If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

-1-

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

UNPUBLISHED

In re BISHOP, Minor. December 3, 2019

No. 349148

Wayne Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 15-519604-NA

Before: METER, P.J., and JANSEN and GLEICHER, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent-mother appeals as of right the trial court’s termination of her parental rights 

to her minor son, GB, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii), (b)(i), (j), and (k)(i). We affirm.

Respondent-mother is the biological mother to four children, but her parental rights to her 

three older children were previously terminated. Two of these older children were born testing 

positive for illegal substances. The trial court terminated respondent-mother’s parental rights to 

all three older children after respondent-mother failed to comply with and benefit from her 

service plan, particularly because of respondent-mother’s failure to address her substance-abuse 

issues This appeal, however, concerns only respondent-mother’s parental rights to her youngest 

child, GB, who was born testing positive for cocaine, opiates, and marijuana. Following GB’s 

birth, petitioner filed an initial petition to terminate respondent-mother’s parental rights to the 

child. The trial court found statutory grounds to terminate respondent-mother’s parental rights to 

GB under MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii), (b)(i), (j), and (k)(i) and concluded that termination of 

respondent-mother’s parental rights was in GB’s best interests because of respondent-mother’s 

unwillingness to address her substance abuse or the other issues necessitating the trial court’s 

jurisdiction. 

On appeal, respondent-mother does not directly challenge the trial court’s statutorygrounds or best-interest findings. Respondent-mother argues only that the trial court’s 

termination of her parental rights was premature because petitioner did not engage in reasonable 

efforts to reunify her with GB because petitioner did not investigate GB’s maternal grandmother 

as a possible relative placement. We review this unpreserved issue for plain error affecting 

respondent-mother’s substantial rights. In re Beers, 325 Mich App 653, 677; 926 NW2d 832 

(2018). “To avoid forfeiture under the plain-error rule, the proponent must establish that a clear 
-2-

or obvious error occurred and that the error affected substantial rights.” Id. “[A]n error affects 

substantial rights if it caused prejudice, i.e., it affected the outcome of the proceedings.” Id. 

(internal citation, quotation marks, and brackets omitted). 

It is noteworthy that respondent-mother frames her claim as an absence of reasonable 

efforts to reunify her with GB. When a child is removed from a parent’s custody, petitioner has 

the “responsibility to expend reasonable efforts to provide services to secure reunification.” In 

re Frey, 297 Mich App 242, 248; 824 NW2d 569 (2012). Included in the reasonable-efforts duty 

is the duty to investigate potential relative placements for the child. See MCL 712A.19a(4)(d); 

MCL 722.954a(2), (5). An absence of reasonable efforts to provide services aimed at 

reunification may render termination premature. In re Mason, 486 Mich 142, 152; 782 NW2d 

747 (2010). “However, the petitioner is not required to provide reunification services when 

termination of parental rights is the agency’s goal.” 1 In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 91; 836 

NW2d 182 (2013) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 

In this case, petitioner sought termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights to GB in 

the initial petition. Accordingly, petitioner was not required to provide respondent-mother with 

reunification services. Id. Therefore, respondent-mother’s argument that petitioner failed to 

make reasonable efforts to reunify her with GB by investigating a relative placement with the 

maternal grandmother is without merit. 

In any event, even had petitioner been required to provide respondent-mother with 

reunification services, respondent-mother is still not entitled to relief. Notably, while petitioner 

may have a duty to provide reunification services, parents have a commensurate responsibility to 

participate in the services that are offered. In re Frey, 297 Mich App 242, 248; 824 NW2d 569 

(2012). Logically, with regard to placement services, these corresponding duties mean that, if 

petitioner has a duty to investigate placement with relatives, respondent-mother has a 

commensurate duty to assist this investigation by providing petitioner with the information 

necessary to complete it. In this case, it is clear that petitioner attempted to investigate potential 

relative placements but respondent-mother failed to respond to petitioner’s phone calls or 

provide any relevant information. While the trial court opined that the maternal grandmother—

who, by all accounts, assumed an active role in respondent-mother’s parenting—could provide 

her information directly to petitioner, the maternal grandmother failed to do so. Petitioner held a 

family team meeting that neither respondent-mother nor the maternal grandmother attended and 

respondent-mother’s and the maternal grandmother’s absence from many hearings and trial made 

it impossible to discuss the issue before the circuit court. Indeed, respondent-mother moved her 

place of residence without providing petitioner with a forwarding address, thereby cutting off an 

alternative method of communication. Therefore, because respondent-mother failed in her 

 1 This principle applies to an initial petition seeking termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(a), (b), 

(d), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i), (j), (k), (1), or (m). See In re Moss, 301 Mich App at 91. Petitioner may 

still be required to provide reunification efforts if termination is not sought under one of these 

subsections. Nonetheless, because petitioner sought termination in the initial petition under 

subsections (a), (b), (j), and (k), it was not required to provide reunification services.
-3-

commensurate duty to participate in the placement services, respondent-mother’s reasonableefforts argument is without merit. 

Finally, it is clear that, even had petitioner erred by failing to investigate placement with 

the maternal grandmother, the error would not affect respondent-mother’s substantial rights 

because the record from the proceedings regarding the three older children demonstrates that the 

maternal grandmother would not have been an appropriate placement for GB. The record from 

the prior proceedings indicates that the maternal grandmother attended many of the parentingtime sessions with the older children, during which she would try to start fights with the 

caseworkers. Indeed, the trial court forbade the maternal grandmother from attending visits with 

the three older children because her behavior at visits was “unacceptable” and “inciteful.” 

Moreover, while the maternal grandmother was largely absent from the proceedings involving 

GB, she did attend many of the hearings involving the older children. The maternal 

grandmother’s presence at these proceedings, however, was less than helpful as her frequent 

outbursts and other inappropriate courtroom behavior prompted the trial court to preclude her 

from testifying. 

Relatedly, the maternal grandmother’s failure to contact petitioner regarding placement 

indicates that, despite respondent-mother’s argument, the maternal grandmother was not 

seriously ready to accept placement of the children. Therefore, because the maternal 

grandmother was not an appropriate or willing placement for the children, any alleged failure to 

investigate the maternal grandmother as a relative placement did not affect the outcome of the 

proceeding. Accordingly, respondent-mother cannot show that the alleged error affected her 

substantial rights. 

Affirmed.

/s/ Patrick M. Meter

/s/ Kathleen Jansen