Docket No. 108932.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. DIONE

 ALEXANDER, Appellee.

Opinion filed November 18, 2010.

JUSTICE BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with

opinion.

Chief Justice Kilbride and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Garman,

Karmeier, and Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

Defendant Dione Alexander was convicted of aggravated

discharge of a firearm and unlawful use of weapons and sentenced to

24 years’ imprisonment by the circuit court of Peoria County. The

appellate court found defendant’s sentence to be excessive and

reduced it to the statutory mandatory minimum of six years. No.

3–08–0373 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). For

the reasons that follow, we reverse the appellate court’s judgment and

reinstate defendant’s 24-year sentence. 

BACKGROUND

Defendant’s convictions resulted from a shooting incident on

January 26, 2005, at Woodruff High School in Peoria, Illinois.
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Defendant fired several shots at Omar Porter, a fellow student,

following a confrontation between defendant and Porter. The shooting

took place in the hallway during a passing period when other students

and teachers were present. A jury convicted defendant of aggravated

discharge of a firearm (720 ILCS 5/24–1.2(a)(1) (West 2004)) and

unlawful use of weapons (720 ILCS 5/24–1(a)(4) (West 2004)). The

trial court sentenced defendant as a Class X felon to 24 years’

imprisonment and a three-year period of mandatory supervised release

(MSR). 730 ILCS 5/5–8–1(a)(3) (West 2004) (sentencing range for

a Class X felony is 6 to 30 years).

The appellate court reversed and remanded for a new sentencing

hearing. People v. Alexander, No. 3–06–0263 (2008) (unpublished

order under Supreme Court Rule 23). The appellate court held that

the trial court had considered an improper aggravating factor at

sentencing, namely, that the offense took place in a school. That factor

should not have been considered in aggravation because it had already

served to elevate the offense to a Class X felony. See 720 ILCS

5/24–1.2(b) (West 2004). See People v. Conover, 84 Ill. 2d 400, 404-

05 (1981) (a factor which is inherent in an offense may not also be

considered by the sentencing court as an aggravating factor).

On remand to the trial court, the following evidence was

introduced at the resentencing hearing on May 16, 2008. According

to the original and updated presentence investigation reports,

defendant was 15 years old at the time of his arrest. Defendant was

residing with his natural father. Defendant’s mother was serving a

term of probation for the aggravated battery of a police officer. Of the

11 children in defendant’s immediate family, one other sibling was in

the care of the Juvenile Division of the Illinois Department of

Corrections. 

In June 2001, at age 12, defendant was taken into custody for

stealing a purse, and in June 2002, he was detained by the police for

throwing a rock at a car. In April 2003, defendant was charged as a

juvenile with unlawful possession of a motor vehicle. In July 2003,

defendant was charged with three counts of retail theft for stealing

two BB guns and a pair of jeans. The two cases were consolidated,

and defendant was adjudicated delinquent as to the motor vehicle

charge. Defendant was made a ward of the court, placed on 15

months’ probation, and 7 days’ detention. When defendant failed to
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appear for a review hearing, a “no bond” warrant was issued, and

defendant was sentenced to the Peoria Drug Treatment Youth Court.

Four warrants were issued from November to January as a result of

his failure to appear in drug court as ordered. Defendant failed to

complete the drug court program and was discharged from the

program.

On June 9, 2004, defendant was arrested for unlawful possession

with intent to deliver a controlled substance and unlawful possession

of a controlled substance. The arrest resulted from a drug raid at

defendant’s mother’s home, where defendant was living at the time.

He was adjudicated delinquent for the amended offense of attempted

possession of a controlled substance and placed on probation for a

term of 18 months. Defendant completed a life skills program and

reported on his probation weekly until two weeks before his arrest in

the present offense, when he stopped reporting. Defendant also had

three curfew violations and one truancy violation from 2001 through

2003. 

Defendant was enrolled in the ninth grade at Woodruff High

School at the time of the shooting. He had participated in special

education services for speech and language since the second grade.

His father was receiving social security benefits as a result of

defendant being classified a disabled child. Defendant’s social history

was marked by school suspensions for fighting, failing to follow

school rules, and for disrespect to persons in authority. 

Following his arrest for the offense in this case, defendant was

detained for more than a year at the Peoria County Juvenile Detention

Center. During that time, he attended educational classes, where it

was reported that he cooperated with the staff and met expectations.

A report indicated that he had adjusted positively to the structure and

rules of the facility, had displayed appropriate behavior, and developed

positive relationships with peers and staff. He was participating in the

“Honor Pod” program. Defendant told the presentence investigator

that he would like to complete his GED and study welding. 

Defendant’s juvenile detention record shows that defendant was

written up on multiple occasions between February 2005 and February

2006 for fighting and threatening other detainees and staff. These

incidents included “throwing chairs around the dayroom and

threatening to do bodily harm to a staff member”; “threatening to
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smack” several female detainees; punching other detainees; and

“attempting to attack” another detainee in connection with alleged

gang activity. 

Defendant was released on February 17, 2006, from the Peoria

County jail to the custody of the Illinois Department of Juvenile

Justice at the Illinois Youth Center in St. Charles. On March 2, 2006,

he was transferred to the Illinois Youth Center in Harrisburg. The

Harrisburg facility reported that defendant lost 30 days’ good-conduct

credit for fighting in December 2006 and lost 6 months’ good-conduct

credit for being involved in a dangerous disturbance in January 2007.

Defendant was released to the Illinois Department of Corrections

facility in Menard on July 13, 2007. On August 1, 2007, he was

transferred to the Pinckneyville Correctional Center, where he

remained in custody until his transfer to the Peoria County jail on

April 1, 2008, to await resentencing. Defendant received no reports

of misconduct after January 2007.

Defendant wrote a letter addressed to the trial judge in which he

stated that he had matured over the last four years and that he had

learned from his mistakes. He wrote that he would like to apologize

to Omar Porter and to all those he had endangered by his crime. He

stated that he would like to complete his education so that he could

improve his life. 

The State requested that the trial court sentence defendant to 24

years’ imprisonment. The prosecutor argued three statutory factors in

aggravation: (1) that defendant’s conduct threatened serious harm, (2)

that defendant had a history of prior delinquency, and (3) that the

sentence was necessary to deter others. The State asked the court to

consider as nonstatutory aggravating factors defendant’s incidents of

fighting in school and in the juvenile detention facility, and the nature

and circumstances of the offense. 

Defense counsel argued that the appropriate sentencing range was

between 6 to 10 years, noting defendant’s age at the time of the crime,

the nonviolent nature of his delinquency adjudications, the

improvement in defendant’s grades, and defendant’s letter to the

court. Defendant made a statement to the court in which he

apologized for his crime, acknowledged that this was a serious case,

and stated that he would learn from the situation and that it would not
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happen again.

After considering the arguments of counsel, the trial court again

sentenced defendant to 24 years’ imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellate court held that the sentence was

excessive, and, pursuant to its authority under Supreme Court Rule

615(b)(4), reduced defendant’s sentence to six years, the statutory

minimum. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(b)(4). The dissenting justice

maintained that the majority’s decision represented a reweighing of

the sentencing factors, which circumvented and nullified the discretion

of the sentencing judge. No. 3–08–0373 (unpublished order under

Supreme Court Rule 23) (Holdridge, J., dissenting).

We granted the State’s petition for leave to appeal. 210 Ill. 2d R.

315(a). 

ANALYSIS

The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court abused its

discretion in sentencing defendant to 24 years’ imprisonment.

Supreme Court Rule 615(b)(4) grants a reviewing court the power to

reduce a sentence. 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(b)(4). That power, however,

should be exercised “ ‘cautiously and sparingly.’ ” People v. Jones,

168 Ill. 2d 367, 378 (1995), quoting People v. O’Neal, 125 Ill. 2d

291, 300 (1988). A reviewing court may not alter a defendant’s

sentence absent an abuse of discretion by the trial court. People v.

Hauschild, 226 Ill. 2d 63 (2007). A sentence will be deemed an abuse

of discretion where the sentence is “greatly at variance with the spirit

and purpose of the law, or manifestly disproportionate to the nature

of the offense.” People v. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d 203, 210 (2000), citing

People v. Fern, 189 Ill. 2d 48, 54 (1999). 

The trial court has broad discretionary powers in imposing a

sentence, and its sentencing decisions are entitled to great deference.

Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d at 209 (citing Fern, 189 Ill. 2d at 53, and People

v. Perruquet, 68 Ill. 2d 149, 154 (1977)). “A reviewing court gives

great deference to the trial court’s judgment regarding sentencing

because the trial judge, having observed the defendant and the

proceedings, has a far better opportunity to consider these factors than

the reviewing court, which must rely on the ‘cold’ record.” Fern, 189

Ill. 2d at 53. “The trial judge has the opportunity to weigh such
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factors as the defendant’s credibility, demeanor, general moral

character, mentality, social environment, habits, and age. [Citations.]

Consequently, the reviewing court must not substitute its judgment for

that of the trial court merely because it would have weighed these

factors differently. [Citation.]” Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d at 209. 

Upon reviewing the record, we find that the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to 24 years’ imprisonment.

The record shows that the trial court considered the appropriate

factors in aggravation and mitigation. At the resentencing hearing, the

trial judge stated that he considered the presentence investigation

reports, arguments of counsel, and defendant’s statement. The court

found no statutory mitigating factors and three statutory aggravating

factors: (1) that defendant’s conduct threatened serious harm, (2) that

defendant had a history of prior delinquency, and (3) that the sentence

was necessary to deter others from committing the same crime. The

court found that it was likely defendant would commit similar offenses

in the future, based on his multiple incident reports while being held

in the juvenile detention facility. 

It is clear from the remarks of the trial judge that he did not rely

on the improper factor that the shooting occurred in a school. Rather,

the court concluded that the nature and circumstances of the offense

warranted a sentence at the higher end of the 6-to-30-year sentencing

range. Specifically, the court noted that five shots were fired into a

crowd of people as retaliation for threats from the victim and with

total disregard for the potential harm to others. The court recognized

that, had defendant fired a gun one time on school grounds with no

bystanders, he would have qualified as a Class X felon with a six-year

minimum sentence. See 720 ILCS 5/24–1.2(b) (West 2004); 730

ILCS 5/5–8–1(a)(3) (West 2004). Under the facts of this case,

however, defendant shot at Porter multiple times, in the middle of a

crowded hallway filled with students, teachers, and other school

officials while school was in session. He endangered not only Porter

but also innocent bystanders.

Defendant contends that the 24-year sentence did not properly

take into account his age at the time of the offense, his tumultuous

background, or his potential for rehabilitation. The record shows that

the trial court did consider the mitigating evidence. Moreover, “[a]

defendant’s rehabilitative potential *** is not entitled to greater
 

1We note that defendant has filed a motion to strike certain statements in

the State’s reply brief referring to defendant’s conduct subsequent to the

resentencing hearing. Because of our disposition in this case, there is no need

to consider the contested material. Defendant’s motion is denied as moot.

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weight than the seriousness of the offense.” People v. Coleman, 166

Ill. 2d 247, 261 (1995). 

The sentencing judge adequately considered the appropriate

factors, and it is not our duty to reweigh the factors involved in his

sentencing decision. The appellate court, however, reweighed the

sentencing factors, overemphasizing the mitigating factors while

minimizing aggravating factors. The court found that the trial court

“failed to give due consideration to Alexander’s social background

and facts evidencing his rehabilitative potential, including the

improvement in his conduct while in detention.” No. 3–08–0373

(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). The court also

held that the trial court “gave undue weight to factors in aggravation,

including the improper factor that the offense occurred in a school.”

No. 3–08–0373 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).

The appellate court substituted its own judgment for that of the trial

court because it would have weighed the factors differently–an

improper exercise of the powers of a reviewing court. See People v.

Streit, 142 Ill. 2d 13, 19 (1991). 

We find that the sentence imposed on defendant by the trial court

was not “greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law, or

manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense.” See Stacey,

193 Ill. 2d at 210. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in imposing a 24-year sentence on defendant. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the

appellate court and reinstate defendant’s 24-year sentence.

1

Appellate court judgment reversed; 

circuit court judgment affirmed.