F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

M A N U E L D E J E S U S O R

T E G A M E L E N D R E S ; J E S S I C A Q U I T U G

U A R O D R I G U E Z ; D A V I D R O D R

I G UE Z ; V E L I A M E R

AZ ; M A N UE L N I E T O , J R

. ; S O M O S A M E R

I C A , Plaintiffs-Appellees

,

v

.

J O S E P H M. A R

P A I O ; M A R

I C O P A C O U N T Y S H E R

I F F ’ S O F F I C E , Defendants-Appellants

. N o. 13-16285

D.C. No. 2:07-cv-02513- GMS

M A N U E L D E J E S U S O R

T E G A M E L E N D R E S ; J E S S I C A Q U I T U G

U A R O D R I G U E Z ; D A V I D R O D R

I G UE Z ; V E L I A M E R

AZ ; M A N UE L N I E T O , J R

. ; S O M O S A M E R

I C A , Plaintiffs-Appellees

,

v

.

J O S E P H M. A R

P A I O ; M A R

I C O P A C O U N T Y S H E R

I F F ’ S O F F I C E , Defendants-Appellants

. N o. 13-17238

D.C. No. 2:07-cv-02513- GMS

OPI NI ONM E L E ND R E S V

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P A I O 2

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Ariz o na G. Murray Snow, District J u dg e, Presiding

Arg ued and Submitted December 3, 2014—San F r ancisco, California

F iled April 15, 2015

B efore: J

. Clifford W allace, Susan P. Graber, and Marsha S. B erz on, Circuit J udg es.

Opinion by

J udg e W allace

SUMMARY *

Civil Rights

The panel affirmed in part a n d vacated in part the district court’s p ermanent injunction and remanded in a n action
ag ainst Sh e r i f

f J oseph M. Arpaio and the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Off

i c e a lleg ing that defendants h ave a custom, policy and practice of racially p r o f i ling L atino drivers a

nd
passeng ers, and of stopping them pret e x t u ally under the auspices of enforcing federal and s t a te immig ration-related laws.

Th e p anel first held that the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, a non-jural entity under Ariz o na state law, improperly

* T h is su m m ary co n stitu

tes n o part o f th e o p in io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b eenp rep ared b y

co urt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.M E L E ND R E S V

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P A I O 3

was named as a party in the action. T h e p a n el ordered that Maricopa County be substituted as a party in l i eu of the Sheriff ’ s O f f ice and also that on remand, the district court may consider dismissal of Sheriff Arpaio in his official
cap ac i ty b ecause an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit ag ainst the entity

. Addressing the defendants’ sufficiency of the evidence
arg ument, the panel held the district court did not clearly err in f inding that defendants’ unconstitutional policies ex tended bey ond the saturation patrol contex t. Moreover
, t h e panel held that the district court d id not err in holding that the named plaintiffs h a d standing to assert the claims of absent class me m b ers who were stopped during non-saturation patrols. F or the sam e reasons, the panel held that there was no error in the district court’s class certification order.

T h e p anel held that the injunction was not overbroad simply b ecause it included non-saturation patrols. The panel further upheld specific p rovisions of the injunction pertaining
to corrective train i ng and supervision procedures a nd provisions requiring specific data collection an d videorecording o f traffic stops

. Th e panel additionally held that
most of the provisions d ealing with the scope of the appointed M onitor’s assessment authority were narrowly tailored to remedy ing the specific constitutional violations.

The panel held that the provisions of the injunction which broadly require the appointed Monitor to consider the internal investig ations and reports o f o fficer misconduct created a proble m t o the ex tent that such internal investig ations a nd reports were u nrelated t o t he constitutional violations f ound by the district court. The panel hel d t h a t these provisions

were not narrowly tailored to addressing the relevantM E L E ND R E S V

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violations of f

ederal law. The panel therefore vacated those particular p rovisions and o rde r e d the district court to tailor them so as to address only the constitutional violations at issue in this case.

COUNSEL

Eileen Dennis GilB ride (arg ued), J ones, Skelton & Hochuli, P.L .C

. , Phoenix

, Ariz o na; Timothy Casey and J ames W i lliams, Schmitt, Schneck, Smy th, Casey & Even, P.C

. , P h oenix

, Ariz ona; Thomas Purcell L iddy

, Deputy Coun t y Attorne y , Maricopa County Attorney ’s Office, Phoenix

, Ariz ona, for Defendants-Appellants.

Stanley Young (arg

ued), Hy un S. By u n , and Priscilla G

. Taylor, Coving ton & B urling L L P, Redwood S h ores, California; Tammy Albarran, Coving ton & B urling L L P, San F rancisco, California; D an Pochoda and J ames L y all, A CL U F oundat i o n of Ariz ona, Phoenix

, A riz ona; Andre Seg ura, ACL U F oundation I mmig r ants ’ R i g hts Project, New York, New York; J o r g e Martin Castillo, Mex ican American L eg al and Educational F u nd, L os Ang eles, Califor n i a ; Cecillia D

. W a n g , ACL U F oundation I mmig rants’ Rig hts Project, San F rancisc o , California; Anne L ai, I rvine, California, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.M E L E ND R E S V

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OP INION

W A L L ACE, Senior Circuit J udg e:

I n a previous opinion in this case, we affirmed the district court’s post-trial prelim i n a ry injunction ag a inst Sheriff J oseph M. Arpaio and the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office (individ u a lly

, Sheriff Arpaio and MCSO; collectively

, Defendants), w h i c h p r o h i b i t e d D e fendants from detaining any individual “ based only o n kno w l e d g e o r reasonable belief, without more, that the person is unlawfully present within the United States.” See Melendres v. Arpaio
, 695 F .3d 990, 994 (9th Cir. 2012) (

Melendres I

)

. I n this opinio n , we address Defendants’ appea l f

rom the district court’s more comprehensive permanent inj u nction. W e have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1 29 1

. W e a f firm in part, a

nd we vacate and remand in part.

I

.

The backg round facts of this case may be found in g reater detail in Melendres I

. The facts relevant to the arg uments made in the present appeal a re a s f o l l o w s. Manuel de J e sus Orteg a Melendres; D avid and J essica Rodrig uez ; Manuel Nieto, J r.; Velia Meraz ; the org aniz ation Somos America; a nd the class o f individua ls the named plaintiffs represent (collectively

, Plaintiffs) b roug h t a class a ction for d eclaratory

an d injunctive relief, alleg ing that Defendants h ave a “custom, p olicy and practice” o f racially profiling L atino drivers and passeng e rs, and o f stopping them pret e x t ually under the au s pices of e n forcing federal and state imm ig ration-related laws. Id. at 994–95. Plaintiffs alleg ed that Defendants’ discriminatory policy ex tended to the poststop investig atory process, r e s ulting in long er and moreM E L E ND R E S V

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burdens o m e detentions for L atinos than f or non-L atinos. These policies, according to Plaintiffs, violated federal constitutional and statutory law. Id.

I t was alleg ed that Defendants implemented this p olicy primarily during “saturation patrols,” or “crime sup p r e ssion sweeps,” in which Defendan t o fficers would “saturat[ e] ” a particular area a n d “sweep[ ] ” it, looking for violations o f federal civil immig ration laws and state immig ration-related laws. Id. at 994. I ndeed, each of the n a m e d individual pl a i n tiffs, ex cept for David and J essica Rodrig uez , was stopped by d efendant officers during a saturation patrol. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t u l t i m ately certified a plaintiff c lass encompassing “[ a] ll L atino persons who, since J anuary 2007, have been o r will be

. . . stopped, detained, q uestion e d o r

se arched by [ Defendants’] ag ents while driving or sitting in

a vehicle on a public roadway or par k ing area in Maricopa County
, Ariz ona,” reg ardless of wheth er such persons were stopped, detained, q

uestioned, or searched a s p a r t o f a saturation patrol. Id. a t 9 95 (alteration in orig inal). At trial, the vast majority of evidence focused on Defendants’ use o f

race during sa t u r ation patrols, althoug h some evidence indicated that Defendants’ policies and p ractices ex tended to reg ular, non-saturation patrols.

After a bench trial, the district court co n c l u d ed that Defendants e mploy ed a n unconstitutional po licy o f considering r a ce as a factor in determining where to conduct patrol opera t ions, in deciding whom to stop and investig ate for civil immig ration violations, a n d in p ro l o ng ing the detentions of L atin o s while their immig ration status was confirmed. The court found that these unconstitutional policies a pplied t o both saturation and non-saturation p atrol activities. A s a result, the district court permanently enjoinedM E L E ND R E S V

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Defendants f

rom (1) “detaining

, holdi n g o r arresting L atino
occupa n t s of vehicles in Maricopa County based on a reasonable belief, without more, that such persons are in the country without authori z ation”; (2) “ using r ace or L atino ancestry ” as a factor in deciding whether to stop any vehicle

w i t h a L atino occupant, or in deciding whether a vehicle

occ u p a nt was in the United States w ithout authoriz ation; (3) “detaining L atino occupants of vehicles stopped for traffic violations fo r a period long er than reasonably n ecessary to resolve the traffic violation in the absence of r e a s o n able suspicion that a

ny of them h ave committed or are committing

a violation of federal or state criminal law”; (4) “detaining

, holding or arrest i n g L atino occupants o f a vehicle

. . . for violations of the A r i z ona H uman Smug g ling Act without a reasonable basis f

or believ i n g that, under all the circumstances, the necessa r y elements of the crime a re present”; and (5) “detaining

, arresting o r h o lding persons based on a reasonable suspicion that they are conspiring with their employ er to violate the Ariz ona E m p loy er Sanctions Act.”

The injunction became effective immediately . However, the district c ourt stated it would confer with the parties about the need for additional injunctive relief, g iven Defendants’ history of being “ag g res s i v e l y responsive” to a majority o f the Maricopa County electorate in pursuing law enforcement efforts a g ainst “unauthoriz e d r esidents.” Such e fforts h ad resulted in violations of the d i strict court’s preliminary injunction. The court sug g est e d that additional injunctive relief should address Defend a nts’ failure to have a “ clear policy ” about conductin g saturation patrols a nd “other enforcement efforts” in a race-neutral manner, as w e l l a s Defendants’ failure to monitor and ke e p proper records
reg arding whether officers were “eng ag ing in racially -biasedM E L E ND R E S V

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enforcement” during saturation patrols. T he district court told the parties that it ex pected them to submit a “consent decree” if they could ag ree on all terms necessary to resolve the matter; h owever, if they could not reach an ag reement on “ all particulars,” they were to submit a “proposed consent decree” that denoted each point of ag reement and disag

r eement.

After t w o months of neg otiation, the parties submitted a document titled “Parties’ J oint Report Reg arding S t atus o f Consent De c r e e N e g o t i a

t i o n s ” ( J oint Report) which contained provisions upon which the p arties ag r eed, desig nated by black font, and those upon which they disag reed, desig n ated by red

or blue font. The J oint Report’s terms did no t d i sting uish between s a turation and non-saturation patrols. A t the evidentiary h earing o n the J oint Report, the district court recog niz ed that the parties had not arrived at a true “consent decree” but r ather had produced a “ g enera l f r a mework
t h r o u g h which [ the court could enter] supplemental injunctive relief” by resolving the parties’ remai n i n g “sig nificant disag reements.” F ollowing that h earing

, a n d using the J oint R e p ort as a framework, the district court entered a supplemental permanent injunction. This injunction r equired Defendants, among other th ing s, to increase training

, improve traffic-stop d ocumentation, d e velop an early identification
sy stem for racial p r ofiling problems, enhance supervision a nd evaluation o f M CSO deputies, a nd improve reporting o f misconduct complaints. The supplemental injunction also directed the appointment of an independent Monitor to assess and report on Defendants’ implementation of the orig inal a nd supplemental injunctions. As with the parties’ J oint R e p ort, the co u rt’s injunctive provisions were n ot limited to saturation patrols, b ut rather applied across the board to all law enforcement activity

within the MCSO.M E L E ND R E S V

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On appeal, Defendants raise t w o m a i n challeng es to the district court’s permanent and s u p p l e m e n t a l i n

j u n c t i o n orders. Fi r s t, they challeng e the scope of the injunction insofar as i t applies to Defendants’ conduct o utside saturation patr o l s

. Defendants maintain that insufficient evidence supported the court’s finding that Defendants’ constitutional viol a t ions occurred during reg ular, n on-saturation patrols

. A l s o , because the di strict court rejected David and J essica Rodrig u ez ’ constitutional claims, and because the Rodrig uez e s were the only named plaintiffs stopped outside a saturati on patrol, Defendants arg ue that the Rodrig uez es lack standing to bring the constitutional claims on behalf of u n named class members similarly stopped outsid e of a saturation patrol. According ly

, Defendants arg ue that the injunction should be vacated a s it applies to reg ular patrol activities, and that the Plaintiff class should b e pa rt i al l y decertified and limited to L atino vehicle occupants stopped, d e t ained, searched, o r questioned “duringa saturation patrol.” Second, Defendants challeng e several terms of the injunction a s being broader than necessary to cure the constitutional violations found by the district court.

I I

.

The district court’s finding s are reviewed for clear error and i t s l eg a l conclusions are reviewed de novo. Saltarelli v

. Bob Bak e r G r p

. Med. Trust
, 35 F .3d 382, 384–85 (9th Cir. 1994). The scope and terms of the district court’s injunction, however, are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See LambW eston, Inc. v. McCain F

oods

, L t d.

, 941 F .2d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1991) ( “A district court has considerable discretion in f a shioning suitable relief and defining the terms o f a n i n j u n c t i o n

. A p p e l l a t e r e v i e w o f t h o s e t e r m s i s corresponding ly narrow” (interna l q uotation marks o mitted)).M E L E ND R E S V

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I I I

.

B e fore we reach t he merits of the injunctions, we first address Defendants’ threshold arg ument that MCSO is n ot a p r o per p arty before the court. Early in this litig ati o n , Defendants moved the d istrict court to dismiss MCSO on the
g ro u n d that it w as a non-jural entity —that is, it lacked separate leg a l status from the County and t h erefore was incapable of suing o r being sued in its own name. When the district c ourt ruled on that motion, Ariz ona law was unsettled

on this issue and, g iven the lack o f consensus among the state and lower federal courts, the district court refused to dismiss MCSO a s a no n

-

j u r a l e ntity

. L ater, the Ariz ona Court o f Appeals clar i f

i e d that MCSO is, in fact, a non-jural entity

. Braillard v. M

aricopa Cnty.
, 232 P.3d 1263, 1269 (Ariz

. Ct. App. 2010). After Braillard

, it is now cle a r that MCSO has improperly been named as a party in this action.

W e therefore order that Maricopa County be subs tituted

as a party in lieu of MCSO. See F ed. R. Civ. P. 21 (“Misjoinder o f parties is not a g round f o r d i smissing an action. On

. . . its o wn, the co u r t m a y at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party ”). O n remand, the district court may consider dismissal of Sheriff Arpaio in his official capacity because “an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other t h an name, to be treated as a suit ag ainst the e ntity

. ” Kentucky v. Graham

, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985); see a lso Ctr. For Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sher i f f Dep’t
, 533 F .3d 780
, 7 9 9 (9th Cir. 2008) (dismissing a d uplicative official-capacity

defendant).M E L E ND R E S V

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I V.

W e now turn to the merits of the injunction s

. W e first address Defendants’ suf

f i c iency of the evidence arg ument. Defendants contend that, althoug h the evidence supports the district court’s f

inding s and conclusions with respect to

con s titutional violations during saturation p atrols, the evidence is insufficient to sustain the c o u rt’s f inding s a nd conclusions that Defendants’ u n c o nstitutional policies

ex tended bey

ond the contex t of saturation patrols.

Althoug h the evidence larg ely a ddressed Defendants’ use of race during saturation patrols, t h e d i strict court did not clearly e rr in finding that Defendants’ policy applied acrossthe-board to all law e n forcement d e c i sions—not just those made during saturation patrols. F or ex ample, the district court cited Sheriff Arpaio’s own testim ony stating that MCSO “continue[ d] to eng a g e in immig ration en f orcement even thoug h not u sing saturation patrols to do so.” Sheriff Arpaio testified that, despit e a n eig h t-month suspension in “immig ration sweeps,” “[ w] e ’re still doing crime suppression concentrating on the drug traffic ” in which “we continue to enforce the illeg al immig ration laws.” Moreover, the district
court pointe d t o multiple instances of deputy sheriffs’ testimony in which it was confirmed that at least some MCSO deputies “continue[ ] to investig ate t h e identity a nd i mmig ration status of persons it detains during [ all] vehic l e stops” irrespective of whether they o ccur during a saturation patrol. Althoug h there is more evidenc e i n the record
reg arding MCSO’s p ractices during saturation patrols, we h o l d that the district court did not clearly err in finding t h at Defendants’ u nconstitutional policies ex tended bey o n d the saturation patrol contex t.M E L E ND R E S V

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V.

W e n ow turn to Defendants’ arg ument that the na m e d plaintiffs lacked standing to r epresent the claims of unnamed class members who were stopped, de t ained, or searched outside of a saturation patrol effort.

The parties ag ree the Rodrig uez es were the “only named plaintiffs who were stopped outside o f a saturation patrol.” Defendants arg

ue that none of the evidence presented on the Rodrig uez stop establishes a F ourth or F ourteenth Amendme n t v i o lation, much less a pattern or practice o f M C S O’s violating the F ourteenth Amendment. Therefore, D e f endants arg ue, no n amed p laintiff has standing to asse r t the claims related to stops outside saturation patrols. They thus ask us to decertify partially the c lass and va c a t e the injunction “as to all activities outside of saturation patrols.”

The difficulty w ith Def e n d a n ts’ arg ument is that it conflates standing and class certificat i on. Althoug h both concepts “ aim to measure whether the proper p arty is before th e c o u rt t o tender the issues for litig a tion,

. . . [ t] hey spring from different sources and serve different functions.” 1 W I L L I A M B

. R

U B E N S T E I N , N E W B E R G O N C L

A S S A C T I O N S § 2:6 (5t h ed.). Standing is meant to ensure that the injury a plaintiff suffers defines the scope of the controversy he or she is entitled to litig ate. Class certification

, on the other hand, is
meant to e nsure that n a m e d plaintiffs are adequate representatives of the u nnamed class. Unfortunat e l y , when
courts h ave found a d isjuncture between the claims o f named plaint i f fs and those of absent class members, they h ave not alway s classified the disjuncture consistently

, some referring
t o i t a s a n issue of standing

, a nd o thers as an issue o f c las s certification. Id. Nor is the distinction alway s easy to discern.M E L E ND R E S V

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Even the Supreme C o u rt has apparently applied both approaches i n c o n s istently

. Id. ; see also Gratz v. Bollinger

, 539 U.S. 244, 2 63 n.15 (2003) ( observing the “tension” in the Co u r t ’s prior c ases as to whether the similarity of injuries suffered by the named plaintiff an d the unnamed class members is “appropriately addres s ed under the rubric o f standing or adequacy

”).

T h e “ s t a n d i ng approach” treats dissimilarities be t w e e n t h e claims of named and unnamed plaintiffs as affecting the “standing ” of the named pla intiff to r epresent the class. I n othe r w o r ds, if there is a disjuncture between the injuries suffered by named and unnamed pl aintiffs, courts a pply ing the standing approach w ould say the disjuncture deprived the named p l ai n t iff of standing to obtain relief f or the unnamed class members. See, e.g. , Blum v. Y a r e t s ky

, 457 U.S. 991, 999–1002 (1982). The “class certification approach,” on the other h and, “holds that once the named plaintiff demonstrates her individual standing to bring a claim, the standing inquiry is concluded, and the court proceeds to consider whether the Rule 23(a) prerequisites for class ce rtification have been met.” N E W

B E R G O N C L A S S A C T I O

N S § 2:6.

W e adopt the class certification approach. This approach has been e mbraced several times (thoug h not alway s) by the Supreme Court, and is the one adopted by “most” other federal courts to h ave addressed the issue. Id. ; see, e.g. , Sosna

v. Iowa
, 4 1 9 U.S. 393, 397–403 (1975); Novella v

. W estchester Cnty.
, 661 F .3d 128, 1 49– 5 0 & n.24 (2d Cir. 2011); Prado-Steiman ex rel. P rado v. Bush

, 221 F

. 3d 1266, 1279–80 (11th Cir. 2000) (a court must first determine whether “at least one named class representative has Article I I I standing

, ” then “ques t ion whether the named plaintiffs have representative capa c i t y , as d efined by Rule 23(a), toM E L E ND R E S V

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assert the r ig hts of others” ( i nternal quotation marks omitted)); F

allick v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.
, 162 F .3d 410, 423 ( 6th Cir. 1998); Cooper v. Univ. of Tex. at Dallas

, 482 F

. Supp. 187, 191 (N.D. Tex

. 1979).

F or ex ample, in Sosna
, the Supreme Court held that

[ a] na m ed plaintiff in a class action must show that the threat of injury in a case

. . . is “real and immediate,” not “ c onjectural” o r

“ h y pothetical.”

. . . This conclusion [ that plaintiff had standing ] does n ot a utomatically establish that ap p ellant is entitled to litig ate the inter ests of the c lass she seeks to represent, b u t i t does shift the focus o f

e x a m i n a t i o n f

r o m t h e e l e m e n t s o f justiciability to the ability o f the named representative to “fairly and ad equately protect the interests of the class.”

419 U.S. at 402–03 (emphasis added, c i t a tions and internal
qu o tation marks omitted). Under the class c ertification approach, therefore, “any issues reg arding the relationship between the class representa t i v e and the passive class members—such as dissimilarity in injuries suffered—are relevant only to class certification, not to standing

. ” N E W B E R G O N C L A S S A C T I O N S § 2 :6; see also Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. F alcon

, 457 U .S. 147, 155–61 (1982) (treating dissimilarities in injuries b etween na m e d and unnamed plaintiffs as an issue of c l as s certification under Rule 23(a)

r a t h e r t h a n o n e o f s t a n d i n g )

. S t a t e d d i f f e r e n t l y , “[ r ] epresentative p arties who have a direct and substantial interest have standing ; t h e q uestion whether they may be allowed to present claims on behalf of other s w h o haveM E L E ND R E S V

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similar, but not identical, interests d e p e n ds not on standing

, but on a

n assessment of ty

picali t y and adequacy o f representation.” 7AA C H A R L E S A L A N W R I G H T E T A L ., F E D E R A L P R A C T I C E & P R

O C E D U R E § 1785.1 (3d ed.).

I n the present case, Defendants d o n ot dispute that the individually named plaintiffs, including the Rodrig u ez es, h ad individual standing to bring their o w n cla i m s under the F ourth and F ourteenth Amendments. Moreover, the Rodrig uez es did n ot lose their individual standing simply because the district court resolved their constitutional c laims in Defendants’ f

avor. See E

quity Lifestyle Props., Inc. v

. Cnty. of S an Luis Obispo

, 548 F .3d 1 184, 1189 n.10 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The jurisdictional question of standing precedes, a nd does not require, analy sis o f the merits”). Defendants a rg ue

on l y that no named p laintiff has “standing ” to represent the claims of unnamed plaintiffs stopped during a non-saturation patrol. B ut this arg u ment raises the question of class certification—i.e., whether the named plaintiffs a re adequate representatives of the claims of the unnamed plaintiffs—not

a question of standing

. See Falcon

, 457 U.S. at 156–58 & nn. 13, 15 (holding that named plaintiff must prove “ much more than the validity of his o w n c l a i m”; the individual p laintiff
must show that “ the individ u a l ’ s claim and the class c laims will share common questions of law or fact and that the indi v i d ual’s claim will be ty pical o f the class claims,”

ex p licitly referencing the “commonality ” and “ t y picality ” requirements of Rule 23(a)).

Under the class certification approach, or t h e standing approach for that matter, the n amed plaintiffs i n t h is c ase, with or without the Rodrig uez es, are adequate representatives because the named plainti f f s’ claims do not “implicate a sig nificantly different set of concerns” than the unn amedM E L E ND R E S V

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plaintiffs’ claims. Gratz
, 539 U.S. at 265; see a lso id. at 263, 265 (holding that “[ r] eg ardless o f w hether the r equirement is deemed one of adequacy or standing , it is clearly satisfied in this case” because “ the Universi ty ’s use of race in und erg raduate transfer admissions d oes not implicate a sig nificantly different set of concerns than does its use of race in underg r aduate freshman admissions”); Falcon

, 457 U.S. at 156 (named plaintiffs can adequately represent claims that a re “fair ly encompassed by the named plaintiff’s claims” (internal qu o t a tion marks omitted)). I n determining what constitutes the same ty

pe of relief o r the same kind of injury

, “we must be careful not to employ too narrow or technical an approach. Ra t h e r, we must ex amine the questions realistically : we must reject the temptation to parse too finely

, a nd consider instead the contex t of the inquiry .” Arms t r o n g v. Davis , 275 F .3d 849, 867 (9th Cir. 2001).

I n this case, MCSO’s practices during saturation patrols, determined by the d istrict court to be unconstitutional, do not raise “a sig nificantly different set of concerns” from the same practices instituted during reg u lar patrols. Gratz
, 539 U.S. at 265. Althoug h Defendants may be rig ht that “the purpose a nd procedures for saturation patrols departed from MCSO’s normal traffic enforcement p o l i c ies,” the operative “set o f concerns” is the c o nstitutional violations flowing from MCSO’s policies that the d istrict court found to apply across the board to all t r af

f i c stops, not just to those conducted during saturation patrols. That is, whether the stop takes place

as part of a saturation pat rol or a routine traffic patrol, the constitutiona l c oncerns are the same because MCSO’s policies, the district c ourt fo u n d

, have been applied to both situations. See Falcon

, 457 U.S. a t 1 59 n.15 (“I f [ a defendantemploy e r] used a biased t e sting procedure to evaluate both applicants for e mploy

ment and incumbent employ ees, a classM E L E ND R E S V

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action on behalf of e v er y applicant o r e mploy ee w ho mig ht have been p r ejudiced by the test c learly would satisfy the

. . . requirements of [ F ederal] Rule [ of Civil Procedure] 23(a)”).

Our view is not c hang e d by Defendants’ reliance on Lewis v

. Casey
, 518 U.S. 3 43 (1996). I n Lewis
, a class o f Ariz ona state priso n er s alleg ed that the prison denied them their rig ht of access to the courts. Id. at 346. Two of the class representatives alleg ed that they were denied access because they were illiterate

, an d t he prisons violated their rig hts b y failing to provide services to a ssist them. See id. at 356. After trial, the district court found actual injury only o n the part o f

one illiterate p laintiff. Id. at 3 58. The Court held th at this injury c ould not confer standing upon that plaintiff to request relief for others who were denied access for other rea s o ns, e.g ., because they did not speak Eng lish or were in lockdown. See id. The Court wrote: “I f the righ t t o c omplain of o ne administrative deficiency automatically conferred the r ig ht to complain of all administrative deficien c i e s, any citiz en ag g r ieved in o ne respect c ould bring th e w h ole structure o f
state administration b efore the c ourts f o r review. That is o f course not the law.” Id. at 358 n.6.

However, in Lewis the concerns of the named plaintiffs differed so sig nificantly from th e concerns of the unnamed plaintiffs that a remedy redressing the named plaintiffs’ i njury c ould not redress that of the unnamed plaintiffs, ev e n thoug h, in g eneral terms, the stated injury (denial of access to t h e courts) was the same. F or ex ample, if the district co u r t

were to order accommodations f o r illiteracy to r esolve the injury of the named plaintiffs, it would do nothing to redress the c oncerns of those unna m e d plaintiffs who were literate but c ould not speak Eng lish or were i n l o ckdown. Lewis therefore stands for the proposition that even where namedM E L E ND R E S V

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and u nnamed plaintiffs state the same g eneral constitutional injury

, if the remedy soug ht by the named plaintiffs wou ld
not red r e s s the injury of the unnamed plaintiffs, the c laims raise a “sig nificantly different set of concerns” t h at consequently makes the n amed plaintiffs inadequate representatives of the un n am ed plaintiffs’ claims. Gratz
, 539 U.S. at 265.

That is not the situation in this case. Here, the d i s t r i ct court foun d t he same challeng ed practice and constitutional injury in and outside of saturation patrols. See supra , Part I V

. As Lewis recog niz ed, a “sy stemwide violation” would justify “sy stemwide re l i e f.” 5 18 U.S. at 359. There, sy stemwide relief was inappropriate because only o ne small injury h ad been sh o w n (inadequate library access for the illiterate) b y contrast to the harm alleg e d (denia l o f a l l access to the courts). Id. B u t here, as stated above, the district court f ound
sy stemwide v iolations, warranting sy stemwide relief. Moreover, contrary to Defendants’ arg ument, Lewis ’s “holding reg arding the inappropriateness of sy s t e m w i d e relief

. . . [ did] not rest upon the application of standing rules.” Id. at 360 n.7.

I n sum, the district court did not er r i n h olding that the named plaintiffs h a d standing to assert the claims of absent class members who w ere stopped durin g non-saturation patrols. F or the same reasons, there is no error in the district court’s class certification order.

VI

.

F inally

, we a ddress Defendants’ arg ument that v arious
terms of the supplemental injunction are overbroad. Plaintiffs first arg ue that Defendan ts waived their overbreadth issueM E L E ND R E S V

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P A I O 19

because, at the d i r e ction of the district court, the parties “attem p ted to d evelop a proposed c onsent decree a nd submitted a joint document that showed Defendan t s ’
agr e e ment with the majority of the remedies they n ow cha l l e n g e.” Thus, Plaintiffs assert that “Defendants consented below to almost all the remedies ordered by the District Court and have therefore waived their argu m e n t on appeal.” However, the parties’ J oint Report was n ot a consent d ecree. I ndeed, when a s king the parties to submit a proposed order,
t h e district court said several times that the proposed o r d e r

was not a “consent decree” and stated that D e f e n d an ts’ participation would no t affect their a p peal. Defendants then orally reiterated their intent to a ppeal and preserved that rig ht in the J oint Report itself. T h erefore, Defendants did not waive their objections to the injunctive provisions challeng ed h ere.

W e have long held that injunctive relief “must be tailored
to remedy the specific harm alleg ed. ” L a mb-W eston, Inc.
, 941 F .2d at 974. An injunction a g ainst state actors “must directly address and relate to the cons t i t utional violation itself,” Milliken v. Bradley

, 433 U

. S

. 267, 282 (1977), a nd
must not “require more of state officials than is necessary to

assure their compliance with the constitution,” Glu t h v. Kangas
, 951 F .2d 1504, 1509 ( 9th Cir. 1991) (i n t e r nal quotation marks omitted).

Nevertheless, the district court has broad discretion in fashioning a r emedy

. Sharp v. W eston , 233 F .3d 1166, 1173 (9th Cir. 2 000). I ndeed, a d i s t r i c t c ourt is permitted to order “‘relief that the Constitution would not of its o w n f o r c e initially require if such r elief is necessary to remedy a

c o n s t i t ut i o n a l violation.’” Id.

, quoting Toussaint v

. McC a r t h y , 801 F

. 2d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 1986). Therefore, an injunction

e x ceeds the scope of a district court’s power o nly if it i sM E L E ND R E S V

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“aimed at eliminating a condition tha t does not violate the Constit u tion o r does not flow from such a violation.” Milliken

, 433 U.S. at 282. F or ex ample, in Sharp

, we affirmed detailed injunctive provisions such as private visiting rooms and educational o pportunities for individuals subject to civil commitment. 233 F .3d at 1173. Al t h o u g h the lack of such amenities d id not i t s e lf violate the Constitution, the district
court could o rder them to cu r e t h e facility ’s “underly ing constitutional vi o l a tion” of inadequate mental health
treatment. Id. Similarly

, in Gluth

, we upheld a comprehensive injunction requ i r i n g a prison to provide specific office supplies to incarcerated plaintiffs to remedy the p rison’s unconstitutional d e n i a l of access to the courts. 951 F .2d at 1510.

Moreover, we have held that the enjoined party ’s “history

o f n oncompliance with prior orders can justify g reater co u r t involvement than is ordinarily permitted.” Sharp

, 233 F .3d at 1173. W e afford “special deference” to the terms of a trial judg e’s injunction where, a s here, that ju d ge has had “y ears of ex perience with the [ case] at hand.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “The district court, w hic h h a s first-hand

ex p erience with the parties and is best qualified to d eal with the flinty

, intrac t a ble realities of day -to-day implementation of constitutional commands, must be g iven a gr e a t deal o f flex i b i l i ty and discretion in choosing the remedy best suited
to curing the violation.” United States v. Y on k e r s B d

. of Educ.

, 29 F .3d 40, 4 3 (2d Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Defendants first arg ue that the injunction is overbroad because it impermissibly ex tends to non-saturation p atrol operations. This is simply another iteration of the arg uments

w e rejected above. F or the reasons a lready discussed, t h eM E L E ND R E S V

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injunction is not overbroad simply because it applies to nonsaturat i o n patrols. The d istrict court’s finding that Defendants’ unconstitutional policy ex tended of fice-wide th r o u g h out the MCSO was supported by evidence in the record. F u rthermore, Defendants’ p r oposed distinction between the two ty

pes o f patrols is artificial and ultimately i m m aterial. F rom Plaintiffs’ perspective, it makes n o difference which internal label the MCSO a s s i gns to any g iven traffic patrol operati o n ; the constitutional injury suffered a s a re s ult of Defendants’ policy is the same when applied, as the d istrict court found, during bo th ty p es o f operations.

Defendan t s also challeng e specific provisions of the injunct ion, arg uing that they are overbroad because they a re “not limited to curing the c o n s t itutional violations resulting from the [ traffic] patrols.” Defe n dants beg in with the injunction’s training directives. The injunction provides that Defendants must conduct twelve hours of training on racial profiling to all deputies and p osse members within 240 day s, and at least six hours annually ther eafter. D efendants must also provide additional training on the F ourth Amendment. However, these challeng ed provisions “directly address a nd relate to the constitutional violation[ s] ” found by the district

co u r t

. Milliken

, 433 U.S. at 282. They address MCSO’s racially discriminatory targ eting of L atinos for traffic stops and MCSO’s u njustified prolong ation o f traffic s t o ps. The evidence demonstrated to J udg e S n o w ’s satisfaction that MCSO g ave v irtually no training on ra cial profiling a nd otherwise p rovided erroneous training that l e d to constitutional violations. There is e vidence that some MCSO deputies a

nd supervisors lacked b asic knowledg e o f constitutional requirements, and that MCSO took no steps to evaluate p ersonnel for racia l profiling or to disciplineM E L E ND R E S V

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personnel who eng ag ed in racial profiling . The district court did not abuse its dis c retion in o rdering these corrective training and supervision proced u r e s in order to redress the constitutional violations it found here.

Defendan t s nex t challeng e the injunctive provisions requiring specific data collection concerning and videorecording of tra ff

i c stops. Ag ain, these measures “ directly address and relate to the c onstitutional violation[ s] ” found b y the district c ourt. Id

. They a llow the district court to monitor whether MCSO deputies are c o m p ly ing with the court’s orders and constitutional requirements. Althou gh requiring
state a ctors to implement recordkeeping sy stems to aid in jud i c i a l monitoring is ty

pically disfavored, it is necessary in this case b ecause o f D e fendants’ record of spoliating evidence. A s stated above, the e njoined party ’s “history o f noncompliance w ith prior orders can j u s tify g reater court involvement than is ordinarily permitted.” Sharp

, 233 F .3d at 1173. Moreover, we h ave u pheld data collection a

nd analy sis requirements in prior cases raising similar issues. Se e , e.g. , Nicacio v. INS
, 797 F .2d 700, 706 (9th Cir. 1985) (upholding injunction requiring I

NS to record particulariz ed g rounds for motorist stops in order to prevent future racial p rofiling ), overruled in part on other grounds by Hodgers-Durgin v

. de la Vina
, 199 F .3d 1 037, 1 045 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc). Courts in ou r sister circuits have d one likewise. S ee, e.g. , Floyd v. City of N.Y

. , 959 F

. Supp. 2d 668, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (ordering b ody -w o rn video c ameras for police d e p a r t m e n t p a t r o l o f

f i c e r s i n s p i te o f “ fi n a n c i a l

, administrative, and other c osts”). W e hold that the d i s t rict
court did not abuse its discretion in requiring the datacollection and recording measures at issue here.M E L E ND R E S V

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Defendants nex t arg u e that the district c o u r t abused its discretion in g ranting ex p a n sive assessment authority to a “Monitor,” which is “a person o r t e a m o f people selected to

assess and r eport on Defendants’ implementation of t h e [ injunction] .” Defendants concede t h a t it is “not the M o n i t or’s appointment that is overbroad,” but rather the
scope of the Monitor’s authority to evaluate “e v e ry thing ” in the MCSO, including “d i s c iplinary outcomes f or a ny violations of departmental policy

, and whether a ny Deputies

are the subject of repeated misconduct Complain ts, civil suits,

or criminal charg es, including f or off-duty conduct.” W e will uphold these provisions unless they are “aimed at eliminating

a condition that does not violate the Constitution or does not flow from such a violation.” Milliken , 433 U.S. at 282.

I n contex t, most of the provisions dealing with the scope of the M o nitor’s assessment authority a re aimed at eliminating the constitutional violations found by the district
court and therefore do not constitute an abuse of discretion. The d istrict c ourt’s injunction requires the Mo nitor to perform “ o u tcome assessments” to g aug e MCSO’s compliance with the court’s order and the “effectiveness o f the reforms.” I n performing these a s s e ssments, the Monitor “shall” take into account eleven enumerated “performancebased metrics and trends.” Defendants f irst attack the metric of “misconduct Complaints” as b eing u n r elated to the constitutional violations at is s u e

. However, the Monitor’s authoriz ation is limited to considering only the prevalence o f “civilian Complaints reg ardin g biased p olicing or unlawful detentions and arrests by MCSO Patrol Operation deputies.” This p r ovision is therefore narrowly tailored to remedy ing the specific constitutional violations at issue and is not a n abuse of discretion.M E L E ND R E S V

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However, the metrics dealing with internal investig ations and reports of office r m i sconduct create a problem to the

ex tent they are unrelated to the constitutional violations f ound b y the district court. The injunction broadly requires t h e Monitor to consider the “disciplinary outcomes for a ny violations o f d epartmental policy ” and to assess w hether Deputies are subject to “civil suits or criminal charg es

. . . for off-duty conduct.” These provisions are not narrowly tailored
to addressing only the relevant viola t ions of federal law at issue here. F or ex ample, if an officer commits spousal abuse,

or clocks in late to work, or faces a charg e of d r i ving under the influence of alcoh o l i n a nother state while o n vacation,

s u c h conduct may amount to violations of departmental policy ; it may subject officers to civil or c riminal charg es; but it has no b e aring on the constitutional rig hts at stake here. W e therefore vacate these particular provisio n s a n d order the district court to tailor them so as to address only the

c o nstitutional violations at issue. See Milliken

, 433 U .S. a t 282. However, we affirm all of the othe r p r o v i sions of the injunction as within the discretion of the district court.

AF F IRMED IN P ART AND VACATED AND REMANDED IN P ART

. Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal.