J-A04016-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

S.H.W. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant

v.

S.E.W.

Appellee No. 2256 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered June 14, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County

Civil Division at No(s): 2015-29053

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., SOLANO, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY SOLANO, J.: FILED APRIL 11, 2017

S.H.W. (“Mother”) appeals from the June 14, 2016, custody order as 

to the parties’ children, Br.W. (born 2002), C.W. (born 2005), and Bl.W. 

(born 2005) (collectively, “the Children”). Upon careful review, we affirm.

S.E.W. (“Father”) and Mother (collectively, “Parents”) were married on 

September 30, 2001. N.T., 6/7/16, at 7. Prior to July 2008, Parents and 

the Children lived in Tokyo, Japan, id. at 13, where the Parents had “various 

forms of childcare help, a babysitter or an au pair.” Id. at 16. When asked 

for more details about the childcare assistance hired in Tokyo, Mother 

testified:

[T]hey were not my nannies. . . . I did not have nannies. The 

[C]hildren had assistance. We had assistance in the home. . . . 

Prior to having [C.W. and Bl.W.], which was in 2005, we may 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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have had one person full time. . . . From time to time, we may 

have had two people helping.

Id. at 122-24.

In July 2008, Mother and the Children moved from Tokyo into the 

martial residence in Haverford, Pennsylvania, and they continue to reside 

there. N.T., 6/7/16, at 7. Father initially remained in Tokyo.

Father joined Mother and the Children in March 2009. N.T., 6/8/16, at 

68-70; see also Trial Ct. Op., 9/21/16, at 13. Upon his return, Father was 

not employed and became the Children’s “full time caretaker,” providing for 

their daily needs, including taking them to and picking them up from school, 

transporting them to their sports and other activities, and cooking for them. 

Father described himself as “a graduate of the hotel school, so cooking is 

something that’s meaningful to [him]”; for example, he made grilled cheese 

sandwiches, spaghetti, or noodles for the Children. N.T., 6/8/16, at 70-71. 

Bl.W. particularly liked cooking and baking with Father, so they started 

making cookies, cupcakes, noodles, ice cream, and other food together. Id.

at 71. Mother would later allege that Father “did nothing” with the Children 

during this period; Father testified that Mother’s claim was “patently false.” 

Id. at 72.

In 2010, Father began doing some part-time consulting work, 

including work for his current company, which is located in New York City. 

N.T., 6/7/16, at 19; N.T., 6/8/16, at 73. Father travelled frequently for this 

job — to Florida, Hawaii, New York, and Japan. N.T., 6/7/16, at 19. Mother 
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asserted that, “if Father returned from New York during the week in 2010, it 

was too late to see or care for the Children.” Mother’s Reply Brief at 4.

During this time, Mother attended the University of Pennsylvania Law 

School, where her focus was “financial regulation and tax.” N.T., 6/7/16, at 

24-25. Mother already held a Master Degree in Business Administration 

from the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania, with a dual 

major in Finance and Statistics, and a Master’s Degree in Public International 

Law from Oxford University. After graduation from law school in 2011, she 

considered moving to New York, where she had several offers of 

employment. Instead, at Father’s request, Mother remained in Haverford, 

and she was hired by The Vanguard Group. Id. at 25.

Father again became employed full-time in May 2011, and he then 

travelled frequently to New York, where his employer was located. N.T., 

6/7/16, at 18-19, 25; N.T., 6/8/16, at 73. When he travelled for this new 

employment, he remained in contact with the Children through telephone 

calls and e-mails. All of the Children have cellular phones. Ex. F-16.

On February 27, 2015, Mother voluntarily left her employment with 

The Vanguard Group, because she did not wish to travel. N.T., 6/7/16, at 

24, 26, 121-22. She searched for a new job, but did not send any 

applications to law firms in the Philadelphia area, even though she had 

passed the Pennsylvania bar exam.
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On November 3, 2015, Parents separated. N.T., 6/7/16, at 7. Mother 

alleges that, since the separation, Father has been “liv[ing] in New York City 

hotels.” Compl. in Divorce at 11 ¶ 15. Mother later testified:

Q Where does [Father] currently reside?

A Currently, he resides in New York. He has been living in 

hotels -- different hotels every night for a number of years.

Q [O]ther than the marital residence, does he have a 

permanent home here in Pennsylvania?

A No.

Q During his custodial time since November, where does he 

go with the kids?

A Since November on his custodial every other weekend, he 

has taken the kids to a hotel in New York City, a hotel in the 

Philadelphia area, to a weekend-only rental in Haverford, and 

most recently to the Crown Plaza West Philadelphia on his 

Thursday with [Br.W.], and to a camping area in Maryland with 

all three kids.

N.T., 6/7/16, at 90.

On February 23, 2016, the Parents entered into a stipulation for entry 

of a custody order (“Custody Stipulation”), in which they agreed that the 

Children would spend every other weekend with Father from Friday until 

Sunday and that on Thursdays Father would spend custodial time with one 

of the Children on a rotating basis. Custody Stipulation, 2/23/16, at 3 ¶ 3.a.
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On April 12, 2016, Mother filed an Emergency Petition requesting 

permission for her to relocate to Bethesda, Maryland1(“Relocation Petition”). 

Mother alleged that she had been offered her “dream job” in Maryland, for 

“the highest salary [she has] ever been offered,” $170,400. N.T., 6/7/16, at 

38-39, 85. On May 16, 2016, Father filed an answer that objected to the 

proposed relocation. 

On June 7 and 8, 2016, the trial court held hearings on the Relocation 

Petition. During the hearings, Mother conceded that if she were permitted to 

relocate to Maryland with the Children, Father’s alternating Thursday 

custodial time would be “difficult.” N.T., 6/7/16, at 55. She did not provide 

a proposed revised custody schedule to the court, and, when asked what she 

would suggest, Mother said that she “intended” to be “as flexible as 

possible” and was “hoping that we can speak about it and come to an 

agreement.” Id. at 54-55. She added that there “could be an opportunity 

in the summer” for Father to spend more time with the Children. Id. 

Father testified that he was looking to purchase a home in the 

Philadelphia area, because “it’s my home” as well as being the Children’s 

home. N.T., 6/8/16, at 110. Father testified that “we have anchored 

ourselves there.” Id. The Children are currently enrolled in private schools 

in Pennsylvania. Order, 7/7/16, at 2. Father further testified that he would 

____________________________________________

1 During oral argument before this Court on February 14, 2016, Mother 

clarified that she hoped to move to Chevy Chase, Maryland, which is about 

two miles away from Bethesda.
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be able to adjust his work schedule to accommodate the Children’s needs if 

they were to remain in Pennsylvania. Trial Ct. Op., 9/21/16, at 14-15 (citing 

N.T., 6/8/16, at 124). He said his employer would be flexible with his work 

and travel schedules and be “very comfortable” with Father “working out of 

Philadelphia,” as opposed to New York. N.T., 6/8/16, at 152-53.

Father claims that since he separated from Mother, he has been 

“hindered frequently” by Mother from taking the Children to activities that he 

wished to attend with them. N.T., 6/8/16, at 76. For example, he said that 

when he wanted to take Bl.W. to a movie, Mother told him “absolutely not.” 

Id. He stated that Mother also would not agree to weekend trips and once 

refused to let him take Br.W. on a planned trip to Father’s cousin’s home on 

Independence Day. Id. at 76-77. Father also testified about how Mother 

would interfere when the Children were allowed to be with him:

And while I was with [Bl.W. and C.W.] up in the Allegheny River, 

[Mother] called them incessantly, she told me on the phone she 

never wanted to be away from the [C]hildren again and that she 

was very, very upset by this occurrence.

And she called the [C]hildren to tell them that she had taken 

[Br.W.] to the shore and that they were riding roller coasters 

and eating popcorn and it was so much fun there. And that 

really hurt.

Id. at 77. Father introduced e-mails between himself and Mother that 

documented his “plea to be active in scheduling the [C]hildren’s activities.” 

Ex. F-11; N.T., 6/8/16, at 78.
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The trial court also interviewed the Children in camera. Br.W. 

confirmed that the Children consistently spend every other weekend with 

Father from Friday until Sunday and that on Thursdays Father spends 

custodial time with each child on a rotating basis. N.T. Interview of Br.W., 

6/8/16, at 4, 10-12. Br.W. “[did]n’t mind” changing that custody 

arrangement, “as long as [he] g[o]t to see [his] mom and [his] dad,” but he 

also expressed that “it would be kind of cool to see [his] dad more.” Id. at 

21-23. C.W. told the trial court, “I don’t want to move to Maryland.” N.T. 

Interview of C.W., 6/8/16, at 11. Bl.W. said that she “wouldn’t mind” 

moving to Maryland but that she would like to see Father “a little bit more.” 

N.T. Interview of Bl.W., 6/8/16, at 12.

On June 14, 2016, the trial court denied Mother’s relocation petition. 

On June 21, 2016, Mother sent a letter to the trial court, requesting that the 

court “submit its opinion under the relocation factors” before July 14, 2016. 

On July 7, 2016, the trial court complied. The court’s decision states:

The [c]ourt considered the relocation factors as set forth in 23 

Pa.C.S.A. §5337(h) as well as the best interests of the [C]hildren 

in considering [Mother]’s petition for relocation. . . . The [c]ourt 

has considered the best interests of the [C]hildren by 

considering the [C]hildren’s current schedule and the importance 

of both [P]arents maintaining an active role in the growth and 

development of the [C]hildren. The [c]ourt finds that both 

[P]arents are able to attend to the daily physical, emotional, 

developmental, educational needs of the [C]hildren. Neither 

parent presented any persuasive evidence that the other parent 

is incapable of caring for the [C]hildren, or providing for their 

needs.
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Based on the evidence presented at the June 7 and June 8, 2016 

hearings, the [c]ourt found that based on the ages and needs of 

the [C]hildren, a relocation to Maryland would not be in their 

best interests. The [C]hildren, [Br.W., C.W.,] and [Bl.W.] have 

lived in Pennsylvania since July of 2008. [C.W.] and [Bl.W.] 

have attended their current schools since they were in first 

grade. [Br.W.] has been at his school since kindergarten. All 

three [C]hildren are in private school in Pennsylvania. There 

was testimony presented that the [C]hildren are doing well in 

school, and are happy. All three children are involved in 

numerous extracurricular activities. Plaintiff/Mother (hereinafter 

“Mother”) testified that she was “hoping to move to Bethesda” 

and offered evidence as to the public school district in that area. 

There was no persuasive evidence presented at the hearings that 

the quality of the [C]hildren’s education would improve, or 

remain consistent for that matter, if they were to relocate to 

Maryland.

There was also no persuasive evidence that the relocation would 

enhance the general quality of life for the [C]hildren financially 

or emotionally.

Under the current custody schedule, Defendant/Father 

(hereinafter “Father”) has partial physical custody of the 

[C]hildren every other weekend from Thursday at 5:00 p.m. 

until Sunday at 5:00 p.m. The [c]ourt found that a relocation of 

the [C]hildren to Maryland would be detrimental to Father’s 

ability to exercise his periods of partial physical custody since 

the [C]hildren would be attending school in Maryland, thereby 

making Father’s overnight custody on Thursdays difficult if not 

impossible. Father also testified that if the [C]hildren were to 

relocate, he would not be able to actively participate in their 

weekday activities in the manner at which he has done so.

Mother testified as to her educational and employment 

background. Based on her education and experience, the [c]ourt 

did not find Mother’s argument that she is unable to find suitable 

employment in the Pennsylvania, New Jersey, or New York area 

to be persuasive. Although acceptance of the specific job in 

Maryland may provide Mother with a financial benefit, Mother did 

not prove that the job in Maryland is the only opportunity she 

will have for similar or even satisfactory employment 

opportunities. The court found that based on the testimony at 

the hearings, Mother’s specific employment opportunity does not 
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outweigh the [C]hildren’s need for stability and continuity in 

their lives, nor does it outweigh the importance of Father 

maintaining an active role in the [C]hildren’s lives.

Based on the testimony presented at the hearings, the [c]ourt 

also has concerns as to Mother’s willingness and ability to 

promote the [C]hildren’s relationship with Father if they were to 

move to Maryland.

The preference of the [C]hildren as to a possible relocation was 

also considered by the [c]ourt.

There was testimony offered that Mother wants to move to 

Maryland to “start a new life, farther away.” The [c]ourt does 

not find that Mother’s desire to start a new life elsewhere 

outweighs the need for continuity and stability in the [C]hildren’s 

lives and the children’s proximity to their father.

Order, 7/7/16, at 1-3.

On July 12, 2016, Mother filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court.2 

On August 17, 2016, Mother responded to an order by this Court for her to 

show cause why the appeal was taken from an order that is final and 

appealable. On August 23, 2016, this Court discharged the rule, but stated 

that this decision was “not a final determination as to the propriety of the 

appeal.” A custody order is final and appealable “only after the trial court 

____________________________________________

2 Mother did not file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement concomitantly with her 

notice of appeal, as required by Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) for cases of this type 

– i.e., Children’s Fast Track (“CFT”). The trial court ordered Mother to file 

her statement within 21 days, and Mother complied. Father does not claim 

that he was prejudiced by the late filing of Mother’s statement, and that late 

filing does not require dismissal of her appeal. See In re K.T.E.L., 983 

A.2d 745, 747 (Pa. Super. 2009) (failure to file a 1925(b) statement 

concomitantly with a CFT appeal will not result in dismissal where there is 

substantial compliance and no prejudice, since failure to file the statement is 

a violation of a procedural rule and not an order of court).
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has completed its hearings on the merits and the resultant order resolves 

the pending custody claims between the parties.” G.B. v. M.M.B., 670 A.2d 

714, 715 (Pa. Super. 1996) (en banc). Here, the trial court had completed 

its hearings on the merits prior to issuing the order of June 14, 2016, and its 

order resolved the dispute regarding Mother’s relocation petition. Thus, we 

now hold that the order of June 14, 2016, is both final and appealable. We 

therefore proceed to the merits of the case. 

Mother raises the following issues for our review:

1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying 

Appellant-Mother’s request for relocation by failing to properly 

consider all of the relocation factors enumerated under 23 Pa. 

C.S.A. § 5337(h) and failing to delineate all of its reasons for 

denying Mother’s request for relocation?

2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion [(A)] by failing to 

properly consider the lack of involvement and presence of 

Appellee-Father in the [C]hildren’s lives under 23 Pa. C.S.A. § 

5337(h)(1) and [(B)] by finding that “both parents are able to 

attend to the daily physical, emotional, developmental, 

educational needs of the children” when Appellee-Father 

admitted that he is somewhere other than Pennsylvania 76% of 

the time?

3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by failing to consider 

other suitable custody arrangements, as is required under 23 Pa. 

C.S.A. § 5337(h)(3), before concluding that the [C]hildren’s 

relocation to Maryland would be “detrimental to AppelleeFather’s ability to exercise his periods of partial physical custody 

since the [C]hildren would be attending school in Maryland, 

thereby making Appellee-Father’s overnight custody on Thursday 

difficult if not impossible”?

4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by improperly 

crediting Appellee-Father’s testimony that, if the [C]hildren were 

to relocate, “he would not be able to actively participate in their 

weekday activities in the manner at which he has done so” 
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because Appellee-Father’s assertion that he has heretofore 

“actively participated” in the [C]hildren’s weekday activities is 

not supported by the record?

5. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by failing to properly 

consider whether relocation would enhance the general quality of 

life of Appellant-Mother, both financially and emotionally, under 

23 Pa. C.S.A. § 5337(h)(6)?

6. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by concluding that 

Appellant-Mother failed to prove that she is unable to obtain 

suitable employment in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and/or New 

York because this conclusion is not supported by the record?

7. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by doubting Mother’s 

willingness and ability to promote the [C]hildren’s relationship 

with Appellee-Father if the [C]hildren relocate to Maryland 

because such a concern is not supported by the record and 

ignores the fact that Appellee-Father willingly spends the 

majority of his time outside of Pennsylvania and away from the 

[C]hildren?

8. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by concluding that 

there was no persuasive evidence presented at the hearings that 

the quality of the [C]hildren’s education would improve, or 

remain consistent, if they were to relocate to Maryland because 

this conclusion is not supported by the record?

9. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by finding that the 

[C]hildren are involved in numerous extra-curricular activities in 

Pennsylvania and failing to consider the evidence that similar 

activities are available in Maryland?

10. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by failing to consider 

under 23 Pa. C.S.A. § 5337(h)(7) the ways in which the 

[C]hildren’s relocation to Maryland, a short distance from 

Washington D.C., would enhance the quality of life for the 

children by providing them with additional extra-curricular 

activities, a gainfully employed Mother with the federal 

government, and the ability to further foster relationships with 

family and close family friends in the Maryland/Washington D.C.

area?
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11. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by concluding that 

the need for continuity and stability in the [C]hildren’s lives and 

the [C]hildren’s proximity to their [F]ather outweighs AppellantMother’s need to relocate because this conclusions is not 

supported by the record, as the [C]hildren are not in close 

proximity to Father while living in Pennsylvania and there is no 

evidence that the Children’s relocation to Maryland would be 

detrimental to them or otherwise affect their relationship with 

Appellee-Father?

Mother’s Brief at 4-7 (answers omitted).

We begin by acknowledging our scope and standard of review in 

custody cases:

In reviewing a custody order, our scope is of the broadest type 

and our standard is abuse of discretion. We must accept 

findings of the trial court that are supported by competent 

evidence of record, as our role does not include making 

independent factual determinations. In addition, with regard to 

issues of credibility and weight of the evidence, we must defer 

to the presiding trial judge who viewed and assessed the 

witnesses first-hand. However, we are not bound by the trial 

court’s deductions or inferences from its factual findings. 

Ultimately, the test is whether the trial court’s conclusions are 

unreasonable as shown by the evidence of record. We may 

reject the conclusions of the trial court only if they involve an 

error of law, or are unreasonable in light of the sustainable 

findings of the trial court.

D.K. v. S.P.K., 102 A.3d 467, 478 (Pa. Super. 2014) (quoting J.R.M. v. 

J.E.A., 33 A.3d 647, 650 (Pa. Super. 2011)).

When considering whether to grant relocation, the court must analyze 

the ten factors set forth in the relocation provision of the Custody Act, 23 

Pa.C.S. § 5337:

(h) Relocation factors.--In determining whether to grant a 

proposed relocation, the court shall consider the following 
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factors, giving weighted consideration to those factors which 

affect the safety of the child:

(1) The nature, quality, extent of involvement and duration 

of the child’s relationship with the party proposing to 

relocate and with the nonrelocating party, siblings and 

other significant persons in the child’s life.

(2) The age, developmental stage, needs of the child and 

the likely impact the relocation will have on the child’s 

physical, educational and emotional development, taking 

into consideration any special needs of the child.

(3) The feasibility of preserving the relationship between 

the nonrelocating party and the child through suitable 

custody arrangements, considering the logistics and 

financial circumstances of the parties.

(4) The child’s preference, taking into consideration the 

age and maturity of the child.

(5) Whether there is an established pattern of conduct of 

either party to promote or thwart the relationship of the 

child and the other party.

(6) Whether the relocation will enhance the general quality 

of life for the party seeking the relocation, including, but 

not limited to, financial or emotional benefit or educational 

opportunity.

(7) Whether the relocation will enhance the general quality 

of life for the child, including, but not limited to, financial 

or emotional benefit or educational opportunity.

(8) The reasons and motivation of each party for seeking 

or opposing the relocation.

(9) The present and past abuse committed by a party or 

member of the party’s household and whether there is a 

continued risk of harm to the child or an abused party.

(10) Any other factor affecting the best interest of the 

child.
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23 Pa.C.S. § 5337(h); see Mother’s Brief at 4-7 ¶¶ 1-11. Mother’s 11 issues 

generally amount to an attack on the trial court’s assessment of these 

factors. Indeed, Mother’s first issue consists of a claim that the trial court 

failed properly to consider all of the factors when it rendered its decision. 

The trial court said that it did consider all of the factors, both in its order 

dated July 7, 2016, and in an expanded analysis in its opinion dated 

September 21, 2016. We shall address Mother’s 11 issues by referencing 

each of the relocation factors seriatim.

(1) The nature, quality, extent of involvement and duration of 

the child’s relationship with the party proposing to relocate and with 

the nonrelocating party, siblings and other significant persons in the 

child’s life.3 Parents do not dispute that Mother has a strong relationship 

with the Children. See, e.g., Mother’s Brief at 26; Father’s Brief at 25, 28. 

The trial court found, however, that the Children also have a strong 

relationship with Father.

The trial court stated: “Father testified as to his involvement in the 

day to day lives of the [C]hidren. . . . Father stated that he has helped the 

[C]hildren with their homework, cooked them meals, [and] attended their 

extracurricular activities[.]” Trial Ct. Op., 9/21/16, at 13; see N.T., 6/8/16, 

at 68-73. The court noted that Father has had physical custody of the 

____________________________________________

3 The first part of Mother’s second issue relates to this first relocation factor. 

See Mother’s Brief at 4 ¶ 2(A).
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Children every other weekend and spent rotating Thursdays with each of the 

Children separately. Custody Stipulation, 2/23/16, at 3 ¶ 3.a.; N.T., 6/7/16, 

at 55; N.T. Interview of Br.W., 6/8/16, at 4, 10-12. Additionally, between 

March 2009 and May 2011, Father was the Children’s “full time caretaker,” 

because he was not employed during that time. N.T., 6/8/16, at 73. During 

this period, Father actively participated in the Children’s sports and other 

extracurricular activities and provided for their daily needs. Trial Ct. Op., 

9/21/16, at 13 (citing N.T., 6/8/16, at 68-70). Father testified that 

“Mother’s claim that he ‘did nothing’ with the [C]hildren during that time is 

‘patently false.’” Id. (quoting N.T., 6/8/16, at 72). 

The trial court concluded that the testimony at the hearings and the 

child interviews “demonstrated to the court” that “Father shares a close, 

warm, and positive relationship with the [C]hildren and has done so since 

their births.” Trial Ct. Op., 9/21/16, at 13. The trial court’s findings “are 

supported by competent evidence of record.” D.K., 102 A.3d at 478. See 

N.T., 6/8/16, at 68-73. Because the record substantiates these findings, we 

hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and properly considered 

“the nature, quality, extent of involvement and duration” of the Children’s 

relationship with Father, pursuant to the first relocation factor under the 

Custody Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 5337(h)(1).

(2) The age, developmental stage, needs of the child and the 

likely impact the relocation will have on the child’s physical, 
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educational and emotional development, taking into consideration 

any special needs of the child.4 In its order of July 7, 2016, the trial 

court asserted:

The Court finds that both [P]arents are able to attend to the 

daily physical, emotional, developmental, educational needs of 

the [C]hildren. Neither parent presented any persuasive 

evidence that the other parent is incapable of caring for the 

children, or providing for their needs.

Order, 7/7/16, at 1. The trial court reiterated this conclusion in its opinion 

of September 21, 2016:

Mother presented no credible evidence at the hearings that 

[Appellee] Father is unable to attend to the daily physical, 

emotional, developmental, and educational needs of the children 

due to his employment responsibilities, or for any other reason. 

She also did not present any credible evidence that [Appellee] 

Father’s work schedule constitutes “a lack of involvement and 

presence” of [Appellee] Father in the children’s lives. There was 

no persuasive evidence that [Appellee] Father’s extensive travel 

for his job which occurred during the course of the parties’ 

marriage was detrimental to the health, safety, or emotional 

welfare of the children.

Trial Ct. Op., 9/21/16, at 14. With regard to issues of credibility and weight 

of the evidence, we must defer to the trial court, which viewed and assessed 

the witnesses, including Father, first-hand. See D.K., 102 A.3d at 478.

Moreover, the trial court’s conclusions are supported by the evidence 

of record. See D.K., 102 A.3d at 478. The evidence supports the trial 

court’s finding that “[t]he [C]hildren were well cared for by both [P]arents, 

____________________________________________

4 This second relocation factor corresponds to the second part of the second 

issue raised by Mother on appeal. See Mother’s Brief at 4 ¶ 2(B).
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and by hired caregivers.” Trial Ct. Op., 9/21/16, at 14. See N.T., 6/7/16, 

at 11, 16; N.T., 6/8/16, at 70-72. Father testified that even when he was 

travelling for work, he stayed connected to the Children through e-mails and 

phone calls. As noted above, between March 2009 and May 2011, Father 

was the Children’s “full time caretaker.” Father also testified that he would 

be able to adjust his work schedule to accommodate the Children’s needs if 

they were to remain in Pennsylvania. Trial Ct. Op., 9/21/16, at 14-15 (citing 

N.T., 6/8/16, at 124).

The trial court concluded: “For the above stated reasons, the [trial] 

court did not err or abuse its discretion in finding that Father is able to care 

for the [C]hildren on a daily basis and meet their needs, and finding that he 

has been an active participant in their upbringing in care.” Trial Ct. Op., 

9/21/16, at 15. We agree that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

and that it did properly consider the Children’s physical, educational, and 

emotional development, pursuant to the second relocation factor under the 

Custody Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 5337(h)(2).

(3) The feasibility of preserving the relationship between the 

nonrelocating party and the child through suitable custody 

arrangements, considering the logistics and financial circumstances 
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of the parties.5 Mother contends that “the trial court improperly credited 

Father’s testimony that ‘he would not be able to actively participate in their 

weekday activities in the manner in which he has done so’” and argues that 

the trial court’s finding “is not supported by the record.” Mother’s Brief at 

39; see also id. at 5 ¶ 4. Father answers that his “custody time and 

involvement in the Children’s extra-curricular activities would be impeded if 

the Children lived in Maryland,” because “it would be difficult, if not 

impossible, for Father to continue his Thursday custodial time if the Children 

were attending school in Maryland.” Father’s Brief at 30.

The trial court observed:

At the hearings, [Father] testified as to his involvement in the 

day to day lives of the [C]hildren. [Father] stated that he has 

helped the [C]hildren with their homework, cooked them meals, 

attended their extracurricular activities, and since the parties’ 

separation, he has had physical custody of the [C]hildren every 

other weekend, and he spends alternate Thursdays with each 

child separately. Furthermore, between March, 2009 and May, 

2011, he was able to be a “full time caretaker” for the [C]hildren 

since he was not employed during that time. N.T.[, 6/8/16,] at 

73. During this period [Father] actively participated in the 

[C]hildren’s sports and other extracurricular activities, and 

provided for their day to day needs. [Id.] at 68-70. He stated 

that [Mother’s] claim that he “did nothing” with the [C]hildren 

during that time is “patently false”. [Id.] at 72. . . . Therefore 

the [trial] court does not find [Mother’s] characterization of 

[Father] having a “lack of involvement or presence” in the 

[C]hildren’s lives to be persuasive. . . . 

____________________________________________

5 This third relocation factor corresponds to the third, fourth, and eleventh 

issues raised by Mother and is directly referenced within her third issue. 

See Mother’s Brief at 4-7 ¶¶ 3, 4, 11.
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At the June 7, 2016 hearing, [Mother] conceded that if she were 

permitted to relocate to Maryland with the [C]hildren, [Father’s] 

alternating Thursday custodial time with the [C]hildren would be 

“difficult.” N.T.[, 6/7/16,] at 55. However, [Mother] did not 

present the court with a viable alternative to the parties’ current 

custody schedule, nor did she present sufficient evidence for the 

court to fashion an alternative custody schedule which would 

provide [Father] with comparable custodial time with the 

[C]hildren. Instead, when asked what her proposed custodial 

schedule would be, [Mother] testified that she “intended” to be 

“as flexible as possible”, and that she was “hoping that we can 

speak about it and come to an agreement.” [Mother] also stated 

that there “could be an opportunity in the summer” for [Father] 

to have additional custodial time with the [C]hildren. [Id.] at 

54-55.

Trial Ct. Op., 9/21/16, at 13, 15.

Although Mother protests that “the trial court improperly credited 

Father’s testimony,” we “must accept findings of the trial court that are 

supported by competent evidence of record, as our role does not include 

making independent factual determinations.” D.K., 102 A.3d at 478. “In 

addition, with regard to issues of credibility and weight of the evidence, we 

must defer to the presiding trial judge who viewed and assessed the 

witnesses first-hand.” Id.

Here, since the trial court’s finding that it would be unfeasible to 

preserve the relationship between Father and the Children was supported by 

competent evidence of record, as demonstrated by its abundant citations to 

the notes of testimony, we cannot disturb the trial court’s factual 

determinations and cannot substitute new credibility determinations for 

those of the trial court. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 5337(h)(3); D.K., 102 A.3d at 
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478. Hence, we accept the trial court’s “credit[ing]” of Father’s testimony 

and conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion. See id.

(4) The child’s preference, taking into consideration the age 

and maturity of the child. The trial court considered the preferences of 

the Children. Order, 7/7/16, at 3. C.W., who was born in 2005, specifically 

wanted to remain in Pennsylvania and did not wish to relocate to Maryland. 

N.T. Interview of C.W., 6/8/16, at 11. Bl.W., who was also born in 2005, 

“wouldn’t mind” moving to Maryland but still wished to see Father “a little bit 

more.” N.T. Interview of Bl.W., 6/8/16, at 12. Br.W., who was born in 

2002, also expressed no preference but likewise would prefer to see Father 

more often. N.T. Interview of Br.W., 6/8/16, at 21-23. The record 

demonstrates that the trial court properly considered this factor in denying 

Mother’s relocation request. 

(5) Whether there is an established pattern of conduct of either 

party to promote or thwart the relationship of the child and the 

other party.6 The trial court stated, “There was . . . evidence presented 

that starting approximately a year ago, [Mother] ‘frequently hindered’ 

[Father] from taking the [C]hildren to their activities or spending time with 

the [C]hildren.” Trial Ct. Op., 9/21/16, at 13 (citing N.T., 6/8/16, at 76-78). 

The record supports this statement. For example, Father testified about 

____________________________________________

6 The Mother’s seventh issue relates to this fifth relocation factor. See

Mother’s Brief at 5 ¶ 7.
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barriers erected by Mother when he wanted to take Bl.W. to a movie or to 

visit Father’s cousin, and he told of interference by Mother during a river trip 

with Bl.W. and C.W.

The court also found that relocation would hinder Father’s ability to 

spend time with the Children. See Trial Ct. Op., 9/21/16, at 17 (requiring 

Father to travel on “a weekly basis in order to exercise his physical custodial 

time is [not] feasible” or “to rent a hotel room or a house in order to spend 

time with his children is unnecessarily burdensome”). We have no ground to 

disturb the trial court’s findings relating to this factor. 

(6) Whether the relocation will enhance the general quality of 

life for the party seeking the relocation, including, but not limited to, 

financial or emotional benefit or educational opportunity.7 “In 

reaching a decision in this matter, the [trial] court took into consideration 

[Mother’s] testimony as to the financial and emotional benefits she would 

gain by relocating to Maryland.” Trial Ct. Op., 9/21/16, at 18. The trial 

court found that if Mother is permitted to relocate, she would earn the 

highest salary that she has ever received and have her “dream job.” Id.

These findings of the trial court “are supported by competent evidence of 

record.” D.K., 102 A.3d at 478. See N.T., 6/7/16, at 38-39, 85. 

____________________________________________

7 This sixth relocation factor corresponds to the fifth and sixth issues raised 

by Mother and is directly referenced within the fifth issue. See Mother’s 

Brief at 5 ¶¶ 5-6.
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However, the trial court was concerned that Mother actively searched 

for employment opportunities in the Washington, D.C. area prior to 

obtaining Father’s agreement to a relocation of the Children or gaining the 

court’s permission for a relocation. Trial Ct. Op., 9/21/16, at 18. The trial 

court noted that Mother’s employment offer did not come to her 

independently or as a promotion by an existing employer. Id. “It is one 

which she pursued of her own volition, knowing that it would require 

relocation and disruption in the [C]hildren’s lives.” Id.

We acknowledge that Mother testified there was no possibility of 

maintaining her employment in Pennsylvania or of receiving a salary as high 

as the one she was being offered in Maryland, despite her educational 

credentials. N.T., 6/7/16, at 24, 38-39, 85, 120-22. However, the trial 

court observed that Mother was not qualified as an expert and provided no 

supporting evidence for these assertions, and the trial court doubted their 

accuracy. Order, 7/7/16, at 2 (the trial court “did not find . . . Mother’s 

argument . . . to be persuasive”); Trial Ct. Op., 9/21/16, at 6 (same), 18 

(“the [trial] court does not find [Mother’s] testimony on this point to be 

credible”). With regard to issues of credibility and weight of the evidence, 

we must defer to the trial court, which viewed and assessed the witnesses, 

including Mother, first-hand. See D.K., 102 A.3d at 478. Mother has not 

established that the trial court abused its discretion when it found that she 

refused to consider any other options, such as applying to positions with law 
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firms in Philadelphia. Trial Ct. Op., 9/21/16, at 20-21. See also N.T., 

6/7/16, at 121.

We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and 

properly considered how the proposed relocation would enhance the general 

quality of Mother’s life, pursuant to the sixth relocation factor under the 

Custody Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 5337(h)(6). The trial court considered the benefit 

that the relocation would provide to Mother, but ultimately concluded that 

the benefit was outweighed by other factors and that Mother had not proven 

to the court’s satisfaction that she could not also derive significant benefits if 

she more actively searched for suitable employment in the Philadelphia area.

(7) Whether the relocation will enhance the general quality of 

life for the child, including, but not limited to, financial or emotional 

benefit or educational opportunity.8 The Children have attended their 

current private schools in Pennsylvania since they were in kindergarten or 

first grade. Order, 7/7/16, at 2. The Children are succeeding academically 

and are happy in their respective schools. Id.; Trial Ct. Op., 9/21/16, at 6. 

The trial court stated:

[Mother] testified that she was “hoping to move to Bethesda” 

and offered evidence as to the public school district in that area. 

There was no persuasive evidence presented at the hearings that 

the quality of the children’s education would improve, or remain 

consistent for that matter, if they were to relocate to Maryland.

____________________________________________

8 This seventh relocation factor corresponds to the eighth, ninth, and tenth 

issues raised by Mother and is directly referenced within the tenth issue. 

See Mother’s Brief at 6 ¶¶ 8-10.
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Order, 7/7/16, 2; Trial Ct. Op., 9/21/16, at 6. With regard to issues of 

credibility and weight of the evidence, we must defer to the trial court, which 

viewed and assessed the witnesses first-hand. See D.K., 102 A.3d at 478.

In addition to considering the Children’s schools, the trial court also 

examined the Children’s opportunities for extracurricular activities. Trial Ct. 

Op., 9/21/16, at 24. The Children are involved in numerous activities in 

Pennsylvania, including music lessons, sports, trips to museums, and other 

pastimes with their friends. Id. Although Mother hopes for similar 

opportunities in Maryland, the court found that Mother “did not prove that 

the activities [available to the Children] in Maryland would ‘enhance’ the 

[C]hildren’s lives as contemplated by” 23 Pa.C.S. § 5337(h)(7). Id. Thus, 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion when considering this seventh 

relocation factor when it held that “[s]imply replicating the [C]hildren’s 

existing extracurricular activities in Maryland does not necessarily 

demonstrate that their lives would be improved by relocation to Maryland.” 

Trial Ct. Op., 9/21/16, at 24.

The trial court concluded that, based on the testimony, Mother’s 

specific employment opportunity and desire to start a new life elsewhere did 

not outweigh the Children’s need for stability and continuity or the 

importance of Father maintaining an active role in the Children’s lives. See 

Order, 7/7/16, at 2-3; Trial Ct. Op., 9/21/16, at 6-7. Based upon our review 

of the record, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and 
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properly considered whether the relocation will enhance the general quality 

of the Children’s lives, pursuant to the seventh relocation factor under the 

Custody Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 5337(h)(7).

(8) The reasons and motivation of each party for seeking or 

opposing the relocation. The trial court found that Mother’s reason for 

seeking relocation was primarily for her own economic benefit. Mother did 

not otherwise articulate how the trial court abused its discretion in 

concluding that the Children’s lives would not be enhanced by the relocation 

and that the Children’s stability would be undermined by Mother’s focus on 

her “dream job.” N.T., 6/7/16, at 85; Trial Ct. Op., 9/21/16, at 18.

Father opposed the relocation because the Children would become less 

accessible to him. This motivation was unequivocal and understandable. 

See Order, 7/7/16, at 2; Father’s Brief at 30.

(9) The present and past abuse committed by a party or 

member of the party’s household and whether there is a continued 

risk of harm to the child or an abused party. According to the trial 

court and the parties’ briefs, neither parent made allegations of abuse. 

(10) Any other factor affecting the best interest of the child. 

The trial court did not identify any factor other than those discussed above 

that is relevant to the best interests of the Children in the context of 

relocation, and Mother has not raised any other factors affecting the 

Children’s best interests. Based upon our review of the record, we hold that 
J-A04016-17

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the trial court did not abuse its discretion when considering the Children’s 

bests interests.

In sum, our review of the record and the trial court’s order and opinion 

convinces us that, contrary to Mother’s contentions, the trial court properly 

considered the ten factors set forth in 23 Pa.C.S. § 5337(h) when ruling on 

Mother’s relocation request. The trial court’s well-reasoned conclusions were 

based on the evidence submitted, as demonstrated by the trial court’s 

copious citations to the record and as supported by our review. We find no 

abuse of discretion in the trial court’s assessment of these factors. We 

therefore affirm the trial court’s decision.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/11/2017