UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. No. 99-4286 ROCKY LEE STALEY, Defendant-Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Durham. N. Carlton Tilley, Jr., Chief District Judge. (CR-98-301) Submitted: November 9, 1999 Decided: November 22, 1999 Before MURNAGHAN, MOTZ, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________ Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________ COUNSEL Louis C. Allen, III, Federal Public Defender, Eric D. Placke, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Walter C. Holton, Jr., United States Attorney, Robert A.J. Lang,Assistant United States Attorney, Laura Gendy, Third Year Law Student, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________Unpublished opinions are not binding pr ecedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________ OPINION PER CURIAM: Rocky Lee Staley was convicted pursuant to his guilty pleas ofmaking a false statement to a firearms dealer in order to obtain a firearm (18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) (1994)) and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (1994)). Staley alleges on appeal that the district court's upward departure under USSG § 4A1.3, p.s., 1 was unreasonable. Finding no reversible error, we affirm. Staley, who was twenty-three years old at the time of the current offenses, had over forty adult convictions, dating back to when hewas sixteen. The probation officer assigned twenty-five criminal history points and placed Staley in the highest criminal history category, Category VI. 2 The district court agreed with the government at sentencing that Staley's significant criminal history warranted an upward departure pursuant to USSG § 4A1.3, p.s. Noting that Staley had twelve points more than the minimum required for Category VI, the district court moved vertically down the sentencing table one level for

_________________________________________________________________ 1 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (1998). This section allows the sentencing court to depart upward from the normal sentencing range when the defendant's criminal history category does not adequately reflect the seriousness of his past criminal behavior or the likelihood that he will commit other crimes. 2 Staley challenged four of these points at sentencing, and he claims on appeal that the court agreed that his objections were technically correct. We find that Staley misunderstands the record. Our review shows that the district court decided not to address the merits of Staley's challenge because there were numerous other convictions which were not c ounted toward his criminal history score due to limitations imposed by the Guidelines but which could be considered when determining the extentof an upward departure. The court ultimately adopted the probation officer's assessment of twenty-five points.
2every three criminal history points above thirteen, for a total of four levels. On appeal, Staley concedes that the district court had the authority to depart in his case. He also admits that the district court used an approved formula (i.e., one level for every three criminal history points). Staley nevertheless argues that the departure in his case wasunreasonable because (1) his record does not contain the type of egregious conduct contemplated by the Sentencing Commission; (2) the court considered the four points he challenged; (3) it was greater than what we have approved in prior cases; and (4) the district court failed to explain why bypassed levels were inadequate. We review the district court's decision to depart upward for an abuse of discretion and find none. See United States v. Hairston , 96 F.3d 102, 105 (4th Cir. 1996). An important part of our review is a determination that the extent of the departure was reasonable. See United States v. Rusher , 966 F.2d 868, 884 (4th Cir. 1992). Contrary to Staley's assertions, his conduct was exactly the type envisioned by the Commission, and we find that the district court properly considered the factors outlined in USSG§ 4A1.3, p.s. In addition to the sheer number of prior convictions, the court noted thatthere were multiple convictions for assault, burglary, carrying a concealed weapon, and reckless driving. Moreover, the court correctlyconcluded that the large number of convictions occurring in a relatively short period of time suggested a propensity to commit future crimes. In short, we concur with the district court's finding that Staley engaged in a repeated pattern of serious misconduct.We further find that the district court properly considered intervening levels in arriving at its final sentence. The court explained the formula it was going to use and identified the sentencing range at each bypassed level. In addition, the court discussed the sentence at length with counsel and allowed Staley to speak in his own behalf. The court ultimately found that only a four-level increase would adequately account for the twelve "extra" criminal history points. Staley's remaining claims are equally without merit. As discussed earlier, the record does not support his claim that the district court
3agreed with his challenge concerning four of his criminal history points. Finally, we usually do not compare sentences in unrelated cases, and we find nothing here to warrant an exception from this general rule.We therefore affirm Staley's sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presentedin the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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