1 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

1050 FIRST STREET, N.E.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20463

BEFORE THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

In the Matter of ) 

 ) MURs 7645/7663/7705

Donald J. Trump, et al. ) 

) 

 

STATEMENT OF REASONS OF CHAIRMAN ALLEN J. DICKERSON

AND COMMISSIONERS SEAN J. COOKSEY AND JAMES E. “TREY” TRAINOR, III

The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (“FECA” or “Act”), as amended, 

bars the knowing solicitation of political contributions from foreign nationals.1 The 

Commission received three complaints alleging that then-President Donald Trump 

violated this provision of the Act when his administration sought the opening of “an 

investigation into allegations regarding Burisma and purported Ukrainian 

interference in the 2016 presidential election” from the government of Ukraine.2 Our 

Office of General Counsel (“OGC”) concurred with this theory, and recommended that 

we find reason-to-believe (“RTB”) that Trump, his campaign committee, Rudy 

Giuliani, and Lev Parnas violated the Act.3 

1 52 U.S.C. § 30121 (“It shall be unlawful for...a person to solicit, accept, or receive a...contribution or 

donation of money or other thing of value...in connection with a Federal, State, or local election...from 

a foreign national”).

2 First Gen’l Counsel’s Report (“FGCR”) at 5, MURs 7645/7663/7705 (Donald J. Trump, et al.), Mar. 

23, 2021.

3 FGCR at 80-81. Technically, OGC recommended two possible tracks under which we could find RTB 

against Mr. Giuliani and Mr. Parnas. Id. at 80 (“Find reason to believe that Rudolph ‘Rudy’ Giuliani 

violated 52 U.S.C. § 30121(a)(2) by knowingly soliciting a prohibited foreign national contribution 

under 11 C.F.R. § 110.20(g), OR knowingly providing substantial assistance in soliciting a prohibited 

foreign national contribution under 11 C.F.R. § 110.20(h), from Ukrainian President Volodymyr 

Zelensky”); (“Find reason to believe that Lev Parnas violated 52 U.S.C. § 30121(a)(2) by knowingly 

soliciting a prohibited a foreign national contribution under 11 C.F.R. § 110.20(g), OR knowingly 

providing substantial assistance in soliciting a prohibited foreign national contribution under 11 

C.F.R. § 110.20(h), from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky”). We found neither theory 

persuasive. 

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We disagreed with OGC,4 and determined that there was no reason-to-believe 

that the prior administration’s efforts to secure an official act from the Ukrainian 

government fell within this agency’s narrow writ of exclusive civil enforcement of the 

campaign finance laws.5 In accordance with governing law, we write this Statement 

to explain our reasoning.6

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The facts as alleged in the complaints will no doubt ring a bell, as they formed 

the factual predicates that led the House of Representatives to impeach, and the 

Senate to acquit, former President Trump for abuse of power in 2019-2020.7 

4 Cert. at 1-3, MURs 7645/7663/7705 (Donald J. Trump, et al.), July 14, 2022; Cert. at 1-4, MURs 

7645/7663/7705 (Donald J. Trump, et al.), July 31, 2022.

5 “[A]s has been noted before, ‘there is a tendency to recast political disputes as campaign finance 

violations and enlist the Commission as a party to larger conflicts.’” Supp. Statement of Reasons of 

Vice Chair Dickerson at 2, MURs 7207/7268/7274/7623 (Russian Fed’n), Sept. 16, 2021 (quoting Supp. 

Statement of Reasons of Vice Chair Dickerson and Comm’r Trainor at 2, MURs 7821/7827/7868 

(Twitter, Inc.), Sept. 13, 2021). 

6 See Democratic Congressional Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 831 F.2d 1131, 1135 (D.C. 

Cir. 1987) (“DCCC”) (establishing requirement that “[t]he Commission or the individual 

Commissioners” must provide a statement of reasons why the agency “rejected or failed to follow the 

General Counsel’s recommendation”); Common Cause v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 842 F.2d 436, 449 

(D.C. Cir. 1988) (“A statement of reasons...is necessary to allow meaningful judicial review of the 

Commission’s decision not to proceed”); see also id. at 451 (R.B. Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part and 

concurring in part) (“I concur in part III of the court’s opinion holding the DCCC rule applicable, 

prospectively, to all Commission dismissal orders based on tie votes when the dismissal is contrary to 

the recommendation of the FEC General Counsel”); Nat’l Republican Senatorial Comm. v. Fed. 

Election Comm’n, 966 F.2d 1471, 1476 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“We further held that, to make judicial review 

a meaningful exercise, the three Commissioners who voted to dismiss must provide a statement of 

their reasons for so voting. Since those Commissioners constitute a controlling group for purposes of 

the decision, their rationale necessarily states the agency’s reasons for acting as it did”) (citation 

omitted); Campaign Legal Ctr. & Democracy 21 v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 952 F.3d 352, 355 (D.C. Cir. 

2020). 

7 H.R. 755, 116th Congress, 1st Sess., Dec. 18, 2019 (alleging that “President Trump—acting both 

directly and through his agents within and outside the United States Government—corruptly solicited 

the Government of Ukraine to publicly announce investigations into—(A) a political opponent, former 

Vice President Joseph R. Biden, Jr.; and (B) a discredited theory promoted by Russia alleging that 

Ukraine—rather than Russia—interfered in the 2016 United States Presidential election”). The 

former President was acquitted on this count by a vote of 52-48. H.R. 755, Record Vote Number: 33, 

Feb. 5, 2020; cf. U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 3 (“The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all 

impeachments...And no Person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two thirds of the 

Members present”).

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The record assembled by OGC8 suggests that the former President sought to 

have the Ukrainian government announce and conduct investigations into Burisma 

and an alleged Ukrainian role in the 2016 election, and that in doing so, the former 

President “refused to schedule a White House visit for Zelensky and blocked the 

release of $391 million in Congressional-approved security aid9 for Ukraine until 

[Ukrainian President Vladimir] Zelensky”10 officially complied with the request. 11

Specifically, the First General Counsel’s Report for these Matters principally 

describes actions taken by former New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani, who appears 

8 As the FGCR notes: “These events were the subject of widespread reporting, including the articles 

cited in the complaints, and were the subject of testimony in connection with the U.S. House of 

Representatives’ Impeachment Inquiry into Trump in 2019. This report cites the sworn testimony, 

taken in closed-door depositions and public hearings, of witnesses appearing as part of that 

impeachment inquiry.” FGCR at 7.

9 The U.S. Government Accountability Office reviewed a pause in the distribution of approximately 

$214 million worth of funds for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (“USAI”) pursuant to its 

statutory role under the Impoundment Control Act (“ICA”). 2 U.S.C. § 686(a). That report noted that 

the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) explained that this deferral of the executive’s 

obligation to appropriate funds had been done “to ensure that the funds were not spent ‘in a manner 

that could conflict with the President’s foreign policy,’” and that because “[t]he ICA does not permit 

deferrals for policy reasons, OMB’s justification for the withholding falls squarely within the scope of 

an impermissible policy deferral.” Decision at 6, “Matter of: Office of Management and Budget—

Withholding of Ukraine Security Assistance”, File: B-331564, U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Jan. 

16, 2020 (quoting OMB Resp. at 9). GAO ultimately determined that the deferral of USAI funds was 

improper under the ICA. Id. at 8-9. All of this is, obviously, far removed from federal campaign finance 

law.

10 FGCR at 7; see also id. at 6-32. In these Matters, OGC also reviewed an allegation that former 

President Trump and his campaign committee solicited a contribution from the People’s Republic of 

China (“PRC”). OGC ultimately determined that “[t]he available information does not support finding 

reason to believe that Trump and the Trump Committee knowingly solicited a contribution from” the 

PRC or any of its instrumentalities. Id. at 77. Nevertheless, rather than recommend that the 

Commission find no reason-to-believe on a record which did “not support finding reason to believe,” 

id., OGC recommended dismissing the allegations instead. Id. at 78-79, 81. On such a barren record, 

we determined instead that if there was no reason to believe that Trump solicited the alleged 

contribution, we should vote that there was no reason-to-believe. 

11 FGCR at 7 This complaint and investigation occurred well before the FEC adopted its requirement 

that OGC notify the Office of the Legal Adviser at the U.S. Department of State regarding enforcement 

matters where a foreign sovereign is listed as a respondent. Fed. Election Comm’n, “Agency Procedure 

Concerning the Treatment of Foreign State Respondents at the Initiation of the Enforcement Process,” 

87 Fed. Reg. 11950, Mar. 3, 2022. Even under that policy, however, no notification would have been 

required because neither President Zelensky nor Ukraine was determined to have been a respondent.

FGCR at 7 (noting that President Zelensky never “announce[d] the requested investigations”).

Nevertheless, out of an abundance of caution, the Commission did consult with the Office of the Legal 

Adviser before it voted on the merits of these Matters.

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to have been working for the then-President;12 two of his associates, Lev Parnas and 

Igor Fruman; and the then-President of the United States.13 In sum, the FGCR 

describes these respondents as engaging in an ongoing, “sustained, coordinated effort 

to request, recommend, and pressure Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to 

publicly announce, and thereafter conduct, an investigation into whether, when he 

was Vice President, Joe Biden acted to protect his son, Hunter Biden, by pressuring 

the Ukrainian government to end an anticorruption investigation into a Ukrainian 

energy company, Burisma, of which Hunter was a board member; and an 

investigation into whether, during the 2016 presidential election, the [Democratic 

National Committee] coordinated with Ukraine to support Hillary Clinton, Trump’s 

opponent in that election.”14 

The effort ultimately culminated in a July 25, 2019 phone call between the two 

heads of state, where President Trump informed the Ukrainian government he would 

have the U.S. Attorney General and Respondent Giuliani follow up regarding the 

official actions the United States was seeking from Kyiv.15 Ultimately, however, 

despite the Trump administration’s efforts, which coincided with the White House’s 

decision to pause the distribution16 of security assistance to Ukraine,17 the Ukrainian 

government never opened the requested investigation.

OGC determined that this failed effort constituted a FECA violation because

“Trump, Giuliani, and Parnas asked that Zelensky investigate these two allegations 

and announce the investigation with explicit references to the allegations, for the 

purpose of benefiting Trump’s reelection campaign,” and “[a]s such, [former 

President] Trump and the Trump Committee, [Mr.] Giuliani, and [Mr.] Parnas 

knowingly solicited a foreign national to provide in-kind ‘contributions’—i.e., things 

12 Compare FGCR at 11 (describing Mr. Giuliani’s representations to President Zelensky and on 

Twitter that he was representing Donald Trump in his capacity as a private citizen) with id. at 15 

(recounting testimony from U.S. officials that Mr. Giuliani seemed to have been installed as an 

“alternate channel” for the United States to work with Ukraine and “they would have to work through 

the Giuliani channel to advance U.S.-Ukraine policy goals”).

13 FGCR at 6-32.

14 Id. at 6.

15 Id. at 21-22.

16 Decision at 6, “Matter of: Office of Management and Budget—Withholding of Ukraine Security 

Assistance”, File: B-331564, U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Jan. 16, 2020. 

17 FGCR at 26-31.

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‘of value’ sought ‘for the purpose of influencing’ the 2020 U.S. presidential election—

from Ukrainian nationals.” 18 

Even taking all the facts as assembled by OGC as true, we disagreed.

II. RELEVANT LAW

The Act defines a “contribution” as “includ[ing]...any gift, subscription, loan, 

advance, or deposit of money or anything of value made by any person for the purpose 

of influencing any election for Federal office.”19 We determined that the activities 

allegedly solicited by the respondents here did not fall within that definition, as it is 

properly understood.20

The language “for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office,” 

which is also part of FECA’s definition of an “expenditure,” was deemed 

unconstitutionally vague in that context by the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo.21

18 Id. at 38.

19 52 U.S.C. § 30101(8)(A)(i).

20 The Commission has promulgated regulations which explain that the term “solicit” means to “ask, 

request, or recommend, explicitly or implicitly, that another person make a contribution, donation, 

transfer of funds, or otherwise provide anything of value.” 11 C.F.R. § 110.20(a)(6) (cross-referencing 

11 C.F.R. § 300.2(m)). While some of us have written elsewhere that our solicitation regulations are 

“hardly a model of clarity,” it is at least clear that if the item a person is requesting is not a 

“contribution” under the Act, that does not implicate FECA. Statement of Reasons of Vice Chair 

Dickerson and Comm’r Cooksey at 3, MURs 7340/7609 (“Great Am. Comm.”), June 25, 2021 (Comm’r 

Trainor recused). 

In addition, while President Zelensky and other arms and agents of the government of Ukraine are 

foreign nationals under the Act, 52 U.S.C. § 30121(b)(1); 22 U.S.C. § 611(b)(1), FECA does not prohibit 

talking with or corresponding with foreign nationals or foreign governments (and it would be a very 

odd statute if it did). Unless the respondents solicited a contribution from Ukraine or Ukrainians, their 

conduct is outside the Commission’s narrow remit. Compare 52 U.S.C. § 30121 with 52 U.S.C. § 

30101(8)(A)(i).

21 424 U.S. 1, 78 (1976) (per curiam) (“Congress...wished to promote full disclosure of campaignoriented spending to insure both the reality and appearance of the purity and openness of the federal 

election process. Our task is to construe ‘for the purpose of...influencing,’ incorporated in § 434(e) 

through the definitions of ‘contributions’ and ‘expenditures,’ in a manner that precisely furthers this 

goal”) (emphasis supplied); cf. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) (“If there is an internal 

tension between proscription and protection in the statute, we cannot assume that, in its subsequent 

enforcement, ambiguities will be resolved in favor of adequate protection of First Amendment 

rights...Precision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so closely touching our most precious 

freedoms”) (emphasis supplied). Accordingly, where necessary, the Buckley Court narrowly construed 

that “the critical phrase ‘for the purpose of...influencing’” so as “to avoid the shoals of vagueness.” 

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 77-78 (quotation marks and ellipses in original).

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This constitutionally troublesome language was never revisited by the Congress and 

remains throughout the statute.22 

In Buckley, the Court noted that a number of federal courts had also “given 

that phrase a narrow meaning” in the context of FECA’s “contribution” definition, so 

as “to alleviate various problems in other contexts.”23 But the Buckley Court 

determined that “the use of the phrase present[ed] fewer problems in connection with 

the definition of a contribution” 24 because, as we have explained previously, “the

Court...assumed—correctly, in our view—that the Act would not be interpreted to 

reach anything of any conceivable value,” aimed at influencing a federal election 

outcome, “but instead would be subject to the ‘limiting connotation created by the 

general understanding of what constitutes a political contribution.’”25 And the 

Buckley Court spelled out specifically what it meant by this “general understanding:” 

“Funds provided to a candidate or political party or campaign committee either 

directly or indirectly through an intermediary” and “dollars given to another person 

or organization that are earmarked for political purposes.”26 

That is to say, the Buckley Court assumed that the Commission would 

interpret “things of value” under the Act to mean things given in-kind that hold a 

specific monetary value and are available on the market.27 This gloss must govern 

our application of this provision of the Act.28

22 See Statement of Reasons of Vice Chair Dickerson and Comm’r Trainor at 3, MUR 7181 

(“Independent Women’s Voice”), May 10, 2021 (“Congress did not update the definitions of 

‘contribution,’ ‘expenditure,’ or ‘political committee’ in the years after Buckley”). 

23 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23, n.24 (see citing to United States v. Nat’l Comm. for Impeachment, 469 F.2d 

1135, 1139-1142 (2d Cir. 1972); Am. Civil Liberties U. v. Jennings, 366 F. Supp. 1041, 1055-1057 

(D.D.C. 1973) (three-judge court), vacated as moot sub nom. Staats v. Am. Civil Liberties U., 422 U.S. 

1030 (1975)).

24 Id. at 23, n.24.

25 Statement of Reasons of Vice Chair Dickerson and Comm’rs Cooksey and Trainor at 10, MUR 7272 

(“Democratic Nat’l Comm., et al.”), June 10, 2021 (emphasis in original) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 

23, n.24). 

26 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23, n.24.

27 Statement of Reasons of Vice Chair Dickerson and Comm’rs Cooksey and Trainor at 10, MUR 7721 

(“Democratic Nat’l Comm., et al.”), June 10, 2021 (“If a campaign would otherwise spend money to 

obtain a good or service, it is reasonable to say that a third party providing that good or service to the 

campaign is making a ‘contribution’ under the Act”).

28 See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (other branches must defer to the findings of the federal 

judiciary regarding constitutionality of a law).

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And, indeed, that is how our regulations have traditionally interpreted the 

term. The relevant portion of the Code of Federal Regulations provides that “the term 

anything of value includes all in-kind contributions,” such as “the provisions of any 

goods or services without charge or at a charge that is less than the usual and normal 

charge for such goods and services....Examples of such goods or services include, but 

are not limited to: Securities, facilities, equipment, supplies, personnel, advertising 

services, membership lists, and mailing lists.”29 This regulation is faithful to the

Buckley Court’s guidance that departing from the “general understanding”30 of a 

contribution would invite a host of “grave constitutional and prudential concerns.”31

The Commission’s decision not to find probable cause in MUR 7271 

(“Democratic National Committee”) is instructive here.32 In that case, Alexandra 

Chalupa, an employee of the Democratic National Committee (“DNC”), engaged in a 

long-running effort to “‘take down [then 2016 U.S. presidential candidate Donald] 

Trump’” by exposing that the Republican nominee’s then-campaign manager, Paul 

Manafort, was “a national security risk to Ukraine and United States.”33 Chalupa 

and “DNC leadership,” including the national party’s communications director, 

provided messaging to the Ukrainian ambassador to the United States, and plotted 

to arrange for the then-President of Ukraine, Pietro Poroshenko, to publicly blast 

Manafort, and by extension, the then-Republican frontrunner, Donald Trump.34

Ultimately, just as in the instant case, the Ukrainian President never provided 

the requested deliverable. Nevertheless, just as here, OGC argued that Ms. Chalupa 

and the DNC solicited a contribution from a foreign national by encouraging 

“Poroshenko...in his official capacity as the Ukrainian head of state, [to] disparage 

 

29 11 C.F.R. § 100.52(d)(1).

30 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23, n.24.

31 Statement of Reasons of Vice Chair Dickerson and Comm’rs Cooksey and Trainor at 2, MUR 7721 

(“Democratic Nat’l Comm., et al.”), June 10, 2021. Cf. supra at 6, n.23. Moreover, such a narrow reading 

is not merely required by the First Amendment, but also is favored by the statutory canon of 

construction known as ejusdem generis. Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124, 128 (1936). 

32 Certification at 1, MUR 7271 (“Democratic Nat’l Comm., et al.”), Apr. 8, 2021.

33 Statement of Reasons of Vice Chair Dickerson and Comm’rs Cooksey and Trainor at 3, MUR 7721 

(“Democratic Nat’l Comm., et al.”), June 10, 2021 (quoting Chalupa Aff. at 21). 

34 Id. at 3-6. President Poroshenko modified the event to eliminate the live question-and-answer 

session. Id. at 6.

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Manafort (and, by extension the Trump campaign)”35 because “requesting that 

Poroshenko disseminate negative information about Manafort, under the theory that 

a statement to the media that could be politically damaging to a candidate is a ‘thing 

of value’ qualifying as a contribution under the Act.”36 Four commissioners voted 

against OGC’s recommendations then, and three of us noted at that time our 

contention that an “official act of a government official—domestic or foreign—will 

often fall outside the Buckley Court’s general understanding of what constitutes a 

political contribution.”37 Just so here. There is simply no policeable line that 

distinguishes the request for negative information about a political opponent made 

by Alexandra Chalupa to the Ukrainian President from those made by then-President

Trump and his agents to the Ukrainian President.

Two additional concerns further counseled in favor of our decision not to adopt 

OGC’s expansive view of this agency’s authority.

The first is that, leaving aside the narrow scope given to the term “anything of 

value” by the Buckley decision and our own regulations, the Supreme Court has 

recently explained that administrative agencies ought to tread carefully before 

asserting expansive authority without the express command of the Congress, even if

such an “assertion[]” has “a colorable textual basis.”38 Here, OGC asked the 

Commission to assert jurisdiction over a foreign state’s decision to use its domestic 

law enforcement authority pursuant to a request from a sitting American president.

All efforts to distinguish the facts here cannot alter the plain, legal truth that acting 

on such a theory would be unprecedented and inject the Commission into 

extraordinarily sensitive areas of foreign and national security policy. The phrase 

“thing of value” in our enabling statute—the only legal tether for such a theory—

cannot possibly bear the weight OGC would place upon it. Nor is there the slightest 

indication—in legislative history, our budget, or the complete lack of institutional 

capacity to consider classified or highly-sensitive information—indicating that 

Congress intended us to take on the role OGC has repeatedly recommended we 

assume. 

35 Id. at 2.

36 Id. at 1 (quoting FGCR at 17-23, MUR 7271 (“Democratic Nat’l Comm.”), Mar. 15, 2019. 

37 Statement of Reasons of Vice Chair Dickerson and Comm’rs Cooksey and Trainor at 11, MUR 7721 

(“Democratic Nat’l Comm., et al.”), June 10, 2021 (quotation marks omitted). As we noted, this is not 

a hard-and-fast prohibition: “[f]or instance, although a check drawn on a foreign treasury and 

delivered to a campaign would presumably involve official acts of the relevant foreign government, it 

would also clearly be ‘a gift of money’ and hence a contribution under the Act.” Id. But the alleged 

contribution here is hardly the functional equivalent of a cash donation to the Trump committee.

38 W. Va. v. Envt’l Protection Agency, 597 U.S. __; 142 S. Ct. 2587, 2609 (2022).

 

MUR764500352
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Thus, even in a world without Buckley, without ejusdem generis, and without 

our regulatory guidance, the major questions doctrine, which holds that 

“[e]xtraordinary grants of regulatory authority are rarely accomplished through 

modest words, vague terms, or subtle devices,” would still militate against OGC’s

expansive reading of the Act.39

Secondly, it is noteworthy that President Trump sought to arrange for the 

Ukrainian government to conduct its dual investigations using the powers of his 

office. His alleged solicitation involved direct communications at the head of state 

level and formal suspension of the expenditure of security assistance “to ensure that 

the funds were not spent ‘in a manner that could conflict with the President’s foreign 

policy.’”40

And the Act specifically precludes enforcement against “the Federal 

Government or any authority of the Federal Government.” 41 At least as regards 

official acts of government officials—and surely that includes the President—

Congress has precluded precisely the roving authority OGC seeks. The Commission 

is empowered to regulate the conduct of a narrow range of activity related to 

campaign spending, not the conduct of official policy. Policing those especially 

sensitive activities is left to others, including the Congress itself. Therefore, just as a 

member of Congress’s request for possibly harmful information about a potential 

political opponent in the course of conducting a Congressional investigation cannot 

be transmogrified into a contribution, neither may the President’s conduct of foreign 

policy.42 Remedies for abuse of those authorities lie elsewhere.

 

39 Id. (quotation marks and brackets omitted); Peter J. Wallison, “Reclaiming Legislative Power from 

the Administrative State,” Law & Liberty, Aug. 2, 2022 (“[T]he so-called “major questions doctrine”—

which holds simply that where an administrative agency makes an important and far-reaching 

decision that is not clearly based on its statutory authority, it will bear a significant burden to prove 

that its interpretation was authorized by Congress”).

40 Decision at 6, “Matter of: Office of Management and Budget—Withholding of Ukraine Security 

Assistance”, File: B-331564, U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Jan. 16, 2020 (quoting OMB Resp. at 9).

41 52 U.S.C. § 30101(11) (emphasis supplied). This definition is essentially duplicated in FEC 

regulation, which defines person as “an individual, partnership, committee, association, corporation, 

labor organization, and any other organization, or group of persons, but does not include the Federal 

government or any authority of the Federal government.” 11 C.F.R. § 100.10.

42 Allowing otherwise would lead to absurdities, such converting a President’s request for a hostile 

foreign power to engage in peace negotiations to wind down an unpopular war, if conducted during an 

election year, becoming the illegal solicitation of a foreign national contribution. 

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CONCLUSION

The Federal Election Campaign Act, as interpreted by the courts, regulates 

with precision. There is no legal basis whatsoever for believing that Congress 

intended the FEC to police official acts of the government that may be intended to 

assist an officeholder’s reelection. Many other legal authorities and law enforcement 

bodies are tasked with that charge. They do so pursuant to clear authority, and they 

enjoy budgets and resources appropriate to the task. The FEC does not, and to 

pretend otherwise is myopic self-promotion. 

Accordingly, we voted that there was no reason-to-believe that the respondents 

knowingly solicited a contribution from a foreign national.

_________________________________ _________________________

Allen Dickerson Date

Chairman

_________________________________ _________________________

Sean J. Cooksey Date

Commissioner

_________________________________ _________________________

James E. “Trey” Trainor, III Date

Commissioner

August 31, 2022

August 31, 2022

August 31, 2022

MUR764500354