from Mr. Hamre roughly that

the budget of Iraq, incorporated, the government that preceded

this, was about $30 billion a year. I never heard of that figure before. I do not know if it is 30, but you probably could establish it.

In other words, $30 billion per year was the a sum of money, the

revenues from all sources that Iraq used to pay for its governance.

Now you could argue that some of that was wasted on troops and

palaces and so forth. So maybe Iraq does not need $30 billion to

run a government. But in any event, they need some sum of

money.

Now Mr. Bolten has filled in some important statistics with regard to where revenues come from now. And so did Ambassador

Bremer. As I look at this, though, it seems to me important that

it is showing not only our staying power and our vision, but also

something to which the Iraqi assembly council or the evolution of

a democratic group of Iraqis may want to make some amendments.

We would say x number of dollars are going to be required for administration of this, this, this, and this, and they add up to something.

38

On the revenue side, the money is going to come from these

sources: oil, of course, plus the confiscated assets which may turn

up. These are going to run out. Mr. Bremer pointed that out. They

may not run out this year, because they will stretch a few assets

over to the next year. But that is about it for that. At some point

this economy of Iraqi must produce some revenue from other

sources. If it works, it will do so, as most governments do. But for

a while, it may not.

There are blanks there that need to be filled: the pledging conference, other countries, other humanitarian resources, the United

Nations. But at the end of the day, probably the United States will

bear the bulk of the burden. What I am trying to draw in terms

of public debate is the thought, first of all, of staying power, of the

confidence you have suggested.

Second, I hope for a lack of surprises. Down the trail, when the

enthusiasm that we now have for solving the problem lessens—and

heaven only knows there may be other problems—I hope that we

have at least some idea of what is likely to be required of the

American taxpayer. Failure to achieve this is going to lead, I believe, to a lot of partisan haggling and bad surprises. Whoever is

President will have to come up with supplementals to avoid running out of money unexpectedly. This was not unexpected. All of

this is fully expected.

I appreciate the difficulty of predictions. Again and again, people

say, well, this is unknowable. As Senator Biden said, of course it

is. We do not know in our government precisely for the next 5

years what in the world we will spend and what kind of revenues

will come in. We are surprised every day by changes of hundreds

of billions of dollars of anticipations.

All I am saying is, with regard to Iraq, perhaps this is not quite

such a volatile, dynamic situation. At least it offers for the fledgling

Iraqi government a chance to amend the motion, to say that these

are not the priorities that we see. And as a matter of fact, we think

there are some revenues that can come from this and that.

I visited with Dr. Rice at the White House last week on this idea.

I have mentioned it publicly several times. I am hopeful we can

begin to fill in the blanks and take seriously this thought of a plan

that we have some confidence in, and that the American people will

understand down the trail what we are doing.

I will not burden you with asking for a further comment, because

my time has expired. I want to pass that along to somebody else.

I have just taken this 5 minutes to make the point. I visited a little

bit with Mr. Bolten about this prior to the hearing. He knows the

regard I have for him and the work at OMB. It is so critical that

we work with you and the Pentagon and the State Department,

and the NSC.

I thank you all for your testimony. And I turn now to my distinguished ranking member, Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. I want to try to ask a couple very specific questions, if you would help me by giving as quick an answer as you

could.

Mr. Bolten, what are your working assumptions on the cost side

for the rest of 2003 and for 2004 for Iraq?

39

Mr. BOLTEN. For the rest of 2003, Senator Biden, on the cost side

are working assumptions are those that Ambassador Bremer has

brought back to us. He is anticipating expenditures in the range for

the total of 2003 of about $7.3 billion.

Senator BIDEN. How much will you be requesting for the remainder of the year, if any, from the U.S. Congress to fund that need?

Mr. BOLTEN. We do not anticipate requesting anything additional

for the balance of this year.

Senator BIDEN. And what do you anticipate for 2004?

Mr. BOLTEN. I do not know the answer to that. Ambassador

Bremer has laid out a reasonable specific budget for the balance of

2003. And I think he had an opportunity to discuss that with you.

But even that was relatively crude because they are just getting a

handle on so many of the variables that are in play right now.

Senator BIDEN. Do you anticipate we will be continuing to spend

$4 billion a month for our troops in Iraq for 2004?

Mr. BOLTEN. That is roughly what we are spending now. Looking

out over the immediate term, we do not have any reason to expect

a dramatic change in that number. But I would not want to predict

beyond the next couple of months, because the situation is so variable.

Senator BIDEN. Do you not have to? I mean, we are talking about

the 2004 budget. We are going to be voting on that in the next couple of months. What the devil are you going to ask us for?

Mr. BOLTEN. Well, the—in the 2004 budget—and, Senator, as

you know, we have been very explicit about it—we have not included the incremental costs of our fighting forces in Iraq nor the

costs of reconstruction. So you——

Senator BIDEN. Why?

Mr. BOLTEN. Simply because we do not know what they will be.

Senator BIDEN. Oh, come on now. Does anybody here at the table

think we are going to be down below 100,000 forces in the next calendar year? Raise your hand, any one of you. You know it is going

to be more than that. So you know at least it is going to be $2.5

billion a month. Give me a break, will you? When are you guys

going to start being honest with us? Come on. I mean, this is ridiculous. You are not even—— Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Senator, to suggest that this is an issue of honesty really is very, very—— Senator BIDEN. It is a suggestion of candor.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ[continuing]. Misleading.

Senator BIDEN. Of candor. Of candor. You know there is going to

be at least 100,000 American forces there for the next calendar

year.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Senator, I do not know——

Senator BIDEN. And you are not asking us for any money——

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I do not know what we are going to have there.

Senator BIDEN. Let me finish, please. Let me finish.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. OK.

Senator BIDEN. And you are not asking us for any money in next

year’s budget for those troops. Now what do you call that?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Senator, there will be a supplemental request.

There is no question about that. And there will be a supplemental

request when we think we can make a reasonably good estimate

40

of what will get us through the whole year, so that we do not have

to keep coming up here with one supplemental request after another. So I do not sit here and say, well, maybe the number is

going to be 100,000, and then it turns out it is 120,000. Then people accuse us of being misleading or dishonest.

Senator BIDEN. Oh, I think you are being—— Mr. WOLFOWITZ. We know what the number is now. We know

what we are trying to do in terms of enlisting other countries. We

do not know whether the Paks are going to come through with a

division. We do not know whether the Turks are going to come

through with division. We do not know how rapidly we are going

to be able to train Iraqis to—— Senator BIDEN. Are you suggesting if, in fact, they come through

with divisions, we are going to reduce American forces?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. If they—I believe that that is exactly the purpose of getting foreign troops in. In fact, in southern Iraq today we

are handing——

Senator BIDEN. Reduce American forces.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ [continuing]. We are handing responsibility for

key provinces of Iraq over to the Poles and the Spaniards and the

Italians. And we are taking marines out. We are not replacing

them with Americans.

Senator BIDEN. So we are going to have a net reduction of American forces for the——

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I am not predicting, Senator. I do not know.

Until we get these Baathist criminals under control, we are going

to put in whatever it takes to do the job. But we are trying to get

other people to fill in for us. We are trying to get Iraqis to fill in

for us. And I think by the end of the year, early next year, we will

have a much better fix on what it takes to get through the year.

Senator BIDEN. Do you have any expectation that you are going

to be able to stand up an Iraqi army of any consequence in the next

6 months?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. They are two different things here. And thanks

for giving me the chance to explain it. We are working on training

an Iraqi army, which is a 2- to 3-year project, out to produce regular units, lots of training, lots of discipline. You do not need that

kind of an army to guard fixed power lines. You do not need that

kind of an army to take over for marines guarding hospitals. You

do not need that kind of an army to guard banks.

Senator BIDEN. That is a civilian defense force you are talking

about.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. A civilian defense force.

Senator BIDEN. How long do you expect that to——

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. We believe we can have thousands of those people available within about 45 days. That is——

Senator BIDEN. Within 45 days. And how about the police?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. The police we are standing up rapidly. And as

you noted correctly, at the police academy, they are not all equally

good. I visited a group down in Basr that still are struggling. But

up north in Kirkuk, for example, the Iraqi police have taken over

the whole function of—— Senator BIDEN. The Iraqi police have taken over—well, OK. I

find this kind of incredible. The picture you painted is—are there

41

any substantive changes of consequence you are recommending to

the President or is everything going along as planned? You have

everything on course here, and everything is pretty well in hand?

I mean, you told us about how the military says we are well ahead

of where we were in Bosnia. Are you happy with where we are

right now?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Senator, I am not happy with where we are

right now. And if there is any way to accelerate anything, we are

looking at it. We are looking at how to accelerate training Iraqis.

I have talked about that at some length. We are looking at emergency ways of accelerating electric power production. Some of that

is already under way. I believe the reason we are able to get the

oil production up over a million barrels a day was because we

brought in portable generators to provide electricity. That is the

kind of thing—— Senator BIDEN. The report called for, what, 5,000 of those? Are

they up—550 diesel-driven emergency generators to be installed,

are they up and running?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I can check that for the record. I do not know

the detail. But that is an example of where we are looking at acceleration. We are looking at acceleration in some non-military areas.

For example, up north one of the big issues is so-called deArabization. A lot of Kurds and some Turks were moved out of

their homes in a kind of slow motion ethnic cleansing. And Arabs

were moved in. The Arabs would be happy to leave, but it is going

to take some money and some legal efforts to do that. We would

like to get that started more quickly than was originally planned.

[The following response was subsequently received.]

Numerous emergency generators were used to accelerate oil production in an effort to establish reliable power at pumping stations and refineries across Iraq. In

early July oil production ranged between 680,000 gallons and 747,000 gallons per

day. Our efforts to increase production were impeded by fluctuating power levels.

To remedy this, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Task Force Restore Iraqi Oil (‘‘TF

RIO’’), along with the Ministry of Oil and Power, worked together to provide and

install two 12.5 MW generators at the Basrah plant. In addition, six 1 MW generators were placed at critical oil facilities by the Southern Oil Company, Kellogg,

Brown & Root. These measures were necessary to provide primary power until the

electrical grid was restored. The combined effect of these emergency generators provided reliable power to the critical oil production facilities and allowed oil production to surpass one million barrels per day.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Your point, Senator, which I agree with, is there

is a window of opportunity here. I cannot measure how long it is.

But I do believe that the sooner we move within that window, the

better off we will be further out in the future, and that money invested now, even if it is not quite efficient, will save us a lot of

money in the long run. And money invested on the civil side can

help bring down that $4 billion a month that we are currently

spending on our troops.

Senator BIDEN. My time is up. But I am confused. General

Myers, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, said if we get these

30,000 additional foreign troops, that it will not be enough for us

to reduce our military in Iraq for months, possibly years. And he

said we need more than 30,000. I do not get you guys. I mean,

Myers says that. You are telling me if we get these additional

troops, we are going to draw down American troops.

42

General KEANE. Can I respond to that, Senator?

Senator BIDEN. Sure.

General KEANE. The two pacing items that involve U.S. troop

commitment is, one, obviously the level of violence and the security

situation that we are currently facing. We have to get that down.

And the second thing is the involvement of multinational forces

and also the Iraqis themselves, the civil defense forces that the

Deputy Secretary mentioned and also the Iraqi army and police

forces.

Those are our pacing items. And General Abizaid, when he looks

to the future, does not want to look beyond March. But even with

looking toward March, what he sees is definitely two multinational

divisions probably by the end of September and the possibility of

a third that has not been committed yet. But the State Department

and Defense Department is working with that.

If that does happen, that will reduce U.S. commitment by one division and also one brigade. And we are moving very quickly, obviously, to get the Iraqis to do more for themselves to help defend

their own people. And that is in its embryonic stages.

As those two items, the level of violence, multinational division

participation, and also the Iraqis themselves will see us reduce the

U.S. troop commitment.

Senator BIDEN. These forces are nowhere. And I would be interested to see about your civilian force.

But at any rate, I thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Biden.

Senator Hagel.

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Gentlemen, thank you for coming before us today. We appreciate

very much you taking the time. And also to your colleagues, general, to our men and women in uniform around the world, our

thanks, our gratitude. We are very proud of what they have done

and what they are doing. And please extend that to them. Thank

you.

General KEANE. Thank you, Senator.

Senator HAGEL. I would like to stay on this issue of manpower

force structure and read just a short paragraph from a July 16

news conference that General Abizaid gave. And he said in that

news conference 13 days ago, speaking of troop rotation, much of

what we are talking about here, in specific reference to the 3rd Infantry Division, when they may rotate out, he picks it up at this

point, he said 13 days ago, ‘‘We will bring those troops home by

September, certainly out of Iraq by September. And they will be

moving toward home in September. And a lot of it, of course, will

depend upon the rotational scheme that either the U.S. Army, U.S.

Marine Corps, or allied coalition forces happen to submit to us in

the next week. But we will know the specific answers to the questions in about a week.’’ Now that was 13 days ago. Do we know what the specific answers are?

General KEANE. Yes, sir. The army has put together a rotation

plan and policy. It is 1 year in length, which means that the forces

in being in Iraq will stay and do a 12-month tour. We have a history with this going back to World War II, where we stayed indefiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 17:31 Jan 20, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 91037 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
43

nitely. Korea, it was 6 months and 12 months for combat forces

and support forces. Vietnam, it was a 12-month individual assignment, if you recall.

And then since that time—— Senator HAGEL. Well, general, may I interrupt just a moment?

I do not mean to be rude, because my time is short here. I understand that part of it. But what about numbers, relevant to what

you have been hearing here? Are we any closer to understanding

what is going to be required here in the way of American force

structure?

General KEANE. Yes. Very specifically, we are essentially doing

a one-for-one replacement of our forces. The 82nd Airborne Division

and its headquarters and two brigades will be replacing the 3rd Infantry Division. There already is a brigade from the 82nd in the

theater.

Senator HAGEL. But that is American for American.

General KEANE. That is correct.

Senator HAGEL. And so that would lead me to believe that we are

going to keep those troops in there for a while, just as referenced

Senator Biden’s comments about General Myers’s comments here

recently, I believe July 24.

General KEANE. Yes. Well, to deal specifically with what you are

talking about is there is a multinational division that is forming

right now with a—Poland is going to be the head of that division.

And that division, as it comes in place, will replace the Marine Expeditionary Force, which is there, which is essentially a division

minus, and will take over their sector. And that is expected to take

place in the September timeframe.

Senator HAGEL. But an American force structure is going to be

required for some time to come.

General KEANE. Oh, absolutely. No question about it.

Senator HAGEL. And what I am trying to get at, like my colleagues have tried to focus on, do we have any idea of what that

force structure is going to look like, understanding completely that

these are dynamic issues, and they float and they move back and

forth, and obviously depending on our international assistance?

General KEANE. We have—— Senator HAGEL. Can you help us here, general?

General KEANE. Sure. We have made a release that indicates

which divisions are going to be replaced and what brigades will be

replaced on a time schedule that takes us through the February/

March timeframe, when all of the units that are currently in Iraq

will be completing a 1-year assignment. And all those forces have

been notified who they are.

Senator HAGEL. Would you say that American numbers, not specific units, but American numbers would remain about the same?

General KEANE. About the same. I mean, obviously——

Senator HAGEL. So we are talking 148,000 Americans.

General KEANE [continuing] We are going to have some slight reduction when we bring out the marines. That is about 9,000-plus.

And if a third coalition division comes in place, which we are working on right now, that will also reduce American numbers.

But by and large, American numbers will remain the same with

some slight reduction.

44

Senator HAGEL. Thank you. There is an interesting story in yesterday’s Wall Street Journal, which I assume the three of you have

seen, ‘‘New Allies Struggle to Fill Role.’’ And it does not paint a

particularly positive picture about the force structure coming from

international support, because the focus of this story’s headline, ‘‘Strains Country’s Resources,’’ just like our force structure, I suspect, is under some strain, when you look at 33 combat brigades,

24 of them overseas. And you know the numbers better than I do.

But the point of this story is for us to look at allies to come in

here, and to some extent rescue our force structure, is probably not

realistic. I do not have enough time to go over this. But if you have

not seen this, general and Secretary Wolfowitz, you each might

want to take a look at this, because it is not as positive as we have

been led to believe by some of our people here in this government.

One last question to Director Bolten. Is it my understanding, Director Bolten, that you will not be coming up here with a line item

for 2005 for the Iraqi account in the fiscal year 2005 budget? You

will not be coming up with a specific request in that budget next

year?

Mr. BOLTEN. Well, I cannot say what will be in the budget next

year. But Secretary Wolfowitz is right. We will be coming with a

supplemental for 2004.

Senator HAGEL. But not in the—what you intend to do right now,

not in a fiscal year 2005 budget request that you always come up

to the Hill early in the year with. You do not intend to have that

line item in there.

Mr. BOLTEN. I do not anticipate that, because I think it would

be, as it has in the past, be needs above and beyond our normal

needs for the military, more likely to be handled in a supplemental,

as we are handling them now.

Senator HAGEL. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Hagel.

Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And let me

begin by thanking you, Mr. Chairman, once again for the series of

these hearings. They have been tremendously helpful and worthwhile. And I want to underscore the comments of Senator Hagel,

as well, general. We have deep appreciation here for the tremendous job the U.S. military has done and have great appreciation for

the tremendous stress that they are facing today with the reports

almost on a daily basis of some 49, I guess, now is the number that

have been killed since May 1. And we want you to convey to all

of your personnel our deep sense of gratitude for the tremendous

job they have done here.

General KEANE. Thank you, Senator.

Senator DODD. Let me, if I can in the time that we have available to us, I am interested, Secretary Wolfowitz, about what our intentions are regarding a U.N. resolution and additional cooperation. I looked at the numbers here of the June 28 report of the humanitarian assistance we have received from other nations. There

are some 29 nations that have pledged about a little over $1 billion.

About half of that has come from the United States, $560 million.

Looking at the Hamre report, which says, and I agree with it,

that the next 12 months, in fact the next 3 months, may be absoVerDate 11-MAY-2000 17:31 Jan 20, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 91037 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
45

lutely crucial, both in terms of the Iraqi population beginning to

see that we can get a handle on all of this. And I think that probably extends to other nations around the globe in terms of their

willingness to step up and be cooperative and be helpful, putting

aside the question of whether or not we should have sought more

cooperation for the coalition before going into Iraq initially.

I wonder if you might respond very specifically to whether or not

we are going to seek a U.N. resolution for humanitarian cooperation. And if so, when will we do that? What is the nature of that

resolution, if we are going to seek it?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Senator Dodd, that is something that Secretary

Powell is exploring right now. And I should not comment on—in

fact, I do not know exactly the status of all of his discussions. We

would certainly welcome any resolution that would make it easier

for countries to contribute peacekeeping troops. Some had said that

it would make it easier for them.

I have to note that that is not necessarily the real reason. I think

it is important to recognize that, again, there is a connection between security and peacekeeping. It is much easier to bring in a

foreign unit in an area that is already stable. And as we improve

our ability to stabilize the country, I think we will get more contributors. The U.N. resolution would help.

Senator DODD. But is that not the chicken and egg, though? Is

that not a bit of chicken and egg? Certainly security is critically

important, but to get security, the notion somehow that there is

going to be more international cooperation, others coming in, other

than just taking on this role almost exclusively with the obvious

exception of the British, does that not in effect contribute to more

stabilization and security, if there are more people involved in

helping us——

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Not necessarily.

Senator DODD [continuing]. Bring about the kind of suggestions

that Secretary——

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. For the security problem you have to have

troops that are willing to take real risks and to fight. Our troops

are. Some of our allies, as the British certainly are. And I believe

Iraqis would. But if you have troops that really think of themselves

there as peacekeepers, then you can only put them in areas where

there is peace.

The other thing that is really important here——

Senator DODD. Well, let me——

Mr. WOLFOWITZ [continuing]. We welcome the U.N. role. The

U.N. has been positive. For example, Sergio de Millo, the Secretary

General’s Special Representative, has played an important role.

But as Senator Biden said, speed is of the essence here. And the

U.N. is not always speedy. That is why Ambassador Bremer is very

anxious to make sure that he preserves his authorities to move the

process forward as rapidly as possible, so that we can transfer authority, not to some other international agency, but to the Iraqi

people themselves.

Senator DODD. Right. So my sense, if I had to be sitting here and

trying to glean from your statements here, you are not overly enthusiastic about a U.N. resolution, at least a U.S.-authored one.

46

2The charts referred to can be found beginning on page 85.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. No. Wrong. I would be very enthusiastic about

the right kind of resolution and very concerned about the wrong

kind. And that is why Secretary Powell is engaged in what is a difficult discussion.

Senator DODD. Well, let me ask you here. As I look through the

Hamre report, and he starts talking about what needs to be done

over the next 12 months, the next 3 months, and he talks about

obviously security is mentioned as No. 1, but he quickly moves to

Iraqi ownership, a rebuilding process in the country, get people

back to work as quickly as possible. I listened to some reports

about what we are doing in terms of private enterprise in the region, in the country, the decentralization, intense and effective

communications.

You go on down a lot of these functions here, he says they are

absolutely critical to get moving on immediately. And I just question you whether or not, in fact, our emphasis here on the security

side of this, and not simultaneously moving to build the kind of cooperation necessary to bring around the political stability, is wise.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I think you either misunderstood me or certainly—let me just say I think Director Bolten stated it very clearly. We have a four-part strategy. I think Ambassador Bremer

briefed it to the full Senate in closed session, of which security is

just one piece. It is security. It is restoring basic services. It is getting the economy going. And it is moving forward on governance.

And what I tried to say by saying you cannot separate security

from rehabilitation or reconstruction, and you cannot separate reconstruction/rehabilitation from security, you have to have a strategy that tries to move forward on all those fronts at the same time.

If you try to just move one of those pieces, it is not going to go very

far, because the other ones are going to hold you back.

Senator DODD. I do not disagree with that conclusion. But, I

mean, look at the Coalition Provisional Authority organization and

the Coalition Provisional Authority, the charts here.2 As you are

looking down the number of people involved, first of all, on the Coalition Provisional Authority chart, which was handed out, there

are some—the total CPA numbers of a little in excess of 1,000,

1,147. There is Department of Defense, 332 people who work with

that authority. The military, 268. Contractors, 300. Other USG personnel—Department of State is 34 people out of the 1,147 people.

And then I look at the Coalition Provisional Authority organization that runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to

Ambassador Bremer and then other subsequent charts which talk

about this structure over here, nowhere do I see the Secretary of

State even mentioned here at all. I understand simultaneity, that

you have to work both, you cannot just have security. But you start

talking about, though, the organizational charts, and the number

of personnel involved in dealing with what we talk about is absolutely critical functions of this country, if you are going to establish

the kind of stability along with security that you need to have, I

do not see that reflected at all in the number of personnel involved

in the coalition or even the presence of the Secretary of State in

47

the organizational chart, a flowchart, of where authority flows from

the President on down.

Where is he in all of this? How do you do these things? You cannot ask the military to do all of this.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Senator Dodd, the CPA staff is a very interagency staff. In fact, many of Ambassador Bremer’s key people, including his deputy for the whole political governance operation, is

a senior State Department Ambassador, Ryan Crocker.

There are a large number of USAID people in those numbers. I

do not know under which category they come. I am a little puzzled.

I think they must come under contractors. I think USAID is the

largest single component in the CPA.

But let me make another point, too. We are not going to run Iraq

with 1,147 CPA people. The whole goal is to get Iraqis running

Iraq. And we have been quite successful in a number of places. The

foreign ministry is a dramatic example where I believe two State

Department advisors, I think, maybe only one, a Rumanian ambassador, and a lot of Iraqis have basically cleansed that ministry of

some 200 Iraqi intelligence officers, because the Foreign Ministry

was a hotbed of the Iraqi intelligence. They are proudly up and

working. It is just—the spirit is inspiring. That is how we get it

going, is with Iraqis.

So there are—I believe I met more State Department people on

my visit at CPA than I met people that I recognized from the Pentagon. So I—— Senator DODD. You understand my concern.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Ambassador Bremer is getting the people he

needs.

Senator DODD. Well, look at the flowchart for a second here.

Where is, in all of this, the Coalition Provisional Authority organization? President, Secretary of Defense, CPA administrator. Where

is—is there any role here for the State Department. So much of

what is talked about here requires political structure and organization, understanding language, culture, customs. It is unfair, in my

view, and wrong to ask the military to take on that kind of responsibility. That is one of the major concerns here. Where is he in

this?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Let me emphasize there are a great number of

State Department people in the CPA, including Ryan Crocker and

other people who are Arabic speakers. And when it comes to coordinating the police guidance, it comes from the President, who is advised by the National Security Council on which the Secretary of

State sits.

But what we have tried to have here is a relatively clean line of

organization that would allow us to get things done efficiently and

would allow us to do the crucial job of coordinating between the

military security tasks, which report through General Abizaid to

Secretary Rumsfeld, with the civilian governance and rehabilitation

tasks, which report through Ambassador Bremer.

Both of them go ultimately to the President, who pays close attention to these issues. And the Secretary of State has a great deal

of input, both at the NSC level and at working levels. This is a real

interagency effort. And the spirit in Baghdad is an interagency

spirit.

48

Senator DODD. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Dodd.

Senator Chafee.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, gentleman.

As you can see, a lot of the questions here relate to the high cost

of the war, not only in resources, but in human lives, of course.

And I would like to get at the key question of what we are really

doing there. And, of course, in the months leading up to the war,

it was a steady drumbeat of weapons of mass destruction, weapons

of mass destruction, weapons of mass destruction.

And Secretary Wolfowitz, in your almost hour-long testimony

here this morning, once, only once, did you mention weapons of

mass destruction. And that was an ad lib. I do not think it is in

any of your written testimony.

And so we are shifting justifications, I think, for what we are

doing there. At a hearing in May, I asked Secretary Wolfowitz the

question. A lot of your answer dealt with that it will help with the

peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians. And now there

has been allegations that this will help with our war on terrorism.

But we just have not seen the proof of any linkage between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda.

And now, today, it is the testimony over and over again about

what a despicable tyrant Saddam Hussein is, who brutalized his

people. But at the same time, in Liberia, Charles Taylor has been

indicted. And according to the prosecutor, he is responsible for the

killing, raping, and maiming of 500,000 people. And the arrest warrant issued by the U.N.-backed court in Sierra Leone charged Taylor with unlawful killing, sexual and physical violence, use of child

labor and child soldiers, looting, burning, and the murder of U.N.

peacekeepers.

And it also alleges that Taylor had a close alliance with the notorious murderous Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone. The

RUF was infamous for dismembering its victims, having a cut hand

unit to chop off limbs, and a burn house unit to torch houses of suspected opponents. And Taylor once had his 13-year-old daughter

publicly flogged for misbehaving in school.

At the same time, human rights watch is saying that Charles

Taylor is one of the single greatest causes of spreading wars in

West Africa. And so all the testimony this morning, and indeed the

submission of the op eds, is about what a tyrant Saddam Hussein

is, who brutalizes his people. But we are doing nothing in Liberia.

So it comes back to the questions of the unified message coming

from the administration as to what we are doing there and why we

did not wait for the United Nations Security Council to do their inspections. Now we are in this endeavor, huge costs, not only in resources, but in lives. So I will ask the question, Secretary

Wolfowitz, give you a chance: What are we doing there?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Senator Chafee, what we have done there is to

remove a regime that was a threat to the United States. We have

said all along, if you go back to Secretary Powell’s presentation at

the United Nations, all three of those concerns were stated very

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cern about Saddam’s links to terrorism, which are there, not as

clear as the case on weapons of mass destruction—— Senator CHAFEE. Mr. Secretary, can I just interrupt? I am a

cynic. So when you make these assertions, give some proof. A

threat to the United States? How?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I would suggest go back and read—if you want

to give me an hour, we can have a different kind of hearing. But

if you go back and read Secretary Powell’s testimony, it is very

clear. And it is the concern that the combination of weapons of

mass destruction and terrorists poses a kind of threat which maybe

10 years ago we thought we could live with. And I would have said

10 years ago my whole view about Iraq would have been very different. Ten years ago, I would have said Iraq, as terrible as it is,

is a problem for the Iraqi people.

I said all along I believed we should have given those people

more help in getting rid of that tyrant. But September 11 put it

in a different light. And taking on that tyrant forcefully meant in

fact, if anything, that we had to take that threat more seriously.

So all three of those concerns are stated in Secretary Powell’s

testimony. I talked about—— Senator CHAFEE. Can I interrupt one more time?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ [continuing]. The mistreatment of the people—

could I——-

Senator CHAFEE. Let me interrupt, because my time is limited,

unfortunately. You just said that this 10 years ago you would not

have agreed to a regime change. However in 1998, you, as a member of the New American Century, sent a letter to President

Clinton——

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Senator, I said something different. I said

ten——

Senator CHAFEE. Now wait a second. You were saying that we

are seeing it in the light of September 11. That is just not true.

You have been advocating for regime change all through the late

nineties. And in this letter, the—— Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Can I explain? There is a very clear

difference—— Senator CHAFEE [continuing]. Strategy should aim, above all— this is 1998. ‘‘That strategy should aim, above all, at the removal

of Saddam Hussein’s regime from power.’’ You signed that letter.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Senator, there is a very big difference. I was

very clear. I do not know if it is in that letter, but elsewhere, I

never thought before September 11 that we should use tens of

thousands of American troops to do the job for the Iraqis. I never

thought we should go to Baghdad, even at the end of the gulf war,

when I thought we should have done some other things we did not

do.

I thought up until September 11 that our job was to help the

Iraqi people. I think the mistake we made in 1991 was they rose

up against Saddam, and they got no help from us. September 11

changed the stakes, in my view, for the United States and made

it a different matter in terms of using American troops.

The end is the same. But you are not distinguishing the means.

And the means are absolutely crucial. Putting American troops,

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50

ened. Our security was threatened. The troops out there, I think,

understand that it is threatened. I think they understand that they

are part of fighting the war on terrorism as we go on today. And

that is important.

And by the way, I agree with you. Charles Taylor is a monster.

And we are trying with the United Nations and with West African

states to get a plan together that will get him out of Liberia. We

also need to do it in a way that does not bring on yet another kind

of slaughter. Because the people going after Charles Taylor may

not be an awful lot better than he is. And that is part of our problem there.

Senator CHAFEE. Well, I will just finish up by saying I really resent when witnesses talk that this is in the light of September 11

when the evidence is to the contrary. The steady—— Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Senator, you are misrepresenting what I said in

that letter.

Senator CHAFEE. Yes. You have over and over again, through the

late nineties, urged regime change in Iraq.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Can I try again, then, since I believe you are

not representing my views properly? It is true I thought from the

end of the gulf war up until September 11, 2001 that it was important for the United States to help Iraqis get rid of that regime. And

that is a policy of regime change.

But I did not believe that it was either necessary or justified to

use large-scale American military forces to do that job. At the end

of the gulf war, all it would have taken was a minimum application

of U.S. air power and some of the artillery that was sitting on the

south bank of the Euphrates River.

September 11 changed the stakes for us, in my view, dramatically. And it changed the whole way of looking at an uncertain, but

still disturbing, threat of the combination of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism.

Senator CHAFEE. Well, I wish we had more time.

[The letter Senator Chafee referenced follows:]

THE PROJECT FOR NEW AMERICAN CENTURY,

Washington, DC, January 26, 1998.

The Honorable WILLIAM J. CLINTON

President of the United States

Washington, DC

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

We are writing you because we are convinced that current American policy toward

Iraq is not succeeding, and that we may soon face a threat in the Middle East more

serious than any we have known since the end of the Cold War. In your upcoming

State of the Union Address, you have an opportunity to chart a clear and determined course for meeting this threat. We urge you to seize that opportunity, and

to enunciate a new strategy that would secure the interests of the U.S. and our

friends and allies around the world. That strategy should aim, above all, at the removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime from power. We stand ready to offer our full support in this difficult but necessary endeavor.

The policy of ‘‘containment’’ of Saddam Hussein has been steadily eroding over the

past several months. As recent events have demonstrated, we can no longer depend

on our partners in the Gulf War coalition to continue to uphold the sanctions or to

punish Saddam when he blocks or evades UN inspections. Our ability to ensure that

Saddam Hussein is not producing weapons of mass destruction, therefore, has substantially diminished. Even if full inspections were eventually to resume, which now

seems highly unlikely, experience has shown that it is difficult if not impossible to

monitor Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons production. The lengthy period durVerDate 11-MAY-2000 17:31 Jan 20, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 91037 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
51

ing which the inspectors will have been unable to enter many Iraqi facilities has

made it even less likely that they will be able to uncover all of Saddam’s secrets.

As a result, in the not-too-distant future we will be unable to determine with any

reasonable level of confidence whether Iraq does or does not possess such weapons.

Such uncertainty will, by itself, have a seriously destabilizing effect on the entire

Middle East. It hardly needs to be added that if Saddam does acquire the capability

to deliver weapons of mass destruction, as he is almost certain to do if we continue

along the present course, the safety of American troops in the region, of our friends

and allies like Israel and the moderate Arab states, and a significant portion of the

world’s supply of oil will all be put at hazard. As you have rightly declared, Mr.

President, the security of the world in the first part of the 21st century will be determined largely by how we handle this threat.

Given the magnitude of the threat, the current policy, which depends for its success upon the steadfastness of our coalition partners and upon the cooperation of

Saddam Hussein, is dangerously inadequate. The only acceptable strategy is one

that eliminates the possibility that Iraq will be able to use or threaten to use weapons of mass destruction. In the near term, this means a willingness to undertake

military action as diplomacy is clearly failing. In the long term, it means removing

Saddam Hussein and his regime from power. That now needs to become the aim

of American foreign policy.

We urge you to articulate this aim, and to turn your Administration’s attention

to implementing a strategy for removing Saddam’s regime from power. This will require a full complement of diplomatic, political and military efforts. Although we are

fully aware of the dangers and difficulties in implementing this policy, we believe

the dangers of failing to do so are far greater. We believe the U.S. has the authority

under existing UN resolutions to take the necessary steps, including military steps,

to protect our vital interests in the Gulf. In any case, American policy cannot continue to be crippled by a misguided insistence on unanimity in the UN Security

Council.

We urge you to act decisively. If you act now to end the threat of weapons of mass

destruction against the U.S. or its allies, you will be acting in the most fundamental

national security interests of the country. If we accept a course of weakness and

drift, we put our interests and our future at risk.

Sincerely,

Elliott Abrams Richard L. Armitage

William J. Bennett Jeffrey Bergner

John Bolton Paula Dobriansky

Francis Fukuyama Robert Kagan

Zalmay Khalilzad William Kristol

Richard Perle Peter W. Rodman

Donald Rumsfeld William Schneider, Jr.

Vin Weber Paul Wolfowitz

R. James Woolsey Robert B. Zoellick

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Chafee.

Senator Feingold.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The hearing has focused on the question of resources. And that

is very important. Because the American people are being asked to

shoulder a tremendous burden in Iraq. And I do think we need

more clarity on costs. And we need to be responsible about making

this a part of the regular budget, not keeping it off the books as

if it were some kind of surprise. In fact, that was my central emphasis on the budget committee and in the budget resolution, trying to kick the ball for the first time and say, could we at least be

honest with the American people, that this is going to cost something? And I think that is terribly important and the purpose for

the hearing.

But, Mr. Chairman, as I listen to Senator Chafee, I am just astonished at our agreement. I started using this phrase shifting justifications a year ago, in response to my inability to see what was

the real purpose of the invasion of Iraq. Senator Chafee is right,

52

what he said about Liberia. And there is even more to it. There is

a heck of a lot of better evidence of possible al-Qaeda connections

with regard to their financing of their operations in Liberia than

there ever has been with regard to Iraq.

And I cannot vouch for the absolute validity of that. But if you

are focused on the war against terrorism, you would certainly be

focused on Liberia at least as much as Iraq.

And so I want to be sure that I understand your assertions here

today. You said in your statement, ‘‘In fact, the battle to secure the

peace in Iraq is now the central battle in the global war on terror.’’

Not stabilizing Afghanistan, where we know that al-Qaeda still operates.

Am I to understand that the way to defeat global terrorists who

use international networks is to have the United States’ administration act on what you have described in your own words, Secretary Wolfowitz, as ‘‘murky intelligence, when this action alienates important allies in fighting terror, in places that do not appear

to have meaningful links to al-Qaeda? That seems to be what you

are saying.

I mean, it sounds as if we basically walked through the looking

glass here. While our brave troops were marching into Baghdad, on

that very day, some of those responsible for the attack on the USS

Cole, which you cited as a cost of our Iraq policy, were escaping

from a prison in Yemen. People with known al-Qaeda connections,

people who have been subsequently, after the escape, indicted. I

would ask you, Secretary Wolfowitz, are you sure we have our eye

on the ball?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I am absolutely sure we have our eye on the

ball. And the ball is a global one. As I said in quoting General

Abizaid at some length, you cannot view this through a soda straw.

You cannot focus exclusively on Iraq. You cannot focus exclusively

on Afghanistan. And you cannot focus exclusively on those two

things.

Although from a military point of view, those are our two principal tasks. As the President has said over and over again, fighting

this war is going to require all the instruments of national power.

We are applying them across the board. We have made some very

big gains in the war on terrorism globally over the last few months,

including rounding up some of the most serious terrorists, one of

whom was the mastermind of September 11, Khalee Sheik Mohammed.

Does it mean it is a uniform gain? No. You are right that a couple people got away in that prison escape in Yemen. We are trying

to find out why. General Abizaid has just been in the Horn of Africa, where we are looking very closely at what is going on there and

what can be done to stop it. And it is not just a military effort.

But also, let us be clear, it is going to be a long struggle. We

have made gains, but we are still vulnerable. We are vulnerable as

a county to some very severe attacks. But there is no question in

my mind that we will be much more secure when we win this battle in Iraq. And we will win it. And then we will have a valuable

ally in the Arab world instead of a country that is a source of instability and sanctuary and resources and other things for terrorists.

53

And I think the terrorists understand that that is why so many

of them have come to Iraq to fight. It is interesting, when we met

with marines who had that eastern flank advance up to Baghdad.

I asked General Mattis what the opposition was like. He said the

main people who fought us were the Fedayeen Saddam and the foreign terrorists. And I said, ‘‘How do you know they were foreigners?’’ He said, ‘‘Well, we found a lot of passports on the corpses

that were from foreign countries. And some of them even said in

the entry permit the purpose of their visit to Iraq was to perform

jihad and to kill Americans.’’ It is much better, as General Abizaid has said, to be killing those

people in Iraq than to have them come here and kill Americans.

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, Mr. Chairman, I would certainly suggest, and in fact I think your comments, Mr. Secretary, suggest

that these people came to Iraq in large because of our actions, visa`-vis Iraq. And at the same time, we are not doing so well, in my

view, with regard to the war against terrorism in places such as

East Africa and Afghanistan and even in situations such as West

Africa. We can only do so much.

I mean, this hearing is about resources, financial resources and

others. We also can only accomplish a few things well at one time.

And in my view, the over emphasis on Iraq has caused a serious

erosion in our ability to go after the actual operatives who are trying to kill us and our children.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I think that is simply wrong, Senator.

Senator FEINGOLD. Mr. Bolten, do you—did you want to respond

to that?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Well, I disagree with that strongly. I think we

have maintained pressure across the board, and not just military

pressure, pressure through the intelligence agencies, pressure

through law enforcement agencies. And I would also emphasize, as

I think I said to the chairman, the war on terrorism is a two-front

war. One front is killing and capturing terrorists. The other front

requires something more positive, something that builds hope in

the Muslim world, and especially in the Arab world, that can be

a counter to the evil appeal that bin Laden and his followers hold

out.

And success in Iraq is going to be important in that respect. And

that is why the terrorists, along with the Baathists are targeting

our success. They want to bring back a terrible regime. And if I

spend a lot of time talking about how terrible that regime was, it

is because I did not come here, Senator, to talk about the justifications of the war. I came up here to talk about what is needed for

reconstruction and rehabilitation.

Frankly, Iraqis do not care—— Senator FEINGOLD. I am going to interrupt you, Mr. Secretary,

and say I did not come here planning to discuss this whatsoever.

This was a hearing about resources. It was only when your testimony at length stated that Iraq is the central location on the war

against terror, it became impossible for me to ignore such an extreme interpretation of what is happening in the world.

I think the American people are on to this idea and are aware

that this administration has grossly exaggerated the connection between the war on terrorism and the Iraq situation. And I would

54

strongly suggest we focus on the merits of trying to deal with the

Iraq situation that we have at hand instead of constantly trying to

pretend that September 11 and Iraq are the same issue.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Senator Feingold follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD

I thank Chairman Lugar and Senator Biden for holding this important hearing,

and for all of their work over the past year on structuring a series of hearings relating to U.S. policy in Iraq. These hearings have proven to be invaluable tools, if not

always for getting concrete answers, at least for clarifying important questions.

Today’s hearing focuses on the tremendous resource demands that confront us as

we survey the situation in Iraq, where insecurity continues to plague both American

troops and Iraqi civilians, where the national economy remains largely an abstract

concept rather than a concrete reality, and where mammoth reconstruction needs

stand in the way of lasting stability and development. I am glad that we are taking

a hard look at these issues, because right now they represent an immense burden

that weighs on the American people. We cannot afford to sweep these costs under

the rug, or to conjure up rosy but unrealistic scenarios to calm the anxiety many

feel when they look at the real commitment of troops and dollars that the U.S. has

made to Iraq.

In my view it is a bit late to be getting honest information about these costs now.

I wish that the administration had been more forthcoming about these issues before,

rather than after, deciding to go to war without broad international support. But

today, we must deal with the facts on the ground.

I did not think that the go-it-alone mentality served this country well in the leadup to conflict in Iraq, and I do not think that it serves us well now as we confront

these enormous costs. The rest of the world has an interest in Iraq’s stability. But

they will not come forward without some sense that they are participating in an effort that is multilateral in its decision-making, not just its billing practices. I hope

that today we will explore how the administration might take some steps that will

increase the comfort level of other donors and shift some of this burden off of American shoulders.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Feingold.

Senator Allen.

Senator ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen. And thank you to all the troops and others in the Department

of Defense who are working to protect our country.

From my perspective, these are historic and transformational

times. The implications are as profound as some of the decisions

that were being made insofar as the cold war is concerned.

History in Iraq, history in the Middle East, United States history, all are being written with the decisions that are being made

right now and in the next few weeks, months, and years. The future of Iraq is being determined step by step by every single decision. The larger implications for the Middle East are at stake here

with the opportunities there may be in Iraq.

But most importantly, I think the future of the United States is

at stake. No. 1, financially and budgetarially. Second, our security.

Our success here will have an impact on our security. And third,

in the larger sense, the reputation and the credibility of the United

States in the ongoing war on terrorism is at stake here. It is the

credibility and reputation with our friends, as well as our credibility and reputation with our foes or potential foes.

I think we need to persevere. We can carry on endlessly about

one aspect of minutiae versus the other. But here we are in this

situation. And I think we need to stick to Ambassador Bremer’s

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ical aspects of the reconstruction of Iraq. I think it is a good, logical

strategic plan on principles, as well as the practicalities of it.

We will have to call audibles. You cannot always determine, as

Ambassador Bremer said, what is going to arise. But you have to

be ready to adapt and react to those situations and stick to your

principles. I believe that we do need to win this peace, and we have

to do it honorably.

Secretary Wolfowitz, you talked about how central Iraq was in

the war on terrorism. I think we will all grant that Afghanistan is

central. It is not a one-front war. One thing that we hear reports

on from time to time, and it seems to be in the media, is that there

are foreign terrorists coming into Iraq. And I would hope that you

or maybe the general could share with this committee information

about these reports of foreign terrorists coming in to Iraq.

There is an assertion that the presence of United States troops

in Iraq act as a magnet for anti-American terrorists from throughout the region and throughout the world. In other words, they

would love to be able to hit us here, but they cannot get here as

well as they can get to Baghdad or outside of Baghdad.

So could you share with us, Mr. Secretary or general, your information and intelligence insofar as are there terrorists coming into

Iraq as part of these, say, mercenaries or other snipers to hit U.S.

troops?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Yes. And if I could take a minute of your time

to go back to the earlier exchange and emphasize what I said, the

battle to secure the peace in Iraq is now the central battle. We

have to approach a long struggle like the war on terrorism with

some strategic sense. A year ago or 18 months ago, I would have

said the central battle, at least as far as the Defense Department

is concerned, is Afghanistan. And I do not mean that Afghanistan

has gone away. And I do not mean that Iraq is the central battle

in the whole war. But right now it is where it is being fought. And

that is why these terrorists are coming in there.

It is true it is an opportunity to kill Americans, but they can kill

Americans in a lot of other places. They understand that killing

Americans, if it leads to our defeat and the restoration of that evil

regime, is a huge victory for them. It is not as—that is why for

them it is so central.

We took out a camp in—in western Iraq a few weeks ago. I do

not think we got anyone that was still alive, but much evidence,

including passports, that these people were from outside, I think,

from Syria, Sudan, Egypt.

At dinner in Baghdad, I was sitting next to an Iraqi woman in

her early thirties, a doctor. She said she had been moved out of her

house before the war to make way for Sudanese, Egyptians, and

Moroccans, who she concluded must have been shooting at Americans, because by the time she got back to her house, there had

been an American tank shell that took it down.

I mentioned General Mattis saying that many of the corpses they

found had this kind of evidence of foreign participation. And one

of the things that is most disturbing——

Senator ALLEN. Well, presently, do you see them coming in?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. It is not easy to get in. We are trying to shut

down the borders. One group, though, that is particularly danVerDate 11-MAY-2000 17:31 Jan 20, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 91037 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
56

gerous is this group called Unsar al Islam, which is connected to

that gentleman, Zurkowi, who was in Baghdad, whom Secretary

Powell spoke about in his Security Council presentation. And these

folks seem to be shifting between Iran and Iraq. We do not think

they are officially supported by the Iranians, but they sometimes

go across the border. And then they come back in. And these folks

are particularly deadly.

I do not know, General Keane, if you want to add to that. But

the——

General KEANE. The three threats that we are really facing certainly deals, one, with the former regime loyalists. And you know

they are the Baathists, the Fedayeens, the Iraqi Intelligence Service, the Special Security Organization, and also the Special Republican Guard. They make up the vast majority of the threat, although I cannot tell you equivocally what those numbers are. They

were 100,000-plus, you know, before the war started. And they are

considerably less in terms of what we are dealing with.

We are also dealing with foreign terrorists, as the Deputy Secretary mentioned. We do not know what those numbers are, but we

have evidence that they are there. And they come from a plethora

of countries, from Syria, from Saudi Arabia, from Egypt, from

Sudan, et cetera.

And the other threat that we are facing is the Unsar al Islam,

as well. And we did take out a terrorist training camp in western

Iraq a few weeks, where we killed 75 of them. And they fought us

tenaciously right down to the last man. And they were, for the

most part, all foreign terrorists.

So we know they are there, but we do not know the numbers

that they are there in, Senator.

Senator ALLEN. Thank you, gentleman.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Allen.

Senator Boxer.

Senator BOXER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to pick up just briefly on what Senator Chafee and Senator Feingold were getting at on this war on terrorism and your

comment that, as I quote you in your speech, ‘‘The central battle

on terrorism is happening in Iraq.’’

I want to put into the record, Mr. Chairman, a page from this

document put out by the Bush administration, ‘‘The Network of

Terrorism.’’ It was put out a month after 9/11. And it has in the

mid-part a page that says, ‘‘Countries Where al Qaeda Have Operated.’’ Iraq is not listed. This is after 9/11. I want to put that in

the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be placed in the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

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Senator BOXER. I would like to talk about your testimony. And

then I have a question on another matter. You said very eloquently

that there is a desperate need in Iraq to get the economy going, a

desperate need for jobs, and basic services, such as electricity. Let

me assure you that those items are on the priority list in my home

state. Jobs, getting the economy moving, and yes, affordable electricity after what the robber barons did to us.

So I want to tell you that when my people hear what we are

spending in Iraq right now, $45 billion a year, they are starting to

ask me questions. And I cannot tell them what the outlook is, because you will not tell us. And not only will you not tell us that

today, sir, you did not tell anybody before this war started, Mr.

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Wolfowitz. And I ask to put in the record your exchanges with

Chairman Spratt, when you testified on the House side, on February 27 and your dancing around that issue in a way that was extraordinary. I do not have time to read it back to you. I would like

to put that in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be placed in the record.

[The House testimony of Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz follows:]

FEBRUARY 27 HEARING BEFORE THE HOUSE BUDGET COMMITTEE

SPRATT. Mr. Secretary, yesterday The Washington Post said, ‘‘Administration officials said the Pentagon’s estimate of $60 billion to $95 billion for a war and its immediate aftermath was certain to be eclipsed when the long-term costs of occupation, reconstruction, foreign aid and humanitarian relief were figured in.

‘‘ ‘President Bush was briefed on the war cost Tuesday, and is scheduled to receive

detailed budget scenarios in the next week or two,’ officials said.’’

Is that an accurate account?

WOLFOWITZ. It may be an accurate account of what some anonymous administration official said, but I don’t he knows what——

SPRATT. Well, that was my next question. Are we looking at the——

WOLFOWITZ. I don’t think he knows what he’s talking—he or she knows what

they’re talking about. I mean, I think the idea that it’s going to be eclipsed by these

monstrous future costs ignores the nature of the country we’re dealing with.

It’s got already, I believe, on the order of $15 billion to $20 billion a year in oil

exports, which can finally—might finally be turned to a good use instead of building

Saddam’s palaces.

It has one of the most valuable undeveloped sources of natural resources in the

world. And let me emphasize, if we liberate Iraq those resources will belong to the

Iraqi people, that they will be able to develop them and borrow against them.

It is a country that has somewhere between, I believe, over $10 billion—let me

not put a number on it—in an escrow account run by the United Nations. It’s a

country that has $10 billion to $20 billion in frozen assets from the Gulf War, and

I don’t know how many billions that are closeted away by Saddam and his henchmen.

But there’s a lot of money there, and to assume that we’re going to pay for it is

just wrong.

SPRATT. The $60 billion to $90 billion cost estimate is consistent with what staff

on this committee have developed in the past year. It’s just a bit above what the

Congressional Budget Office projected would be the cost of such a war based on the

costs in 1990.

Is it in your ball park also?

WOLFOWITZ. Congressman Spratt, I would go back to what I said at greater length

in my opening statement. The ball park is so wide that it’s almost any number you

want to pick out of the air.

It depends on the assumptions, it depends on how long the war lasts, it depends

on whether weapons of mass destruction are used, it depends very importantly on

whether the Iraqi army turns on Saddam Hussein—which I think is a distinct possibility—or whether some important pieces of it decide to fight. It is so dependent on

assumptions that picking a number or even a range of numbers is precarious.

Furthermore, in answer to Congressman Gutknecht’s question, before the Gulf

War in 1991 we had the whole world asking us to do the job of liberating Kuwait.

Because the political situation at the time was such, my office initially proposed,

‘‘Let’s get some help from our allies.’’ We organized what became known as Operation Tin Cup.

We got, as I remember, $12 billion from the Japanese, a comparable number from

the Germans, huge amounts from the Saudis, from the Kuwaitis, from the United

Arab Emirates.

You know the Germans would be difficult people to approach today, but, frankly,

in the context of the reconstruction of one of the most important countries of the

Arab world I think we will approach the Germans and many other countries.

SPRATT. Well, what happened to the Germans before was they got caught in a

very, very embarrassing situation. They had exported some goods to Iraq that included machinery necessary for the production of unconventional weapons. They

were very embarrassed by it, and part of the expiation for what they had done was

about $8 billion.

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That raised the ante for everybody else, the Japanese, for example, and as a con- sequence we were able to raise $60 billion of the $64 billion out-of-pocket costs of

that war.

It looks like now we’re in the reverse situation, whereas before the coalition members were paying us money, this time we’re having to pay the coalition money—substantial amounts.

WOLFOWITZ. No, Congressman Spratt, 12 years ago the weaker members of the

coalition, such as Turkey, were getting assistance from outside. The difference, as

you point out, the German position is different. But believe me when Iraq is liberated I think we’re going to find a lot more of what you’re referring to.

In fact, Germany is one of the largest exporters to Iraq in the world today. Maybe

that has something to do with their current position, but it will certainly lead to

a lot of opportunity for expiation later.

And believe me, from what I heard from the Iraqi-Americans in Dearborn, the

Iraqi people are going to demand it.

SPRATT. Well, let me ask you this: Was the president briefed on Tuesday on the

war costs in detail?

WOLFOWITZ. I wasn’t in the meeting, Congressman.

SPRATT. Do you know if he was? I mean, the question I’m getting at—— WOLFOWITZ. I know there was a meeting and I know they talked about—— SPRATT. You must have formulated some kind of cost. And the reason I’m pressing

this issue is that we’re getting ready to move a budget here, and the dollar amounts we’re talking about for the likely costs of this war are pretty significant.

That budget will probably contain reconciliation authority for two tax cuts that

total—revenue reduction totals of $1.3 trillion. It might be pertinent to everybody,

both sides, to know what the likely cost is going to be before we pass a budget resolution, and certainly before we undertake tax cuts of that magnitude.

SHAYS. Thank you, I’m going to recognize Mr. Thornberry, then we’re going to go

to Mr. Moran, and then we’re going to Mr. Hastings.

SPRATT. Normally I get—I’m a ranking member, I get to—— SHAYS. You know what? You are the ranking member. And I would—— SPRATT. I got one last question, then.

SHAYS. You are the ranking member. If you want to take advantage of that, go

right ahead.

SPRATT. Yes, I do, I do, I do.

SHAYS. Do you want to deprive one of these congressmen here? OK, fair enough,

fair enough. I don’t mean to—— SPRATT. These are good troops.

SHAYS. The gentleman may continue.

SPRATT. Is anybody contributing money to us this time? Or do we expect to get

any mitigation from—in the way of money from our coalition allies?

WOLFOWITZ. I expect we will get a lot of mitigation, but it’ll be easier after the

fact than before the fact, unlike the last time.

And let me underscore, too, what I said in that earlier intervention. Obviously,

the Congress will need to know some numbers even though they’re going to be estimates, because they’re going to be dependent on assumptions and whatever we send

up here will be based on assumptions that probably will turn out, within a couple

of weeks, not to be correct.

But all of that is if we go to war. There is still some small chance that we won’t

go to war.

WOLFOWITZ. And we’re in an extremely delicate point in everything that we’re

doing.

And let me underscore it again: It’s not just at the United Nations, we’re working

hard to try to get the U.N. to stand up to its responsibilities, it is also in putting

together a coalition and getting a number of countries that are quite frightened of

their own shadows, to put it mildly. And they’re stepping up, though quietly, in a

very bold way. And in some ways, most important of all, we’re sending messages

and signals to people inside Iraq.

This is part of our public diplomacy. And if you’ll forgive us for a few weeks, I

think it’s necessary to preserve some what the diplomats call ambiguity about exactly where the numbers are. But obviously, the Congress is going to have to know

sooner rather than later.

Senator BOXER. And I will say that I do agree with Senator

Biden when he says that there is a certain lack of candor and honesty here. We know exactly what these things are going to cost,

based on what we know so far. And when you say, well, it had cost

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us $30 billion over 12 years, in my calculations that is $2.5 billion

a year, not $45 billion a year, to contain Saddam.

Now when you talk to my people in my state, they want to know

what are we spending, how does that compare with what we spend

in this country. Forty-five billion dollars in Iraq. Well, we spend

$23 billion a year on higher education. We spend $6.7 billion on

HeadStart. We spend $31 billion on all of our highways. And veterans’ medical care is $23 billion. And the NIH that is going to find the cure for all the diseases that plague our families, we spend $27

billion. And that is just to give you a clue of why $45 billion a year

is more than anyone of those items. And my people at home say

burden-sharing is what we want and what we expect.

Now I have read books about how the 21st century, we all wanted to be the American century. The question is: What form does

that take? In my mind, to be the American century means we are

the leader, and other people follow. And other people share the burden. And if, Mr. Wolfowitz, you are convinced that this has become

all about terrorism, then the whole world ought to be with us.

And you talk about the Italians. They have given us 400 troops.

You talk about the Poles, 2,400. So how does that come close to

what we are seeing? And by the way, the polls are not even—we

are spending some of the money to support those troops.

So I am very concerned about the direction that we are going.

And in the end, it seems to me we need to use our influence in the

world. You know, the President had the chance. He landed on the

carrier. He declared the war over. Now you call the war a low intensity conflict. What is a low intensity conflict? I want you to

know, when your kid dies, it is not a low intensity conflict.

So we have a lot of problems with this, at least in my state. People in California are very edgy and very anxious.

My question is about a bizarre and morbid new program that we

are all reading about today in the newspapers, an administration

activity that I view as profiting on death. It is setting up some type

of a market for bets on where the next terrorist attack is going to

take place, the next assassination. And people are going to profit

on death.

And that is coming from your Department of Defense. And I wonder what you feel about that program.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. My understanding—I learned about it first from

the newspaper this morning, also. And my understanding is that

it is going to be terminated. In fact, I think there will be an announcement today to terminate it. And we will find out exactly how

this happened.

Recognizing, by the way, that the agency that does it is brilliantly imaginative in places where we want them to be imaginative. It sounds like maybe they got too imaginative in this area.

Senator BOXER. Well, if I could comment

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Let—you said, Senator Boxer——

Senator BOXER. No, no.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ [continuing]. If I might comment—— Senator BOXER. No. Excuse me, sir. Excuse me, sir. You spoke

for over an hour. I have like probably no time left, but just conclude on this. I do not think we can laugh off that DARPA program. There is something very sick about it. And if it is going to

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end, I think you ought to end the careers of whoever it was thought

that up. Because terrorists, knowing they were planning an attack,

could have bet on the attack and collected a lot of money. It is a

sick idea.

Thank you.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Senator, I did not laugh at it. And I do not like

what I have read about it.

You said that the President declared the war was over. He did

not do that. He declared the end of major combat operations. And

he also said—this was on the Lincoln, and I am quoting—‘‘We have

difficult work to do in Iraq. We are bringing order to parts of that

country that remain dangerous.’’ And I agree with you, low intensity conflict is not a very good term, because if you are in it, it is

not low. ‘‘We are pursuing and finding leaders of the old regime,

who will be held to account for their crimes. The transition from

dictatorship to democracy,’’ the President said to the sailors on the

Lincoln, ‘‘will take time, but it is worth every effort. Our coalition

will stay until our work is done. And then we will leave. And we

will leave behind a free Iraq. I think the stakes here are enormous.

I think our country will be safer when we win.’’

Senator BOXER. I think the world ought to get behind us on it.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. We are working on that.

Senator BOXER. Yes. Well, you have to do better.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Boxer.

Senator Brownback.

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank

the panel as well for being here with us today.

Secretary Wolfowitz, for your putting forward that twin policy

objective of fighting terrorism and providing hope, I chaired the

Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia during much of

the late nineties as the ranking member, as the chair ranking

member. And we held a number of hearings about what can we do

in dealing with this region that had so much problems fomenting

them and the prior administration really not focusing much on

what we could do, passed the Iraq Liberation Act, which was to

work with the outside opposition groups, voted on, supported

broadly by the Congress, both Houses, signed by President Clinton.

At that point in time, you testified at some of those hearings.

And I think everybody was pretty consistent on what we needed to

do was to work with the outside groups and that this regime was

a horrible regime that had used chemical and biological weapons

against its own people and against the Iranians, that had terrorist

operating on its soil.

And so it seems to me that we went from a very growing difficult

situation in the late nineties to one where, after post-9/11, we had

to deal with it, and then a huge bipartisan vote in the House and

the Senate to support the use of troops in this situation in Iraq.

I thought then, I think now that our most important and difficult

foreign policy issue over the next 5 to 10 years is going to be our

relationship within the Islamic region of the world and that the key

force is going to have to be fighting terrorism, fighting those who

would use very militant means and at the same time providing

hope for a future, a different future, a future of democracy, a future

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of hope, a future of involvement of all the people. And it seems like

you are on that course.

I do not question that mistakes have been made and that difficulties lie ahead of us. But it seems like we finally got a diagnosis

that you can move forward with, as difficult as it might be.

I have three questions that I would like to ask and then see if

I could get answers from whoever it might be to put these forward,

one just a very pragmatic one. Have the rewards been paid for the

tips that got the two sons? It seems to me those were a positive

aspect on getting some of the tips and maybe more for getting Saddam himself.

A big question I get constantly at home and here is, people are

deeply concerned about the loss of troops, particularly this last

week where we had several days of three troops being lost. Do we

expect some time soon for this spike to subside, or is there anything that we can even project in that area? That may not be one

that is even answerable at this time. But I would like to know your

best thinking, you or General Keane either one.

And finally, on the Arab Marsh area, which you talked about,

which we held hearings on as well, that Saddam drained, is this

going to be—is this in the process of being restored? And what

could we do to really allow the water to come back in the area? As

you note, that is the key to reestablishing that huge region. And

I do not know how difficult it would be, but it was one that the

opposition groups in the late nineties were very focused on at that

time, reestablishing and allowing the water to flow back into those

marshes.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Thank you for those questions and thank you

for reminding me. I should have remember when Senator Chafee

was asking about our letter from 5 years ago, that of course both

the House and the Senate by very wide margins passed the Iraq

Liberation Act. And that was the policy that I was talking about

then, which was helping the Iraqi people liberate themselves, not

doing the job for them. And that was in fact as declared by two

Houses of Congress and, I believe, by the Clinton administration,

the policy of the United States.

The three questions you asked. We are working very hard to provide that reward to the individual who turned in the brothers and

as quickly as possible the safety of his extended family as part of

the issue. It is still not safe in Iraq to be identified in that way.

We feel it is very important, not only to be good to our word, but

to have everyone in Iraq know that we are good to our word, so

that we continue to get the cooperation both on No. 1 and on all

the others.

Second, you know, everybody wants us to predict the future. And

when we refuse to predict the future, then they say somehow we

are misleading people. The future is not predictable, especially not

in a war. You can read that in Von Clauswich. You can read it anywhere. You can read it in all military history.

What we try to do—so I cannot tell you when attacks on our

troops will stop. I do believe that we are on the right course, that

we are making real progress, that we are rounding up the killers,

we are rounding up the weapons, and that it has got to make a difference. Because the second reason, which I believe strongly, is

63

that these people do not enjoy deep popular support. They are not

expanding their recruitment. They are having trouble in that respect, I think.

It is a limited supply, unlike the classic guerrilla war, where the

enemy blends in with the population because the population is

really sympathetic to the enemy or to the guerrillas. This is inside

out. The population really wants to be rid of these people. And that

is why I talked at so much length about getting rid of that blanket

of fear that keeps people from turning in the people they hate.

And finally, with respect to the Marsh Arabs, it is a question I

have come back with a certain sense of urgency about. I am a little

bit afraid that we may say, well, it took 12 years and massive engineering works to create this mess. And we have to take time and

care in restoring it. And I believe in time and care. But I would

certainly like us to look at those things that might be done relatively quickly to at least to begin to create some of that back and

some hope for those people. Because I do not think they will survive too much longer, if we do a 10- or 15-year reclamation project.

Senator BROWNBACK. General Keane.

General KEANE. Yes. I would like to add to that. I welcome the

opportunity, Senator.

Certainly in the early phases of the war with Iraq, we were fighting the army, and to a lesser degree what limited air force they

had. We used all the intelligent resources that were available to

this great country and our coalition powers. And we can bring effective combat power to mass very quickly. And we all saw that.

And now we—the character of that war has changed, certainly.

And we are fighting an opponent who is living in among the people.

And it disarms our technology rather dramatically, to be able to see

and understand who they are, where they are, and what they are

doing.

The only source to get us the kind of intelligence that we need

are the very people themselves that they are living among, and to

be able to build the kind of trust and confidence with them to turn

in their neighbors, to turn in people who are members of the Baath

party, despite the enormous stranglehold of fear that they have on

the people of Iraq.

And I think—I know myself, I certainly underestimated what

that stranglehold of fear truly was and how pervasive the Baath

party was. And it is very similar to the Nazi party in World War

II Germany. And the Gestapo and the Fedayeen are analogous to

each other, I believe.

So that takes time. And we have to have patience. And I firmly

believe it is an act of desperation on their part, because they see

the end in sight. They see an Iraqi free government coming. They

see physical and political reconstruction coming. And they know

they only have months to be able to achieve this. And their objective, frankly, is the moral will of the American people.

It is replete in the Arab press that we can push the Americans

out, because they will not stay the course. They did not stay in

Lebanon. And they did not stay in Somalia. They do not have the

moral and political resolve to stay here and see it through. And

that is their strategic objective, in my view, is the will of our own

people.

64

So we have to educate the American people in terms of what the

nature of this part of the conflict is like and why it will require patience. And no, we cannot predict when this level of violence will

end. But I can tell you that our field commanders are doing everything reasonable to counter that threat, building that trust with

the people. And that is why, when the Deputy Secretary pointed

out that it is really a hand in glove, the physical and political reconstruction and the security of the country go hand in hand, and

that partnership has to take place, because one does follow and

complement the other.

I think we are doing the right things. And we are learning every

day. I mean, we make mistakes, Senator, no doubt about it. And

we will continue to make. But we are a learning organization. And

we are a very adaptable and flexible organization in dealing with

it. And our soldiers are tremendous in this. You know, they certainly have the skill to defeat an army. And they have displayed

that.

But they also bring the values of the American people to this

conflict. They understand firmness. They understand determination. But they also understand compassion. And those values are

on display every day as they switch from dealing with an enemy

and also switch to taking care of a family. And it is remarkable to

see that played out every single day.

I know you are proud of them. And we all are very proud of them

as well. But it will require some patience on all of our parts to deal

with this phase of the war.

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Brownback.

Senator Nelson.

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I had to leave to attend a meeting and specifically came back because I wanted to ask about this group called Policy Analysis Market, which I understand Senator Boxer has just asked about. But

I have a couple of followup questions. And I compliment you, Mr.

Secretary, for indicating to Senator Boxer that you are going to

shut down this group.

The concept overview on the Web is as follows, and I quote, ‘‘Analysts often use prices from various markets as indicators of potential events. The use of petroleum future contract prices by analysts

of the Middle East is a classic example. The Policy Analysis Market, PAM, refines this approach by trading future contracts that

deal with underlying fundamentals of relevance to the Middle East.

Initially, PAM will focus on economic, civil, and military futures of

Egypt, Jordan, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Turkey,

and the impact of the U.S. involvement with each.’’ Now that is their description. And then further in the Web site

is an example. ‘‘Issue A, the overthrow of the Jordanian monarchy.’’ And people basically bet on this. And presumably, according to another one of their Web site pages, they even have a target here on

the Web site. And it is showing that the market method is a greater predictor than other methods of polls.

And I certainly commend you, Mr. Secretary, for shutting it

down. But I want to know who is behind this. Who would have

ever brought this up to the point of getting this thing established?

65

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Senator, I would like to know, too. And I intend

to find out.

Senator NELSON. Is it Admiral Poindexter?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Senator, I first learned about it looking at the

newspaper on the way over to this hearing. So I do not know the

answer. But I share your shock at this kind of program. I will find

out about it. But it is being terminated.

Senator NELSON. Can you tell us how much has already been

spent setting up this Policy Analysis Market [PAM]?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I will get you an answer for the record.

[The following response was subsequently received.]

The Policy Analysis Market (PAM) project had been funded via SBIR contracts

with a company called Net Exchange. The contract for PAM was cancelled shortly

after this hearing. A total of $619,750 was spent on PAM.

Senator NELSON. OK.

Mr. Chairman, I assume that you would share the outrage that

some of us have in seeing that foreign policy and defense policy of

this country would be allowed to be displayed in such a way as basically wagering on death and trading on traitors.

Let me ask you, general, every one of us at this table are getting

a lot of questions and comments from husbands and wives and

mommas and daddies and employers of the National Guard and reservists. In our case in Florida, fully half of our National Guard

has been activated and are deployed. And we are very proud of

them. And I had gone to a number of those ceremonies where they

were mustering and getting ready to be shipped out.

And then when I was in Iraq a couple of weeks ago, I had the

privilege of visiting with a number of Florida soldiers, active duty,

as well as reservists, as well as Florida Guard. And sadly, I arrived

just as the blood of a Florida National Guardsman was flowing into

those part sands, having been the target of a premeditated assassination as he was guarding the group that was going into the university.

So my question is a policy question. And perhaps the Secretary

would want to address this as well. You have a certain requirement

for troops. And that is going to be there for the foreseeable future.

We have relied to a large extent on reservists and National Guard.

But when the requirement is extended over a long period of time,

suddenly the role of that guardsman or that reservist goes beyond

what they initially thought that they were signing up for.

And so what are we going to do? Is the policy going to be that

we are going to increase the active duty roster, so that we keep the

Guard and Reserve more for what that was intended, or are you

going to continue to rely on the Guard and activate them and activate them for long periods of time?

General KEANE. Senator, thank you for your support of our military and in particular for the Guard that you mentioned in your

state. There is no doubt about it. I mean our force is stretched. And

that is self-evident. And we rely heavily on the Guard.

To give you a sense of it, since 9/11, 45 days after, the Guard has

been doing the mission in the Sinai, which we have had since 1982.

They are also doing completely the mission in Bosnia. This month

they will take over the mission in Kosovo. And they have also been

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primarily the force that has been conducting the mission in Guantanamo Bay, where our detainees are.

And also, on the next rotation of the train of Afghan national

army in Afghanistan, they will absorb that mission. There are

seven Guard battalions in Iraq and Kuwait, as we speak. And part

of the rotation force we envision two enhanced separate brigades,

one from North Carolina and one from Arkansas, will round out

the rotation force.

Now what we will do is we will mobilize Guard and Reserves as

a matter of policy for a year and try to hold to that. We have made

some exceptions to that, about 7,000 to 8,000 primarily military police and people involved with chemical-biological were extended

over a year. But we are attempting to hold to that.

They will not stay in Iraq for a year, the two enhanced brigades.

They will stay there about 6 or 7 months, because we want to mobilize them, train them, and demobilize them all within a year.

As it pertains to the—what are the implications to the active

force as we look at the global war on terrorism? We are looking at

that very hard right now. I mean, some facts are these. The Congress of the United States has enabled us in the United States

Army to exceed our end strength by 2 percent. And that is about

10,000. And we have been doing that for most of the global war on

terrorism.

The steady state, the Reserve components, so that we can do our

daily business on a global war on terrorism short of Iraq, we need

another 30,000 just to protect our critical infrastructure in the

United States and overseas. So that is 40,000 that we need just to

do normal business. That would tell you that the active component

is being constrained by that alone, much less our recent commitment to Iraq.

So we are taking a hard look at this. We have identified a number of spaces that we believe we can convert from military to civilian. And we are studying that right now. It is in excess of 20,000.

Whether it will turn out to be that or not, I cannot commit to that.

And at some point, we will probably be making some recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. To assist us in making that conversion, they would have to—as a matter of policy, the Congress of

the United States and the administration would have to permit us

obviously to hire civilians that heretofore were doing military jobs.

So it is possible in the future we may make an end strength recommendation to the Secretary. We have not determined that yet

until we finish our analysis. But I agree with you that our force

is stretched. That is obvious. And we are very dependent on the Reserve components, the National Guard and the United States Army

Reserves to do our business.

And let me say that their performance has been nothing short of

magnificent. I mean, when you go look at units in Iraq and Afghanistan, you cannot distinguish, in terms of motivation and esprit and

commitment to the mission and the performance of the mission

from active to reserve.

Senator NELSON. Well, I would only point out that you are probably going to have a retention problem if the Guard and the reservists get the impression that they are going to be carrying the water

67

and keep getting extended. And therefore, you may be able to give

some slack by converting to civilians some of the work.

One of the other things you have to crank into your calculations

is the fact, what is the role of the Guard? Right now, we are in hurricane season. And half our National Guard is not there. And if we

were ever to get another mega-hurricane, like Andrew, that hits in

a high-density population area, you are looking at $50 billion hurricane, not a $16 billion hurricane. That, by the way, is just insurance losses, not the total cost of the hurricane.

And so what is the role of the Guard, your needs there, as well

as the needs here? And I urge you with the utmost dispatch to

make those decisions.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.

Senator Voinovich.

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Wolfowitz, I want to tell you that I was very impressed with

your presentation today. It is very encouraging to me. I hope it is

encouraging to the people that read your testimony and have

watched you on television.

So often in life we accentuate the negative and eliminate the

positive. We always talk about the glass being half empty instead

of half full. And I think there are a lot of things that you talked

about today that we should feel very, very good about.

That being said, I think I agree with the rest of the members of

this committee, that I think you and Mr. Bolten should be more

forthright in terms of what the costs are going to be, so that we

have some idea, and the American people know, how long, how

much. I know there are some uncertainties, but I think you can figure out a conservative number and share it with us. And I think

it will eliminate some of the problems that you are having with

some of the members of this committee and other Members of Congress.

I was pleased that you were saying that you are doing better

than you do in Kosovo. And as you know, that is the area that I

have concentrated on. I want to tell you, I was very disappointed,

Mr. Secretary, that when we had a hearing on Kosovo, we did not

have anybody from the Defense Department there to testify about

how long you think we are going to be there and what our commitment will be. And I would like to know that. I would like to get

that information.

I would also like to say that I share Senator Nelson’s concern

about the National Guard and the deployment of Guard and Reserve troops. I know that you have clarified for our active duty

troops when they are coming home. I wonder if we have clarified

for the Guard and the reservists when they are going to come

home.

Also, we need to consider what impact this whole thing is going

to have on our force structure. Should we reevaluate the way we

are looking at our responsibilities and the role of the National

Guard and our reservists in that?

The other issue that I would like to raise deals with the same

thing. Secretary Rumsfeld has represented that we are going to

have a lot more troops from all these countries. I know that we

68

have asked India to participate. They indicate that they do not

want to participate until we have a U.N. resolution. I would like

to know, are other countries that we would like to have, our NATO

friends or other allies, taking the same position? And if they are,

what are we doing about going to the United Nations and getting

a resolution that will eliminate that condition precedent of getting

more people involved with us in Iraq?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. As I said earlier, Secretary Powell is talking to

various members of the Security Council about what might be possible in the way of a resolution. And we would certainly like to see

one provided it does not put limitations on what Ambassador

Bremer and our people can do in Iraq that are crucial to speeding

up transition to normalcy and stability and allow us to hand over

power to the Iraqis, which is really the key to things.

We are working. It is harder to try to get some stability into the

numbers for the Guard and Reserve. I need to say especially to

Senator Alexander we are deeply grateful personally to the magnificent support we got on my trip from members of the Tennessee

Air National Guard, who flew us around Iraq. And I was very unhappy to learn how many months they have been on active duty.

And I promised them to try to find out at least why and possibly

to give them some certainty.

What we hear over and over and over again from both active

duty and Reserve troops is the hardest thing is not knowing when

they are coming home or when they are coming off active duty. And

to give them some certainty, even if it is a relatively long period

of time, they are prepared to work to. And we are trying to put

some of that into the system.

Senator VOINOVICH. We are getting a lot of letters every day

from——

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I can imagine you are. We do, too.

Senator VOINOVICH [continuing]. Saying when, when, and at

least tell us what the score is.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. And we are looking at whether we have the

right mix of active and Reserve forces. Some Reserve units get

called up too much because we made decisions years ago to put certain functions entirely in the Reserves or heavily in the Reserves.

And then we end up using those people like civil affairs people on

a very intense scale.

And we are hoping to get authority from the Congress that will

allow us to take some of the jobs that are currently done by uniform people that could very well be done by civilians. The estimates

are up to maybe 320,000 that could relieve some of the overall

stress on the force.

Senator VOINOVICH. You know, one of the things, also, if the

Guard is so involved, General Keane, I have written and asked

about equipment and training for our National Guard in Ohio. We

send somebody down to get training for helicopter duty. We spend

about $200,000 to train them. And then they come back to Ohio,

we do not have the helicopters that they can fly to reinforce the

training that they have received.

And so it seems to me that if the Guard is going to be part of

the force that we need to rely on, that we ought to give them the

equipment to make sure that they are trained up and ready to go

69

and not have to go through this fumbling around that I have been

going through for the last several years trying to get some attention paid to our units in Ohio.

I will just finish up on this note. I want you to know that I think

it is very, very important to the American people that you be successful in Iraq, and that we should be willing to make the financial

commitment and provide the resources to get the job done. It is important to those of us that are here today. But it is more important

to our children and grandchildren that we be successful there.

And I just want you to know this Senator is behind you and will

do whatever we can to make it possible. I know we have a lot of

things here in this country, priorities that need to be addressed.

But we have to have a safe world. And I do not want my children

and grandchildren living under the cloud that they are under right

now.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Thank you, Senator. That is the way I feel. And

I think it is the way our troops feel.

General KEANE. We agree, Senator. Thank you for your support.

In reference to the rotation, what we established was a year-long

rotation as a matter of policy. So all those who are currently serving in Iraq obviously are being informed of that. And that applies

to the National Guard and Reserve units that are there as well.

And while we have worked out the details of all the major organizations that will be replaced, in other words what divisions and

what combat brigades, right now, we will complete it this week, the

much smaller organizations, some of which do come from the National Guard and the Reserves, that will replace the combat support and combat service support troops. Those are the theater support troops for the combat formations. All the details of that are

being worked out this week.

And those organizations who will be going will be notified, as

well as those organizations in theater in Iraq, who will be replacing

them and when. And then we will commit to that date.

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Voinovich.

The Chair would just note that we are probably close to a rollcall

vote. But we are going to have 5 minutes from two Senators who

have been so patient. And I hope the witnesses can remain with

us. Senator Biden may have a closing comment, if we have an opportunity.

Senator CORZINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate

your holding this hearing.

I want to premise what I am going to say by echoing what my

colleagues have said. We are all proud of the American troops. It

is extraordinary, their courage and commitment. I also want to

echo what Senator Voinovich said. I think we are all committed to

winning the peace and making sure that our heritage for our children and grandchildren are secure. And I doubt if there is anyone

on this committee who would stand in the way of providing adequate resources to help us finish the task that we have taken on.

I probably will have the glass half empty view with regard to

some of the information that we are being provided and questions

that sometimes strike at the credibility of that. And I will say that

when selective information, framed information, some people would

70

call spin, but I would say framing information, only in a way that

it justifies a case, is very, very difficult, makes it very difficult for

those of us who are interfacing with the American people all the

time to try to win that case and build that patience and build that

trust. The same trust that we are trying to build with the Iraqi

people we need to develop with the American people with regard

to the case.

And I will tell you that for one Senator who read the Hamre report, which starts with the potential for chaos is becoming more

real every day, and then goes on with a very detailed outlay of

what is happening, what I hear today does not match with what

I am reading with respect to the details of the Hamre report.

Now there is nothing more important in my mind than the fact

that we continue to lose American men and women on the ground

in Iraq all the time. It is a cost that we may very well need to justify for the American people. But it is very real, 11 in the last 5

days.

It is not clear to me, based on reading the Hamre report and in

any kind of discussion we have had today, whether that is

Baathists, whether it is outsiders, or it is criminal organizations

that are organizing themselves for a long haul in committing

crimes against the Iraqi people and for their own purposes.

The idea that we cannot come up with a baseline—everyone

knows in budgets that you have baselines and extreme outer elements with regard to costs—to not have some idea of where we are

going with regard to the cost of this to the American people so that

we can make the judgments about how much we are going to have

to make sacrifices here at home is just, I think, a travesty within

the context of how we have to make budget decisions here.

The idea that we talk about weapons of mass destruction programs, and we do not relate it in a composite way, the way we argued so fully at the start of this hearing, in a context of Korea,

where we know there are programs of weapons of mass destruction,

to me seems to be an abrogation of following through on the principles of what we talked about.

So I am very troubled about how the knowledge base that we

have to form the decisions and try to win over the American people

and develop that patience and trust is being provided. I have a

simple question. Do you buy the conclusions of the Hamre report?

Have you—or do you have a different view? Because what I heard

today was different. And I can go line by line through this report.

The potential use of force by multiple internal and external players, serious security breaches challenge the U.S. confidence and undermine U.S. credibility, rising economic insecurities.

You know, this was a hearing about the status and prospects for

reconstruction and the resources necessary. And in all fairness, I

am not hearing that. And I think that makes it very difficult for

us, those of us who are interfacing with the American public, to go

to them and make the case in a credible way.

Six men and woman in New Jersey have died. I do not feel comfortable I have the information to be able to argue that we want

that patience that I know we need to have for purposes of going

forward.

71

Is the Hamre report an accurate reflection of what is on the

ground?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Senator, we commissioned the Hamre report because we wanted an independent look. And I think it is substantially correct. I tried to emphasize in my testimony that we think

there is an urgent need to get on with the provision of basic services, particularly electricity, and dealing with the unemployment

problem. And I in no way mean to minimize them. I think they are

large. I think the security problem is large. I hope I did not minimize it.

And that Americans are getting killed is very bad. That the numbers have been going up is very bad. And to some degree there is

a certain sophistication in the attacks that is in the wrong direction. I want to be clear about that.

At the same time, our commanders also feel that they are making substantial inroads in getting at that Baathist infrastructure

that is responsible in their view for funding most of the attacks on

us.

The one thing I would say in answer to your question, it is not

random violence that is our problem. And in fact, in all the incidents that I can think over the last month or so, there is only one

which was serious, where some British troops were killed in a

small town, that clearly had a independent local cause. Most of it

seems to be this pattern of mid-level Baathists with money hiring

probably either Fedayeen Saddam or maybe young men, who are

not particularly committed, but just want to make some money, to

do a hit either on a power line or on an American.

And as I said earlier, it is a most unusual tactic. I do not know

of it in previous guerrillas war. It is a serious problem, but we

think we have a strategy to deal with it. If that strategy looks like

it is not working at some point, we will come back and talk about

it. But the people dealing in the most difficult parts of the country,

General Odierno in the 4th Infantry Division, General Dempsey in

Baghdad itself, and even General Blount, who has in many ways,

unfortunately, the 3rd Infantry Division, which had the toughest

fight going north also ended up with the toughest area of the country out near Faluja. Just the day we met with him, he reported

that one of the key imams who had been opposing the coalition had

come over.

It is a glass half empty, glass half full. And I agree very strongly

with the emphasis in the Hamre report that we need to move

quickly. Because if you get to a point where the Iraqi people no

longer believe that you are going to win, then it becomes very difficult to win.

But I think, you know, the most dramatic evidence of the last 10

days was getting those two miserable creatures who did so much

to that country. And it is not just because it is satisfying to be rid

of them. It is because it means so much to the Iraqi people. And

even in the Sunni, predominantly Sunni, city of Baghdad, people

were shooting off for two-and-a-half hours afterwards in celebration.

Senator CORZINE. Mr. Secretary, though, just my read of the

Hamre report says that there are external sources of violence.

There are criminal organizations that are independent of the

72

Baathist activities. And many of these are the potential for, or

party to, the violence we are seeing now.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Senator—— Senator CORZINE. If we only frame it in certain ways, and that

is why I think it is so—if we only look at it in the context of the

two brothers, then I am not sure that we are looking at it, at least

the way I have read and addressed, or thought I was addressing,

this report.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. OK. Well, let me say, there are multiple problems. But criminal elements are not targeting American troops.

The people who are shooting deliberately at us have a strategic

agenda. And that agenda is to kill Americans so that we will leave,

and they can bring back this evil regime. There is no question

about that.

There are other problems. There is, and I think someone referred

to it specifically, there is the danger, if we do not deal with the unemployment problem, that organized crime of the normal kind will

become a big problem of Iraqis killing Iraqis more than Iraqis killing Americans. And that is one important reason why training an

Iraqi police force is so important.

And yes, I cited Mosul as an example of success. I did not mean

to suggest that every city in the country is like Mosul. But my

sense is that where we have success, we are able to reinforce it.

And where we do not have success, we are able to move forward.

We have superior force on our side, superior resources on our side,

and the support of the Iraqi people on our side. So where there are

problems, we can solve them, and where there is success, we can

reinforce it. And I would much rather be in our position than the

people who are trying to defeat us.

Senator CORZINE. And make sure we have the ability to speak

to the American people on this issue.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Corzine.

Senator Alexander.

Senator ALEXANDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you for coming and for staying so long. My views are

these. I think we were right to go to Iraq. The U.S. Senate thought

so, too, by a big vote. I think the war a lot better planned than the

peace, and we have talked about that here. And we are getting beyond that.

I am encouraged by what I have heard from Ambassador Bremer

and what I have heard today about the town councils, about the

civil defense being developed, about the 65,000 to 75,000 police

being trained, about the battalion of Iraqi soldiers. I hope that we

will move quickly in some appropriate way to involve other nations,

if we can. I hope we will move as rapidly as we can to put the Iraqi

forces out front.

And as one Senator, I am prepared now that we are there to insist that we see it all the way through to the end and that we have

learned the lesson of Vietnam and Somalia well enough to provide

that support.

I have two questions. And I will ask them both at once and see

if there is any reaction. And they are a little different than what

we have talked about so far. One has to do with our forces, lessons

that we have learned. By the way, I think the Hamre report is a

73

good example of being straightforward. After all, the Secretary of

Defense, if I am not mistaken, invited them to go to report to him

on what they found and then to make public to us and to the world

what they found. That is an example of an America that is very

open and straightforward with people.

But here are my questions. One, on forces in the field, we invited

special forces years ago in our services to deal with some different

sorts of situations. And they have come in awfully handy. And we

have now integrated them into our regular army and regular

forces.

I know we have civilian affairs people in the Army. But are we

not learning that we may need some special forces for winning the

peace? I mean, what the 101st Airborne Division, as good as it is,

is trained to do is not a lot of what it has been doing in the last

few weeks. And one of the disciplines of the Army, I know, is that

we train for what we do. We train and we train and we train for

what we do. And we are doing some things that our forces are not

trained for. And should we not consider some training for those situations?

And then my second question, I will ask them both at once, has

to do with what happens at home. I am glad to hear that you are

going to be saying when troops are coming home. That is the most

important thing, is to some certainty, if you can give them that.

And Senator Chambliss and I have been conducting hearings on

military parents raising children, and particularly in light of the

long deployments.

I hope that the Defense Department will put as a high priority

a focus on the families at home, such things that we do not hear

as much about, childcare, which is actually a success story in the

military, but there are some things that need to be done there. The

children who transfer when they are senior in high school, the

length of deployment, jobs for spouses, housing issues.

I think the more we focus on military parents raising children,

the readier our forces in the field will be. And I just wanted to

mention that while we are here.

General KEANE. Senator, we completely agree on the use of special forces. We are committed right now with a significant number

of our special forces to Iraq, as they are in Afghanistan. And what

they are able to do for us is, much of the work that needs to be

done needs to be done in terms of human intelligence, contact with

the people. We call it low level source networking. And that is literally dealing with people on the street. And our special forces

have increased training capacity to do that. And you are absolutely

right.

So we are using them to the best of our ability. They are

stretched in terms of the commitments that they are making to Afghanistan, to the Philippines, and now to Iraq. But they are doing

very good work. And we are sending over the 82nd Airborne Division to replace the 3rd Infantry Division. And we intend to package

some special forces with them and have them work directly for the

commanding general of the 82nd Airborne to get at the very issue

that you are talking about.

You put your finger on a capability that is excellent. And we

need to exploit it as much as we possibly can.

74

Infantry forces are what they are. I mean, they are designed to

fight other infantry forces or other combat formations. While they

can be used on the streets of the cities, and they are, and they can

be used in civil military operations, which they are, they are not

as well trained for that as some of our other forces, as our special

forces and civil affairs.

The problem we have is those forces numbers are finite. And

they are smaller in number than the requirements that we have.

And that is the challenge that we have.

The other issue dealing with families, again, you put your finger

on another critical issue. The volunteer force, which I personally

believe is the most significant military transformation since World

War II, the enormous success of the United States military, I

think, is largely attributable to the fact that the people are in it

because they want to be. And they come to us smart, competent,

with dedication to serve their country.

And that has literally changed our force. The challenge with that

is, they come with a family. And administering to the needs of a

family from education to spiritual development to childcare to recreational activities is a challenge that we have been facing for a

number of years. And we have enjoyed the support of the Congress

in doing that.

We put an enormous amount of attention on this issue, not just

when our forces are deployed, which we are currently doing, but

every single day. And we work very hard at it. We are not perfect

at it. There are shortages out there that certainly we would like

to see filled. But it clearly is a very high priority for the United

States military; that is, taking care of our families.

And just let me say that the support that our soldiers receive

from their families is just enormous. They are like soldiers themselves in terms of their own sacrifice and dedication to their loved

one and also to the organizations that their loved one is in. And

we just have enormous pride at how they respond to the challenges

that we are asking for the United States military.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Alexander.

Senator ALEXANDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, if I could just briefly close my

comments by saying that there is an article in the Philadelphia Inquirer on July 11. And it said, ‘‘A small circle of civilians in the

Defense Department have dominated the planning of post-war

Iraq, failed to prepare for the setbacks that have erupted over the

past 2 months.’’ Based on the testimony here today, I think we are making the

same mistake again. I think you are failing to prepare for what is

the reality on the ground. I no more agree, just for the record, with

your assessment that Iraq is the hotbed of terror now than I did

when your assertions about al-Qaeda connections at the front end.

And I voted to go into Iraq. And I would vote to do it again.

And it seems to me the failure of Iraq would be a lot worse than

anything that happened before Iraq. The President, it seems to me,

has to tell the American people, general, you were saying earlier,

prepare them for what is expected of them. And it is going to be

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tens of billions of dollars and tens of thousands of troops for an extended period of time.

That window is going to close in Iraq. But it is also going to

close, as my friend Senator Corzine was implying, in terms of

American public opinion, if we do not start to level with them. Our

credibility as a nation is at stake right now. And I think you are

going to lose the American people, if you do not come forward now

and tell them what you know, that it is going to cost tens of billions of dollars, of American taxpayers’ dollars, and tens of thousands of American troops for an extended period of time.

They think Johnny and Jane are going to come marching home.

And I would also point out that you need cops now, you need a different mix of troops now. And I did not hear anything today to indicate that you are going to get that to happen. I think you got it

wrong in the first place, in terms of pre-war planning. The assumptions, as you said, Mr. Secretary, turned out to be an understatement of the problem. I think you are understanding the problem

again.

We can do this. We can win this. We can win the peace. But you

had better start to tell the American people now, or they are not

going to be around. They are not going to be around. They are

going to be asking us to bring the men and women home, which

would be a tragic mistake.

So level with them, billions of dollars, tens of thousands of

troops. I will vote for it. I will support it. I will stay with you. The

President has to tell them now, now, now, now.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let me thank all the Senators. I thank the

witnesses especially for their testimony, staying with the hearing.

We are at the end of the rollcall vote. And this is why Senators

have disappeared. But we appreciate very, very much your being

here today. And we look forward to staying closely in touch with

you.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. And Mr. Chairman, if I might for the record

submit some refinement on those numbers in CPA that Senator

Dodd referred to. I believe it is very important, the State Department role in this is crucial. I think those numbers do not quite portray what the balance is, but I would like to——

The CHAIRMAN. Please supplement the record. And it will be included.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Thank you.

[The following response was subsequently received.]

As of October 13, 2003 the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq was represented by a total of over 1,000 people. The CPA represents a diverse compilation

of Executive Branch agencies including, but not limited to, personnel from the Department of Defense, Department of State, USAID and others working together

under the direction of Ambassador Bremer toward the common objective of a sovereign democratic Iraq. Additionally, the agencies have dedicated significant resources to the CPA in Washington and Iraq that do not work directly for Ambassador Bremer.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you all very much. The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:38 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]

76

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

Washington, DC, July 14, 2003

The Honorable BILL C.W. YOUNG*

Chairman

Committee on Appropriations

United States House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:

On behalf of the President, I am submitting the second in a series of reports required under Section 1506 of the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations

Act, 2003.

As noted in the report, we have moved from an emphasis on immediate relief operations and are now engaged in a wide variety of reconstruction activities including

restoration of the electric grid, repair of the water and sanitation infrastructure, and

assuring the delivery of critical health care. We have also resumed the food distribution system which is now reaching all Iraqis in need.

There are a number of key tasks ahead including restoring law, order, public safety and self-government, implementing judicial reforms and regenerating economic

activity and growth. We will look forward to working with the Congress as we proceed with this crucial work.

Sincerely,

JOSHUA B. BOLTEN, Director

*Identical letters sent to: The Honorable David R. Obey, The Honorable Ted Stevens, and The Honorable Robert C. Byrd.

Report to Congress

Pursuant to Section 1506 of the Emergency Wartime Supplemental

Appropriations Act, 2003

(Public Law 108–11)

90 Day Update Report on United States Strategy for Relief and

Reconstruction in Iraq

Section 1506(b) of the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2003,

(117 STAT. 580) provides:

(b) SUBSEQUENT REPORTS.—Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment

of this Act, and every 90 days thereafter until September 30, 2004, the President

shall submit to the Committees on Appropriations a report that contains:

(1) A list of significant United States Government-funded activities related to

reconstruction in Iraq that, during the 90-day period ending 15 days prior to

the date the report is submitted to the Committees on Appropriations—

(A) were initiated; or

(B) were completed.

(2) A list of the significant activities related to reconstruction in Iraq that the

President anticipates initiating during the 90-day period beginning on the date

the report is submitted to the Committees on Appropriations, including:

(A) Cost estimates for carrying out the proposed activities.

(B) The source of the funds that will be used to pay such costs.

(3) Updated strategies, if changes are proposed regarding matters included in

the reports required under subsection (a).

(4) An updated list of the financial pledges and contributions made by foreign

governments or international organizations to fund activities related to humanitarian, governance, and reconstruction assistance in Iraq.

The report that follows has four sections that correspond to the four specified categories listed in section 1506(b).

On June 2, 2003, the Administration submitted the initial report required by Section 1506 of the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2003. As

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noted in this initial report on U.S. strategy for relief and reconstruction in Iraq, U.S.

policy goals for the recovery of Iraq remain to:

• Establish a secure environment for the Iraqi people and the conduct of relief

and recovery activities;

• Achieve measurable improvement in the lives of the Iraqi people;

• Maximize contributions from other countries and organizations;

• Prepare the Iraqis for self-government.

Security continues to be the top Coalition priority. Security is the foundation for

success of reconstruction efforts in Iraq and a fundamental task in our administration of Iraq. We have made significant progress since the collapse of the Iraqi regime, but substantial challenges remain.

The security situation in Iraq is complex. In some areas, the security environment

is generally permissive—there is reasonable freedom of movement, recovery activities proceed without significant hindrance, and Coalition forces are engaged in stability operations. In other areas, the environment is less permissive and Coalition

forces are engaged in combat operations against remnants of the Baathist regime.

The Coalition’s approach to establishing security in Iraq is multifaceted, but a key

component is engaging Iraqis to assist in providing for the security of their own

country. The Coalition has moved to establish Iraqi police forces and shortly will

begin recruiting, vetting, and training the first members of a new Iraqi Army. Security forces for ministries and for other purposes—for example, port security—are being screened, hired, and trained. These significant activities are described further

in this report.

1. A list of significant United States Government-funded activities related

to reconstruction in Iraq that, during the 90-day period ending 15 days

prior to the date the report is submitted to the Committees on

Appropriations—

(A) were initiated; or

(B) were completed.

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES. The initial phase of relief and recovery activities to improve the lives of Iraqis has focused on providing basic services, delivering utilities,

and reestablishing law and order. It is important to note that, thus far, there have

been no humanitarian disasters of the type that had been predicted. There is no

food crisis, no refugee crisis, and no crisis in public health.

Since the creation of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), the Administrator

of the CPA has had the primary responsibility for identifying requirements for relief

and reconstruction in Iraq, and for overseeing, directing, and coordinating all U.S.

Government programs and activities in Iraq, except those under the command of the

Commander, U.S. Central Command. Significant activities during this first phase,

by sector, include:

Food. The near-term focus has been on food distribution. Over one million metric

tons of food (much of it U.S. purchased or donated) has been delivered to Iraq since

the war. Another 2.2 million metric tons will reach Iraq by the end of October. In

June, the CPA, working with the UN World Food Program, successfully restarted

the public food distribution system. This system will now reach all Iraqis—even those excluded under the Saddam regime. These activities will continue until Iraq

becomes more self-sufficient and transitions to a more market-based system. As an

important step, the CPA, working with the Iraqi Trade Ministry, the World Food

Program, and the Food and Agricultural Organization, has bought Iraqi harvests at

a fair price, and so far has purchased about 150,000 metric tons of wheat and

20,000 metric tons of barley.

Health. The immediate focus in this area has been on rapid return to at least prewar healthcare levels throughout Iraq. Pre-war health conditions were poor and the

medical infrastructure was degraded by looting in the immediate aftermath of conflict. The public health situation is improving throughout the country and there are

no significant health crises. The CPA activities have focused on working with the

Ministry of Health to ensure that basic healthcare services are available to all

Iraqis. Today, nearly all of Iraq’s 240 hospitals, 10 specialty centers, and more than

1,200 clinics are open and receiving patients. Services at these facilities are at approximately 90 percent of their pre-war levels in the Kurdistan regions, 80 percent

of pre-war levels in the South, and 70-75 percent of pre-war services in Baghdad.

Preventive services also have been initiated, beginning with National Immunization

Day on June 22. This program will be continued every month, providing protection

against disease to all children of Iraq.

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Iraq’s pharmaceutical and medical supply distribution system, known as Kimadia,

is functional again under the auspices of the Ministry of Health, and over 1,500 tons

of supplies have flowed to hospitals, clinics, and warehouses throughout the country.

An Iraqi International Medical Assistance Committee (IMAC) is established and coordinating incoming offers of assistance and supplies from non-governmental organizations throughout the world. This Committee ensures that donations are carefully

vetted and targeted to existing needs. However, extensive looting and a decade of

governmental neglect have caused major infrastructurc challenges that must be addressed. Facilities and basic medical equipment are in need of maintenance and repair. In Baghdad, the CPA has purchased new generators for hospitals and has

begun renovation of the Ministry of Health headquarters. The Senior Advisor for the

Ministry of Health is coordinating an overall assessment of health care needs

throughout the country and is focusing all available resources on the pressing infrastructure needs.

Power. The CPA efforts have aimed at rapidly achieving pre-war power levels

throughout Iraq. Pre-war planning limited damage to the electrical system during

the conflict, but restoring electricity has been challenging because the pre-war

power infrastructure was a dilapidated, fragile, patch-work system. This system has

become even more unstable due to the continuing, targeted sabotage of power lines

and stations and looting of spare parts and computers. Much of Iraq is now at or

above pre-war power availability, with Baghdad the notable exception. Power availability in Baghdad has averaged about 1,000 megawatts per day over the last several weeks, up from 300 megawatts at the end of major combat, but well below the

approximately 2,500 megawatts per day pre-war. Outages in specific areas also have

ripple effects in other sectors such as water and oil. The CPA is working through

a USAID contract and with the Iraq Electricity Commission to improve power generation in the short term and repair the power infrastructure for the longer term.

Water and Sanitation. The focus of activities has been on increasing water supplies to pre-war levels and restoring sewage treatment plants to operation. Much

of Iraq is at or near pre-war water availability, and there are no critical water

shortages. Baghdad water supply levels have plateaued at about 1,600 million liters

per day, less than the pre-war level of 2,000 million liters, but adequate to avoid

critical shortages. The CPA is working through a USAID contract to increase water

supply to East Baghdad by 45 percent (increasing water supply to Baghdad by 15

percent overall) and to rehabilitate water treatment facilities supplying Basra. The

CPA and several international organizations have also funded sewer and sewage

treatment repairs.

Oil and Fuels. Activities have aimed to restore Iraqi oil production as rapidly as

possible. Limited Iraqi oil exports resumed on June 22, 2003, when oil stored at

Ceyhan, Turkey, was loaded on tankers. This freed up storage space removed one

limiting factor on production. Crude oil production was about 750,000 barrels per

day in late June and is expected to exceed 1 million barrels per day by late summer—but this production level will depend on many variables, including security of

the oil infrastructure. While oil production is coming on line, CPA activities have

also focused on ensuring adequate supplies of fuels for the Iraqi people such as gasoline and liquid petroleum gas (LPG). Daily gasoline supply fluctuates between 50-

100 percent of pre-war consumption, and is expected to equal or exceed pre-war consumption by late July. The LPG supplies are expected to reach about 95 percent

of pre-war levels via increased imports by late July.

Public Safety/Law and Order. The CPA activity has focused on vetting, hiring,

training and deploying Iraqi police forces and other security forces to assist in establishing a secure and permissive environment. The CPA has recalled to duty over

30,000 police officers, is refurbishing police academies in Baghdad and Basra, is

equipping 26 police stations in Baghdad, and in May began joint Iraqi-Coalition patrols. After extensive looting, CPA has had to provide virtually all equipment, uniforms and office supplies to stand up the police capability. In Baghdad, 33 police

stations and 3 police divisions are now operating 24 hours a day resulting in a dramatic increase in daily patrols. The CPA and Coalition forces created an armed port

security force for Um Qasr port, and are beginning to create security forces for various ministries. Rebuilding Iraqi police forces has been a challenge because the existing force was poorly trained, ineffective, and widely distrusted. But the creation

and training of responsible public safety forces are indispensable to long-term

progress in Iraq. To address the police situation, former New York City Police Commissioner Bernard Kerik was appointed to serve as CPA’s Senior Policy Advisor

overseeing the police, fire, borders, customs, and immigration organizations. Mr.

Kerik’s team recently completed a study that recommended the creation of a 50-

80,000 member Iraqi police force. This force would be trained and supervised by

international police advisors.

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Justice Reform. The CPA has undertaken a number of initiatives directed towards

instituting the rule of law in Iraq and building public confidence in the legal system.

On June 9, 2003, the CPA suspended certain criminal laws that violated fundamental human rights, such as the offense of insulting a public official.

On June 18, 2003, the CPA issued procedures for applying criminal law in Iraq.

These procedures used the Iraqi Law on Criminal Proceedings of 1971, as amended

by CPA, as its basis. These criminal procedures recognized that the effective administration of justice must consider:

(a) the rehabilitation of the Iraqi investigative and trial capability;

(b) the continuing involvement of Coalition forces in providing critical support

to many functional aspects of the administration of justice;

(c) the need to transition from this dependency on military support;

(d) the need to modify aspects of Iraqi law that violate fundamental standards

of human rights;

(e) the ongoing process of security internee management as provided for by

the Fourth Geneva Convention; and

(f) the possibility of the exercise of jurisdiction by Coalition authorities regarding the commission of war crimes against Coalition forces.

The new procedures established certain fundamental legal rights, including that

confessions extracted by torture will be inadmissible as inculpatory evidence under

any circumstances; previously, such confessions were admissible if corroborated by

other evidence, even if that other evidence was obtained through torture.

The Administrator has also established a Judicial Review Committee to examine

all judges and prosecutors nationwide for complicity in the crimes of the former regime, corruption, or other malfeasance and to remove all offenders. These problems

were endemic under the former regime and eradicating them is crucial to public

faith in the justice system. A Central Criminal Court of Iraq has been created as

a model of procedural fairness and judicial integrity. Repairs and rehabilitation are

underway or complete on many court and prison facilities severely damaged by

looting, war damage, or neglect by the prior regime.

Restoring Economic Activity. Moving beyond the initial phase of relief and recovery activities, economic regeneration is the key driver in the overall process of rebuilding Iraq and will provide the most tangible evidence of progress made by the

CPA and the Interim Administration. Iraq’s assets—its physical resources and its

skilled, energetic people—create opportunities for Iraq as a nation. The potential

benefits to the Iraqi people are huge. The CPA’s priority will be to encourage rapid

transition to an economy guided by free market principles. These have been shown,

in case after case, to offer the quickest way to generate efficient and job-creating

economic activity. The Coalition must also make the ease for the role of foreign investment in the development of Iraq. At the same time, it will be essential to put

in place an adequate social safety net to protect those disadvantaged by rapid

change.

During the past 30 days, the Administrator of the CPA announced a $100 million

Construction Program initiative as a means to rejuvenate the construction industry

and leverage the effects of the jobs it creates to get the economy moving forward.

This Construction program, the Division/Brigade Commander and Regional Director

Emergency Response Programs, the salary and pension payments program, other

critical infrastructure reconstruction programs, and Ministry operations and capital

expenditure programs—all underpinned by the CPA and Coalition Joint Task Force

7 (CJTF-7) efforts to help ensure security—are contributing to economic restoration.

SOURCES OF FUNDS. Through the end of June, the U.S. Government has allocated

approximately $2.7 billion of funds (U.S.-appropriated and Iraqi seized and vested)

for relief and reconstruction activities in Iraq, including the significant activities

noted above. The $2.7 billion allocation covers the following activities. A more detailed table is attached.

• $730 million for relief efforts to reestablish food distribution, provide medical

supplies, purchase fuels, and provide other humanitarian efforts.

• $400 million for emergency payments and salaries for civil servants and other

workers in various sectors and for pensioners.

• $1.37 billion for reconstruction activities including reestablishing critical services (water and sanitation services, electricity), ministries, oil production, and

security forces.

• $200 million for activities that support operation of the Coalition Provisional

Authority.

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Sources of the $2.7 billion for these activities include:

• Iraqi state assets—both vested and seized—totaling about $750 million as of

June 30th. The Iraqi assets are being used to finance the salaries of Iraqi civil

servants, regular payments for Iraqi pensioners, construction program projects,

and other critical relief and reconstruction activities in direct support of the

Iraqi people.

• U.S.-appropriated funds totaling about $2.0 billion for relief and reconstruction

efforts. Thus far, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and

the Department of Defense have been the channels for the majority of this U.S.

financial support.

Appropriated funds are contributing to the relief and reconstruction efforts in the

following ways:

• USAID has allocated approximately $1.4 billion. $740 million was drawn from

the $2.475 billion appropriated in the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund. The

balance was drawn from the Emerson Trust and borrowing from USAID accounts before the war. All planned reimbursements have now been made.

USAID has used these funds to restore economically critical infrastructure in

Iraq including establishing emergency telecommunications, water, sanitation,

and electricity services, food distribution, and transportation capability.

• The Department of Defense has allocated approximately $460 million for reconstruction efforts in Iraq, which includes repairing damaged oil facilities and related infrastructure and preserving the oil distribution capability in Iraq, contracting for trainers for the New Iraqi Army, and providing direct support to

the Administrator and CPA staff overseeing the reconstruction of Iraq.

• Of the $66 million for the Department of State, over $40 million has been allocated for relief efforts of the UN, International Organization for Migration, and

International Committee of the Red Cross. Additional funds will follow to support ongoing humanitarian efforts of the UN and the ICRC as well as the return and reintegration of displaced Iraqis.

• The Department of the Treasury has provided $2.2 million for activities within

its field of expertise.

At the end of June, the balance in the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) account was approximately $1.071 billion, consisting of the transfer from the United Nations

of $1 billion from the Oil for Food escrow account, $1 million of earned interest, and

$70 million of proceeds from the sale of wheat. The Administrator of the CPA intends to deposit into the DFI: (1) 95 percent of the proceeds from the sale of petroleum, petroleum products, and natural gas; (2) any returned Iraqi assets provided

by UN member states; and (3) funds attached to Oil for Food contracts that are not

prioritized or executed by November 21 and for which letters of credit have expired.

Foreign governments have frozen approximately $2.9 billion in Iraqi assets to date,

but none of these funds have been deposited in the DFI. To date, no funds have

been expended from the DFI.

The projected estimate of revenue from the sale of Iraqi oil through September

2003 is approximately $1 billion, based on the current market price. As stated in

the initial report, all DFI resources will be used for the humanitarian needs of the

Iraqi people, for economic reconstruction and repair of Iraq’s infrastructure, for continued disarmament of Iraq, for the costs of an Iraq civilian administration, and

other purposes benefiting the people of Iraq.

On June 25, 2003, the United States and the United Kingdom, with participation

by the CPA staff from Baghdad via telephone, met in Washington with representatives from the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund,

and the Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development to discuss terms of reference for the International Advisory and Monitoring Board (IAMB). The practice

will be to have the IAMB approve independent public accountants to audit the DFI

and export sales of petroleum, petroleum products and natural gas in support of the

objective of ensuring that the DFI is used in a transparent manner and that such

export sales are made consistent with prevailing international market best practices.

Efforts continue to authenticate and make available the Iraqi state and regimeowned assets brought under control in Iraq by U.S. forces. On June 25, 2003, the

United States provided three machines to authenticate the approximately $800 million in U.S. dollars that were found in Iraq. A total of $799,728,061.47 has been

verified as legitimate and taken into account. Eight hundred and five individual

$100 banknotes ($80,500) are awaiting further examination by the U.S. Secret Service. An additional $7,100,300 could not be authenticated because the notes were wet

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and damaged. These notes were hand counted and still must be authenticated. The

Department of Defense is coordinating with the U.S. Federal Reserve to exchange

these damaged notes for quality notes that can be utilized.

An additional 1,100 gold-colored metal bars were recovered in Iraq. They are

being secured in Iraq while a random sample is being brought to Kuwait to assay.

Analysis of the initial sampling of ingots revealed they were comprised of approximately 64 percent copper and 34 percent zinc. Consultation with metallurgists indicates the bars analyzed to date are most likely melted-down shell casings. The total

number of metal bars recovered is now 4,450. All the bars currently located at Camp

Arifjan are being sent to Baghdad, where they most likely will be stored within one

of the Ministry of Industry and Materials facilities until their final disposition is determined.

2. A list of the significant activities related to reconstruction in Iraq that

the President anticipates initiating during the 90-day period beginning

on the date the report is submitted to the Committees on Appropriations, including:

(A) Cost estimates for carrying out the proposed activities.

(B) The source of the funds that will be used to pay such costs.

The Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority has the challenging task

of managing the recovery of Iraq not only from war but also from 30 years of mismanagement and systematic oppression by the former regime. The Administrator is

developing a strategic plan for reconstructing Iraq and is coordinating and developing numerous proposed projects through the CPA organization that he has established and continues to build. The CPA includes representatives from Coalition partners and all U.S. Government Federal agencies involved in the in-theater operations. During the next 90 days, the CPA will continue to focus on activities that

include the following. A more detailed table is attached.

Continuing to improve relief and recovery activities begun in the first phase of reconstruction in Iraq. These include the near-term priorities of providing relief (food,

health services) and reestablishing critical services (power, water, sanitation) for the

Iraqi people. The CPA will continue to pay civil servants and pensioners; to provide

further improvements in the water, sanitation, electricity, communications, medical

and health, education, justice, police, prison and firefighting services; to continue repairs to the transportation services including roads, railroads, and airports; and to

continue reconstruction of the oil infrastructure and preservation of oil distribution

capability so oil proceeds can be used to finance critical requirements of the Iraqi

people.

Restoring economic activity. The CPA will continue to execute the $100 million

Construction Program, the Division/Brigade Commander and Regional Director

Emergency Response Programs, salary and pension payments programs, and other

critical reconstruction projects. High priority efforts are underway to prepare facilities to recruit, equip, sustain, and train the New Iraqi Army. Also, on July 15, 2003,

the CPA will initiate monthly stipend payments to former members of the Iraqi

Army. The CPA will also complete coordination and vetting of the national police

plan mentioned earlier in this report. Coordinated execution of the recruiting, training, and employment of facilities security guards will also continue as a high priority. The CPA has formally reestablished the Central Bank of Iraq and will continue to establish additional branches of the Rafidain and Rasheed banks. The Administrator has made the Central Bank independent of the Ministry of Finance.

Expanding security. One of the CPA’s major initiatives is to establish a New Iraqi

Army that will help provide for the military defense of the country and, as units

become operational, will assume military security duties now being performed by

Coalition forces. The old Iraqi military forces disintegrated with the collapse of organized military resistance; virtually all installations and equipments that were not

destroyed in the fighting were looted or stolen. The CPA formally disbanded the

former Iraqi military and security services and is currently working on the creation

of a New Iraqi Army. The current plan is to build a force of about 40,000 members

(roughly 3 divisions) over 2 years as the nucleus of the national armed forces of the

new Iraq. The first battalion will begin training this month. A U.S. company will

conduct the day-to-day training under the supervision of a coalition military assistance training team, which will be commanded by a U.S. major general and will include officers from the United Kingdom, Spain, and other coalition countries. This

team is leading the effort, including finalizing recruiting, vetting, and training activities. Former Iraqi military personnel are also being hired as police, security

guards, and workers to support engineering and construction activities, and some

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are being hired in the private sector. During an interim period, and subject to a decision by the future Iraqi government, the CPA will provide monthly stipends to

most former career military personnel. These stipends will be paid from Iraqi funds.

Former members of the Special Republican Guard and the intelligence and internal

security services will not be eligible for these payments.

3. Updated strategies, if changes are proposed regarding matters included

in the reports required under subsection (a).

The strategy to achieve U.S. policy goals in Iraq continues to focus on a coordinated interagency effort in the United States and on the ground in Iraq that is integrated with Coalition and other international efforts. In Iraq, the CPA is the focal

point for interagency and international coordination to determine requirements for

reconstruction and to oversee resulting activities.

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY. The duties and responsibilities of the Administrator of the CPA described in section 1 of the initial report have not changed.

Since that report, the Administrator has continued to build up the CPA organization

and hone its structure and responsibilities (the latest CPA organization chart is attached). In addition to those mentioned above, CPA has established and promulgated regulations for two major initiatives, the Program Review Board and the

Council for International Coordination.

The Program Review Board (PRB) was established on June 15, 2003, and is responsible for recommending expenditures of resources from the Development Fund

for Iraq and other resources such as seized and vested Iraqi state or regime funds

and U.S. appropriated funds. In making its recommendations, the PRB is responsible for reviewing all the identified requirements, prioritizing these requirements,

and integrating the prioritized requirements into an overall funding plan. The PRB

reports directly to the Administrator of the CPA. The Board is comprised of voting

and non-voting members. Voting members include the Chairman (appointed by the

Administrator of the CPA), the heads of specific CPA directorates (Economic Policy,

Civil Affairs Policy, Agency for International Development Iraq mission, Operations,

and Security) as well as authorized representatives of the Commander of Coalition

Forces, Iraqi Ministry of Finance, United Kingdom, Australia, and the Chairman of

the Council for International Coordination. Non-voting members include the CPA

Comptroller as well as representatives from the U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General for Iraq.

The Council for International Coordination (CIC) was established on June 17,

2003 as an organization to work on behalf of the CPA to support, encourage, and

facilitate international participation in the relief, recovery and development efforts

in Iraq. The responsibilities of the CIC (referred to as the International Coordination Council in the initial report pursuant to Section 1506 of the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2003) include coordinating international assistance from states and international and non-governmental organizations and

making recommendations to the PRB on international assistance efforts in Iraq; and

identifying international expertise—as well as recommendations for using this expertise—to the Administrator. The Council is not responsible for security matters

such as the establishment of Iraqi police capacity or the New Iraqi Army. The CIC

reports directly to the CPA Administrator and is comprised of representatives from

coalition members and other countries that support CPA goals and possess expertise

or other resources that will assist in furthering the purposes of the Council. The

current Chairman of the CIC is Former Deputy Prime Minister Marek Belka of Poland.

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY CONTRIBUTIONS AND PARTICIPATION. Section 2 of the initial Section 1506 report described the roles and responsibilities of foreign governments and non-governmental organizations in post-conflict Iraq. It also detailed

some of the major military and humanitarian contributions that countries were providing. Since the initial report, coalition military forces have continued to plan, coordinate, and execute the deployment of international military forces into Iraq. Multinational divisions under the lead of the United Kingdom and Poland are being established at present. Numerous countries, including Spain, Italy, the Netherlands,

Slovakia, Denmark, Ukraine, Hungary, Honduras, El Salvador, and the Dominican

Republic, have offered to send forces to help populate these divisions. Numerous

countries are considering making force contributions, but the types of units and

numbers of personnel are matters that remain to be worked out. Others have provided liaison officers to the Coalition military forces in Iraq. The international humanitarian, financial, or other contributions to post-conflict Iraq are discussed in

Section 4 of this report.

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U.S. INTERAGENCY AND INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION. Section 3 of the initial

Section 1506 report described the strategy for coordinating post-conflict activities in

Iraq among the U.S. Government, foreign governments and international organizations. The strategy to achieve U.S. policy goals in Iraq continues to focus on a coordinated interagency effort in the United States and on the ground in Iraq that

is integrated with Coalition and other international efforts. In the United States,

department and agency representatives coordinate daily on Iraq issues. There is

close coordination among the Department of State, the Department of Defense, including the Joint Staff, the National Security Council staff, the Department of the

Treasury, the Department of Justice, USAID, the Central Intelligence Agency,

OMB, and the Coalition Provisional Authority. In addition, the DoD leadership is

establishing an office to give greater capacity for the CPA to reach back to Washington for some assistance or capability that it needs in country.

In Iraq, the CPA is the focal point for interagency and international coordination

to determine requirements for reconstruction and oversee resulting activities. The

CPA staff is entirely interagency in character with representatives from the Departments of State, Treasury, Justice and Defense, and at least 13 other executive

branch agencies providing support. The relationship between the CPA and non-U.S.

Coalition governments on assistance issues is handled through the Council for International Cooperation. As discussed previously, this Council is the principal vehicle

to coordinate coalition assistance support to the CPA. There are numerous embedded Coalition personnel in the CPA staff. The Deputy Director for Security Affairs

is Spanish, for example, and there are a number of British, Canadian, Australian,

and other personnel serving on the CPA staff.

One additional and extremely important change since the initial Section 1506 report is the level of coordination between the CPA and Coalition Joint Task Force

7 (CJTF-7), the military force in Iraq. The CPA and the headquarters of CJTF-7 are

now co-located in Baghdad. This proximity is critical for daily interactions and coordination on security issues. There are also a number of military liaisons on the

CPA staff. This high level of civil-military coordination will have a significant positive impact on coalition efforts to stabilize the country and improve the quality of

peoples’ lives in Iraq.

4. An updated list of the financial pledges and contributions made by foreign governments or international organizations to fund activities related to humanitarian, governance, and reconstruction assistance in

Iraq.

The United Nations, other international institutions, the United States, and other

leading donors continue to urge all nations to contribute to fulfill the needs of the

Iraqi people in any way they can. This has garnered a strong response from the

international community, with over 70 countries coming forward to offer either cash

or in-kind assistance for humanitarian, stabilization or reconstruction efforts. At the

time of the initial Section 1506 report, offers of cash and in-kind assistance from

the international community exceeded $1.9 billion. About $790 million of that

amount was in response to a Flash Appeal for $2.2 billion made by the United Nations in March 2003 to meet urgent humanitarian requirements in Iraq. The remaining $1.1 billion in assistance had been offered outside of the March Flash Appeal.

On June 24, representatives of 52 donor states, the CPA, UN agencies and the

international financial institutions (IFIs) gathered in New York for the UN-hosted

‘‘Technical Consultations on Reconstruction Needs for Iraq.’’ The meeting was the

first major international meeting following the liberation of Iraq to focus on how the

global community—governments, IFIs and the UN—can help Iraqis rebuild their

country. The consultations, which included strong lraqi participation with the CPA

delegation, demonstrated international support for Iraq’s democratic and economic

transformation, helped reconnect Iraq to the world community, and launched the

process for an international donors’ conference. Attendees agreed to convene a donors’ pledging conference in October, to complete a needs assessment prior to that,

and to create a steering group of the US, European Union, Japan and the United

Arab Emirates to work with the UN, World Bank and IMF in organizing the conference. They also agreed to form a liaison group of a larger group of donor countries

that are interested in contributing to the rebuilding of Iraq.

As of June 28, 2003, contributions have increased by $400 million to $2.3 billion

in total offers of assistance. Of that amount, $2.0 billion in humanitarian assistance

has been offered/donated in response to the March UN Flash Appeal, meeting 90

percent of the total $2.2 billion Appeal. On June 23, 2003, the United Nations

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issued another flash appeal for an additional $259 million in immediate humanitarian assistance, bringing the total appeal for the Iraqi people to $2.459 billion.

As anticipated, the passage of UNSCR 1483 provided an important international

signal that fostered more contributions from both public and private donors. Since

the initial Section 1506 report submitted in early June, there have been both increases in the total contributions and shifts in the patterns of contributions. The

most notable change is the increase in contributions from private sources, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations. These contributions now

total over $1.1 billion in assistance, which is primarily within the UN appeal. For

bilateral donors there have been increases as well. In all, 29 countries have made

pledges or contributions within the UN appeal, and additional countries have made

pledges or contributions outside of the UN appeal.

The initial report included examples of the international pledges and contributions. The following are the top 10 public bilateral pledges and contributions (plus

the European Commission) to date (June 28, 2003):

Country/Organization

(Dollars in Millions)

Pledge/Contribution

United States 1 $565.3

United Kingdom $177.1

Japan $101.8

Australia $60.5

United Arab Emirates $47.6

Canada $41.2

Saudi Arabia $36.6

Spain $32.3

Kuwait $27.5

The European Commission $26.3

Italy $22.4

1 Humanitarian assistance pledge

Over the course of the summer, new offers of humanitarian assistance will begin

to ebb as the emphasis shifts away from strictly humanitarian assistance to medium

to longer-term development. Critical to that evolution will be more sophisticated

needs assessments prepared by the United Nations and the World Bank, with significant input from the Coalition Provisional Authority. Specifically, the CPA will

be working over the next several months to develop an operating budget for Iraq

that will identify funding gaps requiring international support. That guidance will

be critical to the conference for donors scheduled for the fall of 2003. Usually there

is a surge in contributions following scheduled conferences for donors.

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[The Washington Times—Monday, July 28, 2003]

ROOTS OF HOPE IN A REALM OF FEAR

[Paul Wolfowitz]

Behind the police academy in Baghdad stands the forked trunk of a dead tree,

unusual for the fact that on each branch the bark is permanently marked by two

sets of ropes—one high enough to tie up a man, the other, a woman. Near the tree

is a row of small cells where special prisoners were held.

Our guide, the newly appointed Sunni superintendent of the academy (who had

spent a year in jail for having made a disparaging comment about Saddarn Hussein

to his best friend) told us of unspeakable things that once happened to men and

women tied to that tree and held in those cells. Beyond the torture tree, a small

gate leads to the Olympic Committee Headquarters, run by Uday Hussein, who

would often slip through the back gate at night to torture and abuse prisoners.

Traveling throughout Iraq last week, I heard many more accounts of unspeakable

brutality—on a scale unimaginable for Americans. While we were in the north, one

commander told us workers had temporarily stopped the excavation of a newly discovered mass grave-site, after unearthing the remains of 80 women and children—

some still with little dresses and toys.

In the south, we met other remnants of the regime’s horrific brutality, the Marsh

Arabs, for whom liberation came just in time to save a fragment of this ancient civilization. But for the Marsh Arabs, the marshes are no more. Where there was once

a lush landscape of productive, freshwater marshes, there is now a vast, nearly lifeless void. The children there greeted us with loud applause and cheers of ‘‘Salaam

Bush’’ and ‘‘Down with Saddam.’’ Their first request was not for candy or toys. It

was, instead, a single word: ‘‘Water?’’

One of my strongest impressions is that fear of the old regime is still pervasive.

A smothering blanket of apprehension and dread woven by 35 years of repression—

where even the smallest mistake could bring torture or death—won’t be cast off in

a few weeks’ time. Iraqis are understandably cautious. Until they are convinced that

every remnant of Hussein’s old regime is removed, and until a long and ghastly part

of their history is overcome, that fear will remain. That history of atrocities and the

punishment of those responsible are directly linked to our success in helping the

Iraqi people build a free, secure and democratic future.

What happened to Uday and Qusay Hussein last week is essential to the process

of building that future. Their demise is an important step in making Iraqis feel

more secure that the Baathist tyranny will never return, in restoring order and in

giving freedom a chance. Even in Baghdad, far from the Shi’a and Kurdish areas

that we associate with Hussein’s genocidal murders, enthusiastic and prolonged

celebrations over the news of their deaths erupted almost at once—suggesting something else I observed: Hussein and his sons were equal-opportunity oppressors.

It was a significant step forward to get Nos. 2 and 3 on our most-wanted list of

regime criminals. That same day we captured the commander of the Special Republican Guard. But we’ve learned in our days on the ground that the roots of that regime go deep—burrowing into precincts and neighborhoods, like a huge gang of organized criminals. So it is the coalition’s intensified focus on mid-level Baathists

that we think will yield even greater results in apprehending the contract killers

and deadenders who now target our soldiers and our success. Recently captured

functionaries have revealed new and helpful information, and we are working to encourage this trend.

Even though the enemy targets our success, we will win the peace. But we won’t

win it alone. We don’t need American troops to guard every mile of electrical cable.

The real center of gravity will come from the Iraqi people themselves—they know

who and where the criminals are. And they have the most at stake—their future.

While Iraqis may remain in the grip of fear, our troops, our coalition, allies and

the new Iraqi national and local Iraqi councils are making significant progress in

lessening its iron hold. When inevitable challenges and controversies arise, we

should remember that most of the people of Iraq are deeply grateful for what our

incredibly brave American and coalition forces have done to liberate them from Hussein’s republic of fear.

When we’ve convinced Iraqis that we mean to stay until the old regime is crushed

and its criminals are punished—and that we are equally determined to give their

country back to them—they will know they can truly begin to build a government

and society of, by and for the Iraqi people.

In many ways, the people of Iraq are like prisoners who endured years of solitary

confinement—without light, without peace, without much knowledge of the outside

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world. They have just emerged into the bright light of hope and fresh air of freedom.

It may take a while for them to adjust to this new landscape free of torture trees.

[The Washington Post—Monday, July 20, 2003]

GETTING TO KNOW THE IRAQIS

(Jim Hoagland)

AL TURABAH, lraq.—Lionized by conservatives and denounced by liberals as the

architect of the second Gulf War, Paul Wolfowitz sits cross-legged in the blowing

dust of a hall made of reeds and perspires visibly as a tribal sheik pleads for support. Wolfowitz’s blue blazer and red tie add to his discomfort; but the U.S. deputy

defense secretary insists on showing respect to a people he has almost certainly

helped save from extinction.

Watching him in the fiery 115-degree heat and the blinding glare of a parched

wasteland that stretches far beyond the horizon, you know that there is nowhere

else in the world Wolfowitz would rather be.

We have flown by helicopter 100 miles northeast of Basrah and descended into

a man-made inferno on the eastern edge of what once were Iraq’s lush and productive marsh lands.

Today, that territory is a salinated desert, the product of Saddam Hussein’s wrath

against the half-million people known as Marsh Arabs.

For more than a decade, the Iraqi tyrant drained and diverted water from their

lands. His genocidal campaign here was even more devastating than his serial wars

on the Kurds in northern Iraq. An estimated 300,000 Marsh Arabs perished. Forcibly resettled in what is as close to Hell as I ever want to experience, the survivors

here have re-created a traditional gathering hall that Wolfowitz is visiting.

On this five-day fact-finding trip that began in Baghdad Thursday, Wolfowitz has

made a point of putting Hussein’s victims rather than himself in the spotlight. Also

on his schedule is a visit to a mass grave in the Shiite heartland and a stop in

Kurdistan. At each station, he talks repeatedly—his critics might say obsessively—

about the Baathist regime’s crimes against humanity.

Isn’t he concerned, I ask later, that he seems to be dwelling on the past when

Iraq needs to secure its future? Is he seeking to justify a regime change he pursued

relentlessly for two decades by raking up deeds that are monstrous but overtaken

by the vast new problems of liberated Iraq?

For once, Wolfowitz does not pause to reflect judiciously before responding to a

question. Trained as a professor of international relations, he has become passionate

about the need for and possibilities of change in Iraq and the Arab world at large.

That passion today drives much of the Bush administration’s policy in the greater

Middle East,

‘‘It is important to offer firsthand testimony about things I have only read in

books until now,’’ the 59-year-old defense intellectual says.

‘‘That part of history I am observing—the destruction, the fear and trembling that

the old regime induced in its subjects—is still alive in the minds of many Iraqis.

We have to be aware that things could go backwards here if we do not put to rest

that part of their history?

Wolfowitz continues: ‘‘I plead guilty to optimism—but not excessive optimism—

that these are remarkable people who can achieve a change in their lives that will

also mean much for the whole region, even if there is more unease than I would

have hoped to see at this stage?

This grueling trip has confirmed rather than shaken the long-distance vision of

Iraq that Wolfowitz began to develop in 1979 when, as a junior policy analyst at

the Pentagon, he identified Iraq as a regional challenge for the United States. This

was, he recalls, ‘‘when others pooh-poohed’’ the idea.

‘‘You can be elated that these people are free but still remember how much they

suffered and how much of that suffering was unnecessarily prolonged,’’ Wolfowitz

says, referring indirectly to the premature ending of the Gulf war in 1991 by the

first Bush administration.

‘‘At least there was still a Marsh Arab civilization capable of being preserved.

They would not have lasted another 12 years.’’

Critics who cast him as the leader of a neo-conservative, pro-Israeli cabal that has

seized control of the administration’s Middle East policy deride him as Wolfowitz

of Arabia. But such critics ignore Wolfowitz’s deep intellectual interest in Arab society and his firm belief that it can reform itself, especially if given encouragement

from outside.

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In his spare time, Wolfowitz reads Arab writers such as Egypt’s Alifa Rifaat,

whose collection of short stories, ‘‘Distant View of a Minaret,’’ graphically portrays

the frustration of women in purdah and other restrictions they face. ‘‘It is important for Iraqis to show what Arabs can do when they live in freedom,’’ he says to the local leaders gathered here. He has arranged to meet them in the

company of Britain’s Baroness Emma Nicholson, the redoubtable human rights campaigner who has championed the Marsh Arabs in the European Parliament. ‘‘What we are seeing’’ Wolfowitz tells me later, ‘‘eliminates any moral doubt about

whether this was a war against Iraq, or a war for Iraq. This was a war for Iraq.’’

[From the New York Times—Sunday, July 20, 2003]

SOUTHERN IRAQ

WOLFOWITZ VISITS MASS GRAVEYARD OF HUSSEIN’S VICTIMS AND PROMISES HELP IN

HUNTING KILLERS

(By Eric Schmitt)

HILLA, lraq, July 19.—For a solid month, nine trucks a day pulled up to a field

off a dirt road here and unloaded their human cargo. Men, women and children

were herded into a freshly dug pit where Saddam Hussein’s henchmen gunned them

down and buried them, sometimes while they were still alive.

Now, 12 years later, the killing field of Hilla is just one of 62 mass graveyards

that American and allied investigators have discovered in southern Iraq since the

end of the war.

About 3,000 bodies have been unearthed here, but townspeople say thousands

more probably decomposed in the shallow water table over the last decade. Relatives

have exhumed about 1,000 sets of the remains. The rest are wrapped in white plastic bags and spread out over the neatly leveled soil, in silent testimony to the horrors of Mr. Hussein’s three-decade rule. ‘‘Obviously, for those people, liberation didn’t come in time,’’ Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz said today, visiting here as part of a five-day trip throughout Iraq.

No one knows for sure how many people died in Mr. Hussein’s purges aimed at

terrorizing and suppressing political opponents and religious rivals, including the

Shiite Muslim majority in this part of lraq. American and Iraqi officials here today

said the total probably ran into the hundreds of thousands.

Mr. Wolfowitz called those who executed the villagers here ‘‘monsters,’’ and promised a group of local Iraqis who joined him today that the occupying forces would

lend whatever aid necessary to help track down the killers. A team of British forensic experts was just here, and there are plans to help start an Iraqi bureau of missing persons.

The United States marines who occupy this part of south-central Iraq have already started case files on many of the killings.

‘‘I look at this like an organized-crime case,’’ said Maj. Al Schmidt, a Marine reservist in charge of mass-grave survey work, who is an F.B.I. agent in civilian life.

‘‘Saddam Hussein is the head, and these are all the tentacles.’’

Local lraqis, while grateful to the Americans for driving Mr. Hussein from power,

nonetheless said they felt that the United States could be doing more to hunt down

the killers. ‘‘We want human rights for the Iraqi people,’’ said Dr. Rafid al-Hussuni,

the Hillah grave-site coordinator.

The Iraqis said American forces had squandered opportunities to capture suspected executioners. The military recently arrested Muhammad Juwad Anayfas, a

tribal sheik who officials said owned this field and took part in the killings. But his

American jailers mistakenly set him free in a paperwork debacle that dealt the military a major embarrassment.

‘‘We will get him,’’ vowed Lt. Gen. James T. Conway, commander of the First Marine Expeditionary Force.

Traveling through this town, as well as the holy cities of Karbala and Najaf, Mr.

Wolfowitz today heard from Iraqis as well as General Conway and his officers, that

the region was relatively free of the security problems and deadly attacks against

Americans in and around Baghdad.

ln Baghdad today, an American serviceman was killed before dawn while guarding a bank on the out-skirts. Four other G.I.’s were wounded In Baghdad when their

vehicle was struck by a homemade bomb.

The soldier who was killed was assigned to the army’s First Armored Division.

He was attacked at 1:30 a.m, with small-arms fire and a rocket-propelled grenade

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while guarding the Rasheed Bank, said Specialist Brian Sharkey, a military spokesman. The soldier, whose identity was not released, was taken to a military aid station, where he died.

The country’s new Governing Council, after six days in session, failed to elect a

president, the Associated Press reported. Instead, leadership will be shared by three

of the 25 members, the report said.

Mr. Wolfowitz was greeted enthusiastically by people in the town, where the marines say they have worked closely with civic and religious leaders in what American military officials call the Shiite heartland. There are still fuel, electricity and

water shortages, but the main streets of Karbala and Najaf bustled with activity.

In Najaf, Mr. Wolfowltz joined two dozen members of a fledgling town council at

one of their meetings, and gave an impromptu lesson in American-style civics.

‘‘I don’t think you can have a free country without a free media,’’ he said. ‘‘I’d be

very, very careful about anything that prevents people from expressing their views.’’

It was clear that after only 48 hours in Iraq, Mr. Wolfowitz was beginning to grow

weary of the laundry list, and perhaps the tone, of requests for services and aid

from lraqis officials he has met.

‘‘The American people are committed to a successful lraq,’’ he said when asked

if United States troops would pull out if someone other than President Bush was

elected in November 2004, ‘‘so long as they believe you are committed to success.’’

[The Wall Street Journal—Monday, July 28, 2003]

‘‘THIS WAS A GOOD THING TO DO’’

(By Paul A. Gigot)

NAJAF, Iraq.—Toppling a statue is easier than killing a dictator. Not the man

himself, but the idea of his despotism, the legacy of his torture and the fear of his

return. This kind of reconstruction takes time. Just ask the 20-some members of the

new city council in this holy city of Shiite Islam. Their chairs are arrayed in a circle

to hear from Paul Wolfowitz, the deputy secretary of defense, who invites questions.

The first man to speak wants to know two things: There’s a U.S. election next year,

and if President Bush loses will the Americans go home? And second, are you secretly holding Saddam Hussein in custody as a way to intimidate us with the fear

that he might return? Mr. Wolfowitz replies no to both points, with more conviction

on the second than the first. But the question reveals the complicated anxiety of

the post-Saddam Iraqi mind.

Most reporting from Iraq suggests that the U.S. ‘‘occupation’’ isn’t welcome here.

But following Mr. Wolfowitz around the country I found precisely the opposite to

be true. The majority aren’t worried that we’ll stay too long; they’re petrified we’ll

leave too soon. Traumatized by 35 years of Saddam’s terror, they fear we’ll lose our

nerve as casualties mount and leave them once again to the Baath Party’s merciless

revenge.

That is certainly true in Najaf, which the press predicted in April would be the

center of a pro-Iranian Shiite revolt. Only a week ago Sunday, Washington Post reporter Pamela Constable made Section A with a story titled ‘‘Rumors Spark Iraqi

Protests As Pentagon Official Stops By.’’ Interesting, if true.

But Ms. Constable hung her tale on the rant of a single Shiite cleric who wasn’t

chosen for the Najaf city council. Even granting that her details were accurate—

there was a protest by this Shiite faction, though not when Mr. Wolfowitz was

around—the story still gave a false impression of overall life in Najaf. On the same

day, I saw Mr. Wolfowitz’s caravan welcomed here and in nearby Karbala with

waves and shouts of ‘‘Thank you, Bush.’’

The new Najaf council represents the city’s ethnic mosaic, and its chairman is a

Shiite cleric. Things improved dramatically once the Marines deposed a corrupt

mayor who’d been installed by the CIA. Those same Marines have rebuilt schools

and fired 80% of the police force. The city is now largely attack-free and Marines

patrol without heavy armor and often without flak jackets. The entire south-central

region is calm enough that the Marines will be turning over duty to Polish and

Italian troops.

This is the larger story I saw in Iraq, the slow rebuilding and political progress

that is occurring even amid the daily guerrilla attacks in Baghdad and the Sunni

north. Admittedly we were in, or near, the Wolfowitz bubble. But reporters elsewhere are also in a bubble, one created by the inevitable limits of travel, sourcing

and access. In five days we visited eight cities, and I spoke to hundreds of soldiers

and Iraqis.

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The Bush administration has made mistakes here since Saddam’s statue fell on

April 9. President Bush declared the war over much too soon, leaving Americans

unprepared for the Baathist guerrilla campaign. (The Pentagon had to fight to get

the word ‘‘major’’ inserted before ‘‘combat operations in Iraq have ended’’ in that famous May 1 ‘‘Mission Accomplished’’ speech.) But U.S. leaders, civilian and military,

are learning from mistakes and making tangible progress.

One error was underestimating Saddam’s damage, both physical and psychic. The

degradation of this oil-rich country is astonishing to behold. Like the Soviets, the

dictator put more than a third of his GDP into his military—and his own palaces. ‘‘The scale of military infrastructure here is staggering,’’ says Maj. Gen. David

Petraeus of the 101st Airborne. His troops found one new Iraqi base that is large

enough to hold his entire 18,500-man division.

Everything else looks like it hasn’t been replaced in at least 30 years. The General Electric turbine at one power plant hails from 1965, the boiler at one factory

from 1952. Textile looms are vintage 1930s. Peter McPherson, the top U.S. economic

adviser here, estimates that rebuilding infrastructure will cost $150 billion over 10

years.

All of this makes the reconstruction effort vulnerable to even small acts of sabotage. The night before we visited Basra, someone had blown up electrical transmission pylons, shutting down power to much of the city. That in turn triggered

long gas lines on the mere rumor that the pumps wouldn’t work.

Rebuilding all of this will take longer than anyone thought.

Iraq’s mental scars are even deeper. Nearly every Iraqi can tell a story about

some Baath Party depredation. The dean of the new police academy in Baghdad

spent a year in jail because his best friend turned him in when he’d said privately

that ‘‘Saddam is no good.’’ A ‘‘torture tree’’ behind that same academy contains the

eerie indentations from rope marks where victims were tied. The new governor of

Basra, a judge, was jailed for refusing to ignore corruption. Basra’s white-and-blue

secret police headquarters is called ‘‘the white lion,’’ because Iraqis say it ate everyone who went inside. ‘‘You have to understand it was a Stalinist state,’’ says Iaian Pickard, one of the

Brits helping to run Basra. ‘‘The structure of civic life has collapsed. It was run by

the Baath Party and it simply went away. We’re having to rebuild it from scratch.’’ This legacy is why the early U.S. failure to purge all ranking Baathists was a

nearly fatal blunder. Officials at CIA and the State Department had advocated a

strategy of political decapitation, purging only those closest to Saddam. State’s Robin Raphel had even called de-Baathification ‘‘fascistic,’’ a macabre irony to Iraqis

who had to endure genuine fascism.

Muhyi AlKateeb is a slim, elegant Iraqi-American who fled the Iraqi foreign service in 1979 when Saddam took total control. (In the American way, he then bought

a gas station in Northern Virginia.) But when he returned in May to rebuild the

Foreign Ministry, ‘‘I saw all of the Baathists sitting in front of me. I couldn’t stay

if they did.’’ He protested to U.S. officials, who only changed course after L. Paul

Bremer arrived as the new administrator.

Mr. AlKateeb has since helped to purge the Foreign Ministry of 309 secret police

members, and 151 Baathist diplomats. ‘‘It’s an example of success,’’ he says now,

though he still believes ‘‘we are too nice. Iraqis have to see the agents of Saddam

in handcuffs, on TV and humiliated, so people will know that Saddam really is

gone.’’ This is a theme one hears over and over: You Americans don’t understand

how ruthless the Baathists are. They’ll fight to the death. You have to do the same,

and let us help you do it.

Which brings up the other large American mistake: The failure to enlist Iraqi allies into the fight from the very start. Pentagon officials had wanted to do this for

months, but they were trumped by the CIA, State and former Centcom chief Tommy

Franks. The result has been too many GIs doing jobs they shouldn’t have to do, such

as guarding banks, and making easier targets for the Baathist-jihadi insurgency.

The new Centcom boss, Gen. John Abizaid, is now correcting that mistake by recruiting a 14,000-man Iraqi security force. He’s helped by division commanders who

are adapting their own tactics in order to win local support and eventually be able

to turn power back over to Iraqis.

In Mosul in the north, Gen. Petraeus of the 101st Airborne runs the equivalent

of a large Fortune 500 company. He’s having to supply electricity, buy up the local

wheat crop (everything here was bought by, or supplied by, Saddam’s government),

form a city council, as well as put down an insurgency. He’s even run a Task Force

Pothole to fix the local roads. It’s no accident that an Iraqi turned the whereabouts

of Uday and Qusay into the 101st Airborne. Like the Marines in Najaf, Gen.

Petraeus’s troops have made an effort to mingle with the population and develop

intelligence sources.

93

In Kirkuk, Maj. Gen. Raymond Odierno’s 4th Infantry Division has had similar

success tapping Iraqi informers to map what he calls the ‘‘network of mid-level

Baathists’’ who are running the insurgency. Late last week they raided a house near

Tikrit after an Iraqi tip and captured several Saddam loyalists, including at least

five of his personal bodyguards. Some have been reluctant to talk, but Gen. Odierno

observes that, ‘‘When you mention Guantanamo, they become a lot more compliant.’’ The U.S. media have focused on grumbling troops who want to go home, especially the 3rd Infantry Division near Baghdad. And having been in the region for

some 260 days, the 3rd ID deserves a break. But among the troops I saw, morale

remains remarkably high. To a soldier, they say the Iraqis want us here. They also

explain their mission in a way that the American pundit class could stand to hear. ‘‘I tell my troops every day that what we’re doing is every bit as important as

World War II,’’ says one colonel, a brigade commander, in the 101st. ‘‘The chance

to create a stable Iraq could help our security for the next 40 or 50 years.’’ A onestar general in the same unit explains that his father served three tours in Vietnam

and ultimately turned against that war. But what the 101st is doing ‘‘is a classic

anti-insurgency campaign’’ to prevent something similar here.

These men are part of a younger Army officer corps that isn’t traumatized by

Vietnam or wedded to the Powell Doctrine. They understand what they are doing

is vital to the success of the war on terror. They are candid in saying the hit-andrun attacks are likely to continue for months, but they are just as confident that

they will inevitably break the Baathist network.

The struggle for Iraq will be difficult, but the coalition is winning. It has the support of most Iraqis, a creative, flexible military, and the resources to improve daily

lives. The main question is whether America’s politicians have the same patience

and fortitude as its soldiers.

The one word I almost never heard in Iraq was ‘‘WMD.’’ That isn’t because the

U.S. military doesn’t want, or expect, to find it. The reason, I slowly began to understand, is that Iraqis and the Americans who are here don’t think it matters all that

much to their mission. The liberation of this country from Saddam’s terror is justification enough for what they are doing, and the main chance now isn’t refighting

the case for war but making sure we win on the ground. ‘‘So I see they’re giving Bush a hard time about the WMD,’’ volunteers a Marine

colonel, at the breakfast mess in Hilla one morning. ‘‘They ought to come here and

see what we do, and what Saddam did to these people. This was a good thing to

do.’’

[The Weekly Standard—August 4-August 11, 2003]

OF PRISONS AND PALACES

NOTES FROM LIBERATED IRAQ.

(By Stephen F. Hayes)

Abu Gharib Prison, Iraq.—I may be the first person in history to have been happy

to be inside Abu Gharib prison. The facility, just west of Baghdad, was the heart

of Saddam Hussein’s torture apparatus. On this day, however, the temperature had

reached above 120 degrees, and the sun was relentless. The prison at least provided

some shade.

I came as one of six reporters accompanying a small delegation led by Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz. We were halfway through a four-day tour of Iraq.

With our base in Baghdad, we raced from city to village in a sweeping arc from the

Shiite south to the Kurdish north. We returned most nights to the capital and slept

in an outlying building on the grounds of one of Saddam Hussein’s opulent palaces—also named Abu Gbarib.

The palace was built in 1999, as U.N. sanctions were bringing economic devastation to most of Iraq. The grounds extend for miles—it takes us 13 minutes to drive

from the main palace to the exit—and feature several manmade lakes filled with

water that looks artificially blue. Handrails lead down into the water from a patio

overlooking the lakes. Outdoor showers are available in small stalls adjacent to the

patio—or were. The palace today is without running water, a casualty of a stray

American bomb. One building just down the road from the main palace was hit

hard. There was intelligence that Uday Hussein had been hiding there, we’re told—

a report that at first sounds plausible but becomes less believable each time I hear

it over the course of the trip. It seems every building damaged during the war was

thought to have held Uday Hussein. But physical evidence of the war here is generally scarce.

94

Hanging from the ceiling in the foyer of the main palace is a massive chandelier,

maybe 100 feet in diameter. The floors and most of the walls are marble. Most of

the furnishings are gold or are painted to look like gold. One soldier calls the style

‘‘Saudi gaudy.’’

There could hardly he a greater contrast than with the prison of the same name.

It sits surrounded by the vast and dry nothingness that is the terrain outside of

Baghdad. The ground around the prison is littered with soda cans, plastic wrappings, pieces of paper, and razor wire.

The inside smells like fresh paint. American soldiers living and working here are

repainting the walls of one wing. Although many coalition officials favored shutting

the place down—the mere mention of its name can induce physical sickness among

Iraqis—the country lacks another high-security detention center. So it’s expected to

operate for the next three years at least.

The soldiers have done a good job. But just down the hall from the wing they have

fixed up are several stark reminders of the atrocities committed here. The two coalition officials guiding us through the facility take us first to one of its execution

chambers. On the ceiling are two well-secured handles that look like the grips from

a pommel horse. The rope is tied to these.

Twelve feet below, two large square holes have been cut into the cement floor.

And in a basement below, there is a wide berth for the vehicles used to remove the

bodies.

Bill Irvine is one of those in charge of the prison. He is a slight, balding man with

a pink complexion. His sing-song Irish accent seems incompatible with his words.

‘‘One of the former guards that I interviewed in recent weeks told me that on one

particular day there were as many as 66 persons executed in this chamber. They

had refrigeration and cooling rooms for 80 bodies at a time. And they carried out

the executions on a Wednesday and a Sunday—very regularly on both those days.

It was very seldom that there were no executions here.’’

The assembly-line killing that took place within these walls accounts for a far

lower death toll than the 300,000 estimated to lie in the mass graves now being dug

up at scores of sites around the country. Still, ‘‘as many as 30,000 were executed

here in this prison,’’ Irvine explains. ‘‘There are reports—unsubstantiated reports—

but there are reports of at least 100,000 people killed in this prison.’’

The killing continued as the regime was on its way to extinction. ‘‘Even three days

before the prison closed,’’ Irvine says, ‘‘I am told that there were executions here.’’

The prison closed on October 10, 2002. Saddam Hussein issued a decree freeing

nearly all of the common criminals—some 70,000 from Abu Ghirab alone—and some

of his political prisoners. There are many things that might explain postwar looting

and security problems. This is one of them.

‘‘Many of those prisoners were charged and imprisoned for very, very serious

crimes,’’ Irvine continues. ‘‘Especially in Baghdad, the military forces have been arresting people who were actually released here. So we believe that a high percentage of the people who were released are actually involved in criminality now in

Baghdad.’’ Many Iraqis who survived their sentences here have returned since their

country was liberated on April 9.

As we walk down the hall towards the dining facility, now a makeshift sleeping

room for hundreds of American soldiers, one Iraqi walking with us stops me and

another American. We are not quite sure what he’s doing with the group—perhaps

he’s a contractor or a former guard. He grabs the electrical wires hanging from the

wall of one cell, applies them to his body, and shakes violently, as if being shocked.

The walls of the cafeteria are decorated with pictures and tributes to Saddam

Hussein. Our interpreter translates: ‘‘All love and faith to our leader, Saddam Hussein.’’ ‘‘Say yes, yes to leader Saddam Hussein.’’ ‘‘There’s no life without the sun,

and no dignity without Saddam.’’

On one wall, accompanied by a 15-foot mural of Saddam wearing 1970s retro-porn

sunglasses, is a mock prison identification card for Iraq.

Father: Saddam Hussein

Mother: Arab Nation

Title: Leader of Victory and Peace

Date of Birth: 17th of July

Type of Blood: Arab milk

Place of Birth: Under the Shade of a Palm Tree

Distinguishing Marks: The tattoo of sincerity

Profession: Knight of the Arab nation

Address: From the Gulf to the Ocean

Place of Birth: In the heart of every Arab citizen

Ideology: Socialist Bath Arab Party

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Writer of this ID: The Arab nation

‘‘The horror of this place and the kinds of things that went on here I think can

help you understand why the fear of Saddam Hussein hasn’t left this country, especially because people are convinced that he’s still alive,’’ said Wolfowitz after the

tour.

Bill Irvine says plans are in place to make most of the prison a memorial. ‘‘It’ll

be a reminder for many, many years of what happened here.’’

One might expect a visit to Abu Ghirab would stir reflections on the most profound matters—the nature of evil, the existence of God. Instead, I could not shake

words I’d read in the Washington Post of July 15, 2003, the day before I’d left for

Iraq. Reporting on the likelihood of stepped-up attacks on coalition forces on July

17, a national holiday under the previous regime, Kevin Sullivan wrote: ‘‘Although

Iraq’s new Governing Council’s first official action was to abolish Hussein-era holidays, July 17 still stands for Saddam in a country deeply unsure if the military occupation is better than his dictatorship.’’

A country deeply unsure if the military occupation is better than his dictatorship.

Could this be true? What about the question put so well in a headline over a column

by Michael Kelly in that same newspaper just weeks before his untimely death:

‘‘Who Would Choose Tyranny?’’ Could it be that Iraqis might actually prefer despotism to freedom, so long as the despot was one of their own?

Judging from dozens of interviews with Iraqis, U.S. soldiers, and representatives

of humanitarian and aid groups over the course of our trip, the answer is no. Most

Iraqis are overjoyed about their liberation. The American troops I spoke with, even

those from units that have suffered postwar casualties, said they have received a

warm welcome from their hosts. But most surprising were the strong words of

praise for postwar Iraq from NGO leaders. If even some of what this delegation

heard is true, the reconstruction of Iraq is going much better than reports in the

American media suggest.

ln Najaf on July 19, Wolfowitz met with the new city council. In this Shiite holy

city, as elsewhere throughout the country, Iraqis had a two-part message. ‘‘You have

done tremendous things for Iraq,’’ said Haydar al Mayalli, the interim governor.

‘‘You still have a heavy responsibility towards our country. You have commitments

that must be filled to the Iraqi people. And we are grateful that you have opened

the door to democracy and freedom.’’

A local sheikh spoke next. ‘‘By destroying the instruments of terrorism and the

Baath party, the people of Najaf breathe in relief,’’ he said. He listed infrastructure,

electricity, water, and security as Najaf’s most pressing needs, before reminding

Wolfowitz of the stakes. ‘‘The world is watching you to see what you do.’’

Wolfowitz acknowledged the importance of the transition and complimented those

on the council for their participation. ‘‘We know that the people of the south—particularly this city—have suffered more than others. For their memory, we have an

obligation to succeed in the tasks you described. The great cities for Shia Islam are

setting a model for democratic Iraq.’’

The council in Najaf had been in existence for just two weeks. Its 22 members

were elected from a larger group assembled from leaders of the brand new professional associations and civic organizations that are springing up, alongside new political parties, unions, and religious groups. It is an encouraging first step.

Similar councils exist in most major cities in Iraq, including Basra, Karbala,

Baghdad, Mosul, and Kirkuk. In Kirkuk, an oil-rich city in the north, coalition officials brought together a delegation of 300 local leaders representing each of the religious and ethnic groups in the city. That group then elected an interim council of

30 members, which in turn picked a mayor, a deputy mayor, and three assistant

mayors. That was two months ago. Wolfowitz met with the council on July 21.

‘‘I would like to express my thanks to you and George Bush for taking this courageous decision,’’ said Kamal Kirkuki, a Kurdish assistant mayor, ‘‘even though some

other nations objected and the United Nations did nothing to liberate us from this

tyrant.’’

Here, too, Wolfowitz was greeted with a mix of gratitude and pleas for help.

Asked Dr. Amed Nasser Azzo, a council member, ‘‘When is it possible to establish

media in Iraq to compete with Arab satellite television that agitates for instability

in Iraq?’’

Earlier Monday, Wolfowitz met in Mosul with representatives of various nongovernmental and humanitarian organizations working in Iraq. Much of the meeting, which featured groups like the United Nations and Save the Children, was

made near incomprehensible by a blizzard of acronyms. The comments I could understand were striking. One representative of the U.N. office of humanitarian assistance said, ‘‘We have gotten fantastic cooperation from the U.S. military’s civil affairs

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teams.’’ An Iraqi man from Suleimaniya, now working for the Mines Action Group,

offered similar praise, and so did an American, a recent Johns Hopkins graduate

working for the Research Triangle Institute. Interestingly, not one of the dozen or

so humanitarian workers in the room used the word ‘‘occupation.’’ All of them referred to the intervention as ‘‘the liberation.’’ America’s challenges in free Iraq are significant. Those of us traveling with

Wolfowitz heard about them in detail. Power is intermittent and unpredictable.

Water isn’t yet available at prewar levels. Jobs are scarce. Conspiracy theories

about American motives are rampant. And security on the streets of Iraq is woefully

lacking.

But most of those problems are solvable. Meanwhile, most doomsday predictions

haven’t come true. Few oil fields were set on fire. Iraq’s majority Shiite population

has resisted meddling from Iran. The Shiites didn’t commit revenge killings against

the Sunnis. There is no move by the Kurds to secede. There was no humanitarian

crisis. There was no mass starvation. The ‘‘Arab street’’ was quiet. And ‘‘friendly’’ Arab governments never fell.

The 12 years of containment between the two Gulf wars were costly for the Iraqis.

Counting only the mass graves and the executions at Abu Gharib, several hundred

thousand at least lost their lives while Saddam Hussein was ‘‘kept in his box.’’ ‘‘If you’d say, ‘Go through another 12 years of containment,’ after seeing what we

saw,’’ says Wolfowitz, ‘‘I mean, that’s impossible to argue.’’ He added, ‘‘Some people

say war is intrinsically immoral. This one wasn’t.’’

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF ENGINEERING SOCIETIES, PAUL J. KOSTEK, CHAIRMAN

IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

The American Association of Engineering Societies (AAES), its 24 member societies and the over one million U.S. engineers it represents, wish to thank Chairman

Lugar and Ranking Member Biden for the opportunity to submit testimony for the

record on the topic of Reconstruction in Iraq.

The engineering community understands and believes the most pressing task in

Iraq is to establish secure and stable conditions throughout the country, and we believe that the Coalition forces are well on their way to doing just that. Key to the

establishment of secure and stable conditions is the reconstruction and building efforts to improve the country’s infrastructure, which are currently underway. Since

the President declared an end to major combat operations on May 1, 2003, building

and reconstruction efforts have focused on critical areas of infrastructure that will

each contribute to substantial improvements in the lives of the Iraqi people. They

are water, sanitation, health, education, electricity, ports, airports, and local governance. The U.S. engineering community believes that one of the most important actions

to occur during the building and reconstruction process must be the engagement of

the Iraqi people in all aspects of the process, especially the Iraqi engineering community. It is an accepted fact that the Coalition forces will be a strong presence in

Iraq for years to come, but at the same time it is also understood that the Iraqi

people will be responsible for their own community once the Coalition forces have

decreased and withdrawn.

In conjunction with the World Federation of Engineering Organizations (WFEO),

the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and others, the U.S. engineering community has

begun to work directly with the Iraqi engineering community during the building

and reconstruction process. Through regular video conference calls, e-mail exchanges, meetings and the like, the U.S. engineering community has come together

to help its colleagues in Iraq. Some examples of that assistance include providing

technical journals and literature in an effort to update existing engineering skills

and technology; providing volunteer U.S. engineers willing to travel to Iraq to help

their colleagues; and providing contacts within the technical community for general

assistance in all manner of issues. At this critical time, we appreciate the efforts

made by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and other federal agencies to help facilitate our outreach to the Iraqi engineering community.

Our outreach to the Iraqi engineering community is an example of how the U.S.

engineering community is working to create a sustainable world that provides a

safe, secure, healthy life for all peoples. The U.S. engineering community is increasing its focus on sharing and disseminating information, knowledge and technology

that provides access to minerals, materials, energy, water, food and public health

while addressing basic human needs. Engineers must deliver solutions that are

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technically viable, commercially feasible, and environmentally and socially sustainable.

The reconstruction of Iraq, and indeed the survival of our planet and its people

requires the collaboration of all professions in both developed and developing countries to sustain future generations. The goal of improving the social and economic

well being of all peoples in the developed and lesser-developed countries is a prerequisite for creating a stable, sustainable world. Although achieving this goal will

require a broad coalition of well-crafted policies, it will only be realized through the

application of engineering principles and a commitment to public/private partnerships involving professionals from all fields including the social sciences, engineering and medicine. It will also require collaboration for development, acceptance and

dissemination of innovative solutions and better use of existing technologies.

Today’s world is increasingly complex, and the need for U.S. assistance in building

and reconstruction more common. The U.S. engineering community stands at the

ready to provide any manner of assistance to help in the creation of a sustainable

world.

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