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FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN CHINA AFTER SARS:

REFORM AND RETRENCHMENT

ROUNDTABLE

BEFORE THE

CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE

COMMISSION ON CHINA

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

SEPTEMBER 22, 2003

Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.cecc.gov

CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

House Senate

JIM LEACH, Iowa, Chairman

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska

DAVID DREIER, California

FRANK WOLF, Virginia

JOE PITTS, Pennsylvania

SANDER LEVIN, Michigan

MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio

DAVID WU, Oregon

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska, Co-Chairman

CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas

PAT ROBERTS, Kansas

GORDON SMITH, Oregon

MAX BAUCUS, Montana

CARL LEVIN, Michigan

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California

BYRON DORGAN, North Dakota

EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

PAULA DOBRIANSKY, Department of State*

GRANT ALDONAS, Department of Commerce*

LORNE CRANER, Department of State*

JAMES KELLY, Department of State*

JOHN FOARDE, Staff Director

DAVID DORMAN, Deputy Staff Director

* Appointed in the 107th Congress; not yet formally appointed in the 108th

Congress.

(II)

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

STATEMENTS

Gong, Xiaoxia, originally from the People’s Republic of China, former director,

Cantonese Service, Radio Free Asia, Vienna, VA .............................................. 2

Zhang, Huchen, senior editor, Voice of America’s China Branch, Washington,

DC .......................................................................................................................... 5

Bu, Zhong, former reporter and deputy editor, the China Daily, College Park,

MD ......................................................................................................................... 7

Lin, Gong, program associate, Woodrow Wilson Center’s Asia Program, Washington, DC ............................................................................................................. 10

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS

Gong, Xiaoxia ........................................................................................................... 26

Zhang, Huchen ......................................................................................................... 28

Bu, Zhong ................................................................................................................. 30

Lin, Gong .................................................................................................................. 31

(1)

FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN CHINA AFTER

SARS: REFORM AND RETRENCHMENT

SEPTEMBER 22, 2003

CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE

COMMISSION ON CHINA, Washington, DC.

The roundtable was convened, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m.,

in room 2255, Rayburn House Office building, John Foarde [staff

director] presiding.

Also present: David Dorman, deputy staff director; Selene Ko,

chief counsel for trade and commercial law; William A. Farris, senior specialist on Internet and commercial rule of law; and Carl

Minzner, senior counsel.

Mr. FOARDE. I would like to welcome everyone to this issues

roundtable of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China.

On behalf of Chairman Jim Leach and Co-Chairman Senator

Chuck Hagel, welcome to our panelists, as well as all of you who

are attending.

Last spring’s SARS crisis and the increasing commercialization

of China’s press have led to significant developments in China’s

media in recent months. Some of these developments have been

positive, such as government notices requiring officials to provide

greater access to reports.

But the arrest of writers, censoring and closing of publications,

and the August 2003 announcement that certain topics are forbidden to be discussed have had a chilling impact on freedom of expression.

Most recently, Chinese officials have announced plans to cut ties

with government publications that do not meet certain revenue and

distribution criteria.

To help us find our way through this complicated and rapidly

changing situation, we have four distinguished panelists. Ms. Gong

Xiaoxia holds a Ph.D. in sociology from Harvard. She has taught

sociology at UCLA and George Washington University. From January 1998 until June of this year, she was Director of the Cantonese

Service at Radio Free Asia [RFA].

Mr. Zhang Huchen currently is a senior editor at Voice of America’s [VOA] China Branch. Mr. Zhang graduated from the school of

journalism at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in 1984, and

from 1984 to 1990, worked with the Overseas Department of the

Xinhua News Agency.

Mr. Bu Zhong worked at the China Daily for 6 years as a reporter and deputy editor, and for CNN for 3 years in Atlanta,

Washington, and Beijing. He holds a Ph.D. in journalism.

2

Our old friend Mr. Lin Gang is a program associate, currently at

the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Asia Program, where we see him

quite frequently. He has served as president of the Association of

Chinese Political Studies and has taught at American University

and Johns Hopkins University.

He has co-edited ‘‘China after Jiang,’’ that came out this year,

and ‘‘Transition Toward the Post-Deng China’’ in 2001. He received

his Ph.D. in political science from Pennsylvania State University,

an M.A. from Xiamen University, and his B.A. from Fujian Teachers University.

A word to our four panelists. Our process here has been to give

each of you 10 minutes to make a statement. After 8 minutes, I

will alert you that 2 minutes are remaining, and that is your signal

to sort of wrap things up.

Inevitably, no matter how disciplined you are, there are some

points that you will wish to make in your opening statement that

you do not have time to make. We hope to have time in the question and answer session, after each of you has spoken, to catch up

those points. We will go until 4 o’clock or until we run out of energy, whichever comes first.

So without any further ado, let me call on Ms. Gong Xiaoxia,

please.

STATEMENT OF GONG XIAOXIA, ORIGINALLY FROM THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, FORMER DIRECTOR, THE CANTONESE SERVICE, RADIO FREE ASIA, VIENNA, VA

Ms. GONG. Thank you. Ladies and gentlemen, I come here today

to share with you some of my thoughts on the recent development

of press freedom, or lack of it, to be more precise, in China.

Particularly, I would like to discuss the meaning of the new regulations we just talked about, issued by the Party, which are widely

hailed as a bold marketization reform and a step toward press freedom.

I would like to address my concern that the overall misinterpretation of these new regulations may lead to misunderstanding

of the Chinese political situation, and might mislead our foreign

policy as well.

I think I can skip introducing myself, since you have done so. Let

me quickly outline my main points here.

Based on my research and my personal experience, I believe that

the new regulations recently issued by the Chinese Communist

Party, although they may bring about some competition among the

media, do not imply any fundamental change in the Party’s tight

control over the media.

In fact, the new market these rules create may provide the Party

with new means to further suppress press freedom. Moreover, it

may set up a more nationalistic, or even xenophobic, trend in covering foreign affairs. It may encourage further America bashing in

the Chinese press.

The new regulations were issued between June and August of

this year. They greatly limit the number of newspapers and magazines owned by the government or Party offices. According to these

regulations, each provincial government office is given the authorVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:52 Dec 01, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 90597.TXT China1 PsN: China1
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ity to buy subscriptions, which was the most resented practice in

the past 50 years.

As a result of this regulatory change, most of China’s press organizations, which used to be directly controlled by the government,

have now been thrown into a new media market.

Although the motivation of these new regulations is budget prudence instead of press freedom, they have raised hope of limited

press freedom in China. Many people believe that, by introducing

marketization, these regulations open doors for private ownership

in the media, which is among the last areas where government

ownership still dominates. In other words, the trend of

marketization in the Chinese economy has now reached the media.

Will this be the beginning of a new era of press freedom? Most

China observers have given positive answers. We can see, like Liu

Xiaobo, and like many other people, they will say, ‘‘Oh great, privatization. And it will be freedom eventually.’’ Undoubtedly, in my view, marketization will introduce competition

and profit seeking among the media organizations, and thus will

indirectly encourage some bold experiments between the competitors.

However, neither marketization nor competition instinctively indicate freedom. Those are different things, as you know. Rather,

market competition may provide the Party authorities another instrument to control the media, since the terms of competition and

the rules of this market are largely set by the Party.

Therefore, for media organizations, privately owned or otherwise,

winning in a competitive market often means to tilt in the direction

of the government authorities. That is something we have to be

aware of.

There are three key questions which can help us to tell if the

new media regulations are or are not likely to lead to more freedom. First, do media organizations need approval from the Party

Propaganda Department to operate?

Second, can the Party Propaganda Department interfere with

personnel decisions, especially hiring, firing, and the promotion of

editorial and management staff in media organizations?

And third, must media organizations follow the guidelines regularly issued by the Party in order to stay in business? Those are

the three questions we have to ask ourselves.

Unfortunately, in my world, the answers we have to these questions leave very little room for optimism. Press freedom in China

remains merely an illusion, even within a competitive market.

In order to survive in today’s market, Chinese media organizations have to yield to the pressure coming first from the Party, and

then from the market. To be in business and profitable, they must

promote the Party ideology but do so in ways that are attractive

to their audience, especially when compared to the old stiff propaganda style.

In the background, the Party maintains tight disciplinary power

over any members of the media who dare to challenge their authority. We have seen plenty examples of that.

Marketization in the media does not necessarily indicate liberalization. In fact, combined with strict dictation from the Party, it

may well open new forms of media control that use the pressure

of the new market to strengthen political dictatorship.

4

In fact, the profit-seeking trend has been taking place for a few

years. The new regulations merely make it official. Under this new

trend, I have observed that the Chinese media organizations have

indeed become more diverse and bolder in reporting social and

some marginal domestic political issues, but few dare to challenge

the political authorities.

Meanwhile, I am also greatly disturbed by the intensifying hostility by the Chinese press toward the United States in its coverage

of international affairs in general, and of the war on terror in particular.

A review of the Chinese media since September 11, 2001, shows

increasingly negative coverage of the West, and, most especially, of

the United States. During the war in Iraq, for example, the Chinese media constantly attacked the coalition forces, even as it kept

praising the Saddam regime and the Iraqi military, which became

sort of a laughing stock after that.

As a Chinese Internet user pointed out, CCTV, the central TV

station in China, was perhaps the only TV station outside the Arab

world that reported so many ‘‘victories’’ of the Iraqi regime, or that

launched so many vicious attacks on the coalition forces.

Another critic said that the Chinese press seemed to want to

become a ‘‘consultant’’ of the Iraqi regime regarding military strategies. Such a tone was, of course, set by the Party Propaganda

Department.

Since the beginning of the war on terror, that department has

issued many directives to guide the media in covering this war. I

personally have some experience with these directives, because

they stopped the publication of my book, in fact.

Whereas the Chinese media follows the Party line as a matter

of survival in domestic affairs, it seems positively enthusiastic in

doing so when covering international affairs. They seem to have

discovered that following the Party line here is quite profitable.

That is what we have to know.

Take the Iraqi war coverage by CCTV as an example. The number of its viewers jumped 28-fold during the period, and the station

earned an extra $100 million.

So in other words, the Chinese media was able to collect millions

of dollars by selling anti-American propaganda. The Chinese audience, sadly, seems to have a genuine appetite for receiving and accepting such propaganda.

The Chinese media here have found a niche. In the past few

years, they learned that America bashing is not only politically

correct, and therefore safe, but also fashionable, and therefore profitable.

Why so? We can think of several reasons. For example, anti-West

sentiment, we have seen recently. But the underlying reason remains Party control.

Today, although China has become a member of the WTO and

its economy has become more capitalist than Communist, the Chinese Government still monopolizes all information resources from

abroad, except for a handful of prudent Internet users and the audience that listens to international radio stations such as Voice of

America or Radio Free Asia.

5

The only source of information about international affairs in

China is the government. Unlike in domestic issues, when most

Chinese have first-hand experience to assist their judgment, the

government can easily regulate charges to dominate the coverage

of international issues, and thereby form and control popular opinions.

Mr. FOARDE. All right. Let us leave it there and pick up the final

points during our questions and answers.

Ms. GONG. Sure. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Gong appears in the appendix.]

Mr. FOARDE. Thank you very much.

I would like to go on now to Mr. Zhang Huchen.

STATEMENT OF ZHANG HUCHEN, SENIOR EDITOR, VOICE OF

AMERICA’S CHINA BRANCH, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. ZHANG. Thank you, Mr. Foarde, and thank you distinguished

panel. I am very happy to be here this afternoon to talk about the

state of the Chinese press in the wake of SARS.

At the height of the SARS outbreak last April, the Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party held an emergency meeting

in Beijing to discuss how to deal with the unprecedented outbreak

of the epidemic.

Among the decisions made at the meeting was to ask the media

to report truthfully and accurately the magnitude and the seriousness of the disease. It was a reversal of the earlier practice of

covering up the disease at both the central and local levels. Two

high-ranking officials, namely the public health minister and the

mayor of Beijing, were sacked for the cover-up.

Drastic changes were seen overnight. Numbers of new cases and

deaths were published daily in the newspapers and on radio and

TV. Press conferences held by the new mayor of Beijing were carried live on China’s Central Television Station.

Mr. Hu Jintao, China’s new president and new Party boss, and

Mr. Wen Jiabao, the new premier, were seen on CCTV touring

Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and Beijing, visiting people in the marketplace and people’s homes talking about the danger of SARS.

Many political observers and analysts of the Chinese press believed that this might be a harbinger for a new beginning for the

Chinese press. However, as the truth of the outbreak reached the

Chinese public, people in large cities, especially in Beijing, became

panicky.

A large number of people, not just those working and living in

Beijing temporarily or peasants from other parts of China, but also

from Beijing itself, fled the city in a matter of days, bringing the

risk of spreading the disease to other parts of the country, especially the countryside.

This must have made the Chinese leaders realize that in a country where there has never been any real form of freedom of the

press, the truth of a major epidemic such as the outbreak of SARS

might be a little too much for its people to handle.

Another drastic change was seen in the Chinese press. Instead

of reporting new areas of contamination and public reaction, the

focus was now shifted to reporting the ‘‘heroic deeds’’ of the ChiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:52 Dec 01, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 90597.TXT China1 PsN: China1
6

nese medical workers, and what measures the government was

taking to keep the virus under control.

The SARS epidemic came to an abrupt end at the onset of summer. As the SARS virus evaporated, so did the hope for any meaningful change on the part of the Chinese press. Gone also was the

hope that the SARS outbreak would lead to any meaningful political reform and a new era of openness.

Soon after the World Health Organization lifted the travel ban

to Beijing and the other major cities in China, Party officials in

charge of propaganda began to rein in those whom they believed

had gone too far in reporting the outbreak.

Several newspapers were ordered to close or were warned for

interviewing a military doctor who revealed the truth about SARS

to the Western media, for reporting a major corruption case in

Shanghai or discussing any ‘‘sensitive’’ topics, such as political reform and Tibet independence. People who sent short messaging

texts on cell phones were also prosecuted.

A telling example of the increased control of the Chinese media

was the massive demonstration in Hong Kong on July 1 against

the proposed article 23 anti-subversion legislation.

After the demonstration broke out, there was a blackout on the

part of the Chinese press. Official news media, including CCTV, did

not report the mass rally at all.

TV signals from Hong Kong carrying news of the mass rally were

cutoff immediately. It was only 12 days later that the China Daily,

the official English newspaper, mentioned the demonstration in a

commentary.

Callers to VOA shows commented that they would have been

kept totally in the dark about the July 1 and subsequent demonstrations had it not been for the reporting of VOA, RFA, and

other international radio stations.

The ever-increasing control of the Chinese media did not mean

that people stopped talking about political reform, corruption, and

the revision of the Chinese Constitution and similar sensitive topics. A number of publications carried articles on these issues, and

a conference was held on June 19–20 in the coastal city of Qingdao

to debate constitutional revision.

This led the Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist

Party to take more action. In August, the department ordered

Party organizations, research institutions, and universities to stop

all conferences and suppress all essays on political reform, revisions to the Constitution, and the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown.

The department also instructed China’s news media not to report

on these ‘‘three unmentionables,’’ namely political reform, constitution revision, and the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989.

An associate of Mr. Cao Siyuan, the organizer of the June conference and a leading advocate for political reform, told VOA that

Mr. Cao was under a lot pressure from the authorities and it would

be ‘‘inconvenient’’ for him to comment further on any issues relating to political reform.

At the same time, broadcasting of VOA, RFA, and other international radio stations continues to be jammed, and overseas Web

sites blocked.

7

However, we can not say that there has been no change on the

part of the Chinese press since SARS. One ‘‘bright spot’’ is the reporting of accidents. For many years, natural disasters and manmade calamities were deemed ‘‘negative news.’’

Reporting of such negative news, it was believed, would only

bring shame to the leadership of the Communist Party and political

system. One lesson the Chinese leaders must have learned from

the SARS outbreak was that diseases, natural disasters, and accidents happen to any country, regardless of its political system.

At the height of the SARS outbreak, the Chinese official media

reported a major submarine accident. After SARS, we have seen

many, many more reports on food poisoning, coal mine explosions,

and other accidents. These reports even led to the imprisonment of

a number of officials who were accused of being responsible for the

accidents or covering up the accidents.

Now how do we explain the back and forth in the battle for

control of the Chinese media? To me, the measures that were taken

at the height of the SARS outbreak were merely measures of necessity.

China was under a great deal of pressure and criticism from the

international community, especially the WHO. The Chinese citizens

had also lost faith in the Chinese media. They would rather rely

on the grapevine, that is, the central word of mouth, text messages

on their cell phones, and the Internet, for news of SARS.

The central leadership took those measures to repair its badly

tarnished international image and to restore some faith in its rule.

Had the SARS outbreak lasted any longer, it might have built

some momentum for press reform.

As it so happened, the SARS virus evaporated at the onset of hot

weather, and the party officials congratulated themselves on their

good luck, and went on doing things the old way.

In any case, the fight for the freedom of the press cannot be won

overnight in China. After all, it will take a Chinese Gorbachev, not

a virus, to bring down the government’s iron rule over the Chinese

press.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FOARDE. Thank you very much, Mr. Zhang. You are admirable in your discipline. You came in right on time.

Mr. ZHANG. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Zhang Huchen appears in the

appendix.]

Mr. FOARDE. Thank you. Let us go on to our colleague, Dr. Bu

Zhong.

STATEMENT OF BU ZHONG, FORMER REPORTER AND DEPUTY

EDITOR, THE CHINA DAILY, COLLEGE PARK, MD

Mr. BU. Thank you. Distinguished representatives of the CECC,

ladies and gentlemen, China has been in the midst of rapid change

in all sectors. Media reform—I do not know if this is the right term

or not—or media changes, though much slower than other sectors,

are just beginning to catch up.

Very few people predicted that the SARS epidemic could bring

such a widespread panic across China, and give a not so widespread, but still heavy, push to China’s media reform.

8

As we know, the SARS epidemic first originated in south China’s

Guangdong Province in February. It then spread to Beijing and

several other provinces. Not surprisingly, the governmentcontrolled media kept tight-mouthed about the disease at the

beginning.

During that period, Beijing residents mainly depended on the

Internet, e-mails, and cell phone text messages for SARS information.

The Internet came to China as the first forceful reminder that the

days of censorship and suppression of information are numbered.

The media silence was broken in early April after new Premier

Wen Jiabao admitted that the SARS situation was ‘‘grave.’’ In

those days the reporting was mainly about government efforts to

contain the spread of the disease and heroic medical workers saving lives.

In May and June, I noticed a few newspapers began to criticize

the government’s hiding of SARS information. More criticism came

after the government declared it would punish any officials who

tried to hide SARS information from the public.

Let me describe a few of the important ways I see China’s media

evolving today in the wake of the SARS epidemic.

As one of the first signs of media reform, the media’s commercialization started silently about 10 years ago. The most dramatic

step of the commercialization came in June when the central government announced that it would end its direct financial support

to all but three newspapers and one journal.

This means that most government-owned print media must sever

their ties with government agencies. As the People’s Daily reports,

these media ‘‘would then be free to operate in the marketplace

rather than continuing to serve as cultural units under government

departments or social organizations.’’

China now has more than 2,000 newspapers, 2,000 TV stations,

and 900 magazines. But 25 years ago, there were fewer than 200

newspapers. The rapid growth of the news media has made government control less effective, and no one can deter them from going

to the market.

The second sign of China’s media reform is the end of compulsory

subscription, which also happened this June. In the past, before the

end of each year, the government used to issue circular orders

requiring all its departments and agencies subscribe to official

publications. Now this practice is becoming history because the

government has decided to cease it.

Over the past 10 years, the official media has become increasingly unpopular. On Beijing’s streets, no People’s Daily can be

found on newsstands. At the same time, the government has been

cutting off its financial support to its mouthpieces.

In late 1990s, the financial support that the China Daily received

from the government accounted for less than 10 percent of what

was needed, while the remaining 90 percent came from its advertising revenue and a few tabloids it published.

Today, all the official newspapers publish one or more tabloids,

which carry a lot of advertisements, and have cut their official

news down to a minimum. These tabloids make so much money

that they can comfortably support their more official big brothers.

9

In Beijing, the Beijing Daily publishes a tabloid, the Beijing

Evening News, and the People’s Daily tabloid is the Jinhua Daily.

Now let me talk a bit about Chinese journalists. It seems to me

that many Chinese journalists are pushing the frontier to put their

‘‘controversial’’ stories in print or on air.

China Central Television’s TV magazine, ‘‘News in Focus,’’ can be

a good example. Now and then, it has to pay lip service to the official line for survival, which is fully understandable.

But from time to time, it airs the deepest grievances and the indignation of those oppressed by the sheer greed and shamelessness

of the lower-level government bureaucracy. To me, the TV show is

mainly a muckraker, occasionally, a shocking muckraker, in the

best tradition of American muckrakers.

Now I would like to talk about the top leadership. The majority

of the new top leadership, once in full power, clearly has in mind

the need to ease media control, but ease it little by little.

As high technology develops at breakneck speed and out of their

control, the Chinese media becomes more and more open, almost

against the Party’s will. Some degree of disobedience and even defiance on the part of the media can be observed in the past couple

of years, and also some official tolerance.

As soon as he gained power, President Hu Jintao invited experts

to give lectures to all the Politburo members regularly. The main

contents of each lecture have been reported in the press as a subtle

means of letting attentive people know what is on the minds of the

top leaders right now.

As I remember, the first study session was on the Constitution

and rule of law, a manifest enough hint to the public that during

Hu’s power he is going to rule by law, not by his personal authority.

The latest lecture they had is about the industrialization of

media content. The concept is nothing new in the West, but it is

in China where media outlets had long been taken as a propaganda

machine.

It seems to me that no change in China’s media is insignificant.

Right now, the gains made at every step seem too insignificant to

matter, but the progress is there for people to see, if they care to

see it. These modest gains will in time amount to marked and

important change.

In China, press freedom and independence is to be a painfully

slow process, but it does shuffle its feet forward in the right direction. It is unwise, even undesirable, for one to exercise undue pressure on it, which may yield an effect to the contrary to that which

is

desired.

If you refuse to believe things are going in the right direction,

pick up any newspaper, even the People’s Daily, and compare it

with what it was, say, 10, or even 5, years ago. In those old, dark

days, news of a plane crash was suppressed in media if there were

no foreigners on board.

After SARS, everyone in China has seen that suppression of information and of public deceit could quickly and directly endanger

people’s lives by the thousands, and drove the lesson home in the

most convincing manner that the denial of the people’s right to

know could be the denial of their very lives.

10

Finally, I hope the voices from the Chinese people can be heard

in the world. To find out what is happening in China’s media, we

must listen to those who still live in China and those who work in

the Chinese news media. I believe they know the best about China.

Mr. FOARDE. Thank you very much for giving us lots of things

to think about, as well as for your brevity and concision.

Mr. BU. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bu appears in the appendix.]

Mr. FOARDE. We will now go on to our friend, Professor Lin

Gang.

STATEMENT OF LIN GANG, PROGRAM ASSOCIATE, WOODROW

WILSON CENTER’S ASIA PROGRAM, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. LIN. Thank you, Mr. Foarde, and good afternoon, ladies and

gentlemen. It is my great pleasure to share my personal observation of Party media reform in China with you.

As you know, one by-product of China’s economic reform is the

growing commercialization of the Chinese media. According to official statistics, between 1978 and 2002, the number of newspapers

in China increased from 186 to 2,137, while the number of magazines increased from 930 to 9,029.

Most of these media are still owned by the party-state, receiving

more or less of a subsidy from the government. However, advertising and subscription income has become the major source of revenue for the media, except for newspapers and magazines directly

run by the Party and government organs, so called ‘‘dangzheng

jiguang.’’

Media commercialization has provided new incentives and opportunities for journalists to cover lively, sensational, provocative, and

diverse stories, and expose political corruption, even though it may

offend government officials.

Amid media commercialization, Party-state organ newspapers

and magazines, continue to lose their readership. The circulation of

the People’s Daily, the principal mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party, decreased significantly from 6.2 million in 1979 to

about 2 million two decades later.

To increase readership, many Party organ newspapers have to

rely on their subordinating newspapers for financial support. Twothirds of Party organ newspapers run by provincial Party committees have evening newspapers or metropolitan newspapers.

The Guangming Daily, a national newspaper run by the Party,

targeting intellectuals, has benefited from its subordinate the Life

Times. Even the official New Chinese News Agency carries some

sensational stories related to sex on its Web site.

To increase readership, China’s new leadership under Hu Jintao

has called for the Party’s media to be ‘‘close to the mass, close to

the realities and close to life,’’ reducing the exposure of leaders’

activities in the media to give more coverage to ordinary people.

Most recently, the Party plans to end its direct financial support

to the mandatory subscription requirement of most Party-government newspapers and magazines.

At the national level, only three newspapers and one magazine

are the exceptions, they include the People’s Daily, Guangming

11

Daily, Economic Daily, and Seeking Truth, which will still be run

by the Party’s central leadership.

At the provincial level, the central leadership will allow each

Party committee to continue operating one newspaper and one

journal. Each municipal Party committee will be allowed to operate

one newspaper only, and county-level Party committees and governments can no longer operate media publications.

Beijing’s reform plan on Party media is based on at least two

considerations. First, to reduce the financial burden. In today’s

China, each province can have as many as several dozen Party

newspapers and magazines, starting from the provincial level down

to the county level.

These media are dull in content, relying heavily on subsidies and

mandatory subscriptions by governments at the different levels.

The lower the level of the government, say the township level, the

more Party newspapers and magazines they are supposed to

subscribe to, thus creating a heavy burden for the grassroots,

particularly to those in poor rural areas. So, first is the financial

consideration.

The second is strengthening the Party media. To maintain too

many Party newspapers and magazines not only increases government’s financial burden, but also makes Party media either more

boring—repeating the same tune here and there—or inconsistent.

This was described by a political scientist as ‘‘different mouths for

the same brain.’’ By keeping a limited number of Party newspapers and magazines, Beijing apparently tries to make a distinction between Party

media and the mass media. In this way, it tries to free the Party

media of fiery market competition with less media, without loosening the Party’s guidelines. That is my personal observation.

The relative retreat of Party newspapers and magazines from the

media market follows Beijing’s strategy of retaining large stateowned enterprises and privatizing smaller ones in economic reform,

so called ‘‘zhuada fangxiao,’’ to reform economic situations.

The commercialization of mass media does not necessarily mean

that the Chinese media will gradually gain political independence

from the state control. For the foreseeable future, the political

taboo will co-exist with Beijing’s one-Party rule.

Chinese journalists have to be cautious in exposing the dark side

of the society, because too much exposure of social problems will

not only shake people’s faith in the performance of the Party-state,

but also challenge the legitimacy of the political regime, and oneparty rule. In the absence of significant political reform, we should

not expect media freedom in China as we understand it in the

United States.

That is my personal statement. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lin appears in the appendix.]

Mr. FOARDE. Thank you very much, Professor Lin. Also lots of

food for thought there.

I will give our four panelists a minute to catch their breath and

I will make a couple of short administrative announcements.

The next week or 10 days is a very busy period for the CECC.

On Wednesday morning, the 24th, we are having a full hearing on

China’s WTO implementation and compliance, and commercial rule

12

of law issues. Chairman Leach will preside, and Co-chairman

Hagel will also be in attendance. That is at 10:30 a.m. on the day

after tomorrow, Wednesday, the 24th, in room 491 of the Dirksen

Senate Office Building.

In addition to that, on October 2, our annual report will be presented to the public at a press conference at 10 a.m. in this room

2255, Rayburn. So, lots going on.

Let us now move to our question and answer period and give our

staff panel here a chance to ask some questions of our panelists.

I think I would began by addressing a question to Gong Xiaoxia.

First of all, you, and Mr. Zhang also, gave us much to think about.

I knew that you had a point or two that you wanted to finish making, and so I give you the opportunity to do that if you would like.

Ms. GONG. Actually, that is pretty much it.

Mr. FOARDE. All right. Then I have a question for you. First of

all, how much, here in 2003, do Chinese readers really trust the

press that they read? You say that the Chinese audience wants the

type of anti-American and anti-Western propaganda that they are

seeing, but do they really trust the press on this and other things?

Ms. GONG. I do not think they completely trust the press or

media. I am from China. I lived in China for 31 years, so as my

fellow Chinese—now I am American, actually—my former fellow

Chinese—I have a really natural distrust of the press. I don’t think

the Chinese people trust the press.

On the other hand, in terms of sentiment, many Chinese, especially the educated Chinese, identify with them and they reflect

that sort of popular anti-Western sentiment.

They would believe that they know even more, and they have

more to support that sentiment. I talk to them—I am from Peking

University—I am still talking to my colleagues, and that is my

impression.

Mr. FOARDE. That is very useful. Thank you very much. I would

address a question to Dr. Bu Zhong. During your presentation, you

were talking about the new tabloids that have been published by

some of the very well-known state publications, and you said that

they are making a lot of money. How are they making the money?

Is it on advertisements or from subscriptions, or how?

Mr. ZHANG. From both, actually, because so many company officials do not talk about so many political issues in the newspaper.

They just talk about whatever sensational is out there, maybe

something about their life, something that happened in their neighborhoods.

A good example was by the Beijing Evening News. For so many

years it was so popular, and the sales—when it hit the newsstands,

in 1 or 2 hours, you could not buy it any longer. Actually, as far

as I can remember, all provincial Party newspapers now publish

tabloids.

Ms. GONG. May I add a point here?

Mr. FOARDE. Please, go ahead.

Ms. GONG. And also corporate sponsorship is well-hidden, or

open.

Mr. FOARDE. How is that done?

Ms. GONG. Well, one case I know, one tabloid paper only reports

on the positive news of corporations, health, or medicine, or someVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:52 Dec 01, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 90597.TXT China1 PsN: China1
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thing. So now the corporations pay a tremendous amount of advertising fees for that paper.

Mr. FOARDE. In return for positive coverage of their activity.

Ms. GONG. Exactly.

Mr. FOARDE. But I take it that this same publication would also

publish other stories?

Ms. GONG. Yes, of course.

Mr. FOARDE. Not just a publication for the company.

Ms. GONG. No. It is not like that. Also, they pay the reporters

under the table. That is something they do.

Mr. FOARDE. My final question, as my time is running out for

this round, is to Professor Lin. You said the readership of the flagship publication of the Communist Party, the People’s Daily, is now

about 2 million a day. Where are the readers? Do you know? Are

they concentrated in the cities, or is it all over the country? Where

are most people actually reading?

Mr. LIN. The People’s Daily is still required to be subscribed by

grassroots units. Not for ordinary people. My friend told me just recently it is difficult for him to find a People’s Daily on the newsstand, but basically, through subscriptions. Those people reading

the People’s Daily are more related to government institutions,

than not. That is my guess.

Mr. FOARDE. I normally do not interrupt these comments with vignettes, but let me give you a brief one which I think underscores

your point.

After many years away from China, I returned in April 2000,

and went out one early morning to have coffee with a friend. The

fact that you could actually go out to have Starbucks coffee in Beijing showed that there had been quite a bit of change.

But I went past the newsstand and I said, let me get a copy of

the People’s Daily. And so I went over and asked the woman in the

kiosk for it. She looked at me very funny. And I said, ‘‘What is in

the People’s Daily today? ’’ And she replied, ‘‘I do not know. I do

not read that thing any more.’’ So, things really have changed a

great deal.

Mr. LIN. Evening newspapers are much more popular than a

daily, say Xinmin Wanbao for Shanghai, and the reporters earn

more money than the chief editor or president of the People’s Daily.

So, you can see the difference.

Mr. FOARDE. How interesting. My time is up.

I would like to recognize my friend and colleague, Dave Dorman,

who represents Senator Chuck Hagel.

David.

Mr. DORMAN. First, I would like to thank each of you for taking

the time today to help us illuminate this important topic for the

members of our Commission. Each of your testimonies was very

valuable.

I would just start with a comment. It is based on something that

Ms. Gong said, and I think Dr. Lin Gang followed up on. You both

made the comment, I believe, that marketization does not necessarily mean liberalization. I am going to add that capitalism does

not necessarily mean democracy, another proof of political science

demonstrated in China. It is an interesting point.

14

I am going to ask each of you to get your crystal ball out for a

second and help us all understand what you think about the reforms and regulations that have recently been announced.

Ms. Gong mentioned a new media market. If we could fast-forward, say a year, or even 2 years from now, and imagine that the

SARS epidemic is occurring for the first time, do you believe that

this new media market would report on the epidemic any differently?

Ms. GONG. Can I go first? I believe, in looking at it, perhaps the

answer is yes. The public thinks, well, if you can chase a story, find

a story, expose social issues, if you find something worth reporting,

you report. You cannot link that to some subjects—for example,

they made a very clear directive to all the news media that you can

discuss SARS, you can go chase the story of SARS.

Well, actually the media did so. But the bottom line here is, you

cannot link SARS epidemic with the political system. We cannot

say, ‘‘What is wrong with the political system which caused this

disaster? ’’ That is the bottom line.

So I believe, in a year or two, the bottom line will remain the

same, until we have broad-reaching change and the reporting itself

may be a lot more diverse.

Mr. LIN. As a result of media commercialization, journalists, in

general, may enjoy more freedom on social and economic issues,

but not on political issues. Talking about SARS. Of course, there

was a lot of exposure of that issue. But for the government, you

have to expose the issue positively or constructively. We do not expect to have some sensational stories. Say, somebody bravely died

because of SARS. We believe a lot of officials who were responsible

for that kind of issue were sacked, but few were exposed in the

media. Then if we make a comparison—in Taiwan, government officials are held responsible for all this kind of problem and exposed

in the media during that period. But in China, they just give you

some figures, very commonly, very constructively and positively.

You do not expect that kind of sensational stories on Chinese TV.

Ms. GONG. Another phenomenon is the so-called rule of law and

the responsibility of others. Several times already, the government

has threatened to sue reporters for reporting a story which caused

political damage. That is something we also have to pay attention

to. They may use other tactics to further suppress press freedom,

especially fines, in a money-driven business.

Mr. ZHANG. I have mixed feelings about this question. On the

one hand, I doubt that if the first SARS outbreak were to happen

2 years from now, instead of disappearing, the result would be any

different. We have seen a lot of growth on the part of Chinese

media and the variety and amount of information in China.

In China, the Chinese people can get access to a large variety of

information these days, including business, entertainment, sports,

health, and lifestyle. But on the other hand, the government is still

controlling very tightly reporting of political news and any news

that may be deemed harmful to the image or the actual rule of the

Chinese Communist Party or the socialist system.

The SARS epidemic was quite different news from other health

news. It concerns a lot of aspects, including the bureaucratic sysVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:52 Dec 01, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 90597.TXT China1 PsN: China1
15

tem, how they reacted to the outbreak, or what the government did

to cover it up.

So the SARS problem might be considered a little bit more than

just health news. It is too important. It is almost political news for

the Chinese leadership. So, I doubt that, if the SARS epidemic

were to happen 2 years from now instead of last spring, the result

would be any different.

But, on the other hand, I also think that the SARS epidemic became such a big thing and had a lot of unique circumstances. First

of all, it was covered up by both the central and local leaders, officials, the Health Ministry, and officials in Guangdong Province.

It also happened that the National People’s Congress annual session and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference

were held in the beginning or middle of March, just before the

height of SARS. Those two things made the Chinese leaders realize

that they must be very quiet about it so as not to bring any factor

to destabilize the country.

So if the SARS epidemic were to happen 2 years from now under

some different circumstances and at a different time of the year,

the result might be a little bit different.

Mr. FOARDE. All right. We are out of time. So, it is time to go

on to our friend and colleague, William Farris, who follows free

flow of information issues for us, and helped put together today’s

panel.

Please.

Mr. FARRIS. Thank you, everyone. I think this question is probably particularly directed to Dr. Bu, but anyone can feel free to

offer their thoughts on this. Doctor, you mentioned during your

talk that the progress is slow in the right direction, and we need

to be careful about what steps are taken in order to encourage this

to keep going in the right direction.

I am wondering if you have any recommendations or any

thoughts on, how important do you think it is for the U.S. Government to continue to fund efforts like VOA and RFA, or various

other Web sites to get information and news into China?

And if you think there are other types of assistance or activities

that the U.S. Government should be undertaking or funding, what

role can the U.S. Government play in encouraging China’s media

and China’s government to continue going in the right direction

and perhaps speed up the progress?

Mr. BU. First, I do not understand what VOA or what Radio Free

Asia is doing. Now I cannot listen to them, because in the United

States I cannot. Back in China, they were jammed.

It basically seems to me that we need to listen to the people living in China. I believe that is very important to find out what is

really in their minds. I keep very frequent contact with all of my

former friends in China—I find so many changes happening in

their minds, in their way to approach new stories.

One of my friends who works in South China told me he could

virtually write anything nowadays, as long as he does not write

anything against the government. He says, yes, there are so many

things that he wants to write, but could not put in print. But there

are some things he could refuse to write. That, it seems to me, constitutes very big changes there.

16

I have never heard of this before. If you were assigned a story,

you must go ahead and cover it, or whatever. Nowadays, in his situation, he can actually choose that. He can enjoy a little bit of that

kind of freedom.

So my basic point is that it is really important to listen to the

people inside China, especially if you want to know the media system there. We need to listen to those media professionals and what

is in their minds.

Another point is, and it is maybe risky, we totally do not recognize the progress China has made. This kind of slow development

can fool us into not seeing the big picture of China’s media system.

You know, so many changes have happened, but we never know.

We still get it framed in our minds that is bad and it is always bad.

I see all the progress that the Chinese are making, and it seems

to me that the leadership is changing, too.

I can give another example. The Labor Minister recently talked

to a group of journalists and said, ‘‘I really urge you guys to report

industry accidents, because I believe 70 percent, even 80 percent of

those accidents were caused by corruption. Your reporting will help

us curb this corruption. We cannot let this happen again and again

in this country.’’ So, I believe that is progress there.

Also, in some provincial governments, like Anhui—they punish

any official who refuses journalists’ interviews. I do not know if you

have heard of that. That was published in the People’s Daily. It

really surprised me.

So, from the people we really notice those kinds of changes. The

top leadership, it seems to me, cannot change everything overnight.

But I do see progress there happening all the time.

Mr. LIN. May I add one sentence? I think we should invite liberal

intellectuals, including journalists, to the United States to let them

have a chance to see what is happening here. But we don’t need

to invite radicals to the United States, trying to educate them, because some of them intentionally present themselves as radicals,

and sell their provocative ideas to the West.

Ms. GONG. I would like to jump in, since I worked at Radio Free

Asia for 51⁄2 years. I have to confess, I am sort of a technological

freak. I really love those things. What I fear is that we have advanced too much in technology. But let me say a few words on

international broadcasting. The international broadcasting to

China has not caught up with technology.

For example, we think of the digital area. They are still using

short-wave broadcasting. I am very obsessed with broadcasting,

since I started listening to all of this since 1971, which was the

main source of my outside information, which also helped me to become a political dissident, and imprisoned later.

But here I really think the United States can get the International Broadcasting Board of Governors to put more effort and

put more research into looking at new technological developments,

including the Internet and digital satellite broadcasting. To push

the Chinese media to change, is to have real competition there.

Also, I was thinking that I talk to a Chinese audience almost

every day. What really impressed me was, during the war in Iraq,

so many Chinese people called in and asked for detailed informaVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:52 Dec 01, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 90597.TXT China1 PsN: China1
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tion about the war in Iraq, because they have no trust in the Chinese official media.

So, I believe, on the one hand we can see the Chinese press has

been much more diverse and yet in a sense not really free, but

open in social and some political issues. But in international reporting, that’s the blind spot. If you let the Chinese Government

lead on this reporting and to form popular sentiment—I really

think the United States should focus on this problem.

Mr. ZHANG. I would just like to add, briefly. I think it is very important for the Congress to continue to fund, and even to increase

funding, for U.S. international broadcasting. Because Mr. Foarde

asked the question, do the Chinese people believe the Chinese

press? The answer is, yes and no.

They turn to the press for any kind of information, including entertainment, health, war, and so on. But the thing they do not

trust, for example, is politics, political news, and international

news. That is why they turn to radio stations like VOA and RFA,

because they want to get more information on China’s political

news and international news, unfiltered, unbiased.

Dr. Gong Xiaoxia talked about how the Chinese media reported

the war in Iraq and other international issues. They want to hear

what is really going on inside Chinese politics, what is going on in

the world, and what is going on in America. That is where U.S.

international broadcasting can provide for the Chinese people.

Ms. GONG. While you will see plenty of diversity in reporting social issues, if you use the Internet search engine and search for

some international news, you end up with so many pages, but usually only one version of the story from the Xinhua News Agency.

I found out that the audience was most interested in that news and

in that reporting. That is an area where we should really step in.

Mr. BU. Could I add one more point? In talking about supporting

things, I really hope the U.S. Congress will continue support for

more Chinese students to come to the United States to take a real

look at what is going on here.

My personal experience has shown me this very clearly. The first

time I came to the United States was on a Freedom Forum fellowship; I came to the United States to get a chance to work at the

various news organizations for 1 year, and to get a chance to visit

Virginia and Tennessee, and a couple of Freedom Forum offices

there. That really helped me understand the American system better.

While I was working in CNN’s news room, I almost always compared the reporting by my Chinese colleagues and my American

colleagues. This helped me understand better the two systems. I

really believe a better understanding between the two systems will

help us better understand the two peoples.

Mr. FOARDE. Thank you very much. William is out of time.

We will go on to our next questioner. I said a few minutes ago

that we are having a busy week or 10 days at the Commission, but

today is a particularly happy occasion because we have a new staff

member who has just joined us.

He is Carl Minzner. Carl is a distinguished attorney with a great

background in China and the Chinese language. This is his first

day on the job, and his first issues roundtable. So, Carl, over to you

for some questions to our panelists, please.

18

Mr. MINZNER. Thank you very much. I appreciate the opportunity to meet and listen to what each of you has to say.

I will just pick up on one thing that William had raised. We were

just talking about American broadcasts into China. Particularly, I

want to pick up on something that Dr. Gong brought up, which is

that you noted that there is a rise in anti-Western sentiment in the

media.

Part of that may not be merely the fact of government control of

the media, but may also reflect sentiment on the part of some of

the readers, on the part of some of the consumers of the media.

Given that, how should the U.S. Government alter its RFA and

VOA broadcasts? Is there anything that should be changed to address this sentiment, and if so, what should be done?

Ms. GONG. All right. Well, I would like to add a little bit more.

My point is that, even as a popular sentiment which seems to be

spontaneous, in that environment, under the political dictatorship,

it was formed by the government, by the government propaganda.

It is a bit of a complicated question, I have to admit.

If one discusses how the sentiment was formed, actually, I would

like to ask something of Mr. Bu Zhong.

In a way, all the students who studied in America and went back

to China, I would say a large percentage—I am not sure if it is a

majority, but a large percentage—became extremely nationalistic

and anti-America. That is a very sad fact, and we can discuss that

further.

But I think RFA and VOA and organizations alike can do is to

have more extensive reporting. Take the war on terror, for example. I watch the Chinese media every day and they did report

American opinions, but overwhelmingly reported the thinking of

leftist intellectuals in America. The idea was ‘‘Even Americans

think the Americans deserve it.’’ That is so ridiculous, I would say.

So for VOA, and RFA, and organizations alike, in our reporting,

I firmly believe we need to organize and to coordinate between all

of us some in depth informational panels for the Chinese audience.

There are plenty of things we can do. But facing the new budget

cuts in international broadcasting, I really doubt if we can very

well accomplish the job if we have further budget cuts.

Mr. ZHANG. I would like to say that we need to explain U.S. policies better for our global listeners. The sentiment Dr. Gong described is very true in China and in other parts of the world.

I happened to be in Korea to cover the World Cup 2002. I found

that a lot of young people in Korea harbor anti-American sentiment

because of a lot of factors. I am not going to say anything about

that today.

But I think we can do a better job of explaining our policies to

our listeners. Sometimes it is hard for us to find people who are

in the position to explain our official policy to our listeners.

I am reporting on the Congress. Congress is my beat now. But,

more often than not, I find a lot of people are not returning my

calls. I know they are very busy people. But sometimes VOA and

RFA might not be their priority.

They think it is more important to be responsible to their own

districts, to be responsible to their voters, or getting on national

19

TV. They do not know it is also important to explain our policies

to our listeners and viewers across the world.

Second, we need to tell people in the world that there are different opinions in America regarding a lot of things, the war in

Iraq, anything, you name it. I think that is how we can win more

people over to our side. Thank you.

Mr. FOARDE. We are out of time.

We will go now to Selene Ko, our colleague who handles commercial rule of law issues, usually, but also is interested in free flow

of information issues.

Selene.

Ms. KO. Thank you, everyone, for being here today.

I wanted to switch subjects a little and talk a bit about the

media profession itself, and professionalism and corruption within

the media in China, and whether or not any of you think that is

a serious problem or whether corruption is raised as an excuse for

increased and heightened government regulation of the industry. If

it is a serious problem, how should it be addressed?

Also, can you tell me whether there are any self-regulation

efforts going on within the Chinese media? Has there been development of a code of ethics or anything of that nature.

Mr. BU. Can I talk a little bit about that? While I worked at the

China Daily, first of all, I worked as a reporter. Someone invited

us for a free lunch for something. In the first year or two, you

think, ‘‘Yes, this is so great. I never got a chance to go to that fancy

hotel before. I can go there now.’’

That happens with some American companies. They are so rich,

they can afford to rent fancy hotels to treat those reporters. Then

the reporters come back with some stories there. Because the companies could be Ford, could be Motorola, whose events are also big

stories there because they have invested so much money in China.

After a while, I found that was a shame to me, especially when

I began to read something about journalism and what we really

should do.

Later I became a copy editor. I could tell if a reporter got money

or not from the sources when his story appeared on my computer.

Sometimes, that is a big story. If that story is not so important but

the reporter wants to get it into the newspaper there. I will tell

him, ‘‘You cannot do this there.’’

But it was a common practice. Back then, when I was working

there in the mid-1990s, I believe that more and more journalists

felt that this was not a good practice at all. You are just like someone who tosses you any food, and you just hang around like a dog.

So, Chinese journalists want to have their own professional dignity. They do not want to just stick around all these issues. I cannot say no one will do that today. As I know, among my friends

there, we talked about this issue. We no longer feel proud of ourselves to get 1,000 or 2,000 yuan or something. It is no longer a

good thing.

More and more newspapers pay journalists very well now, so

they do not care about this kind of money, or ‘‘taxi fees,’’ which it

is often called. So, I believe that the more commercialized a newspaper will be the practice will be less popular there and——

20

Mr. ZHANG. I think it is a growing problem, but not such a serious problem yet. If it becomes worse, each news organization can

develop its own code of conduct to fight it. But right now, they do

not have any code for anything, not even a dress code.

Mr. BU. Actually, the readers are not stupid at all. You have got

this kind of news that always puts those companies in a positive

light, and they can tell. You cannot survive in the market at all,

not for a while.

Ms. GONG. Talking about corruption, another thing I realize is

plagiarism. It is the overwhelming problem. It has been problematic for the past few years. Well, I regularly publish in Hong Kong,

not in mainland China, but in the Hong Kong papers.

Once I published an article about something. I forget. American

marriage, or something like that. I found out, on the Internet

alone, it was copied more than 20 times, published without telling

me, without my name there. So, that is another problem.

Mr. FOARDE. We have some time left. I would like to continue the

questioning by posing a question or two to Mr. Zhang Huchen,

please.

You said in your presentation that, with the ‘‘evaporation’’ of the

SARS virus in the late spring, the Chinese media were patting

themselves on the back. But you gave a very downbeat assessment

of what the longer term implications might be.

One of the things that we are all looking at very carefully is

whether SARS will come back as the weather cools off this fall and

into the winter flu season? If it does, can you give us a sense of

whether you think that the Chinese news media will feel that it

is able to, or will be allowed by the authorities, to report more freely on outbreaks than it was late last winter?

Mr. ZHANG. Yes. I think the reporting of another SARS outbreak

would be much better, first of all. I think the Chinese Government

has learned a lot from the past outbreak. It was treated merely as

a public health issue, not as a political issue anymore. The Chinese

media treated it as such.

Mr. Dorman asked a question about, if this SARS outbreak

happened 2 years from now, and I think I sort of answered his

question. But if another outbreak happens, say next spring or next

winter, would the Chinese Government or the Chinese media treat

it differently?

Yes, I think so. They will treat it merely as a public health issue,

not a political issue any more. They will be downbeat and downgrade the significance of such an outbreak, and I think they will

do a much better job this time.

Mr. FOARDE. So can I ask you a related question? You were talking also in your presentation about the increased ability after

SARS for the Chinese print media to report sort of negative news,

natural disasters.

Does this include official misconduct? For example, when people

feel cheated out of their property or their rights to pensions or

what have you by local government authorities and have protested?

Have you seen more reports of that sort of behavior?

And what about, for example, worker protests of the types that

we saw last year in Liaoyang in the northeast, but also during this

year in some other places on a much smaller scale?

21

Mr. ZHANG. I think they are making a distinction between local

corruption and public resentment or unrest on a larger scale.

The former one can basically be contained locally, like coal mine

explosions.

They arrested and imprisoned a number of local officials for covering up the accidents and not taking enough safety measures to

prevent these accidents from happening.

But anything bigger than that, they are treating it as a political

issue. Right now, they are only addressing the safety issue and the

corruption issue on a local level. They are not bringing the question

to a bigger scale, like, pay more attention to human rights, to

workers’ rights, or any systematic failure on the part of the government. I think that is going to take some time.

Mr. FOARDE. Interesting.

Ms. GONG. Also, there are several official directives on this issue.

If a reporter discovers something like that and even if they have

all the interviews and eyewitness reports, they have to contact the

local related department, which was the department in charge, in

order to publish that story. Otherwise, they would be held accountable for those disclosures.

And about the SARS, the question is—and I am from

Guangdong, so I heard from sources in Guangdong that hospitals

got false reports every day. Every day, somewhere there was a

fever that looked like SARS or something.

But the provincial government had already ordered that whenever there is an outbreak, they will inform the media. But the line

of that is, ‘‘You see, this is an example of how the government

cares for people.’’

Mr. BU. The central government has sent some journalists to disclose this kind of corruption. I could see this on CCTV’s program

‘‘News in Focus.’’ I really, sometimes, just worry for their safety.

They get into that situation and find out what’s really going on,

just using hand sticks there, and hand-held microphones there, just

trying to find out who is doing those bad things there.

Another good example is journalists from time to time broke

some controversial stories, which maybe brought shame to local

governments. But they can still do that. I did observe some tolerance from the central government about their reporting, saying

that is all right.

Mr. LIN. I think for SARS, I agree with Huchen that this is a

social issue. Also, the government and the people have a common

interest in dealing with SARS. It is not necessarily a story. Some

local governments, they still try to cover up SARS.

Then the upper level government may encourage a person to expose that kind of problem and some official may be fired. But that

kind of story would not appear too much in the mass media, saying

how many officials are fired or who is fired. They do not expose

that too much, so we do not know.

Mr. FOARDE. My time is up, so I will go on to Dave Dorman for

another question.

David.

Mr. DORMAN. Each of you have given some very nuanced answers to the question of press freedom in China. It is sometimes

22

difficult to understand nuance. It is much easier for us to understand the press as free or not free.

It would help us understand, and this is just a hypothetical, if

each of you would put yourself in the place—and many of you have

been in this place—of being a journalist in China. Say that you

have uncovered a case of corruption at the local level that you

would like to report.

Could you describe to us the steps that you would have to go

through before you could report this story?

Mr. ZHANG. First of all, you have to talk to your own boss, your

section chief. Say, if I am working for the Xinhua News Agency, I

need to get approval from my Overseas Department.

He probably will have to get permission from the central Xinhua

News Agency, depending on the scale and the magnitude of the corruption case. If it is a big case, the leader of Xinhua may go to the

Propaganda Department of the CPC to get approval.

Mr. DORMAN. Then the journalist basically follows his chain of

command at the newspaper for approval.

Mr. ZHANG. Basically.

Mr. DORMAN. Then the question is not that difficult. You find a

case of corruption. The gray area in terms of what can be reported

and what cannot be reported would be fairly clear to a journalist

at any particular level?

Mr. ZHANG. Well, yes. I think it would be clear. But how to treat

it and how to report it requires some skill.

Mr. DORMAN. Several of you have mentioned that you have seen

certain reporting or certain articles out of China that are politically

risky, and you wonder whether the writer is safe. It tells me that

there is a bit of gray here in terms of making a decision on what

can be reported and what cannot be reported. But, based on your

comments, you are suggesting that the decision is fairly clear.

You suggest that there is a clear line for what can be reported

and what cannot be reported. Yet, some other responses I have

heard from you suggested just the opposite. Maybe it is just the

way things are.

Ms. GONG. I think the beauty of the system is, nothing is that

clear. Well, yes, it is clear, you cannot challenge the Party’s authority. There is no question that that is off limits. But there are some

issues you can play. Smarter people play smarter. Actually, they

can play stupidly, also.

But basically the government has left a large area, a gray area,

for people. If they are brave, people can test the limit, test the limit

again, and exceed the limits sometimes. But the problem here is

the gray area, and the down side, the negative side of the gray area

is that it makes people constantly think of self-censorship.

Mr. DORMAN. Who is testing the limit, though?

Ms. GONG. Reporters.

Mr. DORMAN. The reporters must get permission from their direct chain of command. So risk takes place at the management

level.

Ms. GONG. You are questioning about the reporters, or what?

Mr. DORMAN. Who are the risk-takers? At what level does the

risk take place?

23

Ms. GONG. I think it is also a gray area. It depends on what

paper you work in, what organization you work in. For example,

if you work in the Xinhua News Agency, they know better, and if

you work in the local tabloid, you may be the only person who

deals with everything. But the Party line is always there.

As I said, the beauty of the system is, it makes everybody constantly think of self-control, of self-censorship. That is a great

threat. You know that the threat is always there. But if you test

the limits, at some point you are there.

Mr. LIN. May I? I think the political factor is very important

here. Say at the People’s Daily, which is run by the central committee of the Party. It is treated as a ministerial level organ. So

if an editor decides to try to stretch the limits maybe it is all right.

But if you want to expose somebody at the same level, a superior

level, the People’s Daily has no such power. It has to be done by

the upper level. So, the hierarchy is still an issue here.

Mr. BU. Yes. In terms of uncovering corruption cases, like you

said, I think those who work for some national official news organizations have some privileges over those who work for local media

outlets, for example, those who work for Xinhua News Agency, the

People’s Daily, and CCTV.

They might not publicly report some problems, but they can

write internal reference reports to the central government. That

will get noticed by some central government leaders there, especially top leaders.

When top leaders are involved, the problem reported will be immediately resolved. That is why so many ordinary people go to the

Xinhua News Agency, to CCTV, to the People’s Daily and are waiting to meet journalists. ‘‘Can you help me resolve this problem?

You cannot publish it in your newspaper? That is fine. But report

this to the central government.’’ So, the top leaders go out of their

way to collect information.

Mr. FOARDE. I see that our time has come for this afternoon. We

have had an extremely rich conversation, with, as Dave pointed out

a moment ago, very rich and nuanced answers from each of you on

these questions. They have been very, very helpful to us as we continue to look at our freedom of expression and free flow of information issues in the Chinese media.

So, on behalf of Chairman Jim Leach and Co-Chairman Chuck

Hagel, I would like to thank Gong Xiaoxia, Zhang Huchen, Bu

Zhong, and Lin Gang for spending the time with us this afternoon.

Please, all of you who have stayed with us this afternoon, thank

you for coming. Please check our Web site for information on the

next roundtables, which will be next month, in the month of October.

We hope to see you at the hearing on Wednesday morning.

Thank you very much. Good afternoon.

[Whereupon, at 4 p.m. the roundtable was concluded.]

(25)

A P P E N D I X

26

PREPARED STATEMENTS

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GONG XIAOXIA

SEPTEMBER 22, 2003

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I come here today to share with you some of my thoughts on the recent development of press freedom, or lack of it, to be more precise, in China. Particularly, I

would like to discuss the meaning of the new regulations issued by the party, which

are widely hailed as a bold marketization reform and a step toward press freedom.

I would like to address my concern that the overall misinterpretation of these new

regulations may lead to misunderstanding of the Chinese political situation, and

might mislead our foreign policy toward China.

Perhaps I should first briefly introduce my own background. I was born in the

People’s Republic of China. I was once a peasant, a worker, a scholar, and a political

dissident there. I came to study in the United States in 1987, and am now a U.S.

citizen. From 1998 to earlier this year, I worked as director of the Cantonese Service

in Radio Free Asia. I am also a regular contributor to the Chinese language media

outside China. Therefore, monitoring the Chinese media is not only my job, but also

part of my daily life.

Let me quickly outline my main points. Based on my research and my personal

experience, I believe that the new regulations recently issued by the Chinese Communist Party, although they may bring about some competition among the media,

do not imply any fundamental change in the Party’s tight political control over the

media. In fact, the new market these rules create may provide the Party with new

means to further suppress press freedom. Moreover, it may set off a more nationalistic or even xenophobic trend in covering foreign affairs. It may encourage further

America bashing in the Chinese press.

These new regulations were issued between June and August this year. They

greatly limit the number of newspapers and magazines owned by the government

or party offices. According to these regulations, each provincial government office is

given the ownership of one newspaper and one magazine, each municipal government one paper, while county governments are deprived of media ownership. The

government media can no longer require villages and other groups to buy subscriptions. Such forced subscription has been a most resented practice for the last half

a century.

As a result of these regulatory changes, most of China’s press organizations,

which used to be directly controlled by the government, have now been thrown into

a new media market.

Although the motivation of these new regulations is budget prudence instead of

press freedom, they have raised hope of limited press freedom. Many people believe

that, by introducing marketization, these regulations open doors for private ownership in media, which is among the last areas where government ownership still

dominates. In other words, the trend of marketization in the Chinese economy has

now reached the media.

Will this be the beginning of a new era of press freedom? Most China observers

have given positive answers. For example, Liu Xiaobo, one of the most prominent

writers and political dissidents in China, has pointed out that marketization will

certainly expand freedom. Other critics are even more optimistic. They predict that

a profit-driven competitive media market will expand the horizon of the press, and

eventually bring about liberalization and press freedom in China.

Undoubtedly, marketization will introduce competition and profit seeking among

the media organizations, and thus will indirectly encourage some bold experiments

between the competitors. However, neither marketization nor competition instinctively indicate freedom. Rather, market competition may provide the party authorities another instrument to control the media, since the terms of competition and the

rules of this market are largely set by the party. Therefore, to media organizations,

privately owned or otherwise, winning in a competitive market often means to tilt

toward the direction of the government authorities.

There are three key questions, which can help us to tell if the new media regulations are or are not likely to lead to more freedom. First, do media organizations

need the approval from the Party Propaganda Department to operate? Second, can

the Party Propaganda Department interfere with the personnel, especially hiring,

firing, and promotion of editorial and management staff, in media organizations?

27

And third, must media organizations follow the guidelines regularly issued by the

Party in order to stay in business?

Unfortunately, the answers we have to these questions leave little room for optimism. Press freedom in China remains merely an illusion, even within a competitive

market.

In order to survive in today’s market, Chinese media organizations have to yield

to the pressures coming first from the Party, and then from the market. To be in

business and profitable, they must promote the Party ideology but do so in ways

that are attractive to their audience, especially when compared to the old stiff propaganda style. In the background, the Party maintains tight disciplinary power over

any members of the media who dare to challenge its authority.

Marketization in the media does not necessary indicate liberalization. In fact,

combined with strict dictation from the Party, it may well open new forms of media

control that use the pressures of the new market to strengthen political dictatorship.

In fact, the profit-seeking trend has been taking place for a few years. The new

regulations merely make it official. Under this new trend, I have observed that the

Chinese media organizations have indeed become more diverse and bolder in reporting social and some marginal domestic political issues, but few dare to challenge the

political authorities.

Meanwhile, I am also greatly disturbed by the intensifying hostility by the Chinese press toward the United States in its coverage of international affairs in general, and of the war on terror in particular.

A review of the Chinese media since September 11 shows increasingly negative

coverage of the West, and, most especially, of the United States. During the war

in Iraq, for example, the Chinese media constantly attacked the coalition forces,

even as it kept praising the Saddam regime and the Iraqi military. As a Chinese

Internet user pointed out, CCTV, the central TV station in China, was perhaps the

only TV station outside the Arab world which reported so many ‘‘victories’’ of the

Iraqi regime, or that launched so many vicious attacks to the coalition forces. Another critic said that the Chinese press seemed to want to become a ‘‘consultant’’ of the Iraqi regime regarding military strategies.

Such a tone was, of course, set by the party propaganda department. Since the

beginning of the war on terror, that department has issued many directives to guide

the media in covering this war. Such directives, although rarely openly publicized,

are handed down to each media organization. One of those directives, for example,

was issued before the 16th Party Congress. It forbade the publication of background

information about any of the terrorist organizations before the Congress. It instructed the media to wait for an official party line. After the 16th Congress,

another directive was issued forbidding negative reporting about any Palestinian

terrorist organizations, such as Hamas. To the contrary, those directives were filled

with anti-Western messages.

Whereas the Chinese media follows the party line as a matter of survival in domestic affairs, it seems positively enthusiastic in doing so when covering international affairs. They seem to have discovered that following the party line here is

quite profitable. Take the Iraqi war coverage by CCTV as an example. The number

of its viewers jumped 28 fold during this period. The station consequently earned

an extra 100 million US dollars. In other words, the Chinese media was able to collect millions dollars by selling anti-American propaganda. The Chinese audience, it

seems, has a genuine appetite for receiving and accepting such propaganda.

The Chinese media have found a niche here. In the past few years, they learned

that America bashing is not only politically correct, and therefore safe, but also

fashionable, and therefore profitable.

Why so? I can think of several reasons, including the popular nationalistic and

anti-West sentiment, which has been repeatedly demonstrated in such events as the

EP3 spy plane incident and the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia.

However, the fundamental underlining reason remains the government’s tight control over the media.

Today, although China has become a member of WTO and its economy has become more capitalistic than communist, the Chinese government still monopolizes

all information resources from abroad. Except for a handful of prudent Internet

users and the audience that listens to international radio stations such as Voice of

America and Radio Free Asia, the government-controlled press is the only source of

information about international affairs in China. Unlike in domestic issues, when

most Chinese have first-hand experience to assist their judgment, the government

can easily and does continue regulatory charges notwithstanding to dominate the

coverage of international issues and thereby form and control popular opinions. The

popular nationalistic sentiment mentioned above is itself largely a product of government propaganda.

28

In the past 10 years, people in the United States witnessed increasing hostility

from the Chinese media toward their government, their political system, and their

foreign policies. The Chinese government should be held responsible for such hostility, since it is this government that sets the tone for China’s press. The Congress

of the United States should be aware this basic fact, and not be thrown off the track

by the Chinese Communist Party’s efficiency-focused marketization of the media.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HUCHEN ZHANG

SEPTEMBER 22, 2003

My name is Huchen Zhang, I’m a senior editor at the China Branch of Voice of

America. I’m very happy to be here this afternoon to talk about the state of the Chinese press in the wake of the SARS outbreak. Before I begin, I’d like to tell you

a little bit about myself. I attended the Journalism School of the Chinese Academy

of Social Sciences from 1982 to 1984. From 1984 to 1990, I worked as a reporter

at the ‘‘Central News Desk’’ of the Overseas Department of the Official Xinhua

News Agency, covering the National People’s Congress, the Chinese parliament, and

a number of government ministries. I came to the United States to study in 1990

and have been working for the Voice of America since 1991.

At the height of the SARS outbreak last April, the Political Bureau of the Chinese

Communist Party held an emergency meeting in Beijing to discuss how to deal with

the unprecedented epidemic. Among the decisions made at the meeting was to ask

the media to report truthfully and accurately the magnitude and the seriousness of

the outbreak. It was a reversal of the earlier practice of covering up the disease at

both the central and local levels. Two high-ranking officials—the public health minister and the mayor of Beijing were sacked for the cover-up.

Drastic changes were seen overnight. Numbers of new cases and deaths were published daily in the newspapers and on radio and TV. Press conferences held by the

new mayor of Beijing were carried live on China’s Central Television Station

(CCTV). Mr. Hu Jintao, China’s new president and Party chief, and Mr. Wen Jiabao,

the new premier, were also seen on CCTV visiting hospitals, shopping centers and

homes in the cities of Guangzhou, Shenzhen and Beijing, and saying how worried

and concerned they were about the outbreak.

Many political observers and analysts of the Chinese press believed that this

might be a harbinger for a new beginning for the Chinese press.

However, as the truth of the outbreak reached the Chinese public, people in large

cities, especially in Beijing, became panicky. A large number of people, not just

those working and living in Beijing temporarily, but also Beijing residents, fled the

city in a matter of days, bringing the risk of spreading the disease to other parts

of the country, especially the countryside.

This must have made the Chinese leaders realize that in a country that has never

seen freedom of the press, the truth of a major epidemic such as the outbreak of

SARS might be a little too much for its citizenry to handle. Another drastic change

was seen on the Chinese press. Instead of reporting new areas of contamination and

public reaction, the focus was now shifted to reporting the ‘‘heroic deeds’’ of the public health workers, and what measures the government was taking to keep the virus

under control.

The SARS epidemic came to an abrupt end at the onset of summer. As the SARS

virus evaporated, so did the hope for any meaningful change on the part of the Chinese press.

Gone also was the hope that the SARS outbreak would lead to any meaningful

political reform and a new era of openness. Soon after the World Health Organization lifted the travel warning to Beijing and other major cities, Party officials in

charge of propaganda began to rein in those whom they believed had gone too far

in reporting the outbreak. Several newspapers were ordered to close or were warned

for interviewing a military doctor who wrote to the western media to reveal the true

states of the SARS outbreak, for reporting a major corruption case in Shanghai or

discussing any ‘‘sensitive’’ topics, such as political reform and Tibet independence.

People who sent short messaging texts on cell phones were also prosecuted.

A telling example of the increased control of the Chinese media was the massive

demonstration in Hong Kong on July 1 against the proposed anti-subversion legislation. After the demonstration broke out, there was a blackout on the part of the Chinese media. Official news media, including CCTV, did not report the mass rally at

all. TV signals from Hong Kong to the mainland containing the demonstration were

cutoff immediately. It was only 12 days later that the China Daily, the official

English newspaper, mentioned the demonstration in a commentary. Callers to VOA

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shows commented that they would have been kept totally in the dark about the July

1 and subsequent demonstrations had it not been for the reporting of VOA and

other international radio stations.

The ever increasing control of the Chinese media did not mean that people

stopped talking about political reform, corruption, the revision of the Chinese Constitution and similar sensitive topics. A number of publications carried articles on

these issues, and a conference was held on June 19–20 in the coastal city of Qingdao

to debate constitutional reform.

This led the Propaganda Department of the Communist Party to take more action. In August, the department ordered party organizations, research institutes and

universities to stop all conferences and suppress all essays on political reform, revisions

to the Constitution and the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown. The department

also instructed China’s news media not to report on these ‘‘three unmentionables.’’

An associate of Mr. Cao Siyuan, the organizer of the June conference and a leading

advocate of political reform, told VOA that Mr. Cao was under a lot of pressure from

the authorities and it would be ‘‘inconvenient’’ for him to make any more comments

on revising the Constitution.

This month, the government held another meeting on ‘‘consolidating and rectifying’’ newspapers and periodicals. Decisions made at the meeting included closing

several hundred local papers and magazines and upholding the Communist Party’s

guidance in news reporting.

At the same time, broadcasting of VOA and other international radio stations continues to be jammed and overseas web sites continue to be blocked.

However, we can not say that there has been no change for the better in the Chinese news media. One ‘‘bright spot’’ is the reporting of accidents. For many years,

natural disasters and man-made calamities were deemed ‘‘negative news.’’ Reporting

of such negative news, it was believed, would only bring shame to the leadership

of the Communist Party and socialist system. One lesson the Chinese leaders must

have learned from the SARS outbreak, I think, is that diseases, natural disasters

and accidents happen to any country, regardless of its political system. At the

height of the SARS outbreak, the Chinese official media reported a major submarine

accident. After SARS, we have seen more and more reporting on food poisoning, coal

mine explosion and other accidents. These reports even lead to the imprisonment

of a number of officials who were accused of being responsible for the accidents or

covering up the accidents.

Now how do we explain the back and forth in the battle for control of the Chinese

media? To me, the measures that were taken at the height of the SARS outbreak

were merely measures of necessity. China was under a great deal of criticism from

the international community, especially the WHO. The Chinese citizens had also

lost faith in the Chinese media. They would rather rely on the grapevine, that is,

word of mouth, short texts on their cell phones and the Internet, for news of SARS.

The central leadership took those measures to repair its badly tarnished international image and to restore some faith in its legitimacy. Had the SARS outbreak

lasted a bit longer, it might have built some momentum for press reform. As it so

happened, the SARS virus evaporated at the onset of hot weather, and the party

officials congratulated themselves on their good luck, and went on doing things the

old way.

What about the future of the Chinese press? I see two forces at work: one is the

conscientious effort on the part of Chinese journalists to break the control of the

government. Journalists continue to report on sensitive political issues either out of

their sense of social responsibility or because of the forces of market economy. As

more and more newspapers and other news organizations fight for their survival in

an ever-growing market economy, they feel the need to increase their market share

by reporting on topics people are concerned about. The other force is the Communist

Party’s desire to polish its image and consolidate its rule. Reporting of large scale

corruption and systematic failure would only weaken its rule.

In any case, the fight for freedom of the press cannot be won overnight. After all,

it will take a Chinese Gorbachev, not a virus, to bring down the iron rule on the

Chinese press.

30

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BU ZHONG

SEPTEMBER 22, 2003

Distinguished representatives of the CECC, Ladies and Gentlemen:

China has been in the midst of rapid change in all sectors. Media reform, though

much slower than other sectors, is now beginning to catch up.

Perhaps few predicted that the SARS epidemic could bring such a widespread

panic across China, and a not so widespread, but still heavy, push to China’s media

reform.

CHINA’S MEDIA DURING SARS

As we know, the SARS epidemic first originated in South China’s Guangdong

Province in February. It then spread to Beijing and several other provinces. Not surprisingly, the government-controlled media kept tight-mouthed about the disease at

the beginning. During that period, Beijing residents mainly depended on the Internet, e-mails and cell phone messages for SARS information. The Internet came to

China as the first forceful reminder that the days of censorship and suppression of

information are numbered.

The media silence was broken in early April after China’s new Premier Wen

Jiabao admitted that the SARS situation was ‘‘grave.’’ In those days the reporting

was mainly about government efforts to contain the spread of the disease and heroic

medical workers saving lives.

In May and June, however, a few newspapers began to criticize the government’s

handling of SARS information. More criticism came after the government declared

it would punish any officials who tried to cover up SARS information from the public.

Let me describe a few of the important ways I see China’s media evolving today

in the wake of the SARS epidemic.

MEDIA’S COMMERCIALIZATION

As one of the first signs of media reform, the media’s commercialization started

silently about 10 years ago. The most dramatic step of the commercialization came

in June when the central government announced that it would end its direct financial support to all but three newspapers and one journal.

This means that most government-owned print media will soon have to sever ties

with government agencies. (I’m not sure how the broadcast media will be affected.)

As People’s Daily reports, these media ‘‘would then be free to operate in the marketplace rather than continuing to serve as cultural units under government departments or social organizations.’’

China now has more than 2,000 newspapers, 9,000 magazines, and 2,000 TV stations. But 25 years ago, there were fewer than 200 newspapers. The rapid growth

of the news media has made government control less effective, and no one can prevent them from going to the market.

THE END OF COMPULSORY SUBSCRIPTIONS

Another sign of China’s media reform is the end of compulsory subscription, which

also happened this June. In the past, before the end of each year, the government

used to issue circular orders requiring all its departments and agencies subscribe

to official publications. Now this practice is becoming history because the government has decided to stop it.

CHANGES WITHIN OFFICIAL NEWSPAPERS

Over the past 10 years, the official media have become increasingly unpopular.

On Beijing’s streets, no People’s Daily can be found on newsstands. At the same

time, the government has been cutting off its financial support to its mouthpieces.

In late 1990s, the financial support China Daily received from the government accounted for less than 10 percent of what it needed, while the remaining 90 percent

came from its ad revenue and a few tabloids it published.

Nowadays all the official newspapers publish one or more tabloids, which carry

a lot of ads and have cut their officialdom to a minimum. These tabloids make so

much money that they can comfortably support their more official big brothers. In

Beijing, the Beijing Daily publishes a tabloid, the Beijing Evening News, and the

People’s Daily’s publishes the Jinhua Daily.

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JOURNALISTS PUSH FRONTIER

Many Chinese journalists are pushing the frontier to put their ‘‘controversial’’ stories in print or on air. China Central Television’s TV magazine, ‘‘News in Focus,’’

offers a good example. Now and then, it has to pay lip service to the official line

for survival, which is fully understandable. But from time to time, it airs the deepest grievances and the indignation of those oppressed by the sheer greed and

shamelessness of the lower-level government bureaucracy. To me, the show is mainly a muckraker, occasionally, a shocking muckraker, in the best tradition of the

American muckrakers.

CHANGES IN TOP LEADERSHIP

The majority of the new top leadership, once in full power, clearly has in mind

the need to ease media control, but to ease it little by little. As high technology develops at breakneck speed and out of their control, the Chinese media becomes more

and more open almost against their will. Some degree of disobedience and even defiance on the part of the media can be observed in the past couple of years. And also

some official tolerance.

As soon as he gained the power, China’s President Hu Jintao invited experts to

give regular lectures to all the Politburo members. The main contents of each lecture (already 10 or so lectures to date) have been reported in the press as a subtle

means of letting attentive people know what’s in the minds of the top leaders right

now.

As I remember, the first study session was on the Constitution and Rule of Law—

a manifest enough hint to the public that during Hu’s reign, he’s going to rule by

law, not by his personal authority. The latest lecture they had is about the industrialization of media contents. The concept is nothing new in the West. But it is in

China, where media outlets had long been taken as tools of ideology, and propaganda

machines.

NO CHANGE IS INSIGNIFICANT

It seems to me that no change in China’s media is insignificant. Right now, the

gains made at every step might seem too insignificant to matter, but the progress

is there for people to see, if they care to notice it. These modest gains will in time

amount to marked and important change.

In China, growth in press freedom and independence will likely be a painfully

slow process, but the media are shuffling their feet forward in the right direction.

One can coax, cajole and coerce it to move a little more quickly. But it is unwise,

even undesirable for one to exercise undue pressure on it, which may yield an effect

to the contrary. If you refuse to believe things are going in the right direction, pick

up any newspaper, even the People’s Daily, and compare it with what it was, say,

10 or even 5 years ago. In those old, dark days, news of a plane crash was suppressed in media if there were no foreigners on board.

And next to Internet then came the second great shock that shook the leaders to

their nerve-ends, the misfortune of SARS. It showed the deep-rooted practice of suppression of information and of public deceit in the worst possible light. Now all see

that this hated practice can quickly and directly endanger the lives of thousands

of people. And the epidemic drove the lesson home in the most convincing manner

that the denial to the people’s right to know could be the denial of their very lives.

Finally, I hope the voices from the Chinese people can be heard here. To find out

what’s happening in China’s media, we must listen to those who still live in China

and those who work in Chinese news media.

Thank you very much.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LIN GANG

SEPTEMBER 22, 2003

One by-product of China’s economic reform is the growing commercialization of

the Chinese media. According to official statistics, between 1978 and 2002, the number of newspapers in China increased from 186 to 2137, while the number of magazines increased from 930 to 9029. Most of these media are still owned by the Partystate, receiving more or less subsidy from the government. However, advertising and

subscribing income has become the major source of revenues for the media, except

for newspapers and magazines directly run by Party and government organs

(dangzheng jiguang). Media commercialization has provided new incentives and opVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:52 Dec 01, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 90597.TXT China1 PsN: China1
32

portunities for journalists to cover lively, sensational, provocative and diverse stories, and expose political corruption, even though it may offend government officials.

Amid media commercialization, Party-state organ newspapers and magazines continue to lose their readership. The circulation number of the People’s Daily, the

principal mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party, decreased significantly from

6.2 million in 1979 to about 2 million two decades later. To increase readership,

many Party organ newspapers have to rely on their subordinating newspapers for

financial support. Two-thirds of Party organ newspapers run by provincial Party

committees have evening newspapers (wanbao) or metropolitan newspapers

(dushibao). The Guangming Daily, a national newspaper run by the Party, targeting

intellectuals, has benefited from its subordinating Life Times. Even the official New

Chinese News Agency carries some sensational stories related to sex in its web site.

To increase readership, China’s new leadership under Hu Jintao has called for the

Party’s media to be ‘‘close to the mass, close to the realities and close to life,’’ reducing the exposure of leaders’ activities in the media to give more coverage to ordinary

people. Most recently, the Party plans to end its direct financial support to and

mandatory subscription requirement of most Party-government newspapers and

magazines. At the national level, only three newspapers and one magazine are the

exceptions, including the People’s Daily, Guangming Daily, Economy Daily and the

Seeking Truth (Qiushi), which will still be run by the Party’s central leadership. At

the provincial level, the central leadership will allow each Party committee to continue operating one newspaper and one journal. Each municipal Party committee

will be allowed to operate one newspaper only, and county-level Party committees

and government can no longer operate media publications.

Beijing’s reform plan on Party media is based on at lease two considerations:

• Reducing the financial burden. In today’s China, each province can have as many

as several dozen of Party newspapers and magazines, starting from the provincial

level down to the county level. These media are dull in content, relying heavily

on subsidy and mandatory subscription by governments at the different level. The

lower level of the government, the more Party newspapers and magazines are to

be subscribed; thus creating heavy burden for the grassroots.

• Strengthening the Party media. To maintain too many Party newspapers and

magazines not only increases government’s financial burden, but also make Party

media either more boring—repeating the same tune here and there—or inconsistent. By keeping limited number of Party newspapers and magazines, Beijing

apparently tries to make a distinction between Party media and mass media, freeing the former of fiery market competition with the latter without loosing the Party’s guideline.

The relative retreat of Party newspapers and magazines from media market follows Beijing’s strategy of retaining large state-owned enterprises and privatizing

smaller ones (zhuada fangxiao) in economic reform. The commercialization of mass

media does not necessarily mean that the Chinese media will gradually gain political independence from the State control. For the foreseeable future, political taboo

will co-exist with Beijing’s one-Party rule. Chinese journalists have to be cautious

in exposing the dark side of the society, because too much exposure of social problems will not only shake people’s faith in the performance of the Party-state, but

also challenge the legitimacy of the political regime. In the absence of significant

political reform, we should not expect media freedom in China as we understand

in the United States.

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