Air University

Allen G. Peck, Lt Gen, Commander

Air Force Research Institute

John A. Shaud, Gen, PhD, USAF, Retired, Director

School of Advanced Air and Space Studies

Gerald S. Gorman, Col, PhD, Commandant

James M. Tucci, PhD, Thesis Advisor
AIR UNIVERSITY

AIR Force RESEARCH INSTITUTE

“Who Has the Puck?”

Strategic Initiative in Modern,

Conventional War

Sean M. Judge

Major, USAF

Drew Paper No. 6

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-5962

August 2009
Muir S. Fairchild Research Information Center Cataloging Data

Judge, Sean M. 

“Who has the puck?” : Strategic initiative in modern, conventional war. / Sean 

M. Judge.

 p. ; cm. – (Drew Paper, 1941-3785 ; no. 6)

Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN 978-1-58566-195-5

1. Strategy—History. 2. World War, 1939–1945—Military intelligence. 3. World 

War, 1939–1945—Campaigns. 4. Warfare, Conventional—History. I. Title. II. Series: 

Drew Paper ; no. 6.

355.02/09—dc22

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the 

author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force, 

the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release: 

distribution unlimited.

This Drew Paper and others in the series are available 

electronically at the Air University Research Web site 

http://research.maxwell.af.mil and the AU Press Web 

site http://aupress.au.af.mil.

ii
iii

The Drew Papers

The Drew Papers are occasional publications sponsored by 

the Air Force Research Institute (AFRI), Maxwell AFB, Alabama. 

AFRI publishes this series of papers to commemorate the distinguished career of Col Dennis “Denny” Drew, USAF, retired. 

In 30 years at Air University, Colonel Drew served on the Air 

Command and Staff College faculty, directed the Airpower Research Institute, and served as dean, associate dean, and professor of military strategy at the School of Advanced Air and 

Space Studies, Maxwell AFB. Colonel Drew is one of the Air 

Force’s most extensively published authors and an international speaker in high demand. He has lectured to over 100,000 

students at Air University as well as to foreign military audiences. In 1985 he received the Muir S. Fairchild Award for outstanding contributions to Air University. In 2003 Queen Beatrix of the Netherlands made him a Knight in the Order of 

Orange-Nassau for his contributions to education in the Royal 

Netherlands Air Force. 

The Drew Papers are dedicated to promoting the understanding of air and space power theory and application. These studies 

are published by the Air University Press and broadly distributed 

throughout the US Air Force, the Department of Defense, and 

other governmental organizations, as well as to leading scholars, 

selected institutions of higher learning, public-policy institutes, 

and the media.

All military members and civilian employees assigned to Air 

University are invited to contribute unclassified manuscripts 

that deal with air and/or space power history, theory, doctrine, 

or strategy, or with joint or combined service matters bearing 

on the application of air and/or space power.

Authors should submit three copies of a double-spaced, 

typed manuscript and an electronic version of the manuscript 

on removable media along with a brief (200-word maximum) 

abstract. The electronic file should be compatible with Microsoft 

Windows and Microsoft Word—Air University Press uses Word 

as its standard word-processing program.
iv

Please send inquiries or comments to

Director

Air Force Research Institute

155 N. Twining St.

Maxwell AFB, AL 36112-5962

Tel: (334) 953-9587

DSN 493-9587

Fax: (334) 953-6739

DSN 493-6739

E-mail: research.support@maxwell.af.mil
v

Contents

Chapter	 Page

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

2 THE RUSSO–GERMAN WAR, 1941–45 . . . . . . . 11

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

3 THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–45 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

4 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 

Illustrations

Figure	

1 Operation Barbarossa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

2 Soviet Moscow Counteroffensive . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

3 Operation Blau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

4 Operation Uranus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

5 Operation Citadel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

6 Operation Bagration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

7 Japanese Southern Offensive, December 1941–

January 1942 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

8 Battles of Coral Sea and Midway . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Figure	 Page

9 Papuan Campaign 1942 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

10 Guadalcanal 1942 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

11 Operation Cartwheel and the seizure of the

Gilbert and Marshall Islands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

12 Marianas, South Pacific, and Philippine

Islands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

13 The Philippines and Battle of Leyte Gulf . . . . . . 89

CONTENTS

vi
vii

Maj Sean M. Judge is a 1993 graduate of the United States 

Air Force Academy. He holds a master of military operational 

art and science degree and a master of airpower art and science 

degree from Air University. Major Judge’s professional military 

education includes graduation from the Air Command and Staff 

College and the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies 

(SAASS) at Maxwell AFB.

Major Judge is a senior pilot with over 3,000 flying hours in 

the C-130, T-34, T-37, and T-38.

After completing undergraduate pilot training in 1994, he 

was assigned to the 41st Airlift Squadron, Pope AFB, North 

Carolina. From 1998 to 2001, while assigned to the Training 

Squadron VT-3, Whiting Naval Air Station (NAS), Florida, he 

served as a flight commander and standardization officer. In 

2001, he served as the operations officer for the fixed-wing instructor-training unit also at Whiting NAS. Following that assignment, Major Judge returned to Pope AFB, where he completed two deployments in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. 

From 2004 to 2006, he served as the chief pilot, 43rd Operations Group Standardization/Evaluation.

Major Judge is currently pursuing a PhD in military history 

at the Ohio State University with plans to return to SAASS as a 

faculty member.

About the

Author

Maj Sean M. Judge

Abstract

Historians and other military analysts often use the term 

“strategic initiative.” Most assume a common understanding of 

this term, but the concept has been neither carefully defined nor 

examined in depth. This thesis contributes to the elimination of 

that gap by answering the question: What factors lead to shifts 

in strategic initiative during the conduct of modern, conventional 

war? The Russo–German War of 1941–45 and the Pacific War of 

1941–45 provide the historical evidence for this study. 

Both conflicts progressed through three distinct phases in 

which the Axis combatant first seized the strategic initiative, 

which then fell into dispute, and eventually shifted to control of 

the Allied combatant. Four factors contributing to strategic initiative have been examined for each phase of each war: resources, 

quality of intelligence, strategic acumen, and operational and 

tactical methods. These elements of military effectiveness reflect 

each nation’s war-making capacity, knowledge, wisdom, and 

technique. The relative advantages each side enjoyed in each 

category are compared to determine which factors more significantly influenced shifts in strategic initiative and how each component acted upon the others.

The heart of the study focuses on the transition into, conduct 

during, and the transition from the second phase of each war, 

where the actual shifts in initiative occurred. Strategic acumen 

led the hierarchy of factors that influence strategic initiative in 

war. The side that better matched its goals with its capabilities, 

took advantage of opportunities, and planned more realistically 

reaped the largest rewards. Good intelligence proved to be a key 

enabler to the clear judgments that are the hallmark of strategic 

acumen and placed second in the hierarchy. Resources, followed 

by operational and tactical methods, placed third and fourth 

respectively. Nevertheless, each of these components influenced 

the possession of and shifts in strategic initiative. Intelligence, 

resources, and operational and tactical methods all contributed 

to strategic acumen as well, either restraining or constraining a 

combatant’s abilities. In summary, this study reveals that a 

four-fold hierarchy of superior wisdom, knowledge, capacity, 

and technique drives shifts in strategic initiative in modern, conventional war.

ix

xi

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank my wife Carmen and my children, Ryan, 

Seth, and Amelia, for having the patience to put up with my 

SAASS studies and thesis research. Without their love and 

support, this would not have been possible. I would also like to 

thank my advisors and fellow students who participated in the 

research and peer review. In particular, I am deeply indebted to 

Dr. Harold Winton for all the time and experience he provided; 

his advice, insight, and support were invaluable and contributed immeasurably to my education. 

SEAN M. JUDGE, Lt Col, USAF

SAASS, Class XVII

xi



Chapter 1

Introduction

Initiative is a cardinal tenet of the military art. A perusal of 

most works of military history is likely to yield numerous references to initiative in many different contexts. Commanders at 

all levels, from the tactical, through the operational, to the strategic, are expected to exercise initiative. Those who fail to do so 

often suffer defeat or miss fleeting opportunities and must endure the recriminations of historians. 

Accounts of seizing the tactical or operational initiative 

abound. At the strategic level of war, however, initiative receives 

only transitory mention. Authors and military professionals often assume a common understanding of strategic initiative, including which combatant has it and why. There is neither a 

clear definition of the concept, nor any significant analysis of 

the elements that contribute to it. This thesis contributes to 

the elimination of that gap by answering the question—what 

factors lead to significant shifts in strategic initiative during the 

conduct of modern, conventional war? 

Analysis of current US military doctrine confirms the conceptual void, yielding no definition but revealing the assumption of 

common understanding. Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, refers to potential “forfeiture of strategic or operational initiative” while discussing operational pauses, but one 

can find no definition of strategic initiative in that work.1 A review of the JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military 

and Associated Terms, confirms the omission.2 Air Force doctrine mimics the pattern, using “strategic initiative” in a figure 

depicting the “modern view of conflict” but failing to define the 

term.3 Army doctrine dutifully defines individual and operational 

initiative, focusing a good deal of attention on both, but makes 

no mention of initiative in the strategic arena.4 The concept does 

not appear in either Navy or Marine Corps doctrinal publications. Thus, one must ask, “What is strategic initiative?”
INTRODUCTION

Framing Strategic Initiative

In hockey, the best way to determine initiative is to ask, “Who 

has the puck?” The side controlling the puck possesses the 

general ability to initiate action. The side with possession wields 

greater, though not total, influence over the tempo and style of 

play, the location of the main effort, and the likelihood of scoring a goal. One important and commonly misunderstood point 

is that this ability does not necessarily imply constant offensive 

action. It is possible for a team with the puck to play defensively, simply denying the other team the opportunity to score. 

Hockey is certainly an imperfect analogy to war, but it illustrates several fundamentals of the concept of initiative. 

To distinguish between strategic initiative and initiative in 

general, one can expand on the US Army’s definition of operational initiative—“setting or dictating the terms of action 

throughout the battle or operation.”5 We must, however, distinguish between operational and strategic. The US armed forces 

currently define the operational level of war as the level “at 

which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve strategic objectives within 

theaters or other operational areas.”6 By contrast, the strategic 

level of war is that “at which a nation, often as a member of a 

group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives and guidance, 

and develops and uses national resources to achieve these objectives.”7 Further, “activities at this level establish national or 

multinational military objectives; sequence initiatives; define 

limits and assess risk for the use of military and other instruments of national power; develop global plans or theater war 

plans to achieve those objectives; and provide military forces 

and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans.”8

Colin Gray more succinctly defines strategy as “the use that 

is made of force and the threat of force for the ends of policy” 

and sees operations and tactics as “the instruments of military 

strategy.”9 Clearly, political, economic, and military actions affect strategic initiative. Drawing upon the similarities of these 

various formulations and keeping the focus on the military 

sphere, strategic initiative in war may be defined as the ability 

to influence the course of the conflict by waging those battles, 
INTRODUCTION

operations, and campaigns most suited to the accomplishment of 

one’s own political ends, while avoiding those detrimental to the 

same. Here, it is important to note that the side with strategic 

initiative either may choose, or be compelled, to cede operational and/or tactical initiative at times during the conflict. The 

concepts are not mutually dependent. 

Because these concepts are not mutually dependent, the inherent differences between the strategic and operational levels 

of war require illumination. Strategy encapsulates time, force, 

space, and consequences on a higher order than operations, 

which are generally confined to a shorter period, a smaller 

force, fewer participants, more limited geographic areas, and 

lower stakes. Complexity increases exponentially in the transition from operations to strategy, requiring internal tradeoffs 

and delicate judgment on the part of the strategist. Carl von 

Clausewitz wrote, “. . . it is only in the highest realms of strategy that intellectual complications and extreme diversity of factors and relationships occur.”10 Edward Luttwak also emphasized the complexity of strategy, compounded by paradoxical 

logic, when he wrote, “It is only in the realm of strategy, which 

encompasses the conduct and consequences of human relations 

in the context of actual or possible armed conflict, that we have 

learned to accept paradoxical propositions as valid.”11 This 

complexity means good strategy is often making the least bad 

choice, or in Luttwak’s words, “. . . mere adequacy [in strategy] 

is enough to prevail.”12

The importance of strategy makes a grasp of the underlying 

precepts of strategic initiative imperative. A country, alliance, 

or coalition containing the best tactical and operational commanders and methods carries no assurance of ultimate victory 

in war. The combatants still struggle over where, when, and 

why certain campaigns and battles are waged or not waged. 

Operational or tactical success in the wrong fight may or may 

not be beneficial to victory in the war. It is more advantageous 

to fight the correct battle adequately than the wrong battle brilliantly. The German army in World War II illustrates the point. 

The Wehrmacht was among the most potent tactical and operational forces in the Second World War, yet Germany eventually 

lost strategic initiative on all fronts and with it the entire war.13
INTRODUCTION

Understanding how to seize, hold, and retain strategic initiative is critical to the effective conduct of war.

Historical Examples in Modern, 

Conventional War

Two episodes provide excellent opportunities for investigating 

the factors that underlie strategic initiative in modern, conventional war. The first is the Russo–German War of 1941–45. This 

long and bloody conflict pitted massive armies and air forces 

against each other on a scale not seen before or since. It transitioned through three phases: the first in which Germany held the 

initiative; a period during which both combatants contested initiative; and a final period of Soviet initiative that closed out the 

war. Thus, three questions suggest themselves: Why were the 

Germans able to seize strategic initiative in the beginning? What 

caused initiative to be disputed in the intervening period? Why 

were the Soviets able to gain the strategic initiative and keep it? 

The transitions between each phase afford the most productive 

places to examine shifts in strategic initiative; but to put the transitions in context, the entire war must be examined. 

The second example, the Pacific War of 1941–45, took place 

during the same period; but it differed substantially in character, being a maritime rather than a continental contest. This 

conflict also transitioned through three distinct phases: Japan 

seized the initiative; the initiative then hung in dispute; and, 

finally, the United States gained and held it until ultimate victory. The questions structuring the Russo–German War must 

also be examined here. Once again, the transitions between 

each phase provide the key vantage points from which to analyze those factors influencing the shift of strategic initiative in 

the war, but they must be put in the context of the entire war.

These two historical examples are followed by a comparative 

analysis of the findings of each. The similarities and differences 

between the two cases will provide a basis for conclusions concerning shifts in strategic initiative in large-scale conventional 

wars of the mid-twentieth century.

Evidence for the study comes from numerous and diverse 

sources. Works on the Russo–German War vary widely in scope, 
INTRODUCTION

quality, and often political or personal agenda. This study seeks 

to forge an accurate picture of the war by sampling the full variety. Postwar German memoirs such as Heinz Guderian’s Panzer Leader, Erich von Manstein’s Lost Victories, and Wilhelm 

Keitel’s The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Keitel: Chief of the German High Command, 1938–1945, will be balanced against those 

of their former foes including Georgi Zhukov’s Marshal Zhukov’s Greatest Battles, Sergei Shtemenko’s The Soviet General 

Staff at War: 1941–1945, and Vasily Chuikov’s The Battle for 

Stalingrad. Many of the extensive historical investigations of 

the war such as John Erickson’s two-volume account, Stalin’s 

War with Germany, Albert Seaton’s authoritative The Russo–

German War, 1941–1945, and Alan Clark’s highly readable and 

informative Barbarossa: The Russo–German Conflict, 1941–1945,

will help fill voids and illuminate errors or omission by the participants. More recent works, including Robert Citino’s Death 

of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns of 1942, Chris Bellamy’s Absolute War: Soviet Russia in the Second World War, 

and David Glantz’s numerous studies, which enjoy the benefit 

of greater, though not total, access to Russian archives, will be 

used to complete the picture. 

Historiography on the Pacific War differs slightly, weighted 

by plentiful accounts from the American perspective but limited coverage of the Japanese side. Primary American accounts 

including Samuel Griffith’s The Battle for Guadalcanal, James 

Forrestal’s The Forrestal Diaries, and William Halsey’s Admiral 

Halsey’s Story will be studied. Works such as Mitsuo Fuchida’s 

Midway: The Battle that Doomed Japan, Masuo Kato’s The Lost 

War: A Japanese Reporter’s Inside Story, and Saburo Ienaga’s 

The Pacific War: World War II and the Japanese, 1931–1945

should provide some balance from the Japanese point of view. 

Once again, extensive historical examinations including accounts such as Harry Gailey’s The War in the Pacific: From Pearl 

Harbor to Tokyo Bay, James Dunnigan’s Victory at Sea: World 

War II in the Pacific, and Dan Van der Vat’s The Pacific Campaign: World War II, the U.S.–Japanese Naval War, 1941–1945

will round out the investigation’s evidence. 
INTRODUCTION

Underlying Precepts of Strategic Initiative

Strategic initiative deals with the capacity to exert influence. 

One’s influence derives from a number of different factors depending on the context of the situation in question. War, our 

context for strategic initiative, pits two or more intelligent opponents against each other in an arena of deadly competition. 

Effectively analyzing strategic initiative requires determination 

of those elements that aid or hamper the combatants’ ability to 

seize, retain, dispute, or exploit it. 

Given the complexities of war, the number of possible factors is 

potentially infinite, but four stand out as particularly salient: resources, quality of intelligence, strategic acumen, and tactical/

operational methods.14 These factors correspond to four general 

determinants of military effectiveness: capacity, knowledge, wisdom, and technique.15 Though these elements relate to one another in many ways, they can be sufficiently disaggregated to permit discrete analysis. These capabilities are compared and 

contrasted for each combatant in each phase of the war. 

It is important to note, however, that the most significant influence of each element was exerted near each phase’s transition 

points where shifts in initiative actually occurred. Summary 

questions for each analysis include the following: What was the 

relative significance of each of the four factors? How did they 

operate in concert with one another? and How did they combine 

to result in seizure, retention, loss, and exercise of initiative? 

The resource element consists of the “capital” for waging war, 

or the tools required to fight and win. The analysis of resources 

considers manpower, materiel, and technology. Quantity, however, is not the only consideration. Quality of both men and 

equipment is compared. Technological advantage could be a 

significant factor in the equation. 

Good intelligence implies matching one’s perception of the 

total situation with reality. Quality of intelligence has two components. The first is collection and analysis, which encompasses the ability to discern the foe’s entire war-making capacity and to understand the environment in which one will 

operate. The second component is counterintelligence and security, which attempts to deny the enemy an accurate understanding of the situation. Both areas contribute to overall intel-
INTRODUCTION

ligence effectiveness, and play an important role in strategic 

initiative.

Strategic acumen is a broad concept with many ingredients. 

Fundamentally, it represents the wisdom to shape plans that 

will work in an environment plagued by uncertainty and friction. 

Those endowed with such acumen recognize the correlation between the means they possess, the goals they hope to achieve, 

and the course of action required to achieve them. They also 

sense and act upon opportunities. Those gifted in strategic 

thought weigh the feasibility and payoffs of different courses of 

action against the risks they incur. Clausewitz hinted at this 

when he wrote, “A prince or general can best demonstrate his 

genius by managing a campaign exactly to suit his objectives 

and his resources, doing neither too much nor too little.”16

The first subcomponent of strategic acumen is strategic planning. How effectively did the combatant match its objectives with 

its capabilities given the context of the existing situation? The 

Allied landings in North Africa in late 1942 are a good example 

of matching objectives with capabilities. Pres. Franklin Roosevelt, with the backing of the British, forced an invasion that his 

own military chiefs of staff opposed in order to get American 

forces into the fight against Germany quickly, even if they were 

capable of achieving only modest military objectives.17

The second aspect of strategic acumen is the capacity to 

achieve surprise. Surprise allows one to accomplish the mission 

before the enemy can react, or in Luttwak’s words, “. . . within 

the limits of time and space of the surprise actually achieved, 

the conduct of war becomes mere administration, as simple in 

its total reality as each one of its elements seems to be simple in 

theory.”18 The Russian military theorist Aleksandr Nezmanov described strategic surprise as an action “against which there are 

no means whatsoever for sufficient counteraction in a short period of time,” and, “the initiative would be transferred to the enemy.”19 Surprise has a close relationship with intelligence, but 

differs slightly in that the focus here is on the ability to conceive 

of and to execute deception operations, which are frequently the 

handmaidens of surprise. Though not always required for strategic acumen, effective deception and surprise may yield extraordinary results. The invasion of North Africa serves as a good 

example once again, as it achieved strategic surprise against 
INTRODUCTION

Germany and Italy, even if only for a short time.20 Once again, 

capabilities in these two components may vary widely within one 

nation or coalition, and each has the potential to play a significant role in determining strategic initiative. 

The final factor for analyzing the two examples is the comparison of operational and tactical methods. Eric Larrabee notes, 

“Strategy includes the working out of its consequences.”21 These 

consequences include the sting of battle, where superior operational and tactical methods reveal themselves in success on the 

battlefield, where the bullets fly. Although superior performance 

at the tactical and operational levels is not a guarantee of victory, 

these factors can contribute noticeably to strategic initiative. 

War involves a competitive interaction between two or more 

combatants. Therefore, our examples will pit the performance 

and capabilities of the combatants against one another to determine relative advantages and disadvantages in each category. For example, in the Russo–German War the strategic acumen of Hitler and the German high command was important 

only as it related to that of Stalin and the Stavka. The relative 

superiority or inferiority of one side over the other in each area 

will determine the contribution that element makes to gaining, 

holding, losing, or exploiting strategic initiative.

The above will not, however, be considered in isolation. These 

four components form a construct of military effectiveness, in 

which each relates to and potentially influences, some or all of 

the others. The examination of each case must consider how 

these factors related to one another to influence strategic initiative. Did one factor dominate the others? Did marginal advantages in multiple areas accumulate to deliver strategic initiative into the hands of one side or the other? Was superiority 

in one or more areas negated by disadvantages in the other factors? Examining the cases from various perspectives should 

reveal the interplay among elements and between opponents.

The monumental struggle between Stalin’s Soviet Union and 

Hitler’s Nazi Germany from 1941 until 1945 offers excellent evidence for the dissection of strategic initiative. It was a long war 

with discernible shifts in control of the puck. Nazi Germany 

clearly seized the initiative and held it during the opening stages 

of the war. Opinions over who held the initiative after the battle 

for Moscow vary. However, following either Stalingrad or Kursk, 
INTRODUCTION

it was clear the Soviets were in control, and they maintained the 

strategic initiative on Germany’s eastern front until the total collapse of Hitler’s regime. Determining the two transition points 

between phases may prove to be among the most revealing aspects of the study, allowing for a contrast between distinct contexts of strategic initiative during the fighting. The conflict illuminates many important considerations for strategic initiative in 

a long, land-centric, modern, conventional war.

Notes

(All notes appear in shortened form. For full details, see the appropriate entry 

in the bibliography.)

1. Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, IV–32.

2. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Military and Associated Terms.

3. Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1, Air Warfare, 6.

4. Field Manual 1-02, Operational Terms and Graphics, 1–100.

5. Ibid.

6. JP 1-02, 394.

7. Ibid., 516.

8. Ibid.

9. Gray, Modern Strategy, 17, 20.

10. Clausewitz, On War, 178. While Clausewitz’s definition of strategy as 

“the use of the engagement for the purpose of the war” more closely resembles the modern concept of operations, his reference to the “highest realms of 

strategy” corresponds to the next level and its increased complexity.

11. Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace. The italics are 

Luttwak’s.

12. Ibid., 258.

13. Lonsdale, Nature of War in the Information Age, 80.

14. Tse-Tung, On the Protracted War. Though derived independently of 

Mao, these four categories loosely correspond to those mentioned in his dissection of initiative and superiority. Resources (p. 88): war is a “contest in 

ability between the commanders of the opposing armies in their struggle for 

superiority and initiative on the basis of material conditions like military 

forces and financial resources.” Intelligence (pp. 88–89): “Sun Wu Tzu’s 

maxim ‘know your enemy and know yourself, and you can fight a hundred 

battles without disaster,’ is still a scientific truth . . . . But whatever the war 

conditions and activities, it is possible to know the general aspects and the 

essential points.” Strategic Acumen (p. 89): “It is possible for a commander to 

reduce errors and to give generally correct directions by various means of 

reconnaissance and intelligent inference and judgment. A generally correct 

direction will enable us to win more victories and transform our inferiority 

into superiority.” Operational and Tactical flexibility (p. 97): “Flexibility is a 

quality which enables a commander to adopt timely and appropriate mea-
INTRODUCTION

10

sures, after he has, on the basis of the objective situation, weighed the 

chances and appraised the conditions . . . in other words, flexibility is the 

quality that gives one skill in manoever [sic].”

15. Dr. Harold Winton first conceived of this thematic connection and 

brought it to the author’s attention. A brief conversation followed, but the 

value of this insightful observation was immediately apparent.

16. Clausewitz, On War, 177.

17. Larrabee, Commander in Chief, 133–39.

18. Luttwak, Strategy, 4.

19. Fugate and Dvoretsky, Thunder on the Dnepr, 20.

20. Larrabee, Commander in Chief, 133.

21. Ibid., 6.

10
11

Chapter 2

The Russo–German War, 1941–45

Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet 

Union on 22 June 1941, unleashed a war of far-reaching strategic consequences. By November 1941, the Germans were 

knocking on the door of Moscow, leaving massive carnage from 

their string of military victories in the western regions of Russia. Throughout that summer, the Wehrmacht clearly held the 

strategic initiative, dictating the course of the invasion while 

the Soviets struggled to recover from the initial onslaught.1 As 

winter approached, however, the picture began to change. The 

Russians mounted stiff resistance west of Moscow and stopped 

the Germans short of the capital. The halt of the German advance in 1941 marks the end of the first phase of the war. Why 

were the Germans able to seize strategic initiative and then to 

hold it during this period? Comparing the Germans and Soviets using the elements of resources, quality of intelligence, 

strategic acumen, and operational and tactical methods will 

help answer this question.

A clear understanding of the belligerents’ high command 

structures is a necessary precursor. The German high command enjoyed a celebrated history prior to World War II. Geoffrey Megargee wrote, “In the German army, especially in the 

General Staff, officers were a functional elite. The system selected them based on demonstrated abilities, which it then further refined: a balance of intellectual prowess and strength of 

personality. They learned to plan carefully, issue clear orders, 

delegate authority, and use initiative.”2

The Germans created, what amounted to, two general staffs in 

the Second World War, the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) 

or the armed forces high command, and the Oberkommando des 

Heeres (OKH) or the army high command. “The establishment of 

a centralized armed forces command, if it had any real power, 

would have brought an unprecedented level of coordination to 

the German military. The reality was, however, little more than 

a continuation of old patterns of rivalry among top-level command organizations,” Megargee said of OKW.3 Hitler’s decision to 
THE RUSSO–GERMAN WAR, 1941–45

12

grant exclusive control of Barbarossa to the OKH instead of the 

hierarchically superior OKW magnified this rivalry.4

In addition, Hitler consolidated his dominance over the armed 

forces by personally taking charge of the OKW and strengthening its centralized control following the Blomberg–Fritsch scandal in 1938.5 As supreme commander, Hitler practiced a rigid 

style of command known as the Führerprinzip, which held everyone “duty-bound to obey every order he received from his 

superior commander.”6 In sum, the German high command 

had a historically proven record of accomplishment; but the 

fragmented command relationships and Hitler’s demand for 

blind obedience introduced friction and rigidity, both of which 

became increasingly apparent as the war progressed.

In Russia, the German chain of command was structurally 

straightforward. The chain flowed from OKH, through the three 

geographically delineated army group commanders, to their respective army commanders.7 The army commanders, in turn, 

directed corps commanders who directed the division commanders, and so on down the line.8

The Soviet Union’s high command differed noticeably from 

the Germans. Communism’s inherent fear of the “internal enemy” directly affected the high command structure over the 

army of three million because of the potential threat that army 

represented.9 The chain of command during the war flowed 

from the Committee for the Defense of the State (GOKO), consisting of Stalin and his senior political and military lieutenants, through the Stavka, essentially a general headquarters 

closely monitored by four senior political commissars.10 And, 

as the 1937 purges revealed, Lavrenti Beria’s notorious state 

security organization, the NKVD [People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs], stood ever ready to intervene in military affairs 

and enforce Stalin’s political will.11

The structure was purposefully designed to exercise centralized command of the armed forces at the highest political levels. This it did, but it also stifled initiative. The poor showing of 

the Red Army in the 1939–40 war with Finland caused a reevaluation of and some modifications to this structure, including an emphasis on better discipline within the army and a 

decrease in the authority of the political commissars.12 Interestingly, and in contrast to Hitler, Stalin eventually loosened 
THE RUSSO–GERMAN WAR, 1941–45

13

his grip over the army as the war progressed. According to John 

Erickson, “Out of its subordination, the army marched into 

equality with the [Communist] Party.”13

In May 1941, the Soviets had five “military districts” along 

their western front from north to south: Leningrad, Baltic, Western, Kiev, and Odessa.14 They made a significant adjustment in 

July 1941, establishing “three major commands over the northwestern, western, and southwestern ‘directions,’” but this structure “failed to produce any of the necessary coordination or cohesion.”15 This orientation closely resembled the German 

geographical army groups and was as close as the Soviets came 

to the German organization, but it did not last. By the winter of 

1941–42, the Soviets established more numerous, smaller fronts; 

and the Stavka directed control through its immediate subordinate general staff, to the commanders of arms, then to the defense commissariat, and down to the front commanders.16

“The Stavka system worked with an increasing efficiency as 

the war progressed. To coordinate or even execute major operations, Stavka ‘representatives’ went to specified fronts,” Erickson noted.17 This practice represented an ingenious solution to 

Stalin’s problem of balancing control with allowing military initiative to high-ranking officers. On the one hand, the permanent position of these officers in Stavka kept them close to 

Stalin. On the other, his most experienced and capable commanders, such as Marshal Georgi Zhukov, were able to plan 

and then personally coordinate and direct the most important 

operations. This structure obviated the need for a Soviet equivalent of Germany’s geographical army group commands. 

Phase 1: 22 June 1941–5 December 1941

When they opened the war, the Germans were operating at 

their peak strength and efficiency. Hitler unleashed three army 

groups: north, center, and south against Leningrad, Moscow, 

and the Ukraine respectively. Despite evidence of the impending invasion, the move caught the Soviets unprepared. The 

Germans made rapid advances in the north and in the center, 

while progress in the south lagged. The campaign aimed to 

achieve victory before the onset of winter, but this proved overly 
THE RUSSO–GERMAN WAR, 1941–45

14

optimistic. Despite the rapid German advance and its capture 

of hundreds of thousands of prisoners of war (POW), the Russians kept an army in the field and survived into the winter 

months. The Red Army blunted the final Wehrmacht drive on 

Moscow as winter developed and countered with an attack of 

its own on 5 December 1941. The commencement of this attack closed out the opening phase of the war.

Resources

The Germans concentrated a formidable array of troops for 

Barbarossa (see figure 1), but struggled to maintain their 

strength with each passing month. They launched the invasion 

with roughly 3.2 million men, including the troops of their allies.18 Facing them in the newly acquired western reaches of 

the Soviet Union were 2.9 million Soviet troops, though the full 

establishment of the Soviet armed forces was significantly 

higher.19 As the invasion progressed, however, the Wehrmacht

was unable to replace its operational losses, receiving only a 

fraction of the necessary replacements by 2 August 1941.20 The 

deficit remained a problem throughout the initial period of the 

war with a shortage of 126,000 men by 16 October 1941.21 The 

Soviets suffered enormous casualties in this period and, despite prewar mobilization preparations, found themselves with 

only 2.2 million men directly facing the Germans at the beginning of November 1941.22 These numbers did not bode well for 

the Soviets.

The Germans initially enjoyed a clear advantage in manpower. They employed more troops on the active front and, despite their mounting casualties, inflicted so much damage on 

the Soviet army that they maintained a positive force ratio. The 

relatively primitive nature of Soviet recruits, poor discipline, 

and uneven quality among military units further complicated 

the Red Army’s problem.23 Yet the Soviets had prepared mobilization plans that allowed them to put one million new recruits 

under arms by the end of July, thereby keeping an army in the 

field and laying the foundation for future success.24 Nevertheless, while the manpower margin may have been thin at times, 

it favored the Germans.
THE RUSSO–GERMAN WAR, 1941–45

15

In material terms, the German economy was not geared for a 

long war.25 The Wehrmacht did, however, enter the operation 

with 3,330 tanks;26 and the Luftwaffe committed 2,770 modern 

aircraft to the campaign.27 The Soviets countered these with 

significantly greater numbers including 14,200 tanks and 

9,200 aircraft in the western theater.28 But only 27 percent of 

these tanks were in full working order, the rest being under 

“heavy” or “medium” repair.29 Nevertheless, the Soviets had 

been preparing for a long war with their successive “five-year 

plans” of the 1930s; and their industrial output was growing.30

The Soviet artillery force was both numerous and “the best 

equipped and most professional arm” of the Red Army.31

In terms of pure numbers, the material balance substantially 

favored the Soviet Union at the opening of the war. The quality of 

the equipment, as will be seen, played a significant role. Other 

Figure 1. Operation Barbarossa (See all figures online to enhance resolution. 

http://www.dean.usma.edu/departments/history/web03/atlases/

ww2%20europe/ww2%20europe%20%20maps/ww2%20map19.jpg, 

accessed 16 April 2008).
THE RUSSO–GERMAN WAR, 1941–45

16

factors influencing the material element manifested themselves 

as the campaign progressed. German stocks dwindled due to supply difficulties as the army drove east. The need to convert Soviet 

railways to the German gauge limited rail support, resulting in 

depleted ammunition supplies.32 Panzer Gen Erhard Raus confirmed the debilitating effects of limited supply stating, “The losses 

attributable to technical failure continued to far outweigh combat 

losses [in July 1941].”33 Meanwhile, the Soviets had to contend 

with German successes that overran industry and forced armament factories to evacuate to the east, interrupting production.34

Although the numbers of weapons favored the Red Army, the 

quality of weapons favored the Germans. The Luftwaffe’s technology was generally superior to the Soviet air force’s (VVS), with 

80 percent of Russian aircraft considered outmoded.35 Among 

that remaining 20 percent, however, was the II’yushin II-2 

“Shturmovik,” which proved a nasty surprise to the Germans 

and was “probably the best close air support aircraft of the Second World War.”36 The newer and larger Soviet tanks, including 

the KV-1 and especially the T-34, were superior to the German 

tanks and would remain so until much later in the war; but they 

were available only in limited numbers in 1941.37 Field Marshal 

Wilhelm Keitel confirmed the sustained superiority of Soviet armor noting “the Russian tank forces had a qualitative lead over 

us which we never could and never did catch up.”38 The Germans had a large technological edge in radios, recognizing their 

“indispensable” role in modern, mobile warfare.39 This edge in 

wireless technology paid dividends across the full spectrum of 

military air and ground operations.

Despite several Soviet strengths, the overall edge in technology at this stage fell to the Wehrmacht. The Soviets enjoyed a 

marked superiority on the ground, and German battlefield commanders acknowledged this superiority. Gen Heinz Guderian 

credited the T-34 with inflicting grievous losses on the 4th Panzer Division near Mzensk in October 1941, thereby blunting his 

rapid advance on Tula, to the south of Moscow.40 But this advantage was offset by the combined German ascendancy in the 

air and in radios. The synergy of these two technologies on the 

battlefield offset the Soviet advantage in armor and artillery.

Germany maintained superiority in resources writ large at 

the beginning of Operation Barbarossa. The Germans had a 
THE RUSSO–GERMAN WAR, 1941–45

17

small to moderate edge in manpower and larger edge in technology. The Soviets enjoyed massive amounts of equipment, 

but much of it was of inferior quality. Soviet Gen Sergie 

Shtemenko accurately noted, “Organizationally and technically 

all the Soviet Armed Forces were being brought into line with 

the demands of modern war,” but the key word was “being.”41

Barbarossa had caught them in transition. “In the short-term 

struggle that Hitler planned, Germany had clear qualitative 

and even quantitative advantages over the Soviet Union,”42 was 

the overall verdict for resources in 1941. Deciding how best to 

employ these advantages required good intelligence.

Quality of Intelligence

During the prelude to the invasion, both nations struggled to 

gain a clear picture of the war-making potential and intentions 

of the other. German intelligence collection and analysis prior to 

the invasion were mixed. The Germans had good knowledge of 

the dispositions of Soviet forces in the border areas, but they 

underestimated Russian reserve capabilities.43 They also knew 

about the topography in Soviet-occupied eastern Poland but did 

not have the same grasp for European Russia.44 Before hostilities began, they grossly underestimated several aspects of Soviet 

production capability, particularly in aircraft.45 Compounding 

this underestimation was Hitler’s racial paradigm, which considered the Soviet state a creation of the supposedly inferior “international Jew.”46 Hitler’s assumption of German racial superiority led him to tell Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, on the 

eve of Barbarossa, “You have only to kick in the door [of Russia] 

and the whole rotten structure will come crashing down.”47 

Soviet intelligence was excellent in many respects, but Stalin 

himself undermined its effectiveness. “Probably at no earlier 

time in history has a major belligerent in a soon-to-start war 

ever had more complete intelligence about the strength of an 

opponent and the disposition and capabilities of his forces as 

did the USSR in early 1941,” Bryan Fugate notes.48 Fearful of a 

Western conspiracy to involve him in a war he wished assiduously to avoid, Stalin wasted this advantage, and obdurately 

refused to act.49 His paranoia cost the Soviets dearly.
THE RUSSO–GERMAN WAR, 1941–45

The Germans enjoyed a slight advantage in intelligence collection and analysis at the beginning of the war. Though they “catastrophically underestimated” the Soviet Union’s war-making 

capacity at the opening of hostilities, they did make use of the 

good intelligence generated immediately before the war.50 The 

underestimation, however, would hurt them in the later stages 

of the conflict. The Soviets, given Stalin’s paranoia, were left with 

virtually nothing of strategic intelligence value for employment 

after the supposedly ‘surprise’ attack in June. The fruits of the 

Soviet’s strategic intelligence were plucked from their hands by 

the leader and left to rot.

Maintaining an accurate grasp of the situation proved difficult for both adversaries during the first phase of the war. German intelligence was mixed, with some excellent aspects and 

some notable weaknesses. Much like the prewar intelligence, 

the Germans were consistently able to identify those Soviet 

units in the first echelon of battle but struggled in tracking the 

Soviets at the operational and strategic echelons.51 The Germans held an advantage in communication intelligence early in 

the war and continued to improve this area as more radio direction-finding equipment arrived at the front.52 Despite this 

advantage, Gen Franz Halder’s 3 July 1941 estimate that Soviet reserves had been depleted proved glaringly inaccurate.53

The Soviets struggled as well, caught off balance by the invasion. Their intelligence and reconnaissance procedures were 

uneven and only marginally effective, forcing them to operate 

in the blind when dispersing their units.54

Despite its intelligence imperfections, the Wehrmacht proved 

more adept than the Red Army at piecing the information picture together and garnering a realistic appraisal of the situation 

during the first phase of the conflict. Soviet limitations wreaked 

havoc on the Red Army’s ability to stop the Germans during the 

opening moves of the invasion.55 Soviet Gen Konstantin Rokossovsky stated it best: “I was greatly handicapped by the absence 

of information concerning the situation at the front.”56 The first 

six months of the war illustrated that groping along in darkness 

during a mobile, modern war can be disastrous.

Counterintelligence was also mixed. The Germans were able to 

keep the Soviets in the dark about their movements and intentions as much from Soviet failure as from direct German design. 

18
THE RUSSO–GERMAN WAR, 1941–45

19

The rapid offensive and corresponding Soviet confusion congealed 

to mask the Russians’ vision. The Soviets were atrocious at communications discipline in the opening stages of the war, revealing 

much to the German army.57 On the plus side, the German overestimates of Soviet rifle division strengths and underestimates of 

their mechanized corps strengths at the beginning of the war reflect some Soviet success regarding operational security.58

Thus, the Germans held the edge in counterintelligence and 

operational security, if only by default. The Soviets were often 

unaware of the course of operations and were typically unable 

to cover their own moves and blind the Germans. 

The overall advantage in intelligence goes to Germany for the 

opening phase of the war. Strategically, the Soviets had both 

better collection and assessment, but Stalin wasted these efforts in a misguided attempt to avoid provoking the Germans. 

Throughout the first few months of the campaign, the Germans 

were better able to assess the current situation and act properly. Particularly in the opening months, this near total breakdown for the Soviets allowed the Germans to sustain their operational security, while the Soviets garnered only mixed results 

in their own attempts, but as this phase closed, the gap began 

to narrow. On 4 December 1941, the eve of the Soviet counteroffensive around Moscow, German intelligence failed to detect 

the presence of Soviet reserves and anticipated no possibility of 

attack by the Red Army.59 Meanwhile, in late November 1941, 

the Soviets accurately assessed the Germans’ exhaustion and 

overextension, as well as their lack of reserves.60

Strategic Acumen

Despite some notable deficiencies, the Germans proved to be 

better strategists than the Soviets in the opening campaign. 

Hitler believed Barbarossa would secure Germany in the east, 

force Britain out of the war, allow Germany to slow armament 

production, and keep the United States out of the war.61 The 

plan aimed Army Groups North, Center, and South, at the main 

targets of Leningrad, Moscow, and the Ukraine, respectively.62

Guderian, at least in hindsight, found great flaws in Germany’s 

planning, faulting the invasion for consisting of three different 

army groups pursuing three diverging military objectives.63
THE RUSSO–GERMAN WAR, 1941–45

20

Field Marshal Erich von Manstein found another strategic failure in Hitler’s inability to convince the Soviet Union’s disaffected minorities to help in the war.64 Here, Hitler’s racial predilections again undermined the war effort and represented a 

significant missed opportunity. Robert Citino found an inherent weakness in Germany’s operational focus at the expense of 

strategy: “Exactly how operational victories—even decisive 

ones—would actually lead to surrender of their enemies received very little consideration.”65 Exacerbating all these concerns, Hitler and his General Staff repeatedly disagreed over 

and vacillated among the three military objectives of Leningrad, 

Moscow, and the Ukraine.66 

The Soviets were apparently caught in a transition between 

strategies or in a state of confusion. Prior to the invasion, Red 

Army forces were positioned too far forward, vulnerable to known 

Wehrmacht operational capabilities.67 Bryan Fugate favors the 

first interpretation, stating that Marshals Zhukov and Semyon 

Timoshenko were intentionally switching from an offensive posture to a defense in depth, and had done all they could in the 

short time between January and June 1941.68 Konstantin Pleshakov argues the second interpretation and blames the confusion on Stalin’s misguided directions, which forced Timoshenko 

and Zhukov to be unprepared for either an offensive or a defensive war.69 Zhukov later faulted Stalin for ordering early counterattacks that were well beyond the Red Army’s capabilities.70 Stalin did, however, have the foresight to plan for a long war when 

he ordered the evacuation of as much war industry as possible 

to the east, beginning 24 June 1941.71

The Soviets and Germans were equally inept at strategic planning. Both sides failed to develop or implement a fully effective 

strategic plan. The Germans, too operationally focused, had 

competing military objectives that caused debilitating vacillation 

during execution, and missed the opportunity to exploit disaffected Soviet minorities. The Soviets, caught between plans or, 

confused by Stalin’s management, were not ready for either offense or defense in their deployment. They were also unrealistic 

about their own capabilities at the outset of war. The Germans 

came close to success despite their mistakes, but these mistakes 

would return to haunt them later in the war. The Soviets made 

20
THE RUSSO–GERMAN WAR, 1941–45

21

costly errors initially, but they also made several positive decisions that would pay off in later phases of the conflict.

The Germans executed a successful deception operation and 

launched an effective surprise attack to open the war. There is no 

significant debate among historians that Germany reigned supreme during the opening moves of the war. The Germans masked 

their preparations in the east under the guise of rehearsing for 

Operation Seelöwe against Great Britain, out of range of the Royal 

Air Force.72 Aided by Stalin’s refusal to believe his own intelligence, the Germans struck a devastating blow. By means of comparison, Soviet attempts at maskirovka, which includes “both active and passive measures designed to deceive and surprise the 

enemy,” were limited in scope and effectiveness.73 

The German surprise attack achieved astounding results in 

the opening months of the invasion. The war progressed much 

like an exercise for the Wehrmacht, while the Soviets proved 

incapable of reacting. On the first day alone, the Luftwaffe destroyed 1,200 Soviet airplanes, most of them on the ground in 

neatly parked rows.74 During the first week of the war, 24 different Soviet mechanized corps formations lost over 90 percent 

of their strength.75 Within three weeks, the Red Army had lost 

28 infantry divisions, with the remainder down to 50 percent 

strength, representing 600,000 men out of their original 2.9 

million.76 This was strategic surprise indeed!

Operational and Tactical Methods

At this point in the war, the Germans were the class of the 

league in tactical and operational technique. Citino is unambiguous concerning German operational and tactical prowess: 

“Much of the rest of the war (1941–1945), in fact, can be seen as 

an attempt by the Allies (Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the 

United States) to assimilate the new German methods.”77 Halder 

praised the initiative inculcated into German commanders, allowing for independent leadership and the now-famous employment of Auftragstaktik, or loose mission command, which he 

deemed essential in the vast expanses of Russia.78

The Soviets did not enjoy this kind of trust. Stalin’s purges of 

the armed forces in the late 1930s paralyzed any latent spirit of 

initiative that might have flowed from Marshal Mikhail Tukh-
THE RUSSO–GERMAN WAR, 1941–45

22

achevskii’s concept of “deep battle.”79 Gen Erhard Raus found the 

lower echelons of Soviet command in 1941 “inflexible and indecisive.”80 Soviet shortcomings in wireless communications exacerbated the situation, hampering effective command and control.81

In the open countryside of western Russia, the Red Army was at 

a significant disadvantage against expert tacticians.

German success demonstrated this point; the war’s first 

12 days produced a 15-to-one loss ratio in Germany’s favor.82 Col Hans von Luck noted the achievement of air superiority by the Luftwaffe from the beginning of the campaign.83

The Red Army did not, however, just roll over. Encircled Soviet units fought bitterly, refusing to surrender as had Germany’s previous foes.84 The Red Army also attempted several 

large armored counterattacks “unlike anything in France,” 

an ominous sign for the future.85 Despite these efforts, the 

Wehrmacht reigned supreme operationally and tactically in 

the first phase of the conflict. 

Summary

The scales tipped in varying degrees in favor of Germany in 

resources, intelligence quality, strategic acumen, and operational and tactical methods in the summer and fall of 1941. 

The Germans had concentrated significant amounts of men 

and materiel, with certain critical advantages in technology, 

for the invasion. Despite Hitler’s sociopolitical blindness, they 

developed a fairly accurate intelligence picture. Although their 

strategic planning left much to be desired, they almost won 

the war in six months. They planned and executed a devastating surprise attack. Tactically and operationally, the Germans 

were unmatched. 

The Germans attacked and seized strategic initiative on 22 

June 1941. They were able to hold greater influence over the 

course of the war until December 1941 because of their advantages in all four elements. They sustained resource superiority 

throughout this period; they held advantages in intelligence; 

their short-term strategic focus worked for the first five months; 

and they fought brilliantly at the lower levels of war. Soviet resistance was fierce but could not wrest the initiative from the 

Germans. As the war dragged on, however, the nature of ad-
THE RUSSO–GERMAN WAR, 1941–45

23

vantages in each of these categories began to shift. Those shifts 

accumulated, and the balance of advantage swayed. When it 

did, the conflict entered its second phase; and the implications 

for strategic initiative loomed large. 

Phase 2: 5 December 1941–1 Feb 1943

The Soviets mounted several operations in late 1941 and the 

spring of 1942, including a 5 December 1941 counterattack 

from Moscow and the battles at Kharkov and in the Crimea (see 

figure 2). They attempted and very nearly succeeded to wrest 

the strategic initiative from the Germans. The amazing recovery of the Red Army before Moscow in 1941 dealt the German 

army its first significant defeat and signified to Shtemenko a 

“fundamentally new turn” in the war.86

Figure 2. Soviet Moscow Counteroffensive (http://www.dean.usma.edu/

departments/history/web03/atlases/ww2%20europe/ww2%20europe%20%20 

maps/ww2%20map21.jpg, accessed 16 April 2008).
THE RUSSO–GERMAN WAR, 1941–45

24

The Soviets attempted to follow up with a general offensive, but 

the Germans were able to stabilize a “relatively ordered defensive 

front” by early January 1942.87 The Soviets then attempted attacks 

in the Crimea and around Kharkov, to no avail. The Germans countered with Operation Blau in July 1942, with two thrusts in the 

south toward the Caucasus and Stalingrad (see figure 3). This action forced the Soviets to fight the battle in the south but helped 

them to turn the tide with Operation Uranus and the subsequent 

destruction of the German Sixth Army in January 1943, which 

represented the end of the disputed initiative phase. 

Figure 3. Operation Blau (http://www.dean.usma.edu/departments/history/

web03/atlases/ww2%20europe/ww2%20europe%20%20maps/ww2%20 

map23.jpg, accessed 16 April 2008).

The struggle for strategic initiative ebbed and flowed during 

this phase. Mostly because of definitional confusion, historians 

and participants disagree over which side held the strategic 

initiative and when. The Red Army first began to contest Ger-
THE RUSSO–GERMAN WAR, 1941–45

25

man possession of the strategic initiative with its Moscow counterattack and subsequent general offensive in December 1941. 

They succeeded in gaining operational initiative in these attacks, but the limited results of the general offensive prevented 

their seizure of strategic initiative. The situation in the spring of 

1942 found both sides vying for the initiative.88 The Soviet operations at Kharkov and in the Crimea were disasters after 

which “the [operational] initiative fell firmly into German 

hands.”89 The Germans used that initiative to dictate the course 

of the war with Operation Blau and the resulting battle at Stalingrad in the south of the Soviet Union. Figure 4 shows the 

Soviets countered this move with Operations Mars and Uranus, designed to seize the strategic initiative in the fall and 

winter of 1942–43.90

Figure 4. Operation Uranus (http://www.dean.usma.edu/departments/history/

web03/atlases/ww2%20europe/ww2%20europe%20%20maps/ww 

2%20map24.jpg, accessed 16 April 2008).
THE RUSSO–GERMAN WAR, 1941–45

26

The former German and Soviet commanders dispute who 

held strategic initiative after the Soviet victory at Stalingrad, 

but from February 1943 on it was, in retrospect, clearly in the 

Red Army’s possession. William Shirer was correct in his judgment that after Stalingrad “the initiative had passed from Hitler’s hands, never to return.”91 We must now investigate why 

this shift came about.

Resources

From late 1941 to early 1943, the struggle for resource superiority intensified. In manpower, the two antagonists moved in 

decidedly different directions. Heavy German losses in the 

campaign worsened in the winter months, resulting in a restructuring of divisional organization from nine infantry battalions to seven, and beginning a struggle for manpower on 

Germany’s eastern front “that was never to end.”92 Soviet efforts to mobilize and transfer troops from the Far East told a 

different story. On 1 November 1941, the Red Army fielded 2.2 

million men in the western districts and Ukraine; by early December, that number rose to four million.93 This transfer began 

in the closing weeks of the first phase. By May 1942, there were 

3.5 million Axis soldiers (1 million of which were not Germans) 

facing 5.5 million Soviets.94

This disparity steadily widened as the war progressed. As 

early as the battle for Moscow in 1941, the Soviets were able to 

concentrate a two-to-one manpower superiority at the decisive 

point.95 The Kharkov offensive of 1942 pitted 640,000 Red Army 

soldiers against 500,000 Germans.96 The Germans were forced 

to start their strategic offensive, Operation Blau, with most 

units below strength.97 This problem worsened, and Manstein’s 

attempt to relieve the encircled army at Stalingrad was undermined by “an acute shortage of reserves.”98 The balance in 

manpower had clearly shifted to the Soviet Union.

The battle in materiel was more closely run as the Germans 

lost an enormous amount of armor. By March 1942, their 16 

panzer divisions reported a total strength of only 140 tanks, 

while by late November 1941, 327,000 out of an original 500,000 

transport vehicles were damaged or destroyed; and over 207,000 

horses were lost.99 The Germans were also losing the aircraft 
THE RUSSO–GERMAN WAR, 1941–45

27

production battle: in 1942, they manufactured only 15,409 

planes for use on three fronts; the Soviet Union produced 25,240 

aircraft for one front.100 The Germans, however, concentrated 

2,750 combat aircraft for their 1942 efforts in Russia.101

Supply problems proved a particular challenge for the Wehrmacht as the war dragged on, especially in the winter months. 

The troops were short of heavy clothing, and tanks were 

stranded due to frozen motor oil.102 The Soviet Union, on the 

other hand, was closer to its support base and enjoyed better, 

though not perfect, railway and supply support, especially as 

winter approached.103 While the counterattack around Moscow 

raged, the Russians were at last getting “really good equipment 

in substantial quantities.”104 Furthermore, Allied aid from the 

United States and Great Britain helped fill the production gap 

that Soviet industry developed in 1942 as a result of Stalin’s 

1941 industry evacuation order.105 However, the Red Army had 

suffered enormous losses in artillery in 1941, which they were 

unable to replace fully in early 1942.106

The Soviets edged out Germany in materiel in this phase of 

the war. Supply and weather problems early in this phase conspired to limit Luftwaffe participation to 500 aircraft against 

1,000 Soviet machines in the battle of Moscow.107 Despite the 

previously noted production figures, the comparative dearth of 

German aircraft on such a wide front forced the Wehrmacht to 

concentrate virtually all their aircraft at each battle in 1942, 

limiting operations to a single offensive at a time.108 During the 

battle of Stalingrad, the Soviets solidified their numerical superiority employing 1,500 planes against the Germans’ 1,200.109

Citino highlighted the material trends of 1942 when he noted, 

“On the verge of its great confrontation with a revived and rapidly mechanizing Red Army, the Wehrmacht was in the process 

of reequipping its reconnaissance battalions with bicycles.”110

The technological picture was also changing. The Wehrmacht 

enjoyed significant technical superiority in several areas at the 

beginning of the war, but 1942 was a new year. The Soviets had 

and maintained armored superiority well into the war, including throughout this phase of the conflict. But they also started 

making gains in areas that had previously favored the Germans, such as aircraft and wireless communication. The Luftwaffe had destroyed a huge number of enemy aircraft in 1941; 
THE RUSSO–GERMAN WAR, 1941–45

28

but these were mostly older, obsolescent planes. The aircraft 

entering the fray on the Soviet side in late 1941 and throughout 1942 slowly eroded the technical superiority previously 

held by the Germans.111 One seemingly obscure, but critical, 

area in which the Allies helped the Soviets close the technology 

gap was in the supply of high-octane fuel, which significantly 

improved the performance of Russian aircraft.112

Although the Germans in this phase still clung to a slight 

overall technological edge, it was eroding. Over Stalingrad, 

when the Soviets achieved numerical superiority, 60 percent of 

their aircraft were newer, more capable models.113 The closing 

technological gap, along with superior numbers, also allowed 

the Soviet air force to wrest control of the air over the Leningrad-Bryansk fronts during this phase.114 These various indicators revealed a significant shift.

The Soviet Union tipped the overall balance in resources during the second phase of the war. The Red Army achieved a significant advantage in manpower that would widen as the war 

progressed. The material ratio favored the Soviets, but to a 

lesser extent than the advantage they enjoyed in manning. On 

the technical front, the Germans still enjoyed an overall advantage, but the Soviets had closed the gap in aircraft capabilities 

and maintained their lead in tank design. The Soviets’ cumulative advantages in manpower and materiel exceeded the narrow German lead in technology, shifting the resource element 

in Russia’s favor.

Quality of Intelligence

Relative intelligence capabilities were also changing. The 

Germans still struggled strategically and began to pay the price 

for their earlier underestimation of the Soviet Union’s warmaking capacity. They failed to appreciate Soviet capabilities 

and the size of the reserves available during the Moscow counteroffensive in late 1941 and early 1942.115 Hitler also continued to ignore his own intelligence, underestimating Soviet 

manufacturing capability and refusing to believe accurate production figures of 600–700 tanks per month.116 Finally, the 

Wehrmacht greatly underestimated the material support available to the Soviets on the eve of Operation Blau. They estimated 
THE RUSSO–GERMAN WAR, 1941–45

29

the Soviets had 6,600 aircraft, 6,000 tanks, and 7,800 various 

sized artillery pieces when the true numbers were 21,681, 

24,446, and 33,111 respectively.117

Russian strategic intelligence remained uneven. The Soviet General Staff had a very clear understanding of German capabilities 

and intent before Moscow in 1941, and an accurate assessment of 

Japanese intentions to the east; it acted effectively on these appreciations.118 Nevertheless, in 1942 the Soviets overestimated German capabilities and misread German intentions, fearing a twopronged advance with the major effort directed at Moscow.119

After a disastrous failure in June 1941, mostly because of 

Stalin’s personal failures, the Soviets rebounded nicely in strategic intelligence during this phase. They still had much work to 

do and made some poor analyses, but overall their performance 

exceeded that of the Germans. The Wehrmacht continued to 

struggle, performing about as well as in 1941, which was not 

very impressive. This put them at a relative disadvantage because of the marked gains made by the Russians. Alan Clark 

observed these poor strategic intelligence efforts began to have a 

significant effect on the Germans when their “complete ascendancy” on the battlefield started to erode and “ignorance of their 

opponent’s real strength and intentions was to bring them close 

to a disaster.”120 Even Joseph Goebbels, the Nazi propaganda 

minister, belatedly realized the significance of the errors in his 9 

April 1943 diary entry: “Canaris also claims that our counterespionage predicted Russia’s war potential correctly, especially 

heavy tank production for the Bolshevik Army. Unfortunately, 

the necessary conclusions were not drawn from this report.”121

Such shortcomings persisted throughout the war.

The Soviets also closed the gap in security and counterintelligence. Both sides practiced security measures that clouded the 

enemy’s judgment, with varying effectiveness. German security 

provided a false sense of superiority for the Russians near Kharkov, with the aforementioned deleterious results.122 The Soviets 

successfully used “disjointed” security methods and the extremely tight form of “sequential planning” to maintain secrecy 

prior to Operation Uranus at Stalingrad.123 These efforts allowed 

them to surreptitiously ferry 160,000 men, 10,000 horses, 430 

tanks, 6,000 guns, and 14,000 other vehicles across the Volga 

River in preparation for their counterattack.124
THE RUSSO–GERMAN WAR, 1941–45

30

The area of security proves a draw between the Germans and 

the Soviets at this stage of the war. German capabilities matched 

those they enjoyed at the beginning of the invasion. The Soviets 

showed steady and remarkable improvement in this area, and 

would continue to build upon it in the future. Each side enjoyed 

successes and failures in their intelligence security endeavors.

Thus, the Soviets edged out German efforts in the intelligence arena for phase two, but it was a very narrow advantage. 

The German ability to discern a clear picture of the current 

situation declined due to better Russian security. The Soviets 

showed significant improvement. This razor-thin Soviet advantage in intelligence capacity does, however, represent a marked 

shift from the opening phase of the war.

Strategic Acumen

As the initiative was disputed between the two sides, the relative quality of strategic planning oscillated. The Soviets surprised the Germans with a counterpunch in December 1941 

but pressed the attack beyond its means.125 Their ill-conceived 

operations in the Crimea and around Kharkov in the spring 

both suffered defeats. In the summer of 1942, the Germans 

aimed once again to decide the war in Russia.126 But familiar 

problems arose in the German strategic plan. Hitler’s view of 

strategic success in Russia focused on the conquest of territory 

for economic advantage, while his generals equated success 

with the destruction of the Red Army.127 The disagreement 

strained planning efforts, but the predictable result was implementation of Hitler’s concept of a southern offensive to capture 

vital economic areas that would cripple the Soviet war economy 

and aid Germany’s.128 The Germans, however, had not learned 

from the previous year and again attempted to seize diverging 

objectives, the Caucasus and Stalingrad.129

Stalin’s designs were also ill founded. In early 1942, Stalin 

stated, “I foresee the conduct of local offensive operations along 

a number of axes to fortify the success of the winter campaign 

. . . to seize the strategic initiative and to disrupt German preparations for a new summer offensive.”130 Additionally, Stalin 

had pressed for a general offensive against the Germans at the 
THE RUSSO–GERMAN WAR, 1941–45

31

very beginning of the second phase, following the success of 

the Moscow counteroffensive.131 Both plans fared poorly.

One of the keys to successful strategic planning is remaining 

within one’s capabilities. Both commands failed to do this at 

different times in 1942. After the counterattack at Moscow, 

Stalin’s opportunistic grab for strategic initiative, against his 

advisers’ counsel, pressured the Germans; but it fell well short 

of its intended goal due to inadequate resources.132 The Soviets 

also failed in Operation Mars against Army Group Center, an 

overreach that occurred while the victorious attack at Stalingrad was unfolding.133 The German decision to strike south was 

not a bad option for 1942, but the diverging aims of the two efforts and the dearth of German mobile formations conspired to 

overextend the offensives and leave them vulnerable to Soviet 

counterattack.134 The plan was simply beyond German capabilities. Zhukov did not miss this opportunity. Recognizing the 

weaknesses of the Italian and Romanian armies guarding the 

Germans’ flanks, he developed a plan to break through these 

vulnerable areas, then encircle and destroy the German 

forces.135 Both the Germans and Soviets blundered in the area 

of strategic planning, but the conception and execution of Operation Uranus mitigated other Soviet errors, giving them an 

edge in this period of the war.

There were multiple examples of strategic surprise and deception during the disputed phase of the war. The opening date 

of this phase coincided with the launch of the successful Soviet 

counterattack around Moscow, which caught the Germans unaware.136 Seven months later, the Wehrmacht attempted another war-winning surprise offensive with Operation Blau

against the south, masking it with a large-scale deception plan 

designed to focus Red Army attention on Moscow.137 Not to be 

outdone, the Soviets responded with Operation Uranus against 

Army Group South around Stalingrad, once again shocking the 

Germans.138 The Germans were unable to counter the Soviet 

encirclement of their Sixth Army. The maskirovka operation 

conducted by the Soviets at Stalingrad was their first largescale, successful deception operation; and it taught them valuable lessons for the future.139

Thus, the Soviets had the overall advantage in strategic surprise during this period of the war. Both Red Army surprises 
THE RUSSO–GERMAN WAR, 1941–45

32

caught the Germans off guard and yielded significant strategic 

benefits. While the Germans surprised the Russians with Blau, 

the surprise was not nearly as great nor as strategically consequential as Moscow and Operation Uranus. 

Overall, the Soviets demonstrated more accomplished strategic 

acumen than the Germans in this phase of the fight. Strategic 

planning favored the Red Army marginally, but the Soviet edge in 

achieving surprise tilted the scale decidedly in their favor. Given 

the earlier relative advantage the Germans had over the Soviets, 

the slowly maturing strategic capability of Stalin and the Stavka 

represented a significant shift in overall advantage. 

Operational and Tactical Methods

The Soviets were also becoming tactically and operationally 

more proficient. Throughout the winter of 1941–42, the German 

forces were exhausted, depleted, and unprepared for the 

weather.140 The return of spring and summer rejuvenated the 

Wehrmacht and made it “perhaps the finest pure fighting machine in the world, however weak it might have been in terms of 

strategy, resources, and manpower.”141 Yet things were changing, and Hitler’s increasing interference strangled the Auftragstaktik that had served the Germans so well.142 The Germans 

also limited the depth of their offensive strokes in order to keep 

tanks and infantry in close coordination with each other, and to 

avoid the large, but porous, encirclements of enemy forces.143

Finally, the struggle in Stalingrad forced the Germans to engage 

in a style of fighting that negated all their previous advantages of 

training and tactical orientation.144 The Soviet troops in the winter period were more numerous than the Germans, but were 

much less experienced than the Soviet soldiers in the prewar 

Red Army.145 However, Stalin, in contrast to Hitler, was learning 

from his mistakes and giving his officers slightly more freedom 

of action.146 The Soviets also reorganized their armored formations, creating tank corps of nearly 8,000 men and 170 tanks in 

May 1942.147 The VVS also reorganized, creating mobile air 

armies of 1,000 planes each, with the expectation of fielding 14 

such formations.148 During the street fighting in Stalingrad, the 

Red Army proved determined, skillful, and innovative.149
THE RUSSO–GERMAN WAR, 1941–45

33

The Germans remained operationally superior to the Soviets 

in this period of the war as the Red Army’s setbacks at Kharkov 

in Operation Mars and in the Crimea attest. “With the exception of Stalingrad, the Soviet command never managed to coordinate strength and speed when hitting a decisive spot,” Manstein observed.150 But they were learning. Daily Soviet casualty 

rates for the Stalingrad battle from July 1942 through February 1943 averaged just a third to a half the rates experienced 

in the Ukraine in 1941 and Kharkov in May 1942.151 Once 

again, though still at a disadvantage, the Soviets had significantly reduced a gap between themselves and the Germans.

Tactical superiority in this phase is debatable. The Germans, 

on aggregate, maintained an advantage; but the Soviets were 

superior in the urban fighting of Stalingrad and showed noticeable improvement in the steppes around the city. Soviet Gen 

Vasily Chuikov, commander of the Soviet 62nd Army at Stalingrad, recognized the “polished, coordinated action” that constituted German combined arms tactics.152 These tactics contributed materially to German success in the Crimea, at Kharkov, 

and before Stalingrad. But in the city itself, the Germans were 

unable to use their armor and air assets to full effect; and Russian tactics proved superior.153 Outside Stalingrad, German 

commanders noted the improved tactics of Soviet forces in open 

battle, when the latter rapidly exploited success and flexibly 

shifted their main efforts as the situation demanded.154

Summary

The advantage held in each of the four elements shifted significantly in the second phase of the war. Germany retained an edge in 

operational and tactical methods. But the Soviets had narrowed 

the gap. Resources, intelligence, and strategic acumen swung to 

the advantage of the Soviet Union, which grabbed a slight advantage in the first two and a moderate advantage in the third. 

The Soviet victory at Stalingrad wrested the strategic initiative from the Germans for the duration of the war. Phase two of 

the conflict began as a close-run struggle for that initiative, but 

the Germans were able to retain it until the debacle at Stalingrad. The Germans had largely dictated the course of the war 

until this loss; but after January 1943, the Soviets were run-
THE RUSSO–GERMAN WAR, 1941–45

34

ning the show. In broad outline, the war followed their intentions until its completion in May 1945. They needed no additional motivation to march on to victory. 

Phase 3: 1 February 1943–9 May 1945 

The third and final phase of the war consisted of seemingly 

irreversible Red Army advances. Following Stalingrad, Manstein 

blunted the Soviet advance in the south at Kharkov and stabilized the line of contact. Both sides paused until the Germans 

attempted to regain the strategic initiative at the battle of Kursk 

in July 1943. The Soviets were well prepared for this strike; they 

absorbed the blow and successfully counterattacked.

Kursk proved to be the last major German offensive on the 

eastern front. The Soviets soon began rapid and repeated attacks 

all along the front. They delivered a massive blow with Operation 

Bagration in June 1944, which virtually destroyed Germany’s 

Army Group Center in Belorussia (see figure 5). Thereafter, they 

never looked back, advancing toward the Balkans in the south 

and trapping Army Group North in the Courland Peninsula. They 

finished the war with steady advances in eastern and central 

Europe in the winter and spring of 1945. The Soviet flag, raised 

over the Reichstag Building in Berlin on 1 May 1945, symbolically 

ended the war. Though sporadic fighting continued for a few more 

days, Hitler was dead and the Third Reich conquered.

Historians and former German and Soviet commanders differ 

over which side possessed the strategic initiative following the 

battle of Stalingrad. Shirer’s judgment that it passed into Soviet 

hands for the duration of the war is correct. Manstein spoke of 

the Germans regaining the initiative in late February 1943, allowing him to conduct his famous counterattack at Kharkov that 

stabilized the southern front.155 Even Zhukov seemed to agree 

when he termed Kursk, not Stalingrad, as the “final assumption 

of initiative.”156 However, Manstein’s offensive at Kharkov only 

temporarily limited the depth of Soviet post-Stalingrad exploitation. Thus, its effect was operational, not strategic. Moreover, 

the German attack at Kursk resulted not from their possession 

of strategic initiative, but from a conscious decision by the Soviet 

high command to cede operational initiative temporarily in order 
THE RUSSO–GERMAN WAR, 1941–45

35

to set the stage for significant strategic gains. The Soviets were 

fully aware of German intentions; and a defensive engagement 

at Kursk was, after some debate, the battle they chose to fight. 

Thus, they had the strategic initiative all along. 

After Kursk, even Guderian admitted that the Soviets held 

the strategic initiative for the duration of the war.157 Alexander 

Werth went even further when he wrote Kursk ushered in the 

era of “victory salutes” and “the Russian command knew that 

by winning the Battle of Kursk Russia had, in effect won the 

war.”158 Yet they had to win at Kursk to retain the strategic initiative and had to work to keep it until final victory. Once again, 

relative advantages in resources, intelligence, strategic acumen, quality of intelligence, and operational and tactical methods explain why they were able to do so.

Figure 5. Operation Citadel (http://www.dean.usma.edu/departments/history/web03/atlases/ww2%20europe/ww2%20europe%20%20maps/

ww2%20map 27.jpg, accessed 16 April 2008).
THE RUSSO–GERMAN WAR, 1941–45

36

Resources

As the war marched toward its conclusion, the Soviet resource superiority became increasingly evident. Albert Seaton 

stated that by 1943 the armies were going in different directions as the Wehrmacht steadily degenerated and the Red Army 

and VVS steadily grew and improved.159 On 1 April 1943, 

2,732,000 Germans faced 5,792,000 Soviets,160 and by late 

1944, the disparity was even more pronounced with 1,790,000 

Germans standing against 6,400,000 Soviets.161 The manpower 

shortage forced the Germans to use Russian POWs as support 

troops in their rear areas.162

The Soviets enjoyed a clear superiority in manpower for the 

last phase of the war. Manstein lamented the diminished 

strength of his divisions and the growing frontage that each 

was responsible for covering in 1943.163 The force ratio at the 

battle of Kursk was 2.7 to 1, when 2,226,000 Soviets battled 

900,000 Germans.164 Operation Bagration pitted 2.4 million 

Red Army troops against 1.2 million from the Wehrmacht.

165

During the approach to Berlin, the Soviets did experience some 

manning problems; but they were not sufficiently serious to 

degrade combat effectiveness.166

The overall material situation told a similar tale. Bellamy 

noted that the Russians in 1943 had vast quantities of materiel 

of excellent quality, while the Germans had superb machines 

such as the Tiger and Panther tanks in limited numbers.167

Tank and artillery figures for 1 April 1943 confirmed the disparity, with 1,336 German machines facing 6,000 Soviet tanks 

and 6,360 German guns against 20,000 Soviet guns.168 By August 1944 German industry produced tanks and other armored 

fighting vehicles at a rate that would have been impressive earlier in the war, but the German output was never able overtake 

the Soviet lead.169 The VVS also expanded significantly with 

10,000 front-line aircraft in 1943, 13,500 in 1944, and 15,500 

in January 1945 while the Luftwaffe’s inventory steadily diminished.170 The continuing arrival of Allied assistance in Russia made matters even worse for the Germans, especially in 

transportation resources where 17,000 jeeps and 90,000 trucks 

played a key role in Soviet operations at Kursk.171
THE RUSSO–GERMAN WAR, 1941–45

37

This tremendous Soviet material advantage was manifest in 

every major battle; Kursk in 1943 pitted 1,800 German armored vehicles and 10,000 artillery pieces against 4,800 machines and 33,000 artillery pieces for the Soviets.172 In the air, 

2,000 German planes flew against 2,900 Soviet aircraft.173 In 

Bagration a year later, the Soviets employed 36,400 artillery 

pieces, 5,200 tanks, and 5,300 airplanes against 9,500, 900, 

and 1,350, respectively for the Germans.174 The material disparity between combatants was vastly greater in this phase 

than it had been in either of the first two phases. 

The shift in technology was also dramatic. The Germans 

made excellent gains in armored technology during this last 

stage of the war. The Panzer IVG was the most common German tank in use in 1943, equaling the T-34 variant at that 

time, while the Tiger tanks entered service with a marked superiority over Soviet designs.175 The excellent German Panther 

tank also entered service beginning in 1943; and, once it overcame its teething troubles, became arguably the best tank in 

the war.176 The Soviets did not remain idle, but improved in 

technical areas where the Germans previously reigned supreme. Soviet aircraft such as the Lavochkin La-5FN matched 

the performance of the German Focke-Wulf and Messerschmitt

fighters.177 More significantly, Russian wireless technology improved dramatically and contributed notably to the VVS success against the Luftwaffe.

178 Finally, the Soviet artillery became increasingly mechanized as the war continued.179

Overall, the Germans maintained a very slim technological 

edge. The Soviets managed to narrow, if not close, the gaps in 

the air and in wireless technology. But the Germans finally began producing tanks that could stand up to Soviet designs and 

at times dominate the battlefield. Nevertheless, the German 

advantage in this area was the slimmest it had been during the 

entire course of the war.

The total resource picture favored the Soviets. They were 

greatly superior in both manpower and materiel throughout 

this phase. The Russians were nearly equal to the Germans in 

the third area, technology. Given a clear superiority in the other 

two, the Soviets dominated the resource element and held this 

advantage until the end of the war.
THE RUSSO–GERMAN WAR, 1941–45

38

Quality of Intelligence

The Soviets also improved in intelligence, while the German 

information-gathering and analytical capability continued to 

decline. German strategic intelligence still suffered at the hands 

of Hitler, who refused to believe realistic assessments of Soviet 

capabilities until the very end, considering such estimates 

“completely idiotic” and disparaging those who produced 

them.180 Meanwhile, the Soviets improved their collection abilities and produced increasingly accurate estimates.181

These disparities were also manifest in combat. The Soviets 

were generally able to discern German strategic aims and combat capabilities during this final phase of the war. Before Kursk, 

the Soviets correctly predicted German objectives for the summer of 1943 and knew where and when the Germans were going to attack.182 The “Lucy” spy network based in Switzerland 

relayed the German intentions, routes of attack, order of battle, 

and even a three-day window during which the attack would 

begin.183 This strategic assessment directly “contributed to Soviet strategic success in the summer–fall campaign [of 1943].”184

The Soviets maintained this strategic intelligence advantage 

throughout 1944 and 1945.

Perception of reality nearer to the battlefield shifted as well. As 

the war continued, the deteriorating military situation inhibited 

the Germans’ ability to maintain an accurate picture. During 

1944, German capabilities began to decline in human and signals intelligence, and aerial reconnaissance.185 The Soviets, by 

contrast, improved in their signals intelligence in 1943, setting 

up “electronic warfare” units using lend–lease radios from the 

western Allies.186 Before Bagration, the Soviet intelligence agencies combined comprehensive information from aerial reconnaissance and photography with partisan observation and signals intelligence to form a clear picture of what lay ahead.187

The Soviet perception of reality was noticeably more accurate 

than that of the Germans. The Germans were occasionally able 

to anticipate Soviet operations, such as that around Kharkov 

and Belgorod after the battle of Kursk; but the Soviets were 

more consistently correct.188 Excellent intelligence enabled the 

VVS to launch preemptive air strikes against the Luftwaffe and 

destroy 500 planes before the battle of Kursk.189 General Ro-
THE RUSSO–GERMAN WAR, 1941–45

39

kossovsky utilized good intelligence to shell the German assault troops during their assembly on the morning of their 

scheduled attack.190 This Soviet advantage continued through 

the end of the war, with the Red Army detecting Hitler’s abortive Lake Balaton offensive in Hungary two weeks before its 

scheduled start in March 1945.191

The Soviets also made great gains in counterintelligence and 

operational security. While the Germans proved unable to 

shield their preparations around Kursk, the Russians advanced 

their skills in masking their formations and intentions.192 Soviet air superiority and improved radio discipline countered 

previous German strengths in aerial reconnaissance and signals intelligence.193 Over the course of the war, 150,000 Soviets 

agents deployed along the 2,400-mile front were able “to neutralize the majority of more than 40,000 German agents deployed against them.”194 These Soviet security methods made it 

increasingly difficult for the Germans to obtain an accurate 

picture of the Russian rear areas.195 In sum, in the many instances when Soviet tactical or operational surprise was 

achieved, it resulted from Soviet security more often than from 

German intelligence failure.196 The Germans, on the other 

hand, were no longer enjoying the same kinds of success.

The Soviets surged ahead of the Germans in the element of 

intelligence for the final portion of the conflict. Their perception 

of reality was much more acute, and they were moderately better in security and counterintelligence. These advantages produced a significant overall advantage on the intelligence front 

and represented a significant shift from the second phase.

Strategic Acumen

Strategic acumen followed the trend of the second phase as 

the Soviets continued to improve and the Germans steadily declined. Following Stalingrad, Field Marshal Erich von Manstein 

wanted Germany to assume the strategic defensive and wage a 

mobile war against the Red Army’s coming advances.197 Other 

German commanders, including Guderian and Walther Model, 

agreed and opposed the attack at Kursk in July 1943.198 Yet the 

Germans, despite Hitler’s hesitation, pressed ahead with the 

aims of shortening the front, restoring German prestige, and 
THE RUSSO–GERMAN WAR, 1941–45

40

buttressing shaky allies in Europe.199 The Soviets faced their 

own challenges after Stalingrad. As he had done after Moscow, 

Stalin forced the Red Army to reach for more, with terrible results suffered during Manstein’s March 1943 counterattack at 

Kharkov.200 Following that setback, Stalin was more receptive 

to his General Staff’s advice and acceded to Marshal Zhukov’s 

request to let the Germans strike first at Kursk.201 The German 

defeat at Kursk was largely the product of a correct estimate of 

the strength of the Soviets’ defense and an incorrect estimate of 

the strength of the offense by the Germans.

The Soviets also improved their relative advantage in strategic planning. The German’s did not match objectives with capabilities, particularly at Kursk. General von Mellenthin emphasized this fact claiming Kursk “had little to gain and 

probably a great deal to lose” and that “the German Army threw 

away all its advantages in mobile tactics, and met the Russians 

on ground of their own choosing.”202 The Soviets learned the 

lesson of Kharkov and conducted their later operations with 

detailed planning and realistic goals.203 The gradual maturation of the Stavka’s strategic planning, coupled with the steady 

deterioration of OKW/OKH’s grasp of reality, contributed significantly to the ultimate Soviet victory.

Significant shifts occurred in strategic surprise as well. Here, 

the Germans utterly failed. The attack at Kursk and the much 

smaller offensive near Lake Balaton in Hungary achieved no 

surprise whatsoever. The Soviets, however, were quite successful. The best example was Operation Bagration in June 1944 

(see figure 6). Here, Soviet maskirovka operations caused the 

Germans to divert 24 of Germany’s 30 panzer divisions to the 

south, away from Army Group Center, the true target of the attack.204 The operation resulted in the destruction of 30 Wehrmacht divisions and the death or capture of between 300,000 

and 350,000 German soldiers.205 The Soviets worked diligently 

for the remainder of the war to achieve strategic surprise despite the shortening front and the geographical convergence 

upon obvious military objectives.206

The gulf between Soviet and German strategic acumen during this third phase gave the Soviets an astounding advantage 

in the closing years of the war. To achieve their ends, the Soviets consistently prepared and executed plans that matched 
THE RUSSO–GERMAN WAR, 1941–45

41

their resources and capabilities; while the Germans did not. 

Soviet deception and surprise outshone German efforts and 

kept the Wehrmacht off balance for the duration of the war.

Operational and Tactical Methods 

The Soviets continued to improve in operational and tactical 

methods. The Germans still proved capable but became increasingly predictable. Manstein’s maneuvers in the south following Stalingrad were simply brilliant and demonstrated “unassailable superiority” over the enemy at that time.207 However, 

German methods at Kursk and later merely repeated the same 

techniques employed at the beginning of the war.208 When it 

could mass, “the Luftwaffe performed its tactical role almost 

flawlessly throughout the war, even under the most difficult 

Figure 6. Operation Bagration (http://www.dean.usma.edu/departments/

history/web03/atlases/ww2%20europe/ww2%20europe%20%20maps/ww 

2%20map30.jpg, accessed 16 April 2008).
THE RUSSO–GERMAN WAR, 1941–45

42

circumstances.”209 Yet Luftwaffe resources steadily diminished; 

and, as early as the summer of 1943, it proved unable to engage the VVS in its rear areas or to stem Soviet air support for 

its massive ground operations.210

Similarly, the German army was deteriorating. By the end of 

1943, German infantry divisions were “reduced by casualties 

to below the size of regiments; their training and performance, 

superior though it might have been to that of their Red Army 

counterparts, were hardly to be compared with that of the German infantry of 1941 and 1942.”211 Meanwhile, the Soviets 

steadily improved on the ground. By 1943, “Soviet doctrine, 

organization, and expectations were much closer to battlefield 

reality than were those of the senior German leadership.”212

Beginning with Kursk, the VVS showed remarkable improvement by using larger formations, which proved both easier to 

protect and more effective in attack.213

The comparison of operational and tactical methods in this 

stage of the war generates contentious debate among historians. Citino argues that even as victory became a foregone conclusion, the Allies struggled with German tactical and operational superiority based on “a more talented officer corps, more 

effective methods of command and control, and a better grasp 

of maneuver on the operational level.”214 David Glantz countered, “If the Red Army experienced its primary, secondary, and 

university education at the hands of the Wehrmacht 1941, 

1942, and 1943, it conducted war at the graduate level in level 

1944 and 1945.”215 But even Glantz stopped short of declaring 

the Red Army superior to the Wehrmacht. He faulted the Soviets for a lack of flexibility and initiative at and below the corps 

level and for continually conducting costly frontal assaults, 

problems he noted persisted until the end of the war.216 

Those who actively dispute German superiority find their 

best evidence from the middle of 1944 through 1945. John Erickson posited that in May 1943, Soviet evaluations of their 

troops’ superiority in quality and quantity, as well as the increased experience of Soviet command were essentially “right, 

if a little over-sanguine.”217 Albert Seaton characterized the 

Wehrmacht in 1944 as “a poorly equipped and obsolete army 

with little air and artillery support, crippled for a lack of vehicles and motor fuel” engaged against “powerful enemies.”218
THE RUSSO–GERMAN WAR, 1941–45

43

Shtemenko confidently asserted that, by November 1944, the 

Soviets were not only numerically superior to the enemy, but 

had “surpassed him in fighting skill and equipment.”219 General von Mellenthin also credited Soviet mechanized operations 

beginning in 1944 as “a highly mobile and keenly edged tool, 

handled by daring and capable commanders.220 When considering the entire phase, we must conclude neither side enjoyed 

an overall edge in operational and tactical methods.

Summary

The Soviets retained the strategic initiative throughout the 

final phase of the war, although the Germans attempted to 

wrest the initiative back at Kursk. During this period, the Soviets held a large advantage in resources, a moderate advantage 

in intelligence, and a significant edge in strategic acumen, while 

tactical and operational methods were a draw. The Soviet advantages worked together to keep strategic initiative in Russian 

hands until the war’s conclusion.

Analysis

Several questions arise from this examination. Why did strategic initiative pass from clear German control to being in dispute in December 1941? Why did it then pass decidedly into 

Soviet hands in February 1943? Finally, how did the four elements of resources, quality of intelligence, strategic acumen, 

and operational and tactical methods work together? Is there a 

hierarchy among the elements? If so, what is it?

The easy answer to the first two questions is that the Germans lost great battles at Moscow and Stalingrad. However, 

both sides won and lost many great battles throughout the 

course of the war. The four elements analyzed transcend individual battles. The relative advantage(s) each side enjoyed in 

these elements over the course of an entire phase has been established. The comparison of these factors near the end of one 

phase and the beginning of the next, where initiative shifted, 

may now prove to be even more revealing.

The transition between phase one and phase two in December 

1941 marked the transition from clear German initiative to a time of 
THE RUSSO–GERMAN WAR, 1941–45

44

disputed initiative. The Germans went from a period of modest resource advantage to a period of slight resource inferiority. The infusion of new manpower into the Red Army and the transfer of Siberian troops to the front in December 1941 began this trend, which 

was compounded by a lack of German reserves. In material terms, 

the Germans became inferior. Mounting losses and unpreparedness 

for winter made this problem acute. German technology still surpassed the Soviets, but the gap narrowed.

The Germans enjoyed a large advantage in intelligence at the 

beginning of the first phase; but the Soviets enjoyed a thin advantage at the very end of the phase. The battle for Moscow highlighted 

this swing when the Germans totally underestimated the situation, 

while the Soviets pieced together a relatively accurate picture of 

reality. At Moscow, there was no doubt this Soviet advantage contributed to the Red Army’s ability to dispute initiative. 

Strategic acumen also shifted from a large German advantage 

in the beginning of the first phase to a moderate Soviet edge at 

the beginning of the second. December 1941 encapsulated the 

trend. The initial Soviet counterattack before Moscow was well 

conceived, but went on to overstep its bounds. Had Stalin not 

insisted on a general offensive, the Soviets may have been better 

prepared to vie more effectively for initiative in the spring of 

1942. The strategic surprise the Soviets achieved before Moscow 

also contributed to the shift in strategic initiative.

Operational and tactical methods remained a German advantage in both phases. Yet in December 1941, the lack of winter preparation and exhaustion severely degraded German performance. The Soviet performance was uneven, between the 

highly experienced Siberian troops and the inexperienced conscripts rushed to the front. Despite a decent performance outside Moscow, it seems German steadfastness in operational 

and tactical methods may have been critical in containing the 

shift in strategic initiative. Instead of seizing the strategic initiative, the Soviets proved merely able to dispute it. 

The second transition at Stalingrad demands similar examination. The trend in resources continued as the balance shifted 

from a small Soviet advantage to a large one. Dramatic change 

occurred in both manpower and materiel, giving the Soviets a 

significant advantage in each. The Soviets also closed the gap 

in technology, leaving the Germans with only a slight advan-
THE RUSSO–GERMAN WAR, 1941–45

45

tage. The Soviet manpower and material advantage significantly 

influenced the outcome of the Stalingrad campaign.

Intelligence proved critical during this transition. Improved 

Soviet security enabled the concealed buildup of forces to counterattack in the south. The Germans recognized the Sixth Army’s 

exposure to this kind of strike but did not believe the Soviets had 

the resources to take advantage of the Wehrmacht’s overextension. The ensuing Soviet victory at Stalingrad in January 1943 

resulted in large part from this Russian intelligence superiority.

The Soviets earned their biggest advantage in any single element in the area of strategic acumen during the last phase of 

the war. The battle of Stalingrad, with its effective plan and its 

execution of deception and surprise, ended the second phase of 

the war and ushered in the third. 

The Soviets continued to close the gap in operational and tactical methods between phases two and three, but the Germans 

maintained a very slim overall edge at the transition point. Nevertheless, Soviet operational methods in the execution of Uranus 

proved sufficiently effective to realize their strategic aims. Furthermore, their tactical expertise in street fighting exceeded that 

of the Germans. The Red Army’s performance in these areas 

won the battle and shifted the strategic initiative to the Soviets. 

Following Stalingrad, the Soviets never relinquished it.

Analyzing the interplay of the four elements during these 

transition points and over the course of the war reveals some 

important considerations. German and Soviet advantages in 

the first and third phase, respectively, were ubiquitous and 

granted those nations supremacy in strategic initiative for that 

phase. Yet the transition to, experience during, and transition 

from the second phase is most informative in understanding 

how the initiative shifted in this conflict. 

The Soviets accumulated small advantages in resources and 

in intelligence, and a greater edge in strategic acumen at Moscow in December 1941. They closely contested initiative with 

these advantages. However, the Germans maintained a moderate operational and tactical method superiority that allowed 

them not to lose the initiative. Thus, strategic acumen appears 

to have been the critical element at Moscow, the first transition 

point, where the Soviets successfully disputed strategic initiative. Additionally, the Soviets held superiority in all three cat-
THE RUSSO–GERMAN WAR, 1941–45

46

egories throughout the second phase, but the Germans retained the strategic initiative until February 1943 because of 

their operational and tactical edge.

From a different angle, one can also see the importance of 

the first three elements in gaining strategic initiative. The Soviets rectified significant deficiencies in all three elements and 

challenged the overwhelming German initiative less than six 

months into the war. This was no small achievement given Citino’s previously noted evaluation of the Germans as “the class 

of the league” operationally and tactically at that time. 

Delving deeper, the advantage in intelligence for the Soviets 

was thin during the second phase. The advantages in resources 

and strategic acumen were moderate. The tightness of the contest for initiative during this phase indicates that Soviet advantages in resources, intelligence, and strategic acumen came close 

to overcoming the German tactical and operational advantages. 

The shift to the final phase demonstrates that operational 

and tactical prowess was not enough. The Soviets gained some 

minor tactical superiority but were still limited in their operational methods. At Stalingrad, however, their more pronounced 

advantages in resources, intelligence, and strategic acumen allowed them to seize the strategic initiative. German skill at the 

lower levels of war, though it did not match its abilities at the 

beginning of the conflict, was still formidable. Nevertheless, it 

was unable to overcome the other Soviet advantages and hold 

initiative at Stalingrad or wrest it back at Kursk.

Overall, the Germans used a multitude of advantages to seize 

initiative at the beginning of the war. They were barely able to keep 

from losing the strategic initiative in the disputed phase, during 

which their operational and tactical superiority proved critical. The 

Soviets were able to challenge the German hold on initiative through 

cumulative advantages in resources, intelligence, and especially 

strategic acumen. They were then able to expand these advantages 

and utilize those same three elements to wrest control of initiative 

from the Germans and hold it until the end of the war.

The relationships among factors are more subtle and open to 

interpretation. The Soviets steadily increased their resource 

advantage between the first and second transition points. They 

also greatly improved their intelligence capabilities for an advantage vis-à-vis their German foe. A combatant has a certain 
THE RUSSO–GERMAN WAR, 1941–45

47

amount of direct control over both these elements. The Soviets 

fully mobilized to increase their war-making capacity in resources and redoubled their efforts to collect, synthesize, and 

protect information, thereby increasing their knowledge.

Stalin and the Stavka utilized these advantages to full effect. 

The Soviets used better wisdom in the direction of their war effort during both these transitions and throughout the final 

phase of the war. Better war-making capacity and improved 

knowledge supported their efforts and, combined with strategic 

acumen, proved critical at both transition points. 

In turn, these advantages trickled down to the lower levels of 

war, particularly the operational level, though not necessarily 

the tactical. The Soviets remained at a disadvantage operationally and tactically at both transition points. Nevertheless, their 

performance improved and was significantly effective to allow 

them to dispute and then seize the initiative from the Germans. 

Wisdom in force employment allowed steady improvement in 

operational and tactical execution, or war-making technique.

This analysis shows a clear hierarchy for each element as it 

relates to strategic initiative in the Russo–German War of 1941–

45. Strategic acumen, or wisdom, was the most important element. The side that better matched plans and capabilities, and 

exploited opportunities enjoyed a marked advantage in the 

competition for strategic initiative. Intelligence was the second 

most important element because it enabled wisdom in execution and thereby improved operational performance. Next in 

line were resources, obviously critical to war. Resource superiority for the Soviets played a key role at both transition points. 

The resource element also contributed indirectly by increasingly enhancing Soviet capabilities and steadily diminishing 

German operational flexibility. Operational and tactical methods placed fourth, although the first transition point and the 

entire second phase illustrate how a significant advantage in 

this element may greatly influence possession of the strategic 

initiative. This rank order of elements refutes many postwar 

German accounts, which lay the blame for failure almost solely 

on the overwhelming mass of the Red Army. The hierarchy of 

elements determining shifts in strategic initiative during the 

Russo–German War of 1941–45 included strategic acumen, fol-
THE RUSSO–GERMAN WAR, 1941–45

48

lowed by quality of intelligence, resources, and finally operational and tactical methods.

Drawing far-reaching conclusions from one example of modern conventional war is a risky undertaking. Another analysis is 

required to determine if there are any consistent findings of predictive and planning value. The Pacific War of 1941–45 between 

Japan and the United States provides another appropriate case 

for studying strategic initiative in a modern conventional war.

Notes

1. Stolfi, Hitler’s Panzers East, x.

2. Megargee, Inside Hitler’s High Command, 5.

3. Ibid., 61.

4. Bellamy, Absolute War, 127.

5. Megargee, Inside Hitler’s High Command, 61. In 1938, Gen Werner von 

Blomberg was forced to resign as minister of defense because of the lowerclass roots of his wife. Hitler then refused to accept the appointment of Gen 

Werner von Fritsch, army commander in chief, to Blomberg’s vacated post. 

Fritsch was falsely accused of homosexual activities and disgraced. Hitler 

seized the opportunity to appoint himself chief of the Oberkommando der 

Wehrmacht. 

6. Ibid., 167.

7. Clark, Barbarossa, 11–13.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid., 32.

10. Ibid. 

11. Ibid., Narodnyy Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del (NKVD)/People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs.

12. Erickson, Soviet High Command, 555–57.

13. Ibid., 667.

14. Clark, Barbarossa, 40.

15. Erickson, Soviet High Command, 626.

16. Ibid., 659.

17. Ibid., 667.

18. Erickson, Road to Stalingrad, 98.

19. Bartov, Hitler’s Army, 14–15. Bartov’s estimate of German forces is 

slightly higher than Erickson’s: 3.6 million.

20. Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed, 74. By 2 August 1941, losses 

were 179,500 while replacements amounted to only 47,000.

21. Bellamy, Absolute War, 275.

22. Ibid., 278–79.

23. Seaton, Russo–German War, 89.

24. Clark, Barbarossa, 43.

25. Bartov, Hitler’s Army, 14.
THE RUSSO–GERMAN WAR, 1941–45

49

26. Bellamy, Absolute War, 169.

27. Boyne, Clash of Wings, 143.

28. Pleshakov, Stalin’s Folly, 62.

29. Seaton, Russo–German War, 93.

30. Shtemenko, Soviet General Staff at War, 27.

31. Bellamy, Absolute War, 176.

32. Halder, Burdick, and Jacobsen, Halder War Diary, 494.

33. Raus and Newton, Panzer Operations, 72.

34. Bellamy, Absolute War, 18.

35. Pleshakov, Stalin’s Folly, 64.

36. Muller, German Air War in Russia, 42–43.

37. Citino, Death of the Wehrmacht, 41.

38. Keitel and Görlitz, Memoirs of Field-Marshal Keitel, 124.

39. Citino, Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm, 27.

40. Guderian, Panzer Leader, 233.

41. Shtemenko, Soviet General Staff at War, 27.

42. Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed, 36.

43. Bellamy, Absolute War, 151.

44. Liddell Hart, German Generals Talk, 179.

45. Overy, Air War, 49.

46. Hitler, Mein Kampf, 660–61.

47. Keegan, Second World War, 174.

48. Fugate and Dvoretsky, Thunder on the Dnepr, 59–60.

49. Erickson and Dilks, eds., Barbarossa: The Axis and the Allies, 126. Stepan A. Mikoyan “Chapter 6: Barbarossa and the Soviet Leadership.” Stalin’s 

almost pathological distrust of the West in general, and Great Britain in particular, led him to disregard their repeated warnings of the impending attack. 

He further discredited any sources that seemed to validate those warnings. He 

feared being induced into a proxy war for the benefit of the Western powers. 

50. Bellamy, Absolute War, 161.

51. Ibid., 175.

52. Glantz, Soviet Military Deception, 28–29.

53. Halder, Burdick, and Jacobsen, Halder War Diary, 446.

54. Glantz, Role of Intelligence, 32.

55. Ibid.

56. Rokossovsky, A Soldier’s Duty, 20.

57. Adair, Hitler’s Greatest Defeat, 56.

58. Glantz, Role of Intelligence, 15.

59. Bellamy, Absolute War, 324.

60. Nagorski, Greatest Battle, 243.

61. Stolfi, Hitler’s Panzers East, 37.

62. Bellamy, Absolute War, 168.

63. Guderian, Panzer Leader, 142.

64. Manstein, Lost Victories, 175.

65. Citino, Death of the Wehrmacht, 33.

66. Nagorski, Greatest Battle, 103.

67. Bellamy, Absolute War, 144.
THE RUSSO–GERMAN WAR, 1941–45

50

68. Fugate and Dvoretsky, Thunder on the Dnepr, 133.

69. Pleshakov, Stalin’s Folly, 67.

70. Zhukov and Salisbury, Marshal Zhukov’s Greatest Battles, 66–67.

71. Bellamy, Absolute War, 220.

72. Ibid., 143.

73. Glantz, Soviet Military Deception, 3.

74. Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed, 49.

75. Ibid., 51.

76. Pleshakov, Stalin’s Folly, 9.

77. Citino, Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm, 5.

78. Halder, Burdick, and Jacobsen, Halder War Diary, 403.

79. Simpkin and Erickson, Deep Battle, 51. Simpkin notes that Tukhachevskii and his “elite colleagues from the Tsarist army” considered Auftragstaktik essential to deep battle, but refrained from emphasizing the point because of the nature of Soviet communism and its belief in centralized control.

80. Raus and Newton, Panzer Operations, 7.

81. Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed, 193.

82. Stolfi, Hitler’s Panzers East, 154–55.

83. Luck, Panzer Commander, 66.

84. Bellamy, Absolute War, 193.

85. Ibid., 205.

86. Shtemenko, Soviet General Staff, 31.

87. Keitel and Görlitz, Memoirs of Field-Marshal Keitel, 168.

88. Glantz, Kharkov 1942, 21.

89. Glantz, Role of Intelligence, 45.

90. Glantz, Zhukov’s Greatest Defeat, 2.

91. Shirer, Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, 933.

92. Keitel and Görlitz, Memoirs of Field-Marshal Keitel, 168–69.

93. Bellamy, Absolute War, 278–79.

94. Glantz, Kharkov 1942, 246.

95. Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed, 87.

96. Citino, Death of the Wehrmacht, 94.

97. Ibid., 152.

98. Zhukov and Salisbury, Marshal Zhukov’s Greatest Battles, 183.

99. Erickson and Dilks, eds., Barbarossa, 217. Chapter by Reinhardt.

100. Boyne, Clash of Wings, 161.

101. Ibid., 151.

102. Luck, Panzer Commander, 79.

103. Seaton, Russo–German War, 199.

104. Bellamy, Absolute War, 331.

105. Ibid., 440.

106. Glantz, Kharkov 1942, 104.

107. Overy, Air War, 50.

108. Citino, Death of the Wehrmacht, 157–58.

109. Boyne, Clash of Wings, 153.

110. Citino, Death of the Wehrmacht, 153.

111. Overy, Air War, 54–55.
THE RUSSO–GERMAN WAR, 1941–45

51

112. Bellamy, Absolute War, 444.

113. Boyne, Clash of Wings, 153.

114. Overy, Air War, 55.

115. Bellamy, Absolute War, 324.

116. Liddell Hart, German Generals Talk, 195.

117. Citino, Death of the Wehrmacht, 153.

118. Nagorski, Greatest Battle, 243. 

119. Bellamy, Absolute War, 449.

120. Clark, Barbarossa, 151.

121. Goebbels and Lochner, Goebbels Diaries, 319.

122. Glantz, Role of Intelligence, 46.

123. Ibid., 36.

124. Bellamy, Absolute War, 531.

125. Zhukov and Salisbury, Marshal Zhukov’s Greatest Battles, 93.

126. Halder, Burdick, and Jacobsen, Halder War Diary, 612.

127. Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, 248.

128. Bellamy, Absolute War, 447.

129. Mellenthin, Panzer Battles, 93.

130. Bellamy, Absolute War, 450.

131. Nagorski, Greatest Battle, 266.

132. Zhukov and Salisbury, Marshal Zhukov’s Greatest Battles, 93.

133. Bellamy, Absolute War, 543.

134. Citino, Death of the Wehrmacht, 181.

135. Bellamy, Absolute War, 527.

136. Citino, Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm, 67.

137. Glantz, Role of Intelligence, 42.

138. Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed, 132–33.

139. Adair, Hitler’s Greatest Defeat, 57–58.

140. Bellamy, Absolute War, 317.

141. Citino, Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm, 85.

142. Ibid., 90.

143. Ibid., 158–59.

144. Bellamy, Absolute War, 515.

145. Glantz, Kharkov 1942, 103.

146. Citino, Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm, 91.

147. Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, 9.

148. Boyne, Clash of Wings, 155.

149. Chuikov, Battle for Stalingrad, 160.

150. Manstein, Lost Victories, 440.

151. Bellamy, Absolute War, 457.

152. Chuikov, Battle for Stalingrad, 40.

153. Bellamy, Absolute War, 515.

154. Mellenthin, Panzer Battles, 237.

155. Manstein, Lost Victories, 431.

156. Zhukov and Salisbury, Marshal Zhukov’s Greatest Battles, 203.

157. Guderian, Panzer Leader, 312.

158. Werth, Russia at War, 685.
THE RUSSO–GERMAN WAR, 1941–45

52

159. Seaton, Russo–German War, 352.

160. Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed, 151.

161. Bellamy, Absolute War, 635.

162. Keitel and Görlitz, Memoirs of Field-Marshal Keitel, 170.

163. Manstein, Lost Victories, 473.

164. Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed, 165.

165. Bellamy, Absolute War, 613.

166. Shtemenko, Soviet General Staff at War, 310.

167. Bellamy, Absolute War, 565.

168. Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed, 151.

169. Clark, Barbarossa, 396.

170. Overy, Air War, 57.

171. Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, 37.

172. Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed, 165.

173. Boyne, Clash of Wings, 162.

174. Bellamy, Absolute War, 613.

175. Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, 17–18.

176. Ibid., 19.

177. Ibid., 39.

178. Boyne, Clash of Wings, 164.

179. Zhukov and Salisbury, Marshal Zhukov’s Greatest Battles, 217.

180. Guderian, Panzer Leader, 387.

181. Glantz, Role of Intelligence, 91.

182. Bellamy, Absolute War, 562.

183. Ibid., 570–71.

184. Glantz, Role of Intelligence, 91.

185. Glantz, Soviet Military Deception, 470.

186. Bellamy, Absolute War, 571.

187. Glantz, Role of Intelligence, 157–60.

188. Bellamy, Absolute War, 591.

189. Ibid., 570.

190. Rokossovsky, Soldier’s Duty, 195.

191. Glantz, Role of Intelligence, 178.

192. Shtemenko, Soviet General Staff at War, 152.

193. Adair, Hitler’s Greatest Defeat, 63.

194. Bellamy, Absolute War, 30.

195. Glantz, Soviet Military Deception, 291.

196. Glantz, Role of Intelligence, 137.

197. Manstein, Lost Victories, 443.

198. Guderian, Panzer Leader, 306.

199. Bellamy, Absolute War, 563.

200. Erickson, Road to Berlin, 44.

201. Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, 29–30.

202. Mellenthin, Panzer Battles, 264.

203. Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, 265–66.

204. Bellamy, Absolute War, 612.

205. Adair, Hitler’s Greatest Defeat, 171.
THE RUSSO–GERMAN WAR, 1941–45

53

206. Glantz, Soviet Military Deception, 555.

207. Clark, Barbarossa, 306.

208. Ibid., 329–30.

209. Boyne, Clash of Wings, 165.

210. Overy, Air War, 57.

211. Seaton, Russo–German War, 458.

212. Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, 269.

213. Bellamy, Absolute War, 581.

214. Citino, Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm, 6.

215. Glantz, Colossus Reborn, 122.

216. Ibid., 122–24.

217. Erickson, Road to Berlin, 85.

218. Seaton, Russo–German War, 526.

219. Shtemenko, Soviet General Staff at War, 300.

220. Mellenthin, Panzer Battles, 361.

55

Chapter 3

The Pacific War, 1941–45

The epic conflict between Japan and the United States from 

1941 until 1945 provides a source of evidence for dissection of 

strategic initiative in a maritime theater. Japan seized initiative 

at the outbreak of hostilities and ran unhindered during the 

war’s opening months. After the June 1942 Battle of Midway, 

which checked the Japanese advance in the Central Pacific, the 

United States was able to dispute initiative. With the ensuing 

campaigns at Guadalcanal, from August 1942 until February 

1943, and New Guinea, from July 1942 until January 1943, 

the United States and its allies wrested strategic initiative from 

Japan. From early 1943 on, the United States determined the 

pace and the direction of the war. As with Germany and Russia, the transition points between phases will probably offer the 

greatest illumination about the underlying causes of shifts in 

strategic initiative. 

Phase 1 Overview:

7 December 1941–4 June 1942

The Japanese war aims included attaining primacy in their 

chosen sphere of influence in Asia, defeating the western nations (including eventually Russia), subduing China and incorporating it into their empire, and creating Japan’s Asian “CoProsperity Sphere.”1 Japanese adventurism in China and 

Manchuria during the late 1930s and early 1940s seriously 

complicated relations with the United States, which cut off oil 

supplies to Japan in 1941.2 Obtaining unfettered access to critical resources, and oil in particular, became paramount concerns 

for the ensuing Japanese strategy.3 The Japanese army had always favored a move against Russia. However, the drubbing Soviet forces inflicted on the Japanese in the Nomonahan campaign in 1939, the collapse of France and the Netherlands at the 

hands of Germany in 1940, and the oil crisis of 1941 forced a 
THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–45

56

reevaluation, out of which came a focus on the South Pacific.4

This focus inexorably led to war with the United States.

The Pacific war possessed its own, particular character. Geography dictated an expansive maritime war. The Pacific 

reaches also meant that, unlike the Russo–German War, “the 

numbers of troops actually engaged in fighting on either side at 

any moment were relatively small, but the length of the supply 

lines for both sides was unprecedented.”5 These geographic 

factors combined with the increased capabilities of airpower to 

shape the war’s character in another way. In the words of historian James Wood, “From beginning to end, fighting in the 

Pacific had been as much or more a struggle for the skies as 

the seas, and indeed the latter was quite dependent on the former.”6 One aspect the war shared with the Russo–German War 

was an overtone of racism, from both belligerents. John Dower 

opined “stereotyped and often blatantly racist thinking contributed to poor military intelligence and planning, atrocious behavior, and the adoption of exterminationist policies.”7

The belligerents approached and fought the war with significantly different high command organizations. The Japanese 

government was, in essence, military. Emperor Hirohito was 

the nominal head and chief executive of a government that included coequal legislative, judicial, army, and navy branches; 

but he rarely interfered in daily policy.8

In October 1941, the army refused to countenance withdrawal from China to assure peace with America and exercised 

its right, granted in 1936, to dissolve any cabinet not to its liking.9 On 18 October 1941, Gen Hideki Tojo assumed the post of 

prime minister (PM) with a new cabinet, effectively securing 

army control over the government.10 It is one of the great ironies of World War II that the Imperial Japanese Army, purveyor 

of a ‘northern’ strategy directed at Russia, assumed control of 

the government and persuaded a reluctant Imperial Japanese 

Navy to implement its long-desired ‘southern’ strategy against 

the United States for resources.11

The Imperial General Headquarters (IGHQ) with which Japan 

went to war was a house divided, albeit with an edge for the army 

given its control of the government. The IGHQ, first established in 

1937, included the Ministers of War and Navy and the chiefs of staff 

for both services; it met twice weekly on the Imperial grounds.12
THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–45

57

On matters of grand strategy, the IGHQ met with the government 

at liaison conferences, which included the PM and other cabinet 

officials, and received a stamp of approval from the emperor.13

The IGHQ was not a joint command but an organization where 

the army and navy attempted to secure each other’s cooperation 

and coordination in operations.14 Adm Isoroku Yamamoto, the 

commander of Japan’s Combined Fleet and conceptualizer of the 

Pearl Harbor attack, personified the army-navy rivalry by often 

voicing open disdain for the army in his casual conversations.15

The animosity was mutual and did not bode well for interservice 

relations during the conduct of the war.

The US high command operated quite differently due to a much 

more pronounced degree of civilian control over the services. At 

first glance, the structure appears similar to that in place today, 

with the president as the commander in chief, exercising control 

over the Army and Navy respectively through his appointed secretaries for each branch. But, the chiefs of staff for each branch 

enjoyed more direct command over fielded forces than their modern counterparts have enjoyed since the National Security Act of 

1947 and, especially since, the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986.

Although interservice strains were at times very pronounced, 

the American Joint Chiefs of Staff proved more mutually cooperative than their Japanese counterparts. The command structure 

for the United States in the Pacific, established in the spring of 

1942, placed Gen Douglas MacArthur in command of the Southwest Pacific Area and Adm Chester Nimitz in command of the remainder of the Pacific, with each answering to his respective service chief in Washington.16 The boundaries between their areas 

shifted on occasion. This divided command was an imperfect solution. Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, though reluctant to 

enter the fray, lamented the problems it caused.17 Despite these 

undeniable tensions, the services were ultimately able to cooperate sufficiently well to prosecute the war effectively.

Phase 1 Operations: 

7 December 1941–4 June 1942

The commencement of hostilities on 7 December 1941 was 

not accidental. Masuo Kato wrote, “Japan’s decision to attack 
THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–45

58

[finalized in November 1941] . . . was essentially a now or never 

decision. It was almost wholly an Army decision, and it represented the Army’s best judgment as to the precise time at which 

the greatest opportunity for success might be expected.”18 Following the devastating attack on Pearl Harbor, Japanese forces 

ran up a rapid and continuous string of victories (see figure 7). 

The islands of Guam and Wake fell to Japan within two weeks of 

Pearl Harbor.19 The surrender of Singapore on 15 February 1942, 

which represented the end of the Malayan campaign, was arguably “the greatest military defeat in all British history” and produced the humiliating capitulation of 138,708 Allied service personnel.20 Similarly, the 9 April 1942 surrender of 12,000 soldiers 

and 64,000 Filipino troops on Bataan represented what one historian called “the finale of the greatest military defeat ever inflicted on the United States in the field.”21 The advance in the 

Figure 7. Japanese Southern Offensive, December 1941–January 1942 

(http://www.dean.usma.edu/departments/history/web03/atlases/

ww2%20pacific/ww2%20pacific%20%20maps/ww2%20asia%20map 

%2006.jpg, accessed 16 April 2008).
THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–45

59

south continued into Borneo and Java; and by mid-April 1942, 

Japan had secured its “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.”22

Japanese advances continued unabated until 8 May 1942 when 

their first significant check at the Battle of the Coral Sea resulted 

in a temporary abandonment of their effort to occupy Port Moresby, 

New Guinea.23 This first phase ended with the Battle of Midway 

on 4 June 1942.

Resources

The Japanese began the war with a large army. In 1941, Japan had 51 divisions, many in China or Manchuria, outside the 

scope of this study.24 Yet when considering manpower, one must 

remember the geography of the Pacific meant the ability to get 

forces into the fight proved paramount and generally resulted in 

smaller engagements than in the European theater. Paper 

strength was often misleading and Japan initiated portions of its 

early offensive from a position of numerical inferiority. 

On 8 December 1941, General MacArthur commanded 130,000 

troops in the Philippines Islands, of which about 35,000 were 

US regulars or highly trained Filipino Scouts, while the rest were 

of uneven quality.25 The Japanese employed half that strength 

in their invasion and conquest of the archipelago.26 The Malayan 

campaign was similar, with 55,000 Japanese defeating nearly 

140,000 commonwealth-soldiers.27 In terms of pilots, Japan began the war with approximately 6,000 superbly trained flyers in 

both services, which was just enough to cover their immediate 

needs but not enough for a long war.28 The United States boasted 

3,500 regular and 6,000 reservist pilots in the Navy alone, all 

well trained, and employed a training system more suited to a 

war of attrition.29

The United States and the Allies enjoyed a slight edge in 

manpower numbers during the first phase of the war. Nevertheless, the Japanese pressed forward confidently and successfully. Their pilot strength proved adequate for their immediate plans, and the unflinching discipline of their soldiers 

made up for some of the numerical deficit. Other aspects of 

their resource base also assisted in their conquests.

The material competition in the Pacific centered primarily on 

warships and airplanes. Japan started out strong in each. Both 
THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–45

60

nations began naval preparations for war in the late 1930s, 

with the United States implementing the Vinson naval expansion program and the Japanese the Marusan program.30 In 

1941, Admirals Husband Kimmel and William Halsey knew the 

Japanese navy was superior to the US Navy in nearly every 

category of fighting ship.31 Most importantly, the Japanese 

bested the Americans in aircraft carriers, 10 to three.32 The 

naval situation worsened for the Allies as the first phase progressed because losses inflicted on their navies exceeded those 

of the Japanese.33

The tally of airplanes in the Pacific theater also favored Japan. Japanese aircraft numbered 2,140 to the Allies’ 1,780.34

Here again, the paper strength does not tell the full story. Gen 

Lewis Brereton, who took charge of the US Far East Air Force 

in the Philippines on the eve of war in 1941, lamented the 

dearth of air resources that prohibited adequate security for 

both the United States and its forward bases.35 There simply 

were not enough to go around.

The twin advantages in naval and air superiority gave Japan 

a significant edge in materiel during the first phase of the war. 

The ensuing combat operations in the winter and spring of 

1942 actually increased the Japanese advantage with disproportionate damage inflicted on the United States and its allies. 

One aspect of the material struggle that did not bode well for 

the Japanese was evident from the beginning but would not 

manifest itself until later in the conflict. Japan had a propensity to overlook logistics, often expecting thousands of their 

troops to acquire local sustenance to maintain combat efficiency.36 Haruko and Theodore Cook wrote, “It was in this logistics war that Japan’s war machine was exposed for the hollow shell it was.”37 The brevity of the first phase, however, failed 

to expose this Achilles heel. 

 The technological battle raged in the air, on land, and on 

and below the sea. Initially, Japanese airplanes, particularly 

their Zero fighter, proved superior to Allied aircraft. John 

Keegan wrote, “The Zero had established itself as the finest 

embarked fighter in any navy; the Kate and Val torpedo- and 

dive-bombers, though slower than their American counterparts, carried heavy loads over long ranges.”38 In fact, the Zero 

had remarkable range for a single-engine aircraft, flying 1,000–
THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–45

61

1,200 miles on one tank of gas, a feat well beyond the capabilities of America’s planes.39 Eric Bergerud highlighted a significant Japanese advantage when he noted that smaller Japanese 

aircraft averaged a 250–350 mile combat radius to the Americans’ 150–250 mile ring.40 The one advantage the United States 

did enjoy in the air came in the form of B-17 heavy bombers, 

which greatly impressed the leading Japanese ace Saburo 

Sakai but were initially available in only limited numbers.41

The Japanese army’s technology lagged behind the West in 

general, but not necessarily behind the forces they faced during 

their initial onslaught. The Japanese army began the war, and 

remained throughout, an infantry army that relied on horses, 

remained weak in armored technology and countermeasures, 

and relied on obsolescent small arms and artillery.42

On the sea, Japan successfully designed its ships to counter 

expected US quantitative superiority through individual qualitative superiority in firepower and speed.43 The Japanese also led 

the way in optical equipment required for night fighting.44 The 

United States did enjoy an advantage in radar technology but 

struggled in its attempts to employ radar effectively.45 Under the 

sea, Japan had a weapon that proved critical the first two phases 

of the war. The oxygen-fueled Japanese ‘Long Lance’ torpedo 

combined a powerful warhead with exceptional range and speed, 

as well as being virtually undetectable deriving from its lack of a 

wake.46 By comparison, American torpedoes performed miserably, often failing to hit their target or to detonate because of 

“multiple hidden mechanical flaws.”47 This torpedo disparity had 

serious ramifications during the first two phases of the conflict.

The technological edge at the beginning of the war clearly fell 

to Japan, which generally enjoyed superior aircraft, superior 

warships, and unmatched torpedoes. America did have an edge 

in heavy bombers, in land force technology in general, and in 

radar; but these capabilities were not yet available in sufficiently large numbers. 

Despite its propensity to underestimate the importance of logistical support, Japan still outperformed the Allies. The Japanese effectively employed their combat forces with enough support to achieve their aims. The United States and its allies fought 

with what they had where they had it. They were, with some minor exceptions, unable to reinforce or resupply their garrisons.
THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–45

Thus, Japan held the overall resource advantage in the first 

phase. Despite a slight disadvantage in manpower, Japan’s 

substantial superiority in materiel and in technology carried 

the day. 

Quality of Intelligence 

There was keen intelligence competition throughout the 

opening phase. Initially, both sides underestimated the other’s 

war-making potential and capabilities. The Japanese, seemingly drawing conclusions from Germany’s successes against 

the west, performed a “shoddy analysis” of US war potential 

and denigrated the abilities of British Commonwealth forces.48

In turn, racial views colored the American thinking and estimate of the situation: “Before December 1941 the Americans 

had dismissed the [Japanese] carrier force as an inferior imitation of its own.”49 Not all military men were so blinded. Most of 

Japan’s high-ranking naval officers, Admiral Yamamoto in particular, were able “to make an accurate evaluation of the fleet 

capabilities of the United States.”50

During the initial phase, Japanese intelligence was respectable. Those planning the Pearl Harbor operation received highly 

accurate reports from spies in Hawaii.51 An effective espionage 

program also supported the invasion of the Philippines.52 Japanese signals intelligence, while it could not pinpoint US operations and ship locations, was able to keep tabs on general American naval activities such as the departure of a fleet that seemed 

headed for the Battle of the Coral Sea in May 1942.53 US signals 

intelligence was excellent. Unknown to the Japanese, the Americans were deciphering their secure codes even before the war. 

Winston Groom referred to this breakthrough, known as “Magic,” 

as “one of the greatest success stories of World War II.”54

Nevertheless, the Pearl Harbor attack succeeded because of 

American intelligence failures and too much American focus on 

the Philippines.55 Following Pearl Harbor, intelligence garnered 

from Magic often told Admiral Nimitz “what to expect and where 

to expect it.”56 In the field, things were spotty for the Americans. For example, the Far East Air Force (FEAF) commander 

bemoaned the inadequate intelligence he had on Japanese airfields on nearby Formosa.57

62
THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–45

63

Collection and analysis of intelligence favored the Japanese 

slightly in this stage of the war. Japan generally assembled a 

more accurate picture of the situation closer to the front. American racial attitudes hampered their appreciation in the short 

term. The American breakthrough with Magic was monumental, but its real contribution was not until Coral Sea and after.

Both combatants paid close attention to security and counterintelligence. Japan guarded the Pearl Harbor operation closely. 

The fleet maintained strict radio security; the strike force itself 

maintained radio silence, and orders relating to the attack were 

typically delivered via courier.58 The obvious success of the strike 

indicates effective security measures. On the other hand, the US 

ability to read their codes as well as FEAF’s recognition of trial 

flights between Formosa and the Philippines represent significant Japanese security failures.59

Similarly, US efforts at security were mixed. Safeguarding Magic 

was a problem that persisted throughout the war: “A continuous 

headache for Allied codebreakers was the problem of safeguarding the intelligence they obtained through cryptanalysis—above 

all, safeguarding the fact that the Japanese codes were being 

read.”60 They did this successfully. The Americans failed, however, 

to deny the Japanese valuable photographs of target locations, 

such as Clark Field in the Philippines, much to the delight of 

Sakai and his pilot friends.61 In April 1942, American radio emissions also gave Admiral Yamamoto an imperfect warning that 

something was afoot, resulting in heightened alert around Japan 

at the time of the Doolittle Raid.62 Nevertheless, the raid caught 

Japan unprepared.

Thus, the area of intelligence security was even. Both sides 

were able to protect their most vital secrets and operations and 

shield them effectively enough from enemy view. Yet both sides 

also suffered some smaller setbacks at lower levels that could 

have altered the course of the war at the margins.

During the opening of the war, the Japanese thus edged out 

the United States in intelligence. The Japanese had a better 

feel for the actual situation near the battlefield and they provided enough security to protect their initial moves. The United 

States understood the long-term situation better than Japan, 

but displayed weaknesses in the near-term fight. Roberta Wohlstetter summed up the American intelligence failure at Pearl 
THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–45

64

Harbor perfectly: “If our intelligence system and all our other 

channels of information failed to produce an accurate image of 

Japanese intentions and capabilities, it was not for want of relevant materials. Never before have we had so complete an intelligence picture of the enemy.”63

However, there was a huge gap between American understanding of Japanese capabilities and their grasp of Japanese 

intentions. The intelligence failure at Pearl Harbor was complete and resulted in the destruction or damage to all eight US 

battleships present plus three destroyers crippled, three cruisers damaged, 188 planes destroyed and 159 damaged, to Japanese losses of 29 airplanes, five midget submarines, and one 

large submarine.64 Thus, the Americans did start the conflict 

with an incredible intelligence breakthrough in the form of 

Magic, but most of its fruit ripened in phases two and three.

Strategic Acumen

The rapid, successful execution of Japan’s strategy in the 

opening phase of the war totally neutralized American strategic 

plans. Japan’s strategy for the entire war consisted of three 

stages: a rapid conquest of the resource-rich south, “consolidation and strengthening of the perimeter thus gained,” and then 

holding the gains and repelling Allied incursions until the enemy tired of war.65 Japan’s vision for the first stage corresponds 

closely with what actually transpired, which included three 

stages that ended with the occupation of Thailand, Malaya, the 

Philippines, Borneo, Java, and stabilization in Burma.66 Japan 

estimated that it would require five months to achieve these 

aims.67 It took four. Admiral Yamamoto recognized the threat 

the US Navy posed to the flank of this advance and overcame 

Navy General Staff resistance to the Pearl Harbor attack.68 

America based its prewar strategy for the Pacific on War Plan 

Orange, but it had been significantly altered. The original conception assumed that the Philippines could not resist Japanese 

pressure, and envisioned an immediate naval offensive to recapture the islands.69 At General MacArthur’s insistence in 

1941, the plan was changed to reinforce and hold the Philippines based on the assumption that war would not occur until 

1942, and the Navy would be able to keep sea lanes to the is64
THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–45

65

lands open.70 Historian Dan Van der Vat termed this conception a “delusion”; and in the wake of the Pearl Harbor attack, 

the United States proved unable to implement it.71

While the Japanese proceeded generally according to plan, they 

did miss two critical strategic opportunities. First, Adm Chuichi 

Nagumo retired the strike force quickly from the Pearl Harbor 

raid, thereby forgoing a chance to destroy critical fuel supplies 

and installations on Oahu and force the US Navy to withdraw to 

California.72 Japan also missed a significant opportunity by failing to wage unrestricted submarine warfare against very vulnerable and limited Allied shipping throughout the Pacific theater.73

The US Navy was not similarly negligent. Within six hours of the 

Pearl Harbor attack, it had declared its intention to wage unrestricted submarine warfare against the Empire of Japan.74 Although seizure of this opportunity yielded few immediate results, 

the payoff in later stages of the war was enormous.

The accuracy of each nation’s planning is self-evident. Japan 

clearly got it generally right, while the United States and its allies failed. In their rapid conquest, the Japanese proved prescient. As one historian recently noted, “Proof that the calculations of risk on which the proposed operations were based were 

correct and that the right moment to strike had been chosen 

lay, of course, in the achievements of the Japanese military in 

the first months of the war.”75 Though Japan missed two critical opportunities and the United States seized the only one 

presented, the edge remained with Japan.

Surprise played a central role in this phase and the Japanese consistently achieved surprise. Though aware that war 

was in the offing, the Allies were unable to respond effectively 

to Japan’s opening moves. The Japanese used deception well, 

assisted by American intelligence failures. In late November 

and early December 1941, the Japanese created false radio 

traffic that duped the US Navy into estimating the location of 

Japanese carriers as Japan’s Inland Sea, rather than their actual location en route to Hawaii.76 The Japanese surprises, 

however, did not stop there. Hours later, they caught American 

air forces in the Philippines unaware and, with “the most accurate bombing I [Saburo Sakai] ever witnessed,” halved the 

FEAF in one devastating attack.77 The United States did achieve 

one notable surprise in the opening phase—with the Doolittle 
THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–45

66

bombing raid on Japan in April 1942. Although Yamamoto 

knew something was in the works and the damage inflicted was 

inconsequential, this early strike on the Japanese home islands 

had major strategic consequences.78

Despite the shock of the Doolittle Raid, Japan was superior 

in conceiving and executing deception and surprise. The victories at Pearl Harbor and the Philippines achieved immediate 

results that enabled strategic gain in the Pacific theater and 

left the United States almost paralyzed. The strategic gain from 

the Doolittle Raid, while significant, was more subtle. 

Thus, in the initial stage, Japanese strategic acumen eclipsed 

that of the United States and its allies. Their strategic planning 

was sound, and the execution of surprise in their opening drives 

was unmatched. For the most part, American plans were empty 

and infeasible. US achievement of surprise over Tokyo should 

not be underestimated, but its impact surfaced in the later 

stages of the war.

Operational and Tactical Methods

Operationally, the Japanese and Americans existed in separate leagues at the start of the war. According to historian Harry 

Gailey, “The Japanese conducted their complex operations in 

the East Indies with overwhelming superiority in ships, men, 

and planes, and proceeded with calm efficiency . . . making sure 

that their operations did not outstrip the available air cover.”79

Mitsuo Fuchida, lead pilot on the Pearl Harbor raid, recounted 

how other Japanese operations unfolded with rapid precision 

at Guam, in the Marianas, and at Makin and Tarawa with 

slightly slower, but still satisfactory, progress in the Philippines.80 In contrast, the operations of the Americans in the 

Philippines were lethargic and ineffective. Insufficient staffing 

and inexperience plagued FEAF headquarters.81 When the day 

of battle arrived, it proved unequal to the task. Incredibly, their 

commanders, MacArthur included, failed to authorize preemptive attacks on Japanese airfields in Formosa until it was too 

late; and the Japanese caught and destroyed dozens of aircraft 

on the ground.82 Japanese tactics also contributed to their operational success.
THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–45

67

In 1941 and early 1942, the Japanese army was a fearsome 

weapon. Hiroyuki Agawa captured the spirit when he wrote, 

“Few armies can be compared with the Japanese army in placing emphasis on ‘spirit’ at the expense of scientific know-how, 

mechanization, and modernization.”83 The Malayan campaign 

indicated their land capabilities when they overcame two-to-one 

odds through “flexibility and dynamism.”84 Other evaluations 

were not as charitable. Gailey wrote, “Such training produced an 

army of tough, fatalistic troops who could be almost invincible in 

the attack. Yet these same troops lacked individual initiative 

and, although tenacious in the defense, had a tendency to unnecessarily choose death rather than retreat.”85 But this contrasts again with MacArthur’s failure in the Philippines and the 

strategic implications of that loss.86 A number of problems beset 

MacArthur’s forces. The Philippine Division, a combined unit of 

22.532 men consisting of US regulars and Filipino Scouts, was 

the best-trained and most capable force, but its units were scattered; it rarely functioned as a unified division.87 The remainder 

of the Philippine Army exhibited language and training difficulties, inferior tactical knowledge, and poor discipline.88 Japanese 

army tactics bested those of America and the Allies.

The Japanese navy was also well prepared at the beginning 

of the war. Adm Jisaburo Ozawa argued that the navy emphasized efficiency and mental strength to compensate for a perceived lack of mechanical strength vis-à-vis the United States.89

One historian noted that by December 1941, “the synergy of 

excellent ships, superbly trained crews, aggressive leadership, 

and integrated use of air power enabled the Imperial Navy to 

outthink, outmaneuver, and outfight the Allied naval contingents decisively despite their desperate resistance.”90 Outfight 

them they did. At the Battle of the Java Sea, a portent of future 

naval clashes, despite relative parity of forces, the Japanese 

sank three Allied cruisers and four destroyers in a significant 

victory.91 The Japanese navy believed deeply in the decisive sea 

battle. Historian Richard Overy noted, “The Japanese admirals 

were obsessed with the traditional rules of sea warfare, the 

pursuit of a great fleet engagement like the one they had won 

against the Russian navy in the Straits of Tsushima 37 years 

before, when Yamamoto was a young midshipman.”92
THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–45

68

The US Navy operated timidly in the immediate aftermath of 

Pearl Harbor, even abandoning Wake Island.93 By May 1942, 

things began to change. At the Battle of the Coral Sea, the gulf 

between US- and Japanese-carrier tactics was marginal, with 

slightly superior Japanese tactical performance overshadowed by 

strategic consequences that favored the Americans.94 Under the 

sea, the opening moves of the American submarine campaign suffered from inexperienced commanders, limited tactical intelligence, and faulty torpedoes.95 Thus, in the area of naval operations and tactics, as on land, Japan bested the United States.

Things followed a similar pattern in the air. Sakai flatly stated, “I 

am firmly convinced that in those early days of the war the individual skill of our pilots was definitely superior” to the Allied pilots.96 While Bergerud credits Japan with having “a strong cadre of 

elite pilots at the beginning of the war,” he does not admit the total 

superiority claimed by Sakai.97 Combat results attest to Japanese 

skills and favor Sakai’s assessment. The bombing success of Japanese carrier aircraft in the Indian Ocean, which achieved a 90 percent hit rate in attacks against the HMS Dorsetshire and HMS 

Cornwall, demonstrated excellent tactical and technical proficiency.98 General Brereton marveled at the accuracy of Japanese 

bombers in the 8 December 1941 attack on Clark Field.99 On that 

day, which Brereton called “one of the blackest days in US military 

history,” the Japanese destroyed half of FEAF’s aircraft and set the 

stage for victory in the Philippines.100 But, by April 1942, even Sakai 

admitted that things were not always going Japan’s way in the air, 

and he marveled at Allied pilots’ aggressiveness in combat.101

Operational and tactical methods clearly favored Japan. Their 

initial operations were nearly flawless. Their determination and 

efficiency on land was unmatched. Their dominance at sea went 

unchallenged. Their control of and prowess in the air enabled 

the army and navy to achieve their respective goals and provided 

the foundation on which they anchored their strategic gains. 

Summary

During the opening phase of the war, the balance in all four 

elements favored Japan. The Japanese accumulated adequate 

manpower with a material advantage, and exploited several key 

technological advantages. They assembled a better intelligence 
THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–45

69

picture than the United States. Their strategic planning and 

execution of deception and surprise confounded the United 

States and its allies. Finally, their conduct at the operational 

and tactical levels of war on land, sea, and in the air dominated 

the various battlefields.

Unfortunately, for Japan, the war did not end in June 1942. As 

it progressed into spring of that year, the balance in each category 

began to shift. Through May and into June, Japan possessed the 

strategic initiative and directed the course of the war. Try as it 

might, the United States could not seize strategic initiative or even 

challenge Japan’s hold on it. That was about to change, as shifts 

in balance among the elements provided an opportunity for America to assert its power and “Remember Pearl Harbor!”

Phase 2: 4 June 1942–8 February 1943

Following the Doolittle Raid on Japan, Yamamoto and the Imperial Navy redoubled their efforts to destroy the remainder of the 

US Pacific Fleet, specifically its aircraft carriers. The resounding 

American victory in the resulting Battle of Midway shocked the 

Japanese, emboldened the Americans, and changed the course of 

the war. The aftermath of Midway found the Japanese army attempting to expand its control in the south with a campaign centered on Papua, New Guinea and the conquest of Port Moresby. 

The United States recognized the threat to Australia that this advance, coupled with Japanese gains in the southern Solomon Islands, embodied. To parry the move and begin the long march 

back in the Pacific, the United States launched its first counteroffensive of the war with an invasion of a then obscure island named 

Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands chain. This move produced 

an epic six-month struggle for control of the island that put the 

strategic initiative clearly in dispute. While the fight for Guadalcanal raged, the Allies also repelled the Japanese advance on Port 

Moresby and began pushing the Japanese army off the northern 

coast of New Guinea. The final withdrawal of Japanese troops 

from Guadalcanal on 8 February 1943 marked an end to that 

campaign and concluded the second phase of the war.

Possession of strategic initiative was uncertain throughout this 

phase. Japanese leaders were well aware that 1942 would be criti-
THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–45

70

cal.102 Japan forced the Battle of Midway (see figure 8). and clearly 

held the initiative until its devastating defeat in that battle on 4 

June 1942. After Midway, “In the view of the Imperial Army, however, strategic initiative still rested with Japan,” and they tried to 

exercise that initiative by seizing Port Moresby via an overland campaign in New Guinea.103 But the Americans realized the opportunity that Midway afforded them to counter Japanese moves in the 

South Pacific. On 7 August 1942, they moved against Guadalcanal 

and the Solomon Islands to counter the threat posed to Australia. 

The effects were immediate: “In early August American marines 

landed on Guadalcanal, seizing the almost completed airfield there. 

For the Japanese high command, the focus of the entire war shifted 

from China to the Pacific.”104 The rebuff at Port Moresby and the 

costly defeat at Guadalcanal forced Japan to cede strategic initiative to the Americans (see figure 9). 

Figure 8. Battles of Coral Sea and Midway (http://www.dean.usma.edu/

departments/history/web03/atlases/ww2%20pacific/ww2%20pacific%20 

%20maps/ww2%20asia%20map%2015.jpg, accessed 16 April 2008).
THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–45

71

On 31 December 1942, Admiral Halsey, who clearly understood 

the significance of those fateful events in mid and late 1942, relayed to a correspondent, “We now had the initiative, that the 

Japs would keep on retreating, and that the end of 1943 would 

see us in Tokyo.”105 His prognosis proved overly optimistic, but his 

assessment of initiative was accurate. James Wood wrote that 

this “dramatic reversal took place even before the balance of power 

had tipped in favor of the Allies,” making further investigation of 

this phase crucial to our understanding of strategic initiative.106

Resources

The arrival of war brought about increased urgency in resource 

competition. In terms of manpower, the United States demonstrated a remarkable swing. Though “Germany First” encapsuFigure 9. Papuan Campaign 1942 (http://www.dean.usma.edu/departments/ 

history/web03/atlases/ww2%20pacific/ww2%20pacific%20%20maps/ww2 

%20asia%20map%2019.jpg accessed 16 April 2008).
THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–45

72

lated the philosophy of the Allied grand strategy in World War II, 

by the middle of 1942 there were nearly 400,000 American soldiers in the Pacific theater while only 60,000 faced the European 

enemies.107 Despite this build up, ground combat often occurred 

between numerically even forces. The Americans landed on Guadalcanal with numerical superiority and sustained it through 

most of September 1942 (see figure 10).108 But by October 1942, 

the numbers were even at approximately 22,000–23,000 each; 

and by December, both sides had grown to approximately 30,000 

each.109 Japanese aviation manning, however, began to suffer. 

The Japanese pilot training system failed to meet the growing demands of the war.110 The pilot shortage rapidly manifested itself 

after the Battle of the Coral Sea, which brought the first significant naval air losses of the war, and worsened steadily as the war 

progressed.111 The United States did not similarly suffer.

Figure 10. Guadalcanal 1942 (http://www.dean.usma.edu/departments/history/web03/atlases/ww2%20pacific/ww2%20pacific%20%20maps/

ww2%20asia%20map%2017.jpg, accessed 16 April 2008).
THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–45

73

During the second phase, the United States gained a manpower advantage. American forces expanded exponentially at 

the beginning of the war. Despite the declared priority to Europe, 

the majority of those numbers made their way to the Pacific. 

Japan still possessed a vast array of aircraft and ships as 

phase two commenced, but things were beginning to change. 

Van der Vat wrote, “The Imperial Navy in the spring of 1942 

was markedly superior in numbers and more often than not in 

quality of individual ships to the US Pacific Fleet: ten carriers 

(six large), ten battleships, thirty-five cruisers, and 110 destroyers against four, four, twenty-four and ninety respectively, 

with about forty-four oceangoing submarines each.”112 Even after the disaster at Midway, in which four large Japanese aircraft carriers were sunk, Japan still held an edge in carriers; 

and its surface fleet remained almost untouched.113 US ship 

production, however, began to hit its stride in 1942. They made 

up some of the losses sustained in the first phase of the war, 

allowing the United States to maintain a fleet capable of challenging Japan throughout this period.114

Japan also began to suffer in the air. It struggled to produce 

enough aircraft to sustain its war efforts. As early as April 1942, 

before Coral Sea, the strain was already showing, with “the vast 

majority of units” lacking reserve planes and operating below 

normal strength.115 The contrast between aircraft production of 

the two belligerents in 1942 is revealing, with Japan producing 

8,861 aircraft to the American output of 49,445.116 Although 

many of America’s aircraft were bound for Europe, the huge disparity in production allowed the United States to support both 

theaters. Meanwhile, Japan suffered staggering losses of 2,817 

aircraft between 1 April 1942 and 1 April 1943.117 Poor logistics 

sapped the strength of both sides. American shipping strained to 

meet pervasive demands often meaning extended shortages for 

Pacific forces.118 By late 1942, Japan experienced serious logistical difficulties when a shortage of fuel threatened to hamper 

naval operations in the New Guinea-Solomon Islands area.119

Worse still, by December 1942, Japan struggled to support its 

troops on Guadalcanal, many of whom began to starve.120

Nevertheless, Japan maintained a slight material edge. The 

Japanese navy started and remained superior in numbers, but 

US production kept a navy in the fight and began to close the 
THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–45

74

numerical gap. In the air, the two nations maintained a balance 

of forces that remained relatively even until mid-1943.121 They 

were, however, moving in different directions, as US industrial 

might outstripped that of Japan and the Japanese suffered 

dramatic losses in the war. Logistics challenged each, and 

forces from both sides suffered shortages. The American invasion of Guadalcanal was plagued by supply problems early in 

the campaign because “although considerable attention and 

practice had crafted a doctrine of amphibious assault, little 

searching thought and no realistic practice had been afforded 

in conducting a sizable landing from crude bases 6,000 miles 

from the United States.”122 This early supply strain nearly cost 

the Americans the battle; but incidents of Japanese starvation 

on Guadalcanal reveal significant Japanese failures that 

dwarfed US shortcomings.

Only modest technological advances took place in the second 

phase. Japanese aircraft, as an aggregate, remained superior to 

American planes.123 Yet several weaknesses of the Japanese 

planes, including a lack of armored protection for vital areas and 

a lack of self-sealing fuel tanks, became evident in the skies over 

the South Pacific.124 The United States still enjoyed an edge with 

radar, which allowed for better air defense and interception.125

On the ground, US Marines still fought with some older weaponry, such as the Springfield M1903 bolt-action rifle, but other 

units received the updated M-1 Garand rifle.126 Under the sea, 

the United States began equipping its submarines with the new 

SJ radar that allowed for deeper penetration into dangerous 

bodies of water around Tokyo and Formosa, but problems with 

US torpedoes persisted.127

Technologically, although Japan stagnated, the Japanese 

still possessed a slight edge. The United States was rapidly 

closing the gap and would soon surge ahead; but in late 1942, 

the Japanese used their advantage to good effect.

Japan held on to a narrow advantage in the overall resource 

picture. The slight disadvantage in manpower, especially pilots, 

was offset by small margins of materiel and technological superiority. There was, however, a clear trend of American resurgence in all three areas.
THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–45

75

Quality of Intelligence

The disparity in intelligence during phase two was significant. US collection efforts improved dramatically, while Japanese endeavors declined. Japan continued to use radio intercepts to determine US fleet activities, and the Japanese did 

make some inroads in breaking low-grade American ciphers.128

Prior to Midway, radio intercepts indicated to Japanese admirals that the United States may have had knowledge of their 

plans, but the concern did not produce any alteration of their 

designs.129 In contrast, US code breaking and radio intercept 

efforts were simply superb. Japanese radio traffic from the Battle of the Coral Sea enabled American codebreakers to increase 

the accuracy of their decryption efforts significantly.130 At Midway, analysts predicted the scale and timing of Yamamoto’s 

attack, allowing Nimitz to counter his every move.131 The pattern continued throughout the many naval engagements 

around Guadalcanal, allowing Admiral Halsey’s intelligence division to “make an amazingly accurate estimate of enemy 

strength and capabilities” in the period before the naval Battle 

of Guadalcanal in November 1942.132

The Americans also exploited the Australian coastwatcher 

network in the Solomon Islands. This network provided crucial 

intelligence to the Allies on the eve of the August invasion of 

Guadalcanal and throughout the entire six-month campaign.133

Nimitz’s emphasis on intelligence led to the creation of the Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Area (ICPOA) in May 1942, with a 

charter to combine multiple sources of information into a holistic, generally accurate portrayal of the situation.134 Meanwhile, 

the Japanese consistently struggled to obtain information on Allied strength. IGHQ believed the initial landings in the Solomon 

Islands constituted a small effort by limited forces.135 They repeatedly underestimated American strength on Guadalcanal, 

resulting in overly optimistic estimates of victory by ground commanders dispatched to deal with the supposed nuisance.136 Only 

too late did the Japanese realize the Americans were committed 

to the Solomon Islands in great strength.

The Americans noticeably bested Japanese information collection and assessment capabilities. They pieced together a 

much more accurate assessment of the conditions and their 
THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–45

76

enemy for nearly every battle and in nearly every category. Japanese performance was uneven and had declined noticeably 

from the opening phase of the war.

The United States also improved in security and counterintelligence. Fuchida wrote that, by the time of Midway, “The prewar Japanese intelligence net in Hawaii, which contributed so 

effectively to the success of the Pearl Harbor attack, was of 

course no longer operative.”137 Japanese attempts to make up 

for this loss, including reconnaissance flights over Pearl Harbor, were stymied by American countermeasures.138 The American’s took extra precautions where they could, such as by 

communicating between Hawaii and Midway via underwater 

telegraph cable not susceptible to interception.139 On the other 

side, Japanese communications security was weak and, “Sometimes it seemed as if they didn’t care.”140 They only varied their 

encryption codes every six months.141 Fuchida summed it up 

best when he wrote, “Viewed from the Japanese side, this success of the enemy’s intelligence translates itself into a failure 

on our own part—a failure to take adequate precautions for 

guarding the secrecy of our plans.”142

US security and counterintelligence methods were clearly 

superior to those of Japan. They were both more thorough and 

more effective. The Japanese efforts seem lackadaisical and 

half-hearted by comparison and did little to inhibit US collection and analysis during this phase.

From June 1942 until February 1943, intelligence overwhelmingly favored the United States. American forces usually 

had a better appreciation of the existing situation than their 

Japanese foe. They used their intelligence advantage wisely 

and reaped corresponding benefits.

Strategic Acumen

A perceptible shift also occurred in the arena of strategic 

acumen. After completing their initial conquests at a lower cost 

than expected, the Japanese succumbed to the temptation to 

grasp for more. In the spring of 1942, IGHQ identified four additional objectives including the seizure of Port Moresby, the 

invasion of Midway, the capture of the Aleutians, and an advance towards the New Caledonia-Fiji-Samoa island groups to 
THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–45

77

cut off Australia.143 The decision to continue the advance was 

fateful. Wood wrote, “This decision to continue what were referred to as “Outer Perimeter” operations was a major strategic 

blunder, for it was on that perimeter that mistakes would be 

made that would lead later to the rapid and total defeat of Japan.”144 Wood expanded his analysis: “Midway, New Guinea, 

and Guadalcanal were the wrong battles fought at the wrong 

places at the wrong times.”145 Fuchida later lamented that 

“more imagination than regard for reality” went into Japanese 

planning, and he faulted Japanese leaders for unrealistic war 

gaming and heavy-handed interference in those games.146 In 

short, Japan overestimated its own capabilities, while underestimating those of the United States. 

The Americans performed markedly better, with more realistic plans. In spring 1942, US strategy in the Pacific entailed 

holding a defensible line from Hawaii to Australasia and pushing northwest when the opportunity presented.147 Intelligence 

garnered in the period before Midway presented Nimitz with an 

excellent opportunity to ambush the Japanese fleet. He seized 

the moment, focused his forces to defeat the invading force, 

and won a signal victory.148 That victory presented another opportunity, that of an advance in the Solomon Islands against 

Guadalcanal. Again, Admirals Ernest King and Nimitz seized 

the chance and launched Operation Watchtower, intended to 

eliminate the Japanese bases at Tulagi and Guadalcanal; relieve pressure on New Guinea; and begin the march to the 

northwest toward Rabaul, New Britain.149 Not all American 

leaders agreed with the decision. General MacArthur and Adm 

Robert Ghormley felt the move risky and premature; but the 

operation proceeded with the support of King, Nimitz, and Pres. 

Franklin D. Roosevelt.150 Meanwhile, MacArthur waged war in 

and around New Guinea to check Japanese advances there.151

The Americans conducted strategic planning on a higher 

plane than did their Japanese counterparts. Guadalcanal was 

admittedly a close-run contest, but it ended in victory. American commanders differed over the viability of the invasion and 

there was a hint of desperation in the air. The stakes and the 

risks were very high. In October 1942, President Roosevelt 

weighed in, an indication of the importance of the battle and 

the difficulties of the contest, to stress the need to hold, supply, 
THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–45

78

and win on Guadalcanal.152 In the end, the Americans matched 

means with ends, seized strategic opportunities, and conducted 

effective risk analyses to ensure they obtained the most possible gain for the risks ventured.153 The Japanese did not. The 

Japanese engaged in wishful planning and pushed out beyond 

their means. They started this second phase with a poor strategic plan. In Wood’s words, “The great irony of the Pacific War 

is that the virtually flawless execution of Japan’s initial strategic plans resulted within less than a year not in victory but in 

a series of significant defeats that left the strategic initiative in 

the hands of the enemy.”154 As the phase progressed, the Japanese compounded their problems by remaining committed to a 

poor strategic plan. They refused to “pull back from an arena in 

which they operated at an increasing disadvantage,” and instead, “redoubled their efforts to maintain and reinforce their 

air strength in the Solomons.”155 As a result, they bled themselves white fighting the war on the United States’ terms.

There was also a large disparity in the execution of deception 

and surprise. Japan worked assiduously to achieve surprise in 

the Midway operation, but American intelligence foiled the effort. Instead, the US Navy baited the Japanese through a skillful deception and misinformation campaign that indicated the 

American carriers were operating in the southwest Pacific.156

When Admiral Nagumo and his staff learned US carriers were 

only two hundred miles away and poised to strike, “it struck 

them like a bolt from the blue.”157 The ensuing battle destroyed 

four of Japan’s best aircraft carriers. The United States again 

achieved surprise with its landings at Tulagi and Guadalcanal 

in August 1942. The Japanese responded lethargically. Van der 

Vat wrote, “For many weeks the reaction at IGHQ in Tokyo to 

the American effort in the Solomons was one of paralyzed 

amazement that the Americans were already staking so much 

on so little. By the time the junta woke up to the need to stop 

wasting manpower by reinforcing in penny-packets, the Americans were too well dug in to shift.”158 Thus, the Japanese were 

again caught flat-footed.

 The advantage of strategic acumen was thus totally reversed 

in this phase. American strategic planning was clearly superior, and the United States dominated in the execution of deception and surprise. 
THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–45

79

Operational and Tactical Methods

Japanese proficiency on land now met its match. The pattern 

of fighting on Guadalcanal crystallized early in the campaign. 

The first large-scale encounter between the Marines and Japanese troops in late August 1942 resulted in the death of 800 

Japanese soldiers, with the loss of 43 Marines killed and 56 

wounded.159 This disparity was not accidental. Throughout 

1942, “the actions ashore present a persistent pattern of Japanese failure.”160 Samuel B. Griffith argued that: “The almost 

total lack of imagination, the hidebound intellectual inflexibility, which characterized alike the High Commands of the Japanese Army and Navy, and which—with notably rare exceptions—filtered down to the senior officers of both services, was 

to cost Japan dearly to the very end of the Pacific War.”161

American troops clearly performed better than their foe. Winston Groom said American “tenacity” and “superior infantry 

tactics” contributed significantly to the victory at Guadalcanal.162 The simultaneous landings at Guadalcanal, Tulagi, and 

Gavutu-Tanambogo also validated the Marines’ development of 

amphibious operations and tactics.163 The Japanese lost 23,000 

soldiers in action or through starvation and disease to total US 

losses of 1,600 killed on Guadalcanal.164 The Papuan campaign 

was more costly for the Allied soldiers, with 4,842 Australian 

and American dead to 12,000 Japanese killed.165 Nevertheless, 

in both cases, Japanese operational and tactical methods on 

land were inferior.

The balance in naval operational and tactical method varied depending upon the character of the combat in question. The Japanese excelled at surface warfare, particularly at night. The Battle of 

Savo Island in the seas adjacent to Guadalcanal on the night of 8–9 

August 1942 was a clear Japanese victory and reflected a disparity 

in combat capabilities that haunted the US Navy for the duration of 

the Solomons campaign.166 The Japanese, however, won only a tactical victory that evening because their focus on decisive fleet engagements overshadowed the more important concern of destroying the Allied transports supporting the invasion.167 Despite its 

generally inferior performance in surface warfare, the US Navy prevailed in the naval Battle of Guadalcanal in mid-November 1942, 

which ended the Japanese naval threat to Henderson Field, and set 
THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–45

80

the conditions for the ultimate destruction or evacuation of Japanese land forces on Guadalcanal.168

Japanese proficiency in carrier warfare did not match their 

prowess in surface warfare. Their operations at Midway displayed some faults that persisted in other battles later in the 

war, including a complex plan that overly dispersed their 

forces.169 As already noted, that battle produced a major victory 

for the United States. Bergerud extrapolated carrier capabilities even further, “In my opinion the Americans won all the carrier battles of World War II. Every carrier battle was precipitated 

because one side was supporting an invasion or supply convoy 

and the other side tried to stop it. Because the U.S.-protected 

convoys achieved their objectives—and the Japanese failed in 

theirs—strategically the USN [US Navy] came out on top.”170

Over the course of the Guadalcanal campaign, the Allies lost 2 

carriers and 24 other large warships totaling 126,000 tons, 

while Japan lost 24 ships including two battleships and six 

submarines, for 135,000 tons.171 The Japanese may have been 

tactically superior at times, but the United States achieved all 

its operational objectives, and Japan did not.

The air war also dramatically transformed. Japan still possessed expert pilots at this stage, but that was beginning to 

change. Japanese tactics in the air lacked teamwork, with pilots 

typically operating as individuals when battle commenced.172

Japanese airpower, like its naval counterpart, focused too much 

on targeting enemy weapon systems such as ships and aircraft 

and “did almost nothing to prevent the build up of Allied forces 

in New Guinea during the early months of war.” Nor did they 

target transports during the Solomons campaign.173 In contrast, 

the Americans worked as a team and developed tactics specifically designed to counter Japan’s fighter superiority.174 Their 

adaptability and superior tactics paid off over Guadalcanal with 

a three-to-one air-to-air kill ratio over the Japanese.175 Numbers 

again tell the tale. Total combat losses amounted to 264 American aircraft against 446 Japanese aircraft over Guadalcanal, 

with the Americans losing 420 aviators but the Japanese losing 

two to four times as many.176 American airpower began to flex its 

muscle and Japan could ill afford the ensuing high attrition.

Thus, the United States performed better across the board in 

operational and tactical methods. American ground tactics and 
THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–45

81

operations devastated a Japanese force that was used to fighting 

less disciplined opponents. Naval tactics and operations did not 

manifest the same disparity, but US carrier operations were certainly superior and its surface capabilities proved adequate to the 

task. In the air, the belligerents each reached a turning point. The 

Japanese began to decline steadily, while the United States began 

to show signs of air dominance critical to the future course of the 

war. Samuel Griffith, a Marine veteran of Guadalcanal, wrote, 

“the Emperor’s invincible army had absorbed a series of beatings,” “his ‘sea eagles’ had been unable to establish air superiority 

over Guadalcanal,” and “his navy could not effectively support the 

army operations. . . .”177 Such statements are testaments to American efficiency at the lower levels of war in this critical period.

Summary

Significant shifts occurred in all four elements during this 

phase. American forces narrowed the gap in resources through 

increases in manpower, materiel, and a slight enhancement of 

their technology. Allied forces dominated in the intelligence 

arena and exercised superior strategic acumen to achieve favorable results just six months after the outbreak of war. Operationally and tactically, the United States became a force to 

be reckoned with, while Japanese abilities began to deteriorate 

at the cutting edge.

The United States was now in the driver’s seat. Following 

Guadalcanal, America had undisputed strategic initiative. Yet 

there were over two more years of fighting left, with some unexpected twists. But the four components of strategic initiative 

remained as important as ever while the United States stormed 

across the Pacific and up the New Guinea coast.

Phase 3: 9 February 

1943–2 September 1945

The last phase of the war consisted of a series of American advances in the South- and Central-Pacific theaters that approached 

the very gates of Japan before the two atomic attacks were made 

and Japan surrendered. Following Guadalcanal, MacArthur and 
THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–45

82

Nimitz completed the isolation of strong Japanese garrisons at 

Rabaul and Kavieng with Operation Cartwheel in the South Pacific (see figure 11). The United States then began a two-pronged 

offensive with the southern route commanded by MacArthur and 

the Central Pacific route by Nimitz. The southern offensive proceeded from the Solomon Islands through the Palaus and on to 

the Philippines. Meanwhile, Nimitz began his drive in the Gilbert 

Islands and proceeded through the Marshall Islands; and on to 

the Mariana Islands. As American forces got closer to Japan, 

America’s options narrowed, resulting in the bloody battles at Iwo 

Jima and Okinawa in 1945. Planning for the invasion of Japan 

was in full swing when the atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. The ensuing Japanese surrender averted a bloodbath for both combatants.

Figure 11. Operation Cartwheel and the seizure of the Gilbert and Marshall Islands (http://www.dean.usma.edu/departments/history/web03/atlases/

ww2%20pacific/ww2%20pacific%20%20maps/ww2%20asia%20map%2020

.jpg, accessed 16 April 2008).
THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–45

83

After the battle of Guadalcanal, the United States clearly held 

the strategic initiative. Japanese Adm Matome Ugaki understood the situation when, on 31 December 1942, he recorded 

in his diary, “The year 1942 is going to pass tonight. How brilliant was the first stage operations up to April! And what miserable setbacks since Midway in June! The invasions of Hawaii, 

Fiji, Samoa, and New Caledonia, liberation of India and destruction of the British Far Eastern Fleet have all scattered like 

dreams. Meanwhile, not to speak of capturing Port Moresby, 

but the recovery of Guadalcanal itself turned out to be impossible.”178 Historians have since noted, “On land and sea, under 

the sea, and over it, Allied forces held the strategic initiative, 

and this gave them the tactical advantage around almost the 

entire arc of the Japanese ‘defensive perimeter.’ They were soon 

able to concentrate their forces and strike with overwhelming, 

largely unanswerable strength, wherever and whenever they 

chose.”179 The Japanese attempted to respond with successive 

plans to regain the initiative, but they were never able to stem 

the tide. From 1943 on, all Pacific roads led directly or indirectly to the Japanese home islands.

Resources

The demands of total war stretched Japanese human resources to the limit. By war’s end, Japanese military recruiters 

reached the bottom of the barrel and previously protected segments of the population lost their exemptions.180 Japan, like its 

ally Germany, relied on forced labor, in this case Korean, to 

sustain its war efforts at home.181 Nevertheless, Japan fielded 

nearly eight million men in September 1945, with over half of 

them stationed in Japan.182

Japanese pilot resources steadily diminished. The 1944 campaigns around Rabaul and the Marshall Islands decimated the 

pilot ranks.183 Pilot training standards rapidly declined. The 

1941–42 requirement for 700 flight hours dwindled to 275 in 

1944 and finally to 90 in 1945.184 Although its manpower pool 

was not limitless and it was fighting a two-theater war, the 

United States did not suffer these same strains. Pilot training 

hours for American pilots increased as the war went on, rising 

from 305 hours in 1941–42 to 525 hours in 1945.185 The United 
THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–45

84

States Sixth Army mustered 175,000 men for its 1944 invasion 

of Leyte in the Philippines, approaching the numbers employed 

in Normandy earlier that year.186 On 1 April 1945, 154,000 

“battle-hardened” Americans invaded Okinawa in another impressive demonstration of US capabilities.187

In the last phase of the war, the United States finally fielded 

forces that corresponded to its population base. Although Japan 

still possessed formidable numbers, with the initiative in hand, the 

American commanders concentrated when and where they chose.

The material struggle proved even more advantageous to the 

Americans. The Japanese Navy steadily deteriorated. Overy 

noted that, “In 1943 Japanese shipyards supplied only three 

more aircraft carriers, and four in 1944; the United States navy 

[sic] in those two years procured another ninety.”188 The Imperial Navy started the war with 110 destroyers and added 14 

more by July 1943, but had lost 35 and others were undergoing repair.189 The US Navy, meanwhile, expanded significantly. 

At the end of 1944, it boasted 89 carriers, 23 battleships, 62 

cruisers, 371 destroyers, 378 destroyer escorts, and 238 submarines.190 The gulf in aircraft production was also enormous. 

From 1941 through 1944, Japan produced 58,822 planes to 

261,826 for the United States.191 The US Army benefited from 

American industrial might as well, becoming “the most modern 

army in the world,” and the most motorized of all the combatants.192 Nevertheless, both sides struggled to supply adequate 

transport vessels. The Japanese merchant shipping started the 

war with 6.4 million tons. But, by January 1945, only 2.4 million tons remained; and 7.4 million tons were sunk.193 The 

United States fared better, but shipping was always at a premium; and, well into 1943, it limited American advances.194

From early 1943 to Victory over Japan (V-J) Day, the United 

States retained material dominance. Whether on land, sea, or 

air, Japan was itself in a position of distinct inferiority. US industrial might flooded the battlefield with effective weapons, 

while Japanese industry struggled simply to reconstitute war 

losses. Logistics challenged both combatants; but the United 

States responded more effectively, while Japanese forces became acutely aware of their supply deficiencies.

The United States took the lead in technology during this 

phase. Japan made its biggest technological exertions in air-
THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–45

85

craft, to little avail. While the Japanese “could produce designs 

of high quality, they lacked the technical means to turn them 

into large numbers of battlefront weapons that could compete 

on equal terms with the enemy.”195 Saburo Sakai lamented that 

10 different upgrades to the Zero fighter still failed to match 

American aircraft advances.196 Japanese aircraft still maintained their superior range over American fighters.197

The Unites States made great technological strides in several 

areas. The Americans improved their torpedoes by correcting 

the mechanical flaws by October 1943 and by using a more 

powerful explosive beginning in February 1943.198 Fighters 

such as the F4U Corsair and the F6F Hellcat outclassed their 

Japanese opponents in the air.199 The speed, altitude, range, 

and payload of the B-29 bomber made it a technological marvel 

in 1944.200 But the most glaring example of US technological 

superiority was the atomic bomb.201 Japan had no response.

The United States dominated every aspect of resources in the 

last phase of the war. In terms of manpower, Japan maintained 

strong numbers throughout the Pacific theater, but the Americans picked and chose when and where to fight. They concentrated the forces necessary and got them to the fight, no matter 

the distance. They matured a strong pilot training program that 

towered over Japanese efforts. American industrial might produced warships, planes, and vehicles at an amazing rate, thereby 

making its forces the best equipped in the entire war. While Japanese technology plodded ahead slowly or stagnated, the Americans forged ahead in leaps and bounds. Their technological 

gains usually made it to the battlefield in sufficient time and 

numbers to make a difference while Japanese improvements did 

not. The development and employment of the atomic bomb ended 

the technological competition with an exclamation point.

Quality of Intelligence

American intelligence continued to improve. The ICPOA established by Nimitz in 1942 became a joint organization in the autumn of 1943 and evolved into a very effective intelligence agency.202

But American intelligence was not perfect. Japanese defenders on 

Saipan numbered 32,000, twice the American intelligence estimate.203 Successful code breaking continued to pay dividends. 
THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–45

86

Intercepts of the Japanese “water transport codes” revealed the 

positions of Japanese merchant ships, allowing US submariners 

to focus their efforts at the most opportune times and places.204

Cryptographers continually warned of Japanese naval moves, 

even predicting the death ride of the battleship Yamato during the 

battle of Okinawa in April 1945.205 Japanese commanders generally undervalued intelligence. As a result, “the Japanese intelligence effort was small, of indifferent quality, and over reliant on 

espionage. Its signal work was of high standard but limited in 

scale and scope; the maximum intelligence was extracted from 

open sources, such as enemy publications and broadcasting.”206

American attention to detail and Japanese neglect ceded the 

intelligence advantage to the United States. There is no doubt that 

“good intelligence sources, combined with highly effective intelligence methods—for fusion analysis, tailored operational support, 

and rapid dissemination—made Allied admirals far better informed and knowledgeable than their Japanese counterparts.”207

Japanese efforts at security and counterintelligence were mixed. 

The Japanese did have some success, as the Saipan example 

demonstrated. The execution of “special attack” missions, or Kamikazes, also benefited from good security. The Americans had 

no inkling of this capability when it was first employed near the 

Philippines.208 However, the general American success in garnering intelligence indicates a corresponding failure on the part of 

Japan to implement effective security measures. As during the 

second phase, cryptological failures were more evident. American 

security efforts generally fared better than Japanese attempts. 

Although Pacific geography often limited American offensive options, the Marshall Islands was the only example in the war in 

which Japanese intelligence got word to one of its garrisons in 

sufficient time for it to prepare for the impending attack.209

Thus, the United States maintained a clear intelligence edge. 

Its collection, analysis, and dissemination exceeded Japanese 

capabilities. Similarly, its counterintelligence and security measures provided enough of a veil to keep the Japanese guessing.

Strategic Acumen

Following Guadalcanal, the Japanese and Americans faced 

different strategic challenges. Japan wanted to hold what it 
THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–45

87

possessed, while the United States sought to make inroads into 

those possessions and eventually attack Japan directly. The 

Japanese developed a series of plans designed to defeat the 

American forces and either regain the initiative, even if only 

operationally, or at least establish a strategic equilibrium. Their 

“I-Go” plan to seize air superiority over the New Guinea and 

Solomon Islands areas in April 1943 failed.210 Their “A-Go” plan 

sought a decisive carrier action in the Marianas in 1944 using 

90 percent of Japan’s remaining sea power, but it also failed.211

The “Sho-1” plan for defense of the Philippines very nearly succeeded in its aims of destroying the US invasion force, but it too 

ultimately failed.212 Japan’s biggest mistake, however, was the 

failure to adequately protect its merchant shipping, which exposed a critical vulnerability.213

Meanwhile, the United States had to decide where and why 

to fight. The birth of the “island hopping” concept occurred in 

the South Pacific when the Joint Chiefs of Staff prudently decided to bypass Rabaul, leaving 100,000 Japanese troops isolated and impotent.214 By using MacArthur’s and Nimitz’s concentric advances to keep the Japanese defenses off balance, 

the Americans turned the vice of divided command into a virtue. The overwhelming preponderance of US resources allowed 

this strategy to succeed, despite vehement debate over priorities between the two theater commanders and their respective 

service chiefs. In the spring of 1944, while the US Navy prepared to strike the Mariana Islands with the “largest fleet in the 

world,” MacArthur got ready to attack the Philippines with five 

divisions and two air forces.215

Nimitz marched across the Central Pacific, seizing the Marianas, which enabled strategic bombing of Japan, and then 

continued west and north to prepare for the invasion of the 

Japanese home islands (see figure 12).216 MacArthur liberated 

the Philippines, effectively cutting Japan’s sea lines of communication to its resources in the south. Thus, the United States 

realized its strategic goals, while Japan proved unable to stabilize an ever-deteriorating situation.

The United States bested Japan in strategic planning during 

the last phase of the war. The two-pronged advance kept the 

Japanese guessing,217 but the American march across the Pacific was not flawless. The bloody invasion of Peleliu obtained 
THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–45

88

few positive results and played into the Japanese strategy of 

inflicting heavy losses on the United States.218 The liberation of 

the Philippines also sparks historical debate. Dan Van der Vat 

faulted both the Americans and Japanese for undue focus on 

the Philippines.219 The bloody struggle for control of the archipelago lasted over eight months; but the Americans realized 

their aims. The Japanese, in contrast, failed in every one of 

their major efforts to achieve strategic stability.

Surprise played less of role during this phase than it had 

previously. Effective American intelligence hampered Japanese 

deception efforts. The Japanese did achieve one notable deception during the Battle of Leyte Gulf in October 1944 by luring 

Admiral Halsey and his fleet to the north with a decoy force and 

opening up America’s Leyte invasion fleet to possible destruction (see figure 13).220 The Americans, in turn, faced the same 

difficulties with geography that the Soviets faced as they apFigure 12. Marianas, South Pacific, and Philippine Islands (http://www

.dean.usma.edu/departments/history/web03/atlases/ww2%20pacific/ww 

2%20pacific%20%20maps/ww2%20asia%20map%2025.jpg, accessed 16 

April 2008).
THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–45

89

Figure 13. The Philippines and Battle of Leyte Gulf (http://www.dean

.usma.edu/departments/history/web03/atlases/ww2%20pacific/

ww2%20pacific%20%20maps/ww2%20asia%20map%2029.jpg, accessed 

16 April 2008).

proached Germany. The closer they got to their ultimate 

objective, the more obvious their strategic choices became. 

Surprise thus had to focus on timing. Here, the United States 

had some consequential successes. The Japanese expected an 

invasion of the Philippines in late 1944, but they could not determine where the invasion would fall nor the exact launch 

time until three days before it commenced.221 The same pattern 

followed in other locations such as Iwo Jima and Okinawa.

Neither side achieved any war-changing surprises during the 

final phase. The Americans enjoyed a very slight edge, if only 

because the surprises they achieved were more consequential. 

The Japanese could have gained useful strategic benefits from 

their deception at Leyte Gulf, but they missed the opportunity 

to destroy the invasion transports.

Thus, American strategic acumen bettered that of the Japanese. Ultimately, despite the imperfections of divided command 
THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–45

90

and several questionable operations, the United States realized 

all of its goals. The Japanese continued to overreach their capabilities and suffered setbacks as a result. They also missed a 

key opportunity for strategic gain in the Philippines.

Operational and Tactical Methods

As the war progressed, the Japanese suffered horrendous 

losses in land combat, but they did alter their tactics from those 

used in the Solomons and New Guinea. Japanese soldiers 

learned to sell their lives dearly. Rather than conducting wasteful frontal assaults, the Japanese learned to dig in and make the 

Americans come to them. At Iwo Jima, Japan lost nearly 20,000 

soldiers killed and nearly 200 captured but inflicted 25,000 casualties on the Marines, including 6,000 killed, for a total casualty ratio of 1:1.25 in Japan’s favor.222 Japanese commanders on 

Okinawa in April 1945 “skillfully utilized terrain to inflict maximum casualties” that totaled 49,451 men, of which 12,520 were 

dead or missing, although 110,000 of their own soldiers died.223

The United States also adjusted its tactics. After the bloody 

fight on Tarawa atoll, the Navy and Marines implemented key 

changes to their amphibious doctrine, including the increased 

use of tracked amphibious vehicles, longer pre-invasion bombardments, and more effective small-unit tactics.224 Successive invasions were certainly bloody, but the United States generally came 

off better than Japan. At Saipan in 1944, the Japanese lost 23,811 

killed and 1,780 captured to US losses of 3,426 dead and 13,099 

wounded.225 On Leyte in the Philippines, the Japanese units committed were among the best in their army, but “almost all the 

sixty-five thousand-man force was destroyed at a cost to the 

Americans of thirty-five hundred dead.”226 On Luzon, Japanese 

forces numbered around 170,000 troops, of whom approximately 

50,000 remained to surrender in August 1945.227 The US Sixth 

Army lost 8,297 killed or missing, and 29,557 wounded in the 

173-day struggle to defeat that force and conquer Luzon.228

American ground tactics and operations were better than 

Japan’s, but the Japanese had learned to be more economical 

with their lives. They adapted their tactics to the defense to 

maximize their ability to inflict losses on the United States. 

They were able to do so because they could focus on the de-
THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–45

91

fense. The United States, however, had to conduct offensive 

operations to realize victory.

From October 1943 on, the United States Navy surged ahead 

of the Japanese navy in all forms of combat. In surface warfare, 

the United States won eight victories to Japan’s zero.229 Carrier 

warfare followed a similar pattern, though instances of such 

battle dropped significantly after 1942. The only true carrierto-carrier battle was in the Marianas in June 1944.230 The 

United States won the battle in the Marianas, though it was US 

submarines that inflicted much of the damage on the Japanese 

carriers.231 The Japanese failed utterly at combating the submarine threat. When they finally instituted a convoy system for 

their merchant ships, they used small and inefficient convoys 

that failed to provide adequate protection.232 Nineteen fortyfour was a banner year for US submariners. They sank 1.5 million tons of Japanese shipping, including 400,000 tons of oil 

tankers, which caused severe Japanese fuel shortages and 

hampered fleet operations.233

The Japanese continued unduly to seek decisive battle. Wood 

elaborated on Japan’s failure to capitalize on their successful 

deception at Leyte Gulf: “For one of the few times in the war, 

powerful Japanese surface units, including a Yamato class 

battleship, came within gunnery range of a temporarily unprotected invasion fleet of hundreds of supply and transport vessels. But Admiral Ozawa lost his nerve and turned back in the 

face of bluffing by a few American destroyers and escort carriers. And to what purpose? Preservation of his units took precedence over a delivery of an extremely damaging blow.”234

American admirals were not, however, totally immune from 

mistakes. It is interesting to note how the US Navy, when inferior, never lost sight of why it was fighting each particular battle, whether to repel an invasion, or protect its own invasion or 

convoy. But at Leyte Gulf, when in a position of vast superiority, Admiral Halsey took the Japanese bait and pursued a decoy fleet in search of a decisive battle, leaving the invasion 

transports unguarded.235 Nevertheless, because of the Japanese navy’s failures, Leyte Gulf proved to be a clear American 

victory, after which the Japanese navy never posed a significant threat.236 The US Navy reigned supreme whether it was a 

surface, carrier, or undersea action.
THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–45

92

The United States also owned the skies. As James Wood 

noted, control of the land and sea depended on control of the 

air and “by late 1943, Japan’s air forces had lost this decisive 

struggle.”237 Sakai confirmed this observation, recounting that 

US Navy fighters downed their Japanese enemies by the bushel 

in 1944 around Iwo Jima, destroying 20 Zeros out of 40 in one 

fight and then 60 out of 80 engaged in another.238 The Americans also developed some innovative tactics. In the Battle of 

the Bismarck Sea, US air forces destroyed an entire Japanese 

merchant convoy using skip-bombing, costing the Japanese 

3,664 troops.239 The United States also began strategic bombing of Japan. Between April and August of 1945, bombing destroyed 40 percent of 66 Japanese cities, causing factory absenteeism to skyrocket.240 Japan’s Kamikaze tactics were 

deadly, but they did not alter the course of the war. The Japanese were unable to wrest the skies back from the Americans.

In sum, the United States dominated the lower levels of war 

on land, sea, and in the air. “The American Navy won all but 

one of their engagements with the Imperial Japanese Navy after 

Guadalcanal. All seventy-two army and marine amphibious 

landings in the Pacific succeeded. By late 1944, U.S. submarines owned the sea lanes; and her land and carrier-based 

planes ruled the sky,” Wood noted.241 Despite their legendary 

tenacity, the Japanese suffered defeat after defeat until their 

ultimate surrender in September 1945.

Summary

The United States held the strategic initiative throughout 

this third phase. The Japanese attempted several large operations to alter the course of the war, but to no avail. The United 

States enjoyed large advantages in all four elements and significant advantages in each of their sub-areas for this phase. 

These cumulative advantages made it impossible for Japan to 

challenge the firm American grasp of strategic initiative.

Analysis

 As with the Russo–German War of 1941–45, several questions remain to be answered. Why did Japan’s hold on strategic 
THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–45

93

initiative fall into dispute in June 1942? Why did it then pass 

permanently into American hands in February 1943? How did 

the four elements of resources, quality of intelligence, strategic 

acumen, and operational and tactical methods relate to one 

another? Is there a hierarchy among these elements? If so, 

what is it?

The relative advantage(s) each side held in these elements for 

each entire phase has been established. Analysis must now focus on the comparison of these factors at the junctions between 

the first and second phases and the second and third phases.

The transition from Japanese possession of initiative to disputed initiative occurred in June of 1942. The Japanese had 

actually increased their overall resource advantage slightly by 

June 1942 due to the disparity in losses during the opening 

months of war. US industrialization and mobilization had not 

yet matured sufficiently to influence the war. 

There was, however, a significant shift in intelligence that 

directly affected the Battle of Midway on 4 June 1942. Once 

they attempted to move beyond their intended perimeter, the 

Japanese intelligence capabilities dropped dramatically. The 

United States, in contrast, increased its intelligence gathering 

and analysis capabilities through improved deciphering and 

integration. This intelligence disparity best explains the clear 

American victory at Midway.

The balance in strategic acumen also tipped dramatically. 

The Japanese overreached, attempting simultaneously to complete unplanned thrusts at Midway, the Aleutians, and the 

South Pacific all at once. The United States knew its limits, put 

up minimum resistance in the Aleutians, and focused nearly 

all its resources to repel the Japanese at Midway. Nimitz executed an effective deception plan that allowed him to ambush 

Nagumo’s carriers near Midway. The resulting surprise provided a strategic victory with long-term implications for the war 

and immediate implications for strategic initiative.

In June 1942, the Japanese remained tactically superior, 

particularly in the air. Yet the Americans performed effectively 

at the tactical level and performed in superior fashion at the 

operational level. This operational superiority enabled their victory at Midway and helped place strategic initiative in dispute. 
THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–45

94

The United States seized strategic initiative at the second 

transition point in February 1943. Japan continued to maintain a resource edge, but the United States was closing the gap. 

Troops, aircraft, and ships began arriving in the Pacific, making up for losses and increasing operational flexibility. The Japanese, meanwhile, were beginning to feel the effects of attrition, 

particularly in pilots.

The Americans maintained intelligence superiority. The synergy between their success with Magic and the contribution of the 

Australian coastwatchers proved critical to victory at Guadalcanal. Japanese failures in intelligence contributed to their eventual 

withdrawal from the island after a titanic six-month struggle.

Superior strategic acumen also favored the United States. 

Although Guadalcanal had been a risky undertaking and a 

close run battle, the Americans matched their capabilities with 

their plans and won a significant victory. Japan, on the other 

hand, fought the battle piecemeal and continued to feed its 

limited resources into a sinkhole. Neither side had an advantage in deception or surprise that contributed to the February 

1943 shift.

Tactically, the Japanese remained superior only in surface 

warfare. The Americans bested them in the air and on the 

ground. Tactically, carrier warfare was very close to equilibrium, but operationally the United States remained superior 

across the board. Even when suffering significant tactical defeats, such as at Savo Island, the US Navy carried out its primary responsibilities of protecting the transports and turning 

the Japanese back. By the end of the Guadalcanal campaign, 

the United States had demonstrated superior operational and 

tactical prowess. 

Analyzing the relationship among the four elements during 

these transition points and over the course of the war brings 

some informative insights. The pattern from the Russo–German 

War held true in the Pacific, with clear Japanese and American 

advantages in the first and third phases, respectively, granting 

each nation supremacy in strategic initiative. Once again the 

transition to, experiences during, and transition from the second phase prove most revealing in allowing us to understand 

how strategic initiative shifts in war.
THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–45

95

The Americans enjoyed significant advantages in quality of intelligence, strategic acumen, and operational method at Midway, 

while ceding advantages in resources and tactical method. American advantages allowed them to contest initiative almost immediately and permitted them to vie for initiative at Guadalcanal a mere 

two months later. Because of its resource advantage, particularly in 

naval and air units, Japan did not immediately lose initiative. Yet 

Nimitz and the Americans displayed polished strategic acumen by 

using their intelligence advantage to seize a fleeting opportunity 

and inflict debilitating damage on the Japanese fleet.

The Japanese resource base and, to a degree, their tactical 

advantages mitigated the Midway disaster for a while. Thus, 

the Americans could not immediately gain the strategic initiative; they could only dispute it.

Strategic initiative in the second phase of the Pacific War was 

more closely contested than it was in the second phase of the 

Russo–German War. One could attempt to argue that the 7 August 

1942 landings on Guadalcanal represented seizure of American 

initiative; but the ebb and flow of that campaign, along with the 

Papuan struggle, makes such reasoning problematic. This campaign, in fact, indicates just how closely the struggle for initiative 

was waged. Throughout the second phase, Japan’s superior resources balanced US advantages in intelligence, strategic acumen, 

and operational and tactical method until the Battle of Guadalcanal was over. 

By the end of the second phase, the resource gap was closing 

as America’s industrial might was inexorably brought to bear 

and Japan strained under the punishment of attrition warfare. 

When the United States approached parity in resources with 

the Japanese air and sea forces, its advantages in the other 

three elements solidified its hold on strategic initiative for the 

duration of the war. 

In sum, the Japanese seized initiative in December 1941 with 

advantages in every category. In June 1942, their resource superiority prevented the loss of initiative. The United States challenged Japanese initiative with advantages in intelligence, strategic acumen, and operational (though not tactical) method. 

During the second phase, the United States improved in all 

four elements and seized the initiative, though it continued to 

operate at a resource disadvantage.
THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–45

96

Determining the relationships between each element again 

requires interpretive analysis. The Americans used greater wisdom to seize a fleeting opportunity at Midway and to match 

ends with means at Guadalcanal. They also, like the Soviets, 

expended great effort to improve in the areas over which they 

could exert some direct control: resources and intelligence. Intelligence efforts paid rapid dividends, increasing American 

knowledge and buttressing strategic acumen. American capacity remained adequate, but the geography of the Pacific slowed 

American attempts to leverage its industrial might. Improvements in operational technique followed quickly, while tactical 

performance grew more slowly.

The Americans were first able to use the benefits of their superior knowledge at the Battle of Midway. Their capacity after that 

battle was limited, but it would slowly increase as the second 

phase progressed. But knowledge alone is insufficient; it must be 

put to good use or it is wasted. The Americans used their increased knowledge to employ the limited capacity they had in a 

very wise fashion, displaying strategic acumen. Hence, they were 

able to dispute, though not seize, initiative. In short, superior 

American strategic acumen, aided by improved intelligence and 

supported by an edge in operational method, caused a shift in 

strategic initiative. Continued Japanese advantages in resources 

and tactical method limited the magnitude of that shift. 

The Guadalcanal campaign produced the final shift. American advantages in strategic acumen, intelligence, and operational method continued. The United States assumed the risks 

inherent in the Guadalcanal operation to some extent out of 

desperation, but also out of recognition of the opportunity that 

the Midway victory provided. During the campaign, the Americans improved tactically, holding an edge in every area except 

naval surface warfare. The Japanese initially maintained a resource advantage, but America was closing the gap. The narrowing resource gap and improved American tactical performance meant that US advantages in strategic acumen, 

intelligence, and operational method achieved greater results. 

The Americans seized the initiative and never let go.

Thus, we see another clear hierarchy for the elements in the 

Pacific War from 1941–45. Strategic acumen led the way. Japanese strategic acumen was superb for their initial operations. 
THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–45

97

However, the Americans learned quickly and took advantage of 

opportunities, while the Japanese misjudged the situation at 

Midway and in the Solomon Islands. Intelligence was again the 

second element. It gave the United States’ better knowledge of 

the situation and enabled wiser choices for the war. The inherent maneuver dimensions of a maritime war meant operational 

and tactical methods placed third. Operational prowess wielded 

greater influence than tactical proficiency. As long as the combatants performed adequately in tactical areas, any advantage 

here was offset by more important advantages in the other areas. Resources placed fourth; but resource superiority allowed 

the Japanese to avoid total loss of initiative until the United 

States enhanced its own war-making capacity around the second transition point in February 1943. 

Yet further analysis is still required. These two historical examples must be compared and contrasted to see if there are 

any additional insights into shifts in strategic initiative in modern, conventional war.

Notes

1. Keegan, Second World War, 249.

2. Fuchida et al., Midway: The Battle That Doomed Japan, 32.

3. Ibid., 33.

4. Van der Vat, Pacific Campaign, 59–65.

5. Cook and Cook, Japan at War, 261–62.

6. Wood, Japanese Military Strategy in the Pacific War, 88.

7. Dower, War without Mercy, x.

8. Van der Vat, Pacific Campaign, 42–43.

9. Kato, Lost War, 51.

10. Ibid., 52.

11. Dull, A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 5.

12. Gailey, War in the Pacific, 58.

13. Wood, Japanese Military Strategy, 10.

14. Gailey, War in the Pacific, 59.

15. Agawa, Reluctant Admiral, 128.

16. Gailey, War in the Pacific, 144.

17. Forrestal, Forrestal Diaries, 32.

18. Kato, Lost War, 40.

19. Dull, Battle History, 22–26.

20. Van der Vat, Pacific Campaign, 117.

21. Costello, Days of Infamy, 3.

22. Dull, Battle History, 115.
THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–45

98

23. Dunnigan and Nofi, Victory at Sea, 523.

24. Gailey, War in the Pacific, 59.

25. Ibid., 51.

26. Ibid., 109–10.

27. Holmes et al., eds., Oxford Companion to Military History, 534.

28. Gailey, War in the Pacific, 63–64.

29. Wood, Japanese Military Strategy, 92.

30. Fuchida, Midway, 28–29.

31. Halsey and Bryan, Admiral Halsey’s Story, 70.

32. Dunnigan and Nofi, Victory at Sea, 4.

33. Wood, Japanese Military Strategy, 75.

34. Dunnigan and Nofi, Victory at Sea, 4.

35. Brereton, Brereton Diaries, 6–7.

36. Cook and Cook, Japan at War, 206.

37. Ibid., 261–62.

38. Keegan, Second World War, 268.

39. Sakai, Caidin, and Saito, Samurai!, 42.

40. Bergerud, Fire in the Sky, 9.

41. Sakai, Caidin, and Saito, Samurai!, 50.

42. Overy, Why the Allies Won, 221–22.

43. Fuchida, Midway, 27.

44. Ibid., 209.

45. Halsey and Bryan, Admiral Halsey’s Story, 72.

46. Dull, Battle History, 60.

47. Wood, Japanese Military Strategy, 48.

48. Ienaga, Pacific War, 141.

49. Keegan, Second World War, 268.

50. Fuchida, Midway, 26.

51. Agawa, Reluctant Admiral, 251–52.

52. Brereton, Brereton Diaries, 51.

53. Ugaki et al., Fading Victory, 119.

54. Groom, 1942: The Year That Tried Men’s Souls, 38.

55. Costello, Pacific War, 118.

56. Dull, Battle History, 120.

57. Brereton, Brereton Diaries, 37.

58. Keegan, Second World War, 254.

59. Brereton, Brereton Diaries, 35.

60. Spector, Eagle against the Sun, 457.

61. Sakai, Caidin, and Saito, Samurai!, 41.

62. Van der Vat, Pacific Campaign, 156.

63. Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision, 382.

64. Schom, Eagle and the Rising Sun, 143–45.

65. Van der Vat, Pacific Campaign, 121.

66. Ibid.

67. Ibid., 120.

68. Fuchida, Midway, 35.

69. Gailey, War in the Pacific, 47.
THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–45

99

70. Ibid., 50.

71. Van der Vat, Pacific Campaign, 26.

72. Fuchida, Midway, 43.

73. Wood, Japanese Military Strategy, 63.

74. Van der Vat, Pacific Campaign, 140.

75. Wood, Japanese Military Strategy, 12.

76. Agawa, Reluctant Admiral, 278–79.

77. Sakai, Caidin, and Saito, Samurai!, 46.

78. Ibid., 108. The shock of the Doolittle Raid changed Japanese attitudes 

towards the war. The chimera of invulnerability disappeared.

79. Gailey, War in the Pacific, 126.

80. Fuchida, Midway, 45.

81. Brereton, Brereton Diaries, 20.

82. Ibid., 38–41.

83. Agawa, Reluctant Admiral, 128.

84. Keegan, Second World War, 257.

85. Gailey, War in the Pacific, 55.

86. Costello, Days of Infamy, 5.

87. Morton, United States Army in World War II, 21.

88. Ibid., 27–30.

89. Goldstein and Dillon, ed., Pacific War Papers, 74.

90. Wood, Japanese Military Strategy, 75.

91. Agawa, Reluctant Admiral, 288–89.

92. Overy, Why the Allies Won, 33.

93. Hoyt, Carrier Wars, 56.

94. Schom, Eagle and the Rising Sun, 278–79. Despite their tactical victory against the American carriers in the Battle of the Coral Sea, the Japanese aborted their attempt to invade Port Moresby. This was their first failure 

at conquest. Wake Island had repelled one invasion, but fell on the second 

attack. Port Moresby remained a Japanese target and shaped the initial New 

Guinea campaign, but it never fell to Japan.

95. Van der Vat, Pacific Campaign, 161.

96. Sakai, Caidin, and Saito, Samurai!, 88.

97. Bergerud, Fire in the Sky, 327.

98. Fuchida, Midway, 51.

99. Brereton, Brereton Diaries, 43.

100. Ibid., 44.

101. Sakai, Caidin, and Saito, Samurai!, 74–75.

102. Ugaki et al., Fading Victory, 65.

103. Frank, Guadalcanal, 43–44.

104. Wood, Japanese Military Strategy, 18.

105. Halsey and Bryan, Admiral Halsey’s Story, 141.

106. Wood, Japanese Military Strategy, 19.

107. Overy, Why the Allies Won, 34.

108. Dull, Battle History, 238.

109. Ibid., 238.

110. Wood, Japanese Military Strategy, 90.
THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–45

100

111. Fuchida, Midway, 208.

112. Van der Vat, The Pacific Campaign, 162.

113. Gailey, War in the Pacific, 170.

114. Dunnigan and Nofi, Victory at Sea, 364.

115. Fuchida, Midway, 62.

116. Frank, Guadalcanal, 615.

117. Bergerud, Fire in the Sky, 668.

118. Overy, Why the Allies Won, 37.

119. Ugaki et al., Fading Victory, 217.

120. Groom, 1942, 334.

121. Wood, Japanese Military Strategy, 92–93.

122. Frank, Guadalcanal, 135–36.

123. Wood, Japanese Military Strategy, 91.

124. Sakai, Caidin, and Saito, Samurai!, 129.

125. Bergerud, Fire in the Sky, 463–64.

126. Marion, Cuddihy, and Cuddihy, On the Canal, 225.

127. Van der Vat, Pacific Campaign, 246–47.

128. Ibid., 267–68.

129. Ugaki et al., Fading Victory, 131.

130. Groom, 1942, 197–98.

131. Wood, Japanese Military Strategy, 17.

132. Griffith, Battle for Guadalcanal, 193.

133. Clemens, Alone on Guadalcanal, 14–15.

134. Ford, Rosenberg, and Balano, Admirals’ Advantage, 12.

135. Griffith, Battle for Guadalcanal, 44.

136. Groom, 1942, 301. General Kawaguchi, during his September 1942 attack on Henderson Airfield at Guadalcanal, believed the Americans had only 5,000 

men on the island. He felt, incorrectly, his force would be at least equal in strength 

to his enemy.

137. Fuchida, Midway, 85.

138. Dull, Battle History, 134.

139. Overy, Why the Allies Won, 38.

140. Kahn, Codebreakers, 590.

141. Ibid., 587.

142. Fuchida, Midway, 200.

143. Van der Vat, Pacific Campaign, 163. These objectives extended the 

Japanese perimeter beyond that for which IGHQ aimed in its prewar planning. 

Japan’s rapid conquests and slight losses seemed to provide an opportunity to 

extend their perimeter even further while simultaneously forcing the decisive 

battle that would force the Americans to negotiate a peace.

144. Wood, Japanese Military Strategy, 15.

145. Ibid., 19.

146. Fuchida, Midway, 91–92.

147. Van der Vat, Pacific Campaign, 147.

148. Ibid., 180–81.

149. Spector, Eagle against the Sun, 185–86.

150. Griffith, Battle for Guadalcanal, 31.
THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–45

101

151. Spector, Eagle against the Sun, 186.

152. Larrabee, Commander in Chief, 290–91.

153. Clausewitz, On War, 573. Clausewitz, while discussing the culminating point of victory takes measure of military commanders: “This is why the 

majority of generals will prefer to stop short of their objective rather than risk 

approaching it too closely and why those with high courage and an entertaining spirit will often overshoot it and fail to attain their purpose. Only the man 

who can achieve great results with limited means has really hit the mark.” 

The Americans did this at Midway and Guadalcanal.

154. Wood, Japanese Military Strategy, 7.

155. Ibid., 93.

156. Overy, Why the Allies Won, 37.

157. Fuchida, Midway, 146.

158. Van der Vat, Pacific Campaign, 223.

159. Griffith, Battle for Guadalcanal, 86–87.

160. Frank, Guadalcanal, 606.

161. Griffith, Battle for Guadalcanal, 129.

162. Groom, 1942, 339.

163. Frank, Guadalcanal, 81.

164. Gailey, War in the Pacific, 207.

165. Ibid., 321.

166. Frank, Guadalcanal, 120. The Battle of Savo Island on the night of 

8–9 August 1942 resulted in the sinking of four Allied cruisers: Canberra, 

Vincennes, Astoria, and Quincy. The destroyer Jarvis was also crippled and 

the cruiser Chicago heavily damaged. The Japanese force suffered only light 

damage in the exchange. The Japanese incurred 214 casualties to the Allied 

total of 1,777. (pp. 102–23). 

167. Ibid., 121.

168. Halsey and Bryan, Admiral Halsey’s Story, 131.

169. Wood, Japanese Military Strategy, 77.

170. Bergerud, Fire in the Sky, 424.

171. Van der Vat, Pacific Campaign, 245.

172. Sakai, Caidin, and Saito, Samurai!, 89.

173. Bergerud, Fire in the Sky, 570.

174. Dunnigan and Nofi, Victory at Sea, 240.

175. Bergerud, Fire in the Sky, 670.

176. Frank, Guadalcanal, 611.

177. Griffith, Battle for Guadalcanal, 179.

178. Ugaki et al., Fading Victory, 319.

179. Cook and Cook, Japan at War, 261.

180. Ibid., 126–27. By the end of the war, according to recruiter Debun 

Shigenobu, even Japanese mayors and assemblymen were called up to serve 

in the armed forces.

181. Ibid., 192–93. Somewhere between 670,000 and 1,000,000 Koreans 

toiled in Japan’s mines and construction sites by the end of the war.

182. Ibid., 403. Cook records 4.3 million in Japan, 3.5 million in Asia and 

the Pacific, which included the 1.1 million posted to China and Manchuria.
THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–45

102

183. Hoyt, Carrier Wars, 129.

184. Dunnigan and Nofi, Victory at Sea, 256.

185. Ibid., 256.

186. Costello, Pacific War, 501–02.

187. Ibid., 554–55.

188. Overy, Why the Allies Won, 43.

189. Dull, Battle History, 273.

190. Hoyt, Carrier Wars, 216.

191. Cook and Cook, Japan at War, 171.

192. Overy, Why the Allies Won, 224–25.

193. Dunnigan and Nofi, Victory at Sea, 61.

194. Wood, Japanese Military Strategy, 30.

195. Overy, Why the Allies Won, 220.

196. Cook and Cook, Japan at War, 138.

197. Gailey, War in the Pacific, 311.

198. Van der Vat, Pacific Campaign, 249.

199. Bergerud, Fire in the Sky, 347.

200. Van der Vat, Pacific Campaign, 319. The B–29 could fly at 360 miles 

per hour, 36,000 feet altitude, with a 3,250-mile range (with half a load of 

bombs). Its bombing capacity included 20,000 lbs. carried internally.

201. Overy, Why the Allies Won, 296.

202. Ford, Rosenberg, and Balano, Admirals’ Advantage, 12–13.

203. Spector, Eagle against the Sun, 302.

204. Wood, Japanese Military Strategy, 54.

205. Kahn, Codebreakers, 594.

206. Van der Vat, Pacific Campaign, 269.

207. Ford, Rosenberg, and Balano, Admirals’ Advantage, 17.

208. Bergerud, Fire in the Sky, 675.

209. Kahn, Codebreakers, 584.

210. Van der Vat, Pacific Campaign, 261.

211. Gailey, War in the Pacific, 308.

212. Spector, Eagle against the Sun, 421–22.

213. Wood, Japanese Military Strategy, 47.

214. Spector, Eagle against the Sun, 276–78.

215. Ibid., 298.

216. Gailey, War in the Pacific, 301.

217. Spector, Eagle against the Sun, 253.

218. Gailey, War in the Pacific, 345.

219. Van der Vat, Pacific Campaign, 342.

220. Spector, Eagle against the Sun, 431–36.

221. Costello, Pacific War, 500–01.

222. Ibid., 547.

223. Gailey, War in the Pacific, 445.

224. Ibid., 261.

225. Van der Vat, Pacific Campaign, 328.

226. Gailey, War in the Pacific, 372.

227. Hart, History of the Second World War, 689–90.
THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–45

103

228. Morison, Two-Ocean War, 489.

229. Dull, Battle History, 341.

230. Costello, Pacific War, 514–15.

231. Spector, Eagle against the Sun, 310–11.

232. Wood, Japanese Military Strategy, 48.

233. Van der Vat, Pacific Campaign, 332.

234. Wood, Japanese Military Strategy, 78.

235. Van der Vat, Pacific Campaign, 355.

236. Gailey, War in the Pacific, 364.

237. Wood, Japanese Military Strategy, 88–89.

238. Sakai, Caidin, and Saito, Samurai!, 235.

239. Van der Vat, Pacific Campaign, 260.

240. Overy, Why the Allies Won, 126.

241. Wood, Japanese Military Strategy, 31.

105

Chapter 4

Conclusion

The disparate characteristics of the two wars studied demand 

a comparison of the hierarchy of elements underlying shifts in 

strategic initiative. Comparison of the two transition points in 

which initiative fell into dispute and comparison of the two 

points in which initiative finally changed hands will prove especially revealing. A final comparison of the overall rank order of 

the elements in each historical example should prove similarly 

educational.

If a nation can stave off defeat in an opening campaign, what 

matters most is not who possesses the strategic initiative at the 

beginning of the war, but who has it at the end is the most obvious, and perhaps most important, insight to be gleaned from 

these studies. Underlying this truth is the finding that an advantage in strategic acumen was the most significant contributor to the efforts of both the Soviets and the Americans to wrest 

the initiative from their opponents. Both recognized and grasped 

opportunities, despite the commensurate risks involved, to 

fight important battles whose outcomes had positive, strategic 

consequences. In each case, surprise was a critical element in 

gaining this advantage. The Moscow counteroffensive was audacious, although its ill-advised expansion to a general offensive overreached Soviet capabilities. The American plan at Midway proved bold but more reasonably calculated. 

In both examples, intelligence proved to be the key enabler of 

superior acumen. Soviet advantages at the Moscow transition 

point were limited. They did enjoy a slightly better appreciation 

of reality than the Germans, but not to the extent that the 

Americans did over the Japanese at Midway. Nevertheless, 

their more accurate awareness of the situation enhanced Soviet judgment and enabled them to bring about surprise. Intelligence at the Midway transition point was superb, allowing the 

American perception to match reality, while denying the same 

to Japan. These advantages helped produce a better plan for 

the battle and again enabled the achievement of surprise. 
CONCLUSIONS

106

Examination of resources and operational methods reveals 

noticeable differences between the Soviet and American experiences. The Soviets held resource superiority around Moscow in 

1941, but the United States was inferior in strategic resources 

at the Battle of Midway. Operationally, the reverse was true; 

the United States bested Japan, while the Germans were superior to the Soviets. Tactically, both Axis nations were better 

than their Allied foes. Nevertheless, the outcome was the same: 

initiative fell into dispute. 

This contrast requires further analysis. At the first transition 

points, the Soviets held a moderate edge in strategic acumen 

and smaller advantages in intelligence and resources, while the 

Germans held a moderate operational and tactical superiority. 

The United States held large advantages in strategic acumen 

and intelligence as well as an edge in operational method to Japan’s significant resource advantage and small tactical superiority. The smaller Soviet edge in resources, combined with its 

other advantages, offset their operational and tactical inferiority, 

while Japan’s lackluster strategic acumen, intelligence, and poor 

operational method undermined its advantages in resources and 

tactics. At Midway, the Americans achieved resource parity in 

the critical element of aircraft––caused by Japanese decision 

making and operational methods that dispersed their carrier 

force. This comparison reveals that the elements of the strategic 

initiative paradigm are highly interactive. It also illustrates that 

resources and operational methods may potentially supplant 

each other in the hierarchy of significance. 

We must also compare the transitions of the two experiences 

from disputed initiative to the erstwhile defender’s attainment 

of initiative. The Soviets had multiple advantages over Germany 

at the close of the Stalingrad campaign. They held a large edge 

in strategic acumen, demonstrating vastly superior planning, 

deception, and surprise. The Germans retained only a very 

slight operational edge. Similarly, at Guadalcanal the United 

States held significant advantages over Japan in all categories 

except resources. These advantages were less pronounced than 

in the Russo–German experience. Thus, strategic acumen 

proved the most significant contributor to the shifts of strategic 

initiative in both cases. 
CONCLUSIONS

107

In assessing the shifts from the second to the third phases of 

both wars, intelligence retained its position as the second-most 

significant contributor to and determinant of strategic initiative. By the time of Stalingrad, the Soviets had developed a better picture of the situation than the Germans; and they materially improved their own security operations. At the end of the 

Guadalcanal campaign, the Americans had clear intelligence 

superiority over the Japanese. Their understanding of the situation towered over that of their Asian foe, and their security 

measures contributed to Japan’s lack of situational awareness. 

Once again, knowledge proved critical to prudent decision making and judgment.

There was also a diversion between the relative significance of 

resources and operational and tactical method between the two 

examples. At Stalingrad, the Soviets held a large resource advantage but were marginally inferior to the Germans operationally and tactically. The reverse was true between the Americans 

and the Japanese. The Americans held a significant operational 

and tactical edge, but the Japanese held a slight resource advantage after Guadalcanal. Nevertheless, the outcomes were 

similar, with the Soviets and the Americans both seizing strategic initiative and holding it for the remainder of the war. Why the 

difference? The German operational and tactical advantages at 

Stalingrad were razor thin. In some instances, such as urban 

combat, the Soviets were superior. Thus, Soviet resource superiority proved critical. On the other side of the globe, the significant operational and tactical superiority of the Americans undercut the Japanese edge in resources.

The overall hierarchy of the elements in both conflicts was 

generally parallel. Strategic acumen ranked first, followed by 

its supporting element, intelligence. In Russia, resources and 

operational and tactical method finished a very close third and 

fourth, respectively. Operational and tactical prowess seems to 

have played a more critical role in the Pacific than it did in Russia, surpassing resources for the third rung in the hierarchy. 

Overall, however, resources placed third, with operational and 

tactical methods placing fourth.

The rank ordering of the four elements makes a certain amount 

of theoretical sense. There is a clear demarcation between strategic acumen and intelligence on the one hand, which corre-
CONCLUSIONS

108

spond to wisdom and knowledge, and resources and operational 

and tactical methods on the other, which correspond to capacity 

and techniques. Wisdom and knowledge exist in the realm of 

thought, and capacity and technique exist in the realm of action. 

Many implications flow from this correlation.

Strategic acumen consistently ranked first because of its relationship to the other elements and its existence in the realm 

of thought and conception. Wisdom in war requires the knowledge given by intelligence, but it also requires an understanding of one’s own capacity for war and one’s own abilities in war. 

Hence, intelligence, resources, and methods are factors the 

strategist must consider. Consistently sound judgment depends on a proper understanding of all three subordinate elements. Such an understanding is easier to describe than to 

achieve. Fortunately, a country at war does not have to achieve 

perfection; it must only achieve a relative advantage. But, the 

greater the advantage, the greater the payoff rings true. 

The second mental component is knowledge, or intelligence. 

Knowledge is critical to proper judgment. Without it, decisions 

are but a guess. However, knowledge is subordinate because 

the truly gifted can make up in intuition what they lack in factual awareness. Thus, intelligence is a foundational element of 

strategic acumen. 

Resources, which ranked third in our hierarchy, delineate the 

transition to the more tangible elements. They are the currency 

of war. Accumulation and expenditure of resources is required 

to achieve one’s aims. Without men and equipment, war simply 

cannot be waged. Resources, however, do affect the other categories. The strategist must understand what is available for expenditure and decide where and when to expend it. The more a 

combatant has available, the more options the combatant enjoys. Thus, resources can either ease or complicate strategic dilemmas. Similarly, resources, including both their number and 

quality, affect the operational and tactical methods of the party 

in question. As former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 

once famously remarked, nations are compelled to fight with the 

military forces they have.1 Thus, resources potentially provide 

flexibility or restraint at all levels of war. 

Operational and tactical methods challenge resources for third 

place in the hierarchy, but generally seem to fall just short of the 
CONCLUSIONS

109

influence material richness or poverty exert. In the Russo–German 

War, Soviet resource advantages at both transition points proved 

critical to the shifts in initiative. Nevertheless, after the Battle of 

Moscow, Germany’s operational and tactical superiority limited the 

Red Army to disputing the initiative, rather than seizing it. The 

opposite was true in the Pacific. American operational superiority was critical to placing the initiative in dispute, while Japanese 

resource superiority ensured the Americans could not immediately seize the initiative when it became disputed. The Americans, 

however, did seize the initiative at Guadalcanal while still suffering 

from resource inferiority. One explanation for this difference is in 

the geographic characteristics of the two theaters. Logistics were 

of vital importance in both wars, but the Pacific’s breadth and the 

maritime nature of the war fought there made logistical support 

significantly more difficult. One might be able to use rail, roads, 

or barges to supply Stalingrad; but there was only one major way 

to sustain Guadalcanal; that way, shipping, had to traverse thousands of miles of ocean, often vulnerable to submarine or air attack. Therefore, raw numbers of resources told only a partial story. 

Thus, the import of operational and tactical method was enhanced 

in the vastness of the Pacific and closely rivaled that of resources. 

Yet the general observation stands: as long as a combatant performed adequately tactically and operationally, any advantage in 

that arena could be offset by more important advantages in the 

other three elements. 

In sum, both the Russo–German War and the Japanese–

American War demonstrate that while resources and operational and tactical method are important, strategic acumen 

and intelligence exert noticeably greater influence over strategic initiative in a modern, conventional war. Japan and Germany executed very well at the operational and tactical levels 

during the beginning of and well into their wars, but Allied 

advantages in the other areas turned the tide and eventually 

decided the issue. 

Areas for Further Study

The historical examples studied here clearly point to the need 

for further investigation. Both studies correspond to a specific 
CONCLUSIONS

110

era and to conventional war, albeit in maritime and land-centric theaters. A greater understanding of the concept of strategic initiative requires broader analysis.

The scale of the war investigated may influence the underlying precepts of strategic initiative. Geography played a key role 

in both these wars. The breadth of the Soviet Union resulted in 

a land campaign of unprecedented size. German successes 

against smaller, less populous nations in Europe stand in stark 

contrast to Operation Barbarossa. The vast expanses of the 

Pacific also produced a long war and effectively shielded, for a 

time, the homelands of both major combatants. It may be that 

in wars confined to smaller areas or of shorter duration, the 

hierarchy of elements fluctuates. 

The character of the war in question may also influence strategic initiative. These were conventional wars. The state-of-theart forces of two or more nations vied for victory against similar 

adversaries. Strategic initiative and the influence of its underlying precepts may exhibit decidedly different characteristics in 

irregular conflicts. 

Time may also imply changes. These examples from World 

War II tell us about the nature of strategic initiative and shifts 

therein in the middle of the twentieth century. To obtain greater 

confidence in the dynamics of strategic initiative over time, the 

chronological breadth of study must be expanded. Industrialization is a fact in the modern era. Analysis of conflicts from 

the pre-industrial age may well exhibit substantially different 

influences on shifts in strategic initiative.

There is also room for more in-depth investigation of the differences between a land-centric war and a maritime conflict. 

The potential for maneuver in a war in which the sea plays a 

large role may increase the import of operational and tactical 

methods. Whether this was unique to the Pacific in World War 

II or a common facet of war in a maritime theater warrants additional study.

Strategic air campaigns may provide another venue for analysis. The European air war from 1939 through 1945 could provide one example. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s 

Kosovo campaign of the 1990s could provide another. The air 

war over China during World War II may also be worth consideration. The fluid nature of air campaigns will probably make 
CONCLUSIONS

111

the concept of initiative more difficult to define and analyze; 

but this challenge would be worthy of addressing.

Conventional wisdom views Allied resource dominance as the 

ultimate arbiter of victory in World War II. It is often presumed 

that Soviet masses and American industrial might were predestined to overcome Germany’s and Japan’s military machines. 

This study of strategic initiative sharply challenges such an interpretation. Possession of initiative at the end of the war proved 

critical in both examples. But resources ranked only third in the 

hierarchy of elements that underlie strategic initiative. There is 

no doubt that resources are essential to the conduct of war. 

Similarly, there is no doubt that a nation with an overwhelming 

resource advantage may enjoy a significant edge in modern, 

conventional war, even if lacking in the other elements. Examples such as the Soviet victory in the Russo–Finnish War of 

1939–40 seem to validate this assertion. But in a conflict lacking 

such a wide disparity in resources, strategic acumen supported 

by good intelligence frequently overcomes brute strength. Both 

the Soviets and Americans eventually fielded huge military machines that helped them end the war. But, they both started 

down the path to victory and were winning the war before they 

accumulated such overwhelming power. 

Thus, the burden of these two cases is clear. A four-fold hierarchy of superior wisdom, knowledge, capacity, and technique drives shifts in strategic initiative in modern, conventional war.

Note

1. Schmitt, “Iraq-Bound Troops Confront Rumsfeld,” New York Times, 8 

December 2004. Rumsfeld, when answering questions about lack of armored 

protection on US vehicles in Iraq, stated, “You go to war with the army you 

have, not the army you might want or wish to have at a later time.”

113

Bibliography

Adair, Paul. Hitler’s Greatest Defeat: The Collapse of Army Group 

Centre, June 1944. New York, NY: Arms and Armour, 

1994.

Agawa, Hiroyuki. The Reluctant Admiral: Yamamoto and the Imperial Navy. Translated by John Bester. New York, NY: Kodansha International, 1982.

Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-1. Air Warfare, 22 January 2000.

Bartov, Omer. Hitler’s Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the 

Third Reich. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1991.

Bellamy, Chris. Absolute War: Soviet Russia in the Second World 

War. New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 2007.

Bergerud, Eric M. Fire in the Sky: The Air War in the South Pacific. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000.

Boyne, Walter J. Clash of Wings: World War II in the Air. New 

York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1994.

Brereton, Lewis H. The Brereton Diaries: The War in the Air in 

the Pacific, Middle East and Europe, 3 October 1941–8 May 

1945. New York, NY: W. Morrow and Company, 1946.

Chuikov, V. I. The Battle for Stalingrad. Translated by Harold 

Silver. New York, NY: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1964.

Citino, Robert Michael. Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm: The Evolution 

of Operational Warfare. Modern War Studies. Lawrence, 

KS: University Press of Kansas, 2004.

———. Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns of 

1942. Modern War Studies. Lawrence, KS: University Press 

of Kansas, 2007.

Clark, Alan. Barbarossa: The Russian-German Conflict, 1941–

1945. New York, NY: Quill, 1985.

Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Translated by Michael Howard 

and Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 

1976.

Clemens, Martin. Alone on Guadalcanal: A Coastwatcher’s 

Story. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1998.

Cook, Haruko Taya, and Theodore Failor Cook. Japan at War: 

An Oral History. New York, NY: New Press, 1992.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

114

Costello, John. Days of Infamy: MacArthur, Roosevelt, Churchill, 

the Shocking Truth Revealed: How Their Secret Deals and 

Strategic Blunders Caused Disasters at Pearl Harbor and 

the Philippines. New York, NY: Pocket Books, 1994.

———. The Pacific War 1941–1945: The First Comprehensive 

One-Volume Account of the Causes and Conduct of World 

War II in the Pacific. New York, NY: Quill, 1981.

Dower, John W. War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War. New York, NY: Pantheon, 1986.

Dull, Paul S. A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 

1941–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1978.

Dunnigan, James F., and Albert A. Nofi. Victory at Sea: World 

War II in the Pacific. New York: William Morrow and Co., 

1995.

Erickson, John. Stalin’s War with Germany. vol. 1, The Road to 

Stalingrad. London, UK: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983.

———. Stalin’s War with Germany. vol. 2, The Road to Berlin.

London, UK: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1975.

———. The Soviet High Command: A Military-Political History, 

1918–1941. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984.

Erickson, John, and David Dilks, eds. Barbarossa: The Axis 

and the Allies. Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 

1994.

Field Manual (FM) 1-02. Operational Terms and Graphics. 21 

September 2004.

Ford, Christopher A., David Alan Rosenberg, and Randy Carol 

Balano. The Admirals’ Advantage: U.S. Navy Operational 

Intelligence in World War II and the Cold War. Annapolis, 

MD: Naval Institute Press, 2005.

Forrestal, James. The Forrestal Diaries. New York, NY: Viking 

Press, 1951.

Frank, Richard B. Guadalcanal. New York, NY: Random House, 

1990.

Fuchida, Mitsuo, Masatake Okumiya, Clarke K. Kawakami, 

and Roger Pineau. Midway: The Battle That Doomed Japan. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1992.

Fugate, Bryan I., and Lev Dvoretsky. Thunder on the Dnepr: 

Zhukov-Stalin and the Defeat of Hitler’s Blitzkrieg. Novato, 

CA: Presidio Press, 1997.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

115

Gailey, Harry A. The War in the Pacific: From Pearl Harbor to 

Tokyo Bay. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1995.

Glantz, David M. Colossus Reborn: The Red Army at War, 1941-

1943. Edited by Theodore A. Wilson. Modern War Studies. 

Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2005.

———. Kharkov 1942: Anatomy of a Military Disaster. Rockville 

Centre, NY: Sarpedon, 1998.

———. The Role of Intelligence in Soviet Military Strategy in 

World War II. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1990.

———. Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War. London, UK: F. Cass, 1989.

———. Zhukov’s Greatest Defeat: The Red Army’s Epic Disaster 

in Operation Mars, 1942. Modern War Studies. Lawrence, 

KS: University Press of Kansas, 1999.

Glantz, David M., and Jonathan M. House. The Battle of Kursk. 

Modern War Studies. Lawrence, KS: University Press of 

Kansas, 1999.

———. When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler. Modern War Studies. Lawrence, KS: University Press 

of Kansas, 1995.

Goebbels, Joseph, and Louis Paul Lochner. The Goebbels Diaries, 1942–1943. Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, 1948.

Goldstein, Donald M. and Katherine V. Dillon, ed. The Pacific 

War Papers: Japanese Documents of World War II. Washington, DC: Potomac Books, Inc., 2004.

Gray, Colin S. Modern Strategy. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Griffith, Samuel B. The Battle for Guadalcanal. New York, NY: 

Lippincott, 1963.

Groom, Winston. 1942: The Year That Tried Men’s Souls. New 

York, NY: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2005.

Guderian, Heinz. Panzer Leader. Translated by Constantine 

Fitzgibbons. New York, NY: Da Capo Press, 1996.

Halder, Franz. The Halder War Diary, 1939–1942. Edited by 

Charles Burton Burdick and Hans Adolf Jacobsen. Novato, 

CA: Presidio Press, 1988.

Halsey, William Frederick, and J. Bryan. Admiral Halsey’s 

Story. New York, NY: Whittlesey House, 1947.

Hitler, Adolf. Mein Kampf. Translated by Ralph Manheim. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1971.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

116

Holmes, Richard, Hew Strachan, Chris Bellamy, and Hugh Bicheno, eds. The Oxford Companion to Military History. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2001.

Hoyt, Edwin P. Carrier Wars: Naval Aviation from World War II to 

the Persian Gulf. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1989.

Ienaga, Saburo. The Pacific War: World War II and the Japanese, 

1931–1945. New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1978.

Joint Publication (JP) 1-02. Department of Defense Military and 

Associated Terms. 12 April 2001 (as amended through 17 

October 2007). 

JP 5-0. Joint Operation Planning. 26 December 2006.

Kahn, David. The Codebreakers: The Story of Secret Writing. 

New York, NY: Macmillan, 1967.

Kato, Masuo. The Lost War: A Japanese Reporter’s inside Story. 

New York, NY: A. A. Knopf, 1946.

Keegan, John. The Second World War. New York, NY: Penguin 

Books, 1990.

Keitel, Wilhelm. The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Keitel: Chief of 

the German High Command, 1938–1945. Edited by Walter 

Gorlitz. Translated by David Irving. New York, NY: Cooper 

Square Press, 2000.

Larrabee, Eric. Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 

His Lieutenants, and Their War. New York, NY: Harper & 

Row, 1987.

Liddell Hart, Basil Henry. The German Generals Talk. New York, 

NY: W. Morrow, 1948.

———. History of the Second World War. New York, NY: G.P. 

Putnam’s Sons, 1970.

Lonsdale, David J. The Nature of War in the Information Age: 

Clausewitzian Future. Cass Series: Strategy and History, 

no. 9. New York, NY: F. Cass, 2004.

Luck, Hans von. Panzer Commander: The Memoirs of Colonel 

Hans von Luck. New York, NY: Dell Publishing Group, Inc., 

1989.

Luttwak, Edward. Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace. Revised and enlarged ed. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of 

Harvard University Press, 2001.

Manstein, Erich von. Lost Victories. Edited and translated by 

Anthony G. Powell. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1994.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

117

Marion, Ore J., Thomas Cuddihy, and Edward Cuddihy. On the 

Canal: The Marines of L-3-5 on Guadalcanal, 1942. Stackpole Military History Series. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole 

Books, 2004.

Megargee, Geoffrey P. Inside Hitler’s High Command. Modern 

War Studies. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 

2000.

Mellenthin, F. W. von. Panzer Battles. Translated by H. Belzer. 

New York, NY: Ballantine Books, 1956.

Morison, Samuel Eliot. The Two-Ocean War: A Short History of 

the United States Navy in the Second World War. Boston, 

MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1963.

Morton, Louis. United States Army in World War II: The War in 

the Pacific, the Fall of the Philippines. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the 

Army, 1953.

Muller, Richard. The German Air War in Russia. Baltimore, MD: 

Nautical & Aviation Pub. Co. of America, 1992.

Nagorski, Andrew. The Greatest Battle: Stalin, Hitler, and the 

Desperate Struggle for Moscow That Changed the Course of 

World War II. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2007.

Overy, Richard J. Why the Allies Won. New York, NY: W.W. Norton, 1996.

———. The Air War, 1939–1945. Chelsea, MI: Scarborough 

House, 1991.

Pleshakov, Konstantin. Stalin’s Folly: The Tragic First Ten Days 

of World War II on the Eastern Front. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 2005.

Raus, Erhard, and Steven H. Newton. Panzer Operations: The 

Eastern Front Memoir of General Raus, 1941–1945. Translated by Steven H. Newton. Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 

2003.

Rokossovsky, Konstantin. A Soldier’s Duty. Translated by Vladimir Talmy. Moscow: Progress, 1970.

Sakai, Saburo, Martin Caidin, and Fred Saito. Samurai! New 

York, NY: Dutton, 1957.

Schom, Alan. The Eagle and the Rising Sun: The JapaneseAmerican War, 1941–1943, Pearl Harbor through Guadalcanal. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2004.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

118

Seaton, Albert. The Russo-German War, 1941–45. Novato, CA: 

Presidio, 1990.

Shirer, William L. The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of 

Nazi Germany. New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1960.

Shtemenko, S. M. The Soviet General Staff at War: 1941–1945. 

Translated by Robert Daglish. Moscow: Progress, 1970.

Simpkin, Richard E., and John Erickson. Deep Battle: The 

Brainchild of Marshal Tukhachevskii. Washington, DC: 

Brassey’s Defence, 1987.

Spector, Ronald H. Eagle against the Sun: The American War 

with Japan. New York, NY: The Free Press, 1985.

Stolfi, R. H. S. Hitler’s Panzers East: World War II Reinterpreted. 

Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.

Tse-Tung, Mao. On the Protracted War, 2nd ed. Peking: Foreign 

Languages Press, 1960.

Ugaki, Matome, Gordon William Prange, Donald M. Goldstein, 

and Catherine Dillon. Fading Victory: The Diary of Admiral 

Matome Ugaki, 1941–1945. Translated by Masataka Chihaya. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991.

Van der Vat, Dan. The Pacific Campaign: World War II, the U.S.-

Japanese Naval War, 1941–1945. New York, NY: Simon & 

Schuster, 1991.

Warlimont, Walter. Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, 1939–45. 

Translated by R.H. Barry. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1991.

Werth, Alexander. Russia at War, 1941–1945. New York: Carroll 

and Graf, 1964.

Wohlstetter, Roberta. Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962.

Wood, James B. Japanese Military Strategy in the Pacific War: 

Was Defeat Inevitable? New York, NY: Roman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2007.

Zhukov, Georgi I. Konstantinovich, and Harrison Evans Salisbury. Marshal Zhukov’s Greatest Battles. Translated by 

Theodore Shabad. New York, NY: Harper and Row, 1969.
“Who Has the Puck?” Judge

Strategic Initiative in Modern,

Conventional War

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Cut along dotted line

After you have read this research report, please give us your 

frank opinion on the contents. All comments—large or small,

complimentary or caustic—will be gratefully appreciated.

Mail them to the Director, AFRI, 155 N. Twining St.,

Maxwell AFB, AL 36112-6026.

Thank you for your assistance.

“Who Has the Puck?”

Strategic Initiative in Modern,

Conventional War

Air University Press Team

Chief Editor

Belinda Bazinet

Copy Editor

Andrew Thayer

Cover Art, Book Design, and Illustrations

Daniel Armstrong

Composition and

Prepress Production

Mary P. Ferguson

Quality Review

Mary J. Moore

Print Preparation

Diane Clark

Distribution

Diane Clark