" ! HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

111TH CONGRESS

1st Session 

REVIEW NO. 

09–9099 

OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS 

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF 

REPRESENTATIVES 

Report and Findings 

Transmitted to the 

Committee on Standards of Official Conduct 

on December 2, 2009 

and released publicly pursuant to H. Res. 895 of the 

110th Congress as amended 

December 2009 


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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

1 

55–501 

" ! HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

111TH CONGRESS

1st Session 

REVIEW NO. 

2009

09–9099 

OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS 

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF 

REPRESENTATIVES 

Report and Findings 

Transmitted to the 

Committee on Standards of Official Conduct 

on December 2, 2009 

and released publicly pursuant to H. Res. 895 of the 

110th Congress as amended 

December 2009 


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(II) 

OFFICE OF 

CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS 

BOARD 

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

DAVID SKAGGS, Chair 

PORTER GOSS, Co-Chair 

YVONNE BURKE 

KAREN ENGLISH 

ALLISON HAYWARD 

JAY EAGEN 

WILLIAM FRENZEL 

ABNER MIKVA 

LEO J. WISE, Chief Counsel & Staff Director 

OMAR S. ASHMAWY, Investigative Counsel 


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REPORT 

Review No. 09–9099 

The Board of the Office of Congressional Ethics (hereafter the 

‘‘Board’’, by a vote of no less than four members, on November 20, 

2009, adopted the following report and ordered it to be transmitted 

to the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct of the United 

States House of Representatives. 

SUBJECT: Representative John Murtha 

NATURE OF THE ALLEGED VIOLATION: In Fiscal Year 2009, 

Representative John Murtha authored several earmarks for clients 

of PMA Group, Inc. (hereafter ‘‘PMA’’). During campaign cycles 

2008 and 2010, Representative Murtha received contributions to 

his campaign committee and ‘‘Leadership PAC’’ from PMA’s PAC, 

PMA employees, the PACs of PMA clients for whom he authored 

earmarks, and the employees of those clients. 

If Representative Murtha solicited or accepted contributions or 

other items of value in exchange for or because of an official act, 

or solicited or accepted contributions or other items of value in a 

manner which gave the appearance that the contributions were 

linked to an official act, then Representative Murtha may have violated 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (Bribery), 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) (Illegal Gratuities), 5 U.S.C. § 7353 (Gifts to Federal Employees), and House 

Rules and Standards of Conduct. 

RECOMMENDATION: The Board of the Office of Congressional 

Ethics recommends that the Committee on Standards of Official 

Conduct dismiss the above allegations. 

VOTES IN THE AFFIRMATIVE: 6 

VOTES IN THE NEGATIVE: 0 

MEMBER OF THE BOARD OR STAFF DESIGNATED TO 

PRESENT THIS REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON STANDARDS OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT: Leo Wise, Staff Director & Chief 

Counsel. 


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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 3 

A. Summary of Allegations ....................................................................... 3 

B. Jurisdictional Statement ...................................................................... 3 

C. Procedural History ............................................................................... 3 

D. Summary of Investigative Activity ..................................................... 4 

II. THE OCE UNCOVERED NO EVIDENCE THAT REPRESENTATIVE 

MURTHA REQUESTED EARMARKS FOR PMA CLIENTS IN CONNECTION WITH CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS HE RECEIVED ....... 6 

A. Relevant Law, Regulations, Rules or Standards of Conduct ............ 6 

B. Earmark Process ................................................................................... 9 

C. Campaign Fundraising ......................................................................... 10 

D. Relationship with PMA ........................................................................ 11 

E. Perception of Corporate Donors .......................................................... 12 

F. Contributions Linked to Official Acts by Outside Entities ............... 13 

III. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 14 

IV. INFORMATION THE OCE WAS UNABLE TO OBTAIN AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF SUBPOENAS ................. 14 


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1 H. Res 895, 110th Cong. § 1(e) (2008) (as amended). 

2 A preliminary review is ‘‘requested’’ in writing by members of the Board of the OCE. The 

request for a preliminary review is received by the OCE on a date certain. According to H. Res. 

895 of the 110th Congress (hereafter the ‘‘Resolution’’), the timeframe for conducting a preliminary review is 30 days from the date of receipt of the Board’s request. 

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CITATIONS TO LAW 

Review No. 09–9099 

On November 20, 2009, the Board of the Office of Congressional 

Ethics (hereafter the ‘‘Board’’) adopted the following findings of fact 

and accompanying citations to law, regulations, rules and standards of conduct (in italics). The Board notes that these findings do 

not constitute a determination of whether or not a violation actually occurred. 

I. INTRODUCTION 

A. SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS

1. There is not substantial reason to believe that Representative 

Murtha solicited or accepted contributions or other items of value 

in exchange for or because of an official act, or solicited or accepted 

contributions or other items of value in a manner which gave the 

appearance that the contributions were linked to an official act. 

B. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

2. The allegations that were the subject of this review concern 

Representative John Murtha, a Member of the United States 

House of Representatives from the 12th District of Pennsylvania. 

The Resolution the United States House of Representatives adopted creating the Office of Congressional Ethics (hereafter the 

‘‘OCE’’) directs that, ‘‘[n]o review shall be undertaken . . . by the 

board of any alleged violation that occurred before the date of adoption of this resolution.’’ 1 The House adopted this Resolution on 

March 11, 2008. Because the conduct under review occurred after 

March 11, 2008, review by the Board is in accordance with the Resolution. 

C. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

3. The OCE received a written request for a preliminary review 

in this matter signed by at least two members of the Board on July 

6, 2009. The preliminary review commenced on that date.2 The preliminary review was scheduled to end on August 5, 2009. 

4. At least three members of the Board voted to initiate a second 

phase review in this matter on August 5, 2009. The second phase 


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3 According to the Resolution, the Board must vote on whether to conduct a second-phase review in a matter before the expiration of the 30-day preliminary review. If the Board votes for 

a second-phase, the second-phase begins when the preliminary review ends. The second-phase 

review does not begin on the date of the Board vote. 4 Id. at § 1(c)(2)(A)(ii) (2008). 

review commenced on August 6, 2009.3 The second-phase review 

was scheduled to end on September 20, 2009. 

5. The Board voted to extend the 45-day second phase review by 

an additional 14 days, as provided by the Resolution, on September 

17, 2009. Following the extension, the second-phase review was 

scheduled to end on October 5, 2009.4

6. The Board voted to refer the matter to the Committee on 

Standards of Official Conduct for dismissal and adopted these findings on November 20, 2009. 

7. This report and findings were transmitted to the Committee 

on Standards of Official Conduct on December 2, 2009. 

D. SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY

8. Due to the nature of the allegations in this review, the OCE’s 

investigation required the collection of information from a number 

of sources. 

9. The OCE reviewed publically available records of campaign 

contributions to the campaign committees of Members of the House 

Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense (hereafter ‘‘Defense Subcommittee’’) from recipients of earmarks during the 2008 and 2010 

campaign cycles. The review included campaign contributions to 

the leadership political action committees (hereafter ‘‘PACs’’), if 

any, of these Members. 

10. Specifically, the OCE reviewed campaign contributions to 

these Members from donors that were affiliated with the lobbying 

firm of Paul Magliocchetti and Associates Group, Inc. (hereafter 

‘‘PMA’’), i.e., contributions from the PMA PAC, PMA employees, the 

PACs of corporate clients of PMA (hereafter ‘‘PMA clients’’) and 

employees of PMA clients. 

11. The OCE also reviewed campaign contributions to Members 

of the Defense Subcommittee from PACs of non-PMA clients, and 

employees of non-PMA clients. 

12. Beyond Members of the Defense Subcommittee, the investigation included a review of campaign contributions from PMA clients and non-PMA clients to Representatives who are not on the 

Defense Subcommittee, but authored defense earmarks for PMA 

clients and non-PMA clients. 

13. The OCE requested information from forty PMA clients that 

received earmarks from Members of the Defense Subcommittee for 

fiscal years 2008 to 2010. 

14. All of the PMA clients that the OCE contacted cooperated 

with the investigation, except for two. 

15. Aeroflex and Kimball and Associates are the only PMA clients that refused to cooperate with the investigation. 

16. Thirty-eight PMA clients and Representatives’ offices produced documents totaling approximately 200,000 pages. These 

PMA clients also made witnesses available for interviews upon request of the OCE. 


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17. Based on the information discovered during the review of the 

produced documents, the OCE interviewed twenty-six individual 

PMA client witnesses. 

18. In addition, the OCE interviewed six witnesses who were formerly employed as lobbyists with PMA during the 2008 and 2010 

campaign cycles. 

19. In sum, the OCE requested and received documentary, and 

in some cases testimonial, information from the following sources: 

(1) 21st Century Systems, Inc.; 

(2) AAR Composites; 

(3) Advanced Acoustic Concepts; 

(4) Advanced Concepts & Technologies Intl.; 

(5) Aircraft Interior Products; 

(6) Applied Global Technologies; 

(7) Argon ST; 

(8) Boeing Corporation; 

(9) Carnegie Mellon University; 

(10) Coda Octopus Group; 

(11) Concurrent Technologies Corporation; 

(12) Conemaugh Health Systems; 

(13) Cryptek; 

(14) DDL OMNI Engineering; 

(15) DRS Technologies; 

(16) EM Solutions; 

(17) General Atomics; 

(18) General Dynamics; 

(19) Goodrich Corporation; 

(20) Innovative Concepts, Inc.; 

(21) ITT Corporation; 

(22) Lockheed Martin Corporation; 

(23) MobilVox; 

(24) NuVant Systems, Inc.; 

(25) Optimal Solutions & Technologies; 

(26) Parametric Technology Corporation; 

(27) Planning Systems Inc.; 

(28) Profile Systems; 

(29) Prologic, Inc.; 

(30) QTL Biosystems; 

(31) RaySat Antenna Systems; 

(32) Rockwell Collins; 

(33) Samueli Institute; 

(34) Sierra Nevada Corporation; 

(35) Teledyne Continental Motors, Inc.; 

(36) Teledyne Controls; 

(37) Windber Research Institute; 

(38) Xunlight Corporation; 

(39) Vice President, 21st Century Systems, Inc.; 

(40) Chief Administrative Officer, 21st Century Systems, 

Inc.; 

(41) Vice President for Communications, 21st Century Systems, Inc.; 

(42) PAC Treasurer, 21st Century Systems, Inc.; 

(43) General Manager, AAR Composites; 

(44) Chief Operating Officer, AAR Composites; 


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(45) Chief Executive Officer, Applied Global Technologies; 

(46) Vice President, Applied Global Technologies; 

(47) PAC Treasurer, DRS Technologies; 

(48) President, DRS Technologies; 

(49) Chief Operating Officers, Optimal Solutions & Technologies; 

(50) Chief Executive Officer, Optimal Solutions & Technologies; 

(51) Director, Optimal Solutions & Technologies; 

(52) CEO, Samueli Institute; 

(53) Vice President, Sierra Nevada Corporation; 

(54) Congressional Affairs Director, Sierra Nevada Corporation; 

(55) Assistant to Business Development Director, Teledyne 

Continental Motors, Inc.; 

(56) Business Development Director, Teledyne Continental 

Motors, Inc.; 

(57) PAC Treasurer, Teledyne Controls; 

(58) General Manager, Teledyne Controls; 

(59) Vice President, Teledyne Controls; 

(60) Director of Contracts, Teledyne Controls; 

(61) Contract Administrator, Teledyne Controls; 

(62) Legislative Affairs Director, Teledyne Controls; 

(63) Associate General Counsel, Teledyne Controls; 

(64) President, Teledyne Controls; 

(65) PMA Lobbyist 1; 

(66) PMA Lobbyist 2; 

(67) PMA Lobbyist 3; 

(68) PMA Lobbyist 4; 

(69) PMA Lobbyist 5; 

(70) PMA Lobbyist 6; 

(71) Representative Murtha’s Chief of Staff; 

(72) Representative Murtha’s District Director; 

(73) Representative Murtha’s Campaign Coordinator; 

(74) Representative Murtha’s PAC Coordinator; 

(75) Representative Murtha’s Staffer; and 

(76) Representative Murtha. 

II. THE OCE UNCOVERED NO EVIDENCE THAT REPRESENTATIVE MURTHA REQUESTED EARMARKS FOR PMA CLIENTS IN CONNECTION WITH CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS 

HE RECEIVED 

A. RELEVANT LAW, REGULATIONS, RULES OR STANDARDS OF CONDUCT

20. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)—Bribery of public officials and witnesses 

‘‘(b) Whoever— 

(2) being a public official or person selected to be a public official, directly or indirectly, corruptly demands, seeks, receives, 

accepts, or agrees to receive or accept anything of value personally or for any other person or entity, in return for: 

(A) being influenced in the performance of any official 

act. . . .’’ 

21. 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)—Illegal Gratuities 

‘‘(c) Whoever— 


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5 House Ethics Manual (2008) at 79. See also United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 526 

U.S. 398, 404 (1999). 6Memorandum of the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Recommendations for disposition of the complaint filed against Representative DeLay. Accessed online on June 24, 2009 

at http://ethics.house.gov/Investigations/Default.aspx?Section=18. 7 Id. 

8 Id. 

9 House Ethics Manual (2008) at 147. 

10Memorandum of the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Recommendations for disposition of the complaint filed against Representative DeLay. Accessed online on June 24, 2009 

at http://ethics.house.gov/Investigations/Default.aspx?Section=18. 11 House Ethics Manual (2008) at 147. 

(1) otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge of official duty— 

(B) being a public official, former public official, or person selected to be a public official, otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge of official duty, directly or indirectly demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or 

agrees to receive or accept anything of value personally for 

or because of any official act performed or to be performed 

by such official or person. . . .’’ 

22. ‘‘An illegal gratuity . . . may constitute merely a reward for 

some future act that the public official will take (and may have already determined to take), or for a past act that he has already 

taken.’’ 5

23. House Rules and Standards of Conduct 

‘‘[T]he scope of the House standards of conduct in this area 

is broader than that of the criminal bribery statute . . . the 

House standards of conduct generally preclude any link between the solicitation or receipt of a contribution and a specific 

official action.’’ 6

‘‘Put another way, there are fundraising activities that do not 

violate any criminal statute but well may violate House standards of conduct.’’ 7

‘‘[T]here are certain proffered campaign contributions that 

must be declined, and certain fundraising opportunities that 

must be forgone, solely because they create an appearance of improper conduct.’’ 8

‘‘[N]o solicitation of a campaign or political contribution may 

be linked to an action taken or to be taken by a Member or employee in his or her official capacity.’’ 9 In addition, a Member 

may not accept any contribution that is linked with any specific 

official action taken or to be taken by that Member.’’ 10

‘‘It is probably not wrong for the campaign managers of a legislator . . . to request contributions from those for whom the 

legislator has done appreciable favors, but this should never be 

presented as a payment for the services rendered. Moreover, the 

possibility of such a contribution should never be suggested by 

the legislator or his staff as the time the favor is done. Furthermore, a decent interval of time should be allowed to lapse so 

that neither party will feel that there is a close connection between the two acts. The Standards Committee has long advised 

Members and staff that they should always exercise caution to 

avoid even the appearance that solicitations of campaign contributions are connected in any way with an action taken or to 

be taken in their official capacity.’’ 11


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12 Id. 13 Id. at 151 (citing Code of Ethics for Government Service, ¶5). 14 Id. at 151 (citing Code of Ethics for Government Service, ¶10). 

‘‘[A] Member should not sponsor or participate in any solicitation that offers donors any special access to the Member in the 

Member’s official capacity.’’ 12

‘‘[G]overnment officials should ‘never discriminate unfairly by 

the dispensing of special favors or privileges to anyone, whether 

for remuneration or not.’ ’’ 13

‘‘ ‘[P]ublic office is a public trust,’ and the public has a right 

to expect House Members and staff to exercise impartial judgment in performing their duties.’’ 14

24. 5 U.S.C. § 7353—Gifts to Federal Employees 

‘‘(a) Except as permitted by subsection (b), no Member of Congress . . . shall solicit or accept anything of value from a person— 

(1) seeking official action from, doing business with . . . the 

individual’s employing entity; or 

(2) whose interests may be substantially affected by the performance or nonperformance of the individual’s official duties. 

(b)(1) Each supervising ethics office is authorized to issue 

rules or regulations implementing the provisions of this section 

and providing reasonable exceptions as may be appropriate. 

(2)(A) Subject to subparagraph (B), a Member, officer, or 

employee may accept a gift pursuant to rules and regulations established by such individual’s supervising ethics office pursuant to paragraph (1) 

(B) No gift may be accepted pursuant to subparagraph 

(A) in return for being influenced in the performance of an 

official act.’’ 

25. House Ethics Manual—Soliciting Campaign and Political 

Contributions 

While the federal gift statute (5 U.S.C. § 7353) broadly restricts the ability of House Members and staff to solicit things 

of value from virtually anyone, even when no personal benefit 

to the solicitor is involved, legislative materials concerning the 

statute state that it does not apply to the solicitation of political 

contributions. Consistent with those materials, the Standards 

Committee has long taken the position that the restrictions on 

solicitation set forth in that statute do not apply to political solicitations. However, in soliciting campaign or political contributions, Members and staff are subject to a number of other 

restrictions, as follows. 

A Contribution linked to an Official Action May Not Be Accepted 

. . . no solicitation of a campaign or political contribution 

may be linked to any action taken or to be taken by a Member 

or employee in his or her official capacity. 

In a similar vein, a Member or employee may not accept any 

contribution that the donor links to any official action that the 

Member or employee has taken, or is being asked to take. In 

this respect, a campaign or political contribution is treated like 

any other gift, and acceptance of a contribution in these circumstances may implicate a provision of the federal gift statute 


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15 Rule 9 of the OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS, RULES FOR THE CONDUCT OF 

INVESTIGATIONS 11 (2009) provides that ‘‘[t]he Board shall refer a matter to the Standards 

Committee for further review if it determines there is a substantial reason to believe the allegation based on all the information then known to the Board.’’ 16Memorandum of Interview of Rep. Murtha (Exhibit 1 at 09–9099l6). 17Memorandum of Interview of Representative Murtha’s Staffer (Exhibit 2 at 09–9099l6). 18 Id. at 09–9099l7. 19 Id. 20 Id. 21 Id. at 09–9099l8. 22 Id. at 09–9099l7. 23 Id. 24 Id. 25Memorandum of Interview of Representative Murtha’s Chief of Staff (Exhibit 3 at 09– 

9099l10). 

(5 U.S.C. § 7353) or the criminal statutes on bribery and illegal 

gratuities. 

26. Based on the facts collected by the OCE, the Board concludes 

there is not substantial reason to believe the allegations that are 

the subject of this review.15

B. EARMARK PROCESS

27. Representative John Murtha represents the 12th Congressional District of Pennsylvania. 

28. The process for handling Representative Murtha’s requests 

for earmarks for the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee 

is managed by his Congressional office staff.16 Originally two individuals were directly responsible for the process, Mr. Charles 

Horner and Representative Murtha’s Staffer. However, Mr. Horner 

recently retired and Representative Murtha’s Staffer is currently 

responsible for managing the process.17

29. The initial evaluation of the earmark requests are done by 

Representative Murtha’s Staffer. The requests are evaluated based 

on certain criteria and the overall merit of the request.18

30. Representative Murtha’s Staffer reviews the nature of the 

project, the recipient and the impact the project will have on the 

Congressman’s district.19 Aside from the project’s merit, the primary criteria for evaluating earmark requests is whether the 

project contributes to economic development and jobs in the Member’s district.20

31. Representative Murtha’s Staffer explained that the process 

for evaluating earmark requests does not include the consideration 

of campaign contributions from the entities requesting the earmark.21 Representative Murtha’s Staffer does not know who contributes to Representative Murtha’s campaign. He has never asked 

for that information and that information has never been provided 

to him, nor has he ever been instructed to consider campaign contributions when vetting the earmark requests.22 While Representative Murtha’s Staffer has attended Representative Murtha’s fundraisers in the past, he has no role in the fundraising process.23

32. Representative Murtha’s office receives hundreds of earmark 

requests annually. Entities typically begin making earmark requests in January.24 Those requests either go directly to Representative Murtha’s Staffer or the district office. If a request goes to the 

district office, it is sent to the Washington, DC, office for further 

review.25


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26Memorandum of Interview of Rep. Murtha (Exhibit 1 at 09–9099l3). 27Memorandum of Interview of Representative Murtha’s Staffer (Exhibit 2 at 09–9099l7). 28 Id. 29Memorandum of Interview of Rep. Murtha (Exhibit 1 at 09–9099l3). 30 Id. at 09–9099l3. 31 Contribution amounts are derived from reports filed with the Federal Election Commission 

by Murtha for Congress and Majority PAC. 32 Id. at 09–9099l4. 33 Id. at 09–9099l4. 34 Id. at 09–9099l3. 35Memorandum of Interview of Representative Murtha’s Campaign Coordinator (Exhibit 4 at 

09–9099l13). 36 Id. at 09–9099l14. 

33. Other than providing general guidelines to his staff on how 

to evaluate the projects, Representative Murtha does not participate in the vetting process.26 Instead, his staff evaluates the earmark requests and prepares a final list of 25–30 individual requests for the Congressman.27

34. The list is provided to the Congressman for his review, but 

it is approved by the Member without any changes.28

35. Representative Murtha explained to the OCE that his earmark process is completely staff driven.29 His guidance to staff is 

to focus primarily on the merit of the project and the positive impact it will have on the economic development of his district. According to the Congressman, the process for evaluating earmark requests does not include any consideration of campaign contributions from the requesting entities.30

C. CAMPAIGN FUNDRAISING

36. During campaign cycles 2008 and 2010, Representative Murtha accepted approximately $390,180 in campaign contributions 

from PMA’s PAC and employees and from the PAC and employees 

of PMA clients.31

37. Representative Murtha spends approximately $50,000 per 

month to run a full time campaign office. He explained to the OCE 

that one of the reasons he does this is to ensure a full separation 

between his legislative activities and his campaign activities.32

38. The campaign typically hosts a large fundraising event in 

February. The reason for the timing of the event is because it corresponds to the month in which Representative Murtha was first 

elected to the House of Representatives in a special election.33

39. Representative Murtha has a professional fundraiser who 

manages his campaign’s fundraising efforts. According to Representative Murtha, in his entire career he has never called an individual or entity and requested a campaign contribution.34

40. Representative Murtha has a full-time campaign coordinator. 

Representative Murtha’s Campaign Coordinator’s job duties include 

managing a database of contributors, Federal Election Commission 

compliance, and assisting with local fundraisers. Representative 

Murtha’s Campaign Coordinator explained that to her knowledge, 

the defense firms in the Congressman’s district have not sponsored 

any local fundraisers.35

41. Representative Murtha’s Campaign Coordinator told the 

OCE that no one from the Washington, DC, Congressional office 

has ever asked her about individual contributors.36 The only person 

who works in the Congressional office who may see a list of conVerDate Mar 15 2010 00:47 Sep 05, 2012 Jkt 055501 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\55501.XXX 55501

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37 Id. at 09–9099l13. 38Memorandum of Interview of Rep. Murtha (Exhibit 1 at 09–9099l4) and Memorandum of 

Interview of Representative Murtha’s Chief of Staff (Exhibit 3 at 09–9099l10). 39Memorandum of Interview of Representative Murtha’s PAC Coordinator (Exhibit 5 at 09– 

9099l16). 40 Id. at 09–9099l16. 41Memorandum of Interview of Rep. Murtha (Exhibit 1 at 09–9099l3). 42 Id. 43 Id. at 09–9099l4. 

tributors is Representative Murtha’s Chief of Staff.37 However, according to both the Congressman and his Chief of Staff, Representative Murtha’s Chief of Staff has no role in the appropriations process.38

42. Representative Murtha also has a full-time campaign coordinator for his political action committee, ‘‘Majority PAC.’’ That individual has held the position since 2007.39 Prior to that position, she 

was the Congressman’s campaign coordinator for the previous 15 

years. The campaign coordinator for the Congressman’s PAC told 

the OCE that no legislative staffer from the Washington, DC, office 

has called her concerning individual contributors to the campaign 

or PAC. Similarly, no one from the Congressman’s Washington, 

DC, staff has ever asked to add or delete a name from the list of 

individuals to solicit.40

43. Representative Murtha confirmed the statement by Representative Murtha’s Campaign Coordinator and the campaign coordinator of his PAC. Representative Murtha told the OCE that he 

knew some companies thought that contributing to his campaign 

might increase the likelihood of receiving an earmark, but the reality is that he often did not even recognize the individuals who attend his fundraisers.41 Representative Murtha candidly explained 

that he did not know who gave to his campaign and he has never 

seen a list of contributors.42 His involvement in his campaign’s 

fundraising activities is essentially limited to attending events.43

D. RELATIONSHIP WITH PMA

44. During the time period of the 2008 and 2010 campaign cycles, fifteen corporate clients of PMA were awarded earmarks requested by Representative Murtha. 

45. The PMA clients that received earmarks during this period 

are: 

(a) Argon ST (Requested, $16,000,000); 

(b) Advanced Acoustic Concepts (Requested, $13,500,000); 

(c) DRS Technologies (Requested, $12,000,000); 

(d) Windber Research Institute (Requested, $12,000,000); 

(e) Conemaugh Health Systems (Requested, $9,600,000); 

(f) Concurrent Technologies Corporation (Requested, 

$8,000,000); 

(g) QTL Biosystems (Requested, $6,500,000); 

(h) Parametric Technology Corporation (Requested, 

$5,000,000); 

(i) Prologic, Inc. (Requested, $2,400,000); 

(j) Planning Systems Inc. (Requested, $2,300,000); 

(k) Goodrich Corporation (Requested, $1,000,000); 

(l) Carnegie Mellon University (Requested, $800,000); 

(m) Ardiem Medical, Inc. (Requested, $1,600,000); 


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44 H.R. 3222, Pub. L. 110–116 (2008); H.R. 2638, Pub. L. 110–329 (2009); and H.R. 3326, 111 

Cong. (2009). 45Memorandum of Interview of Rep. Murtha (Exhibit 1 at 09–9099l3). 46 Id. at 09–9099l2. 47 Id. 48 Id. at 09–9099l3 49Teledyne PAC Contribution Request (Exhibit 6 at 09–9099l20). 

(n) Washington and Jefferson College (Requested, 

$2,400,000); and 

(o) MTS Technologies, Inc. (Requested, $14,800,000).44

46. As previously addressed, Representative Murtha told the 

OCE that his earmark selection process is staff driven.45 While 

these are earmarks authored by Representative Murtha, the evidence before the Board indicates the Congressman did not actually 

select them. 

47. When asked about how PMA was different than other lobbying firms, Representative Murtha stated that PMA hired good 

people and their lobbyists were ‘‘as good as you could find.’’46 According to Representative Murtha, PMA hired individuals who had 

worked in government and the military and who knew the issues 

as well as or better than anyone.47 Mr. Paul Magliocchetti, according to Representative Murtha, was smarter than the average lobbyist and understood what was important to Members. For instance, Mr. Magliocchetti knew that the economic development of 

Representative Murtha’s district was a high priority for the Congressman and therefore brought good projects that created jobs to 

the Congressman for his support.48

48. Representative Murtha knew Mr. Magliocchetti from the 

time Mr. Magliocchetti worked on the Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense. He has seen Mr. Magliocchetti at numerous 

fundraisers and has interacted with him professionally and socially 

over the years. He has not spoken with Mr. Magliocchetti since 

shortly after the FBI raided PMA’s offices. 

49. Representative Murtha has a personal relationship with Mr. 

Dan Cunningham, a former PMA lobbyist. The Congressman has 

spent time with Mr. Cunningham since PMA went out of business, 

but Representative Murtha and Mr. Cunningham have not spoken 

about the FBI raid of PMA’s office. Mr. Cunningham has never addressed the subject with the Congressman and the Congressman 

has not inquired about what happened. 

E. PERCEPTION OF CORPORATE DONORS

50. There is evidence that some of the commercial entities seeking earmarks from Representative Murtha believe that a political 

donation to him has an impact on his decision to author an earmark for that donor.49

51. However, Representative Murtha credibly articulated a process that separates his legislative activities from campaign fundraising activities. Representative Murtha achieves this separation 

by eliminating his and his legislative staff’s exposure to information from the campaign’s fundraising operation. Similarly, since 

Representative Murtha has full-time campaign staff, his campaign 

staff is isolated from his legislative activities. As result, neither the 

campaign nor Representative Murtha’s legislative staff is aware of 


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50Memorandum of Interview of Rep. Murtha (Exhibit 1 at 09–9099l4). 51 Email from Argon ST, dated February 22, 2008 (Exhibit 7 at 09–9099l22) and Email from 

Argon ST, dated September 19, 2008 (Exhibit 8 at 09–9099l24). 

what the other is doing. In each case, both legislative staff and 

campaign staff corroborated Representative Murtha’s account. 

52. Representative Murtha explained to the OCE that he operates his campaign and Congressional office in this manner to prevent even the appearance that their legislative acts are influenced 

by contributions to their campaign or PAC.50

53. The Board notes that one risk associated with this is the possibility of an appearance of a conflict of interest if, out of ignorance, 

the Member’s campaign accepts a contribution near in time to a 

legislative act that has an impact on the individual or entity making the contribution. This potential for an appearance of a conflict 

may explain why companies requesting an earmark appear to 

think that a contribution to the respective campaign or PAC affects 

the ultimate receipt of an earmark. The House Ethics Manual is 

unclear as to what obligations, if any, are placed on a Member to 

discourage or disabuse an entity of that impression. 

F. CONTRIBUTIONS LINKED TO OFFICIAL ACTS BY OUTSIDE ENTITIES

54. In several instances, the OCE uncovered evidence that commercial entities seeking earmarks from Members of Congress appear to have linked contributions to Representative Murtha’s campaign and/or PAC to specific legislative acts. These documents were 

internal to the companies and there is no evidence they were 

shared with Representative Murtha or his staff.51

55. The federal gift statute, 5 U.S.C. § 7353, prohibits the solicitation or acceptance of anything of value from a person seeking official action from or doing business with the House, or from someone whose interests may be substantially affected by the performance or nonperformance of a Member’s, Officer’s or staff member’s 

official duties. The statute also provides that the Committee on 

Standards of Official Conduct may enact reasonable exceptions to 

the prohibition. According to the Ethics Manual, the Standards 

Committee has long taken the position that the restrictions on solicitation set forth in the statute do not apply to political solicitations. However, Members and staff are subject to a number of other 

restrictions regarding the solicitation of campaign or political contributions under the rules of the House. 

56. Under House rules, a Member or employee may not accept 

any contribution that the donor links to any official action that the 

Member or employee has taken, or is being asked to take. If a donor’s contribution is linked to any official action, it is treated like 

any other gift and may be subject as such to the federal gift statute 

and the criminal statutes on bribery and illegal gratuities. 

57. The Board notes that the examples provided in the Ethics 

Manual of instances where a Member may be in violation of the 

House’s rule against accepting a contribution linked to an official 

action are all instances in which the Member has some degree of 

knowledge of the link. As a result, it stands to reason that it is unlikely a violation of the rule could occur unless and until a Member 

is aware of the link and does nothing to remedy the situation. 


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58. The Board finds nothing in the factual record to indicate the 

Representative Murtha was aware that the donor linked the contribution to an official act. As such, the Board concludes there is 

not a substantial reason to believe that a violation of either 5 

U.S.C. § 7353 or the applicable House rules occurred. However once 

the Congressman becomes aware of the link, if the matter is not 

remedied by either by the Member or by formal advice from the 

Standards Committee declaring the contribution acceptable, then a 

violation may occur. 

III. CONCLUSION 

59. For these reasons, the Board recommends that the Standards Committee dismiss the above described allegations concerning 

Representative Murtha. 

IV. INFORMATION THE OCE WAS UNABLE TO OBTAIN AND 

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF SUBPOENAS 

60. In every instance, the OCE asked the recipient of an OCE 

request for information to identify any information they withheld 

and the reason they were withholding it. However, absent the authority to subpoena the evidence in possession of the witness, it is 

impossible for the OCE to verify if information was withheld, but 

not documented. 

61. In some instances documents were redacted or specific information was not provided. For instance, DRS Technologies provided 

evidence responsive to the OCE’s Request for Information but indicated they would not provide any information regarding their ‘‘Legislative Strategy.’’ 

62. In at least one instance, the OCE had reason to believe a 

witness withheld information requested, but did not comply with 

the OCE’s request that they identify what was being withheld. Specifically, Boeing Corporation represented that they had fully cooperated. However, the Boeing Corporation indicated that they had 

no electronic mail responsive to OCE’s Request for Information. 

The OCE then received, from another source, electronic mail to and 

from Boeing Corporation that was in fact responsive to the OCE’s 

request. 

63. The Board also notes that while the OCE was able to interview six former employees of PMA that provided general information on PMA and its business practices, many remaining former 

employees either refused to consent to interviews or did not return 

calls from the OCE. In addition, the OCE was unable to obtain any 

evidence within PMA’s possession. 

64. The Board makes the recommendation contained in this referral based on the factual record before it. Given its recommendation to dismiss, the Board does not recommend the issuance of subpoenas, but recognizes that the Committee on Standards of Official 

Conduct may determine otherwise. 


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