United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

December 2001 ARMY READINESS

Readiness Improved

for Selected Divisions,

but Manning

Imbalances Persist

GAO-02-98
Page i GAO-02-98 Army Readiness

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Background 3

Divisions Report They Can Conduct Wartime Operations 6

Impact of Peacekeeping Missions on Unit Readiness Has Varied 19

Conclusion 21

Recommendation for Executive Action 21

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 21

Scope and Methodology 22

Appendix I Comments From the Department of Defense 25

Appendix II GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 27

Tables

Table 1: Peacekeeping Missions and Personnel Deployed for

Selected Divisions (Feb. 1998 Through June 2001) 4

Table 2: Divisions Reporting Selected Military Occupational

Specialties Shortages (Jan. Through June 2001) 11

Table 3: Selected Military Occupational Specialty Fill Rates and

Authorizations (May 2001) 12

Figures

Figure 1: Deployment Timeline and Number of Personnel Deployed

for Selected Divisions (Feb. 1998 Through June 2001) 5

Figure 2: Enlisted Personnel Manning Levels for the Five Selected

Divisions (Dec. 1999 Through May 2001) 8

Figure 3: Enlisted Personnel Grade Levels in the Five Selected

Divisions (May 2001) 9

Figure 4: Enlisted Personnel Fill Rates by Military Occupational

Specialty in the Five Selected Divisions (May 2001) 10

Figure 5: Aggregate Average Mission Capable Rate for Ground and

Air Systems for Five Selected Divisions (Jan. Through

June 2001) 17

Contents
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Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

GAO General Accounting Office

METL Mission Essential Task List
Page 1 GAO-02-98 Army Readiness

December 20, 2001

The Honorable Bob Stump

Chairman, Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable John M. McHugh

Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Personnel

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

In 1998 we testified that personnel shortages, assignment priorities, and

frequent peacekeeping deployments were degrading the combat readiness

of the Army's five later-deploying divisions.1

 In October 2000, you

requested that we follow up our 1998 testimony to examine a number of

issues associated with the readiness of the five divisions that had been

considered later-deploying. In July 2001, we reported our initial

observations on personnel readiness issues for these forces, particularly,

the progress in achieving the goals of the Army Chief of Staff's manning

initiative of October 1999.2

 This initiative was designed to ensure that all

active Army units are assigned 100 percent of enlisted personnel in terms

of the authorized numbers, grades, and skills needed to perform wartime

missions. Since that report, terrorists attacked the World Trade Center and

the Pentagon, and the Bush administration formulated a new military

strategy. These developments may change how, when, and where these

divisions will be used—as evidenced by the deployment of soldiers from

the 10th Infantry Division in Operation Enduring Freedom.

 1

 Such forces deploy in the event of a second simultaneous or nearly simultaneous majortheater war, or as reinforcements for a larger-than-expected first war. The Army has 10

active combat divisions, 4 of which—the 82nd Airborne, 101st Air Assault, 3rd Infantry, and

1st Cavalry—are "contingency" divisions, the first to deploy to a major-theater war. The

2nd Infantry Division, while not a contingency force, is currently deployed in Korea. The

remaining five divisions—the 1st Armored, 1st Infantry, 4th Infantry, 10th Infantry, and

25th Infantry—are the focus of this report. For a transcript of our testimony, see Military

Readiness: Observations on Personnel Readiness in Later Deploying Army Divisions

(GAO/T-NSIAD-98-126, Mar. 20, 1998).

2

 See Military Readiness: Preliminary Observations on the Army's Manning Initiative

(GAO-01-979R, July 26, 2001).

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, DC 20548
Page 2 GAO-02-98 Army Readiness

This report, which was largely completed prior to the events of September

11, 2001, focuses on the other unit-readiness1

 issues you requested that we

review. We analyzed (1) the current state of the combat readiness of

personnel, training, and equipment in these divisions and (2) the effect of

peacekeeping missions on that readiness.

On the basis of our examination of the Army's official readiness and

training reports and discussions with division personnel, as of June 2001,

the five divisions reported they were ready and able to perform all or most

of their combat missions. Throughout the review period, these divisions

reported that their readiness was at high levels both overall and in the

specific areas of personnel, training, and equipment. Enlisted personnel

levels were at or near 100 percent of their authorization compared with

93 percent as we reported in March 1998. The divisions also increased the

numbers of assigned personnel by grades to more than 95 percent and

skills (i.e., occupational specialties) to greater than 100 percent by May

2001.

These staffing improvements were due largely to the Army Chief of Staff's

manning initiative. However, imbalances of occupational specialty staffing

levels for certain combat support skills continue to exist among the five

divisions. In one specialty, for example, one division had no positions

filled, while another was staffed at 119 percent of its authorized level. In

the area of training, each division met its requirements for training to

prepare for combat missions. Reported readiness based on the amount of

equipment on hand and the serviceability of that equipment2

 was high,

indicating that the five divisions were able to perform their combat

 1

 Unit readiness is the ability of units to accomplish their assigned missions. Commanders

periodically report their units' readiness via the Status of Resources and Training System,

which uses various indicators to assess the readiness of personnel, training, equipment,

and the unit overall. Commanders also provide comments in these status reports when a

unit's condition needs explanation or discussion. A commander cannot change the system's

measurement of personnel, training, and equipment readiness, but he can change the unit's

overall readiness level if he believes that it does not truly represent the unit's status.

2 “Equipment readiness” is indicated in two unit status report resource areas—equipment

on hand status and equipment serviceability status. “Equipment on hand” indicates whether

units have their principal weapon systems and major equipment items compared with their

wartime requirements. “Equipment serviceability” indicates how well units are maintaining

their on hand reportable equipment. The serviceability rate is a percentage based on the

number of days that reportable equipment is available to the unit and fully able to do its

mission compared with the number of days it could have been available.

Results in Brief
Page 3 GAO-02-98 Army Readiness

missions, although there were shortages of some items and difficulties in

maintaining some equipment. Equipment shortages were attributed to

outdated authorization documents and the incomplete fielding of new

equipment. According to readiness reports, however, these shortages

generally did not degrade readiness. Maintenance problems were primarily

attributed to the shortage of personnel with specific repair skills and the

difficulties encountered with old equipment.

Army officials found it difficult to quantify the varied effects of

peacekeeping operations on the five divisions' readiness. According to

division commanders, participation in peacekeeping operations improved

readiness: it enhanced training for some support activities and provided

leadership opportunities for junior officers and senior enlisted personnel.

However, peacekeeping operations can also have negative effects. For

example, absences from home stations due to peacekeeping can erode

war-fighting skills, especially those that require the maneuvering of large

armored or infantry formations. In November 1999, the Army recognizing

the significance of ongoing peacekeeping operations and their effect on

reported readiness, issued supplemental readiness reporting guidance to

assist commanders in determining the availability of unit assets deployed

for peacekeeping operations for redeployment to a war. As a result of the

new guidance, reported readiness significantly improved for two divisions

in the following month. Additionally, the guidance acknowledged the need

for deliberate planning efforts for disengagement, recovery, reconstitution,

and redeployment of Army forces and equipment committed to current

and future peackeeping operations. Divisions have developed

disengagement plans designed to quickly recover and retrain units

returning from peackeeping operations to their critical war-fighting skills.

To address staffing imbalances for occupational specialties common to all

its divisions, we are recommending that the Army develop and implement

a plan to address those imbalances in making staffing decisions affecting

the divisions and monitor its progress in alleviating the imbalances. DOD

concurred with our recommendation.

The Army maintains 10 active divisions—6 heavy and 4 light, each of

which is assigned 10,000 to 15,000 personnel. Heavy divisions are armored

or mechanized and equipped with tanks, fighting vehicles, and attack

helicopters. Light forces are airborne, air assault, and infantry divisions

tailored for operations on restricted terrain, such as mountains, jungles, or

urban areas. We reviewed the following five divisions:

Background
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• 1st Armored Division—Also known as "Old Ironsides," is a heavy armored

division with headquarters and three brigades in Germany and a fourth

brigade at Fort Riley, Kansas.

• 1st Infantry Division—Also known as the "Big Red One," is a mechanized

division with two brigades and headquarters in Germany and a third

brigade at Fort Riley, Kansas.

• 4th Infantry Division—Also known as "Ivy," is a mechanized division with

two brigades and its headquarters at Fort Hood, Texas, and a third brigade

at Fort Carson, Colorado.

• 10th Infantry Division—Also known as the "Mountain" Division, is a light

infantry division with headquarters and two brigades at Fort Drum, New

York.

• 25th Infantry Division—Also known as "Tropic Lightning," is a light

infantry division with headquarters and two brigades at Schofield

Barracks, Hawaii, and a third brigade at Fort Lewis, Washington.

In addition to preparing to fight and win the nation’s wars, these divisions

have deployed soldiers and units periodically to peacekeeping operations.

For example, since 1995 units from the 1st Armored, 1st Infantry, and

10th Infantry divisions have deployed at various times to Bosnia as part of

an international peacekeeping force. Since February 1998, these divisions

have deployed 12 brigade-size units and supported numerous smaller

deployments. (See table 1.)

Table 1: Peacekeeping Missions and Personnel Deployed for Selected Divisions (Feb. 1998 Through June 2001)

Division

Brigade-sized

deployments

Battalion-sized

deployments

Deployments

< 200 personnel

Total

deployments

1st Infantry 8 1 0 9

1st Armored 4 1 0 5

10th Infantry 0 4 4 8

25th Infantry 0 1 15 16

4th Infantry 0 2 0 2

Total 12 9 19 40

Legend

< means less than

Source: GAO's analysis of divisions' data.

Nearly 83 percent of all the deployments—to include all the brigade-sized

deployments—were to the Balkans, while the remaining deployments

were to the Middle East and East Timor. (See fig. 1.)
Page 5 GAO-02-98 Army Readiness

Figure 1: Deployment Timeline and Number of Personnel Deployed for Selected Divisions (Feb. 1998 Through June 2001)

Legend

TFAS = Task Force Able Sentry

SFOR = Stabilization Force—Bosnia

KFOR = Kosovo Force—NATO Operation Joint Guardian

TFHawk = Task Force Hawk—Albania

MFO = Multinational Force Observers
Page 6 GAO-02-98 Army Readiness

Note: Each deployment shown on the timeline is placed beneath the fiscal year during which it began,

first showing the name of the operation, followed by the number of personnel deployed, then the

number of months deployed. If the data were not available, they are so indicated.

a

According to a 10th Infantry division official, this number is an estimate of the number of soldiers

deployed during 1998 for operations in Bosnia.

b

The 4th Infantry Division deployed two battalions to Bosnia during fiscal years 1998–2000. However,

the division could not provide detailed data showing the total number of personnel, exact year, or

length of time deployed.

Source: GAO's analysis of the Department of the Army's and divisions' data.

Two of these divisions have been involved in transformation activities. The

4th Infantry is the Army's experimental division for advanced war-fighting

concepts, and part of a brigade of the 25th Infantry is designated to test

transformation concepts.

The manning initiative directed all Army units to be staffed at 100 percent

of their authorized personnel by numbers, grades, and skills3

—and

thereafter to maintain those staffing levels—so that they have the

personnel needed for wartime missions. The initiative redressed staffing

imbalances that had developed in part because staffing priority had been

given to the contingency divisions. It included certain measures to ensure

the maintenance of adequate readiness; for example, units are to have no

fewer than 70 percent of authorized personnel. The Chief of Staff also

emphasized retention and described recruitment as his number one task.

Although the specific details are classified, each of the five divisions

reported they can conduct most or all of their wartime missions.

Throughout January to June 2001, these units reported their overall

combat readiness and their readiness in personnel, training, and

equipment to be at high levels. The division, brigade, and battalion

commanders we interviewed considered the five divisions able to perform

their wartime missions. Although the personnel levels for all five divisions

are at or near 100 percent of the enlisted personnel that they are

authorized, each has some shortages in grades and skills. In at least some

cases, the redistribution of existing soldiers would fill these staffing

shortages. Training also improved, which Army officials attributed to (1)

 3

 Skills are grouped by grade as follows: skill level 1, E1–E4 (lowest grades of enlisted

personnel: Private, Private First Class, Corporal, and Specialist); level 2, E5–E6 (mid-level

noncommissioned officers: Sergeant, and Staff Sergeant); and level 3, E7–E9 (senior

noncommissioned officers: Sergeant First Class, Master Sergeant, First Sergeant, Sergeant

Major, Command Sergeant Major, and Sergeant Major of the Army).

Divisions Report They

Can Conduct Wartime

Operations
Page 7 GAO-02-98 Army Readiness

the increase in the number of personnel, prompted by the manning

initiative, and (2) the implementation of a new funding policy for fiscal

year 2001 that restricted the use of training funds to pay for other

expenses. However, the Army could not show specifically how the new

funding policy improved training or unit readiness. In terms of the amount

of equipment on hand and its serviceability, readiness was high during

fiscal year 2001, although some items were in short supply and some

equipment difficult to maintain. Shortages were attributed to outdated

authorizations and the incomplete fielding of new equipment; according to

the Army's readiness reports, equipment shortages generally did not

degrade readiness. Equipment maintenance problems were primarily

attributed to the shortage of personnel with specific repair skills and the

difficulties associated with maintaining old equipment.

As we reported in July 2001, the manning initiative was largely responsible

for staffing the reviewed divisions at authorized enlisted levels and, as a

result, improving personnel readiness. For the time period January

through May 2001, each of the five divisions maintained overall numbers

of enlisted personnel at nearly 100 percent of authorizations,4

 compared

with the 93 percent we reported in March 1998. (See fig. 2.)

 4

 Our analysis did not include personnel data for the 25th Infantry Division’s 1st Brigade,

located at Ft. Lewis, Washington.

Manning Initiative Has

Increased Personnel Fill

Rates, but Shortages in

Some Skills and Grade

Levels Persist
Page 8 GAO-02-98 Army Readiness

Figure 2: Enlisted Personnel Manning Levels for the Five Selected Divisions (Dec. 1999 Through May 2001)

Note: Our analysis does not include personnel data for the 25th Infantry Division’s 1st Brigade, located

at Ft. Lewis, Washington.

Source: GAO's analysis of the Army Personnel Command’s data.

The divisions also increased, on average, the numbers of assigned

personnel by grade to more than 95 percent (see fig. 3) and skills to

greater than 100 percent (see fig. 4) by May 2001.
Page 9 GAO-02-98 Army Readiness

Figure 3: Enlisted Personnel Grade Levels in the Five Selected Divisions (May 2001)

Note: Our analysis does not include personnel data for the 25th Infantry Division’s 1st Brigade, located

at Ft. Lewis, Washington.

Source: GAO's analysis of the Army Personnel Command’s data.
Page 10 GAO-02-98 Army Readiness

Figure 4: Enlisted Personnel Fill Rates by Military Occupational Specialty in the Five Selected Divisions (May 2001)

Note: Our analysis does not include personnel data for the 25th Infantry Division’s 1st Brigade, located

at Ft. Lewis, Washington.

Source: GAO’s analysis of the Army Personnel Command’s data.

According to Army officials, the increase in personnel has had a great

impact not only on personnel readiness but on overall readiness as well.

They believe that the increase in personnel overall, as well as in grade and

skill, increased the number of personnel available to train and perform

maintenance activities, thereby improving overall readiness.

Though manning has improved significantly over the past 2 years,

divisions still have shortages in certain combat support skills that Army

commanders consider critical to their wartime mission. For example, at

some time in those months, all five division commanders considered their

staffing of specialty 96R—ground surveillance system operator—to be

critically short. One commander listed it as critical in all 6 months, while

another listed it for 5; the others did so in at least 2 of the 6 months.
Page 11 GAO-02-98 Army Readiness

According to Army officials at the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for

Personnel, this particular specialty has poor retention for initial term

soldiers; retention is better for mid-term and career soldiers. Table 2

shows how many division commanders in a particular month reported a

shortage for the specified military occupational specialty.

Table 2: Divisions Reporting Selected Military Occupational Specialties Shortages

(Jan. Through June 2001)

2001

Military occupational specialty Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June

27E — Land combat electronic missile

system repairer 11000 0

63Z — Mechanical maintenance supervisor 0 1 1 0 0 0

96H — Imagery ground station operator 10000 0

96R — Ground surveillance system operator 44422 2

97E — Interrogator 1 1 1 2 2 3

98J — Electronic intelligence

interceptor/analyst 0 1 1 1 1 1

Source: GAO's analysis of data from the Army's Unit Status Reporting System.

In addition to the shortages reported at the division level in table 2,

brigade and battalion commanders told us they have experienced

shortages such as aircraft electricians, aviation mechanics; and aircraft

power train repairers. Even though brigade and battalion commanders

reported some of these critical shortages on monthly reports, the

shortages might not have been reported at the division level.5

Our analysis of fill rates for occupational skill specialties shows that one

area that the Army needs to address is the imbalance of occupational

specialty staffing levels among the five divisions.6

 In some instances, one

or more divisions have too few soldiers for a particular skill, while others

 5

 Division commanders have the authority to subjectively report or not report these

shortages on monthly reports on the basis of their perceptions of how essential the

specialties are to performing their mission.

6

 In March 2000, we reported that aggregate measures of retention mask significant

reductions that occurred among specific groups of enlisted military personnel in different

occupational specialties. While the types of occupational groups that saw retention

declines differed somewhat in each service, the majority of them were concentrated in the

areas of communications and intelligence and electrical and mechanical equipment repair.

See Military Personnel: Systematic Analyses Needed to Monitor Retention in Key

Careers and Occupations (GAO/NSIAD-00-60, Mar. 8, 2000).
Page 12 GAO-02-98 Army Readiness

have more soldiers than authorized. As shown in table 3, the Army fill rate

for these selected specialties ranged from 74 to 101 percent, yet the rates

for the five divisions ranged from zero to 133 percent. For example, for

specialty 96H—imagery ground station operator7

—the Army fill rate was

74 percent, yet the 10th Infantry Division's fill rate was zero percent,

compared with 119 percent for the 4th Infantry Division.

Table 3: Selected Military Occupational Specialty Fill Rates and Authorizations (May

2001)

Military occupational specialty

Army fill

rate

Range of

authorizations

among

divisions

Range of fill

rates among

divisions

27E — Land combat electronic missile

system repairer 101% 12-58 67%–125%

63Z — Mechanical maintenance

supervisor 99% 19-40 79%–103%

96H — Imagery ground station operator 74% 25-37 0%–119%

96R — Ground surveillance system

operator 84% 58-59 75%–90%

97E — Interrogator 89% 10-12 60%–100%

98J — Electronic intelligence

interceptor/analyst 85% 5-9 60%–133%

Note: Our analysis does not include personnel data for the 25th Infantry Division’s 1st Brigade, located

at Ft. Lewis, Washington.

Source: GAO's analysis of the Army Personnel Command's data.

The fill rates shown in table 3 are as of May 2001, but in our opinion are

generally representative of the trend from December 1999 through May

2001. Our review indicates that, in at least some of these cases, the

redistribution of existing soldiers would fill such staffing shortages. For

example, for specialty 27E—land combat electronic missile system

repairer—redistribution would fill three of the five divisions to 100 percent

and the other two to 96 percent.

As we reported earlier,8

 Army officials think it unlikely that the service can

ever fill divisions at 100 percent in the grades and skills required; they

 7

 Imagery ground station operator supervises or participates in detecting, locating, and

tracking ground targets and rotary wing and slow-moving fixed wing aircraft.

8

 See GAO-01-979R.
Page 13 GAO-02-98 Army Readiness

estimate that about 94 percent may be the best they can do. Changes in

requirements can be prompted by a need for greater expertise in a skill, by

the unforeseen alteration of a mission, or by upheavals in global politics.

For instance, the end of the Cold War led the Army to reduce the number

of Russian interpreters it needs, while increasing its requirements for

Spanish interpreters. Also, personnel with highly technical skills may not

be easy to recruit, so a time lag to fill these slots is often inevitable.

Given the dynamics of rapidly evolving military technologies and the skills

needed to employ those technologies, in concert with recent changes to

the U.S. national security and military strategies, it is a challenging task for

the Army to achieve its goal to man all of its active component divisions at

100 percent of its authorized enlisted personnel by the skills and grades

needed. Army officials acknowledge there have been problems with

recruiting and retaining personnel for these specialties, and several of

them will be placed on the Army's top-25 recruiting list in fiscal year 2002.9

However, some of the specialties will remain difficult to staff because of

(1) difficulties in recruiting personnel who can learn the skill; (2) lengthy

advanced individual training courses; (3) small authorizations that, with

the loss of a single soldier, can create drastic shortages in operating

strength;10 and (4) incomplete equipment fielding and therefore the

personnel are not yet needed. For example, the Army Recruiting

Command added the specialty 98J—electronic intelligence

interceptor/analyst, to its top-25 recruiting list at the priority-1 level for

fiscal year 2002. However, the five divisions are authorized only five to

nine positions, so the loss of a single soldier can create drastic shortages

in operating strength. At the time of our review, two of the divisions still

had empty slots for specialty 98J—electronic intelligence

interceptor/analyst.

 9

 Each year, the Army targets 25 military occupational specialties as its top recruiting

priorities on the basis of, but not limited to, (1) projected operational strength, (2) fill

priority, (3) inclusion on the Army's 10 most critical military occupational specialty list, (4)

initial training attrition, (5) training course length, and (6) recruiting history.

10 The occupational specialties included in tables 2 and 3, although considered low density

by the Army, have Army-wide (active component) authorizations that range from more

than 500 to around 850 personnel, compared with two of the Army's highest-density

occupational specialties which have Army-wide authorizations that range from around

13,000 to more than 24,000 personnel.
Page 14 GAO-02-98 Army Readiness

According to division, brigade, and battalion commanders, shortages of

personnel for combat or combat support occupational specialties can

result in

• ineffective training that is not accomplished as intended by Army doctrine

because troops learn "work arounds" rather than the skills that will be

needed when they go to war and

• impaired ability to sustain critical combat equipment in a high-intensity

conflict.

On the basis of our examination of the Army's official readiness and

training reports and discussions with division personnel, as of June 2001,

the five divisions reported they met their training requirements. Reported

training readiness11 improved early in fiscal year 2001, remained constant

through May 2001 for three of the divisions, and was constant throughout

the fiscal year for the other two. The commanders of the divisions

attributed this improvement to the manning increase. As their units'

complement of personnel more closely reflected the numbers, grades, and

skills required for successful combat, their ability to train increased.

During our review, none of the divisions reported being untrained in any

mission-essential task.12

Even though commanders stated that training readiness was at high levels,

some told us that the lack of experienced senior enlisted personnel in

equipment repair (such as the military occupational specialty 63Z—

mechanical maintenance supervisor, identified in tables 2 and 3) impeded

development and on-the-job training of newer soldiers. Senior personnel

are very knowledgeable concerning specific equipment, its peculiarities,

and troubleshooting techniques. Without them, it takes longer for newer

soldiers to become proficient in repairing equipment.

The Army also attributed training improvements to a new funding policy

restricting the use of training funds to pay for other expenses, such as base

 11 An assessment of the unit's ability to perform its wartime missions.

12 These tasks are derived from an analysis of a unit's assigned wartime missions. Missionessential tasks for the reviewed divisions include deploying, attacking the enemy,

conducting area defense, sustaining the force by providing personnel and logistical

support, and protecting the force from enemy attack and from the effects of nuclear,

biological, and chemical hazards.

Divisions Reported

Improvements

in Training to Conduct

Combat Operations
Page 15 GAO-02-98 Army Readiness

operations and real property maintenance. However, the Army could not

demonstrate this effect. Earlier this year we reported that, during fiscal

years 1997–2000, the Army obligated almost $1 billion less than the nearly

$4.8 billion that the Congress had provided for training.13 We found no

evidence that this reduction in funding caused a cancellation or delay of

any planned training.

Also as previously reported, since at least the mid-1990s, the Army has

obligated millions of dollars less than it budgets for the conduct of

training. 14 For example, training in tanks has not been at the 800-mile

level.15 As of June 2001, with only one quarter remaining in the fiscal year,

it appeared that two divisions—the 1st Infantry and 1st Armored—were

still not training at the 800-mile level. Therefore, the Army cannot pinpoint

a finite correlation between the level of training funds received and the

level of training readiness reported. According to division commanders,

however, a primary drawback of the new funding restriction has been a

decreased ability to maintain training ranges. Before the funding policy

was changed, commanders could use training funds to pay for the

maintenance and operation of these ranges.

On the basis of our examination of the Army's official readiness reports

and discussions with division personnel, as of June 2001, the five divisions

reported the amount of equipment on hand and the serviceability of that

equipment was in a high state of readiness, indicating that the five

divisions expected to be able to perform their combat missions. Although

the Army met its goals for having certain percentages of equipment on

hand and ready to perform its mission, some units reported shortages of

certain equipment items and difficulty with maintaining old equipment.

 13 See Defense Budget: Need to Better Inform Congress on Funding for Army Division

Training (GAO-01-902, July 5, 2001).

14 See GAO-01-902.

15 The Army's Combined Arms Training Strategy identifies (1) mission-essential tasks that

units must be able to perform in time of war and (2) the type of training events or exercises

and the frequency with which they should be performed in order to be ready in those tasks.

It has established that the tanks will be driven, on average, 800 miles each year for home

station training—the level of training needed to have a combat-ready force—and its budget

request states that it include funds necessary to support that training. However, after

publication of our report, Defense Budget: Need to Better Inform Congress on Funding for

Army Division Training (GAO-01-902, July 5, 2001), the Army budgeted for only 730 miles

in it’s fiscal year 2002 budget.

Division's Reported

Equipment Readiness

High, but Some Shortages

and Maintenance Problems

Exist
Page 16 GAO-02-98 Army Readiness

Division officials attributed equipment shortages to outdated authorization

documents and the incomplete fielding of new equipment. Although unit

commanders cited their top 5 to 10 equipment shortages in monthly

readiness reports, they told us that these shortages did not degrade

readiness. For example, one unit told us that several years ago, new

secure-communications sets for radios were added to its authorized

equipment list. The equipment started a phased entry into the supply

system instead of an entry at the fully authorized level. The result of this

phased equipment fielding is that the unit still does not have these vital

sets for all its radios as authorized.

All the divisions reported the serviceability of their equipment to be at

very high levels of readiness during the period of our review. Our analysis

of the five divisions' reported mission capable rates16 showed that the

average mission capable rates for the divisions' ground and air systems

exceeded the Army's mission capable goals for those systems. (See fig. 5.)

 16 Mission capable rates (also referred to as serviceability rates) are the primary indicator

used by a commander to determine equipment readiness. A mission capable rate indicates

the percentage of time during a particular reporting period that a piece of equipment can

fulfill at least one or more of its missions. During each reporting period, commanders

report an aggregate mission capable rate for all ground systems and air systems.
Page 17 GAO-02-98 Army Readiness

Figure 5: Aggregate Average Mission Capable Rate for Ground and Air Systems for

Five Selected Divisions (Jan. Through June 2001)

Note: One air system has an Army mission capable goal of 70 percent versus 75 percent for the

other air systems.

Source: GAO's analysis of data from the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics.

The aggregate average mission capable rates for the divisions' ground and

air systems exceeded the Army's mission capable goals during the time of

our review. However, we recently reported that although some Army

aviation systems generally met their mission capable goals, spare parts

shortages have adversely affected operations and led to inefficient

maintenance practices that have lowered the morale of maintenance

personnel.17 Although generally meeting their mission capable goals

indicates that parts shortages have not affected mission capability, supply

 17 See Army Inventory: Parts Shortages Are Impacting Operations and Maintenance

Effectiveness (GAO-01-772, July 31, 2001).
Page 18 GAO-02-98 Army Readiness

availability rates and the cannibalization18 of parts from one aircraft to

another indicate that spare parts shortages have indeed been a problem.

According to division officials, by having more people available to make

repairs, the increased numbers of personnel have helped units maintain

high equipment readiness. Maintenance problems that do exist are largely

due to the shortage of personnel with specific repair skills—aircraft

electricians, aviation mechanics, missile system repairers, and aircraft

powertrain repairers—especially at the more experienced supervisory

level, or difficulties encountered trying to maintain old equipment. For

example, at one unit the lack of experienced repair personnel resulted in

most of its mortar guns’ failing a recent depot-level inspection. At the unit

level, the repair personnel responsible for the inspections were not

experienced enough to find the defects. If the unit had been called to

deploy prior to the depot-level inspection, 4 of its 18 guns would have been

incapable of performing their missions.

Army officials at another division said they did not always have the skilled

personnel needed to fix new equipment. For instance, a unit had received

new equipment to improve fire accuracy, but it lacked the trained

personnel to repair the item. According to unit officials, if this item were

to break during wartime, the unit's ability to sustain combat would be

affected because the item would have to be sent to a depot for repair.

The maintenance of old equipment also presents a challenge. In June 1999,

we reported that aging Army equipment was becoming increasingly

difficult to maintain and that unit mechanics were devoting increasing

amounts of time to keep equipment operating.19 During our review, one

battalion commander at Fort Riley20 told us that, every time the unit uses

its nearly 30-year-old M-1A1 tanks for training, they break down; if he had

to depend upon these tanks in wartime, he said, he would not have

confidence in accomplishing his mission. His brigade commander,

 18 The Army's definition of cannibalization, referred to as "controlled exchange," is the

removal of components from equipment designated for disposal.

19 We also reported that serviceability rates did not provide a good assessment of

equipment condition because equipment that is old, unreliable, and difficult to maintain

may still be reported serviceable. See Military Readiness: Readiness Reports Do Not

Provide a Clear Assessment of Army Equipment (GAO/NSIAD-99-119, June 16, 1999).

20 Two separate brigades are located at Fort Riley; one is attached to the 1st Armored

Division, while the other is attached to the 1st Infantry Division.
Page 19 GAO-02-98 Army Readiness

however, maintained that the brigade, as a whole, would be able to carry

out its mission with the equipment on hand and equipment prepositioned

in-theater. In October 2000, a team from the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for

Logistics was sent to review this brigade and the other brigade located

there to determine what was needed to raise the M1A1 fleet to current

mission-capable standards and to maintain the fleet. The team and brigade

staff identified problems with supply, maintenance, personnel, and

training and identified possible solutions. The report stated that the total

estimated cost of implementing all recommendations exceeded $25

million.

On the basis of our examination of the Army's official readiness reports

and deployment schedules and on discussions with division personnel, the

number of peacekeeping missions and their effect on unit readiness have

varied. According to division, brigade, and battalion commanders, these

effects have been both positive and negative, but peacekeeping has not

interfered with the divisions' ability to fight and win the nation's wars.

In March 1998 we testified that sustained increases in peacekeeping

operations for three of the five divisions exacerbated personnel shortfalls

and degraded unit readiness and training within those divisions.21

However, during this review, Army officials found it difficult to quantify

the effects of peacekeeping operations, but they did offer several

observations. These operations improve training for intelligence, medical,

logistics, transportation, and engineering activities because they are called

upon to perform tasks similar to their wartime tasks. Peacekeeping

operations have also provided junior officers and senior enlisted personnel

with leadership opportunities not normally available in a nondeployed

status. However, we were told that peacekeeping operations can erode a

unit's warfighting skills—especially those that require the maneuvering of

large armored or infantry formations, a task considered crucial to the

divisions' ability to perform their wartime missions.

Army officials told us that, for these five divisions, peacekeeping

operations are no longer the exception, but are a regular part of

operations. According to division, brigade, and battalion commanders,

sustained peacekeeping operations have changed the five divisions from

 21 For a transcript, see Military Readiness: Observations on Personnel Readiness in Later

Deploying Army Divisions (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-126, Mar. 20, 1998).

Impact of

Peacekeeping

Missions on Unit

Readiness Has Varied
Page 20 GAO-02-98 Army Readiness

later deployers to a war to early deployers to ongoing and smaller-scale

operations. In November 1999, the Army provided unit commanders

additional readiness reporting guidance—used in conjunction with Army

Regulation 220-1, Unit Status Reporting—that recognized the significance

of ongoing peacekeeping operations and their effect on reported

readiness. The guidance was formulated to assist commanders in

determining whether forces and equipment deployed to peacekeeping

operations could be available to redeploy to a major-theater war within

scheduled deployment time frames. Prior to the guidance, division

commanders generally reported forces and equipment deployed to

peacekeeping operations as unavailable for deployment to a major-theater

war. The guidance also acknowledged the need for units deployed to

peacekeeping operations to have specific plans in place for their

disengagement, recovery, reconstitution, and redeployment of forces and

equipment committed to current and future peackeeping operations prior

to those deployments.

For example, in November 1999, as a result of the unavailability of some

forces and equipment for immediate deployment to a major-theater war,

two divisions reported low levels of readiness. However, the guidance

which provides for consideration that deployed forces and equipment

could be recovered, reconstituted, and available for redeployment within

deployment time frames, allowed the two divisions to report a level of

readiness that reflected the divisions’ actual readiness within majortheater war deployment time frames. Those division commanders reported

that without the guidance, their divisions would have continued to report

lower readiness levels that did not provide an accurate picture of the units’

ability to meet wartime requirements. The divisions’ reported readiness

continued to remain at high levels through our review.

According to Army officials, since the reporting guidance was issued, the

divisions have developed detailed plans to quickly recover and retrain

them to their critical war-fighting skills, and to recover and reconstitute

equipment for redeployment within established deployment time frames.

For example, the 1st Armored and 1st Infantry Divisions in Germany have

developed plans that include 4 months of training for peacekeeping

operations, 6 months of deployment on such operations, then 6 months of

redeployment and reintegration training. According to Department of the

Army officials, all divisions that participate in peacekeeping operations

have similar plans and those plans can be adjusted to retrain soldiers more

quickly in the event of other contingency operations.
Page 21 GAO-02-98 Army Readiness

Additionally, to ease the burden of the divisions under review, the Army

has extended their participation in peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and

Kosovo—commonly called rotations—to units of the Army Reserve, Army

National Guard, and other corps-level units. Deployments for missions in

Bosnia, which started in April 2001 and are expected to run through April

2005, will incorporate Reserve units and six National Guard-enhanced

separate brigades. Furthermore, from June 2001 through May 2005, other

active units from the Army's III Corps (Fort Hood, Tex.), V Corps

(Heidelberg, Germany), and XVIII Airborne Corps (Fort Bragg, N.C.) will

support peacekeeping rotations in Kosovo.

Since our last report, primarily because of the Army Chief of Staff's

manning initiative, which increased enlisted personnel, staffing, and

occupational specialties, the combat readiness of five divisions—the

1st Armored, 1st Infantry, 4th Infantry, 10th Infantry, and 25th Infantry—

has improved. However, the Army's continuing imbalance of occupational

specialty staffing levels among the five divisions, although a balance

difficult to achieve, should be addressed. These imbalances continue to

result in manning shortfalls in some occupational specialties deemed

critical to readiness by commanders. While some equipment maintenance

problems exist, none of them appear to be "show stoppers" in preparing

for wartime missions.

To address staffing imbalances for occupational specialties common to all

its divisions, we recommend that the Secretary of the Army develop and

implement a plan to address those imbalances in making staffing decisions

affecting the divisions and monitor the Army's progress in alleviating the

imbalances. The Army's plans should include a means to prioritize the

distribution of skilled personnel not only among these divisions but also

wherever they are needed in the Army.

In written comments on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense

concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of the Army

develop and implement a plan to address staffing imbalances for critical

occupational specialties. The Department further stated that the Army’s

manning initiative and innovative enabling programs and policies have

provided an effective blueprint for managing the distribution of soldiers in

critical occupational fields. Although imbalances in some critical skills

have existed, the causes have been identified and the appropriate

management actions taken to correct or smooth the imbalances.

Conclusion

Recommendation for

Executive Action

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation
Page 22 GAO-02-98 Army Readiness

We agree with the Department’s view that the Army Chief of Staff’s

manning initiative, along with the Army’s personnel management policies,

provides a blueprint to guide and manage the distribution of soldiers in

critical occupational specialties. However, the Army’s manning initiative

and personnel management policies have not yet resulted in the Army’s

meeting its fiscal year 2001 goals to staff its combat divisions, armored

cavalry regiments, and early deploying nondivisional units at 100 percent

of authorized enlisted personnel by skills and grades needed. We reported

in July 2001 that the Army had achieved only a 93-percent fill rate by skills

and grade level for its combat divisions and armored cavalry regiments,

and only an 86-percent fill rate by skills and grade level for its

nondivisional combat support units.22

We agree with the Army’s assessment that broad transformational change,

equipment modernization programs and other short-term changes to force

structure will continue to challenge the Army’s management of soldiers in

low-density and difficult-to-fill occupational fields. However, the staffing

imbalances we identified in this report were representative of a trend from

December 1999 through May 2001. Therefore, we continue to believe that

the Secretary of the Army should take the steps necessary to ensure that

the Army addresses staffing imbalances in not only these five divisions but

wherever they are needed in the Army and continue to monitor the Army’s

progress in alleviating the imbalances. The Department’s comments are

reprinted in appendix I.

As requested, we updated our 1998 testimony23 to determine (1) the

current combat readiness of personnel, training, and equipment in these

divisions and (2) the effect of peacekeeping missions on that readiness.

We obtained data from and interviewed officials with the Office of the

Secretary of Defense, the Offices of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for

Personnel and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations; the Army

Personnel Command; Army Forces Command; and U.S. Army Forces

Europe; and division, brigade, and battalion commanders and staff from

the 1st Armored Division, 1st Infantry Division, 4th Infantry Division,

10th Infantry Division, and 25th Infantry Division.

 22 See GAO-01-979R.

23 See GAO/T-NSIAD-98-126.

Scope and

Methodology
Page 23 GAO-02-98 Army Readiness

To determine the current combat readiness of the Army's personnel,

training, and equipment in the selected divisions, we reviewed the Army's

Unit Status Reporting Regulation 220-1 to determine the criteria for unit

readiness reports and interviewed division officials regarding their

readiness status and how it is reported. We reviewed reports in the Unit

Status Reporting System from the five divisions and two separately

reporting brigade combat teams located at Ft. Riley, Kansas for February

1998 to June 2001. We focused our assessment of the current state of

combat readiness for each unit overall and in the measured areas of

personnel, training, and equipment on readiness data for the time period

January through June 2001. We analyzed the overall ratings as well as

those for personnel, training, equipment on hand, and equipment

condition. We trended reported readiness for each of the five divisions and

the two separately reporting brigades located at Ft. Riley, Kansas for the

time period February 1998 through May 2001. We also reviewed

commanders' assessment letters, which provided a narrative assessment

of a unit's readiness to accomplish its wartime mission. Additionally, to

further determine readiness for the measured areas of personnel, training

and equipment, we did the following:

• Personnel: We analyzed enlisted manning data for each of the divisions

over an 18-month period; these data came in electronic form from the

Army, Personnel Command. We compared authorized and assigned

numbers from these data across the divisions24 as well as across the Army

overall. We gathered additional data and conducted interviews with

applicable Army personnel to determine the reasons for manning

imbalances and for low fill rates for specific military occupational

specialties considered by division commanders as critical to sustaining

combat.

• Training: We obtained and reviewed quarterly training briefings and

mission-essential task list (METL) data from the divisions and the two

separately reporting brigades. We analyzed METL assessment data to

determine whether divisions were fully or partially trained. To determine

whether the implementation of a new policy restricting the movement of

operation and maintenance training funds improved readiness, we

interviewed officials in the Resource Management Offices of the five

divisions. We analyzed the operation and maintenance funds obligated for

fiscal years 1998 through 2001.25 For fiscal year 2001, the year the new

 24 Our analysis did not include personnel data for the 25th Infantry Division’s 1st Brigade, located at Ft.

Lewis, Washington.

25 Data for fiscal year 2001 were as of the latest date available from each location.
Page 24 GAO-02-98 Army Readiness

policy became effective, we compared tank miles driven with operations

and maintenance funds obligated. We also interviewed division, brigade,

and battalion commanders to determine the effect that the new funding

policy had on training and unit readiness.

• Equipment: We reviewed division equipment-on-hand and equipment

shortage lists. We analyzed divisions' mission capable rates and compared

those rates with reported readiness levels. We interviewed division,

brigade, and battalion commanders, as well as division logistics officials to

determine whether equipment shortages or serviceability issues adversely

affected unit readiness or the ability to train.

To determine whether peacekeeping missions have affected readiness, we

interviewed Department of the Army officials from the Office of the

Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, and division, brigade, and battalion

commanders at four of the five divisions. We analyzed data on the number

and types of deployments for fiscal years 1998 to 2001 and compared the

timing of deployments with readiness indicators. We reviewed the Army's

three-phase training plans to reintegrate troops returning from

peacekeeping missions and retrain them to fight major-theater wars. We

reviewed recently published GAO, Congressional Research Service, and

RAND reports.

We conducted our review from December 2000 through October 2001 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional

committees, the Secretaries of Defense and the Army, and the Director of

the Office of Management and Budget. We will send copies to other

interested parties upon request. Please contact me on (757) 552-8111 if you

or your staff have any questions about this report. Additional contacts and

staff acknowledgments are listed in appendix II.

Neal P. Curtin, Director

Defense Capabilities and Management
Appendix I: Comments From the Department

of Defense

Page 25 GAO-02-98 Army Readiness

Appendix I: Comments From the Department

of Defense
Appendix I: Comments From the Department

of Defense

Page 26 GAO-02-98 Army Readiness
Appendix II: GAO Contacts and Staff

Acknowledgments

Page 27 GAO-02-98 Army Readiness

William M. Solis (202) 512-8365

Claudia J. Dickey (202) 512-6399

Other staff who made key contributions to this report were Connie W.

Sawyer, Donna M. Rogers, Melissa McDowell, Lauren S. Johnson, Nancy

Ragsdale, James E. Lewis, and Nadine Furr.

GAO Contacts

Staff

Acknowledgments

Appendix II: GAO Contacts and Staff

Acknowledgments

(350018)
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