IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2018-CA-00370-COA BRUCE D. LINDSAY APPELLANT

v. PAULA E. LINDSAY AND CHRISTY PICKERING, CPA APPELLEES

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 11/17/2017 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. MICHAEL H. W ARD COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: HARRISON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT, FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: REED STANTON BENNETT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: TIMOTHY LEE MURR THOMAS W RIGHT TEEL RUSSELL SCOTT MANNING NICHOLAS VAN W ISER NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS DISPOSITION: REVERSED, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED - 04/07/2020 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE J. WILSON, P.J., GREENLEE AND LAWRENCE, JJ. LAWRENCE, J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. This acrim onious divorce case involves Bruce Lindsay and Paula Lindsay

. In 2014, Paula f iled her com

plaint f or divorce on the ground of h abitual cruel and inhum an t reatm ent, and Bruce f

iled an answer along with a m otion f or tem porary relief

. On June 13, 2014, the

court held a tem

porary -relief hearing, where the c h a n cellor issued a bench ruling ordering b o t h p arties to “keep every thing status quo.” B ut a written o rder was not entered u n t i l October 3, 2016. It was that r uling tha t l a t e r resulted in Bruce being held in contem pt onOctober 1 9, 2017, and ordered to be incarcerated until he “purged” him s elf o f that contem pt. ¶2. On Novem

ber 1, 2017, the court held a hearing o n Bruce’s contem p t, and Bruce was transported f

ro m j a i l t o t he hearing. During that hearing, Bruce agreed to the t erm s of a property s ettlem ent a gre e me n t a s part of the divorce. Paula also t estif ied as t o Bruce’s habitual cruel and inhum an treatm ent. At the close of the hearing, the court granted Paula’s request f o r a divorce on the ground of habitual c r uel and inhum an treatm e nt a nd incorporated the parties’ stipulated property settlem ent agreem e nt. The court f urther ordered Bruce to pay all of Paula’s a t t o r n e y ’ s f ees and the court-appointed c e rtif ied p ublic accountant (CPA) Christy Pickering’s expert f

ees and her attorney

f ees. 1 ¶3. On appeal, Bruce raises six issues. Because we f ind f o u r o f t h o s e i s s u e s t o be dispositive, we l im i t our d iscussion to t he f ollowing: (1) whether the contem pt order was too
vague to enf

orce; (2) whether t here was suf f icient proof f

or the c hancellor to g rant a divorce judgm ent on the ground of habitual cruel and inhum an treatm e n t; (3) whether the court erred in ordering Bruce to pay Pickering’s f ull expert f

ees and her a ttorney ’s f

ees; a n d (4) whether the court erred in ordering B ruce to pay P aula’s attorney ’s f ees. Af ter review, w e reverse the chancery c o u r t ’s contem

pt order and divorce judgm ent, s et aside the property settlem ent

1 A lth o u g h B ru ce ag r eed t o p ay P au la’s atto rn ey ’ s f ees an d P ick erin g ’s ex p ert f ees an d atto rn ey ’s f

e es, th e ex act am o u n t o f th o se f ees w ere n o t k n o w n a t th e N o v em b er 1 , 2 0 1 7 h earin g . P au la’s atto rn ey ’ s f ees w ere d eterm in ed in th e N o v e mb e r 1 7 , 2 0 1 7 d iv o rce j u d g m en t, an d P ick erin g ’s ex p ert f ees an d atto rn ey ’s f

ees w er e s p ecif

ied l ater in an o rd er d ated F eb ru ary

1 6 , 2 0 1 8 . B ru ce n o w claim s in t h i s ap p eal th at h e w as u n d er d u ress w h en h e m ad e th e ag reem en t to p a y th o se f ees. 2agreem ent, reverse the chancery court’s order that Bruce pay all the court-appointed expert’s

f ees and attorney ’ s f

ees and P aula’s attorney ’s f ees, and r em and this case to the chancery court f urther proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶4. Bruce and Paula m arried in 2000. T h e y h a v e one child t ogether, who was born in
2001. On January 3, 2 014, Bruce and P aula separated. P aula f iled her c om

plaint f o r divorce

on J anuary 22, 2014, on the grou n d o f habitual cruel and inhum an treatm ent or, in the alternative, irreconcilable dif f erences. Shortly t hereaf ter, B ruce f

iled h is answer to th e

com plaint f or divorce and at the sam e tim e f iled a m otion f

or tem porary relief

. On April 25, 2014, Bruce propounded num erous requests f or adm issions to Paula. Paula did not respond

t o t h o se requests until October 4, 2016, and only then in an e f f o rt t o def eat a mo t i o n f

o r

sum m ary judgm ent that Bruce had f iled. ¶5. On Ju n e 1 3 , 2 0 1 4 , J u d g e S andy Steckler presided over a hearing on the issue of

tem porary relief

. 2 Both p arties sought both the use and possession of the m arital h om e and custody of the m inor child. 3 Num erous exhibits were introduced a t the hearing, including Paula’s Rule 8.05 f

inancial statem ent, 4 Paula’s tax inf orm ation f

rom 2010, 2011, and 2012,

2 T h e c ase w as o rig in ally a ssig n ed t o J u d g e Jim P erso n s, w h o recu s e d o n A p r il 7 , 2 0 1 4

. T h e case w as th en reassig n ed to Ju d g e Jen n i f er S ch lo eg e l. Ju d g e S ch lo eg el recu sed o n A p ril 1 6 , 2 0 1 4 , an d th e case w as reassig n e d to Ju d g e S teck ler.

3 T h e d a y b ef

o re th e h earin g , Ju d g e S t eck ler h eard t estim o n y f r o m th e ch ild in h is ch am b ers.

4 U n if o rm C h an cery

C o u rt R u le 8 .0 5

. 3and Bruce’s Rule 8.05 f inancial statem e nt. Paula’s Rule 8.05 f inancial statem ent disclosed that her t otal m onthly incom e was $0. 5 She testif i ed t hat she was wholly dependent on Bruce f or f inancial support. Paula also t e s t i f i e d that she was the child’s prim ary c are giver.
Bruce’s Rule 8.05 f

inancial statem ent disclosed that h is t otal gross mo n t h l y i ncom e was $12,563.09. But his n et incom e was $10,260. Further, Bruce’s Rule 8.05 f inancial statem ent showed that he was responsible f or nearly all of the couple’s expenses, nam ely t he m ortgage, hom e m aintenance, utility bills, groceries, household expenses, and child expenses. Bruce listed his total m onthly expenses as $14,783.82. B r u c e t e s tif i ed that he served as the president of Coast Managem ent Sy stem s LLC, a m anagem e nt com p any f or various trucking

com panies. At the close of the hearing, J udge Steckler issued a bench ruling, ordering that Paula have t em

p orary sole custody of the m inor child and tem p orary use and possession of the m a rital hom e. 6 Judge Steckler f urther stated that Bruce was “to c ontinue pay ing
every thing tha t h e ’ s p a y ing now. I want him to keep every thing status quo.” Despite the bench ruling, no written tem porary order was ever e ntered. A n ew judge t ook over the case, and, on October 3, 2016, he entered a written tem porary order. ¶6. On October 9 , 2014, the c ourt entered an order a ppointing CPA Christy Pickering as the court’s expert. T he court appointed P ickering to investigate “the various com panies and

5 P au la w as th e d irecto r an d o w n er o f th e P ass C h ristian S o a p C o m p an y . S h e testif

ied th at th e co m

p an y d id n o t g en e rate an y p ro f its.

6 B ru ce w as allo w ed to rem ain in th e m a rital h o m e f o r o n e w eek to allo w h im t im e to m a k e altern ativ e liv in g arran g em en ts. 4trust that the husband has som e interest in and also t he soap c om pany and the f

ilm com pany that t he wif

e has som e interest in [ and] determ ine the value o f the c om panies and the parties’ interest in those com

panies f or court purposes in a divorce.” The court explained that “both parties believe the other p arty is m aking m ore mo n e y t han reported; theref ore, the Court directs t hat both p a rties’ f

inancial inf

orm ation about the c om

panies sh o u l d b e transparent and
f orthright through discovery and through the work of

the f orensic expert.” ¶7. On January 2 6, 2015, Picker i n g s e n t l e t t e r s t o B r u c e ’ s a t t o r n e y r e q u e s t ing docum entation f

rom twelv e c o mp a n ies in w hich he h eld an alleged f i nancial interest.
Between M ay 11, 2015 and May 21, 2015, twenty -f our subpoenas d

uces tecum were issued

to the respective com

panies, requesting s p e c i f i c f i nancial docum ents. On May 29, 2015, attorney Michael Hollem an f iled a special a

ppearance, m otion to quash and f or a protective order, and other relief on behalf of all twelve com panies. The com

panies denied that Bruce held a ny f

inancial intere s t i n t w o o f the com panies and a lso c laim e d that Pickering had exhibited bias against Bruce and t he com panies and t hat h er investigation had been tainted by the use of

“illegally obtained data” f

rom Paula’s attorney

. On June 10, 2 015, Pickering

sent a letter to J udge Steckler deny ing the all e g a t i o n s s et f orth in the com

panies’ m otion. Pickering also hired an attorney to def end her against those allegations. ¶8. O n July 15 and July 1 6, 2015, the court held a hearing on the m oti o n t o q u a s h a n d heard partial testim ony f r om both s ides. Ther e a f ter, the court determ ined that Bruce “serve[ d] as president o f the nineteen to twenty businesses, b oth lim ited liability com panies

5(LLCs) and corporations.” The court f urther determ ined that Bruce has a f inancial interest in several of the LLCs or c orporations individually and that all the businesses f unction in a
group. Ultim at e ly , the court held in abey ance i ts d ecision on the m otion to quash pending
f inal testim ony f

rom bot h s i d e s. In the m eantim e, the c o urt ordered P ickering, Hollem an, Bru ce’s attorney , and Paula’s attorney to go to each business, download any and all el e c t r o n i c data, m ake copies of any p hy sical records r equested by Pickering, and take the inf orm ation to the chancery clerk’s of f ice f or saf e storage. ¶9. On August 17, 2015, Bruce and Hollem an, on behalf of the com panies, f i led a joint

m otion f or recusal o f Judge S teckler as a r esult of com m ents the j udge m ade at the previous hearing. On Septem

ber 10, 2015, Judge Steckler entered a sealed order and recused him self
f rom t he case and was later replaced by Judge Michael W ard. On Novem ber 16, 2015, Judge
W a rd held a h earing on the oral tem p orary order by J u d g e S t eckler f rom the original

tem porary hearing date of J u n e 13, 2014. B ruce’s attorney sought clarif ication on what
Bruce needed to pay t o “ ma i n t a i n the status q uo” since a tem

porary order had never been entered and the oral order was vague. Judge W a r d questioned both attorney s as to why no order had bee n e n tered, and Paula’s attorney s tated that “there were o bjections to various things when an o rder was presented.” The court held f o ur other hearings between March 18, 2016, and August 23, 2016, t o determ ine what the June 13, 2014 ruling encom p assed. At the April 22, 2016 hearing, Paula testif ied that Bruce had stopped m aking pay m ents to her the

m onth prior.

6¶10. Finally , m o re t han two y ears af ter the hearing on October 3, 2016, the court entered

a nunc pro tunc tem

porary order requiring Bruce to “continue to p a y a n [ y ] and all debts, obligations and e xpenses he w as pay ing prior to June 13, 2014.” S im ilar t o Judge Steckler’s bench r uling, Judge W ard’s ruling did not s pecif y any e xact am ounts or a n y o f the exact obligations that Bruce was expected to pay

. ¶11. The f

ollowing day , O ctober 4, 2016, Paula f iled a m otion f

or contem pt against Bruce. Paula’s m o tion f

or c ontem pt alleged that Bruce violated the “tem porary m atter as o f October 3, 2 016 and m ad e nunc p ro tunc to J une 13, 2014.” Specif ically , t he m otion alleged that
Bruce was in arrears f

or $2,500 per m onth i n c hild support ( a total am ount of $20,000) and the other expenses B ruce h ad stopped pay ing. The contem pt m otion alleged Bruce was in

contem pt f or f ailure to pay

all of the expenses listed in his Rule 8.05 f inancial statem ent at the June 13, 2014 hearing. Yet, Bruce’s Rule 8.05 f inancial s tatem en t never listed $2,500
in m onthly chi l d s u p p o r t, and the court never ordered that support o bligation. T he words “child s upport” are not m entioned in the oral ruling o n June 1 3, 2 014, or the w ri t t e n o r d er

on October 3, 2016. This b e com es vitally im por t a n t in addressing the contem pt order and the incarceration of

Bruce f or f a ilure to pay that support. ¶12. On Septem

ber 15, 2016, Bruce f

iled a m otion f

or sum m ary judgm ent and sanctions. Specif ically , B ruce argued that Paula had f ailed t o o b

ject or respond to t he requests f or adm issions f

iled on April 25, 2014. Paula subsequently f iled a response to Bruce’s m otion,

as well as a m otion requesting r elief under M ississippi R ule o f C i v i l Procedure 36(b),

7allowing am endm ents to untime l y adm issions. The court heard the m atter on O ctober 5,

2016. The f

ollowing day , the court entered an order deny ing Bruce’s m otion f or sum m ary judgm ent but also stated “the c ourt f inds that a ll requests f

or a dm issions as adm itted at this tim e.” T hose “ adm itted” requests f or adm issions essentially tracked t he standard f or habitual cruel and inhum an treatm ent under Mississippi law and denied the required f acts. ¶13. On April 2 6 , 2 0 1 6 , the court entered an order approving P ickering’s interim bill of $28,657.65. T he court f

urther ordered that each p a r t y w as responsible f or pay ing half the bill—$14,328.83—no later than May 15, 2016. Neither party com plied. ¶14. On October 25, 2 0 16, the c ourt entered an order based on an agreem ent between the parties regarding P ickering’s f ees, which they f

ailed to pay in com

p liance with the April 26,
2016 order. The order stated that Bruce agreed to pay Pickering $14,428.82 plus i nterest at the annual rate of f

ive p ercent, and Paula agreed to pay Pickering $16,550.70 plus interest

at the annual rate o f f

ive p ercent. Bruce and Paula also agreed to split Pickering’s attorney ’s f ees of $900. ¶15. Bruce was term i nated f rom his job on August 12, 2015, and claim ed his f iring was due

to the advers a r i a l n ature o f the divorce proceedings and specif ically alleged that Paula’s

“ a c t ions along with t hose of her a ttorney and the court’s expert have cost Mr. Lindsay hi s

em ploy m ent.” 7 On Novem

ber 2 8, 2016, Bruce f

iled f or bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the

7 B ru ce m ad e th is alleg atio n in h is m o tio n f o r tem p o rary relief f

iled o n S ep tem

b er 1 , 2 0 1 5

. 8Bankruptcy Code, i nitiating an autom atic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 3 6 2 ( a ) ( 2 0 1 2 ). On

January 18, 2017, Paula f iled a motion f

or relief f r om t he a utom atic stay , a n d o n February 27, 2017, t h e b a n k r uptcy court entered an order granting her m otion, allowing Paula to proceed i n her state cou r t p r o c e edings with r espect to t he f ollowing: “(1) dissolution of

m arri a g e , (2) custody of t he m inor child, (3) alim ony , m aintenance a nd/or s upport f rom property that was not property of the bankruptcy estate, and (4) determ ination of equitable division of m arital p roperty .” Furtherm ore, the order provided that “the autom atic stay shall

rem ain in f

ull f orce and ef

f ect and this court reserves e xclusive jurisdiction with r espect to: (1) enf orcem e nt of a judgm ent in the chancery c ourt case to the extent it af f ects property of the bankruptcy estate, and (2) approval a n d e n t r y o f any consensual property settlem ent
agreem ent which a f

f ects property of the bankruptcy estate.” As a r esult, Paula proceeded on her m otion f

or contem pt and com

plaint f or divorce in this action. ¶16. On March 22, 2017, Picker i n g f i l e d h e r p r o o f o f claim in Bruce’s bankruptcy proceedings f

or the am ount Bruce owed i n expert f ees. On April 14, 2017, s h e f iled an adversary proce e d ing in B ruce’s bankruptcy action b y f iling a com

plaint objecting to dischargeability

pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) and § 523(a)(15) (2012). ¶17. The c ourt h eld several hearings between May 2, 2017, and Septem ber 19, 2017. Part of those h earings involved Pickering and her repeated ef f orts to gain inf

orm ation regarding both parties’ f

inancial inf

orm ation, particularly Bruce’s and h i s involvem ent with the previously

m entioned com

panies. On August 24, 2 017, Bruce’s attorney f iled a m otion to

9withdraw, which the c ourt g ranted on Septem ber 19, 2017, at the beginning of the hearing

on Paula’s m otion f

or contem pt. On Septem

b er 21, 2017, the court entered an order stating that since the June 13, 2014 ruling,
B r u c e was required to pay $500 per week, to pay the house note, to p ay f o r house and p ool m aintenance, and t o pay all utilities, all of which he was pay ing prior to June 13, 2014. As of the date of the hearing on the m otion bef o re the court, Bruce is f

ound by a clear p reponderance of the evidence to be in a rrears som e $77,657. 25, com

prised of $37,500 in unpaid support, $27,026.03 in house notes he has not p aid, $10,500 in h ouse and pool m aintenance expenses he has not paid, and $2,631.22 in unpaid utility bills. The court did not item ize what length of tim e m ade up the “$37,500 in unpaid support” or exactly w hat ty

pe of support Bruce f

a iled to pay

—child, s p ousal, or both. Again, Paula’s

m otion f o r contem

p t alleged $20,000 in owed child support, but the court never indicate d what previous order m andated that support or whether that was part o f the $37,500 it f ound
Bruce owed in support. 8 Ultim ately , the c ourt held B ruce in contem pt in the total am ount of $77,657.25. Additionally , t he court ordered t hat Bruce pay Paula the f ull am o unt b y October 19, 2017, in addition to $5,000 f or her attorney ’s f

ees. T he court m ade c lear that Bruce had until O ctober 1 9, 2017, to purge h im self of the contem pt by pay ing the $77,657.25, or he would be incarcerated. ¶18. The court held a hearing on the contem pt order on October 19, 2017. Bruce appeared

at the hearing pro se and provided the court w i t h a n a pproxim a te incom e sum m ary dated

8 N eith er th e o ral tem

p o rary o rd e r n o r th e w ritten t em p o r a r y o rd er m en tio n an y am o u n t o f

sp o u sal o r ch ild su p p o rt. 1 0January 1, 2017, to Septem ber 30, 2017, which showed his total incom e as $20,516. At the close of the hearing, the court issued the f o llowing bench ruling:
I f ind that M r. Lindsay has f ailed to pay the support as previously ordered by the court of the $500 p e r w e e k

. I c o unt 19 weeks t here t hrough the 15th of October of 2017. That’s a total of 9,500. H e f ailed to pay house n otes in the am ount of $12,416, house and pool m aintenance of $3 , 3 0 6

. 6 0 , utilities of $2,590.82 f

or a total o f 27,813.42 f

or w h ic h judgm ent is granted i n f a vor of Ms. Lindsay

. Now, I do, in addition, f ind that there has been no showing with any particularity by Mr. Lindsay that he can’t pay at least a part of that which he is required to pay , and there has not been a c o p p e r coin paid f or m o nths, about a y ear n o w. I f

ind that he is, by his f

ailure t o pay even this o ne penny in support, t hat he’s i n willf

ul, obstinate, contum acious contem pt, and now owes a total of $ 105,470.67. Now , Mr. Lindsay shall stand incarcerated at the Harrison County Jail until such tim e as he shall pay said am ount. (Em phasis added). That sam e day , the trial court entered its written order of contem pt and order f or i ncarceration, f

inding t hat Bruce Lindsay had f ailed to purge his contem

pt or prove his inability to pay . Bruce was placed in the county jail f or his f ailure to pay . At the tim e of that hearing, it is undisputed that Bruce had no lawy e r , was no longer em ploy ed at his job, and had a pending bankruptcy petition. ¶19. On Novem

ber 1, 2017, Bruce was transported f r om jail f or a h earing on his c ontem pt. At the beginning of t he hearing, Bruce stated, “ I’m n ot able to pay the order. At this point,
I’m requesting an attorney

appointed by

the court, and to be r eleased.” The judge asked if
Bruce had access to the library , and he respond e d “ n o . ” Bruce c ontinued, “[ T]his is an
extrem ely com

plex case . . . I am asking, again, f or a court-appointed attorney .” The judge

1 1explained that because the c ase w as civil, he was “powerless” to appoint an a t torney

. 9 Bruce

responded, “I’m not a c rim inal and this has been rough a nd I’m in w ith c onvicted f elons and, additionally , I ’ ve gotten sick this week

. . . I don’t see h ow I can m ake headway without an attorney .” The court t old Bruce t o m eet with Paula and her attorney t o determ ine if the issues in the divorce could be resolved. Later, af ter a recess, the contem

pt hearing was transf

orm ed into a d ivorce hearing w hen Bruce agreed to the term s of t he divorce settlem e n t. As part of the agreem ent, Bruce agreed to deed to Paula the m arital hom e and all its b elongings, pay of f the m ortgage on t he m arital hom e , d e e d the c o uple’s t ownhom e t o Paula and pay of f the

m ortgage, and then pay Paula r ent if Bruce stay ed there, pay $1,400 in m onthly child support, and approxim ately $905,470.67 in lum p-sum alim ony , which included t he contem pt am ount of $105,470.67. Bruce f

u r ther agreed to pay Paula’s a t torney ’ s f ees to be determ ined later. Finally , d espite a previous o rder f rom c ourt directing each party to e ach pay half of Pickering’s expert f

ees, Bruce agreed to pay all o f Pickering’s f ees and attorney ’s f

ees on or

9 In T u rn er v. R o g ers , 5 6 4 U .S

. 4 3 1 , 4 4 6 ( 2 0 1 1 ), t h e U n ited S t a t e s S u p rem e C o u rt stated th at th e D u e P ro cess C lau se o f th e U n ited S tates C o n stitu tio n d o es n o t au to m atically req u ire p ro v id in g c o u n s el in cert a i n c i v il p ro ceed in g s w h ere in carceratio n is th reaten ed

. Wh en d e cid in g w h eth er o r n o t co u n sel w o u l d b e req u ired , th e co u rt m u st tak e i n t o acco u n t th e o p p o sin g in terests, as w ell a s c o n sid er if “ad d itio n a l o r su b stitu te p ro ced u r al saf eg u ard s” w e re p resen t. Id

. In T

u rn er , th e U n ited S tates S u p rem e C o u rt rev e r sed a d ef en d an t’s o rd er o f in carceratio n b ecau se h e h ad n o law y er a n d “d id n o t receiv e clear n o tice th at h is ab ility to p ay w o u ld co n stitu te th e critical q u estio n in h is civ i l co n tem p t p ro ceed in g . ” Id . at 4 4 9

. T h e S u p rem e C o u rt also n o ted th at th e d ef en d an t w a s n o t p ro v id ed w ith a f o r m d esig n ed to elicit in f o rm atio n ab o u t h is f

in an cial circu m stan ces, an d th e trial co u rt d id n o t sp ecif ically d eterm in e if th e d e f

en d an t w as u n ab le to p a y h is arrearag e. Id

. D esp ite r eq u estin g an atto rn ey b e p r o v id ed , B ru ce d id n o t raise th is issu e o n ap p e al. 1 2bef

ore March 1, 2 018, w ith t he exact am ount to b e determ ined later. T he c ourt reserv ed ruling on the exact am o unt u ntil f urther determ ination as to Pickering’s expert f ees. Af ter the property settlem ent agreem e nt w a s r e a d i nto the record b y Paula’s attorney , Paula was called t o the witness stand and provided testimo n y o n Bruce’s alleged h abitual cruel and inhum an treatm ent. The court f o und the evidence suf

f icient and granted Paula a divorce on that ground. The court entered a written judgm ent of divorce on Novem

b er 17, 2017. ¶20. Pickering f

iled h er m otion f

or assessm ent o f f

ees and e x penses i n the c h ancery court

o n N o v e m

b er 17, 2017, requesting a ruling on t he balance Bruce owed. The court held a hearing on Decem

ber 6, 2017, to determ ine t he exact am ount owed t o Pickerin g and her attorney

. On February 16, 2018, the court entered a n order awarding Pickering expert f ees in the am ount of $39,328.48 and attorney ’s f ees in the am ount of $34,658.08, which the court f ou n d w e r e “ n ecessarily i ncurred as a proxim ate result of B ruce Lindsay ’s actions in threate n i n g to f

ile suit against P ickering in her capacity as court appointed expert and in resisting the ef

f orts of Pickering to ascertain the f inancial condition of Bruce Lindsay .” The court f urther ordered Bruce to pay the entire am ount. ¶21. Bruce no w a p p e a l s f r om t he divorce judgm e nt, i ncluding the provisions regarding Paula’s attorney ’s f

ees and Pickering’s expert f ees and litigation costs.
STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶22. “In d o me s t i c - relation cases, our review is l im ited to whether the chancery court’s f indings were m anif

e stly wrong or clearly erroneous, or the court applied the wrong legal

1 3s t a ndard.” Gwathney v
. G wathney , 208 So. 3d 1087, 1088 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. A pp. 2017). I f

substantial evidence in the record supports the c hancellor’s f indings o f f

act, we will not disturb his decision. Id.
ANALYSIS
1. Contem pt Order ¶23. “Civil contem

pt o rders enf

orce a private party ’s rights or com pel com pliance with a
court’s order.” Hans h a w v. Hanshaw , 5 5 S o. 3d 143, 147 (¶13) (Miss. 2011). “Failure to

com ply with a court order is prim a f acie evidence of contem

pt.” Evans v. E

vans , 75 So. 3d 1083, 1087 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011). “Bef ore a party m ay be held in contem p t f or f ailure

to com p l y with a j udgm ent, ‘the judgm ent m ust be com

plete within itself

[ ,] leaving open no

m atter or description or designat i o n o u t of which contention m ay arise as to m eaning.’”
Davis v. Davis , 829 So. 2 d 712, 714 (¶9) (Miss. C t. App. 2002) (quoting W ing v. W ing , 549
So. 2d 944, 947 (Miss. 1989)). “A contem pt c itation is p roper only when the contem ner has wilf ully and deliberately ignored t he order o f t he c ourt.” Lewis v. Pagel , 172 So. 3d 162, 178 (¶39) (Miss. 2015) (quoting Gaiennie v. M cMillin , 138 So. 3d 131, 136 (¶13) (Miss. 2014)). Further, “[ t]his Court will not r everse a contem pt citation where the chancellor’s f indings are supported by substantial c redible evidence.” W itters v. W itters , 864 So. 2d 999, 1004 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2004) (citing Varner v. Varner , 666 So. 2d 493, 496 (Miss. 1995)). ¶24. “A def

endant m ay avoid a judgm ent of contem pt by e stablishing that he is without the present ability to discharge his obligations. However, i f t he c ontem nor raises inability to pay

1 4as a def

ense, the burden is on h im to show this with particularity , not just in general term s.”
Varner , 666 So. 2d at 496 (citation om itted). ¶25. H e r e , t h e t r i a l c o u rt held Bruce i n contem pt of the October 1 3, 201 6 w r i t t e n
tem porary order entered nunc pro tunc to June 13, 2 014. At the June 1 3, 2014 h earing, the

court exam ined B ruce’s Rule 8.05 f inancial statem ent and heard testim ony f rom both Bruce and Paula. At t he close of the hearing, Judge Steckler indicated his ruling was not com plete, stating, “But I want to m e et again with both attorney s early next week and go over it and then we’ll f inish this order.” He continued “[ B]etween now . . . and t he tim e that I enter another order, he is to continue to pay every thing that he’s pay ing now .” (Em phasis a dded). His b e n ch ruling m ade no m ention of the exact am ount of child support, t he e x act am ount o f spousal support, hom e m ortgage n otes, house m aintenance f or the pool or y ard, o r any other specif ic am ount f

o r a specif

ic obligation that Bruce was to pay

. ¶26. W h at Bruce was actually p ay i ng at t he tim e of June 13, 2014 hearing i s unclear f rom the record. His Rule 8.05 f i nancial statem ent f

rom that hearing shows he was pay ing over $14,000 per m onth in e xpenses despite only having $10,260.76 in net incom e. Further, his Rule 8.05 f

inancial statem ent does not m ention a n y a mo u n t of child support or spousal support, b oth of which he w as l ater held in contem p t f or not p ay ing. The vague nature of the

tem porary order continued with the new chancery judge’s equally vague ruling—the October 3, 2016 w ritten order—that Bruce “continue to p ay an[ y ] and all deb t s , o b l i gations and

e xpenses he was pay ing prior to June 13, 2014.” The specif ic am ounts f

o r what sp e c i f

i c

1 5obligations that Bruce w as required to pay and f or w hich he was h eld in contem pt f or not
p a y i n g w e r e n ot “com

plete w ithin the judgm ent.” In other words, Bruce was held in

contem pt and incarcerated f

or not pay i ng obligations t hat were never specif ically set f

o r th within the f

o ur c orners of the oral ruling on June 13, 2014, or the written t em porary order entered by a dif

f erent judge on O ctober 3 , 2016. The w ritten ord e r s i m ply u sed sim ilar language g iven b y J udge Steckler f rom the June 13, 2014 hearing. I f we l ooked only to the

tem porary orders, it would be im possible to know what exactly Bruce had been ordered to
pay and i n what am ounts. The order s a r e v a g u e a n d conf u sing. At the second contem pt proceeding on October 19, 2017, bef ore he was o r d e r e d t o be i ncarcerated, B ruce said as

m uch when he argued pro se to the court the f o llowing: My point, I guess, is t h a t i t ’ s c e r t ainly not willf u l. There’s a lack of m oney . Additionally , I think the r e w a s def initely conf

usion over this to this d ay , but there certainly was conf

usion t hrough the dif

f erent m eetings, conf

erences . . . and hearings and no written order by Judge Steckler. ¶27. Sim

ply put, t he language in the oral order f r om the bench a nd the written order entered

over t wo y ears later never m ention any specif i c t y pe of obligation or in what am ount that obligation is to be paid. In f act, the words child support, spousal support, hom e m ortgage, and lawn or pool m aintenance, or any specif ic m o netary amo u n t s f

or a ny of those obligations, are never m entioned in either orders. At t he J une 13, 2 0 1 4 h e a ring, the court sim ply said to “pay every

thing that he’s pay ing n ow[ ,]” a nd t he October 3, 2017 written order sim ply stated, “ [ P]ay any and

. . . all debts, obligations, and expenses he was pay ing prior to June 1 3 , 2 0 1 4

. ” This Court h as m ade clear that the “ judgm ent m

ust be com

p lete within
1 6itself

[ ,]

. . . leaving open no m atter or d escription or designation out of which contention m ay arise as to m eaning.” Davis , 829 S o. 2d at 714 (¶9) (quoting W ing , 549 So. 2 d at 947). The

m eaning of the oral order f rom the bench on June 13, 2014, and the written order try ing to reduce to writing that o r al order w as not clear a nd certainly not “com plete” within itself

. Ord e r s f rom courts, whether oral or written, should not be so vague as to p revent a reasonable person f

rom understanding its clear legal ef f e c t or the potential f

or contem pt in
f ailing to abide by its term s. Those term s should be clearly def ined within t he f

our corners of the order in an ef

f ort to c ause “ contention [ that] m ay arise as to m e aning.” Id

. The

tem porary orders i n this c ase were overly vague, a m biguous, and unclear as to exactly what

was required to be paid. Theref o re, the order o f c o n t e m

pt against Bruce in the am ount of $105,470.67 is hereby reversed.
2. Divorce Judgm ent

a. Ground for Divorce ¶28. Bruce argues that the chancellor erre d w h e n g r a n t i ng P aula’s r equest f o r a divorce based o n habitual cruel and inhum an treatm ent. At t rial, Paula bore the burden to prove her
f ault-based ground f

or divorce by a preponderance of the evidence. Daigle v. Daigle , 626
So. 2d 140, 144 (Miss. 1993). The Mississippi Suprem e Court has c l assif i ed habitual cruel and inhum an treatm ent as the f o llowing: Conduct that (1) endangers life, lim b or health , or c reate s a r easonable apprehension of such danger, rendering t h e relationship unsaf e f or the o f f e n d ed party , o r (2) is so unnatural and infam ous as to m a ke t he m arriage revolting to the offended spouse and render it im possible f or t hat
1 7spouse to d ischarge the duties of m arriage, t hus destroy ing t he b a s i s f o r its continuance.
Pittman v. Pittman , 195 So. 3d 727, 732 (¶13) (Miss. 2 016) (em phasis add e d ) ( i nternal quotation m arks om itted) (cit i n g Richard v. Richard , 711 So. 2d 884, 888 (Miss. 1998)). Additionally , the conduct m ust be m ore than m ere unkindness, lack of af f e ction, or incom patibility , and i t m

ust be r outine and continuous. Id

. “Although cruel an d inhum an
treatm ent usually m

ust be shown to have been sy stem a tic and continuous, a s ingle incident

m ay provide grounds f

or divorce.” Kumar v. Kumar , 976 So. 2d 9 57, 9 61 ( ¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Rakestraw v
. Rakestraw , 717 So. 2d 1284, 1287 ( ¶8) (Miss. C t

. App. 1998)). ¶29. Thus, “[

j]ustice requires that the chancellor’s prim a r y inquiry m

u st be into the ground
f or divorce with a dual f

ocus upon 1) the conduct of t he of f ending spouse and 2 ) t he im pact of that conduct upon the plaintif f .” Fisher v. Fisher , 771 So. 2d 364, 367 (¶10) (Miss. 2000) (citing Daigle , 626 S o. 2d at 144). The d uel-f o cus inquiry is subjective, and “we concentrate on the conduct’s ef

f ect on the particular of

f ended spouse.” Gwathney , 208 So. 3d at 1089 (citing Harmon v. Harmon , 141 So. 3d 37, 42 (¶16) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014)). The Mississippi Suprem e Court has held that the standard of proof is steep b ut “certainly not im possible to satisf y .” Holladay v. Holladay , 776 So. 2d 662, 677 (¶65) (Miss. 2000). ¶30. This Court requi r e s c o r r o b o r a t i on of the of f e n sive conduct com

p lained of by

the

m ovi n g p a r t y w hen seeking a divorce b ased on the ground o f habitual cruel and inhum a n
t r e a t me nt, except in u nusual c ases such as isolation. Rawson v. Buta , 609 So. 2d 426 , 4 3 1
1 8(Miss. 1992); H e a t h e r l y v
. Heatherly , 914 S o. 2d 754, 7 57 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005). Additionally , “ t h e c o rroborating evidence need not be suf f icient in itself to establish the ground” but rat h e r “ n e e d o nly provide enough s upporting f acts f or a court to conclude that the plaintif

f ’s testim ony is true.” 10 Deborah H

. Bell, Bell on Mississippi Family Law § 4.02[ 8 ] [ d ] , at 74 (2005) (citing Anderson v. Anderson , 1 90 Miss. 508, 200 So. 726, 728 (1941)). ¶31. Here, the evidence of Bruce ’ s c o n d u c t e s s e n t i a l l y c a me d i r ectly f rom Paula’s testim o ny . At the f

inal divorce he a r i ng on Novem ber 1 , 2017, Paula described Bruce’s behavior as f

o llows:
He was condescending and m ean-spirited. [ I]n the f i rst part of the m arriage, he was—he w a s f

ine, a nd t hen he started

. . . as soon as he [ becam e f inancially stable and m ore pow e r f

ul], he started becom ing very belligerent. He w ould leave constantly and not have f am il y t i m e t o gether and he would – he started getting to where he would get in m y f ace and scream a nd in m y daughter’s f a ce a nd just—just condescending

. . . . I m ean, I would try to f ix d i n n e r e v e r y af ternoon when he’d com e hom e and som etim es he would just take it and push it back into the garbage can. ¶32. Counsel f

or Paula s tated, “I’m n ot going to go into e very thing because I’m just t ry ing

to put on just enough proof to satisf y the statute.” The court determ ined t hat it had suf f icient

10 In Ju ly 2 0 1 7 , th e M ississip p i L eg islatu re am e n d e d M i s sissip p i C o d e A n n o tated sectio n 9 3 -5 -1 ( R ev . 2 0 1 8 ) to in clu d e “sp o u sal ab u s e” w ith in th e term “h ab itu al cru el an d in h u m a n t r e a t me n t .” 2 0 1 7 M iss. L aw s ch

. 4 2 7 , § 6 (S .B

. 2 6 8 0 ). T h e L e g i slatu re f u rth er stated th at “[ s] p o u sal d o m estic ab u se m ay b e estab lish ed t h ro u g h th e reliab l e testim o n y o f a sin g le c r ed ib le w itn ess . . . .” Id

. E v en u n d e r t h e a m en d m e n t to t h e statu te, th e lim i ted testim o n y o f P au la, w i th o r w ith o u t co rro b o rated ev id en ce, w a s i n s u f f icien t to estab lish h ab itu al cru el an d in h u m an treatm en t u n d er M ississip p i law

. 1 9evidence and granted a divorce on the ground of habitual and cruel and inhum an treatm ent.

The r ecord l acks any other evidence that would rise to t he level of habitual cruel and inhum a n
treatm ent. Interestingly , a t the August 23, 2016 tem porary order hearing, Paula testi f i e d , under oath, as f

ollows: Q: He was a good husband?
A: Yes, he w as a good husband. Q: Okay

. A: He sure w as. Q: Good [ p]rovider?
A: Yes, he was. Q: Okay . He took care of y ou?
A: Yes. And I took care of him

. Q: And took care of

the child?
A: Yes. And so did I. Q: Okay

. A: I w as very good to him

. And I thought he w as very good t o m e , t oo. Q: Okay

. And y ou wanted to stay m arried to him , but ac c o rding to y o ur testim ony until he at Christm a s of 2014 said, we need to go o ur separate way s?
A: Yes. ( Em phasis added). Also at t hat sam e hearing, P aula s tated that “October is when I decided

2 0that I didn’t want to be with him any longer. I knew that h e w as cheating on m e and he knew

that I knew i t

. ” T h e claim of knowledge in Paula’s previous testim ony directly contradicts her subsequent testim ony in the Novem

ber 1, 2017 f

inal divorce hearing: Q: Up till today , do y ou know whether or not he has com m itted adultery ?
A: I’m not sure. I ’ve suspected highly

. I m ean, I don’t have photographs, but I’ve had people tell m e a n d so f orth and I j u s t

—

just the t reatm ent and the way he was pulling away , also. ¶33. At a hearing on October 5, 2016, Paula stated i n her answer to interrogatories that in 2012, she had a stress-related heart attack f rom Bruce’s conduct but never s tated exactly what conduct of Bruce’s caused her heart attack. Paula provided no corroboration to her claim s of

stress or em otional abuse by Bruce. In prior h a b i t u a l-cruel-and-inhum a n -treatm ent cases,

em otional a

buse w as suf

f i c i e ntly evidenced b y m edical experts or m edical records corroborating t he plaintif

f ’s testim ony . Faries v. Faries , 607 So. 2d 1 204, 1 209 (Miss. 1 992) (holding that the p laintif

f ’s t estim ony of the def

endant’s em otional abuse, corroborated b y a

m edical expert’s f

indings, was suf

f icient evidence). Af

ter review, we f

ind that the evidence presented as to habitual cruel a nd inhum an treatm e nt does not rise to the l evel required by the law of the State of

Mississippi. ¶34. Further, Paula f

ailed to respond t o Bruce’s requests f o r adm issions. On April 25, 2014, Bruce propounded the f

ollowing requests f

o r adm issions to Paula: REQUEST TO ADM IT NO. 10: P lease adm it that y o ur husband does not want a divorce;

. . . . 2 1REQUE S T T O A DMIT NO. 12: Please adm it t hat y our husband has never

engaged in conduct that created in y ou f ear f or y our lif

e; R E Q U E S T TO ADMIT NO. 13: Please adm it t hat y our husband has never engaged in conduct that created in y ou f ear f or y our health; REQUEST TO ADMIT N O. 14: Please a dm it that y our husband has never, during t he c ourse of y our m arriage, engaged i n conduct that was unnatural; and REQUEST TO ADMIT N O. 1 5: Please adm it that y our husband has never, during the course of

y our m arriage, engaged in conduct that was inf am ous. T h e above adm i ssions dem onstrate a stark contrast to the testim ony of f ered at the divor c e proceedings. It is im

portant to note that t h e r e q u e sts f or adm i ssions tracked the caselaw def ining habit u a l c r

u e l a n d inhum an treatm ent. Paula did not attem pt t o deny t hem until
Bruce f iled a m o tion f

o r sum m ary judgm ent partly based on those requests f or adm issions. The court deem ed those requests f o r adm issions adm i tted by written order on October 6, 2016. The court f

ound “all requests f

or adm issions as a dm itted at this tim e.” The court never issued another order allowing an untim ely denial of those requests f or adm iss i o ns or granting a

m otion to alter or am end the order ref erenced above. ¶35. Rule 36 of

the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure states that an untim ely response
to requests f

or adm issions results in the m atters being d eem ed adm itted. Rule 36(b) states that “[ a]ny m atter adm itted under this rule is conclusively established u nless the c o urt on m otion
perm its withdrawal or am endm e nt of the adm ission.” Id. ( em phasis added). The Mississippi Suprem e Court has “reiterated that Rule 36 is to be enf orced d espite the f

act that harsh
consequences m ight r esult[ .]” DeBlanc v. Stancil , 814 So. 2d 796, 801 (¶23) (Miss. 2002).

2 2Thus, Rule 36 “is m eant t o provide, and should provide, an authoritative ma n n e r of

procedure.” Id. ¶36. In DeBlanc , the Mississippi Suprem e Court noted that trial courts are given a degree of discretion in granting am endm ents o r allowing withdr a w a l s o f a dm issions in proper circum stances to am eliorate harsh applications of the rule. Id. The suprem e court, however, recognized that “[ m ] echanism s exist whereby a trial court m ay hold that an untim ely response does not constitute a d eem ed adm ission because the trial court has broad discretion in pretrial

m atters.” Id. (em

phasis added). But, f

o r cases involving “unexplained, untim ely responses, the a ppellate courts of this state unanim ously have e m phasized that Rule 3 6 is to be enf orced according to its t erm s.” Dillon v
. PiCo Inc. , 239 So. 3d 527, 533 ( ¶16) (Miss. Ct. App. 2 017) (citing Y oung v. Smith , 67 So. 3d 732, 738 (¶10) (Miss. 2011)). ¶37. Here, Bruce ’ s c o u n s e l p r o p ounded requests f or adm issions along with a notice of service of discovery resp o n s e s to Paula’s counsel on April 25, 2014. At the subsequent hearing on J une 13, 2014, Bruce’s counsel asked the court to “take judicial notice that there

were [ requests] to adm i t t hat were propounded on April 25 that still have not b een r esponded to,” and Bruce’s counsel asked f or the c ourt to deem the r equests adm i tted. I nitially , Paula’s counsel claim ed they had answered the requests but acknowledged that his f i rm had recently hired a new secretary and would have to verif y . Af ter Bruce’s counsel d em onstrated that no answers had been f

i led, the chancellor reiterated Rule 36: Okay

. W ell, I ’m s ure y ou b oth kn o w t h e r ules with regard to that, that every thing would be, if it has not b een sen t i n , t h a t which

. . . has not been
2 3answered or denied would be presum ed to be adm i tted o r accepted as adm i tted.

Now, that’s an a nswer. You have the right to am end y our a n swer by a proper m otion to do t hat. And of course, there are som e guidelines f o r t hat as to good cause. S o, y ou all can l ook at that and we’ll t ake that issue up at another tim e. In spite of the chancellor’s advice in J une 2014, Paula’s counsel did not f ile f or relief under Rule 3 6 until October 4, 2016—two y ears later in an attem pt to respond to Bruce’s m otion f or

sum m ary judgm ent based on those requests f or adm i ssions. Ultim a t ely , as stated previously , the requests were deem ed adm itted in the order d eny ing s um m ary judgm ent in October 2016, but the chancellor never addressed the relief requested by

Paula under Rule 36. ¶38. On review, the adm i ssions were deem ed adm itted, and Paula testif ied at the August 2 3,
2016 hearing that Bruce was a “good husband.” And a t t he Novem ber 1, 2017 heari n g her

t e s t i m o n y w a s t

h at he was “condescending,” “m ean-spirited,” and som etim es threw her ho m e cooked d inners in the garbage can. Quite sim ply , Paula’s testim ony did not rise to the level of endangering “lif

e , lim b or health,” nor was it s o “unnatural and inf a m ous as to m ake the

m arriage revolting to the of f ended spouse.” See Pittman , 195 So. 3d at 7 32 (¶13). W e hold that Paul a’s testim ony , as set f orth in the record bef

ore this Court, was i nsuf

f icient to grant

a d ivorce on the ground of h abitual cruel and inhum an treatm e nt, and we theref ore reverse the grant of divorce and rem and this m atter to the chancery court.
b. Property Settlem ent Agreem ent ¶39. “It is well-established in Mississippi law that a property

- settlem e nt a g r e e me n t is a binding contract between t he parties.” W ilson v. W i lson , 53 So. 3d 865, 869 (¶13) (Miss. C t. App. 2011). Once the chancellor deem s the provisions t o provide adequately and suf f iciently
2 4f

or both parties, t he agreem ent becom es i ncorporated into the divorce judgm ent. Id. Thereaf ter, the agreem ent is “ n ot m odif iable absent f

raud, duress, or a contract provision allowing f

or m odif i cation.” Id. W ith t hat s aid, the Mississippi Suprem e Court has concisely def ined duress as it relates to contracts:
Duress strikes at whether a party actually consented to a contract. A d om inant party m ust conduct h im self or herself in a m anner that overrides the v olition of the weaker party

. [ A] deprivation of a party ’s f ree exercise of

his or her own will constitutes duress.
Estate of Davis v. O’Neill , 42 So. 3d 520, 525 (¶17) (Miss. 2010) (citing Askew v. A skew , 699
So. 2d 515, 5 18 (¶15) (Miss. 1997)). Im portantly , “provisions i n contracts contrary to public policy or where o b tained by overreaching, d uress, or undue influence are unenf orceable.”
I d. ( em phasis added) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Vicksburg v. Caruthers , 443 So. 2d 861, 864 n.3 (Miss. 1983)). ¶40. In W

ilson , this Court held t hat the wif e was n ot under d

uress due t o certain saf

eguards in plac e w h e n she signed t he contract. W ilson , 53 So. 3d at 870 ( ¶14). The saf eguards in place were having the presence o f her own attorney with readily available advice, tim ing, and being inf orm ed that the chancellor would hold a hearing that s am e day

. I d

. Sim ilarly , in
Estate o f Davis , 42 So. 3d at 525 (¶17), the aggrieved party alleged that t he threat of crim inal prosecution induced the p arty ’s agreem ent. The suprem e court, however, held there was “no legitim ate threat of c rim inal prosecution,” and the p arty did n ot produce evidence suggesting threat, coercion, or lack of suf f icient saf eguards. Id. ¶41. The Novem

ber 1 , 2017 hearing began as a h earing to determ in e w h e t h e r Bruce had
2 5purged his contem pt but was later transf

orm ed into a divorce proceeding. Bruce had been in jail since October 19, 2017, u nder the o rder to pay $105,470.67. Bruce h ad n o attorney

. The

court stated, “W ell why d o n’t we let y ou two talk and then we’ll worry about that in a little while, o k ay ? ” Apparently the parties m et o f f the record (out of the courtroom ) i n an attem pt to reach an agreem ent. Upon entering the courtroom , the f ollowing exchange occurred:
Mr. Teel: [ Bruce] has a n issue with som ething, and s o we’re at an im passe since we don’t have an agreem ent. The Court: Oh, we are at an im passe? Mr. Teel: Yeah. The Court: W ell, it’s set f or trial in January

—no, March. The Court: Y ou’ve got March or Jan u a r y ? A l l r i g h t , t h e n . T h a n k y o u .

W ell, I don’t see that there’s any other alternative that the C ourt has. I wonder, Mr. Lindsay , perhaps, I should bring y o u back in 30 day s to s ee if we have reached any kind of accord with regard to w hether or not y ou have b een able to pay t h e j udgem ent, w h e t h er y ’all settle t he case has nothing to do with— t o y o u incarceration.
Bruce: Your Honor— The Court: Just a second, sir. I’m going to get to y ou, I prom ise. The Court: I’m

going to set this f

or 8:45. Mr. Teel: Okay . Thank y ou. The Court: Yes, sir.
Bruce: I concede. I’ll agree. The Court: W ell, now—no, I d o n ’ t —I’m not at all certain that y ou want to
2 6do that, because it sounds t o me l i k e y ou are only doing that to get y ourself

out of jail. (Em phasis added). T he chancellor acknowledged that he did not want Bruc e t o s i g n the
agreem ent sim

ply to be released f

rom jail, reiterating that the contem p t and divorce settlem ent

were separate issues. However, B ruce’s only way out of jail was t o sign t he a g reem ent, which was the sole basis of the chancery court’s release order. ¶42. The p roperty settlem ent n egotiation and agreem ent occurred while Bruce w a s under

an order of i ncarceration. The only w ay to obtain release f rom t hat i ncarceration was to p ay Paul a $ 7 7,657.25 f

or the f irst contem

pt am ount, $5,000 f

or Paula’s attorney ’s f

ees, and $ 2 7,813.42 f

or the second contem

pt am ount. That m eans Bruce h ad t o pay $105 , 4 7 0

. 6 7 bef ore he could b e r e l e a s e d f r om jail. Bruce lost his job in 2015. Bruce l ost his lawy er in Septem ber 2017. Bruce had a pending bankruptcy proceeding o ngoing. W hen he balked a t

som e of the requirem ent s b e i n g i mp osed by P aula’s a ttorney , the c o urt told Bruce that h e would be sent b a ck to jail and that the hearing would be reset in M arch 2018. The court also stated, “[ P]erhaps, I should bring y ou back in thirty day s to see if we have reached any kind of accord.” At a m axim

um , B ruce was then looking at potentially spending f o ur m ore m onths in jail if the hearing was set in March 2 018 or at a m inim um thirty m ore day s in jail if the

court dec i d e d to schedule another contem pt hearing. Bruce then s t ated, “I concede. I’ll agree.” Paula’s attorney

then read into the record what Bruce agreed to:

• Bruce agreed to pay $1,400 in child support per m onth;

• Bruce agreed to pay of f any debts o n t h e ma r i t a l hom e a nd d eed said
2 7property to Paula;

• Bruce agreed t o pay of f all debts of the townhouse condo o f the parties and then deed all the property to Paula;

• Bruce agreed to pay rent t o P a u l a f or that condo if he decided to live there;

• Bruce agreed to p a y three dif f erent lum p sum alim onies. The f

irst in the am ount of $450,000, at f o ur per c ent interest if paid m onthly by installm ents;

• Bruce agreed to pay a third lum p sum a l im ony in t h e a mo u n t of $105,470.67, which represented the am o unt of the contem pt j udgm ent, f or which he had been incarcerated f or not pay ing. That third lum p sum alim ony incurred f

our percent interest if he paid in m onthly installm ents;

• Bruce agreed to obtain l if e insurance f

or Paula’s benef

it in the am ount of $1,000,000;

• Bruce agreed pay in f ull Pickering’s expert f

ees and a ttorney ’ s f

ees, the exact am ount o f w h i c h was unknown at that tim e but what later determ ined to b e in the a m ount o f $39,328.48 in e x pert f e e s and $34,658.08 in attorney ’s f ees;

• Bruce a greed t o p a y Paula’s attorney f e e s, the exact am ount of which was unknown at th a t t i me but was later included in the judgm e nt of divorce in the am ount of

$90,995.50;

• Finally , if Bruce “acquire any ownership interest in any of t he f o rm er Louis Norm an businesses (or successor businesses) Paula Lindsay shall be entitled to 1⁄2 that interest granted or agreed upon within f ive y ears of his y ears working at that com pany . ” ¶43. As previously stated, a deprivation of a p art y ’ s f r e e e x ercise of his o r her own will constitutes duress, a nd “ provisions in c ontracts

. . . obtained by overreaching duress or undue inf luence are unenf

o rceable.” Estate of

Davis , 42 So. 3d a t 525 (¶17). On Novem ber 1, 2017,

2 8Bruce had spent two weeks in jail because he could not pay $ 105,470.67. But on that sam e

day , without a lawy er representing him , he agreed t o p ay approx i mately $905,000 in lumpsum alim ony , pay the loan o f f on the m arital hom e and the parties’ condo and then deed t hose properties to Paula, p ay $1,400 per m onth i n ch i l d support, p ay approxim ately $91,000 in Paula’s attorney ’s f

ees, and pay of

f in f ull Pickering’s e xpert f

ees and attorney ’s f

ees despite the cou r t p reviously ordering those f ees evenly split between the parties. I f that were not enough, h e a lso agreed that if he were to acquire an interest in a business within f ive y e a rs, that new i ntere s t w o u l d becom e m arital property , and he would d eed half that interest to Paula. ¶44. At the tim e of the Novem ber 1, 2017 hearing, the court knew that Bruce had lost his job, was claim ing an inability to p ay dif f e r ent am o unts ordered by the court, h ad a pending bankruptcy p etition, had no l awy er, and had been incarcerated f or over two weeks. The court did not engage in any

ty pe of colloquy w ith Bruce to e n sure that he was, in f act, consenting

to t he property settlem ent agreem ent f ree f rom duress or o verreach. 1 1 According to Bruce, he could not af

f ord to pay t he $105,470.67, which resulted i n his incarceration. Two weeks later, h e was transported to jail and sudde n l y a g r e e d to be responsible f o r well over $1,000,000 in f

inancial obligations. ¶45. This Court does not a ttem p t to curtail the p o w e r of a trial court to u se t he contem pt

11 T h e c o u rt sim

p ly ask ed B ru ce if h e h a d in itialed th e ag reem en t an d i f th at w as h is ag reem en t. N o q u e stio n s w ere ask ed ab o u t h is f in an cial d if

f icu lties, h is ab ility to p ay , th e larg e su m s, o r if

th is w as in f

act an eq u itab le d istrib u t io n .

2 9power to enf orce i ts orders. Nor does t his Court f ind f ault with incarceration as a punishm ent f or contem

pt. This Court is c oncerned with va g u e orders o f trial courts and judgm ents of

contem pt including incarceration when those vague orders are alleged to have been violated. Likewise, when a person i s h e l d incarcerated f or contem

pt, a court should be diligent and suspicious as to a sudden agreem ent of all divorce issues when the likelihood of duress and

ove rreaching is possible, especially when t he contem nor has no lawy er, no job, and has obvious f i nancial d i f

f iculties. Af

ter a thorough review of the record, we h old t hat B ruce was under duress when he signed the p roperty settlem ent a greem ent, and theref ore the contract is unenf orceable and should be vacated and is hereby set aside.
3. Pickering’s Fees and Attorney ’s Fees ¶46. At the Novem

ber 1, 20 1 7 h e a ring, Bruce agreed to pay P ickering’s expert f ees and litigation costs. That am ount was later determ ined t o b e $ 39,328.48 i n e x p e r t f ees and $34,658.08 in attorney ’s f ees. W e already f

ound that Bruce signed and agreed to the property settlem ent agreem ent under duress. Since we a lready s et the property settlem ent agreem ent aside as a m atter of law, so too are Pickering’s expert f ees and attorney ’s f

ees. Theref

ore, w e

reverse the chancery c ourt’s order that Bruce pay Pickering’s expert f ees and attorney ’s f

ees and rem and this issue f

or f urther determ ination by

the chancellor.
4. Paula’s Attorney ’s Fees ¶47. At the Novem

b e r 1, 2017 h earing, Bruce also agreed to pay Paula’s a ttorney ’s f ees in the am ount of

$90,995.50. Since we already set the property

settlem ent agreem ent aside as

3 0a m atter of law, so too are P aula’s attorney ’s f ees. Theref

o re, we reverse the c h ancery court’s order that Bruce pay Paula’s attorney ’s f ees a nd rem a n d this issue f or f urther determ ination by the chancellor.
5. Attorney ’ s Fees on Appeal ¶48. In her a

ppellee brief

, Paula requests attorney ’s f e es o f one-half of $90,995.50, which the c hancery court a warded to her. See Riley v. Riley , 1 96 So. 3d 1 159, 1164 ( ¶23) (Miss. C t. App. 2016) ( stating that “[ g]enerally , on appeal t his Court awards attorney ’ s f ees of one-half of what was awarded in t he trial court”). On August 1 9, 2019, Paula f iled a s eparate m otion
f or appellate attorney ’s f

ees in accordance with the s up r e me c o u r t’s opinion in Latham v. Latham , 261 S o. 3d 1110, 1115 (¶23) (Miss. 2019) (requiring p arties to f ile a separate m otion
f or attorney ’s f

ees as set f

orth in Mis s i s s i p p i R u le of Appellate Procedure 27(a)). In her

m otion, Paula requests this Court “ grant her attorney ’s f ees in the am o unt of $45,477.75 with regard to this appeal.” ¶49. Pursuant t o M i s s i s s i p p i R ule o f Procedure 3 6(a), “[ i]f a judgm ent is reversed, costs shall be taxed a gainst the appellee unless otherwise ordered.” Theref o re, because we reverse the trial court’s judgm ent, we decline to award Paula attorney ’s f ees or costs on appeal.
CONCLUSION ¶50. Because we f

i nd the tem

p orary order s w e r e t o o v a g ue to enf orce, we r everse the chancery court’s order of contem pt. Further, we f

ind that the divorce judgm e nt i s void f or two reasons: (1) Paula f

ailed to present suf

f icient evidence to p rove her g round f or divorce; and

3 1(2) Bruce signed the p roperty settlem ent agreem ent under duress. F inally , because we f ind

t h at the divorce judgm e nt is void, we f ind that both provisions in the divorce j u d g me n t requiring B ruce to pay P aula’s attorney ’s f ees and P ickering’s f

ees a n d litigation costs are also void. Accordingly , we reverse and rem and the chancery court’s judgm ent. ¶51. REVERSED, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
BARNES , C . J . , C A R L T O N A N D J . W I L SON, P .JJ., GREENLEE, M cDONALD, McCARTY AND C. WILSON, JJ., C ONCUR. TINDELL, J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY WITHOU T S E P A RATE WRITTEN OPINION. WESTBROOKS, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

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