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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

No. 126,247

In the Matter of the Wrongful Conviction of MICHAEL SIMS.

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

1.

K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-5004(c)(1)(B) requires a claimant to show two elements: 

(a) a court's reversal or vacating of a felony conviction; and (b) either the dismissal of 

charges or a finding of not guilty following a new trial.

2.

The phrase "the charges were dismissed" in K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-5004(c)(1)(B) 

clearly and unambiguously means both terminating the criminal accusation presented in 

court and relieving the defendant of that accusation's criminal liability. 

Appeal from Saline District Court; JACOB E. PETERSON, judge. Submitted without oral argument

December 15, 2023. Opinion filed January 26, 2024. Affirmed.

Larry G. Michel, of Kennedy Berkley, of Salina, was on the brief for appellant. 

Kurtis K. Wiard, assistant solicitor general, and Kris W. Kobach, attorney general, were on the 

brief for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

BILES, J.: In this civil proceeding for wrongful conviction and imprisonment,

Michael David Sims seeks monetary damages after the Court of Appeals reversed his

felony conviction for interference with law enforcement and he was resentenced to time 
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served on a misdemeanor charge for the same crime. The issue is whether that felony

interference charge can be considered "dismissed" as required by K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-

5004(c)(1)(B). The district court held it was not dismissed and denied the claim. We 

affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2016, a domestic dispute between Sims and his wife led to a 911 call. When the 

police arrived, Sims physically resisted. A jury convicted him of criminal restraint, 

battery, assault of a law enforcement officer, criminal damage to property, and felony 

interference with law enforcement. See generally State v. Sims, No. 120,449, 2021 WL 

1228113 (Kan. App. 2021) (unpublished opinion).

On appeal, Sims raised an issue with the conviction for felony interference with 

law enforcement. Both parties advised the Court of Appeals panel they believed the

evidence was insufficient and asked that the conviction be reversed, the sentence vacated, 

and the case remanded for resentencing on a misdemeanor interference offense. The 

panel agreed without analyzing how Sims could be convicted of misdemeanor 

interference when he was charged and convicted only of the felony crime. Sims, 2021 

WL 1228113, at *2.

On remand, the lower court resentenced Sims, ordered the misdemeanor 

conviction to run concurrent with all other counts, and found he satisfied his sentence

with the time served.

Sims then brought this wrongful conviction lawsuit alleging he spent nearly a year 

in prison because of an invalid felony conviction. The State answered and moved for 

judgment on the pleadings. It primarily argued Sims could not prove his interference 
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charge was dismissed or that he was found not guilty on retrial. See K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 

60-5004(c)(1)(B). In opposing the motion, Sims urged the court to liberally construe this

remedial civil statute to accomplish its purpose. He claimed his "felony charge" was 

"actually or effectively dismissed" when the Court of Appeals reversed the felony 

conviction.

In its 16-page decision, the district court agreed with the State that Sims' 

interference charge was not dismissed as envisioned by the statute. In so ruling, it treated 

the State's pleading as a motion for summary judgment because the State attached the 

criminal case's Court of Appeals judgment and the original journal entry of judgment. 

See K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-212(d) ("If, on a motion [for judgment on the pleadings], 

matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion

must be treated as one for summary judgment under K.S.A. 60-256 . . . . All parties must 

be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the 

motion."). It also took judicial notice of the criminal case's record.

The district court's factual findings are undisputed:

"1. On or about August 31, 2018, Mr. Sims was convicted of felony interference 

with a law enforcement officer and related misdemeanors under K.S.A. 21-5904(a)(3) 

and (b)(5)(A). . . .

"2. Mr. Sims appealed his conviction to the Kansas Court of Appeals.

"3. On appeal he argued and the State conceded that the evidence presented at 

trial was insufficient to convict him of felony interference. . . .
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"4. The Court of Appeals 'reverse[d] [Mr. Sims'] felony conviction, vacate[d] 

Sims' sentence, and remand[ed] . . . for resentencing consistent with a conviction for the 

lesser included offense of misdemeanor interference with a law enforcement officer.'

"5. On remand, the district court sentenced Mr. Sims to '12 months in the Saline

County Jail on Count 5 [i.e., the interference count] to run concurrent with all remaining 

counts.'

"6. The Court further ordered 'that all time served to date is sufficient to fulfill

sentence [sic].'"

The court held the only question was whether Sims had a viable claim under the 

wrongful conviction statute. It dismissed the lawsuit based on K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-

5004's plain language and this court's interpretation of the wrongful conviction statute in 

In re M.M., 312 Kan. 872, 482 P.3d 583 (2021) (interpreting "conviction") to dismiss 

Sims' lawsuit.

He directly appeals to this court. Jurisdiction is proper. See K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-

5004(l) (district court's decisions in civil cases to recover damages for wrongful 

convictions "may be appealed directly to" Supreme Court).

ANALYSIS

Eligibility for damages under K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-5004(c)(1)(B) requires the

claimant prove the charge was "dismissed or on retrial the claimant was found to be not 

guilty." (Emphasis added.). Sims primarily contends he did not commit felony 

interference, for which he was convicted and imprisoned. He argues he was wrongfully 

incarcerated because the Court of Appeals effectively dismissed his felony conviction 

upon reversal. The State responds the interference charge was never dismissed because
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the case was remanded and Sims was convicted of misdemeanor interference—as he 

specifically requested in the Court of Appeals.

Standard of review

Because the district court dismissed this case on summary judgment and Sims 

does not allege any genuine issue of any material fact, this appeal presents only a 

question of law. Roe v. Phillips County Hospital, 317 Kan. 1, 5, 522 P.3d 277 (2023)

("When the parties agree that the facts are undisputed, an appellate court reviews a 

district court's decision to grant summary judgment de novo."). Likewise, the lower 

court's interpretation of K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-5004 is reviewed de novo. In re Wrongful 

Conviction of Bell, 317 Kan. 334, 337, 529 P.3d 153 (2023).

Discussion

We consider first whether the Court of Appeals had the authority to reverse and 

vacate Sims' felony interference conviction and remand for sentencing on the 

misdemeanor. This helps contextualize the legal question presented here. K.S.A. 2015 

Supp. 21-5904(a), under which Sims was convicted, provides various alternative means 

for committing interference with law enforcement. See K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-

5904(a)(1)(A) (falsely reporting a particular person committed a crime); (a)(1)(B) (falsely 

reporting a law enforcement officer committed a crime); (a)(1)(C) (falsely reporting any 

information intending to influence officer's duty); (a)(1)(D) (falsely reporting any 

information about the death or disappearance of child under 13); (a)(2) (concealing, 

destroying, or altering evidence); (a)(3) (knowingly obstructing, resisting or opposing law 

enforcement officers). Subsection (b) provides the appropriate classification and severity 

level for each type of interference with law enforcement outlined in subsection (a).
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The State charged Sims with felony interference. The complaint stated:

"COUNT 5

"That on or about the 6th day of April, 2016, in Saline County, Kansas, Michael 

David Sims, then and there being present did unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly 

obstruct, resist or oppose Carlos Londono and Edward Addo persons he knew or should 

have known to be law enforcement officers, to wit: Carlos Londono and Edward Addo, 

and such law enforcement officers are authorized by law to perform an official duty, and 

further that such act of Michael David Sims, to wit: resist and oppose, substantially 

hindered or increased the burden of Carlos Londono and Edward Addo in the 

performance of the officer's official duty, and that such act was committed in the case of 

a felony, or resulting from parole or an authorized disposition for a felony.

"Interference with Law Enforcement - Obstruction of Official Duty - In violation 

of K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5904(a)(3) & (b)(5)(A), a severity level 9 nonperson felony

(Penalty: from a minimum of 5 months to a maximum of 17 months in prison and a fine 

of up to $100,000; Postrelease supervision term of 12 months)." (Emphases added.) 

K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5904(a)(3) provides:

"(a) Interference with law enforcement is:

. . . .

(3) knowingly obstructing, resisting or opposing any person authorized by law to 

serve process in the service or execution or in the attempt to serve or execute any writ, 

warrant, process or order of a court, or in the discharge of any official duty.

"(b) Interference with law enforcement as defined in:

. . . .
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(5) subsection (a)(3) is a:

(A) Severity level 9, nonperson felony in the case of a felony, or resulting from 

parole or any authorized disposition for a felony; and

(B) class A nonperson misdemeanor in the case of a misdemeanor, or resulting 

from any authorized disposition for a misdemeanor, or a civil case." K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 

21-5904.

As shown, both felony and misdemeanor obstruction share the same criminal 

elements outlined in subsection (a)(3), but their classification diverges depending on the 

case's circumstances, as described in subsection (b). 

State v. Hudson, 261 Kan. 535, 931 P.2d 679 (1997), is instructive. There, the 

defendant faced a felony charge of obstructing official duty, which the district court later 

reduced to a misdemeanor. The Hudson court upheld the reduction, reasoning the 

classification depends on what the officer believed their duty to be during the incident, 

not the defendant's actual status. It noted the record showed the officer was performing 

duties related to a misdemeanor by trying to stop the defendant for a traffic violation, 

even though he later learned the defendant had outstanding felony warrants. See 261 Kan. 

at 538-39 ("We conclude that 'official duty' under K.S.A. 21-3808 [currently K.S.A. 2022 

Supp. 21-5904] is to be defined in terms of the officer's authority, knowledge, and 

intent."). But see 261 Kan. at 539-40 (Davis, J., dissenting) (contending classification 

should be based on the actual status of the accused at the time of obstruction, not the 

officer's knowledge and intent).

In Sims' case, the jury instruction only provided the criminal elements under 

subsection (a)(3):
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"To establish this charge, each of the following claims must be proved:

"1. Carlos Londono was discharging an official duty, namely investigating the 

report of a crime.

"2. The defendant knowingly resisted or opposed Carlos Londono in discharging 

that official duty.

"3. The act of the defendant substantially hindered or increased the burden of the 

officer in the performance of the officer's official duty.

"4. At the time the defendant knew or should have known that Carlos Londono

was a law enforcement officer." (Emphasis added.)

No element addressed Officer Londono's knowledge or intent. The instruction 

merely stated the officer was discharging his official duty—"namely investigating the 

report of a crime" without reference to whether the case was a felony or misdemeanor. 

And the jury simply found Sims "guilty of Interference with Law Enforcement by 

Obstructing Official Duty as charged in Count Five." The record remained silent on 

whether Londono believed he was discharging his official duty "in the case of a felony, 

or resulting from parole or any authorized disposition for a felony." K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 

21-5904(b)(5)(A) (felony obstruction). This explains why the parties jointly agreed the 

Court of Appeals should reverse the felony conviction and remand for resentencing on 

misdemeanor obstruction.

The panel in Sims' criminal case appropriately adjusted the classification, just as 

the district court in Hudson properly reduced the charge. Felony and misdemeanor 

interference's identical elements mean Sims' felony conviction necessarily establishes the 
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misdemeanor's elements, so retrying Sims' case was unnecessary. And the record 

supported a conviction of misdemeanor obstruction. No party disputed this. 

Next, we interpret the wrongful conviction and imprisonment statute, beginning

with its text. A court "must first attempt to ascertain legislative intent through the 

statutory language enacted, giving common words their ordinary meanings." H.B. v. M.J., 

315 Kan. 310, 320, 508 P.3d 368 (2022).

K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-5004(c)(1) lists the conditions a claimant must establish by 

a preponderance of evidence to bring a wrongful conviction claim within the statutory 

framework. Our focus is subsection (c)(1)(B).

"(c)(1) The claimant shall establish the following by a preponderance of 

evidence:

(A) The claimant was convicted of a felony crime and subsequently imprisoned;

(B) the claimant's judgment of conviction was reversed or vacated and either the 

charges were dismissed or on retrial the claimant was found to be not guilty;

(C) the claimant did not commit the crime or crimes for which the claimant was 

convicted and was not an accessory or accomplice to the acts that were the basis of the 

conviction and resulted in a reversal or vacation of the judgment of conviction, dismissal 

of the charges or finding of not guilty on retrial; and

(D) the claimant did not commit or suborn perjury, fabricate evidence, or by the 

claimant's own conduct cause or bring about the conviction. Neither a confession nor 

admission later found to be false or a guilty plea shall constitute committing or suborning 

perjury, fabricating evidence or causing or bringing about the conviction under this 

subsection." (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-5004.
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Breaking it down, subsection (c)(1)(B) requires a claimant to show: (1) A court's 

reversal or vacating of a felony conviction, and (2) either the dismissal of charges or a 

finding of not guilty following a new trial. The district court and the parties agreed the 

Court of Appeals reversed the felony conviction, which settles the first element. What is

contested is whether the Court of Appeals' reversal dismissed the charge.

The wrongful conviction statute does not define the phrase "the charges were 

dismissed," and neither do any provisions within the Code of Civil Procedure, K.S.A. 60-

101 et seq. But the Kansas Code of Criminal Procedure, K.S.A. 22-2101 et seq., defines 

"charge"—"a written statement presented to a court accusing a person of the commission 

of a crime and includes a complaint, information or indictment." (Emphasis added.) 

K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 22-2202(h). It does not explicitly define "dismiss" or "dismissal."

In the civil context, the terms' meaning and effect vary depending on the type of 

dismissal involved, rendering a meaning less straightforward in Sims' case. See generally 

K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-241 (dismissal of actions; outlining different scenarios such as 

voluntary dismissal, which is dismissed without prejudice, dismissal by court order, 

which is dismissed without prejudice unless a court determines specific terms, 

involuntary dismissal, which generally operates as an adjudication on the merits, and so 

forth). But Black's Law Dictionary defines "dismissal" as "[t]ermination of an action, 

claim, or charge without further hearing, esp. before a trial; esp., a judge's decision to 

stop a court case through the entry of an order or judgment that imposes no civil or 

criminal liability on the defendant with respect to that case." (Emphases added.) Black's 

Law Dictionary 589 (11th ed. 2019).

In this context, the phrase "the charges were dismissed" in K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-

5004(c)(1)(B) is clear and unambiguous. The phrase signifies both terminating the 
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criminal accusation presented in court and relieving the defendant of that accusation's 

criminal liability. The district court similarly defined the phrase as: a "termination[]

of . . . legal proceedings without the 'not guilty' factual determination associated with an 

acquittal." And with this understanding, it becomes evident the district court correctly

found Sims failed to prove subsection (c)(1)(B). His interference charge was never 

dismissed because he was convicted of that same charge on remand—even if only the 

reduced classification, i.e., misdemeanor.

In short, while the panel reversed Sims' felony conviction, the interference

accusation in count five remained effective, leading the district court to sentence him 

based on his criminal liability. Although "[t]he touchstone for the classification of the 

offense is the reason for the officer's approaching the defendant," it is not a criminal 

element itself. Hudson, 261 Kan. at 538; see also K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5904(a)(3) 

("knowingly obstructing, resisting or opposing any person authorized by law to serve 

process in the service or execution or in the attempt to serve or execute any writ, warrant, 

process or order of a court, or in the discharge of any official duty"). Sims' argument the 

felony conviction's reversal equated to dismissal misses the point and does not align with 

the legal principles at play.

As the State correctly claims, "if the Court of Appeals had effectively dismissed 

the charge, there would have been no charge upon which the misdemeanor conviction 

could rest. The reversal could not have been a dismissal." In addition, though the 

complaint specifically charged Sims with the felony by citing K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5904 

(b)(5)(A), he can still be convicted of the misdemeanor version, given that both versions 

share identical criminal elements. Construing this reversal as a dismissal of the charge

would collapse subsection (c)(1)(B)'s second element into the first, rendering it 

meaningless. See State v. Moler, 316 Kan. 565, 573, 519 P.3d 794 (2022) ("Courts 

'presume the legislature does not intend to enact useless or meaningless legislation.'").
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Sims also asks that the statute's purpose be considered, proposing its construction 

in his favor due to its remedial nature. But we have already rejected a similar claim in In 

re M.M., a case in which the court was asked to "disregard the Legislature's intent as 

expressed through the plain language of the statute and instead construe K.S.A. 2019 

Supp. 60-5004 as broadly as possible because it is a remedial statute." 312 Kan. at 874. 

The M.M. court explained:

"[W]e held that 'a tort statute may be construed liberally in order to give effect to its 

remedial purpose.' (Emphasis added.) Unlike tort law—derived from common law—

K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 60-5004 was promulgated by the Kansas Legislature. As a result, we 

are bound to interpret and apply the provisions of K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 60-5004 as the 

Legislature intended—not to extend the statute's application when the court sees fit.

"We reject M.M.'s claim that K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 60-5004 applies to juvenile 

adjudications because the plain language of the statute unambiguously states otherwise.

[Citations omitted.]" (Emphasis added.) 312 Kan. at 874-75.

We hold the district court properly granted the State's motion for summary 

judgment.

Judgment of the district court is affirmed.