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87–649 PDF 2004

S. HRG. 108–236

U.S POLICY REGARDING NARCOTICS CONTROL

IN COLOMBIA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

CAUCUS ON INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS

CONTROL

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 3, 2003

Printed for the use of the Committee on Narcotics

(

(II)

SENATE CAUCUS ON INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL

IN COLOMBIA

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

Charles E. Grassley, Iowa, Chairman

Joseph R. Biden, Delaware, Co-Chair

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama

MIKE DeWINE, Ohio

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota

BOB GRAHAM, Florida

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California

ERIC J. AKERS, Staff Director

MARCIA LEE, Minority Staff Director

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on June 3, 2003 ................................................................................. 1

STATEMENTS

Grassley, Hon. Charles E., U.S. Senator from Iowa ............................................. 1

Biden, Hon. Joseph R., U.S. Senator from Delaware, prepared statement ........ 1

DeWine, Hon. Mike, U.S. Senator from Ohio ........................................................ 3

Sessions, Hon. Jeff, U.S. Senator from Alabama .................................................. 43

WITNESSES

Santos-Calderon, Hon. Francisco, Vice President, Republic of Colombia,

Bogota ́, Colombia .................................................................................................. 4

Prepared sattement .......................................................................................... 14

Simons, Paul E., Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington,

DC. and J. Curtis Struble, Acting Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC. ........................... 19

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 21

Struble, J. Curtis, Acting Assistant Secretary of State, Western Hemisphere

Affairs, prepared statement ................................................................................ 27

Hill, James T., Commander, U.S. Army, Miami, Florida; accompanied by

Marshall Billingslea, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC. ..................................................................... 28

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 29

Ford, Jess T., Director, International Affairs and Trade, U.S. General Accounting Office, Washington, DC. ....................................................................... 53

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 55

McLean, Phillip, Senior Fellow and Deputy Director, The Americas Program,

Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC. .................. 65

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 67

SUBMITTED QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Responses by J. Curtis Struble and Paul Simons to Questions Submitted

by: ..........................................................................................................................

Hon. Joseph Biden ............................................................................................ 73

Hon. Charles Grassley ..................................................................................... 78

Colombia Hearing Questions Submitted (Classified Answers Retained in Committee files) to: .....................................................................................................

DoD .................................................................................................................... 82

Jess Ford, GAO ................................................................................................. 83

Phillip McLean, CSIS ....................................................................................... 83

General Hill from Senator Biden .................................................................... 83

State Department ............................................................................................. 84

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U.S. POLICY REGARDING NARCOTICS

CONTROL IN COLOMBIA

TUESDAY, JUNE 3, 2003

U.S. SENATE, CAUCUS ON INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL, Washington, DC.

The Caucus met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m., in room SD–

215, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Charles E. Grassley,

Chairman of the Caucus, presiding.

Present: Senators Grassley, DeWine, and Sessions.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES E. GRASSLEY,

U.S. SENATOR FROM IOWA

Chairman GRASSLEY. I thank everybody for their patience, although everybody is here on time and we are able to get started.

I particularly want to acknowledge a lot of people who have come

a long distance, obviously, the leadership of our friend, the country

of Colombia, coming so far, as well as our people here in the United

States who are so integrally involved coming from Florida and elsewhere.

Just in case our ranking minority member, Mr. Biden, is not able

to be here, he asked that I would put a statement in the record for

him and we will do that. But if he is able to come and he wants

some time for his opening, I will obviously be very happy to give

it to him.

[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE

Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this hearing today to examine U.S. policy in

Colombia.

We are honored to be joined by Vice President Francisco Santos. The Vice President knows all too well the price that Colombia has paid in its three-front war

against drug traffickers, left-wing guerrillas, and right-wing paramilitaries. He was

held hostage for nearly 8 months by the Medillı ́n cartel in 1990—and he has received numerous death threats from the FARC.

The people of Colombia live with a level of violence that Americans cannot comprehend; the bravery that Vice President Santos and his colleagues in government

have demonstrated in the face of that danger is inspiring.

Three years ago, we renewed our commitment to the Andean region, providing

funding for Plan Colombia, as well as for counter-narcotics programs in Bolivia,

Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela and Brazil. Since then, we have provided over two billion

dollars in assistance to Colombia to combat the drug trade and restore the rule of

law.

We have a duty to help in this effort because it is America’s seemingly insatiable

demand for narcotics that has helped fuel the drug trade.

We are beginning to see some results. Last year, there was a 15 percent decrease

in coca cultivation and a 25 percent decrease in opium poppy cultivation. This reVerDate 03-FEB-2003 11:09 Jan 14, 2004 Jkt 087649 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 D:\NARC\87649.TXT SSC2 PsN: SSC2
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duced supply has led to a modest decrease in purity of both cocaine and heroin on

the streets of the United States. There is still a long way to go, but this progress

is encouraging.

Unfortunately, we had a setback elsewhere in the Andean region, with coca cultivation increasing by 8 percent in Peru and 23 percent in Bolivia in 2002. We must

do more to help Colombia’s neighbors guard against the so-called ‘‘balloon effect’’.

And to successfully counter the drug trade in the entire region, we must have a

three-pronged strategy: eradication, interdiction, and alternative economic opportunities.

Several other elements of our policy in Colombia bear emphasis.

First, human rights. According to the most recent State Department report, in

2002:

‘‘The [Colombian] Government’s human rights record remained poor . . . A

small percentage of total human rights abuses reported were attributed to State

security forces; however, some members of the government security forces continued to commit serious abuses, including unlawful and extrajudicial killings.

Some members of the security forces collaborated with paramilitary groups that

committed serious abuses. Impunity remained at the core of the country’s

human rights problems.’’

I know that the Vice President, and President Uribe are committed to improving

human rights. But the message is still not getting through to all levels of the military. We need to see more improvements.

Second, last year Congress changed the law to allow Colombia to use equipment

we have provided for other than counter-narcotics purposes. This recognizes the reality that Colombia’s illegal groups are all involved in the drug trade. But we must

be sure that this change in authority does result in a major change in focus: our

priority must continue to be fighting the drug trade.

Finally, we must make sure that our other commitments abroad do not distract

us from our promise to help Colombia and its neighbors. There’s a lot on the foreign

policy agenda. But we have a lot at stake in the Andes, and we owe it to our neighbors to help.

The Administration has done a good job in Colombia, but the Secretary of State

cannot be focused on every world problem simultaneously. He needs some lieutenants. Unfortunately, the Narcotics Bureau at the State Department has not had a

confirmed Assistant Secretary since August, and as yet no successor has been nominated. I urge the Administration to send us a nominee as soon as possible.

I look forward to hearing from our distinguished witnesses this morning, and having a frank discussion with them about the progress we are making and the road

ahead.

Chairman GRASSLEY. Today, we are going to examine the current

status of events in Colombia. The United States has a particular

interest in the stability and future of Colombia because it is both

one of the oldest democracies in our hemisphere as well as the

home to three terrorist groups, each of whom get a significant

amount of their operational funds from drugs smuggled into the

United States.

With illegal drugs grown and shipped from Colombia killing

Americans everyday and the sale of these drugs funding terrorists

who are killing Colombians everyday, it is in the interest of both

the country of Colombia and our Nation to work together to eliminate drug production and trafficking in Colombia.

This past year has seen a very significant increase in the tempo

of activities in Colombia, which has resulted in some of the successes we will hear today. But we obviously still have a long way

to go, as we all know. This fight is by no means over, and I hope

that we won’t let these first signs of success distract us from the

long road ahead. Today’s hearing will highlight several aspects of

the situation in Colombia and the nature of objectives of assistance

that we are providing.

The last year has been a tumultuous one for the country of Colombia. Rapidly evolving events make maintaining a clear course

3

of action even more difficult. The most recent developments stem

from former Colombian President Pastrana’s decision to give up on

4 years of attempted negotiations with the FARC and end the

Despeje territory, which had been created in an attempt to bring

the FARC to the negotiating table.

Negotiating a peace with the FARC has been a cornerstone of the

Pastrana presidency, but his efforts were ultimately frustrated by

the FARC’s reluctance to negotiate seriously. The failure to find a

peaceful solution meant a new approach to the problem had to be

found.

The people of Colombia demonstrated their resolve to take a new

approach in confronting terrorist groups through the overwhelming

election of President Uribe and of our first witness this morning,

Vice President Santos. Elected in the first round by a significant

margin over the nearest competitor, the President and Vice President face significant pressure to quickly fulfill their campaign

promises, a pressure that we all understand and about which I am

sure our first witness is well aware.

For the United States, eliminating coca production in Colombia

is a longstanding goal of our National Drug Control Strategy.

Opium poppy cultivation is a more recent development, but its

elimination is also in our strategy.

Working in close cooperation with the Government of Colombia,

we have finally been able to get ahead of production this past year.

According to the most recent cultivation surveys, coca production in

Colombia was down 15 percent from 2001 and opium poppy production was down close to 25 percent. United Nations estimates show

an even bigger reduction in the coca crop, so it seems that we are

making some progress.

President Uribe has made it his goal to eliminate all coca production within Colombia by August 2006. This is a laudable goal that

the United States is willing to and should support. Eliminating

coca and poppy production is important not only because of the tremendous damage that these poisons do to users, but because of the

important role they play as a funding source for terrorist organizations operating in Colombia. I hope today’s testimony by our second

panel of witnesses will shed additional light on what steps are necessary.

Does Senate DeWine have anything he wants to say in an opening statement before I introduce the Vice President?

STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE DEWINE, U.S. SENATOR

FROM OHIO

Senator DEWINE. Well, Mr. Chairman, I will be very brief. I

want to thank you very much for holding this very important hearing. The witnesses that you have lined up are very impressive.

Mr. Vice President, thank you very much for joining us here

today.

Mr. Chairman, I have had an opportunity to travel to Colombia

on a number of occasions. We all have an interest in Colombia. I

had a chance to meet with President Uribe a few months ago in

Colombia and talk with him about the problems of Colombia.

This is a country that is in our own backyard. It is one of the

oldest democracies in our hemisphere. It is a country that is, as we

4

all know, a struggling country that is struggling against the narcoterrorists. And if we cannot assist a country such as Colombia that

is fighting terrorism in our own backyard, then obviously we can’t

do it anywhere in the world. And we are doing it; we are trying

to help Colombia.

The importance of Colombia to the United States, I think, is obvious. This is a country that is engaged with us in a common struggle against not only terrorism, but a common struggle against the

drug dealers. We are the consumers of drugs. Colombia is a producer of drugs. So we have a common problem and we both recognize that problem and we are working together. Our hearing today,

of course, is to see where we are in that common struggle, and to

evaluate that and to see where we need to go from here.

So, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding this very, very important hearing, and I thank our witnesses, who all are on the front

line in this struggle, for being here today and I look forward to

their testimony.

Chairman GRASSLEY. Our first witness obviously, as I mentioned,

is the Vice President, Francisco Santos, and he was elected with

the present administration in May of 2002. The election of the Vice

President is his most recent of a long string of initiatives that Mr.

Santos has undertaken to improve the lives of all Colombians.

Previously, he was editor of El Tiempo, Colombia’s largest newspaper, and in weekly columns there often speaking out against

kidnappings and massacres, and calling upon the civil society to

take a more active role in finding peaceful solutions to facing the

problems of Colombia.

He has stridently condemned murderous acts, whether they come

from the extreme left or the extreme right, and obviously has been

a target of drug traffickers. He was, in fact, kidnapped by Pablo

Escobar, then-leader of the Medellin drug cartel. He also, with 10

other journalists, was held then for nearly 8 months in the unsuccessful attempt to extort a promise from the Colombian Government not to extradite drug traffickers to the United States.

After being released, he spent a year at Harvard University as

a Nyman Fellow, and then returned to Bogota ́, finding publications

that would assist the victims of kidnappings and their families, and

the organizations to back it up.

So he has been in the middle and suffered as a result of his crusades for freedom and for better living conditions for people in Colombia. So we are privileged to have the Vice President here, and

I thank you very much for your testimony.

Proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. FRANCISCO SANTOS-CALDERON, VICE

PRESIDENT, REPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA, BOGOTA ́ , COLOMBIA

Vice President SANTOS-CALDERON. Good morning, Chairman

Grassley, Senator DeWine, and distinguished members of the Caucus. I appreciate the opportunity to meet with you today to discuss

the significant progress both our countries are making in the war

against narco-terrorism. I have prepared a statement for the record

which I will summarize in the next few minutes.

Let me start by painting a broad picture of the situation in Colombia today. My country remains one of the most dangerous

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places in the world. As we have taken the fight to the traffickers,

they have responded with increasing violence across the country.

We are not just fighting disparate networks of drug traffickers, but

powerful terrorist groups who target primarily civilians.

The fight has moved from rural, isolated regions of the country

to our largest cities. It has shifted from random acts of violence to

sophisticated and coordinated attacks. The conflict is becoming increasingly regionalized, as illegal actors use Colombia’s borders to

escape our reach.

More than 8,000 acts of terror have been committed against the

Colombian people over the past 5 years, more than the combined

acts of terror committed worldwide during this period. Colombia

suffers 30,000 violent deaths every year, equal to 10 times the victims who died on September 11 every year.

About 2,600 Colombians are kidnapped every year. Children are

forced to fight for the illegal groups. Every type of economic infrastructure—roads, bridges, power lines, telephone towers, reservoirs,

and all pipelines—has been targeted, costing billions of dollars and

disrupting millions of lives. More than 1 million Colombians have

been displaced by the violence of the drug terrorist organizations.

How have we responded to the situation in our first 9 months in

office? The Uribe administration is implementing a multi-track

fight against the illegal drug trade. This involves eradication of illegal crops, interdiction, destruction of narco-trafficking infrastructure and seizing their assets, military and police action against

traffickers, and law enforcement and judicial cooperation. All these

efforts are directed to a single goal: zero tolerance for drug trafficking and total eradication of this activity in Colombia by the

year 2006.

We have already had positive results to demonstrate in each of

these areas. A record level of illegal coca crops were sprayed last

year. We sprayed 130,000 hectares of coca. This area of land is

equivalent to 524 square miles, or 7.5 times the size of the District

of Columbia. This spraying reduced Colombia’s coca crop by 30 percent for the first time in 10 years.

We have sprayed an additional 65,000 hectares since January

2003, and we hope we will be able to achieve our goal of spraying

more than 150,000 hectares this year. Our aerial spraying campaign is also targeting illegal poppy crops. We have sprayed 3,300

hectares in 2002, and so far this year we have sprayed 1,658 hectares.

We seized a record amount of illegal drugs. From January 2002

to the present, we have interdicted more than 100 tons of pure cocaine and 850 kilos of heroin. The street value of these drugs is

more than $3 billion, but these drugs will never reach America’s

streets.

With a better trained and equipped military and police, we have

targeted narco-terrorists with greater success. Last year, 3,553

guerrillas and 1,336 members of the self-defense groups were captured. An additional 1,138 members of these illegal groups have

turned themselves in. We have seized over 4,000 weapons, arms

that would have been used to perpetuate violence against our citizens.

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Our anti-narcotics brigades, trained and equipped by the United

States, have located and destroyed dozens of cocaine-producing laboratories and other drug-trafficking infrastructure. In just one 2-

week period in May, a brigade destroyed 16 coca labs in the State

of Narino. Since assuming office last year, the Uribe government

has extradited 78 Colombians to the United States to face justice

here for narco-terrorist crimes.

Senators Plan Colombia is working. These results have been realized because the Uribe government is committed to taking the

fight directly to the drug terrorists. But it is also the result of military, economic and social assistance provided by the United States

and the extraordinary level of cooperation between our two governments.

This cooperation that started under the Pastrana and Clinton administrations has continued between President Bush and President

Uribe, but it also extends to many thousand Colombians and Americans who are today working side by side to defeat narco-terrorism

wherever it exists and whenever it strikes.

Plan Colombia is working for several reasons. First, it was developed in a bipartisan manner, and bipartisan support has enabled

it to be implemented thoroughly. Second, it required a commitment

by both our countries to combine our resources and share the burden that this activity inflicts in both of our societies.

Third, we have both invested significant funds. To date, the

United States has provided $1.7 billion in military, economic and

humanitarian assistance. The Colombian Government has spent

nearly $4 billion of our own funds in support of Plan Colombia.

Our recent effort to more aggressively target illegal groups is reducing the level of violence in Colombia. During the first months

of this year, homicides were down by 20 percent, compared to the

same period in 2002. Kidnappings were down 40 percent over the

same period.

We are investing significant resources to restore law and order

throughout the country. Defense spending will rise from 3.5 to 5.8

percent of GDP during President Uribe’s 4-year term. The armed

forces will be enlarged by 126,000 troops. Already, there is a greater police and military presence on Colombia’s rural highways and

roads. This is critical for commercial activity and for tourism and

public safety.

In addition, we are this year training and equipping 27,000 new

police officers who are being stationed in 170 rural towns where

there is no police at all and in 260 rural towns that have less than

10 policemen each. The bottom line is this: We are making Colombia a safer country day by day, road by road, town by town. We

are committed to this effort because we know narco-terrorist violence affects all Colombians, rich and poor, urban and rural, powerful and ordinary citizens.

President Uribe and I have not been exempt from it. Our inaugural ceremony last year was targeted by a FARC missile attack.

The President’s father was kidnapped and assassinated by the

FARC in the 1980’s. I was kidnapped by Pablo Escobar and held

captive for 8 months in 1990. My brother-in-law was killed by a

bomb that Pablo Escobar put in an airplane.

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Nearly every member of President Uribe’s Cabinet has lost a

family member or a close relative in this violence. Governors, mayors, congressmen, labor leaders, soldiers, policemen, human rights

workers and journalists, all brave citizens fighting to take back our

country from those illegal organizations, have been murdered.

For President Uribe and myself, defeating terrorism is not just

a policy. It is a total commitment. We know the destruction that

drugs and violence inflict not just on our country, but on our families and loved ones. To end the cycle of drugs and violence, we need

continued support and cooperation from the United States and the

international community.

We are benefiting from American technology, intelligence, training, and financial assistance. We offer in return our full commitment and energy to learn, to execute, to cooperate, and to achieve

the results both our countries desired. Colombia’s strength is its

national resilience in the face of adversity. We move forward, propelled by our determination and the help of allies like the United

States to a more promising future.

Thank you.

Chairman GRASSLEY. Well, thank you, Mr. Vice President. The

two of us would have a few questions to ask you, and I might make

an announcement for you as well as for other panels as well.

Particularly on Tuesdays, there are a lot of committee meetings

and members might not be able to come to all these hearings. So

you might get questions in writing from members who can’t be here

or even from those of us who are here, and we would appreciate

responses in about a 21⁄2-week period of time, if you do get questions in writing.

First of all, Mr. Vice President, you were very positive from your

point of view about Plan Colombia working, and I am very happy

to hear that sort of positive response and, of course, that is what

this hearing is basically about.

Are there any shortcomings in Plan Colombia that you would

want to point out to Members of the U.S. Congress?

Vice President SANTOS-CALDERON. No. At this point in time, I

think the most important thing is to maintain the level of assistance. Obviously, we are going into new areas where our planes are

being hit tremendously, the spraying planes, the helicopters.

Right now, we have moved to the southern part of the Bolivia region, to other regions, and the anti-narcotics battalions are going

to be moved there. So we think that will improve the situation. But

certainly, as we move more aggressively in more areas, we are taking hits on those planes in a more massive manner than we did

before. But with the level of assistance that right now is being provided, we think that our goal of eradicating drugs and cultivation

in the year 2006 will be able to be met.

Chairman GRASSLEY. I would like to have you describe for me

the support that your administration has received from Colombian

citizens for its fight against drug trafficking and terrorism. Obviously, I presume that those that are outside of what you might call

the drug-growing areas or the areas not so close to the FARC and

other organizations obviously would welcome the sort of aggressive

action you are taking.

8

But the extent to which you could quantify that support, more

important if there is any way you can describe support from those

whose lives are closer to the regions where fighting might be going

on, that would be helpful.

Vice President SANTOS-CALDERON. President Uribe and his administration have had a very, very clear discourse in regard to defeating drugs. That is why Colombians elected us, and in that

sense we have been very, very clear with Colombian society about

what our goals are.

And we have backed up that discourse with action. We have told

drug barons that they are going to be extradited and we have extradited them, that they are going to be attacked and they have

been attacked, that we are going to seize their assets, and in the

latest action we seized 6,000 hectares of land that is going to go

to displaced peasants.

We have told the peasants who are involved in drug trafficking

that an illegal hectare of crop is an illegal hectare of crop, and that

we are going to eradicate it. In that sense, what we have seen is

that more and more of the peasants that have been displaced from

those areas are going back to the traditional agricultural areas

where they used to be.

We are protecting some crops so that they can go back to the

places and be able to have a sustainable income. Our growth in cotton is very impressive, and cotton in Colombia generates a lot of

rural employment. We are trying to protect coffee, also, that generates employment.

So what we have seen is that our security policy has been able

to absorb those peasants that moved out of the traditional cultivation areas into coca areas, and the growth of the agricultural economy is pretty impressive. So in that sense, by protecting the rural

areas, we have been able to generate the employment that our

poppy and coca spraying campaigns have generated in other areas.

President Uribe’s popularity, according to sources, is around 65

to 70 percent, and in that sense it shows that Colombians are fed

up with violence, that Colombians want this to end, and I think

have supported the President in a way that sometimes we didn’t

expect it was going to be as high as it is.

We have been very transparent with the Colombian population

about what we are doing. We have accepted the mistakes that

sometimes the policy can have. We are willing to correct them, but

what we have been very clear on is that our zero-tolerance policy

toward drugs is non-negotiable, non-negotiable because it is a national security matter.

If we eradicate drugs, we will take the main fueling agent of the

conflict and we will be able to defeat easier the drug terrorist organizations that are killing all those Colombians and that are destroying a lot of the infrastructure and that are displacing Colombians. So Colombians who voted for us to recuperate security, that

is what they are getting and they are pretty happy about it.

Chairman GRASSLEY. Even though your administration is less

than a year old, have you seen, and if you have seen any changes

in terrorist organization functioning, how they function or what

they accomplish compared to before—in other words, as a result of

9

your administration’s actions, any sorts of changes that have taken

place that you actually see within the last few months.

Vice President SANTOS-CALDERON. Yes, we can foresee a couple

of changes which are pretty important. The first one is that the

FARC, which used to be a very conservative organization in terms

of military development, has gone shopping in the world, has

bought technology from different terrorist groups and has used it.

Last year, we lost, I think, 15 explosives experts because they

bought technology from a terrorist organization and they learned

very quickly how to put bombs in a different manner and our explosives experts didn’t know it was being done. The attack on the

7th of August was technology also bought from a terrorist organization.

So we can foresee the FARC to use more efficient methods of terrorism, to look for it, to shop around the world not only for technology, but knowledge too. And they have urbanized the conflict, so

we can foresee a lot more terrorist activities in regard to the conflict, terrorist activities in the large urban areas.

In the past 8 months, our police have seized in Bogota ́, the capital, more than five tons of explosives. Our police have done a very

good job. Unfortunately, we can’t stop them all and we had the

Nogal incident, but they really want to take terrorism into the

urban areas.

The second thing is that our attacks against the paramilitaries

and the drug traffickers have been so strong, and will be even

stronger in the future, that you can foresee the most radical elements of those organizations working together with the FARC in

order to destabilize the country and in order to make more efficient

the terrorist war.

Drug traffickers fish in turbulent waters, and the more order we

have, the less they will be effective in promoting their business. So

I would foresee, and I think it wouldn’t be a strange thing if those

radical elements come together and move efficiently in some areas.

The FARC and the paramilitaries are starting to share the business, the coca business. So you are starting to see some signals

that are very worrisome and that will require the Colombian army

and the Colombian police to combat them even stronger.

The other thing that I think will be worrisome—and I know this

might be in the future—the FARC has become a more fearless type

of organization. Their political elements are in the back seat. A lot

of the political figures who grew out of the organizations have been

taken away of positions of power. And the FARC has created an

organization that is very efficient because it promotes those who

get more money and are more violence-oriented, produce more results.

And in that sense, what you foresee is an organization that has

less restraints and will look for allies all over the world. I think

that in the future, when they feel weak—and when they feel weak,

they react very violently. That is the pattern they have had. I am

worried that they might use different types of weapons of mass destruction.

They have gotten involved in the water reservoirs, which is very

dangerous. So I foresee for the near future that our successes will

make the FARC more violent, more prone to get allies in the interVerDate 03-FEB-2003 11:09 Jan 14, 2004 Jkt 087649 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 D:\NARC\87649.TXT SSC2 PsN: SSC2
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national community of terrorists and looking for new ways of generating terror in Colombia.

Chairman GRASSLEY. My last question would be in regard to—

I don’t know whether this would be a fair measure of your continuing success, but I would see that in previous attempts that

maybe the average citizen in Colombia would be fearful of helping

the government in any way, with information or any other way,

against drug traffickers. But with an aggressive administration,

you might see the average citizen moving to help the government

and the police and the military to a greater extent without feeling

their lives were maybe so jeopardized as otherwise.

Are you seeing any movement in that direction of the average citizen being less fearful and more willing to cooperate with the government against FARC and other organizations, or is that still

pretty much a difficult thing for the average citizen to be involved

with?

Vice President SANTOS-CALDERON. That certainly has been the

case. The population more and more is cooperating with the policy,

with the army, and with the government. We are seeing it all over

the country.

As I said before, in 170 towns we are going to get back a pretty

important contingent of soldiers and policemen, between 50 and

100. In the 90 towns where we have put them back so far, they are

received like heroes. They say finally you are taking away this terror that we used to live in. What people want is authority, State

legal authority, to be imposed and to get back to being able to live

successfully.

Our policy of recuperating the roads has been a major success.

Before, you used to be incarcerated in the cities. You know, you

were so worried that you left the cities and you were kidnapped.

Our internal tourism was practically dead, and that has generated

huge popular support because people immediately realized that authority imposed with respect for human rights, but authority nonetheless can benefit the citizens.

The past Easter where there was a big vacation, more than 8

million Colombians took to the roads again. We hadn’t seen that

in the past 7 years. So all those small steps have made people believe in authority again, have made people believe in the government again. And certainly without their help, we wouldn’t be able

to stop a lot of the terrorist actions we have been able to stop.

The army and the police have responded very quickly to tips

from the citizens, which didn’t used to happen. So there is a trust

that is starting to grow immensely. In polls that have been made

by independent organizations, newspapers, et cetera, the No. 1 institution in trust and popularity in Colombia is the armed forces.

That is a process that has helped, certainly, the cooperation of citizens with the government.

Chairman GRASSLEY. I thank you for your testimony and thank

you for answering questions.

I now turn to Senator DeWine.

Senator DEWINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Vice President, you have really touched upon this, but I

want to get into it just a little bit more. You really have entered

a new phase of this war with the guerrillas, the FARC, moving into

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the urban areas. This is obviously a calculated effort to bring terror

to the middle class, terror to the urban areas, to Bogota ́ and the

other major cities.

What impact has this had, do you think, on the people in the

urban areas so far? I mean, this was an attempt that was made

years ago by the drug dealers with some success, actually, in the

past. How are you going to keep this from happening again? What

has been the reaction of the people in Bogota ́ ? The people in

Cartagena and people in the other urban centers—what has been

their reaction?

Vice President SANTOS-CALDERON. You know, certainly, for example, the bomb that they put in the club where they killed 37 persons and more than 100 were injured, it hurt us. You have to recognize it, you know, and people get scared.

But what we felt immediately was that after the initial reaction,

Colombians citizens toughened up and said, ‘‘You know, we know

this is the price we have to pay’’. So you have a population that

has lived through all that and is tougher than ever, which doesn’t

mean that we don’t have to really improve our intelligence and try

to avoid those types of acts.

As a matter of fact, with the help of U.S. Government intelligence, informants, and work which we are doing in a very coordinated way, the police have stopped many, many incidents like

those in Bogota ́, in Medellin, in Cali, and in other cities. The work

has been quite impressive. The results are very, very good in stopping terrorist acts.

But unfortunately, with one that you can stop, a lot of that policy

gets not stopped, but people get frightened and questioned. But I

think the leadership of President Uribe that he established after

the bombing accident and that was reflected in a phrase he said

in a speech after that that said that Colombians are crying but

they will not surrender—that is the feeling of the country right

now.

And the support for security policy, even though it suffers a little

bit with those incidents—I think we have gone a long way from the

early 1990’s when car bombs in the cities and terrorism almost put

Colombian society to its knees. We have learned a lesson and we

know that we are going to pay some more prices, some really high

prices in this fight against terrorists, but we are willing to do it

and so far we have the support of Colombian society.

Senator DEWINE. Mr. Vice President, in both your written testimony and your oral testimony, you have really, I think, done a

good job in helping us understand the human cost of narcotics production and trafficking in Colombia. While most Americans understand the toll that cocaine and heroin take on our own young people, I venture to say that few Americans are really aware of the

toll that narcotics take on the children of Colombia.

As noted in a human rights report recently released by our own

State Department, children are often caught in a crossfire. For example, last June a crossfire between paramilitaries and a mixed

contingent of FARC and ELN fighters killed a 7-year-old boy outside that little boy’s home in Colombia. In September, three children in Bogota ́ were killed when the grenade with which they were

playing exploded. The grenade apparently had been discarded by

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members of the FARC urban militia that operated in that neighborhood.

An estimated 12,000 to 15,000 children were members of illegal

armed groups, both paramilitary and guerrilla. The Roman Catholic Church has reported that FARC used its freedom and its former

safe haven to lure or force children into its ranks, which you have

already talked about. Children who have deserted from the FARC

have reported that local guerrilla commanders threatened to kill

their families should they desert or attempt to do so.

Let me ask you, could you further describe the impact that

narco-terrorism is having on your country’s young people, or maybe

give us some personal perspective on this aspect of the conflict?

Will you expand on what you have already talked about a little bit?

Vice President SANTOS-CALDERON. Drug trafficking fuels Colombia’s war. It finances the paramilitaries, it finances the FARC, and

the alien which didn’t used to get its finances from drug trafficking

now is involved in the business.

All those three organizations, especially the first two of them, are

involved in all aspects of the business, not only protecting crops,

not only protecting labs, but now they are involved in all the ladder

of the drug trafficking business. That provides between $300 and

$500 million to those terrorist organizations. If Al-Qaeda had that

kind of money, I don’t want to even think what they could do.

We need to take that money away from them. That money has

allowed them to grow, to buy technology. The FARC 10 years ago,

15 years ago, was a 3- to 4,000-member army. Now, they have

17,000, all financed from drugs.

I will give you a perspective of what is happening. We have 15

members of Congress kidnapped. The head of the human rights

commission is kidnapped. The head of the peace commission of the

senate is kidnapped. A Governor was just killed. They have a

former Governor kidnapped. They have a Presidential candidate

kidnapped. They had two former ministers kidnapped. They tried

to kidnap a bishop. Last year, they killed 90 council members.

They have 18 State assembly members kidnapped.

The Colombian government has a President, as I said before,

whose father was kidnapped and killed. The interior minister, his

father was kidnapped and was released. The education minister

has a brother who was kidnapped by the FARC, killed, and now

has a brother that is kidnapped.

The prosecutor general’s wife, which was a former culture minister, was kidnapped and she was murdered. The minister of agriculture, his son used to work for the crop substitution program and

he was killed in a plane crash when he was going to a region.

Obviously, I was kidnapped. I had to leave the country in the

year 2000 because of threats by the FARC. In the bombing of El

Nogal, I lost a very good friend, and my 9-year-old daughter had

to go the funeral of a school friend that died from that bomb.

When you look at the amount of displaced people, it is a horrendous humanitarian problem. The AUC, the paramilitaries and the

FARC use displacement as a military weapon, a territorial control

weapon. They are using displacement in their barbaric types of tactics and we have between 1 and 1.5 million Colombians displaced

by those organizations.

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If we don’t destroy crops and eliminate drug trafficking from Colombia, we will not be able to destroy those organizations. Therefore, we have to combat them with everything we have, and there

is an element that also generates immense problems and it has to

do with children in the conflict.

The AUC, the FARC and the ELN, more than 30 percent of their

members are children between the ages of 10 and 15 years old.

What we are seeing in the massive desertions is a lot of those children want to leave those organizations and we have a special program designed with our institution to protect children, the ICBF,

the Colombian Institution for Children’s Benefits, to protect them

and we have a special program. But that is another element of it.

I will give you a personal story. I had somebody who worked with

me. When I had to leave for Spain, she went back to her town,

which was in the highlands, and she went just 3 months ago and

told me a horrendous story about what was happening in her region.

She had left because the FARC had come and wanted to take her

children, to recruit them, to force recruitment. So she left everything and went to Bogota ́, and what she told me was not only that

the FARC was doing that—and what we have been able to see is

that forced recruitment of children is the No. 1 cause of displacement. People would rather leave their area than give their children

to the FARC, to the paramilitaries, or to the ELN. So that is also

complicating the social scenery and the humanitarian tragedy that

these terrorist groups are generating.

So in all areas of Colombian society, you see the drug-financing

terrorist activities affecting Colombian society, affecting broader

elements of Colombian families. And the hindering of social development is also an element that this conflict is generating.

Senator DEWINE. Mr. Vice President, that is a chilling description, I think, of the price that your country is paying and what the

FARC and the ELN and the paramilitaries are doing to your country. I appreciate hearing this and I think it is something that the

American people need to understand and I think it was a very eloquent description.

I have been very impressed by your government. As I said, I had

the opportunity several months ago to meet with President Uribe

in Cartagena and discussed with him the situation for about an

hour-and-a-half. It was at a time shortly after some additional attempts on his life and I was impressed by his courage and his tenacity and his determination to do what was necessary to hang in

there and to fight back against the terrorists.

So we appreciate your coming and we appreciate your testimony.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GRASSLEY. Mr. Vice President, I don’t have any other

questions, but we obviously are going to monitor this situation and

continue to lend what help we can and encourage you all we can.

I hope that you will free to stay in touch with this group that we

call the International Narcotics Control Caucus, the group that is

holding this meeting, on how we can be helpful.

We have been very impressed with the leadership that you send

representing your country here in Washington, DC. They keep in

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touch with us on a regular basis. We consider them friends and we

want you to be very successful. Thank you very much.

You are welcome to stay if you want to sit in the audience for

the rest of the day, if you want to. I know you are probably very

busy, but you would be welcome to stay if you want to stay.

Vice President SANTOS-CALDERON. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Vice President Santos-Calderon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. FRANCISCO SANTOS-CALDERON, VICE PRESIDENT OF COLOMBIA

Good morning Chairman Grassley, Senator Biden and distinguished members of

the Caucus.

It is an honor to be here today and have a chance to report on the progress that

has been possible thanks to the support and cooperation of both this Congress and

the Government of the United States. Thanks to U.S.-Colombia collaborative efforts

we have made significant progress in building democratic security in Colombia and

begun to show increasing results in successfully combating narcoterrorism.

I. A SUCCESSFUL ALLIANCE

Through Plan Colombia the U.S. became more immersed and committed to the

fight against drugs. Less than 3 years into its implementation, this strategy has

demonstrated greater results than any other strategy previously attempted.

President Alvaro Uribe’s commitment is clear: zero tolerance for drug-trafficking.

One of Colombia’s main goals is the total eradication coca and opium poppy cultivation and trafficking by the year 2006. Since year 2000, U.S. Congress has provided us over $1.7 billion dollars in economic, humanitarian and security aid. The alliance between our governments enables us to address common objectives such as combating drug trafficking and terrorism. The narco-terrorist threat affects both our countries and our joint efforts to

combat it will improve the security of the U.S. and Colombia and provide stability

to the entire Andean region.

Together, we have made considerable progress.

• Aerial spraying: In 2002, we sprayed 130,363 hectares of coca. According to the

United Nations, this represents a 30 percent reduction of total coca cultivation. It

is the largest number of hectares sprayed and the steepest decline of coca cultivation. So far this year we have sprayed over 65,000 hectares. By the end 2003 we

expect to eradicate 50 percent of all illicit coca cultivation. • Interdiction: We have also made significant progress in seizing illegal drugs.

From January 1, 2002 to the present we interdicted over 110 tons of pure cocaine,

most of this in cooperation with the United States. In the same time period, we confiscated more than 850 kilos of heroin. We destroyed more than 225 cocaine production laboratories.

• Coca production: Since every hectare of coca is equivalent to 3.9 to 4.3 kilos of

cocaine, our spraying strategy succeeded in removing more than 150 tons of pure

cocaine off the market last year. This result, together with interdiction successes,

represents 260 tons of cocaine that did not reach the U.S. or the world market.

• Heroin production: As for heroine, a serious and growing threat to the United

States, we achieved a net reduction of 25 percent in opium poppy cultivation in 2002

alone. Our spray teams, trained and assisted by the United States, sprayed over

3,300 hectares last year and, we have already sprayed 1,658 hectares this year. This

is another area of considerable progress, taking into account that, according to CNC

estimates, Colombia currently has approximately 4,900 hectares of poppy plantations. As a positive consequence of the these efforts, from 2001 to 2002, the purity

of heroin in the United States fell by an average of 6 percent, according to DEA

estimates.

When the Colombian Army Counter Drug (CD) Brigade began its operations in

2001, it focused on the southern region of Colombia, especially in the Department

of Putumayo. This State was at that time the heart of the Colombia coca cultivation.

Trained and supported by the United States, the Brigade achieved impressive results. They located and destroyed dozens of cocaine production laboratories and

other drug trafficking infrastructure, including oil refineries used by the FARC to

produce cocaine base. As a consequence, the narco-trafficking organizations have

transferred their activities to other regions of the country, mainly the Pacific Coast

Department of Narin ̃ o.

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In late 2002, the Uribe administration restructured the CD Brigade. It was transferred from the Joint Task Force South and placed under Colombian Army command with the mission to attack high-value narco-terrorist targets throughout the

country. It also received advanced training from United States Army Special Forces.

These changes gave new strength to the fight against narco-trafficking organizations. In May, the Government deployed a battalion of the Brigade to attack the

drug industry in Narin ̃ o: in only 2 weeks a CD Brigade-led joint operation with the

Colombian Navy and National Police destroyed 16 cocaine-producing laboratories

and confiscated a ton of pure cocaine alkaloid.

In light of the results of our successful alliance, it is easy to understand what the

Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), John P. Walters,

said recently:

‘‘President Uribe has achieved major successes against the illicit drug trade.

Reductions in drug production in Colombia will mean fewer drugs on American

streets. We intend to remain a solid partner with Colombia as they fight against

a drug industry that inflicts damage on both of our nations.’’

You know as well as we do there were many skeptics that Plan Colombia would

succeed in reducing drug trafficking. These accomplishments, which are just a few

from a long list of successful missions undertaken in cooperation with the U.S.,

speak for themselves. We have proven non-believers wrong and the Uribe administration assures you we will eradicate drugs from Colombia. To successfully accomplish this mission our partnership with the United States is vital.

II. NARCO-TRAFFICKING AND TERRORISM

Terrorism continues in Colombia. Here are just 3 of the 361 acts of terrorism suffered by Colombia during the first 4 months of 2003: • On Friday, February 14, 2003, a patrol of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of

Colombia (FARC)—one of the State Department’s designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO)—fired upon a downed U.S. reconnaissance aircraft while it flew

a counter-narcotics mission in Southern Colombia. The FARC brutally murdered

U.S. citizen Jennis Thomas and Colombian Sergeant Luis Alcides Cruz, and kidnapped three other American citizens who are still being held.

• Last May 5, in a jungle camp of the guerrillas in Urrao, Department of

Antioquia, another FARC group, perpetrated a massacre by killing the Governor of

that Department, Guillermo Gaviria, his Peace Adviser, and former Minister of Defense, Gilberto Echeverri, who had been kidnapped the previous year, and eight soldiers whom they had held in captivity for several years. The hostages were kept in

inhumane conditions.

• On February 7, a car-bomb exploded, killing 32 people and injuring close to 150,

including many children, at the El Nogal social club in Bogota ́.

Colombia is a long standing democracy with a president elected last year with

broad popular support. Our democracy is besieged by a violent minority that lacks

any popular support and whose main sources of financing are drug trafficking, kidnapping and extortion.

These illegal armed groups repeatedly and systematically engage in summary executions, torture and kidnapping. They attempt to restrict our freedom of movement

and opinion. They threaten and assassinate local elected officials. They destroy the

country’s infrastructure. In general, our common heritage is under siege. The truth

is undeniable: Colombians are the victims of terrorism.

It is violence that affects everyone: rich and poor, urban and rural, powerful and

ordinary citizens. President Alvaro Uribe’s father was assassinated by the FARC in

the 1980’s. Last year this group murdered the wife of the Attorney General Edgardo

Maya, former Minister Consuelo Araujo. My own family has been a victim of narcoterrorism: My brother-in-law, Andres Escabi, died in a commercial airliner that was

blown up by Pablo Escobar, the former leader of the infamous Medellin Cartel. I

was kidnapped and held for 8 months.

Some key statistics illustrate the extent of the human cost in terrorist violence: • In the nexus between narco-trafficking and terrorism Colombia has suffered an

average of 30,000 violent deaths a year for the last 3 years. This is a figure close

to the total number of victims of the attacks of September 11, 2001—every month!

• Over the last 5 years, 16,000 people have been kidnapped.

• Over 6,000 children have been recruited mainly by coercion or force to fight for

the illegal armed groups.

• Today, the illicit armed groups are responsible for almost all the violations of

human rights in Colombia.

• Over the last 5 years, we have suffered 8,000 acts of collective destruction.

The economic costs of their actions are also enormous:

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• During 2002, the illegal armed groups downed 483 power lines, 62 communications towers, 100 bridges and attacked 12 reservoirs. These attacks have cost Colombia more than $4 billion dollars, money which was literally stolen from the citizens of our country. • Terrorist violence costs an estimated 2 points of Colombia’s Gross Domestic

Product every year.

The FARC and Colombia’s other two State Department-designated FTOs, the

United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) and the National Liberation Army

(ELN), have moved from simply taxing coca fields to the production and distribution

of pure cocaine.

Here are some examples:

• In November 2000, a senior lieutenant to FARC military commander, Mono

Jojoy, was arrested in Mexico City while meeting with the chief of operations of the

powerful Mexican Arellano Felix Cartel. • In March 2002, soon after the end of the Zona de Despeje, the Colombian National Police discovered over seven metric tons of pure cocaine in several FARC-run

cocaine production labs—these drugs were ready to be shipped to international markets. • The leader of the AUC has publicly admitted to trafficking in drugs to finance

his weapons and arms purchases. There is ample evidence that paramilitary groups

ship tons of pure cocaine through Pacific and Caribbean drug transshipment points

to United States and Europe.

The FARC, ELN and AUC are the perpetrators of the majority of the violations

of human rights and international humanitarian law in my country. The principal

victims are the civilian population. For each member of the Armed Forces killed last

year, at least six civilians were murdered by the illegal armed groups. For every

soldier and policeman taken hostage against international humanitarian law, 43 civilians were kidnapped. A total of 35 mayors have been assassinated over the last

3 years and 62 representatives of city councils in the last year alone.

III. ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE

Together with this escalation of death and terror, drug trafficking organizations

cause enormous, irreparable damage to the global environment.

Drug traffickers have concentrated their activity in environmentally-sensitive ecosystems: poppy is planted in high Andean forests and highlands while coca is grown

in the vast plains and tropical forests of Orinoquia and Amazonia. These form part

of one of the world’s most important ecological zones to regulate global climate.

Moreover, this region is humanity’s largest source of flora and fauna that could hold

the secrets to curing diseases.

Studies show that for every hectare of coca cultivated, four hectares of Amazon

forest are felled. For every hectare of opium poppy, 2.5 hectares of Andean forest

are destroyed. In addition to this loss of flora and fauna, destruction of these forests

itself contributes to global warming—an estimated 380 kilograms of biomass per

hectare is burnt. The area destroyed by traffickers between 1990 and 2000 is equal

to about twice the size of Yellowstone National Park.

Drug traffickers use a broad range of insecticides, herbicides and fungicides to

grow their illegal crops. These destroy biomass because of their high toxicity. In the

year 2000 alone, approximately 4.5 million liters of these chemicals were used.

These chemicals, solvents, acids and bases are dumped into Amazon streams and

rivers, damaging the environment and the normal functioning of aquatic ecosystems, especially the biological cycles and the very existence of their fauna. The

quantity of chemicals dumped into the Amazon river systems each year is equivalent to two Exxon Valdez disasters.

IV. DEMOCRATIC SECURITY

In spite of terrible terrorist atrocities committed against my country, Colombia

continues to thrive. It is a dynamic Nation of 44 million people—the vast majority

of whom are honest, love their country, want their rights to be respected and are

productive members of society.

Colombia is the fifth largest economy in Latin America after Mexico, Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela; the second largest in the Andean region; and, the largest

market among the Andean Trade Program and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA)

member states. Our population is the third largest in Latin America. 90 percent of

our inhabitants are under 50 years of age and 71 percent live in urban areas. Colombia has a cultured entrepreneurial class with a sizable and growing middle class.

It has a productive, intelligent workforce, with significant skilled human resources

and low labor costs. According to the United Nations Development Program’s

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(UNDP) Human Development Index, Colombia is a medium developed country,

ranked 15 among the 83 countries in that category.

Even during recent years when acts of narco-terrorism were at their highest, the

Colombian economy continued to grow. Colombia grew 2.23 percent in the second

half of 2002 and 3.8 percent in the first quarter of this year. This places us in the

same position of the 1980’s and 1990’s, when our economy grew without interruption

and at rates much higher than the Latin American average.

Colombia has always honored its international debts and commitments. At

present, the majority of our external debt is long-term. In recent years, Banco de

la Repu ́ blica, the country’s central bank, succeeded in stabilizing inflation in line

with international standards.

The fact that we have achieved constant, uninterrupted economic growth in spite

of being plagued by many difficulties, is a demonstration of the determination of our

hard working people.

Colombia will not permit minority terrorist armed groups, principally financed by

drug trafficking, to continue indiscriminately attacking innocent citizens, perpetrating assaults and massacres, kidnapping, laying anti-personnel land mines and

committing other terrorist acts. These terrorist groups are harming our country’s

economy, spoiling the tranquility of our citizenry and restricting Colombians’ right

to progress.

President Uribe’s commitment is to defeat narco-terrorism shares the same vision

expressed by President Bush after the events of September 11, 2001 when he said:

‘‘We will direct all the resources we have available to us—all diplomatic channels, all the tools of intelligence, all the instruments for the enforcement of the

law, all the financial influence and the necessary arms of war—towards the destruction and defeat of the global network of terror.’’

V. THE COLOMBIAN CONTRIBUTION

Under the leadership of President Uribe, we are implementing a policy of democratic security to combat terrorism, drug trafficking, extortion and kidnapping.

One of the priorities of this policy is to strengthen the Armed Forces. Our military

personnel and police ratio is very low compared to other countries: 3.9 troops for

every 1,000 citizens. President Uribe intends to increase, the size of the Military

Forces by 126,361 and defense spending from 3.5 percent to 5.8 percent of GDP during his 4-year administration. To achieve this, Colombians are being called upon to

make a greater sacrifice. Last year, the Government decreed a tax on capital for

companies and citizens with the highest incomes, through which, in spite of the economic difficulties of the time, resources close to 1 percent of GDP are being collected.

Since the onset of Plan Colombia, Colombia improved the professionalism and efficiency of its public forces. Today we have a force that is more aggressive and offensive-minded, better equipped and trained for night combat, with improved war-fighting capability. There is improved coordination and cooperation between the different

services. The military force is more sensitive to and respectful of human rights.

One shortfall in returning security to Colombians has been the lack of police presence in conflicting zones. The Colombian National Police (CNP), in cooperation with

the U.S. Government, is implementing a plan to reestablish public security by training and equipping 165,000 policemen. These will be assigned to 157 municipalities

which currently do not have a police presence. We are creating 62 mobile

Carabineros Squadrons, or rural police, and building 80 hardened new police stations in the larger municipalities.

Our efforts are already showing results, but we recognize there is a long and difficult road ahead. Some statistics:

• Compared to last year, in the first 4 months of 2003 we reduced the number

of homicides by 20 percent, thus saving the lives of 1,964 Colombians.

• We also managed to reduce kidnappings by 32 percent and have increased rescues of people held for ransom by 56 percent. This has meant freedom for 322 Colombians.

• In the first half of 2002, there were 170,000 displaced persons and in the second

half, 98,000.

• In the first half of 2002, the deaths of 98 union members were reported; in the

second half, these deaths declined to 52 and in the first quarter of 2003, to 9.

These results have been achieved by public forces who are respecting human

rights. Data we have provided to this Congress and to the U.S. Government, in accordance with the requirement contained in Section 564 of Law 107–115, show that

in spite of the intensification of the conflict, human rights complaints against members of the Armed Forces have been substantially reduced.

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President Uribe has made it clear: We do not accept violence either to combat the

Government or to defend it. Both are terrorist acts. We are committed to promoting

and defending human rights.

VI. TOWARDS FINAL VICTORY

Three of the four State Department-designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations

which operate in the Western Hemisphere are present in Colombia. It is time for

all leaders, media, individuals and organizations to realize the enormity of the danger these organizations represent to our country.

Since 1992, these groups have kidnapped 54 and murdered 11 American citizens.

While they are not as clear and present danger as Al-Qaeda, they have indirectly

caused greater harm to Americans by promoting drug consumption, poisoning the

population, frustrating the future of millions of young people and inciting violence

and crime in towns and cities. According to information provided by the ONDCP,

drugs in the United States cause the death of as many as 50,000 Americans every

year. This is a threat to both of our countries and we need to continue working together to defeat it. The Uribe administration is committed to this war.

The Uribe Administration, in addition to democratic security, is focusing on political, economic and social transformation by reducing, government spending, improving tax collection, reforming the administration, reinvigorating the economy and social policy. In addition to the results in the fight against drugs and the struggle to

overcome terrorism, the assistance we have received from the United States have

been important to our efforts to fight corruption, improve the justice system, protect

human rights, reinsert ex-combatants into society [especially children] and promote

alternative development in coca and poppy growing regions.

In addition to building up democratic security, our priority is to continue strengthening our economic stability. US-lead initiatives such as FTAA, ATPA and ATPDEA

allow us to create more jobs and move toward greater growth and development, providing legal alternatives to narco-trafficking.

I wish to express, once again, the gratitude of millions of Colombians who have

benefited, directly or indirectly, from America’s generous assistance.

We are committed to defeat terrorism. We need know-how, expertise and to maintain the levels of support the U.S. provides Colombia. I invite you to continue to

protect this alliance, to strengthen and empower its results. To channel the successes and abundant experience we have accumulated in the fight against narcotrafficking and terrorism, which are, at the end of the day, the same thing, to fulfill

the plans and attain the goals which the Presidents of our two nations have been

so right in outlining to eradicate these threats.

Thank you.

Chairman GRASSLEY. It is my privilege now to call the second

panel. I had invited the Deputy Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Mark Grossman, to testify, but last week he was sent by the

Secretary of State to Europe for NATO ministerial meetings, and

then on to Africa. When the President calls, I can understand his

not being here.

So we are fortunate to have Curt Struble, Acting Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs, and Mr. Paul Simons, the

Acting Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement. They have come in the stead of Mr.

Grossman.

Then we also have Marshall Billingslea, Under Secretary for

Special Operations, Low-Intensity Conflict. He has joined General

Hill to respond to any questions that we may ask. Again, two witnesses for one invitation, and we feel very fortunate to have these

people with us.

I am sorry. I should have told you to come to the table as I was

introducing you, so please come up here. Then, according to instructions from my staff, long statements will be put in the record

and you don’t have to ask us to do that, and then we would like

to have you give whatever summary you want to give. We appreVerDate 03-FEB-2003 11:09 Jan 14, 2004 Jkt 087649 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 D:\NARC\87649.TXT SSC2 PsN: SSC2
19

ciate very much your taking time, particularly traveling long distances for some of you to be here.

So, Mr. Struble, and then Mr. Billingslea.

STATEMENT OF PAUL E. SIMONS, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND

LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

WASHINGTON, DC. AND J. CURTIS STRUBLE, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS, U.S.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC.

Mr. STRUBLE. Senator, thank you very much. I have agreed with

Acting Assistant Secretary Paul Simons that he will give a short

statement on behalf of both of us.

Chairman GRASSLEY. Thank you.

Mr. Simons.

Mr. SIMONS. Mr. Chairman, Senator DeWine, thank you very

much for the opportunity to appear before you this morning to talk

about the narcotics situation in Colombia, as well as the Department of State’s response to that situation.

We have a longer written statement which we would ask be submitted for the record. In order to give sufficient time for questions,

I would like to summarize that statement in four very brief points.

First of all, what we are doing in Colombia on the drug side

makes a difference in terms of overall U.S. counter-narcotics objectives in the world. Colombia, as you know, is very much the center

of the illicit narcotics industry. In recent years, as the Vice President noted, the rural security vacuum in Colombia created a situation in which Colombia has grown to now be responsible for over

70 percent of the world’s total coca cultivation, as well as some 90

percent of the cocaine entering the United States. Colombia is also

a significant source of heroin for the U.S. market. So we need to

get it right in Colombia for our overall counter-narcotics objectives.

Second—and again this was a point that the Vice President

touched on—directly linked to the illicit drug trade is the scourge

of terrorism that also plagues Colombia. Terrorism in Colombia

both supports and draws resources from the narcotics industry, and

Congress’ willingness to provide resources for a unified campaign

against narco-trafficking and terrorist organizations, I think, is a

very real demonstration of this linkage.

Third—and I refer again to the testimony of the Vice President

which coincided so much with our thinking—since taking office,

President Uribe has demonstrated an unwavering commitment to

countering narco-terrorists. In spite of at least 15 assassination attempts, both before and after his election, he continues to implement bold policies that are intended to give Colombia back to the

Colombians.

Most recently, during his meetings here in Washington at the

end of April with both the executive branch as well as Members of

Congress, President Uribe emphasized his commitment to complete

elimination of Colombia’s coca crop by the end of his term in office.

He is an avid supporter of the aerial eradication and alternative

development programs that are the centerpiece of U.S. activity in

Colombia. During his brief 10 months in office, the Colombian police, together with U.S. support, have sprayed an unprecedented

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130,000 hectares of coca. And as the Vice President mentioned, we

are starting to see results from Plan Colombia.

Coca cultivation overall is down by over 15 percent for the first

time in a decade. Opium poppy cultivation is down by 25 percent

in 1 year alone. President Uribe is working together with us to

strengthen the presence of the Colombian State in the rural areas

and to ensure the primacy of the rule of law and respect for human

rights throughout Colombian territory.

His national security strategy includes commitments to respect

human rights, to dedicate additional resources to the Colombian

armed forces, and to reform the conscription laws. He is eager to

ensure the effectiveness of joint efforts with the U.S. Government

to achieve our common goals in combatting narcotics trafficking

and terrorism.

Finally, after many years of effort, we believe that the money we

have invested in Colombia is now beginning to pay off. The Plan

Colombia equipment did take a couple of years to arrive—the helicopters, the spray planes, some of the training of counter-drug brigades, the support for the Colombian police. But we are now beginning to see that, having accumulated those assets and that training

on the ground, we are achieving positive results.

We believe we have turned the corner, in particular, on the coca

crop in Colombia. Nationwide, hectarage was down more than 15

percent in 2002. As the Vice President mentioned, we sprayed an

additional 65,000 hectares during the first 5 months of this year.

And our plan, together with the Colombian police, is to spray all

of the remaining coca in Colombia by the end of this calendar year,

as well as all of the opium poppy in Colombia.

A spray program with this level of dedication sends a strong signal to the Colombian farmers and cultivators that they simply cannot wait us out this time, that there is firm determination on the

part of this Colombian government to see the course and to have

a policy that emphasizes continuity. This is very important to the

success of this program.

At the same time, we have strengthened our commitment to pursuing an environmentally sound aerial eradication program, and

we have put into place a number of other programs which are described in my statement that have helped strengthen democratic

institutions, protect human rights, assist internally displaced persons, and foster social and economic development. This is basically

the coordinated approach that was designed for Plan Colombia and

it is beginning to show results.

Finally, full realization of U.S. policy goals will require concerted

Colombian strategy and effort, backed by sustained U.S. assistance

to establish control over national territory, eliminate narcotics cultivation and distribution and terrorism, and promote human rights

and the rule of law.

In this respect, we urge members of this Caucus and other supporters on the Hill to provide full funding for our fiscal year 2004

budget request. The Andean Counter-Narcotics Initiative element

of this request comes to $731 million, of which $463 million is for

Colombia. We also have an additional $110 million in foreign military financing for Colombia that indirectly supports these efforts.

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This budget reflects our continued support for the Uribe administration’s courageous anti-narcotics and anti-terror agenda. The

progress described earlier needs to be cemented if we are to achieve

our long-term goals of improvements in all areas of Colombian life

and a reduction of illegal drug cultivation, as well as terrorism.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statements of Simons and Struble follow:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PAUL E. SIMONS, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS

Good afternoon Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, and members of the Caucus. Thank

you for the opportunity to speak to you about the current narcotics situation in Colombia, and the Department of State’s response to that situation. Because of the importance of our efforts in Colombia, I am especially pleased to meet with this Caucus, which is a key stakeholder in this process.

I. OVERVIEW

Situation in Colombia

Colombia is of great importance to the United States. It is a vibrant democracy

and a country with extraordinary promise, facing an extraordinary threat. Colombia

has four times the land area of California and a population of over 40 million. Its

gross domestic product is more than $90 billion a year. Colombia has important reserves of petroleum, natural gas and coal.

Unfortunately, Colombia is also a center of the illicit narcotics industry. In recent

years, Colombia has been responsible for over 70 percent of the world’s coca cultivation. Ninety percent of the cocaine entering the United States is either produced in

or passes through Colombia. Colombia is also a significant source of heroin for the

U.S. market.

The drug trade has a terrible impact on the United States. There are 50,000 drugrelated deaths yearly in the United States with 19,000 directly attributable to

drugs. This is six times the loss of life on September 11, and it happens every year.

The drug trade also has devastating consequences in Colombia. Not only is that society rife with drug-related violence, its unique eco-system and environment are increasingly threatened by the slash and burn cutting of tropical forest for coca cultivation and the indiscriminate dumping of toxic chemicals used in drug processing.

Directly linked to the illicit drug trade is the scourge of terrorism that plagues

Colombia. Colombia is home to three of the four U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) in this hemisphere, and has suffered a four-decades cycle of violence and conflict. Terrorism in Colombia both supports and draws resources from

the narcotics industry. Nefarious narcoterrorist organizations also rely on kidnapping and extortion—including threats to U.S. citizens and economic interests—to

support themselves. Colombia’s terrorist groups have kidnapped 138 American citizens since 1980, and killed 11. Since February, three DOD, contractors have been

held hostage by the FARC and one of their colleagues was assassinated upon capture.

The country’s 40-year-old internal conflict—among government forces, several leftist guerrilla groups, and a right-wing paramilitary movement—intensified during

2002. The internal armed conflict, and the narcotics trafficking that both fueled it

and prospered from it, were the central causes of violations of international humanitarian law. In a 2001 report, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights noted

that all sides in the conflict failed to respect the principles of humanitarian law. The

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the paramilitaries are the

principal perpetrators of these human rights violations. The Colombian Army is

charged with committing very few of the human rights violations alleged in 2002.

Violence by the three FTOs—the FARC, the National Liberation Army (ELN), and

the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)—caused the deaths of thousands

of civilians in 2002, including combat casualties, political killings, and forced disappearances.

Kidnapping continues to be a major source of revenue for both the FARC and

ELN. The FARC continued to kidnap persons in accordance with its so-called ‘‘Law

002,’’ announced in March 2000, which requires persons with more than the equivalent of $1 million in assets to volunteer payments to the FARC or risk detention.

The Free Country Foundation, a Colombian NGO, reported that guerrillas committed 75 percent of the 2,986 kidnappings reported during the year in which a perpetrator was identified. The Foundation reported that the FARC kidnapped 936 perVerDate 03-FEB-2003 11:09 Jan 14, 2004 Jkt 087649 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 D:\NARC\87649.TXT SSC2 PsN: SSC2
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sons and the ELN 776. In addition, the FARC often purchased victims kidnapped

by common criminals and then negotiated ransom payments with the families.

Additionally, the ongoing terrorist offensive against democratic institutions and

civil society has had tragic costs for Colombia. Each year the AUC, ELN and FARC

kill more than 3,000 persons. Their victims have included judges and prosecutors,

journalists, labor union leaders and human rights workers, soldiers, police, and ordinary citizens. Even clerics and Red Cross workers are! not exempt from the violence.

The narco-terrorist threat is among the greatest the United States and Colombia

face, and success against the drug trade and terrorism in Colombia will improve security in both countries, and in the Andean region as a whole. The ongoing internal

strife that Colombia has suffered has hampered its economic progress, severely

strained both military and civil institutions, and wreaked havoc on the civilian population who must live with the constant threat of terrorist violence. It has also resulted in a flood of illicit drugs into the United States.

What is occurring in Colombia matters to the United States. We stand in solidarity with the people of Colombia who, like us, know first-hand the scourge of terrorism. Although Afghanistan and Iraq currently receive more public attention, our

important partnership with Colombia is yet another front in the war on terrorism,

and remains a priority of this Administration. With the support of the U.S. Congress, the Administration has devoted considerable monetary resources and personnel to this effort.

Commitment of President Uribe

The recent visit of Colombian President Alvaro Uribe, and President Bush’s renewed pledge to support him in his efforts against the narco-terrorists, underscore

the high value we place on our relationship and the importance of this struggle.

Since taking office, President Uribe has demonstrated unwavering commitment to

countering the narco-terrorists. In spite of at least 15 assassination attempts, both

before and after his election, he continues to implement policies that will give Colombia back to Colombians.

During his meetings in Washington, April 30 to May 2, with the Executive Branch

and many members of this Caucus, President Uribe emphasized his commitment to

complete elimination of Colombia’s coca crops by the end of his term of office.

President Uribe is an avid supporter of aerial eradication and alternative development programs. During his tenure, eradication programs have reduced coca cultivation by more than 15 percent and opium poppy production by 25 percent from 2001

levels. President Uribe is working to strengthen the presence of the Colombian State

and to ensure the primacy of the rule of law and respect for human rights throughout Colombian territory. He is also making the tough fiscal decisions that will allow

him to fund these policies and reforms. He has increased government security expenditures for military and police activities from 3.5 percent of GDP in 2001 to a

goal of 5.8 percent of GDP by the end of his term.

President Uribe’s national security strategy includes commitments to respect

human rights, to dedicate more resources to the Colombian Armed Forces, and to

reform the conscription laws to make military service universal and fairer. He is

eager to ensure the effectiveness of joint efforts with the United States government

to achieve our common goals in combating narcotics trafficking and terrorism, and

has proven an effective partner in the war on terrorism. Since the lifting of the ban

against extraditing nationals in December 1997, Colombia has extradited more than

100 of its nationals charged with high-level narcotics trafficking, drug-related money

laundering, hostage taking, and the murder of a retired New York City policeman.

We have no better extradition partner.

United States Policy Toward Colombia

Beyond the struggle against the narco-terrorists, there are broad and important

U.S. national interests in Colombia that include stability in the Andean region,

trade, immigration, human rights, humanitarian assistance, and protection of the

environment.

U.S. policy toward Colombia supports the Colombian government’s efforts to

strengthen its democratic institutions, promote respect for human rights and the

rule of law, intensify counter-narcotics efforts, foster socio-economic development,

address immediate humanitarian needs, and end the threats to democracy posed by

narcotics trafficking and terrorism. Our support reinforces, but does not substitute

for, the broader efforts of Colombian government and society.

In implementing these programs, the Administration and Congress increasingly

came to understand that the terrorist and narcotics problems in Colombia are intertwined and must be dealt with as a whole. Working with Congress, the Administration sought and Congress enacted new authorities in the 2002 Supplemental ApproVerDate 03-FEB-2003 11:09 Jan 14, 2004 Jkt 087649 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 D:\NARC\87649.TXT SSC2 PsN: SSC2
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priations Act (P.L. 107–206) that would help address this combined threat. These

provisions were renewed in the fiscal year 2003 Omnibus Appropriations Act (P.L.

108–7).

Since 2000, the United States has provided Colombia with over $1.7 billion in economic, humanitarian and security assistance to support these efforts, with another

$600 million appropriated for fiscal year 2003.

The U.S. counter-drug objective in Colombia is to reduce illegal drug production

and trafficking. We use both eradication and interdiction programs in this effort.

Through programs to eradicate coca leaf and opium poppy and to interdict their

movement and that of precursor supplies, cash or final products, we expect to reduce

the amount of cocaine and heroin entering the United States. Maintaining effective

demand reduction programs will also be key.

Additional pressure can be brought against the illegal drug industry by more effectively controlling transportation corridors across the Andes that are used to import chemicals, supplies and cash into the growing areaas, or to move illegal drug

products out. If the drug producing areas are isolated from markets and necessary

supplies, the costs and risks of moving narcotics products will increase.

Interdiction of cocaine and heroin at sea and in the air is another important element of drug market disruption. With U.S. assistance, technology, intelligence support, and law enforcement training, the Government of Colombia should be able to

increase pressure on drug warehousing sites and go-fast boat movements, and increase seizures of cocaine and heroin.

Importantly, as a result of the ongoing Colombian criminal justice reform, including United States training of specialized task force units as well as prosecutors and

police, and the bilateral cases developed with U.S. law enforcement, more and more

seizures and arrests are leading to convictions and dismantling of narco-terrorist organizations.

II. FISCAL YEAR 2003 BUDGET

In 2003, Congress funded $700 million of a requested $731 million for the Andean

Counterdrug Initiative account. Of that amount, more than $433 million will go to

Colombia, with $284 million for eradication/interdiction support and $149.2 million

for alternative development, support for the rule of law, and institution building.

Programs include the following:

The $284 million for eradication/interdiction will go toward support for the Colombian military (pending the Secretary of State’s certification that the conditions in

section 564(3) of the fiscal year 2003 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (P.L.

108–7) have been met) including its Army Counter Drug Brigade (CD BDE) and

Army Aviation. These funds will also support a renewed Air Bridge Denial Program

(after necessary legal steps and interagency coordination are completed), coastal

interdiction and continued support for the Colombian National Police, to include

aviation support and eradication and interdiction programs.

Funding for alternative development and institution-building ($149.2 million) will

fund programs which support the rule of law, such as the DOJ-supported specialized

task force units on Human Rights, Anti-Corruption, Money Laundering/Asset Forfeiture and Narcotics, criminal code reform, judicial and witness protection programs and prosecutorial and police training; bomb squad; human rights reform and

drug awareness and demand reduction projects; and the GOC ‘‘carabinero’’ program

which will establish permanent police stations and begin rural patrols in areas that

have no government presence and are under virtual control of drug trafficking and

insurgent organizations. Funding is also targeted for USAID’s ‘‘Support for Democracy’’ and alternative development projects, and USAID and PRM programs to support vulnerable groups and internally displaced persons.

In addition, Congress appropriated $34 million to the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) in the fiscal year 2003 Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations

Act (P.L. 108–11) for Colombia, and the Administration is allocating an additional

$37 million in FMF funding from the Supplemental. These funds will go toward

Presidential security; bomb squad support; increasing police presence in remote

areas; support for internally displaced persons; and aerial eradication programs.

In fiscal year 2003, $93 million in regular FMF funding will support the infrastructure security program for the area of the Cano-Limon pipeline and stop terrorist attacks on this important source of revenue for Colombia. IMET will improve

the professionalism, technical competence and human rights performance of the Colombian Armed Forces through a variety of military educational training courses.

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III. RETURNS ON INVESTMENT

Our years of effort, and the money that we have invested in Colombia are beginning to pay off. This year, we have turned the corner on coca and opium poppy cultivation. Nationwide coca hectarage was down by more than 15 percent in 2002 to

144,000 hectares, with additional declines in the first quarter of 2003. Key southern

coca cultivation (Putumayo/Caqueta) declined by over 50 percent (82,300 to 40,550

hectares) in 2002. In the first 5 months of 2003, we sprayed approximately 64,000

hectares of coca, well on our way to meeting our goal of spraying all remaining coca

this calendar year. Opium poppy cultivation has likewise decreased, with a 25 percent decline in 2002. The CNC estimates that there are currently 4,900 hectares

yearly (2,450 hectares counted twice to account for two distinct crops) of opium

poppy remaining. Our aim is to spray opium puppy three times during calendar

year 2003. Through May, we have sprayed approximately 1,650 hectares of opium

poppy, well on our way to meeting our target of spraying all remaining opium poppy

in 2003.

At the same time, we have strengthened our commitment to pursuing an environmentally sound aerial eradication program. In September 2002, the Department

switched to a more benign glyphosate formulation—one with decreased risk of eye

irritation compared to the former mixture. We have evaluated the toxicity of the

spray mixture and have also increased environmental training for our spray pilots,

conducted toxicological reviews or medical investigations of each health concern

brought to the attention of the Embassy, trained Colombian specialists who now

conduct soil and water analysis, and coordinated with the OAS in its long-term

monitoring of the spray program.

Beyond the achievements in eradication, U.S. programs have helped strengthen

democratic institutions, protect human rights, assist internally displaced persons

and foster socio-economic development. Specifically, we have succeeded in the following areas:

• deployment of Colombia’s first Counternarcotics Brigade which has moved aggressively against drug labs and other illegal facilities and has expanded its interdiction efforts beyond southern Colombia;

• support for the police Anti-Narcotics Directorate (DIRAN) which destroyed 61

HCl labs and 401 coca base labs in 2002, and seized thousands of kilos of cocaine;

• support for police presence in rural areas, which has increased significantly

with the addition of permanent police units to 79 municipalities that previously had

no police presence;

• over 22,000 families have benefited from the alternative development program;

• 24,549 hectares of licit crops are being supported;

• 16,673 hectares of illicit crops have been manually eradicated by alternative development communities;

• 31 Justice and Coexistence Centers have been opened; these provide cost-effective legal services to Colombians who have previously not enjoyed access to the

country’s judicial system; over 1.6 million cases have been handled by the centers;

• USAID programs have provided protection to 2,731 human rights activists, journalists and union leaders;

• USAID has provided assistance to 774,601 Colombians displaced by violence;

• USAID is funding a program to rehabilitate former child soldiers, including

those captured by the army or those who have deserted from the illegal armed

groups. Some 733 children have received treatment, education and shelter;

• an Early Warning System (EWS) is helping Colombia avert massacres and violations of international humanitarian law; to date, over 194 warnings have identified threats to communities across Colombia, and have resulted in 154 responses by

the military, police and/or relief agencies;

• the PRM bureau supports international and non-governmental organizations

working in Colombia that provide food, temporary shelter, basic health and sanitation, education and other emergency humanitarian assistance to displaced people.

PRM also supports the dissemination of information on international humanitarian

law to the Colombian military and police, local civilian authorities, and illegal

armed groups;

• DOJ-sponsored justice sector reform programs have helped the Government of

Colombia to reform its judicial system and strengthen local government capacity;

implement a comprehensive program to investigate and prosecute kidnapping and

extortion offenses; trained a cadre of professional prosecutors; enhanced maritime

enforcement capabilities; and improved witness and judicial protection programs;

• DOJ support to the Prosecutor General’s Office has helped in establishing dedicated human rights satellite units arrayed throughout the country to facilitate the

investigation and prosecution of human rights abuses.

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Additionally, our focus on human rights is having an impact on Colombian institutions. President Uribe is working to end collusion between the Colombian military

and the paramilitary AUC terrorist organization. Last year, 168 paramilitaries were

killed, 764 captured and 20 turned themselves in. In the past 2 months, the GOC

has increased its crackdown on illegal paramilitary groups. In four major operations,

Colombian security forces detained an Army officer paramilitary collaborator, arrested a major paramilitary leader and apprehended large groups of illegal combatants.

The Department takes very seriously the human rights record of the Colombian

military. For example on January 3, we suspended assistance to a Colombian Air

Force unit (CACOM–1) due to lack of responsiveness and progress on an important

human rights case. The suspension will remain effective until the Colombian government provides a credible account of what occurred at Santo Domingo and takes

appropriate action consistent with the facts.

The State Department carefully monitors the human rights record of the Colombian Armed Forces. Pursuant to the ‘‘Leahy Amendment,’’ we regularly vet units of

the security forces and do not provide assistance to units for which there is credible

evidence (as determined by the Secretary) that they have committed gross violations

of human rights.

In addition, the Department is moving ahead toward rapid resumption of the Air

Bridge Denial program. The U.S. and Colombia have signed a bilateral agreement,

which lays out the safety procedures for the program. Our goal is to ensure that

we have adequate procedures in place for the protection of innocent life while at the

same time providing a credible deterrent to aerial trafficking of drugs.

Recently, a certification team visited Colombia to review whether the Colombians

would be able to discharge their responsibilities to operate the Air Bridge Denial

Program in accordance with the safety procedures agreed upon between Colombia

and the United States. If the team recommends that Colombia’s procedures meet

the requirements of the bilateral agreement, which would be a major step toward

facilitating the initiation of the program. Department officials will be on the Hill

this week to seek Congressional advice. If the President signs a determination, the

Air Bridge Denial program can recommence. We are hoping this will happen in the

near future.

I would like to note that we have achieved all this while conforming to the limits

on U.S. personnel in Colombia in connection with support of Plan Colombia—400

U.S. civilian contractors and 400 U.S. military personnel—established by Congress.

If present programs are sustained, then Plan Colombia’s original goal of reducing

coca cultivation in Colombia by 50 percent by the end of 2006 should be achieved,

President Uribe has called for a more ambitious target: eradication of all coca by

the end of his term of office in 2006.

If these eradication and interdiction objectives are achieved we would expect to

see a major reduction in the amount of cocaine available for the United States, with

corresponding impacts on cocaine price and purity in the U.S. market. Reductions

in Colombian heroin availability might not produce comparable effects because of

the availability of heroin supplies from other parts of the world.

IV. CHALLENGES TO OUR PROGRAMS

In addition to our success, many challenges also confront us in Colombia.

First and foremost among these is safety of our personnel. The terrorist organizations operating in Colombia are ruthless killers, and the aerial spray operations,

particularly of opium poppy, are perilous. This weekend, another spray plane was

destroyed when it hit a tree while spraying coca; fortunately, the pilot survived. Recently, we lost a U.S. citizen spray pilot during low-level application of herbicide to

opium poppy. There was no evidence that the plane had been hit by ground fire;

rather it appears that pilot error—in the difficult terrain of the high Andes—was

the cause of the crash.

This latest tragedy brings to three the number of U.S. citizen civilian State Department pilot contractors who have died in Colombia since 1998. Two perished on

July 27, 1998 in an aviation accident when their T–65 aircraft crashed during a

training flight.

Colombia is a high-risk assignment and the U.S. military personnel, U.S. civilian

contractors and the permanent and temporary U.S. Government personnel assigned

to Colombia are well aware of this. Our personnel and official facilities maintain a

high State of alert, take every possible precaution, and are very proactive in matters

regarding safety. The Department continually strives to improve the already strong

safety record of our spray program.

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We are currently instituting additional safety procedures, including improved intelligence exchange, increased armed helicopter escorts, and joint operations that

employ Counter Drug Brigade ground troops on interdiction operations in areas

where increased hostile fire is expected.

V. THE ROAD AHEAD

Full realization of U.S. policy goals will require a concerted Colombian strategy

and effort—backed by sustained U.S. assistance—to establish control over its national territory, eliminate narcotics cultivation and distribution, end terrorism, and

promote human rights and the rule of law. We urge Members to support full funding of our 2004 budget request of $731 million, of which $463 million is for Colombia.

This budget reflects our continued support of the Uribe Administration’s courageous anti-narcotics and anti-terror agenda. The progress described earlier needs to

be cemented if we are to achieve our long-term goals of improvements in all areas

of Colombian life and reduction in illegal drug cultivation and terrorism.

First, we would stress that the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) is a regional

effort. It will require full support in Congress if it is to succeed. Among the goals

we have set for ourselves is to ensure that accomplishments in Colombia do not reverse our gains in Bolivia or Peru. We also aim to prevent spillover into Brazil, Ecuador, Panama and Venezuela.

We are making significant progress in our eradication efforts, but will require continued support for eradication and alternative development in order to eliminate remaining cultivation and replanting and to deter permanently the coca growers from

pursuing this illicit business. Our budget request balances law enforcement with

sustainable long-term development.

In Bolivia, we need to provide the GOB with strong incentives to reinforce

counter-narcotics programs, particularly in light of increasing political pressure to

stop eradication and increase licit coca cultivation. In Peru, the democratic government is experiencing unprecedented unrest and resistance in hardcore coca cultivation regions. We should not turn our backs on these partners when they most need

our political and financial support to cement earlier eradication gains.

Specifically, our 2004 ACI programs are intended to do the following:

• Combat illicit drugs and terrorism, defend human rights, promote economic, social and alternative development initiatives, reform and strengthen the administration of justice, and assist the internally displaced;

• Enhance counter-terrorism capability by providing advice, assistance, training

and equipment, and intelligence support to the Colombian Armed Forces and the

Colombian National Police through ongoing programs as well as by implementing

the new authorities and the pipeline protection program;

• Promote economic growth and development through support for market-based

policies, including negotiation of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), and

implementation of the Andean Trade Preferences Act (ATPA) as amended by the

Andean Trade Program and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA);

• Reduce the production and trafficking of cocaine and heroin from Colombia by

strengthening counter-narcotics eradication programs; advise, train, and assist

counterdrug organizations and units; dismantle drug trafficking organizations; disrupt the transportation of illegal drugs, precursor and essential chemicals, trafficker

supplies, and cash; address major cultivation regions; and respond rapidly to shifts

in cultivation regions; eliminate any remaining coca and opium cultivation, to include replanting of these crops;

• Increase institutional development, professionalization, and enlargement of Colombian security forces to permit the exercise of governmental authority throughout

the national territory while ensuring respect for human rights; and

• Reform and strengthen the criminal justice system by enhancing the capabilities

of the police investigators and prosecutors as the country moves in transition from

an inquisitorial to a more accusatorial system with oral and open trials to increase

effectiveness and build public confidence.

Along with ACI funding, Colombia assistance will include $110 million in FMF

funding, to include maritime interdiction support—a priority of President Uribe and

one that meshes with U.S. counter-narcotics goals.

VI. CONCLUSION

Finally, I would like to thank you again for this opportunity to update you on the

status of our counter-narcotics policy and programs. The Administration is committed to supporting the Uribe Administration and to working with our other partVerDate 03-FEB-2003 11:09 Jan 14, 2004 Jkt 087649 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 D:\NARC\87649.TXT SSC2 PsN: SSC2
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ners in the Andean region and beyond to stem the flow of illicit narcotics into our

country and to check the influence of terrorist organizations wherever they reside.

These are important and costly missions—both in terms of financial and human

resources. But they are worthy missions—which require the continued support of

our Congressional partners. We thank you for the tremendous support and counsel

you have provided in the past, and look forward to our continued partnership.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CURTIS STRUBLE, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE,

WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS

Good morning. Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, members of the Caucus, allow me

to first express our appreciation for your ongoing interest in and support for our policy toward Colombia. Your consistent availability to visiting Colombian government

officials, such as Vice President Santos this morning, and your Congressional delegations to Colombia help sustain crucial support for our Colombia strategy.

My colleague Paul Simons has addressed in detail our counternarcotics policy in

Colombia, I would like to offer an update on the current status of U.S.-Colombian

relations, and our efforts to bolster regional and international support for President

Uribe’s goals of attaining peace and strengthening democracy.

Colombia is central to our regional counternarcotics and counterterrorism goals.

We are committed to helping President Alvaro Uribe address Colombia’s security,

economic and narcotics issues, not only because it is in our national interest to do

so, but because we recognize the unique, reliable partner we have in President

Uribe. He has our full political support. U.S.-Colombian cooperation has never been

better. Colombia is producing tangible results and deserves the full support of the

region.

The focused high-level interest in Colombia, supported by the large number of

two-way visits, including your Congressional delegations, is a positive contribution

to our relationship.

President Uribe has been to Washington three times: once as President-elect

(June 2002); then in September 2002; and most recently in early May.

Vice President Santos, Foreign Minister Barco, Defense Minister Ramı ́rez, Peace

Commissioner Restrepo, Minister of Commerce Botero, and others have made individual trips to solidify this relationship.

Our Cabinet level visits:

• Secretary Powell traveled to Colombia in December 2002.

• Secretary Snow visited in April 2003.

• USTR Representative Zoellick is planning a trip for July.

President Uribe’s first year in office continues to be marked by unprecedented cooperation between Colombia and the United States. Last week: (May 28th), Colombia extradited the first FARC terrorist to the U.S. for the kidnapping and murder

of three U.S. indigenous rights workers in February/March 1999, bringing the total

number of extraditions under Uribe to 44. This is in addition to the 64 extraditions

former Colombian President Ande ́s Pastrana ordered during his presidency. Uribe

has sent a clear message to the FARC and other illegal groups that reinforces the

rule of law in Colombia: They will be held accountable for their actions.

President Uribe remains a stalwart supporter on Iraq. Even before Operation

Iraqi Freedom began, Colombia was key in lining up support before rotating off the

U.N. Security Council last December. As UNSC President, Colombia decided to distribute the Iraqi Declaration to UNSC: members with the expertise to assess risks

of proliferation first, despite objections by Syria. Three months later, President

Uribe expressed solidarity with the U.S. on Iraq at a high political cost because he

believes the world must stand up to terrorists.

On May 5 the Colombian Army mounted an unsuccessful hostage rescue operation

and the FARC responded by murdering 11 of its hostages, among them Antioquia’s

Governor Guillermo Gaı ́ria and former defense minister and peace adviser Gilberto

Echeverri. This brutality reminded Colombians and the international community of

the ruthlessness with which the illegal armed groups rob Colombians of peace and

security. Instead of cowering, the Colombian people maintained their support of

President Uribe’s aggressive stance against the FARC. His current approval rate is

steady at 71 percent. No other Latin American leader comes close to this level of

support.

The Uribe administration’s concerted effort to extend ‘‘democratic security’’

throughout Colombia is still in its early stages, but President Uribe has underscored

the importance of human rights as an integral component of his strategy. On May

16, he told graduating Colombian Police cadets, to act with:

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‘‘aggressiveness to defeat: terrorism, determination to defend human rights, respect and tolerance for critics, respect and tolerance for NGO’s, whether or not

we share their points of view.’’

He further said that respect for human rights and tolerance of critics is ‘‘fundamental for the respectability of our use of force, so that we can speak forcefully’’

on terrorism both in Colombia and abroad.

BUILDING INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL SUPPORT

We are committed to bolstering more support for President Uribe both regionally

and internationally. Many of Colombia’s challenges do not stop at Colombia’s borders and require a regional solution. After February’s bombing of the El Nogal social

club in Bogota ́, we supported Colombian efforts to secure a UN Security Council resolution and an OAS resolution condemning this bombing and calling on member

states to stop providing refuge to terrorist groups while cracking down on terrorists

manipulating their financial institutions. In March, the Colombians organized a Defense and Security ministerial with representatives from Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador,

Panama, Peru and Venezuela, to strengthen regional cooperation in pursuing, capturing, and punishing the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of terrorist acts.

In July, Colombia’s Foreign Minister Carolina Barco will have the opportunity to

outline the Colombian government’s priorities to donors in order to increase international consensus for Uribe’s policies and to build better coordination of the various donor, NGO, and GOC programs. We will be there to lend our support. We have

been working with the Europeans, the United Nations, the IDB, and the GOC to

make this conference happen. It should gain additional EU support for Colombia,

confirm for the international community the link between terrorism and narcotics,

and help to better coordinate international assistance to Colombia.

Thank you again for your interest, and for your commitment to help us help Colombia confront the daunting challenges it still faces. This concludes my formal

statement, but I am ready and eager to answer your questions.

Chairman GRASSLEY. Thank you very much.

General are you the one giving the statement?

General HILL. I am, Senator.

Chairman GRASSLEY. Please proceed.

We have been joined by Senator Sessions, as you can see.

STATEMENT OF GENERAL JAMES T. HILL, COMMANDER, U.S

SOUTHERN COMMAND, U.S. ARMY, MIAMI, FLORIDA; ACCOMPANIED BY MARSHALL BILLINGSLEA, DEPUTY ASSISTANT

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,

WASHINGTON, DC.

General HILL. Mr. Chairman, other members of the Caucus,

thank you for inviting me to appear before you today to discuss the

U.S. Southern Command’s role in supporting our country’s efforts

and assisting Colombia with the battle on narco-terrorism. I also

have to say I have had the privilege of sitting here this morning

and listening to Vice President Santos’ very compelling testimony.

Your soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines and Coast Guardmen are

performing in an outstanding manner in a variety of missions

aimed at preventing the flow of illegal narcotics that kill over

19,000 Americans annually, while destabilizing the security and

stability of Colombia and increasingly other countries in Latin

America and the Caribbean.

The illegal narcotics trade in Colombia is dominated by the

FARC, ELN and AUC. These groups, all on the State Department’s

list of terrorist organizations, are incredibly well-financed and sustain themselves by their involvement in every aspect of drug cultivation and production. They destabilize the region by operating in

and out of Colombia’s neighbors, and fueling other illicit activities

such as arms trafficking and money laundering. Additionally, tradiVerDate 03-FEB-2003 11:09 Jan 14, 2004 Jkt 087649 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 D:\NARC\87649.TXT SSC2 PsN: SSC2
29

tional transit nations are now becoming consumer nations. Brazil,

for example, has become a major consumer of cocaine and is suffering the terrible effects of the drug-fueled gangs in Rio and Sao

Paulo.

I have traveled to Colombia 12 times since taking command in

August and have met several times with President Uribe. I am impressed by his strong and principled leadership, as well as his determination and vision to get the job done. He knows the Colombian government must do more to succeed. He understands that

there is no single military solution to the crisis of governance that

is Colombia. He and the Colombian military know and understand

they must fight the narco-terrorists justly, in accordance with

democratic values and human rights. His actions are beginning to

show results.

President Uribe is increasing the size of the military and the police. He levied a war tax on the wealthiest segment of Colombian

society, and more importantly he has collected it. They are reclaiming areas where the government hasn’t operated in for years and

going after the leadership of the narco-terrorist organizations in

ways the Colombian military has never done before.

Southern Command is actively engaging in non-combat roles

with the Colombian military. We are assisting them in making the

counter-narcotics brigade lighter and more operationally flexible.

We have helped them develop a special operations command and

commando battalion to go after counter-drug and narco-terrorist

high-value targets throughout the country.

We are training units in northeast Colombia to protect oil pipelines and other infrastructure so vital to Colombia’s economy which

remain under attack by narco-terrorists. We are training Colombian riverine units to interdict the tremendous volume of illicit

traffic along the waterways.

We are expanding our strategic and operational planning and assistance to Colombian staffs and units. We are working with the

Colombian military to better allocate and use resources by planning and conducting more joint operations, and we are seeing

progress.

The Colombian military is a capable, professional force that respects human rights. This progress is resulting in increasing success on the battlefield. With steady U.S. assistance and support,

and under President Uribe’s leadership, I am guardedly optimistic

that Colombia will be able to establish the security and stability so

necessary for other democratic reforms that President Uribe has

advocated to take hold and mature.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and other members of the Caucus for

this opportunity and for the support that you provide to the tremendous men and women of Southern Command. I look forward to

your questions, sir.

[The prepared statement of General Hill follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GENERAL JAMES T. HILL, U.S. ARMY COMMANDER,

U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND

Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, distinguished members of the Caucus, it is a pleasure to appear before you today to discuss the United States Southern Command’s

role in assisting Colombia and the region’s other countries with the battle on

narcoterrorism. Every day our soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen,

30

civilians and interagency members work hard to accomplish their missions in our

part of the War on Terrorism. This work is vital for regional security and, given

our nation’s proximity to Latin America and general ease of access to the United

States, shores up our own national security.

I have traveled to Colombia 12 times since taking command last August. Our unwavering fiscal, political, and military support provide their government steady reassurance that we stand with them in their fight. Practical measures are required,

however, to augment our support. The most important of these measures is the continuation of Expanded Authority through Fiscal Year 2004. Expanded Authority

successfully broke the artificial barrier that previously existed between counterdrug

and counterterrorist efforts and synchronized disparate funding streams to address

a common threat. It boosted the effectiveness of our support in 2003 and is the most

logical way to continue combating Colombia’s illegal armed groups, groups that are

most accurately described as drug-fueled terrorist organizations.

These narcoterrorists pose a grave threat to Colombia as well as to the entire Andean region. All of Colombia’s neighbors have experienced the total disregard for

sovereign borders displayed by these groups. Most countries are taking efforts to address this threat, but we must help them coordinate and bolster their efforts. The

region’s countries are all consolidating democracies that will take time to mature.

Meanwhile, these countries face uncertainty, whether from weak institutions that

have yet to undergo multiple cycles of free elections or from disappointment that

liberal market reforms have not yet produced sustained improvement. It is upon

these inherent vulnerabilities that narcoterrorist organizations prey. The corruption,

greed and instability narcoterrorists foster undermine the best efforts of dedicated

public servants and honest citizens. Corruption and instability create safe havens

for not only narcoterrorists but also for other international terrorist organization

such as Hizballah, Hamas, and Islamiyya al Gammat, which have support cells

throughout Latin America. Battling narcoterrorism and its beneficiaries is just one

part of the overall War on Terrorism, but it is an essential part which must be

waged, particularly in our hemisphere.

To outline United States Southern Command’s efforts in this endeavor, I will discuss the threats we face, the progress we have made, and the way ahead. Helping

the region’s countries gain and maintain security is an ongoing, gradual process

that requires us to stay the present course. Building security inside these countries

is vital to our overall regional approach, because only nations that are secure can

benefit from democratic processes and economic growth. In both the short and the

long term, it is in our own best interest to help the Colombians and their neighbors

help themselves. Our continuous, steady support is required to forge the way ahead.

THREATS IN THE REGION

The War on Terrorism is my No. 1 priority. While the primary front in this global

war is in the Middle East, Southern Command plays a vital role in fighting

branches of global and local terrorism in this hemisphere. We are increasingly identifying and assisting partner nations to engage those who seek to exploit real and

perceived weaknesses of the region’s democracies.

The primary threat in our region continues to come from the three largest illegal

armed groups in Colombia, all named on the State Department’s list of foreign terrorist organizations: the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia or FARC, the National Liberation Army or ELN, and the United Self-Defense Forces or AUC. Many

familiar with Colombia’s conflict and many press accounts still sentimentally describe these terrorist groups as ‘‘revolutionaries,’’ ‘‘guerrillas,’’ ‘‘rebels’’ or ‘‘militias,’’

lending them some kind of tacit legitimacy with those words. These terms are misleading and obsolete. A group that straps explosives to an 11-year-old boy, sends

him into a police station, and then remotely detonates the explosives, as the FARC

did on April 17th in Arauca, Colombia, forfeits any claim to legitimacy. While these

groups surely retain fragments of their founding philosophies, they appear to have

jettisoned ideology in favor of terrorist methods and illicit revenues. Today, these

groups consist of criminals, more precisely defined as narcoterrorists, who operate

outside the rule of law in order to profit at the expense of Colombia and its people.

These terrorists directly challenge the legitimate authority of the Colombian administration yet offer no viable form of government themselves. Some of them have had

40 years to win the hearts and minds of their countrymen, yet they, and the FARC

in particular, can garner no more than 3 percent public approval.

Colombia is on the very front line of the regional war against terrorism. Their citizens suffer daily from murder, bombings, kidnappings, and lawlessness practically

unimaginable to us. In this war-torn country, the conflict has been accelerated by

illicit drug money and claimed thousands of lives. Colombia is also experiencing an

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unprecedented humanitarian crisis, with an estimated 1.5 million Colombians having been displaced from their homes. In 2001 there were more terrorist attacks in

Colombia alone than in all other nations of the world combined—averaging four per

day. Colombia has the highest homicide rate in the world—77.5 per 100,000—nearly

14 times the U.S. rate, making homicide the most likely cause of death. Moreover,

about 3,000 people were kidnapped last year, making Colombia the kidnapping capital of the world. Colombia remains the world’s leading producer of cocaine and accounts for 90 percent of the U.S. supply. The narcoterrorists have become dependent

on drug income for much of their operational capacity. We expect them to fight to

keep the drug industry productive as it comes increasingly under attack from the

Government of Colombia.

One example of this trend is found in the Cocaleros movement in Bolivia, in which

manipulative traffickers, in conjunction with a radical political party, seek to tap

peasant frustration to undermine the elected government. There is evidence that

outside forces are attempting to influence this movement. On April 10th, Bolivian

authorities arrested suspected Colombian ELN member Francisco Cortes, along with

Bolivian Cocaleros and two members of the Bolivian ELN. Authorities confiscated

ELN literature, false identity documents, over two kilos of cocaine base, and material to fabricate explosive booby traps. Another example is becoming evident in

Peru. The Shining Path is undergoing a resurgence, based on the FARC model, by

protecting cocaine smugglers and collecting taxes on the coca trade. This resurgence

already directly threatens U.S. interests, as evidenced by the Shining Path bombing

near the U.S. Embassy prior to President Bush’s visit last March. These examples

of narcoterrorists operating transnationally and attempting to influence other movements set an unwelcome but likely precedent in the region.

Beyond the narcoterrorist threat concentrated in the Andean Ridge are extensions

of Middle Eastern terrorism. Radical groups that support Hamas, Hizballah and

Islamiyya al Gammat are all active in Latin America. These cells, extending from

Trinidad and Tobago to Margarita Island off Venezuela to the tri-border area of

Paraguay, Argentina and Brazil, consist of logistics and support personnel. However, terrorists who have planned or participated in attacks in the Middle East,

such as recently captured Khalid Shaihk Mohammed, have spent time in the region.

These groups make millions of dollars every year via illicit activities. Hizballah, for

example, smuggles Latin American cocaine to Europe and the Middle East. These

cells continue to reach back to the Middle East and solidify the sophisticated global

support structure of international terrorism. Not surprisingly, international terrorist

groups and narcoterrorists in Colombia all practice the same business methods.

A derivative threat from continued narcoterrorist violence is the instability and

corruption it provokes across the region. Governments that face direct challenges to

their legitimacy and which cannot effectively police their entire sovereign territory

can become safe havens for illicit groups of all persuasions. As the United States

roots out international terrorists across the world, we must be careful not to overlook instability generated by narcoterrorists nearer to home, which makes threatened countries attractive destinations for terrorist groups. These countries are desirable to those who seek to harm the United States for many reason. First, they are

close to us. Second, they provide launching points along already established drug,

arms, and human trafficking routes. Third, terrorists with large amounts of cash

can procure counterfeit official documents in the region. Fourth, Islamic radicals can

easily blend into Latin America’s long established Arab communities to avoid scrutiny. Finally, the money generated by narcotrafficking cannot fail but to entice terrorist groups beyond those already operating in Colombia, such as we are seeing

with the Shining Path in Peru.

While the threats to our Nation from international terrorism are well known, the

threats spawned by narcoterrorism are lesser known yet reach deep into this country. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, over 19,000 Americans die annually as the direct result of drug-related causes. This equates, in my

mind, to a weapon of mass destruction. This staggering number does not take into

account the second and third order effects on families, the lost productivity of those

lives cut short, or the additional thousands of Americans we lose to indirect drugrelated causes. As a Nation we simply cannot afford to give up on tens of thousands

of our own citizens every year. Taking the fight to the narcoterrorists is one way

we as a Nation can effectively address one crucial part of this multi-faceted problem.

THE URIBE ADMINISTRATION’S PROGRESS

The threats we face in our hemisphere are real, but we are not standing idly by

and watching them grow. Instead we are working with the nations across the region

to shore up their internal security. Colombia faces the biggest challenge; the

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narcoterrorist center of gravity lies within its borders. President Uribe won a landslide victory by running on a platform of aggressively hunting down the terrorists

in his country. After years of failed attempts to negotiate with these groups, to include a bold experiment that gave the FARC a safe haven in the southern part of

the country, the people of Colombia had finally had enough of terrorist groups, especially after seeing how the FARC had used their safe haven to plot terrorist acts

instead of social progress and to cultivate coca rather than community.

President Uribe faces enormous challenges, but he is using his mandate to put

deeds behind his words. He has only been in office for 8 months, and turning the

government from a conciliatory posture to an aggressively focused one is not an easy

task. We need to be steadfast in our support of him now to set the conditions for

his longer-term success. We are only two and a half years into our substantial support for Plan Colombia. President Uribe will be the critical player in ensuring the

overall success of this investment by the American people. The signs of his progress

are already becoming evident. Colombia developed a comprehensive national security strategy that directs all the tools at the government’s disposal toward a common

end of defeating the terrorists. President Uribe has levied a war tax on the country’s

wealthiest citizens. He is increasing military and police end-strength. The government has developed a plan to protect travelers along the major roadways. He is

pushing the military and the police to regain control of areas and neighborhoods

dominated by the narcoterrorists. In those areas where the government is regaining

control, they are providing more robust social services to support those who previously suffered most from their absence.

Specifically, the military has had growing operational success against mid-level

leadership in narcoterrorist organizations across the country. Last October, elements of the Colombian 1st Counter Narcotics Brigade dealt the FARC a significant

blow when they carried out an intelligence-driven combined arms operation that resulted in the death of the 15th Front Commander, Mocho Cesar, and the capture

of several key subordinates. On February 15th of this year, Colombian forces captured Aparicio Conde, the finance chief of the FARC’s Joselo Lozada Mobile Column.

On March 10th, they captured 13 FARC members of the 37th Front in Barranquilla,

to include Jose Olivero Ospina, the 37th Front operations officer. This notably cohesive operation was a joint and interagency undertaking, effectively coordinating the

efforts of the police, the Army, and the Prosecutor General’s office. On March 24th,

the Colombian National Police captured Luis Armando Castillo, the finance chief of

the FARC’s Manuel Cepeda Vargas Front. Finally, throughout the month of April,

Colombian security forces arrested senior members of the Antonio Narino Urban

Front, the main unit that terrorizes Bogota ́. The Colombian military and National Police have also been more aggressive in

rescuing a number of kidnap victims, to include an archbishop and the daughter of

a prominent businessman. Eradication efforts showed marked improvement in 2002

as coca cultivation in Colombia decreased by 15 percent. These examples show the

incremental progress that is being made against key actors and support systems in

the narcoterrorist infrastructure. Meanwhile, the psychological benefits that all lawabiding Colombians derive from observing these successful and professional actions

do much to strengthen their national morale.

A remarkable event occurred on April 25, 2003. Rafael Rojas, a 20-year veteran

of the FARC and commander of the group’s 46th Front under the alias Fidel Romero, turned himself in to Colombian authorities. On April 28th, flanked by President Uribe and the administration’s top military leaders at a nationally televised

press conference, Rojas called on his former comrades to surrender stating, ‘‘Positive

things have not resulted . . . On the contrary, the prolonged war has left only desolation and destruction.’’ More importantly, Rojas said the ‘‘movement had clear origins, but its ends are no longer known.’’ While we don’t know Rojas’ motivation for

turning himself in, his statement implies that he grasps the reality of what is occurring today in Colombia. We hope this marks the beginning of a trend. The firm resolve of the Uribe administration, backed by aggressive military operations, has resulted in increased desertions by enemies of the state. The government’s actions are

paired wisely with a complementary government program under which those who

leave the FARC voluntarily are put in protected housing and receive health care,

education, and work training.

In conjunction with military efforts, President Uribe has sponsored political, economic, and judicial reforms. With the support of his Congress, the government is

calling for political reforms. These reforms aim to reduce the government bureaucracy, cap pensions, and eliminate corruption. These measures will streamline the

government and increase its ability to focus on the internal disturbance. Economically, Uribe’s stance and the promised reforms have buoyed the country’s confidence.

Colombia has raised over one billion dollars via bonds since the new administration

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took office, and its stock market has increased by 50 percent this year. Likewise,

President Uribe has sought to stamp out corruption and bolster judicial reform. He

issued Presidential Directive No. 10, which was his anti-corruption strategy, designed to halt the revenue lost from corruption and political cronyism. He established a mechanism to oversee State contracting that will save an estimated two billion dollars annually, and he has established merit-based hiring practices. Though

an overburdened judiciary continues to sort through an enormous pending case

backlog, there are positive trends that those accused of crimes, especially those with

money and influence, are being tried in due course and not being allowed to opt out

of the system.

Colombia is fighting its illegal armed groups justly, in accordance with democratic

values and human rights. This is instrumental in what we are collectively striving

to achieve. The Colombian government is not resorting to rural concentration

camps, peasant roundups, massacres, disappearances or other tactics used by their

enemies. We continue to monitor closely the human rights record of the Colombian

military. If one reads all of the Department of State’s 2002 Colombian Human

Rights Report instead of the snippets that have been circulating, one gains a deeper

appreciation of the strides the government has made. The vast majority of allegations of human rights abuses, over 98 percent, are attributed to Colombia’s illegal

armed groups, primarily the three-narcoterrorist groups, and not to government

forces. This report clearly demonstrates the institutionalization of human rights by

the Colombian government, whose forces as recently as the mid–1990’s were accused

of 50–60 percent of human rights abuses.

The Human Rights report finds that,

‘‘The government has an extensive human rights apparatus coordinated by

the office of the President’s Advisor for Human Rights. That office coordinates

with local human rights groups. Most notably, it established a special ‘momentum’ committee to advance judicial resolutions of 100 key human rights cases.’’

Over 290,000 members of Colombia’s security forces have received specialized

human rights training since 1996, conducted by the International Committee of the

Red Cross, the Colombian Red Cross, the Roman Catholic church, foreign governments, and other government offices and agencies. The Ministry of Defense signed

an agreement with two prestigious, private civilian national universities and the

Inter-American Institute of Human Rights to conduct research and training on

human rights and international humanitarian law issues and to organize seminars

designed to foster dialog with nongovernmental organizations and academics. I am

convinced the Colombian government is serious about human rights and will continue to promote them aggressively.

An area of concern is the perception of collusion between the Colombian military

and the AUC. President Uribe and the senior military leadership have made it perfectly clear that they will not tolerate any collusion with the AUC or other illegal

‘‘self-defense’’ groups, and that they are just as criminal as the other terrorists. Collaboration with any groups that operate outside the law is illegal and punishable

by the civilian justice system. Despite great progress, it would be disingenuous to

say that all collusion has been stamped out. Like any tough problem, this one will

take time. I’m confident that as an institution, the Colombian military and its current leadership completely understand the seriousness of this matter and are headed in the right direction. As just one demonstration of their resolve in this area,

the military doubled operations against illegal self-defense groups last year and has

quadrupled the number captured since 2000.

This list is just a partial highlight of the coordinated effort the Colombian government is making to solve its own problems. President Uribe has infused his government with energy, organization, and a sense of purpose. He is getting results now,

and will continue to direct all his resources toward snaking Colombia a safe, prosperous, democratic nation. He understands that this is primarily a Colombian problem, one which Colombia must solve, yet he still needs our help to make his efforts

ever more effective. President Uribe stood by us as a member of the Coalition of

the Willing in Operation Iraqi Freedom, a stance unpopular with both Colombian

public opinion and his regional peers. He is providing the strategic leadership that

Colombia needs to move ahead. Recent polls show public confidence in him and the

military increasing. Now, early in his administration, is the time he most needs us

to demonstrate to him, his government, and his people our continued resolve.

U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND ASSISTANCE TO COLOMBIA

Southern Command’s assistance to Colombia is not operational but instead is in

training and assisting the Colombians to deal with their internal problems themselves. We have a vested interest in the outcome, but it must remain primarily a

34

Colombian fight. President Uribe’s actions have generated momentum against his

country’s criminals, and our deployed forces have seen a noticeable boost in the attitudes of those we are training. Our physical presence is rather modest, by law being

no more than 400 troops and 400 civilian contractors. But you’ve seen what a few

dedicated men working with allied forces can accomplish. We’re having a similar effect in Colombia. Their military proficiency is improving. This means they can respond quicker, move faster, and fight better than ever before.

Our Special Forces have trained the staff and soldiers of Colombia’s best units,

giving these units an added edge of operational effectiveness that is paying dividends. The 1st Counter Narcotics Brigade has provided the Colombians a flexible,

mobile, offensively oriented fighting force of three 600-man battalions that are able

to conduct quick strike missions against narcoterrorists. The establishment and

training of a Commando Battalion, modeled on our own Ranger battalions, has

given the Colombians a unit that can strike high-value targets including enemy

leadership. The Colombians plan on establishing another commando battalion in

Fiscal Year 2004. We have also trained with the Colombian urban counter-terrorist

unit and continue to work with them to upgrade their capabilities and equipment.

Recently, U.S. Special Forces have also been training Colombian Armed Forces in

Arauca to protect a portion of the 772-kilometer oil pipeline that has been a frequent target of FARC and ELN attacks. This training is just one part of a nationwide Infrastructure Security Strategy that protects critical facilities and reestablishes control in narcoterroirist influenced areas of the country.

We continue to train Colombia’s helicopter pilots, providing their forces a growing

ability to perform air assaults that are key in the battle against dispersed enemies.

We deploy intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets in country that have

provided timely, actionable intelligence to Colombian units. We are training their

staffs with Planning Assistance Teams that increase their ability to plan and execute intelligence driven operations against illegal armed groups. We are working

with Colombian Marines to establish two Mobile Training Teams that will work

with the Riverine Brigade to raise proficiency for riverine interdiction. We contract

logistics to help the Colombians maintain their own C–130 fleet. We are training

the Colombian National Police Carabineros (Rural) with the goal of reestablishing

governance throughout the country. We are providing medical training and assistance to help the Colombians improve their casualty evacuation methods as well as

implementing other safety programs to help them preserve their combat power. In

civil-military operations, we are helping the Colombians to build civil-affairs capability that will be implemented in the Arauca Rehabilitation Zone to bring humanitarian aid and functioning institutions to previously terrorized areas. This program

will eventually be expanded across the country. Finally, we are working with the

State Department to re-establish the Air Bridge Denial Program to be run by the

Colombians with U.S. ground and air safety monitors. In support of this issue, the

United States Department of Justice is assisting a certification team to ensure that

legal controls are applied and implemented.

The one constant running through all of our efforts is the non-negotiable emphasis on human rights. Southern Command has played a leading role in advancing the

cause of human rights in Colombia and throughout the region, and our efforts have

certainly supplemented the government’s program and helped professionalize the

Colombian military. We are the only combatant command to have a full time human

rights staff directorate. Respect for human rights is embedded in everything we do,

whether training forces, educating officers, or conducting exercises. This guiding

principle will remain our foundation.

Although we are not taking part in direct operations, Americans are still at risk

during the course of their duties. Currently, three American contractors are being

held hostage by the FARC. We have been working hard to recover them, There are

several factors that make this recovery difficult, but two are overriding. First, the

area where the search is being conducted is in some of the thickest jungle in the

country. Second, this area is the FARC’s backyard, and they have a first hand

knowledge of the terrain combined with a sizable support network in the area. We

are pressing forward with the search and rescue effort around the clock. There is

at least one positive result so far. The Colombian Military, to include units from the

1st Counter Narcotics Brigade, has been leading the search, and in doing so are operating in parts of the country they haven’t set foot in for 15 to 20 years. They are

taking the fight to the enemy on his turf, and they are doing well. Our training

shows.

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REGIONAL SUPPORT BEYOND COLOMBIA

Colombia is the linchpin in the narcoterrorist battle, but we must be careful not

to win the battle in Colombia and lose the war in the region. As the Colombians

make progress, their success will push narcoterrorists to seek safer areas in which

to operate. Already, the FARC, ELN, and AUC operate freely across the weak borders of Colombia’s neighbors, and the remote nature of many of these areas makes

them ever more attractive as safe havens. Those countries also lack the organization

and resources to maintain territorial sovereignty in these ungoverned spaces. Consequently, across the Andean Ridge we are working with the bordering nations to

increase cooperation, fortify borders and strengthen capabilities.

We are actively strengthening regional cooperation. In an ongoing multinational

exercise, we are training with the Colombian Navy on littoral techniques in a combined operation with Panamanian, British, and Dutch participation. In Peru, we

have built upon their riverine interdiction ability, as well as working with the interagency to support their eradication program and counternarcotics aviation. We are

working to restart the Air Bridge Denial Program in Peru with additional safeguards. In Ecuador, we have supported their riverine capability and worked closely

with them in completing the essential forward operating location at Manta. We are

seeing a welcome acknowledgment of the Colombian border concern by their leadership, and we are studying the possibility of training; their 19th Jungle Brigade

along the same lines as the units we’ve trained in Colombia. In Bolivia, we have

worked on their riverine capabilities as well and supported their eradication efforts.

We will continue to monitor the Cocalero movement. I am particularly encouraged

by the bilateral talks President Lula of Brazil and President Uribe conducted in

March during which they acknowledged the common interest their countries shared

in controlling drug traffickers in the Amazon region. We have already seen the Brazilians take up active patrolling on their own border with Colombia.

Venezuela is undoubtedly a key player in overall regional security but also the

most unpredictable. We are maintaining military-to-military contacts at the colonel

level and below. Venezuelan officers come to our schools and we send U.S. officers

to theirs. In the domestic turmoil so far, the Venezuelan military has not harmed

its own citizens, which is a positive signal that the military is attempting to maintain its professionalism. We will maintain our contacts providing the Venezuelan

military continues to act in a constitutionally correct manner.

WAY AHEAD

As the lead agent for the Department of Defense to implement U.S. policy for the

military efforts in Colombia, U.S. Southern Command will continue to maintain a

priority effort against narcoterroriism. Key in most of our recent endeavors has been

approval by the U.S. Congress of Expanded Authority legislation. This legislation

has allowed us to use funds available for counterdrug activities to provide assistance

to the Government of Colombia for a coordinated campaign against the terrorist activities of its illegal armed groups. The granting of Expanded Authority was an important recognition that no meaningful distinction can. be made between the terrorists and drug traffickers in our region. All three of Colombia’s terrorist groups are

deep into the illicit narcotics business. Trying to decide whether a mission against

a FARC unit was a counterdrug or counterterrorist one was an exercise in futility

and hampered operational effectiveness on the ground. Expanded Authority has

eliminated the time consuming step of first evaluating the mission based on its

probable funding source and now allows us to bring to bear all our assets more rapidly. As just one example, it will allow assets controlled by Joint Interagency Task

Force South (JIATF-S) to continue being used to their full potential to provide realtime, actionable intelligence that is key in conducting effective operations against

the narcoterrorists. Expanded Authority for FY04 is the single most important factor for us to continue; building success in Colombia.

Expanded Authority is foundational for the overall way ahead for Colombia, but

it will be supplemented on many fronts across the region. JIATF-South, a model of

interagency cooperation for our entire government, will broaden its focus beyond

narcotics to use its assets to counter all illicit trafficking, including arms, ammunition, explosives and weapons of mass destruction. We will continue to conduct exercises and training in the region. We are working with nations in the region to build

their intelligence capabilities and to protect their critical national infrastructures.

We are working with them to build effective logistics and communications architectures that will support intelligence driven operations.

We will continue to bring Latin American officers, non-commissioned officers, enlisted members, and defense civilians to our professional schools in the United

States. Hand-in-hand with our professionalization efforts is a continued emphasis

36

on human rights and international humanitarian law. All of these efforts help build

a coordinated regional approach and regional cooperation. While our efforts are, for

good reason, Colombia-centric, we are not letting others fall behind to become the

next targets for terrorist groups. The cooperative counter narcoterrorist groundwork

we are laying today will further our national security for decades to come.

CONCLUSION

For most nations in our region, the threats come from within. It will be up to

those nations to demonstrate their ability to govern, enforce the rule of law, implement judicial reform, and develop a profound respect for human rights. These fundamentals provide the stable and secure environment necessary for economic

growth—growth that will improve the quality of life for ordinary citizens. Southern

Command plays a crucial role in assisting the development of security forces that

help provide the ability to govern throughout the region, particularly in Colombia.

We are at a critical time in Colombia’s history. The elected government of President Uribe enjoys unparalleled approval[ ratings approaching 70 percent. Under his

leadership, the military and police are helping to regain control of areas long held

by narcoterrorists. Colombia’s citizens are taking a more active role in their nation’s

defense and providing actionable intelligence to the Colombian Armed Forces. There

is a renewed sense of momentum, commitment, and hope as the Colombian people

struggle to save their country, but there is also a finite window of opportunity beyond which public opinion and support will wane without significant progress.

I am cautiously optimistic about Colombia, though there remains an enormous

amount of work to be done. I am proud to say we do a great deal to further our

nation’s interests in this hemisphere with very few resources and a modest presence. We are at a critical point where the progress in eliminating conflict, reducing

tension, and establishing democracy throughout the region could be at risk if we are

not steadfast in our efforts. While our attention is drawn to another region of the

world, we must keep in mind that we live in this hemisphere, and its continued

progress as a region of democracy and prosperity is paramount to our national security.

I would like to thank the Chairman and the Members of the Caucus for this opportunity and for the tremendous support you have provided this command. I can

assure you that the men and women of the United States Southern Command are

working to their utmost to accomplish their missions for our great country.

Chairman GRASSLEY. What I am going to do here is ask questions that both of you can respond to, but you don’t have to both

respond. When I say both, I mean the four of you as two different

entities.

Originally, Plan Colombia called for significant levels of assistance from several European countries. I hope I am right in understanding that very little assistance has been forthcoming, despite

current estimates that close to 50 percent of all cocaine produced

in Colombia is ending up in Europe.

Is that accurate, and what changes have had to be made to U.S.

assistance to compensate for the lack of help we expected from the

Europeans?

Mr. STRUBLE. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. You are correct that we have been very disappointed.

Chairman GRASSLEY. Just a minute. I think that we should put

the clock on so that I don’t eat up all the time of my colleagues.

Proceed.

Mr. STRUBLE. Thank you, sir. We have been disappointed by the

failure of the European Union and individual European countries

to come in to support the goals of Plan Colombia. As you have

noted, they have a strong interest in this.

I am pleased to say, though, that there are some increasing signs

of recognition on the part of European countries that they need to

do more. We believe that they could most particularly make a contribution to the social goals of Plan Colombia.

37

The United Kingdom will be sponsoring a conference on July 10.

It is actually a preliminary conference which is aimed at getting

donor countries to talk about the unmet needs of Colombia. And

then a second conference later on in the year will seek to ensure

that there is a more robust answer to those needs.

Now, I will say that some European countries have been an exception to this general rule. The Government of Spain, for example,

has donated some aircraft to Colombia and the British government

has provided some very useful military training of special units in,

for example, long-range reconnaissance.

Chairman GRASSLEY. The United States has spent, I believe, over $2.5 billion since the year 2000 to assist Colombia in this way.

Have there been some changes in the original time lines that were

very wildly optimistic?

Now that all assistance called for in Plan Colombia has been delivered, could you highlight what performance measures are being

used to assess the success or failure of the eradication and military

training assistance that has been funded, and what is the time line

for either the completion of the eradication or the military assistance programs currently being conducted?

Mr. Simons.

Mr. SIMONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The original Plan Colombia document included a policy objective of reducing the coca crop

by 50 percent in 6 years’ time, and that would essentially mean a

50-percent reduction in cropping levels by the end of 2005.

I think it is fair to say that because of initial delays in the provision of some of the helicopters and some of the spray planes that

we got going a little later than we originally thought. But we believe that, in particular, with the results that were demonstrated

last year and with the pace of spraying that we are on now, including the goal of spraying all remaining coca in Colombia during the

course of calendar 2003, we are on track to meet that original

deadline of a 50-percent reduction by the end of 2005.

Now, President Uribe has staked out an even more ambitious

goal of complete elimination of coca by the end of his term in office.

And, again, our goal for 2003 is to spray all remaining coca, spray

all remaining poppy.

The other area that we have set, I think, a fairly——

Chairman GRASSLEY. Can I ask you if those time lines have been

affected in any way because we have lost two spray planes since

the first of the year, and presumably they haven’t been replaced

yet?

Mr. SIMONS. That is correct, but fortunately we recognized during the course of 2002 that we were going to have to step up our

spray operations, including stepping up our infrastructure. So what

we have been able to do, with the cooperation of Congress, is we

have adjusted our 2003 budget to provide an additional $9 million

for the spray program. Congress also, in the context of the emergency supplemental for 2003, provided us an additional $14 million

for the spray program. So with those resources, we believe that we

can achieve our objectives for this year.

I would like to make one other point, though, on the question of

objectives. On the helicopter side, 2 years ago the Colombian army

had no helicopter fleet at all. We essentially stood up from scratch

38

a 72-unit helicopter fleet. In 2 years’ time, while it has been costly

in terms of the amount of operating expenses that we have had to

cover, we now have 72 helicopters up and running at an 80-percent

operational readiness rate.

I believe this is a very strong achievement, and these helicopters

are the ones that are providing the mobility for the counter-drug

brigade to undertake interdiction operations to support the spray

operations on the ground. So I think actually, while it took some

time to get these helicopters up and running, they are making a

major contribution now 2 years into Plan Colombia.

Chairman GRASSLEY. General Hill, does that speak for you, too,

or do you have a different perspective or an added perspective from

where you are posted?

General HILL. Yes, sir. From my perspective, especially since

President Uribe took office in August, the ability of the Colombian

military to conduct military operations, both in a counter-drug and

a counter-terrorist situation, has gone up exponentially.

We did a wonderful job and they responded greatly in terms of

training the counter-narcotics brigade, especially, and then they

went into operations in the Putumayo and Caqueta area. We have

essentially moved drug trafficking out of those two provinces closer

to the coast to the Narino area, and the Colombian military is now

undergoing major operations in Narino and doing a wonderful job

there, also, collecting significant seizures.

Those kinds of military operations, though, are simple operations

when compared to going after high-value targets, infrastructure,

and the leadership of the illegal narco-terrorist organizations. In

the last 90 days, we have done some work with their commando

unit and those operations are also paying off tremendously.

I think that over the next year you will those operations, as the

Colombian military even gets better at those very sophisticated operations, paying off in even greater dividends. But you cannot overstate the importance of the mobility of the helicopter fleet. It is

what gives the Colombians the ability to get out into the countryside and to carry out operations where they have not been to go

for years.

Thank you, sir.

Chairman GRASSLEY. This will be my last question and it is in

regard to our bilateral agreement regarding the number of personnel that are available for helicopter operations and maintenance.

While initial levels for trained personnel were met, we are going

to have the General Accounting Office later on today testify that

many of the trained personnel cannot be currently located. This

means that this program is heavily dependent, then, on contractor

support for operations.

What is being done to ensure that trained Colombian military

personnel can be identified and are putting their U.S.-funded training to use?

General HILL. I think there are two pieces to that, so I will have

Mr. Simons start.

Mr. SIMONS. Mr. Chairman, I think this is a very good point that

we have been in discussions with the GAO about for some period

of time and it is one that we focus a lot of energy on. I think I

39

would like to address it in two separate pieces; first, the pilot situation and, second, the situation of the mechanics.

Again, we were creating a Colombian army aviation capacity

from the ground up, and in the case of the pilots for the 72 helicopters that we have up and running now, we have identified and

trained a total of 126 Colombian pilots in the past 2 years. So all

the helicopters now have Colombian co-pilots full qualified and we

are in the process of converting those co-pilots into pilots and command. That process is going to take a couple of years, but we are

well on our way to a Colombianization of the pilot crews for all of

these helicopters.

With respect to mechanics, we have approximately 65 Colombian

army mechanics available to perform maintenance on the helicopters and they are undertaking training under the contractor’s

supervision. I have discussed this issue this morning with my staff

and I understand it takes about 6 years to get a fully trained helicopter mechanic operational.

So this is going to be again something that is going to take some

period of time, but we are fully committed to it. We are fully committed to working with the Colombians to try to get them to enforce agreements such that when we put people through the training program, they stay on the job for a significant period of time.

But this will be something that will take a number of years to fully

phase in.

Chairman GRASSLEY. Does that speak for you, General, or did

you have something to add?

General HILL. No, sir. It does speak for me.

Chairman GRASSLEY. I thank each of you for coming here and for

your testimony. I am going to call on Senator DeWine now, but I

am also going to call on him to Chair the Caucus because I have

the responsibility as Chairman of the Finance Committee for the

prescription drug program and I have to go to a meeting on that

now.

So would Senator DeWine take over?

Senator DEWINE. I certainly will, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GRASSLEY. I apologize to the third panel that I am not

going to be able to hear them. I have a lot of questions of this

panel, so I may submit some for answers in writing because I

didn’t get very far down the line.

Senator DEWINE [PRESIDING.] Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me ask members of the panel—and you have covered this

really a little bit, but if you could kind of summarize for me what

has been the biggest disappointment or disappointments of Plan

Colombia. Where are we behind? Just kind of give me a list.

Who wants to start? And if we are behind, how are we going to

get caught up?

Mr. STRUBLE. I will start, Senator, by saying that we acknowledged a year when we requested new authorities from this Congress that the original premise of Plan Colombia was too limited,

that the actions of narcotics traffickers and of Colombia’s terrorist

groups were so intertwined that an effort that focused simply on

the law enforcement piece of this, on going after the narcotics traffickers, created a number of anomalies in intelligence-sharing, for

example, and in our ability to provide training for some key ColomVerDate 03-FEB-2003 11:09 Jan 14, 2004 Jkt 087649 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 D:\NARC\87649.TXT SSC2 PsN: SSC2
40

bian units that were needed in that integrated counter-terrorism

role.

I believe, though my colleague, General Hill, could comment on

this more, that the provision of the new authorities has been extremely important in setting us on the right course and allowing

us to set the stage for the rapid progress that we have seen.

Senator DEWINE. But you have that now.

Mr. STRUBLE. We have that, yes.

Senator DEWINE. So you are catching up, is what you are saying.

Mr. STRUBLE. We are catching up, indeed.

General HILL. Sir, let me add to Mr. Struble’s comments, especially on the expanded authority. If you said to me what are the

two biggest issues, one is the expanded authorities that allowed us

to break the drug nexus into narco-terrorism, counter-terrorism operations, is the single greatest deficiency.

We focused so long only on the drug nexus that we were unable

to go after the leadership. We can now do that—greater intelligence-sharing with the Colombian military, use of the Plan Colombia helicopters, dollars, and other assets, and the ability of the

Colombian military to take that actual intelligence and operate

with it. That is before the Congress again and we just simply have

to have it. If we walked back from expanded authority, it would be

a terrible mistake.

I will give you two anecdotes, one good, one bad.

Senator DEWINE. That would be helpful.

General HILL. When Ms. Bettencourt was kidnapped, before expanded authorities, the Colombian military came to us and asked

us for helicopter support to go in search of her. We could not provide it because there was no drug nexus to support that operation.

Senator DEWINE. You could not supply——

General HILL. The helicopters to look for Ms. Bettencourt.

Senator DEWINE. What about intelligence?

General HILL. We couldn’t provide the intelligence either.

Senator DEWINE. So you can’t do intelligence, you can’t share intelligence?

General HILL. No, sir.

Senator DEWINE. There was a wall there?

General HILL. An absolute firewall between, if you couldn’t prove

a drug nexus, you could not provide the intelligence. That put the

burden on the intel analyst to sit there and to show you that there

really was a drug nexus in order to do it. That is ludicrous and we

are beyond that.

Senator DEWINE. So it is equipment, plus intelligence.

General HILL. Yes, sir. If the Congress gave it to us with drug

money, before expanded authority, we could not use that money in

support of activities in Colombia. We are beyond that.

Senator DEWINE. OK, one example.

General HILL. Yes, sir. I will give you a good example. About 4

months ago, after we had expanded authority, the Colombian military and the counter-narcotics brigade was running an operation in

the Putumayo area and they were doing operations going from village to village with our helicopters, Plan Colombia helicopters.

In one little village, a man walked up to them and said, ‘‘You

know, the 45th Front FARC commander comes in here all the time;

41

if you will give me a cell phone, I will call you the next time he

is in town and you can come and get him.’’

About 3 weeks later, the phone rings, it is a Saturday morning,

and it is this villager who said, ‘‘Hey, they’re here’’, and described

the building that they were in and all the details. As luck would

have it, and sometimes wars are won on luck, there was a platoon

sitting on an airstrip and an aggressive commander who was able

to get some helicopters.

They had been in that village a couple of weeks before. They got

the helicopters in, they planned the attack, they flew there, they

took down the village, and got the FARC commander and 300 kilos

of cocaine and a lot of ammunition. Start to finish, 6 hours. If that

was a unit from the 101st Airborne Division Air Assault at Fort

Campbell, Kentucky, where I used to command a brigade, you

would applaud it. It was an excellent operation. It could never have

taken place before expanded authorities.

Senator DEWINE. Good, that is helpful.

General HILL. I think Mr. Billingslea would like to add something.

Mr. BILLINGSLEA. Senator, I think we came to the realization

that the FARC is fundamentally a narco-terrorist organization

somewhat late, and we inherited a structure related to the Plan

Colombia program that was somewhat stovepiped, as you have

heard, between the counter-drug approach and the counter-terrorism approach.

Because we have not only obtained the expanded authorities, but

because we have, I think, more prudently defined the term

‘‘counter-drug’’ to include measures that are reasonably related to

narcotics trafficking, we have been able to provide a variety of assistance that previously was not provided.

We have been able, for instance, to provide military assistance

teams to translate intelligence information into operational capacity. Just because you have intelligence on a terrorist group doesn’t

necessarily mean that you have the gears engaged to then take action to thwart a planned terrorist attack. That is something that

has been evolving and is going to be crucial to the process.

Second, you will find that we have been able to train a larger variety of units, all carefully vetted through the Department of State

process. That is critical, but sometimes can be slow, and that can

impede the rapidity with which we can act in concert with our

partners.

But you will find that we have been able to train not only a

counter-narcotics brigade, but also a special forces commando battalion; a lancero battalion, which is a rangers type of unit; and a

special operations command headquarters staff. All of this training

is essential to bring the other pressure point to bear, which is not

just eradication of the coca fields and the financial mechanisms

that the FARC uses to fund itself, but to move against the FARC

itself, to move against the leadership, to assist the Colombian government in deploying small, agile teams that are capable of going

after this terrorist group to strike them before they are able to conduct further attacks.

Senator DEWINE. My time is up and I am going to turn to Senator Sessions, but I want to get back to the question of what is not

42

working. You have told me now we have changed something and

we are moving in the right direction, but if we look at the overall

Plan Colombia, what is not working?

General HILL. From a military perspective, in my view, the Colombian military, especially in the last 9 months, has made significant strides in their ability to take actionable intelligence that we

can provide them and operationalize that intelligence. They are

still a long way away from doing that routinely or without our assistance. They are getting better everyday, but they have a way to

go.

The other thing that the Colombian military needs to improve

upon is the ability to operate jointly, but again we are working

with them in order to do that.

Senator DEWINE. What does that mean, General?

General HILL. Sir, that means the ability for the army and the

air force to coordinate an operation, again, in a routine manner effectively and efficiently. It means that if there is an operation that

requires the police and the military to act coherently that they do.

They are getting better at it.

As I remind many of my colleagues both in the State Department

and in the military, this is a learned skill, jointness. The U.S. military became joint at the point of a Congressional gun in 1986, and

we are still not as joint as we should be. This is hard work, but

I applaud them on their efforts.

Senator DEWINE. We have a cap on the number of U.S. military

in Colombia. We have trainers there. Describe for me in layman’s

terms what our role there is as far as training. What kind of impact can we have?

We are doing training and I look at this and say, well, how can

we have much of an impact? I will play the devil’s advocate. How

can we have much of an impact with a relatively small number of

trainers? Now, maybe from a military point of view, it is not a

small number of trainers.

General HILL. What is a small number of trainers?

Senator DEWINE. I mean, just tell me what is it, General, from

a military point of view.

General HILL. I think the results that we have—I will go back

to the first part of your question, which is what is our job. Our job

is, from a military perspective, to work with the Colombian military to help them more professionalize themselves to gain greater

proficiency in operationalizing on actionable intelligence and to

work jointly, as I just discussed, and at the unit level to be more

tactically correct.

What is happening with our ability to do this with a small number of trainers is that we started with a pretty professional army

and military. They were not an unprofessional group before we

started working with them. They have a long history of being a

good, capable force. We are helping them become a more capable

force.

We do it only after we have vetted a unit and that unit then can

receive U.S. training. All the units that we have trained you can

point to and see the difference, how much better they are. I will

also say to you there is an ancillary benefit. I can also go down and

point to units that the United States has not helped train and they

43

are getting better because there is, in fact, cross-fertilization as

people move between units.

Senator DEWINE. Good, thank you.

Senator Sessions.

STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF SESSIONS, U.S. SENATOR

FROM ALABAMA

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you very much, Senator DeWine, and

I want to express my appreciation to Senator Grassley and to you

for your consistent and dedicated interest in this issue. I know you

have been to Colombia and other countries, and probably more

than anybody in this Senate have personally been engaged on the

ground with the problems of drugs from this area of the world.

I do remember a number of years ago when I came here that I

asked a series of questions about our role. Ambassador Pickering,

a fine public servant, insisted under the previous administration

that our goals were solely anti-narcotics. And I said, ‘‘Are we on the

side of the Colombian government against the communist narcoterrorists?’’, and he basically said our interest is narcotics. And I

pressed him again. Our interest is narcotics. To me, that was always an absurd philosophy and I am glad to hear that we have

made some substantial progress over the years in eliminating that.

General Hill, it would be irrational to expect a government like

the Government of Colombia to eliminate narcotics in an area of

the country they don’t even control, would it not?

General HILL. It would certainly be a very difficult thing to do

that, for sure.

Senator SESSIONS. It seems to me that from the beginning we

have had two goals, to encourage the Colombian government to assert its control over its entire country, and in the course of that victory against these terrorist insurgents we can expect and would expect that they would take strong efforts to eliminate narcotics trafficking in the process.

Secretary Struble?

Mr. STRUBLE. I fully agree, sir. That is one reason why we have,

for example, provided such enthusiastic support for the efforts described by Vice President Santos earlier today to help the Colombians establish a police presence in the municipalities where they

have not had one. It is absolutely key that there be an official presence throughout the national territory of Colombia.

Senator SESSIONS. Well, as a Federal prosecutor and a U.S. Attorney for a number of years on the Gulf Coast, we prosecuted a

lot of cases that traced back to Colombia. I remember indicting a

number of Colombians and we hoped that there would be extraditions. They never occurred.

I remember a young police officer coming and testifying from Colombia and he was utterly courageous. I asked him about his personal safety and he had no fear. He told the truth and if they came

after him, so be it. So there are a lot of superb people in Colombia

that are dedicated to changing what is occurring.

General Hill, is the Government of Colombia making progress in

expanding its control of territory, and how would you characterize

the strength of the FARC and the other groups?

44

General HILL. Yes, sir, they are, in fact, expanding their territory, as Vice President Santos testified earlier this morning. There

are two major programs underway by the Uribe government to go

into areas that they had either vacated before or have never been

in, and there are many locales where they have never had much

government presence.

One, there is a campesino program where they have trained volunteers to give them some sort of military training under the control and guidance and leadership of a Colombian military person to

go back into the villages to provide security. They have also expanded police presence. The number that I have seen is about 127

villages over the last 3 or 4 months that they have put police presence back into.

The FARC and the ELN and the AUC are strong opponents.

They have lots of money, they have a defined ability of infrastructure and communications, and they are ruthless in their application of power. We have, however, over the last several months seen

some intelligence indicators that you make you want to smile.

We are seeing a little bit of the money dry up because of the effort that goes after the drugs and the narco-terrorism. We are seeing some areas where they have not been able to make their coca

paste production. The eradication effort is beginning to really make

some inroads in their ability to fund themselves. The desertion

rates are up tremendously. A lot of that I think is because they

have gone out and forcibly recruited children and other people, and

those folks are taking off and there are some good signs in all of

that.

Senator SESSIONS. It seems to me that President Uribe is what

Colombia needed. I think in the United States and in Colombia

there was a sort of generalized feeling that this war had gone on

so long and it was just going to go on forever and it just couldn’t

be ended. But it can be ended. There is no doubt in my mind that

if the people of Colombia make up their minds that they will not

allow this to continue that they can defeat this group.

I mean, they have so many advantages, General. Wouldn’t you

agree that, militarily, a united, determined Colombia can defeat

these insurgent groups and restore the democracy which Colombia

is known for? As one of the oldest democracies in the hemisphere,

it is in a life-and-death struggle, it seems to me, for its heritage

and future.

General HILL. Yes, sir, and I agree with that. I would also say

to you that, militarily, they have made great strides. They will continue to make great strides and, militarily, I believe they have the

momentum and they can continue the momentum.

But I think just as importantly, what the Uribe government has

done is understand that it can’t be only a military victory. They

must, in fact, have political reform, labor reform, and judicial reform, which is a major point. And they have programs and they

are, in my view, moving in the correct direction in all of those

areas, and it is paying off both in terms of political and people support for the Uribe government, about a 65-percent popular government, and the fact that the military has emerged as the single

most respected institution in the country.

45

If that military was out there violating the human rights of the

citizenry, they would not be the most respected institution in the

country. I think that all of those things bode well for two things

to happen: the Uribe government stays the course, along with the

Colombian people, and I believe they will, and that the United

States, with the support of this Congress, does the same.

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you very much.

Mr. BILLINGSLEA. Senator, I might add denial of territory in the

spraying program which is having an effect on the revenue stream

as the coca crops dry up is one piece of the Uribe administration’s

strategy. They have got several other pieces that are also working

very effectively.

They have an amnesty program which is inducing not only foot

soldiers and conscripts to come in and lay down arms, but has also

induced the defection of a number of key personnel from the FARC

and the ELN, including some financiers.

They have made progress in Europe with disrupting FARC fundraising in Europe. Gone are the days when the FARC is romanticized as some kind of egalitarian revolutionary movement. It is

now recognized for being a brutal, drug-running terrorist organization. So the information campaign and the perspective on the organization has changed in a very positive way.

Senator SESSIONS. Marxist in its heritage, is it not?

Mr. BILLINGSLEA. Marxist in its heritage, but those individuals

are increasingly taking a back seat to the drug-running crowd.

Then, finally, there is a program to degrade the FARC infrastructure and the cell structure that it has as the Colombian military

gets more agile and is able to operate in remote areas in small

units for sustained periods of time. So there is a very positive picture that is evolving here.

Senator DEWINE. I would like to turn to the topic we have not

talked about today, and that is the Air Bridge Denial Program.

Who is going to be my volunteer to talk about that? Mr. Secretary,

very good.

Now, my understanding is that we are getting close to starting

that back up. Is that correct?

Mr. SIMONS. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. We have made substantial progress over the past 6 months in moving toward standing up this program.

Senator DEWINE. How far away are we?

Mr. SIMONS. We are very close. I would expect in the next couple

of weeks you will be hearing from us on this. We have had very

good cooperation from the Colombians. We held two rounds of negotiations with them during the course of this year. Colombia agreed

to establish air bridge zones. They agreed to the revised safety procedures which we needed to put into place following the shoot-down

in Peru.

They have agreed to a vigorous process of notifying their own

public of the existence of the air bridge zones. Again, we have had

good cooperation with the air force, civil aviation, the Colombian

police.

Senator DEWINE. As you know, I think this is something that we

have to do. I don’t want to take a lot of time today to go into all

the details. I know you are going to roll this out at some point in

46

the future, but what I would like to talk about is the U.S. accountability. I wonder if you could talk a little bit about that and who

is going to make that decision and do the sign-off and what our role

will be.

Mr. SIMONS. That has been very carefully worked out between

the State Department, the Defense Department, the Colombians,

and the Customs Service, which is also a participant. We have just

sent an interagency team down to Colombia which was represented

by State, Defense, Customs, and Homeland Security.

There are various players on the U.S. side who are providing intelligence, who are operating the aerial frames, or who are involved

as riders in some of the Colombian trackers. There is a very detailed procedure for the steps that we need to go through in order

to ramp up to an eventual decision.

All of these procedures have been worked out. They have been

fully coordinated here, interagency, with the Department of Justice. There has been a testing of these procedures on the ground

with the Colombians, and so we are ready to move on this.

Senator DEWINE. What is the role, if any, of any contract employees?

Mr. SIMONS. There is a contractor, a State Department-hired contractor, that will be performing some of the ground safety monitoring function, as well as the air safety monitoring function. But

the overall coordinator of the process will be JATF South, in Florida. They will be essentially in charge of making sure that the

steps are passing through.

Senator DEWINE. Well, again, I have a concern about what the

role of the contractor is going to be; in other words, that we don’t

contract out ultimate responsibility here. Do you want to get into

a little more detail for me here about the role of the contractor?

Mr. SIMONS. The contractor clearly will play a key role, but there

will be other players that are direct-hire U.S. Government employees that will also be involved in the process, as well as the Colombians.

Senator DEWINE. What you are telling me is you don’t want to

talk about it today.

Mr. SIMONS. I think it is a shared responsibility.

Senator DEWINE. Well, what is the role? What is the contractor’s

role?

Mr. SIMONS. The contractor has a role in sitting with the Colombians at the command center of the Colombian Air Force, in

Bogota ́, in making sure that the various steps are being followed.

There are contractors also that will be flying with the Colombians

as air safety monitors, making sure that those steps are gone

through.

But there is also someone back in Florida who is monitoring the

entire process, who is bringing the intelligence together through

JATF South, who is also following the same sheet of music going

down the steps to make sure that all the steps are followed that

have been agreed to in terms of meeting our security conditions. So

there are a number of checks and balances that have been built

into the program.

Senator DEWINE. Well, I won’t belabor it.

General do you have anything you want to add about this?

47

General HILL. The only thing I would add, Senator DeWine, is

that as the contractor who is overseeing and making—he has a

checklist and making sure that they are following exact procedures.

But the person in charge who eventually gives that instruction goes

back to JATF South, our folks sitting, understanding all the intelligence, what they are looking at, and ensuring that all the proper

steps are being taken to do it.

Senator DEWINE. Who ultimately makes the decision to shoot

down?

Mr. SIMONS. The Colombians make the decision, in consultation

with the various U.S. operators.

Senator DEWINE. And the various U.S. operators include who?

Mr. SIMONS. Contractor, as well as JATF South; Customs, if they

are involved, and anyone else who has provided intel into a particular operation.

Senator DEWINE. Well, I support starting this up. I think we

have to do it. I don’t think we have any choice. Obviously, we want

to have as many safeguards as we can. We all have that same interest. I just want to put everyone on notice as someone who has

looked at this before that I have a concern about the role of a contractor and the role of contracting anything out that is ultimately

a governmental responsibility. I am going to be looking at it.

I think we in the Congress have a responsibility to look at this

and to have some oversight over this. So when you all are ready

to totally roll this out, that is fine, but this is one Senator who is

going to be looking at it. That is all. I am very sympathetic to doing

it, but I am also very leery, frankly, of having a contractor, a contract employee, doing this.

Mr. SIMONS. We will be up to brief you in the next couple of

weeks in detail on this.

Senator DEWINE. I look forward to that.

Mr. BILLINGSLEA. Senator, we are also very aware of that. We

labor in Colombia under some unusual requirements that you don’t

find anywhere else in the world. There is a congressional restriction that caps our military presence at 400 people and our contractor presence at 400 people.

Senator DEWINE. I understand.

Mr. BILLINGSLEA. So there is that context to all of this.

Senator DEWINE. You have got both, though; I mean, you have

got both caps.

Mr. BILLINGSLEA. Yes, sir. I think you will find when we brief

you that there are a number of safeguards built in for legal protection of all U.S. personnel involved in the program, as well as a

structure which was negotiated with the Colombian government

that is designed from beginning to end to guard against and to protect against the loss of innocent life.

Senator DEWINE. Senator Sessions.

Senator SESSIONS. Just to reiterate how proud I am of the Colombian people and President Uribe, I just can’t overstate that. I

think he has an opportunity to be the Abraham Lincoln of Colombia. The Civil War in the United States was not an easy battle. A

lot people lost their lives, but you had consistent, strong leadership

from the top and we are now a united Nation. So I think it is a

big, big deal what is going on.

48

General Hill.

General HILL. If I could, sir, you said Abraham Lincoln and I

wanted to relate to you a story. When President Uribe was here

several weeks ago to visit President Bush—and I know he made

lots of rounds on the Hill, also—I had the privilege of taking him

to Gettysburg on Saturday morning. He wanted to go; he asked to

go.

He and I and several people walked the battlefield with some experts. He asked very pointed questions, because he made that same

analogy in his mind—I could see it—the comparison between what

Lincoln had to do to save this country and what President Uribe

has to do to save his.

Senator SESSIONS. I think there is a legitimate analogy there and

it has just gone on longer. I am sure it is more difficult to rally

the country.

One of the things that troubled me, General Hill, was the recruitment of the military, the length of their service, and some of

the things that indicated a lack of commitment there. Have they

made improvements in that, and what would you say are the problems that remain?

General HILL. They have, sir. They have done a couple of things

to improve that situation. One, they are increasing the length of

service from 18 months to 24 months. They have essentially done

away with, without the law, the bachelaras program that said high

school grads couldn’t serve in certain capacity. They have, on their

own, whittled that down to almost nothing. In fact, there is proposed legislation to just do away with that program completely.

Those are major steps forward to demonstrate the commitment of

the Colombian people, not just a small segment of it.

I would also say one other thing on that issue. If you are a recruit in the Colombian military, you can elect to stay on as a professional soldier after your 18-month, or now 2-year stint. At that

point, you go into a school of the professional soldier and after that

is over with, you are integrated into the army as a professional soldier.

We have encouraged them, and the Colombian army, in particular, has wanted to build a professional non-commissioned officer corps. I have had my command sergeant major on about five

different trips to Colombia in the last couple of months, both looking at their procedures and talking with their senior commissioned

and non-commissioned officers, and have brought up several of

their non-commissioned officer leadership to some of our schools, in

particular at Fort Benning, not WINSEC, but our non-commissioned officer academies at Fort Benning. I believe that the army

will name a sergeant major of the army sometime in August. This

is a major step forward in terms of professionalizing their force.

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you.

Senator DEWINE. Let me turn to the pipeline security issue. Last

month, the State Department released its report on international

terrorist activity and according to that report, there were 199 international terrorist attacks during 2002 in Colombia, which was a

44-percent drop from the previous year.

But what many people fail to notice is that one of the biggest

reasons for the decrease was the sharp drop in the number of oil

49

pipeline bombings in Colombia. There were 41 such bombings last

year, which was down from 178 in 2001. Really, that decrease is

remarkable, and wonder, General, or anyone else on the panel if

you would like to comment about what this decrease is due to and

what the change in the policy has been and what our program has

been, and talk a little bit about that. And if you could explain

whether we have any other plans to change that policy or to expand that policy, whoever would like to take that one.

Mr. STRUBLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will begin and then

ask General Hill to fill in. The most remarkable thing about that

decrease, Senator, is that it precedes the main deployment of our

trainers into Arauca Province. But in point of fact, a number of

steps have been underway since we originally requested the Congress’ authorization for this program that have already, as you

have noted, had a big impact.

The first was our discussions with the Colombians about dedicating adequate force to this mission. The Colombians, even before

the arrival of our trainers, began to essentially double the number

of troops on the ground that were devoted to security in Arauca

Province.

Senator DEWINE. These were Colombian forces on the ground?

Mr. STRUBLE. These were Colombian forces on the ground, sir.

The second was to ensure that the Government of Colombia took

a general approach to the problem of security here. So to give one

very important example, there is now a fiscal, a prosecutor—Senator Sessions can identify with this—who has been assigned from

Bogota ́ to that area because the local prosecutors were too compromised, if you will, by the violence in the area by association

with some of the illegal actors.

This person, this prosecutor, lives on a Colombian military base

and has been brought in to ensure that those who have been detected or suspected or are being investigated for bombings and

other terrorist acts are, in fact, detained and subjected to the process of justice.

And then, last, we have had a number of assessment missions

that came out to help us design the most productive training program that had some fast-acting recommendations for the Colombians on how they integrate intelligence and put it in the hands

of those who most need it.

General HILL. Sir, I will just add a couple of short statements to

that very good answer. I think one thing it shows is our determination, the United States’ determination to stay the course, and bolsters the Colombian military’s self-confidence. It urges them to

take the fight to the enemy and helps in their ability to do that.

Also, the early training and discussions that we did and the fact

that they added more people up in the Arauca area and Sarvina

area—when you say ‘‘regarding the pipeline,’’ that conjures up

someone sitting on top of the pipeline, and that is what they used

to do. What we do now is we have got them out in the countryside

taking the fight to the enemy where the enemy is, not waiting for

something to simply blow up and to go back and fix.

Mr. BILLINGSLEA. Which, in turn, translates into one simple

thing, which is every day of unimpeded oil that goes through that

50

pipeline is an additional day of revenue for the government to use

in this struggle.

Senator DEWINE. We have talked today specifically about Colombia and we have gotten some very good news about Colombia, but

as we look around the region, we have seen some other countries

around the region and drug production going up.

We always talk about this balloon effect. We have good news

here and we push it here and then we have it go out in other regions or in other parts of the region. What are we going to do about

that?

We look at the funding for the region, $731 million. The funding that is requested for the Andean Counter-Drug Initiative is $731,

which is really the same amount that was requested in the previous two fiscal years, flat-funded. The bulk of the funding goes to

Colombia. I don’t think anyone is disagreeing with that, but we

have got problems in surrounding countries. What are we going to

do about that?

Mr. STRUBLE. I think that there are two answers to that question, Senator. One of them has to do with the political approach to

it, and the second is the programmatic approach. I know that Assistant Secretary Paul Simons can speak to the latter.

On the political side, you are right that we do have a very serious problem. First of all, there is a need for greater regional coordination. In fact, I should have stepped in when you asked earlier

what are the areas where we still have deficiencies in Plan Colombia. That is one.

Colombia’s neighbors need to realize that Colombia’s fight is

their fight, too, that they have a strong stake in the Colombian

government establishing effective security over its national territory, and especially the border regions. I commend the Colombian

government for having taken the initiative on March 12 of this

year to invite foreign ministers and defense ministers from all the

neighboring countries for a very open discussion of this problem, in

which they shared, for example, an intelligence brief that talks

about the presence in border areas of foreign terrorist organizations.

The second issue here is we have made significant progress in

Peru and Bolivia over the past 5 or 6 years in decreasing coca cultivation. It is down about 70 percent, even with some increase last

year. But what we have seen, as that number gets lower and lower,

is that core group of people whose livelihoods, especially farmers

whose livelihoods depend upon coca production start to resist more

the continued eradication. In the case of Bolivia where that has

come together with a number of other problems, a drop in growth

rates in the last few years, it has created a very, very significant

political problem for the government.

We are working very closely with the international donor community, with the international financial institutions and bilaterally

to ensure that there is an increased flow of money to Bolivia for

development in order to show that staying the course on this is

going to be productive for the vast majority of Bolivian citizens.

Mr. SIMONS. I agree with Curt’s observations. I would just add

one point, which is that when the Andean Counter-Narcotics Initiative was put together initially, this problem was anticipated, the

51

fact that we could be successful in Colombia and therefore pressures would grow. So there was a rather substantial increase up

front in our funding for both Peru and Bolivia, in particular on the

alternative development side.

So we were able to create very robust alternative development

programs both in Bolivia and in Peru that have to some extent

given us a head start. So, clearly, there are going to be more pressures. To the extent we are successful in Colombia, pressures will

grow. Pressures are already growing, but we have to some extent

built an infrastructure.

The funding that we have requested for 2004, $207 million for

Peru and Bolivia, we think is adequate to provide the assistance

that is needed both on the alternative development side as well as

on the eradication and interdiction side.

On the eradication and interdiction side, we have some advantages that we don’t have in Colombia. We have a much better security situation. We have a long history of working with the military

and the police on a lot of these programs. So, for instance, some

of the difficulties we have with mechanics and pilots, we don’t have

these problems in Bolivia and Peru because we have been there a

long time and we have worked out a lot of bugs in the programs.

So we can get a little more efficiency out of those programs and we

can get the job done.

Senator DEWINE. Senator Sessions.

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Senator DeWine. Again, I want to

express my appreciation for your leadership. I know you have been

to Colombia four times. That is probably as much as anybody in

this Senate. You are care about it and are providing good leadership there.

I guess, Secretary Struble, the economic damage from terrorism

and what is happening in Colombia is significant. Isn’t that another big reason why Colombia needs to break the back of this terrorist insurgency?

Mr. STRUBLE. It is indeed. In his written testimony, Vice President Santos said that terrorism in Colombia costs the country 2

percent of its domestic product every year, year after year. And, of

course, the human cost is horrific as well, with 30,000 deaths.

Frankly, I think that is the reason why the Colombian people have

responded to President Uribe’s call for greater sacrifice.

If we look at what has happened in that country in the past 10

months, where the people have been asked to pay a special tax contribution based upon their assets that is equivalent to 1 percent of

GDP, where the Congress has passed a number of tax efficiency

measures in December of last year and government reform measures that are intended to save hundreds of millions of dollars and

to generate additional resources for the state, where the government has announced its intention to increase spending on the security services from about 3.5 percent of GDP to 5.8 percent of GDP

in the next few years, what we have seen is the people are tired

of this and they recognize that the cost is borne by society as a

whole and that they are willing to contribute to meeting that cost.

Senator SESSIONS. I think there is a possibility of victory here

and it encourages me to hear some of the numbers that you mentioned, such as we have got more territory taken back by the govVerDate 03-FEB-2003 11:09 Jan 14, 2004 Jkt 087649 PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 D:\NARC\87649.TXT SSC2 PsN: SSC2
52

ernment, sabotage of the pipeline is down, defections have increased in the FARC. Those kinds of things can be sustained and

actually can sometimes increase as the doom becomes more obvious

to those who are resisting.

I don’t want to be overly optimistic. I know this has gone on for

a long time, but I also think that we can see cause for optimism

here. Would you agree?

Mr. STRUBLE. I would very strongly agree. In fact, I will add another area that you have not cited to the successes and that is on

the institutional side. You mentioned your experience as a Federal

prosecutor when you couldn’t get extraditions from Colombia. It

was because the judiciary in Colombia was so intimidated that it

didn’t process them effectively even in those moments when there

was not a constitutional prohibition against it.

If my colleagues from the Department of Justice were here today,

I am confident they would tell you, as they have told me, that the

best extradition relationship we have in the Western Hemisphere

today is with Colombia.

Senator SESSIONS. Well, let’s ask about that because you say

they were intimidated. That should not demean the judges too seriously because, in fact, they were being killed in large numbers.

They killed nine members of the Supreme Court of Colombia.

Judges who took courageous actions, they and their families could

expect to be killed frequently and it was a very, very difficult time.

What is the status of the ability to prosecute a significant drug

dealer or a significant insurgent member in the courts of Colombia

today?

Mr. STRUBLE. What I would like to do, Senator, is respond for the

record in writing with some more specific detail about the number

of prosecutions and the decrease in time of people in the system.

What I will note in terms of strengthening the judiciary is that,

in part thanks to U.S. assistance over the past few years, a lot of

hardened courtrooms have been built. Security details have been

provided for prosecutors and judges to protect them. Justice has

been made available to people who were formerly denied it because

they lived miles and miles away from any courtroom.

I think one of the most successful programs we have is that of

the casas de justicia. There are now some 31 that we have funded

in Colombia and they have adjudicated 1.6 million cases. Many of

those are civil cases, but you also understand perfectly well the importance of having access to civil law as well as civil law, and I

think that we have seen the Colombian judiciary measurably perform in these areas over the last few years.

Senator SESSIONS. One more brief question, General Hill. You

talked about the essential need for helicopter lift to respond rapidly

to opportunities in the conflict there. We had some debate here

about the proper mix between Blackhawk helicopters and Hueys.

Let me ask you how you feel about that mix and would it be helpful if there were more helicopters provided.

General HILL. Well, more is always better, and the Blackhawk

helicopter is the finest helicopter made in the world and there is

no comparison between the Blackhawk helicopter and any other

type of assault helicopter or troop-carrying helicopter that is necessary. However, it is also more expensive.

53

The Colombians, in fact, do have a mixture of air frames that

makes it more difficult in several areas—spare parts, mechanics,

pilots, all the above. The reality of life, however, is they do have

that mixture. There is something to say for more than less. For example, with the infrastructure money for the pipeline that is coming, we are going to get 2 Blackhawks, 6 UH–2s, and we are going

to fix another Blackhawk and give them some more spare parts. I

think that is a good mixture. It has been worked out between the

Colombians and us, the State Department. I think that is a good

mixture.

Would it be better if they were pure-fleeted? Absolutely. Could

they or we afford that? I think the answer is no.

Senator SESSIONS. I tend to agree. The Huey is still a valuable

aircraft and can do many things. Isn’t it more expensive to maintain a Blackhawk, in addition to just the cost?

General HILL. The Huey and the Huey–11, in particular, are excellent aircraft. They get the job done for what the Colombians

need. They are easier to fly. They are, in fact, if you have the spare

parts, easier to maintain. So there is a lot to say for that and I am

not in any way taking away from that.

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you.

Senator DEWINE. Gentlemen, thank you very much. I think it

has been a very helpful panel, very informative. We appreciate

your testimony and we also appreciate your service. Thank you

very much.

Let me introduce our third panel, and I would ask our third

panel to start coming up as I introduce you. Our third panel today

is here to give us their take on what all this means.

Jess Ford, the Director of the International Affairs and Trade Division at the General Accounting Office, will be presenting testimony drawn from GAO’s extensive oversight of our activities in Colombia. The GAO is currently finishing up their latest work on U.S.

assistance to the region which, I understand should be published

later this month.

Mr. Phil McLean is currently a Senior Associate with the Center

for Strategic and International Studies’ Americas Program. He previously served for more than three decades in the U.S. Foreign

Service with overseas assignments in Latin America and Europe.

After retirement from Government service in 1994, he was appointed Assistant Secretary for Management at the Organization of

American States and served as adviser to the OAS Secretary.

As a standard practice, gentlemen, you may submit a lengthier

statement, but I would ask that you keep your opening comments

to 5 minutes. Thank you very much and we look forward to your

testimony.

Who wants to start?

Mr. Ford, do you want to start?

STATEMENT OF JESS T. FORD, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL

AFFAIRS AND TRADE, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,

WASHINGTON, DC.

Mr. FORD. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to be here to discuss

GAO’s work on U.S. counter-narcotics in Colombia. As you menVerDate 03-FEB-2003 11:09 Jan 14, 2004 Jkt 087649 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 D:\NARC\87649.TXT SSC2 PsN: SSC2
54

tioned in your opening statement, we will be issuing a report later

this month.

Today, I am going to focus on two key areas that the Caucus

asked us to examine, as well as the Senate Appropriations Committee, dealing with the status of U.S. assistance to the Colombian

army from fiscal years 2000 to 2003, approximately the time of

Plan Colombia, and what the U.S.-supported police aerial eradication program has accomplished in recent years. And then I am

going to talk a little bit about some of the remaining challenges,

as we see them.

First, with regard to the army, the United States has provided approximately $640 million to train and equip the Colombian army

counter-narcotics brigade, and supplied the army with 72 helicopters, which was mentioned this morning. All of the helicopters

have been delivered to Colombia, and based on the information we

have obtained, all of them should be operational by sometime this

month.

After the successful first year of operations, the brigade’s results

dropped off in 2002. The brigade initially busted 24 labs in 2001.

The number of labs busted in 2002 was reduced to four. As a consequence, U.S. Government and Colombian officials decided to retrain the brigade and provide it with greater mobility. The training

occurred in late 2002. The Colombian army reorganized the brigade, made it smaller, more professional and more mobile. They

currently, as you heard this morning, are conducting operations in

Narino.

Although all the U.S.-produced helicopters are in Colombia, there

were a number of unanticipated problems in training the Colombian army pilots and mechanics to operate and maintain the helicopters. Some of these problems continue to limit the army’s ability

to operate and maintain the aircraft.

These include insufficient numbers of trained pilots and mechanics, the availability of pilots and mechanics, and limited financial

support from the Colombian government. Consequently, the army

will have to rely on contractor support because it will not have

enough trained pilots in command and senior mechanics for the

foreseeable future.

U.S. assistance to support the helicopters was originally planned

to end in 2006, with the Colombian army taking over responsibility

for operating and maintaining the aircraft. However, U.S. and Colombian officials stated that a continued level of U.S. assistance

will be needed beyond this date because the army is not expected

to have the personnel trained and the resources necessary. Although U.S. embassy officials stated that they have not officially

estimated what the assistance level will be, they have tentatively

projected it will cost approximately $100 to $150 million a year to

sustain this operation.

Now, I am going to turn to the police. In recent years, the Colombian National Police aerial eradication program has had mixed results. Since 1995, net coca cultivation rose every year, until 2002.

As you heard this morning, the official numbers are there has been

a reduction of 15 percent in overall coca cultivation. The story for

poppy is even better. The results for the last 2 years are a 35-percent reduction in poppy cultivation.

55

U.S. embassy officials attributed these recent successes primarily

to the Colombian government’s willingness to spray coca and poppy

plants in all areas of the country. Since 1998, U.S. embassy officials have been concerned with the rising U.S. presence in Colombia and the associated costs. Since 1998, the costs of the aerial

eradication program from the U.S. perspective has almost doubled.

Now, I want to turn to some of the challenges. Although the

U.S.-supported counter-narcotics program has recently shown some

results, Colombia and the United States continue to face financial

and management challenges in sustaining these programs.

Colombia’s financial resources are limited. Neither the army nor

the police can sustain ongoing counter-narcotics programs without

continued U.S. funding for the foreseeable future. According to our

analysis and our discussions with U.S. officials, ongoing programs

for the police and the Colombian army will cost approximately $230

million a year, and future costs for some other programs have not

yet been determined.

Colombia also continues to face challenges associated with its political and economic instability fostered by the longstanding insurgency. For U.S. assistance to continue, there will be a need for the

army and the police to comply with human rights standards. The

aerial eradication program will need to meet environmental conditions, and alternative development projects must be conducted in

the areas where aerial eradication occurs.

Colombia is a long-time ally and significant trading partner of

the United States, and therefore its economic and political stability

is important to the United States, as well as the Andean region.

Colombia’s longstanding insurgency and the insurgents’ links to

the illicit drug trade complicate its efforts to tap its natural resources and make systematic economic reforms. Solving these problems is important to Colombia’s future.

As we noted in 2000, the total costs of the counter-narcotics program were unknown. Nearly 3 years later, the Department of State

and the Department of Justice have still not developed estimates

for the future costs of the program, defined their future roles in Colombia, identified the proposed end state, or determined how they

plan to achieve it.

Mr. Chairman, that is a summary of my comments. I would be

happy to answer any of your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ford follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JESS T. FORD, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

AND TRADE

DRUG CONTROL—FINANCIAL AND MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES CONTINUE TO

COMPLICATE EFFORTS TO REDUCE ILLICIT DRUG ACTIVITIES IN COLOMBIA

WHAT GAO FOUND

In fiscal years 2000–03, the United States provided about $640 million in assistance to train and equip a Colombian Army counternarcotics brigade and supply the

army with 72 helicopters and related support. Most of this assistance has been delivered and is being used for counternarcotics operations.

In recent years, the Colombian National Police aerial eradication program has

had mixed results. Since 1995, coca cultivation rose in every year until 2002 and

opium poppy cultivation remained relatively steady until 2001. But, for 2002, the

U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy reported that net coca cultivation in Colombia decreased 15 percent and net opium poppy cultivation decreased 25 perVerDate 03-FEB-2003 11:09 Jan 14, 2004 Jkt 087649 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 D:\NARC\87649.TXT SSC2 PsN: SSC2
56

1For more information on U.S. assistance for Plan Colombia, see U.S. General Accounting Office, Drug Control: U.S. Assistance to Colombia Will Take Years to Produce Results, GAO–01–

26 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 17, 2000).

2The leaves of the coca plant are the raw ingredient of cocaine, and opium poppy is used to

produce heroin. The aerial eradication program involves spraying the coca and poppy plants

from low-flying airplanes with an herbicide that attacks the root system and kills the plant.

cent—the second yearly decline in a row. U.S. officials attributed this success primarily to the Colombian government’s willingness to eradicate coca and poppy

plants without restriction.

Although the U.S.-supported counternarcotics program in Colombia has recently

begun to achieve some of the results envisioned in Plan Colombia, Colombia and the

United States must continue to deal with financial and management challenges.

Neither the Colombian Army nor the Colombian National Police can sustain ongoing

counternarcotics programs without continued U.S. funding and contractor support

for the foreseeable future. According to U.S. embassy officials, these programs alone

may cost up to $230 million per year, and future costs for some other programs have

not been determined. Because of overall poor economic conditions, the government

of Colombia’s ability to contribute more is limited, but the continuing violence from

Colombia’s long-standing insurgency limits the government’s ability to institute economic, social, and political improvements. Moreover, Colombia faces continuing challenges associated with the need to ensure it complies with human rights standards

and other requirements in order for U.S. assistance to continue. As GAO noted in

2000, the total costs of the counternarcotics programs in Colombia were unknown.

Nearly 3 years later, the Departments of State and Defense have still not developed

estimates of future program costs, defined their future roles in Colombia, identified

a proposed end state, or determined how they plan to achieve it.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Caucus:

I am pleased to be here to discuss GAO’s work on U.S. counternarcotics assistance

to Colombia. Today we will highlight the preliminary findings from our ongoing review of U.S. assistance to Colombia. Our draft report is with the responsible agencies for comment; we expect to issue a final report in mid-June. I will focus my comments on (1) the status of U.S. counternarcotics assistance to the Colombian Army

in fiscal years 2000–03 and how this assistance has been used, (2) what the U.S.-

supported Colombian National Police aerial eradication program has accomplished

in recent years, and (3) what challenges Colombia and the United States face in sustaining these programs.

In 1999, the Colombian government introduced Plan Colombia—a $7.5 billion program that, among other things, proposed reducing the cultivation, processing, and

distribution of illegal narcotics by 50 percent over 6 years.1 A key component of the

Colombian-U.S. counternarcotics strategy was the creation of a Colombian Army

2,285-man counternarcotics brigade, for which the United States agreed to provide

helicopters to help it move around southern Colombia to reduce cocaine production

and trafficking. Closely allied with this objective was U.S. support for the Colombian National Police’s aerial eradication program to significantly reduce, if not

eliminate, coca and opium poppy cultivation.2

57

SUMMARY

In fiscal years 2000–03, the United States provided about $640 million to train

and equip the Colombian Army counternarcotics brigade and supply the army with

72 helicopters and related training, maintenance, and operational support. Most of

this assistance has been delivered and is being used for counternarcotics operations.

However, some problems were encountered. For example,

• After a successful first year of operations, the brigade’s results dropped off in

2002. U.S. and Colombian officials attribute this, in part, to coca growers and producers moving out of the brigade’s range in southern Colombia. In late 2002, with

U.S. assistance, the Colombian Army reorganized the brigade and gave it authority

to operate anywhere in the country. This change, according to U.S. embassy and Colombian Army officials, will improve the brigade’s ability to conduct operations

against high-value, drug-trafficking targets, such as cocaine production laboratories

and the leadership of insurgent groups involved in drug-trafficking activities. One

of the brigade’s retrained battalions has been operating in Narino department since

early May 2003.

• Some initial impediments slowed the delivery and operational use of the helicopters. The start of entry-level helicopter pilot training was delayed 5 months while

the United States determined who would provide and fund the training. The delivery of 25 UH-II helicopters was delayed 5 months while the United States and Colombia decided what type of engine to use in the aircraft. U.S. funding for the brigade’s operations was slowed for a total of about 5 months in 2002 because the Department of State did not meet congressional deadlines for reporting on Colombia’s

progress in addressing human rights violations.

U.S. assistance to support the helicopters provided as part of Plan Colombia was

originally planned to end in 2006 with the Colombian Army taking over the responsibilities of operating and maintaining the aircraft. However, U.S. embassy and Colombian officials stated that a continued level of U.S. assistance will be needed beyond this date because the army is not expected to have the personnel trained or

the resources necessary. Although U.S. embassy officials stated that they have not

officially estimated what this assistance level will be, they tentatively projected that

it would cost between $100 million and $150 million a year to sustain ongoing counternarcotics programs. In addition, other recently initiated U.S. programs will require additional support.

In recent years, the Colombian National Police aerial eradication program has

had mixed results. Since 1995, net coca cultivation rose in every year until 2002 and

net opium poppy cultivation remained between 6,100 to 7,500 hectares. But in recent months, the Office of National Drug Control Policy reported that:

• net coca cultivation in Colombia decreased 15 percent in 2002, from 169,800

hectares in 2001 to 144,450 hectares, and

• net opium poppy cultivation in Colombia decreased 25 percent in 2002, from

6,500 hectares in 2001 to 4,900 hectares—the second yearly decline in a row.

U.S. embassy officials attributed this recent success primarily to the current Colombian government’s willingness to spray coca and poppy plants without restriction

in all areas of the country. However, since at least 1998, U.S. embassy officials have

been concerned with the rising U.S. presence in Colombia and the associated costs

of the aerial eradication program. At the time, the embassy began developing a 3-

year plan to have the Colombian National Police assume control over the program;

but, for various reasons, the police never agreed to the plan. Since then, contractor

involvement and the associated costs have continued to rise, and the Colombian National Police are not yet able to assume more control of the aerial eradication program. In fiscal year 1998, U.S. embassy officials reported that the costs for the U.S.

contractor, fuel, herbicide, and related support totaled $48.5 million. For fiscal year

2003, U.S. embassy officials estimated that the comparable costs totaled $86.3 million. Much of this increase occurred between fiscal years 2002 and 2003 to support

the additional spray aircraft, multiple operating locations, and the anticipated continuation of spray operations throughout Colombia. According to U.S. embassy officials, these costs are expected to remain relatively constant for the next several

years.

Although the U.S.-supported counternarcotics program has recently shown some

of the results envisioned when Plan Colombia was first introduced, Colombia and

the United States continue to face financial and management challenges in sustaining programs in Colombia.

• Colombia’s financial resources are limited. Neither the Colombian Army nor the

Colombian National Police can sustain ongoing counternarcotics programs without

continued U.S. funding and contractor support for the foreseeable future. According

58

to U.S. embassy officials, ongoing programs alone may cost up to $230 million per

year, and future costs for some other programs have not been determined.

• Colombia also continues to face challenges associated with its political and economic instability fostered by its long-standing insurgency and, for U.S. assistance

to continue, the need to ensure that (1) the military and police comply with human

rights standards, (2) the aerial eradication program meets certain environmental

conditions, and (3) alternative development is provided in areas subject to aerial

eradication.

Colombia is a longtime ally and significant trading partner of the United States

and, therefore, its economic and political stability is important to the United States

as well as the Andean region. Colombia’s long-standing insurgency and the insurgents’ links to the illicit drug trade complicate its efforts to tap its natural resources

and make systemic economic reforms. Solving these problems is important to Colombia’s future stability. On the other hand, recent world events—from the global war

on terrorism to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq—have diverted scarce U.S. resources and made it paramount that the United States fully consider the resources

committed to its overseas assistance programs. As we noted in 2000, the total costs

of the counternarcotics programs in Colombia were unknown. Nearly 3 years later,

the Departments of State and Defense have still not developed estimates of future

program costs, defined their future roles in Colombia, identified a proposed end

state, or determined how they plan to achieve it.

BACKGROUND

The United States has provided assistance to help reduce illegal drug production

and trafficking activities in Colombia since the 1970’s. Yet, Colombia is still the

world’s leading cocaine producer and distributor and a major source of the heroin

used in the United States. According to State, Colombia provides 90 percent of the

cocaine and about 40 percent of the heroin entering the United States. The Drug

Enforcement Administration reports that several billion dollars flow into Colombia

each year from the cocaine trade alone, and this vast amount of drug money has

helped the country’s two largest insurgency groups—the Revolutionary Armed

Forces of Colombia and the National Liberation Army—gain unprecedented economic, political, and social power and influence. The insurgents exercise some degree of control over 40 percent of Colombia’s territory east and south of the Andes

where much of the coca is grown.

In an effort to address the influx of cocaine and heroin from Colombia, the United

States has funded a counternarcotics strategy in Colombia that includes programs

for interdiction, eradication, and alternative development, which must be carefully

coordinated to achieve mutually reinforcing results. Besides assistance for the Colombian Army counternarcotics brigade and the Colombian National Police aerial

eradication program, the United States has supported Colombian efforts to interdict

illicit-drug trafficking along rivers and in the air as well as alternative development,

judicial sector reform, and internally displaced persons programs. The Departments

of Defense and State have provided most of the funding and State, through its Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and Narcotics Affairs

Section in the U.S. Embassy Bogota ́, oversees the program. In fiscal years 2000

through 2003, the United States provided more than $2.5 billion to Colombia for

counternarcotics assistance. (See table 1.) For fiscal year 2004, the administration

has proposed an additional $700 million in aid.

Table 1.—U.S. Counternarcotics Assistance to Colombia, Fiscal Years 2000–03

[Dollars in millions]

Fiscal years

Agency 2000 1 2001 2002 2003 2

(estimated) Total

State ........................................................................................ $744.9 $48.0 $275.4 $452.0 $1,550.3

DOD .......................................................................................... 128.5 190.2 119.1 149.9 587.7

USAID 3 ..................................................................................... 123.5 0 104.5 151.0 379.0

Total .................................................................................... $1,026.9 $238.2 $499.0 $752.9 $2,517.0

Source: Departments of Defense and State and the U.S. Agency for International Development,

1 Includes funds appropriated for Plan Colombia through the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, Fiscal Year 2000 (Division B of

P.L. 106–246).

59

3The laboratories are used in the final stages of processing coca into cocaine and are considered high-value targets. 4Of the 33 UH-1Ns, 28 remain available for use by the brigade; 1 crashed on a mission and

4 were transferred to support the aerial eradication program.

2 Includes $93 million in Foreign Military Financing funds appropriated in the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Appropriations Act, 2003 (Division E, Title III of P.L. 108–7); $34 million appropriated to State and $34 million appropriated to Defense in the Supplemental Appropriations Act to Support Department of Defense Operations in Iraq for Fiscal Year 2003 (P.L. 108–11); and $37.1 million for Foreign Military Financing allotted from fiscal year 2003 supplemental appropriations. 3 In fiscal years 2000–03, State transferred $375 million to the U.S. Agency for International Development for alternative development, judicial sector reform, and internally displaced persons programs.

Following increased violence in Colombia during early 2002, the Congress provided ‘‘expanded authority’’ for the use of U.S. assistance to Colombia, which enabled the Colombian government to use the U.S.-trained and—equipped counternarcotics brigade, U.S. provided helicopters, and other U.S. counternarcotics assistance to fight groups designated as terrorist organizations as well as to fight drug

trafficking. Similar authority was provided for fiscal year 2003 and is being sought

for fiscal year 2004.

ASSISTANCE TO THE COLOMBIA ARMY HAS BEEN DELIVERED, BUT PROBLEMS

WERE ENCOUNTERED

U.S. assistance to the Colombian Army during fiscal years 2000–03—$640 million

for the counternarcotics brigade, 72 helicopters, and related support—has, for the

most part, been delivered and is being used for counternarcotics operations. However, both the United States and the Colombian Army experienced some unanticipated problems that delayed the operational use of the helicopters. In addition, U.S.

support will be needed for the foreseeable future to sustain operations.

Status of the Brigade

The United States initially agreed to train and equip a Colombian Army counternarcotics brigade of three battalions and a total of about 2,285 professional and conscripted soldiers. The United States provided the counternarcotics brigade with

about $45 million in training and equipment—from weapons and ammunition to rations, uniforms, and canteens. The brigade’s primary mission was to plan and conduct interdiction operations against drug-trafficking activities, including destroying

illicit drug-producing facilities, and, when called upon, to provide security in insurgent-controlled areas where aerial eradication operations were planned. According

to U.S. and Colombian officials, the brigade was highly effective in 2001—for example, it destroyed 25 cocaine hydrochloride laboratories3—but was less successful in

2002, when it destroyed only 4 such labs. U.S. embassy officials stated that the brigade became less effective because the insurgents moved their drug-producing activities, such as the laboratories, beyond the brigade’s reach. In addition, according

to these officials, the brigade became more involved in protecting infrastructure,

such as bridges and power stations, and performing base security. Moreover, the

aerial eradication program did not call on the brigade to provide ground security

on very many occasions, essentially planning spray missions in the less threatening

areas. In August 2002, U.S. embassy and Colombian military officials agreed to restructure the brigade to make it a rapid reaction force capable of making quick, tactical

strikes on a few days’ notice. As part of this restructuring, the Colombian Army designated the brigade a national asset capable of operating anywhere in Colombia

rather than just in its prior area of responsibility in southern Colombia. The newly

restructured brigade consists of three combat battalions and a support battalion

with a total of about 1,900 soldiers, all of whom are professional. Two of the combat

battalions have been retrained. The third combat battalion should be retrained by

mid-June 2003. This change, according to U.S. embassy and Colombian Army officials, will improve the brigade’s ability to conduct operations against high-value,

drug-trafficking targets, such as laboratories containing cocaine and the leadership

of insurgent groups involved in drug-trafficking activities. One of the retrained battalions has been operating in Narino department since early May 2003.

Status of the Helicopters

A key component of U.S. assistance for Plan Colombia was enhancing the brigade’s air mobility. To do this, the United States provided the Colombian Army with

33 UH–1N helicopters, 14 UH–60 Black Hawk helicopters, and 25 UH–II helicopters.4

• The 33 UH-1N helicopters were supposed to serve as interim aircraft until the

UH-60 and UH-II helicopters funded under Plan Colombia were delivered. The UH1Ns were delivered in stages between November 1999 and March 2001. Since flying

60

their first mission in December 2000, the helicopters have logged 19,500 hours in

combat and have supported more than 430 counternarcotics brigade operations. Colombian Army personnel are qualified as pilots and mechanics, but many of the experienced pilots and mechanics who operate and maintain the aircraft are provided

through a U.S. contractor.

• The UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters were delivered between July and December

2001 but did not begin support operations for the brigade until November 2002 because of a shortage of fully qualified Colombian Army pilots. Forty-two Colombian

Army personnel have completed the minimum UH-60 pilot training, of which 13

have qualified as pilot-in-command. U.S.-funded contract pilots fill in as pilots-incommand. In addition, a U.S.-funded contractor continues to maintain the helicopters and provide maintenance training.

• State procured 25 UH-II helicopters under Plan Colombia and planned to deliver them to the Colombian Army between November 2001 and June 2002. However, they were delivered between March and November 2002 instead because the

Colombian military was considering whether to use a more powerful engine in the

helicopters than the one usually installed. Ultimately it decided to use the more

common engine. According to NAS officials, although some of the UH-II helicopters

are being used for missions, all the helicopters will not be operational until June

2003. As of January 2003, 25 Colombian Army pilots had completed their initial

training and 21 of these pilots are completing the training needed to qualify for

operational missions. However, contractor pilots continue to supplement Colombian

Army pilots and a U.S.-funded contractor continues to provide maintenance support.

Problems with Pilot and Mechanic Training

Although all the U.S.-provided helicopters are in Colombia, a number of unanticipated problems in training Colombian Army pilots and mechanics to operate and

maintain the helicopters were encountered. Some of these problems continue to limit

the Colombian Army’s ability to operate and maintain the aircraft. Primarily, the

Colombian Army will have to continue to rely on contractor support because it will

not have enough trained pilots-in-command and senior mechanics for the foreseeable

future.

• When the United States agreed to provide the UH-60 and UH-II helicopters for

the Colombian Army in July 2000, the assistance for Plan Colombia did not include

any funds to train the Colombian pilots and mechanics needed to operate and maintain the helicopters. About 6 months after passage of U.S. assistance for Plan Colombia, Defense agreed to provide the training and reported that it would transfer

up to $20 million from other counternarcotics projects in Colombia to pay for it.

• A training plan was approved in mid-2001. Although the plan provided training

for Colombian Army personnel to meet the minimum qualifications for a pilot and

mechanic, it did not include the additional training necessary to fly missions in a

unit or to become a senior mechanic. Basic training for 117 helicopter pilots—known

as initial entry rotary wing training—began in November 2001 and is projected to

be completed by December 2004. This training is intended to provide a pool or pipeline of pilots for more advanced training to fly specific helicopters. In addition, according to U.S. embassy officials, a new pilot takes an average of 2 to 3 years to

progress to pilot-in-command.

• According to U.S. embassy and contractor officials, 105 out of 159 Colombian

Army personnel have completed the basic UH-60 and UH-II maintenance training

and are taking more advanced training to qualify as senior mechanics. These officials told us that the remaining 54 personnel will receive the contractor-provided

basic training in the near future, but they did not know when it would begin. Moreover, these officials also told us that it typically takes 3 to 5 years for mechanics

to gain the experience necessary to become fully qualified on speck helicopter systems, in particular the UH-60 Black Hawks.

• The Colombian Army Aviation Battalion is responsible for providing helicopters

and other aircraft and personnel for all Colombian Army missions with an aviation

component, including counternarcotics and counterinsurgency operations throughout

Colombia. Information provided by the Colombian Aviation Battalion shows that it

is staffed at only 80 percent of its required levels and that, over the past several

years, it has received between 60 percent to 70 percent of its requested budget for

logistics and maintenance. The Colombian military’s decision to continue using the

UH-1N helicopters in addition to the UH-60 and UH-II helicopters will also make

it more difficult for the Aviation Battalion to provide the numbers of personnel

needed to operate and maintain the helicopters. State originally intended that the

UH-1N helicopters would not be used after the UH-60 and UH-II helicopters were

available to support operations.

61

5Section 567 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2002 (P.L. 107–115). Specifically, the act provided that not more than 60 percent of

the funds could be obligated until after the Secretary of State made a determination and certification that the Colombian military was (1) suspending members of the Colombian Armed Forces

who have been creditably alleged to have committed gross violations of human rights, (2) cooperating with civilian prosecutors and investigators, and (3) severing links between the Armed

Forces and paramilitary groups. In addition, the remaining 40 percent of the funds could be obligated only after June 1, 2002, and after the Secretary of State made a second determination

and certification with respect to the same conditions. 6 According to U.S. embassy political section personnel, they encountered difficulties developing the information required to make the human rights determination and certification. The

first report was issued on May 1, 2002—almost 2 months later than State’s target date. The

second report was issued on September 9, 2002—almost 3 months later than State’s target date. 7The estimates of net hectares of coca and opium poppy under cultivation are prepared annually by the U.S. Director of Central Intelligence, Crime and Narcotics Center. See U.S. General

Accounting Office, Drug Control: Coca Cultivation and Eradication Estimates in Colombia,

GAO–03–319R (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 8, 2003). 8The number of hectares eradicated is provided by the Office of Aviation and is based on the

number of net hectares sprayed multiplied by an estimated ‘‘kill rate.’’ Although many thousands of hectares of coca and poppy are killed, coca and poppy farmers often replant in the same

Continued

• According to bilateral agreements between Colombia and the United States, the

Colombian Army must ensure that pilots and mechanics who receive U.S. training

be assigned to positions using their training for a minimum of 2 years. This has

not always been the case. For example, although 19 Colombian Army personnel

were qualified to serve as pilots-in-command on UH-1N helicopters, only 1 pilot was

assigned to serve in this position. The remaining pilots-in-command were provided

by a U.S. contractor. • Of the funds appropriated for fiscal year 2002, $140 million was used to support

Colombian Army counternarcotics efforts. Most of this amount was used for U.S.

provided helicopter operations and maintenance, logistical, and training support.

However, not all the funding could be released until the Secretary of State certified,

in two separate reports to appropriate congressional committees,5 that the Colombian military was making progress meeting certain human rights conditions. Because State was late in providing these reports, the U.S. embassy could not use this

funding for operations and training on two occasions for a total of about 5 months

during 2002.6 These delays resulted in fewer counternarcotics operations and limited the training and experience Colombian Army pilots could obtain to qualify as

pilots-in-command.

Continued U.S. Support Needed to Sustain Operations

U.S. assistance to support the helicopters provided as part of Plan Colombia was

originally planned to end in 2006 with the Colombian Army taking over these responsibilities. However, U.S. embassy and Colombian Army officials stated that a

continued level of U.S. contractor presence will be needed beyond this date because

the Aviation Battalion is not expected to have the personnel trained or the resources

necessary. Although the embassy officials stated that they have not officially estimated what this assistance level will be, they tentatively projected that it would

cost between $100 million and $150 million annually to sustain the U.S.-supported

counternarcotics programs. Moreover, other recently initiated U.S. programs will

likely require U.S. assistance and contractor support, but the long-term costs of sustaining such programs are not known.

COLOMBIA’S AERIAL ERADICATION PROGRAM HAS HAD MIXED RESULTS

Since the early 1990’s, State’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (through the U.S. Embassy’s Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) and

the Office of Aviation) has supported the Colombian National Police’s efforts to significantly reduce, if not eliminate, the cultivation of coca and opium poppy. However, for the most part, the net hectares of coca under cultivation in Colombia continued to rise until 2002, and the net hectares of opium poppy under cultivation remained relatively steady until 2001–02.7 In addition, the U.S. embassy has made

little progress in having the Colombian National Police assume more responsibility

for the aerial eradication program, which requires costly U.S. contractor assistance

to carry out.

Recent Progress in Reducing Net Cultivation of Coca and Poppy

As shown in figure 1, the number of hectares under coca cultivation rose more

than threefold from 1995 to 2001—from 50,900 hectares to 169,800 hectares—despite substantially increased eradication efforts.8 But in 2002, the Office of Aviation

62

or other areas, which helps explain why the number of hectares under cultivation often does

not decline.

estimated that the program eradicated 102,225 hectares of coca—a record high. In

March 2003, the Office of National Drug Control Policy reported for the first time

since before 1995 a net reduction in coca cultivation in Colombia—from 169,800 hectares to 144,450 hectares—a 15 percent decline.

As shown in figure 2, the net hectares of opium poppy under cultivation varied

between 6,100 and 6,600 for the period 1995–98 but rose to 7,500 hectares in 1999

and 2000. In 2001, the net hectares of poppy estimated under cultivation declined

to 6,500 and, in 2002, further declined to 4,900—nearly a 35 percent reduction in

net cultivation over the past 2 years.

U.S. embassy officials attributed the recent unprecedented reductions in both coca

and poppy cultivation primarily to the current Colombian government’s willingness

to allow the aerial eradication program to operate in all areas of the country. They

also noted that:

63

9 In March 2002, the previous Colombian government reduced the strength of the spray mixture because of environmental concerns. 10GAO-01-26.

• the number of spray aircraft had increased from 10 in July 2001 to 17 in January 2003;

• recently acquired spray aircraft can carry up to twice the herbicide as the older

aircraft; and

• as of January 2003, aircraft were flying spray missions from three forward operating locations—a first for the program.

The ability to keep an increased number of spray aircraft operating out of three

bases was made possible, at least in part, because the U.S. embassy hired a contractor to work with the Colombian National Police to, among other things, help

maintain their aircraft. As a result, the availability of police aircraft for the spray

program increased. Moreover, in August 2002, the Colombian government allowed

the police to return to a higher strength herbicide mixture that, according to embassy officials, improved the spray’s effectiveness.9 These officials project that the

aerial eradication program can reduce the amount of coca and poppy cultivation to

30,000 hectares and 5,000 hectares, respectively, by 2005 or 2006, assuming the police continue the current pace and can spray in all areas of Colombia.

Colombian National Police Have Not Assumed Control Over Aerial Eradication

Operations

As we reported in 2000,10 beginning in 1998, U.S. embassy officials became concerned with the rising U.S. presence in Colombia and the associated costs of the aerial eradication program. At the time, the embassy began developing a 3-year plan

to have the Colombian National Police assume increased operational control over

the program. But for various reasons, the police did not agree to the plan. Since

then, contractor involvement and the associated costs have continued to rise and the

Colombian National Police are not yet able to assume more control of the aerial

eradication program.

As shown in table 2, in fiscal year 1998, the Office of Aviation reported that the

direct cost for a U.S. contractor providing aircraft maintenance and logistical support and many of the pilots was $37.8 million. In addition, NAS provided $10.7 million for fuel, herbicide, and related support, for a total of $48.5 million. For fiscal

year 2003, the comparable estimates for contractor and NAS-provided support were

$41.5 million and $44.8 million, respectively, for a total of $86.3 million. Most of this

increase occurred between fiscal years 2002 and 2003 and is for the most part to

support the additional spray aircraft, multiple operating locations, and the anticipated continuation of spray operations throughout Colombia. According to NAS and

Office of Aviation officials, these costs are expected to remain relatively constant for

the next several years.

Table 2.—U.S. Support for the Aerial Eradication Program, Fiscal Years 1998–2004

[Dollars in millions]

Fiscal years

Cognizant office 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

2003

(estimated)

2004

(proposed)Total

Office of Aviation ..................................... $37.8 $36.8 $52.5 1 $38.0 $38.2 $41.5 $45.0 $289.8

Narcotics Affairs Section ......................... 10.7 14.1 20.9 11.1 17.6 44.8 2 44.2 163.4

Total ..................................................... $48.5 $50.9 $73.4 $49.1 $55.8 $86.3 $89.2 $453.2

Source: U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and the Office of Aviation.

1 Includes $20 million for additional spray aircraft.

2 In addition, NAS paid $38.8 million for a contractor to support the Colombian National Police Aviation Service. NAS could not readily identify the proportion of this contract that is related to aerial eradication. NAS officials stated that they expect this expenditure to continue for

the next 2 years and possibly up to 4 years.

The Colombian National Police do not provide funding per se for the aerial eradication program and, therefore, the value of its contributions is more difficult to

quantify. In recent years, the police have provided helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft for spray mission support and the use of many of its facilities throughout Colombia. In addition, the police have about 3,600 personnel assigned to counternarcotics missions and estimate that 84 are directly supporting the aerial eradication program.

64

U.S. Efforts to Improve Police Capacity for Aerial Eradication

To help the Colombian National Police increase its capacity to assume more responsibility for the aerial eradication program, NAS has initiated several efforts.

In February and March 2002, the Office of Aviation conducted an Aviation Resource Management Survey of the Colombian National Police Aviation Service. According to Office of Aviation officials, these surveys are intended to provide a stringent onsite assessment of flight operations from management and safety to logistics

and maintenance. The survey team made a number of critical observations. For example, • The Aviation Service’s organizational structure, lines of authority, and levels of

responsibility were not clear. Relying on an overly centralized command structure

resulted in unnecessary delays and the cancellation of some planned aerial eradication missions because the commanding general could not be reached.

• The Aviation Service did not have a formal flying hour program to help forecast

its budgetary requirements and enhance maintenance scheduling.

• About 35 percent of the maintenance staff were inexperienced. According to the

survey team, this could result in improper maintenance procedures being performed,

which could adversely affect flight safety and endanger lives.

• Management of items needing repair and control of spare parts were deficient.

The survey team found 230 items awaiting repair—some from August 1998—and

more than $4 million in UH-1H helicopter blades and parts stored outside and unprotected.

As a result of the survey, in July 2002, a NAS contractor (a $38.8 million, 1-year

contract with options for 4 additional years) began providing on-the-job maintenance

and logistical training to the Aviation Service and helping the police address many

of the issues raised by the Aviation Resource Management Survey team. Embassy

officials noted that a more formal flying hour program has improved the availability

rates of many of the Aviation Service’s aircraft. For example, the availability rate

of the Aviation Service’s UH-II helicopters—often used to support aerial eradication

missions—increased from 67 percent in January 2002 to 87 percent in December

2002. According to these officials, improved availability rates made it easier to

schedule and conduct spray missions.

In addition, NAS has begun a program for training pilots to fly T–65 spray planes

and plans to start training for search and rescue personnel who accompany the

planes. U.S. officials stated that the contractor presence should decline and the police should be able to take over more of the eradication program by 2006, when NAS

estimates that coca and poppy cultivation will be reduced to ‘‘maintenance levels’’—

30,000 hectares and 5,000 hectares, respectively.

FINANCIAL AND MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES CONTINUE TO COMPLICATE EFFORTS TO

REDUCE ILLICIT DRUG ACTIVITIES

The U.S.-supported counternarcotics program in Colombia has recently begun to

achieve some of the results envisioned in 1999–2000. However, Colombia and the

United States must continue to deal with financial and management challenges.

• Under the original concept of Plan Colombia, the Colombian government had

pledged $4 billion and called on the international community to provide $3.5 billion.

Until recently, Colombia had not provided any significant new funding for Plan Colombia and, according to U.S. embassy and Colombian government officials, anticipated international assistance for Plan Colombia—apart from that provided by the

United States—did not materialize as envisioned. But because of overall poor economic conditions, the government of Colombia’s ability to contribute more is limited.

• The Colombian government has stated that ending the civil conflict is central

to solving Colombia’s problems—from improving economic conditions to stemming illicit drug activities. A peaceful resolution to the long-standing insurgency would

help stabilize the nation, speed economic recovery, help ensure the protection of

human rights, and restore the authority and control of the Colombian government

in the coca-growing regions. The continuing violence limits the government’s ability

to institute economic, social, and political improvements.

• For U.S. assistance to continue, Colombia faces continuing challenges associated

with the need to ensure that the army and police comply with human rights standards, that the aerial eradication program meets certain environmental conditions,

and that alternative development is provided in areas subject to aerial eradication.

Overall, neither the Colombian Army nor the Colombian National Police can sustain ongoing counternarcotics programs without continued U.S. funding and contractor support for the foreseeable future. According to U.S. embassy officials, these

programs alone may cost up to $230 million per year, and future costs for some recently initiated programs have not been determined. In addition, we note that this

65

estimate does not include future funding needed for other U.S. programs in Colombia, including other aerial and ground interdiction efforts; the police Aviation Service’s U.S.-funded contractor; and alternative development, judicial sector reform, and

internally displaced persons programs.

In recent years, world events—from the global war on terrorism to the wars in

Afghanistan and Iraq—have diverted scarce U.S. resources and made it paramount

that the United States fully consider the resources committed to its overseas assistance programs. As we noted in 2000, the total costs of the counternarcotics programs in Colombia were unknown. Nearly 3 years later, the Departments of State

and Defense have still not developed estimates of future program costs, defined

their future roles in Colombia, identified a proposed end state, or determined how

they plan to achieve it.

SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

In conducting our work, we reviewed pertinent planning, implementation, and related documentation and met with cognizant U.S. officials at the Methodology Departments of State and Defense, Washington, D.C.; the U.S. Southern Command

headquarters, Miami, Florida; and the U.S. Embassy in Bogota ́, Colombia In Colombia, we interviewed Colombian military, police, and government officials and visited

the Colombian Army bases at Larandia, Tolemaida, and Tres Esquinas and other

sites in the primary coca-growing regions of Colombia In addition, we observed a

Colombian Army counternarcotics brigade airlift operation and several aerial eradication missions.

We also discussed this testimony with cognizant officials from State’s Bureau for

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and its Office of Aviation and

State’s Bureau for Western Hemisphere Affairs. They generally concurred with our

treatment of the issues presented.

We conducted our work between July 2002 and May 2003 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared

statement. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.

Senator DEWINE. Very good.

Mr. McLean.

STATEMENT OF PHILLIP MCLEAN, SENIOR FELLOW AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR, THE AMERICAS PROGRAM, CENTER FOR

STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON,

DC.

Mr. MCLEAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me to this

Caucus, and let me make a few brief remarks from my written testimony which is submitted to you.

I think there is a question in the public mind when the discussion of Colombia comes up, is this a narcotics-only activity or is the

main objective terrorism. I would like to make the case today that,

in fact, the narcotics target is, in fact, the correct target. If you are

going to conquer terrorism and conquer the chaos in the country,

you have got to get at this narcotics heart of what the problem is.

Colombia some years ago was a very promising country. It stood

with Chile as one of the best-performing countries in the hemisphere. But you can draw a strict correlation from the rise of narcotics in Colombia to the decline of the Colombian institutions and

states. So it is not inappropriate, in my view, to make narcotics the

central focus and target of what you are doing.

Colombia in the 1970’s, as you had the rise of the narcotics culture, which has brought into the country something like 2 percent

of the gross national product in illegal funding—that money overcame the institutions, and particularly the institutions of law and

order. The military to some degree, the police, but most specifically

the judicial system has been deeply damaged, and these damages

66

to these institutions is not something that you cure with a 1-year

appropriation or even a decade of appropriations.

That country, which had the ability before to stand up and be

among the proud countries of the world, is, in fact, being—almost

a generation has got to be worked through as those countries refocus their attention. Clearly, the corruption and the violence

which is so impressive if you have lived there—and you, Senators,

have visited the country. You know many of these stories.

I lived there for 3 years as No. 2 in the embassy and the charge,

and I left the country in 3 years and I knew 11 people who had

been murdered in that short period of time. Since that time, of

course, I have known a great many more. It is an enormously tragic event.

I would just like to address some fallacies that often come up.

There is a fallacy that the United States can’t do anything about

this. I disagree with that. That perhaps the only thing we could do

would be to legalize drugs. I certainly disagree with that. That

there is a balloon effect. I can’t disagree that there is not a balloon

effect to some degree. But, in fact, my experience is that the balloon effect depends upon some assumptions. One of them is that

the demand for drug must necessarily be constant. And, in fact, we

know that it is not. Americans can change to other drug formulas,

or, in fact, one would hope, reduce our drug consumption.

Another fallacy is that you have to have a crop substitution program. Well, of course, given the price of the narcotics products, the

illegal products, there can be no substitution. But I have seen, in

fact, that when you have a program where you combine law enforcement with programs that help people, you can get people to

move off that particular economy.

Another fallacy is that these are poor campesinos, poor peasants

who have been living there for years and have gotten hooked into

this particular trade. The story in Colombia is not that. The story

in Colombia is they are people who go there to produce drugs. They

are, in fact, called colonos, colonists, who move into these areas.

Therefore, that is one of the reasons you can, in fact, give them incentives to move away.

What Colombia needs is a vibrant, restored economy, and the

United States, in fact, has taken a number of steps. Certainly, the

Andean trade preference initiatives by this Congress and were just

renewed are said to have produced 100,000 jobs in the last round

of that preference initiative, and is expected to produce another

100,000 to 300,000 in the coming years.

So my point is that the United States should, in fact, choose narcotics as the focus of what we are doing. It is very important in this

particular instance to keep our programs very focused and not try

to cure or address every Colombian need.

I think, in fact, by and large we have been doing that, but there

obviously are big pressures, in fact, to expand and try to address

every single need of the Colombian people. My experience is that

President Uribe, whom I have known for many, many years, is, in

fact, focused in this way.

One of the strange things is as I begin to hear in the United

States, oh, narcotics is not the appropriate target for our assistance, it is just at this time that the Colombians themselves, includVerDate 03-FEB-2003 11:09 Jan 14, 2004 Jkt 087649 PO 00000 Frm 00070 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 D:\NARC\87649.TXT SSC2 PsN: SSC2
67

ing their President, are saying narcotics should be what the United

States is directing itself to.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. McLean follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PHILLIP MCLEAN, SENIOR FELLOW AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR, THE AMERICAS PROGRAM, THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

OVERCOMING NARCOTICS AND VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to speak to this Caucus about a

topic that has been a concern to the United States for many years. Are U.S. policies

ever going to make a difference in slowing the flow of narcotics to this country?

What can be done to help Colombia overcome the constant violence that has plagued

that country and is the most obvious threat to peace in our own hemisphere? And,

in fact, should not terrorism, rather than narcotics, be the main object of U.S. involvement in Colombia?

I followed the growing crisis in the Andes, and in Colombia especially, during

more than a decade of my professional career in the Department of State and in

recent years have made Colombia a subject of my writing and other activities at

CSIS. My belief is that narcotics should very definitely be the main target of U.S.

programs in Colombia. It is no accident that the Colombian government, encouraged

and strengthened by the programs authorized and funded by this Congress, is beginning to have success against both the drug trade and violence. From what I have

observed, the arrival of U.S. aid is making a difference. The hard part now will be

to keep both the U.S. and Colombian governments focused on achievable counter

narcotics goals.

The story of Colombia in recent years is most often told with vivid anecdotes. Dry

statistics do not quite get across the depth of the tragedy and the frequently bizarre

results of so much illegal money flowing into the economy of a poor country. Estimates are that some $35 billion drug profits enter Colombia each year. These vast

sums distort normal economic incentives and have ironically made Colombia a poorer nation. The greed unleashed by the narcotized economy has broken down the institutions that normally protect people and led to devastating personal stories. Drug

earnings finance death and corruption. • I had the privilege of knowing the charismatic Luis Carlos Galan. He stood up

to the Medellin Cartel but then was assassinated by Pablo Escobar in the middle

of his campaign for the presidency. His interrupted political career promised to

unite the country as never before. • Just a year ago I met with the wife of the Governor of Colombia’s important

Antioquia department a month after he was taken hostage by the FARC (the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia). The Governor had thought that he could use

the principled tools of the U.S. civil rights movement to shame the guerrillas into

making peace with civil government. After holding him for a year, the guerrillas

killed him and ten other captives when they heard army helicopters arriving for a

rescue attempt.

• It came to light in recent weeks that a Colombian army company sent to retake a guerrilla zone had stumbled across barrels of money totaling some $14 million buried in the jungle. Higher-level officials discovered that the troops had shared

the cash among themselves rather than turning it in when non-commissioned officers began resigning and troops showed up with expensive purchases. Many Colombians expressed sympathy with the poorly paid soldiers—an example of how hard

it is to hold to a sensible moral discipline when challenged by waves of narcotics

wealth.

SOME FALLACIES

For many years a common view among Americans, repelled by the bloodshed and

chaos, was that we should not get involved. If the United States were to do anything, according to some, it would only be to legalize the consumption of narcotics.

Efforts to suppress drug production and trafficking, they assert, send the price of

the illegal products up and that just feeds criminality. Moreover, there is a ‘‘balloon

effect.’’ Suppression necessarily drives the drug business to other places and other

criminal networks. Eradication, according to this argument, deprives poor

campesinos of their only possible livelihood because alternative development programs do not work. Alienated peasants then join the guerrilla bands that have engaged the Colombian government in a ‘‘civil war’’ for the last 40 years.

My experience suggests that all of those arguments are essentially wrong.

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• ‘‘Legalization’’ may be an interesting proposition for a debate, but no reasonable

person would ever want to see the United States experience the increased drug consumption that would follow, certainly not of the ‘‘hard’’ drugs now produced by Colombia. By working on both the demand and supply side of the problem, the United

States has reduced cocaine consumption by two thirds since the late 1980’s. Drug

use is still, of course, intolerably high, but, while the signs are mixed, there is reason to believe we are about to see a further decline in cocaine use.

• The usual rules of economic analysis are of only limited value when it comes

to criminal enterprises, particularly one so large and constantly changing as the

drug trade. Criminals don’t keep accurate records. Statistics derived from indirect

evidence are often at best indicators. When Bolivia and Peru reduced their coca harvests, cultivation in Colombia did increase but not proportionately to what had been

destroyed, and now that Colombia is having success with its eradication program,

production in the southern Andean countries has increased only slightly. Studies indicate the total amount of cocaine produced has decreased every year since 1988.

Within Colombia, cultivation does move from one area to another but is pushed

more by movement of the drug producers and less by economics.

• The simple version of the ‘‘balloon’’ theory assumes that demand is constant.

It is not. After the sharp drop of cocaine consumption in the United States beginning 15 years ago, demand for the drug continued to fall, if only marginally, in this

country. Sadly, during the 1990’s it increased significantly in Europe and Brazil.

Now it appears the supply of cocaine is destined to be squeezed, at least in the short

run. It will be an opportunity for the United States to reduce addiction. Whether

or not that happens will depend on other factors since the millions who now consume cocaine will be able to substitute other drugs. Whatever the outcome here, the

result will be favorable for Colombia.

• Contrary to the image often portrayed, coca cultivation is not good for poor Colombians. Rather it is a bonanza economy that leaves people miserable over the long

run.

• No agricultural product can compete with its very high immediate returns—

and therefore there is no such thing as ‘‘crop substitution.’’ The prospect of

such high short-run returns draws subsistence farmers into remote parts of

the country for what is generally a primitive slash-and-burn form of agriculture that destroys tropical forests.

• In several recorded cases, these new arrivals have driven indigenous native

people of their historic lands. In the Catatumbo near the Venezuelan border

the Motilones people once lived in peace. Now the region, largely stripped of

its jungle cover, is the battleground where two distinct guerrilla bands and

paramilitary forces seek to dominate the newly arrived coca cultivators.

• The life of the coca farmer is not just violent but also contaminated by the

chemical used to extract the coca base from the plant’s leaves. The smell of

kerosene and other chemicals is characteristic of a coca farm.

• Experience shows that if laws against narcotics production are seriously enforced and some alternative economic activity is offered, most cultivators get

out of the drug business. Clearly, even with the aid of government programs—however well designed—only a fraction of those currently engaged in

drug production will be able to make a living out of the weak tropical soils.

• Ultimately their welfare and that of all poor Colombians will depend on the

growth and diversification of the Colombian economy as a whole. In that regard, it is interesting to note that the Andean trade preferences initially extended to Colombia in 1991 have created some 140,000 jobs in the modern

sector of Colombia’s economy, and the act renewed and amplified last year by

the Congress will, according to estimates, create an additional 100,000 to

300,000 jobs.

• The final fallacy is to say that Colombia is in a ‘‘forty-year-old-civil war.’’ The

two major guerrilla movements are widely unpopular and attract minuscule support. They may have had some ideological underpinning early in their histories, but

they are now best understood—given their mafia-like loose organization, their criminal methods of extortion, kidnapping and narcotics trafficking—as criminal gangs.

In the same way, the paramilitary groups that in some cases began as local defense

forces are now dependent on criminal activity to support their existence. It is all

good and well to offer to ‘‘keep the door open’’ to discussion with all of them, as

President Uribe has, but ending Colombia’s plague of violence will be more similar

to a campaign against lawlessness than a war.

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U.S. APPROACH TO COLOMBIA’S CRISIS

If the Colombia conflict is more a gigantic law and order problem rather than a

war in the classic sense than the United States must manage its assistance accordingly. Counterinsurgency models from El Salvador or even less Vietnam are not appropriate. U.S. aid, as large as it currently is, would be diluted if it were simultaneously directed at every aspect of Colombia’s security crisis. Moreover, it is not

clear that this country could properly select and prioritize the best targets for such

a comprehensive approach. Colombia’s needs are urgent and important, but it just

seems in the complex conditions there to be good management sense for the United

States to choose specific tasks, with specific goals and performance measures rather

than searching for a wider role.

The security assistance given to Colombia under Plan Colombia has up to now,

in fact, followed that practice. Stopping narcotics trafficking has been the main goal,

and even though the Congress loosened the strict prohibition against using U.S. resources for other than counter narcotics purposes, my understanding is that the

anti-drug goal is still the primary focus. In several instances, I have heard, even

when the United States has authorized the diversion of Plan Colombia aid, the operation ended up uncovering narcotics or tracking related activity—a further illustration of the extent of link between violent groups and criminality.

Instead of having an open-ended commitment and the U.S. purpose defined as

‘‘strengthening the Colombian state’’ or some other highly desirable but ill-defined

goal, the narcotics control objective gives U.S. activities a clear way to judge success

or failure.

Curiously, the much smaller U.S. program to assist with the protection of the

Can ̃ o Limon-Covenas pipeline similarly has a specific objective and means of measuring accomplishment. But defeating the narcotics trade deserves to be the main objective of U.S. security efforts both because of its direct connection to one of our

country’s leading social concerns but also because narcotics corruption is the principal cause of Colombia’s failure in the last two decades.

Before the scourge of the narcotics trade, Colombia was one of the best-regarded

countries in Latin America. Now many fear that it could become a troubling base

for terrorism. Certainly, President Alvaro Uribe puts a high priority on narcotics

control. If it can find the will, as it seems to have in the last year, Colombia can

do much on its own to confront its antagonists. The United States can best help him

save his country by staying focused on specific objectives. With the arrival of the

U.S. resources anticipated under Plan Colombia there is a chance of breaking the

power of the narcotics interests, helping Uribe and finally reducing cocaine shipments to the United States.

Senator DEWINE. Mr. Ford, the GAO previously reported that alternative development programs were having trouble getting off

the ground mainly due to poor security and the fact that they were

originally focused on a flawed strategy geared toward crop substitution.

From what I understand, we have shifted strategy somewhat to

focus less on crop substitution and more on creating jobs and improving infrastructure. How are we coming in regard to that?

Mr. FORD. Mr. Chairman, we are aware of the changes. They

made a change in strategy after we issued our report in February

of 2002. I have seen the State Department’s recent progress report,

issued, I believe, in the second quarter of this year which has indicated that they have made quite a bit more progress from the time

we issued our report.

We have not independently analyzed that information, but I will

say that there is a clear sign that they are making progress in the

area. They did adjust from the idea of crop substitution, particularly in southern Colombia where they found it was not going to

be viable and security wasn’t going to allow them to operate programs down there. So they have made adjustments in areas where

they think they can have more of an impact.

Senator DEWINE. Senator Sessions.

70

Senator SESSIONS. Mr. McLean, I think you made some very good

points. The first one is that the United States can do something

and can be a positive influence. But I think you would agree that

ultimately the success or failure in Colombia will be determined by

the will of the Colombian people.

No. 2, I think you are correct about crop substitution programs.

That is a nice-sounding idea, but it has never struck me as particularly realistic. There was an article some professor wrote in the

Washington Post that showed just how little—if I recall, it is something like 10 cents is paid to the crop grower for cocaine that sold

for over $100 an ounce. So you could afford to pay the crop grower

a dollar or ten dollars and still have a huge profit on cocaine.

Be frank with us. Isn’t that the difficulty? If the demand is

strong, it would be difficult to create an economic system in which

an alternative crop could still compete economically with cocaine

production.

Mr. MCLEAN. Senator, I would say that any program has to have

a one-two punch and the lead has got to be the strong line. You

have got to have law enforcement. Unless it is illegal, unless you

are establishing a legal order, you are not going to have effectiveness.

I do believe that you can top it off. If you have an alternative

development program in the area, it can help lure people away at

the end. I will give you an experience of the anti-marijuana programs of the 1980’s. It is hard to remember, but there used to be

something called Colombian Gold. I was a little bit too old to enjoy

it, but I am told it was a much-used product.

The United States came in and had a very strong program of

eradicating marijuana. It was an easier crop to take care of, and

we did it year after year after year. And suddenly—and I mean

suddenly—it just stopped. Now, it stopped because the Colombian

government on its own, not with pressure from the United States,

came in behind us after years and years of eradication and came

in with an assistance program to lure those discouraged farmers to

finally get them off the land and doing something else.

So if you use the two things together, I think it is possible, but

most of all it is the health of the economy and the law enforcement

regime that you have to put in place.

Senator SESSIONS. So strong law enforcement with efforts to

strengthen the economy so that there are other ways to make a living is the combination.

Mr. MCLEAN. That is right.

Senator SESSIONS. Well, that is an interesting story about marijuana. When I first became a Federal prosecutor in the mid-1970’s,

and even in the early days of the 1980’s when I was a U.S. Attorney, we still saw boat loads of marijuana coming from Colombia.

But by the mid-1980’s, I think virtually it dried up to zero. Marijuana comes, I guess, from Mexico or is home-grown from what we

see, but the huge multi-ton, 15-ton, 20-ton boat loads that were

coming through virtually ended. So that was a success story that

we should not forget.

I don’t think I understand you to be suggesting, do I, Mr.

McLean, that it is not important for the Colombian government to

take over its country, to be able to enforce law and order in every

71

area of the country, and ultimately that means confronting these

insurgent groups?

Mr. MCLEAN. Not at all, Senator. I, of course, have dealt with

the Colombian police and military for many, many years and have

the greatest respect for some of them. I feel there have been some

failures over the years, but I blame it more to a condition of defeat

than anything else.

Certainly, the United States, I think, should be a helpful partner, but I am talking about specifically where we put our $2.5 billion and how we perform as a friend. I think we perform best as

a friend by keeping ourselves in the types of things where you can

measure performance.

I think that is, in fact, one of the good things about the narcotics

program is that the GAO and others can come along and say you

said you were going to do this and you have done this, but not fully

fulfilled. You have a program that has a measure of success or failure and if you are failing, you may get out, but in this circumstance I think you would probably adjust what you do. That is

perfectly right.

But if you take on a goal such as strengthening the Colombian

state, it is so broad, it is so wide, you will never accomplish it. And

my own experience is that there will be a lot of pressures for the

operators of the U.S. Government to push their funds into areas

where there is an immediate demand.

Unless we have some restraint—and I am not saying going back

to what I think was an erroneous policy of a strict firewall, as General Hill talked about, but I think there must be a strong orientation. I am not quite sure how the Congress handles that or the administration. My understanding is, in fact, at this point people are

well-focused, but my fear is that we will get off focus in the future.

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you.

Senator DEWINE. The two of you had the opportunity to listen

to the first two panels and I would like to give you an opportunity

to react. Mr. McLean has already reacted to the balloon analogy,

but I wonder if either one of you would like to react to anything

else that was said in the last 2 hours, I guess.

Mr. FORD. Well, I think from where we sit, first of all, we have

been going down to Colombia since the mid-1990’s, so we have kind

of a longer view of what we have tried to do there. I believe that

there are clear signs that there is progress there and a lot of it has

to do, I think, with the attitude of the Colombian government to

support the kinds of things that the United States is interested in.

I think that the point we tried to make and we will be making

in our report is that there is a cost associated with this, and that

we would like to see from a GAO point of view a little more transparency from the administration about what these programs are

going to cost, because they have new initiatives that they talked a

little bit about this morning and there is a dollar tag to that.

On some of these things, we are not aware of what their costs

will be and we think that we would like to see those costs up front,

and we would like to see some time line that lets the Congress

know how long it is going to take for some of these programs to

reach fruition and get some real results.

72

So I think we are favorably disposed that progress is being made,

but we would like to see a plan from the administration that lays

out how much it is going to cost and some benchmarks along the

way so we can measure whether we are moving in the right direction.

Senator DEWINE. Well, Mr. Ford, that is an interesting comment.

I think that is certainly a legitimate position.

When you are dealing with the situation in Colombia, I think it

is quite frankly difficult to tell how long this is going to take. If

you can project it—I don’t know; maybe you can, but I don’t think

I can. You know, this is going to take a while.

One thing I do know is it is going to take a while. I don’t know

what a while is, but we are in this for a number of years, I think.

I understand your point, but this is not any short-term problem, at

least from my perspective.

Anything else you want to add, Mr. McLean?

Mr. MCLEAN. Well, Senator, I would only say thank you again

for having me. I do think that the question of keeping focused on

our security system is very important, but clearly Colombia has

many, many other problems. I think that the United States is, in

fact, taking certain portions of those problems, but I wouldn’t

undersell the Colombians.

As you saw here today with Francisco Santos, the Vice President,

they are people of enormous talent and energy, and they are able

to do a lot. But we have to think about the way that we relate to

those problems. We now have certainly more than 1,000 official

Americans in Colombia. This is a management problem and if our

relationship to them is to be successful, we have got to be very

clear on what we are trying to accomplish.

Thank you.

Senator DEWINE. Well, let me thank both of you for coming in,

very helpful, a very, very important topic, and we appreciate it. I

thank all of the members of the three panels for coming in. I think

it has been a very productive hearing. Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 12 p.m., the Caucus was adjourned.]

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A P P E N D I X

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. JOSEPH BIDEN TO J. CURTIS STRUBLE, ACTING AS- SISTANT SECRETARY (WHA) AND PAUL SIMONS, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF

STATE (INL)

Question 1a. Over the past few years, as you know, there has been significant and

legitimate concern about the human rights situation in Colombia. Indeed, the Department’s most recent Human Rights report, released in March, states that in

2002:

‘‘The [Colombian] Government’s human rights record remained poor . . . some

members of the government security forces continued to commit serious abuses,

including unlawful and extrajudicial killings. Some members of the security

forces collaborated with paramilitary groups that committed serious abuses.’’

The Colombian military needs to make significant progress on human rights and

severing ties with paramilitaries—yet according to the Department’s report, serious

problems remain.

I understand that you are in the process of determining whether or not Colombia

will be certified this year on its progress on human rights.

Can you speak to these continuing concerns, especially those outlined in the Department’s report?

Answer. Over the last several years, the Colombian Armed Forces have made significant progress in improving their human rights record. Still, some military personnel continue to maintain ties to paramilitary units that are a major source of

human rights violations. A high level of criminality in Colombia, together with a

weak judiciary, further undermines the rule of law and human rights in Colombia.

A lack of accountability for many types of criminal activity, including human rights

violations, remains a significant issue.

Question 1b. What can we point to, specifically, that indicates that Colombia is

making significant progress on human rights?

Answer. The Uribe Administration has taken steps to improve the human rights

situation in Colombia. Vice President Santos has reinvigorated the Presidential

Human Rights Program creating a Special ‘‘Momentum’’ Committee to promote

more actively the judicial resolution of high-priority human rights cases. He has also

established regular dialog with local human rights groups. Additionally, at the request of President Uribe, the mandate of the Colombia office of the United Nations

High Commission for Human Rights (UNHCHR) was extended through 2006. To

create an environment conducive to the protection and promotion of human rights,

Uribe has instituted a Democratic Security plan designed to increase and consolidate state presence throughout the country, particularly in previously neglected

areas where U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations have traditionally had

significant influence.

As we have certified in past reports to Congress, the Colombian Armed Forces are

taking effective action to sever links between military personnel and paramilitary

units. Intelligence activities and combat operations by the Colombian Armed Forces

against paramilitaries increased in 2002. As of November 30, 2002, Colombian military operations have resulted in the deaths of 183 paramilitaries (compared to 117

in 2001) and the capture of 1,214 (compared to 1,089 in 2001).

We are committed to continue working closely with the GOC to strengthen and

increase access to the judicial system, prevent human rights violations, and to promote the rule of law.

Question 1c. I understand that there has been an increase in the number of arrests of paramilitaries—however, have any high-ranking members of the paramilitary been arrested?

Answer. There has been progress in apprehending paramilitary members and

their high-ranking leaders. On June 21, 2003, the Colombian armed forces seized

a far-right paramilitary warlord, Bolmar Said Sepulveda, sought in the killings of

450 people in Barrancabermeja.

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Question 2a. As you know, U.S. personnel are under high security risk in Colombia. Drug traffickers view the Drug Enforcement Administration as enemy No. 1,

embassy personnel must travel by armored vehicle, dozens of U.S. citizens have

been kidnapped in the last decade, and three are currently being held hostage.

What can you tell us about continuing efforts to locate the three U.S. citizens who

are currently being held hostage by the FARC?

Answer. Since the February 13 plane crash, the Colombian Government has committed significant resources to an extensive and intense search and rescue effort.

It initially deployed more than 2,000 Colombian Army troops to the area where the

Americans were most likely being held. The Colombian government committed another 5,000-plus to support operations. To support the Colombian Army’s efforts, the

U.S. sent additional personnel to Colombia, and made available resources and

equipment that were already in-country.

Despite several engagements with FARC units, it appears that the FARC has

moved the three hostages to a remote area outside the immediate reach of the Colombian military. We continue to provide intelligence and logistical support to Colombian security forces involved in the search and rescue effort.

Our primary concern is the safe return of the hostages. We are assessing additional steps to bring about their recovery. As tactical search operations involving

large-scale deployments of troops are reduced, good, actionable intelligence becomes

more important. We continue an active campaign to locate the hostages.

The Department of State continues to maintain close, regular contact with the

families of the three hostages to keep them apprised of events on the ground in Colombia. The United States has made clear that we hold the FARC responsible for

the safety of these three individuals. We have made clear that we will not press

the Government of Colombia to make concessions nor will we make concessions to

the FARC to obtain their release.

Question 2b. Are we considering any significant policy changes toward Colombia

as a result of the kidnappings?

Answer. The holding of American hostages underlines the imperative that we continue our current policy for providing support—both financial and diplomatic—to the

Colombian government as it seeks to combat the twin threats of terrorism and

narcotrafficking in that country. As Colombia advances toward its aim of projecting

a stabilizing security presence throughout its territory, threats to U.S. citizens and

interests will gradually recede.

Question 2c. Are we seeing increased threats to U.S. personnel and facilities in

Colombia in general?

Answer. Colombia is a dangerous environment for U.S. personnel and American

citizens in general. From November 2002 until May 2003, Embassy Bogota ́ received

an increase in the number of threats. The Embassy’s assessment is that the seizure

does not necessarily signal an elevated threat against Americans. The FARC has

routinely and repeatedly designated Americans as legitimate ‘‘military’’ targets;

however, to our knowledge, it has not conducted premeditated operations with the

specific intent to kill or capture American citizens. That said, the general threat to

Americans of kidnapping remains significant.

The threat of collateral damage impacting U.S. citizens has increased significantly. Although the local police and military have had many successful operations

targeting FARC cells, a higher number of urban bombings have occurred since the

beginning of the year. In the past, the majority of bombings targeted Colombian government facilities in rural areas, or in the southern part of Bogota ́. However, the

attack on an exclusive social club just three blocks from the U.S. Ambassador’s residence in Northern Bogota ́ is evidence that the FARC has broadened its targeting

spectrum. We have not seen an increase in crime against Americans, but U.S. businesses frequently received extortion threats from November 2002 until early May

2003.

Question 2d. What additional security measures can be put in place to protect

U.S. citizens and facilities in Colombia?

Answer. The Embassy has already tightened its security significantly since November 2002, even before the February hostage situation began.

The USG relationship with the police and other Colombian security services is excellent; however, the Colombian forces are stretched very thin. The Embassy’s Consular Section, in consultation with the Regional Security Office, sends warnings to

American citizens via its network of wardens when the Embassy obtains specific

and credible threat information. Realistically, however, the large presence of Americans in Colombia makes it likely that many will continue to frequent popular malls,

clubs, and restaurants. Embassy announcements have no binding authority over

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non-official Americans, but serve to alert them of possible dangers and advise them

to vary their patterns of activity.

Embassy Security Officers also work very closely with American companies

through the Overseas Security Advisory Committee, which has about 120 members

and associate members. This has been an effective source for disseminating security

information to U.S. companies throughout the country.

Question 3. I understand that civilian contractors often experience ground fire as

they fly spray missions over FARC-controlled territory. Recently, one press report

quoted one U.S. official that planes have been hit by bullets seventy times so far

in 2003.

• How do we provide protection to U.S. and Colombian personnel, who are conducting these highly risky missions?

Furthermore, we are all aware of the three fatal plane crashes of U.S. contractors

since February, two of them involving Cessna 208 aircraft. I understand that contractors have raised concerns that the single-engine Cessna 208, which is used for

the U.S.-supported spray programs, is not suitable for Colombia’s mountainous regions because it cannot perform the steep climbs required by the terrain.

• Do we know the reason for the engine failure that caused the two recent crashes?

• Are the contractors and other analysts raising a valid concern about the use of

single-engine aircraft in the mountainous areas of Colombia? If so, why are we

using this type of plane, and putting U.S. contractors at further risk?

• Is the Department contemplating leasing or acquiring alternate aircraft for surveillance and spray missions?

Answer. We have seen a sharp increase in ground fire hits against the spray aircraft and escort helicopters in our counter-drug efforts. As of June 3, 2003, there

have been 184 ground fire hits—compared to a total of 194 hits for all of CY2002.

We believe the aggressive spray program is really hurting illicit drug crop growers—

and that they and narcoterrorist groups such as the FARC and AUC, all of which

thrive on the narcotics trade, are responding by shooting more often.

With respect to the three fatal plane crashes of U.S contractors since February,

the two Cessna 208 aircraft were operated by Department of Defense contractors

and the one Ayres ‘‘Thrush’’ spray aircraft was operated by the INL Air Wing contractor. INL was in no way involved in the maintenance, operation, and accident

investigation process for those two Cessna 208 aircraft. Therefore, Department of

Defense is the appropriate agency to respond to questions about the results of the

crash investigations and concerns about the single-engine Cessna 208 aircraft’s ability to perform the Department of Defense missions they are assigned. However, we

would comment that INL pilots who fly the Cessna 208 are confident in the performance of our aircraft.

Of six Cessna 208 aircraft supported by the INL Air Wing, only one is operated

in Colombia, for the purpose of coca crop targeting and coca spray verification. That

aircraft, equipped with a MDIS (multispectral digital imaging system), performs its

missions at altitudes that are well beyond the range of most small arms. While we

have found our Cessna aircraft to be very reliable over the years, we have a request

into the Pentagon for the transfer of several excess twin-engine C–12 ‘‘King Air’’

planes as replacements for our aging Cessnas. The multi-engine C–12 aircraft will

yield increased area coverage on each MDIS mission due to its greater airspeed. It

will also provide an enhanced margin of safety for its crewmembers, as our MDIS

camera aircraft usually operates as a single-ship mission without a wingman or escort aircraft.

On April 7, we lost one of our pilots in the crash of a single-engine, Ayres

‘‘Thrush’’ spray aircraft. The accident was due to pilot error and not ground fire.

Though we practice extensive security procedures to minimize risk to pilots and

planes, it must be noted that there is no procedure that perfect, in itself, to ensure

total safety during flight operations. INL’s Air Wing continues flying what is universally recognized as a very difficult mission in an increasingly hostile environment.

To meet that environment, we are increasing security of our spray program through

an integrated program—one that provides for improving intelligence coordination

and exchange, using armed Black Hawk helicopter escorts, adding Colombian

ground troop presence in the aerial spray zone, and flying twin-engine spray aircraft

in the higher risk areas.

Question 4. According to the report that the General Accounting Office (GAO) released at the hearing, there have been numerous problems with pilot and mechanic

training as well as pilot retention: Pilots are not showing up for training; qualified

Colombian pilots are not being assigned to flying missions; and trained pilots are

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not remaining in the program. The report contends that the U.S. must, as a result,

spend $150M a year to sustain ongoing operations with contractors. • How can we get enough pilots trained if we can’t even get them to show up? • What can we do to keep the pilots we train in the program? Why do you think

they are dropping out? • When do you think the Colombian military will be able to operate without extensive U.S. assistance? When will we be able to scale back on aid to the military?

Answer. The challenges associated with training pilots and mechanics for 72 helicopters provided to the Colombian Army over a relatively short period of time have

been great. With help from the Department of Defense, we have made excellent

progress. There are now 126 Colombian Army pilots for the Plan Colombia helicopters, and training is continuing. Of these pilots, 31 are Pilots-in-Command or Instructor Pilots. Approximately 220 COLAR personnel have received maintenance

training from Department of Defense, and many of these personnel have obtained

additional formal and informal instruction from INL’s aviation support services contractor.

As noted in the GAO report, there have been some difficulties in ensuring that

COLAR’s internal management of these resources is as effective as possible. Because of maintenance demands associated with COLAR’s FMS-purchased (non-Plan

Colombia) helicopters and other military requirements, at times the full complement

of trained personnel was not available to fly or work on the helicopters. We have

not experienced COLAR personnel ‘‘dropping out,’’ but COLAR leaders have not always managed the workforce effectively. We are working as closely as possible with

the COLAR to maximize the availability of their personnel to perform operations

and to step up training and development in preparation for assuming full responsibility for operation and maintenance of these important assets in the future.

We are working very hard to expedite the transfer of responsibility for running

this program to the Colombians, and will make the transition as quickly as possible

without compromising safety or mission effectiveness. As part of that process, we

do anticipate significant contractor participation for the foreseeable future while the

COLAR continues to train and gain experience and maturity.

Question 5. We have all discussed that to have an effective counternarcotics policy, we need to advance a three-pronged approach: interdiction, eradication, and alternative development.

Yet, last year a report prepared for the Agency of International Development

(AID) concluded that the alternative development programs originally planned for

Colombia are not likely to work for a number of reasons: the farmers in the southern part of the country distrust the government so they continue to plant coca as

an insurance policy even as they agree to stop growing it; the soil is not conducive

to many legal crops, and costs of production are too high for them to be competitive;

the infrastructure is so poor that they cannot get products to market; and security

concerns make it difficult to operate.

More recently, AID has estimated that a comprehensive alternative development

program may be cost prohibitive: about 130,000 families are involved in the illicit

crop business and it costs around $12,000 per family per year to provide a long-term

sustainable economic development program. That brings the total to about $1.5 billion a year.

What is the plan to create an effective and sustainable alternative development

program in Colombia?

Answer. The report which you mention identified a number of constraints that

make it difficult and sometimes dangerous to carry out development activities in

areas where there is not a significant and visible national government presence. It

was written just as the alternative development program was beginning in

Putumayo Department and at a time when the aerial spray program had been

largely suspended there.

Since that report was written, USAID has made a series of implementation adjustments in the alternative development program and the aerial spray program has

been reactivated. The results have been impressive. Production of coca in Putumayo

Department (the focus of the alternative development program) has been reduced

from about 60,000 hectares to approximately 1,500 hectares. This experience shows

that the USG’s counter-narcotics strategy which calls for a combination of alternative development, forced eradication (aerial spraying) and interdiction is fundamentally sound. We are, nevertheless, continuing to learn from our experiences

and have consequently expanded our thinking regarding the essential elements of

an effective and sustainable alternative development program.

Current thinking regarding creation of an effective and sustainable alternative development program in Colombia calls for a broad program of activities with five important elements:

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• Alternative Development assistance to identify, promote and develop licit production and employment alternatives;

• Forced eradication (by aerial spraying or other methods);

• Interdiction;

• Public Diplomacy; and

• Governance assistance.

As Public Diplomacy and Governance are relatively recent additions to our set of

counter-narcotics tools, we are still discussing how they may best be applied in particular situations.

The central features of Public Diplomacy include:

• Provision of information to the public regarding the ways that international

narcotics activity damages the economy and society as a whole;

• Information on how drugs and the drug culture harms individuals; and

• Development of anti-cocaine norms and values.

Important features of the Governance element include:

• Establishment of police and military presence to ensure that illegal armed

groups do not control the area and become the ‘‘de-facto’’ government.

• Expansion of national government presence in rural areas by providing support

for rural infrastructure and socioeconomic services such as: health care, education,

access to justice, agricultural extension and related services.

• Support for activities that strengthen links between communities and the State;

and

• Support for local governments and activities that strengthen municipal management capacity, community cohesion and collaboration among local groups.

Question 6a. I am concerned about reports that the office of the Colombian Attorney General is not improving its record in prosecuting human rights cases. According to the March 2003 State Department Human Rights Report, of the 116 killings

of labor union members documented as of September 2003, there were no arrests,

prosecutions or convictions at year’s end.

Furthermore, I am aware of concerns that members of the Uribe Administration

have made statements that threaten non-governmental human rights workers in

Colombia.

Can you speak to these points, especially in light of the Department’s pending

human rights certification of Colombia?

Answer. Colombia’s under-equipped and overworked judiciary confronts profound

challenges, such as corruption and intimidation by guerrillas, paramilitaries, and

other wealthy criminal organizations. Limited accountability for human rights violations and other crimes is the single greatest obstacle to the integrity of the Colombian State and the creation of a culture of respect for human rights.

Owing to these systematic weaknesses, prosecuting murderers of trade unionists

has proven extremely difficult. Prosecutors have been unable to identify the assailants in 125 of the 178 such murders in 2002.

However, Colombia has made improvements. The National Labor School in

Medellı ́n (a labor NGO) reports a downward trend in the number of murders of

trade union officials over the past 21⁄2 years: from 184 in 2001 and 178 in 2002 to

29 in 2003 (through mid-May).

Colombia’s vice-President has created a special committee dedicated to trade

union murders, particularly in the conflictive areas of Barrancabermeja, Arauca,

and Cauca.

Question 6b. Are you aware of an increasing climate of threat and intimidation

toward human rights workers, perpetuated by members of the Uribe Administration?

Answer. Several NGO’s have claimed that statements made by Colombian officials

contribute to a climate of threat and intimidation for human rights workers. For example, Human Rights Watch stated that Brigadier General Camelo accused NGO’s

of waging a ‘‘legal war’’ against the military, calling them ‘‘friends of subversives.’’

In our conversations with Colombian officials, we have stressed that such comments,

particularly from military officials, are counterproductive and undermine the credibility of the Uribe Administration’s commitment to improve human rights.

President Uribe has publicly addressed these concerns. At the 96th Anniversary

of the Jose Maria Cordova Cadets School, Uribe called for respect and tolerance for

NGO’s. At a recent conference on security and individual liberties, he emphasized

that democracies require the defense of human rights workers so that they can pursue their activities without fear.

The President has acted on this commitment, instituting a Democratic Security

Plan designed to increase and consolidate the government presence and rule of law

throughout the country, and reinvigorating the Presidential Human Rights program.

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Under the Vice President’s leadership, the GOC conducts regular discussions with

local human rights groups and has encouraged efforts to more aggressively resolve

100 high priority human rights cases. President Uribe has requested the extension

of the mandate of the Colombia office of the United Nations High Commission for

Human Rights (UNHCHR) to the end of his term in 2006. He has also instructed

the Foreign Ministry to more energetically pursue settlements of cases currently before the Inter-American commission on Human Rights.

Question 6c. Is the Uribe Administration making adequate efforts to prosecute

cases of human rights violations?

Answer. The Uribe Administration is committed to holding members of the Colombian Armed Forces accountable for their actions. The Colombian judiciary continues to process cases. On June 19, a Colombian judge sentenced Colonel Lino

Sanchez to 40 years in prison for conspiring with paramilitaries to massacre peasants in Mapiripan in 1997. In March, the Prosecutor Generals Office charged Lt.

Col. Orlando Pulido Rojas with homicide and conspiracy for collaborating with

paramilitaries in the murder of five alleged FARC collaborators. At the same time,

he issued an arrest warrant for former General Jaime Humberto Uscategui for failing to prevent a paramilitary massacre in Meta Department in 1997.

Question 6d. What are we doing to support investigation of the assassination

cases of trade unionists?

Answer. U.S. Government judicial sector reform programs and assistance to protect human rights are strengthening the Uribe Administration’s ability to investigate and prosecute trade union cases. As part of Plan Colombia, the Embassy has

provided support to the Prosecutor General’s Office (Fiscalia) in an effort to aid investigations of assassination cases of trade union officials. Plan Colombia funding

has established 11 satellite Fiscalia Human Rights throughout Colombia, enhancing

the Fiscalia’s ability to identify, investigate and prosecute human rights violations,

including cases involving trade union activities. In total, we have provided

$3,711,734.07 for crime scene kits, modular furniture, office equipment, armored vehicles, operational support funds, and specialized training in human rights and forensic sciences. In FY03, the USG provided $154,030 directly to support investigations.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. CHARLES GRASSLEY TO J. CURTIS STRUBLE, ACTING

ASSISTANT SECRETARY (WHA) AND PAUL SIMONS, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY

OF STATE (INL)

Question 1a. The United States has spent over $2.5 billion since 2000 to assist

Colombia in its fight against narco-trafficking. The press has been full of reports

questioning the success of our efforts in Colombia, pointing to reports that just as

much cocaine is available in the United States today as was available 5 years ago,

at higher purity and lower price. While there may be questions regarding the interpretation of statistics, it does raise a fundamental question of what measures should

be used to gauge the progress of our efforts.

What performance measures are being used by the State Department to assess

the success or failure of U.S.-funded counter-narcotics programs to Colombia?

Answer. The main goal of the United States’ counter-narcotics programs in Colombia is to supply side reduction. The availability of illegal narcotics is reduced

through destruction of the illicit crops that are the essential ingredients of illegal

drugs in Colombia coupled with attacks on the narcotics processing and trafficking

infrastructure. Crop reduction programs include forced eradication (through aerial

spraying) and alternative development programs administered through USAID.

The eradication program measures progress toward its goals by tracking illicit

crop production estimates, provided for the U.S. Government by the CIA’s Crime

and Narcotics Center (the United Nations Drug Control Program separately conducts an estimate). The eradication program also measures progress by monitoring

the number of hectares of illicit; crops sprayed and by estimating the effectiveness

of the spraying as evaluated through ground truth verification of previously sprayed

fields. These figures are then combined with processing efficiency estimates to estimate how much processed cocaine has been removed from the supply chain to U.S.

and other markets for consumption.

USAID gauges progress of its alternative development efforts through illicit crop

size estimates, coupled with other performance measures—including the number of

families that USAID programs assist with programs to provide legal employment

and the number of hectares of legal crops that USAID generates through alternative

development programs.

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Other Department of State-assisted programs support supply reduction by helping

the Government of Colombia’s security forces (Colombian National Police and the

Colombian Armed Forces) to destroy laboratories where drugs are produced and to

interdict narcotics trafficked through Colombian road, sea, and air corridors. These

programs evaluate success with statistics recorded by the Government of Colombia.

The leading indicators include the number of laboratories destroyed (both coca base

and cocaine hydrochloride), and quantities of illicit drugs and precursor chemicals

interdicted. Other important performance measures are the number of drug traffickers arrested in Colombia and the number of Colombians extradited to the United

States for narco-trafficking offenses (through the Department of Justice’s Multilateral case Initiative program).

The ultimate goal of the supply side narcotics reduction strategy is to reduce the

amount of illegal drugs available in the United States. Performance measures to

track progress toward this goal—the price and purity indices alluded to in your

question—also measure supply side efforts in other drug producing countries as well

as law enforcement programs in the drug transit zone and on U.S. soil. These indices are determined by the USDEA.

Question 1b. Please provide a summary of each ongoing counternarcotic program

in Colombia, the baseline for these programs, what has been accomplished to date,

and what the Department believes will be accomplished by these efforts should Congress provide full funding, and an associated timeline for these programs.

Answer. The recently published GAO report that you solicited recommended that

‘‘the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, establish

clear objectives, including developing specific performance measures, and estimate

future U.S. funding requirements for the programs with the Colombian Army and

the Colombian National Police.’’ The State Department concurs with the GAO recommendation and is in the process of developing revised goals, estimates of funding

requirements, and timelines for U.S. assistance to Colombia for the remainder of

Plan Colombia and beyond. It is our intention to provide this information to the

Congress for consideration in the fiscal year 2005 appropriations cycle.

Question 2a. The U.S. Agency for International Development has received ap- proximately $350 million for alternative development for Colombia since fiscal year

2000. The funding information I have received from USAID (see attached table) provides funding levels for general program functions and purposes.

Within the categories on the attached worksheet, what specific programs in Colombia are currently being funded through USAID and how much is currently being

spent to run each of them? Answer. USAID has received $351 million for its program in Colombia since fiscal

year 2000. These resources have been used to support three programs.

Strengthening Democracy ..................................................................... $99 million ................... (28 percent)

Alternative Development ....................................................................... 160 million ................... (46 percent)

Internally Displaced Persons ................................................................ 92 million ................... (26 percent)

Total ................................................................................................. $351 million ................... (100 percent)

The attached fiscal year 2004 ARI funding worksheet shows that $150 million has

been requested for Alternative Development/Institution Building in Colombia.

USAID will receive $122.2 million (81 percent) of this amount. The remaining $27.8

(19 percent) will be used to support Alternative Development/Institution Building

projects that are implemented by the Department of Justice and the State Department’s Bureaus for Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM), and for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). The $122.2 million that

USAID expects to receive in fiscal year 2004 from the Alternative Development/Institutions Building line item will be used as shown below.

Strengthening Democracy ..................................................................... $24 million ................... (20 percent)

Alternative Development ....................................................................... 60 million ................... (49 percent)

Internally Displaced Persons ................................................................ 38 million ................... (31 percent)

Total ................................................................................................. $122 million ................... (100 percent)

Questions 2b and 2c. How much, if any, additional funding will be needed to see

these projects (identified in A) through to their completion?

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What timeframe has been established for their completion?

Answer. It will take approximately five to seven more years to consolidate

USAID’s existing alternative development achievements and help the Colombians

expand the national government’s presence into areas formerly controlled by illegal

armed groups. USAID’s resources will be crucial in assisting the GOC to provide alternative development, administration of justice, human rights and related socioeconomic assistance in areas that were here to fore neglected by the national government. The Department of State and AID are in the process of discussing future

funding requirements with the GOC. As these discussions progress, we will be able

to better specify the level of funding that will be needed to see our programs to a

successful conclusion in order to consult with Congress.

Question 2d. What measures will be used to judge the success or failure of these

programs?

Answer. Each USAID project has results indicators and targets for implementation activities that are used to determine if the project is on track. Illustrative indicators which USAID has used in Colombia are as follows:

• Hectares of licit crops established to replace drug crops;

• Number of social infrastructure projects completed;

• Number of internally displaced persons assisted;

• Number of justice houses established;

• Number of alerts issued by the Early Warning System; and

• Number of responses by the Colombian police, military; ombudsman or other

government institutions to Early Warning System alerts.

USAID will continue to use these indicators as long as they remain relevant. New

indicators will be identified and adopted, as needed, to monitor progress and demonstrate results for existing or new activities.

Question 3. We have been providing assistance to Colombia for over two decades.

Can you please provide two or three examples of alternative development programs

that were established in Colombia during that period but no longer require U.S. assistance to be maintained?

Answer. USAID assistance to Colombia today is the result of international drug

trafficking and terrorist activities that have almost destroyed the Colombian economy and are a serious threat to Colombian democracy. USAID support for Plan Colombia is not simply a continuation of USAID assistance over the last two decades

and programs today bear little resemblance to USAID’s Colombian programs from

1980 to 2000.

• USAID assistance to Colombia was scheduled to end by the year 2000 and was

reduced to about $200,000 in fiscal year 1998.

• Very little (if any) USAID assistance during the period 1980–1998 was for alternative development (AD).

• USAID support for alternative development began in 1999 with a small program to assist poppy farmers and was greatly expanded in fiscal year 2001 when

Plan Colombia Funds became available.

• The USAID program since fiscal year 2001 has been highly successful. Significant AD achievements since fiscal year 2001 include:

• Establishment of over 30,000 hectares of licit crops;

• Provision of AD assistance to nearly 33,000 families;

• Voluntary manual eradication of nearly 18,000 hectares of illicit crops; and

• Completion of over 400 social infrastructure projects.

• Most of USAID’s assistance to Colombia during the last 20 years provided support for health and democracy programs.

• The health sector is one example of an area in which previous USAID assistance had strengthened Colombian institutions to the point where minimal outside

assistance was needed.

• The corrupting influences of huge narco-trafficking operations have, however,

weakened the fabric of, society and virtually all government institutions to the point

that some observers are asking if additional health assistance may be necessary.

Questions 4a and 4b. There was a considerable increase in the number of hectares

of.coca sprayed during 2002. Much of this increased spraying has been attributed

to the new policies put into place by the Uribe administration. For 2003, President

Uribe has set a goal of spraying 200,000 hectares—almost 60,000 more than were

sprayed in 2002.

Do you believe that this is a realistic objective, or is this a ‘‘stretch’’ goal that we

hope, but do not expect, to meet? Please include an assessment about what effect,

if any, the loss of two spray planes since this goal was established has on the ability

to reach this goal.

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If this objective is a stretch, what combination of assets and funding must be

added to the current levels of U.S. assistance to make sure that the goal of eradicating 200,000 hectares is reached?

Answer. INL’s stated goal for 2003 is to spray all of the remaining coca in Colombia, up to 200,000 hectares. This is an ambitious target, but spray goals have expanded commensurate with the recent expansion of Government of Colombia political will mentioned in the preface to your question. Whether all the remaining coca

in Colombia really means spraying 200,000 hectares depends largely on whether

there are 200,000 hectares of coca available for spraying in 2003.

in 2002, coca eradication markedly outpaced replanting and new cultivation, resulting in a CNC estimate that Colombian coca cultivation dropped by 15 percent

from the previous year (the first CNC-registered decline in Colombian coca cultivation in over a decade). The CNC estimates Colombian coca cultivation at 144,450

hectares as of year-end 2002. The UNDCP estimated that Colombia cultivated

1.02,000 hectares of coca in 2002.

Certainly, 2003 is a year of decision for coca eradication. we are now in a position

to convince growers that nowhere in Colombia is safe for investing in coca. Coca

eradication in 2003 is on pace to surpass last year’s record spraying—planes have

already sprayed some 71,000 hectares of coca in Colombia as of June 24. This

should allow us to spray more than 144,450 hectares in the CNC estimate, meaning

that planes can return to some areas more than once—to discourage replanting and

new cultivation.

We are concerned about the loss of two spray aircraft and have noted a sharp rise

in the levels of hostile fire that the spray planes receive from the ground (planes

have received 204 impacts to date this year, already surpassing the entire year totals for 2001 and 2002). However, we still have sufficient fixed wing (and related

helicopter) assets to maintain spray operations from three spray bases consecutively. Congress has provided $15 million, through the 2003 counter-terrorism supplemental, to sustain increased eradication and will fund the purchase of replacement spray aircraft.

Barring additional, unfortunate accidents, our fleet of aircraft should allow us to

target Colombia’s decreasing illicit crop, even as we face the law of diminishing returns. 2002 and early 2003 levels of eradication will be hard to sustain over time,

as field dispersal, smaller fields, and aircraft range limitations will require that

planes have to fly more to spray less.

Question 5a. I understand that the 200,000 hectares scheduled to be eradicated

next year is part of a larger strategy by the U.S. Embassy in Bogota ́ to move coca

cultivation in Colombia to a ‘‘manageable level’’ of about 30,000 hectares.

Is this strategy a written document with periodic benchmarks and other measures

to ensure that the strategy is on track? if so, please include a copy for the record.

Answer. Initial Plan Colombia eradication goals were drafted under the previous

Colombian Administration and contained more modest assumptions about the

amount of spraying that the Government of Colombia would allow. As stated in the

Department’s answer to your question 1(b) above, the Department is leading an

interagency review of Plan Colombia andintends to provide this information to the

Congress for consideration in the fiscal year 2005 appropriations cycle. An updated

eradication strategy with eradication goals and benchmarks to gauge progress will

be a fundamental part of that revised assessment.

Question 5b. What role did the Government of Colombia play in arriving at the

conclusion that our ultimate objective should be to reduce coca production in Colombia to this manageable level?

Answer. The U.S. Embassy in Bogota ́ maintains a constant dialog with the Government of Colombia on counternarcotics policy and operations, including the setting of goals for U.S.-supported counter-narcotics programs. This coordination will

continue as we determine goals and objectives, benchmarks for success, required resources, and a new timeline.

Question 5c. What resources (planes, funding, etc.) are expected to be necessary

to ‘‘manage’’ coca production at this level?

Answer. As per the Department’s answer to 5(A) above, this information will be

provided to the Congress for consideration in the fiscal. year 2005 appropriations

cycle.

Question 6a. Protection of the basic human rights of all individuals in Colombia

is an important priority of the United States. In addition, Congress has placed some

restrictions on the assistance that we provide Colombia in an attempt to encourage

human rights reforms.

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Are the current human rights restrictions (commonly known as the ‘‘Leahy

Amendment’’) on U.S. assistance adequate to ensure that funding is not being used

for actions that violate human rights?

Answer. The Leahy Amendment has been an effective tool to help us identify

problem individuals and units within Colombia’s security forces. Those receiving

U.S. assistance and training are being thoroughly vetted by all relevant U.S. Government agencies to ensure that such assistance is not provided to human rights

violators.

Question 6b. Are the current restrictions overly burdensome to the implementation of U.S.-funded programs?

Answer. Vetting foreign security forces can be a lengthy process, involving both

the Embassy in Bogota ́ and the Department of State in Washington. U.S. funded

training at times has been delayed by vetting requirements. We do not consider this

an obstacle but rather an example of the seriousness we place on human rights vetting.

Question 6c. How successful do you believe the human rights training programs

have been in reducing violations in the Colombian Military?

Answer. USG-funded human rights training programs have placed human rights

concerns firmly on the agenda of our bilateral security relationship, and have helped

create a culture of respect for fundamental rights among military and police officials. Rights violations by State actors continue to occur, but on a far smaller scale

than in years in which U.S. security assistance was minimal.

Question 6d. Have these changes been made institutionally—that is, are they permanent? If so, are the restrictions created by the Leahy Amendment still needed?

Answer. A commitment to severing military-AUC ties exists at the highest levels

of the Colombian government. President Uribe and senior Colombian officials have

stated repeatedly stressed the importance of respect for human rights and taken actions to back up their commitment to improve performance in this area. The Government of Colombia has responded more aggressively to cases where members of

the Colombian military committed human rights violations. Most recently, a Colombian judge sentenced retired Army Colonel Lino Sanchez to 40 years in prison for

conspiring with far right paramilitaries to massacre 30 peasants in 1997. This sentence is considered one of the heaviest ever levied against such a high-ranking Colombian military officer.

There is more that must be done. while the majority of human rights violations

in Colombia continue to be committed by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the Self Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), a small portion of human rights violations can still be traced to the

Colombian military. The Leahy Amendment is a useful mechanism that helps the

U.S. identify problem individuals and units and focus the attention of the Government of Colombia on the issue. We are committed to human rights and continue

to underscore this issue with Colombian officials.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO COLOMBIA HEARING (CLASSIFIED ANSWERS ARE BEING

RETAINED IN COMMITTEE FILES)

COLOMBIA HEARING QUESTIONS TO BE SUBMITTED—DOD

Question 1. United States assistance for the helicopter program was originally

supposed to end in 2006 when the Colombian Military was to assume complete control. That deadline has been pushed back indefinitely.

• What steps are being taken to re-establish this time line?

• What recommendations have been made to create an internal capacity within

the Colombian Military to foster the successful assumption of program control?

Question 2. Protection of the basic human rights of all individuals in Colombia

is an important priority of the United States. In addition, Congress has placed some

restrictions on the assistance that we provide Colombia in an attempt to encourage

human rights reforms.

• Are the current human rights restrictions on U.S. military aid adequate to ensure that funding is not being used for actions that violate human rights, and are

they overly burdensome?

• How successful do you believe the human rights training programs have been

in halting violations in the Colombian military?

• Do you believe these changes have been made institutionally—that is, are they

permanent?

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Question 3. After a very successful year in 2001, the productivity of the CounterNarcotics Brigade diminished significantly in 2002. In response, the Brigade was reorganized and their area of operations was expanded to include all of Colombia. In

support of this shift, the U.S. agreed to provide advanced training to take advantage

of the expanded function areas.

• Please provide an update on the current status of this new training. In particular, highlight the new capabilities the Brigade should have once the training is

complete.

• Does this new training, take advantage of the expanded authorities the Senate

reauthorized for 2 years in the 2004 Defense Authorization Act?

• How has the Counter-Narcotics Brigade been integrated with the rest of the Colombian military operations?

Question 4. Both the Colombian National Police and the Colombian military have

noted successes in forcing cocaine-processing facilities to move from one area of the

country to another. In my view, this is a measure of activity, not of success which

would be the reduction of coca processing throughout the region. However, this cannot happen until the Government of Colombia fully regains control of the countryside.

• Is it possible, with our current levels of assistance to Colombia, for the Colombian military and police to significantly deter and reduce the creation of new coca

labs throughout Colombia?

COLOMBIA HEARING QUESTIONS TO BE SUBMITTED—JESS FORD, GAO

Question 1. Mr. McLean’s testimony touches briefly on the ‘‘balloon effect.’’ While

coca production in Colombia has decreased, it has slightly increased in other countries of the region.

• Do you believe there is more that we should be doing today to prevent the

spread or re-emergence of coca cultivation outside Colombia?

• Given that we live in a world of limited resources and based on your familiarity

with the region and understanding of the current situation, do you believe that

some of our funding and efforts currently directed toward Colombia should be redirected to other drug producing countries in the region?

COLOMBIA HEARING QUESTIONS TO BE SUBMITTED—PHILLIP MCLEAN, CSIS

Question 1. Currently, the various guerilla forces have control over approximately

40 percent of the countryside which impedes the ability of both the Colombian and

U.S. governments to implement programs in many regions of the country. You have

described the Colombian government’s struggle to gain control as more of a campaign against lawlessness than a war.

• How central is the elimination of lawlessness to our efforts to eliminate narcotics production? Should our efforts and attention be refocused away from eradication and toward a campaign to end this lawlessness?

Question 2. Your testimony touches briefly on the ‘‘balloon effect.’’ While coca production in Colombia has decreased, it has slightly increased in other countries of

the region.

• Do you believe there is more that we should be doing today to prevent the

spread or re-emergence of coca cultivation outside Colombia?

• Given that we live in a world of limited resources and based on your familiarity

with the region and understanding of the current situation, do you believe that

some of our funding and efforts currently directed toward Colombia should be redirected to other drug producing countries in the region?

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR. FOR THE RECORD FOR

GENERAL HILL

Question 1. As you know, the 2002 supplemental appropriations bill changed longstanding policy that limited the use of U.S.-provided equipment to counter-narcotics

missions by giving Colombia authority to use the equipment for counter-insurgency

purposes.

• To what extent is this new authority being used?

• What types of missions are being carried out under this new authority?

• To what degree is the counter-insurgency authority distracting from the

counter-drug mission?

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• What is the decisionmaking process in the Embassy for approving missions that

do not involve a direct counter-narcotics mission?

Question 2. According to the report that the General Accounting Office (GAO) released at the hearing, there have been numerous problems with pilot and mechanic

training as well as pilot retention: Pilots are not showing up for training; qualified

Colombian pilots are not being assigned to flying missions; and trained pilots are

not remaining in the program. The report contends that the U.S. must, as a result,

spend $150 million a year to sustain ongoing operations with contractors.

• How can we get enough pilots trained if we can’t even get them to show up?

• What can we do to keep the pilots we train in the program? Why do you think

they are dropping out?

• When do you think the Colombian military will be able to operate without extensive U.S. assistance? When will we be able to scale back on aid to the military?

COLOMBIA HEARING QUESTIONS TO BE SUBMITTED—STATE DEPARTMENT

Question 1. The United States has spent well over $2.5 billion since 2000 to assist

Colombia in its fight against narco-trafficking but with only limited success.

• What performance measures are being used by the State Department to assess

the success or failure of U.S. funded programs?

• What is the ultimate objective for our counter-narcotics assistance programs in

Colombia?

Question 2. The U.S. Agency for International Development has received over

$350 million for alternative development since FY2000.

• What alternative development projects have been identified and what timeframe has been established for their completion?

• How much, if any, additional funding will be needed to see these projects

through to their completion?

• What goals and purposes have been established for each of these alternative development projects and how successful have the programs been in meeting their

goals to date?

• We have been providing assistance to Colombia for over 2 decades. What programs have we helped the Government of Colombia set up that no longer require

U.S. assistance?

Question 3. There was a considerable increase in the number of hectares of coca

sprayed during 2002. Much of this increased spraying has been attributed to the

new policies put in place by the Uribe administration. For 2003, President Uribe

has set a goal of spraying 200,000 hectares—almost 60,000 more than were sprayed

in 2002.

• Do you believe this is a realistic objective, or is this a ‘‘stretch’’ goal that we

hope, but do not expect, to meet?

• If this objective is a stretch, what combination of assets and funding must be

added to the current levels of U.S. assistance to make sure that the goal of eradicating 200,000 hectares of coca is reached?

Question 4. I understand that the 200,000 hectares scheduled to be eradicated

next year is part of a larger strategy by the U.S. Embassy in Bogota to move coca

cultivation in Colombia to a ‘‘manageable level’’.

• Is this strategy a written document with periodic benchmarks and other measured to ensure that the strategy is on track?

• Has this strategy been agreed to by the Government of Colombia?

• Can a copy of the strategy be provided to the members of this Caucus?

Question 5. I understand that as part of the eradication strategy for Colombia,

the threshold of 30,000 hectares of coca cultivation is being considered a ‘‘manageable level’’.

• Can you please define what a ‘‘manageable level’’ of coca production is and how

this amount was determined to be a ‘‘manageable level’’?

• What resources (planes, funding, etc.) are expected to be necessary to ‘‘manage’’

coca production at this level?

Question 6. The Colombian National Police Anti-Narcotics Directorate has noted

successes in forcing cocaine-processing facilities to move from one area of the country to another. In my view, these should not be considered successes because the

cocaine is still being produced but the facility has simply changed its location.

• What, if anything, is being done to completely shut down the labs?

Question 7. Protection of the basic human rights of all individuals in Colombia

is an important priority of the United States. In addition, Congress has placed some

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restrictions on the assistance that we provide Colombia in an attempt to encourage

human rights reforms.

• Are the current human rights restrictions on U.S. military aid adequate to ensure that funding is not being used for actions that violate human rights, and are

they overly burdensome?

• How successful do you believe the human rights training programs have been

in halting violations in the Colombian Military?

• Do you believe these changes have been made institutionally—that is, are they

permanent?

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