The Honorable Catherine D. Perry, United State District Judge 1

for the Eastern District of Missouri.

 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of 2

Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

___________

No. 95-2554

___________

Calvin J. Weber, *

 *

Appellant, *

 *

v. * Appeal from the United States

 * District Court for the

Robert L. Buhrkuhl, Civ. Project * Eastern District of Missouri.

Mgr.; Diane Ottolini, Civ. *

Personnel Mgr.; Nicholas J. * [UNPUBLISHED]

Ciccarello, U.S. Army Col., *

Named Federal Officials in their *

individual capacities, *

 *

Appellees. *

___________

 Submitted: November 27, 1995

 Filed: December 21, 1995

___________

Before WOLLMAN, MAGILL, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Calvin J. Weber appeals from the district court's dismissal of his 1

Bivens action against federal officials. We affirm. 2

During the Gulf War, Weber, a civilian Army engineer, informed

various news media organizations and legislators that the Army was covering

up reliability problems and not providing soldiers with the best equipment

available. In June 1993, the Army terminated
-2-

Weber. Believing that his termination was in retaliation for his

whistleblowing activities, Weber brought this Bivens action. Weber claimed

his free speech and due process rights were violated when defendant federal

officials allegedly made false statements and perjured themselves during

his administrative appeals of the revocation of his security clearance and

his termination. 

The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss for failure

to state a claim, concluding that Weber's First Amendment allegations were

conclusory, and that Weber's due process rights were not violated when his

clearance was revoked because he had no right to a security clearance.

We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim.

Alexander v. Peffer, 993 F.2d 1348, 1349 (8th Cir. 1993). Even assuming

that Weber's allegations identify a constitutional violation, the Civil

Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA) and the Whistleblower Protection Act of

1989 (WPA) bar such a claim. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 1211-16, 1221, 2302; Bush v.

Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 385-86, 390 (1983) (CSRA prevents the creation of new

judicial remedies for federal employees whose First Amendment rights are

violated by superiors); see also Gergick v. Austin, 997 F.2d 1237, 1239

(8th Cir. 1993) (CSRA exclusive remedy for government employees with claims

under WPA), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1536 (1994). We disagree with Weber

that defendants' actions fall outside the scope of CSRA "prohibited

personnel practices." Cf. Bush, 462 U.S. at 385 n.28 (noting conduct such

as wiretapping, warrantless searches, or uncompensated takings would not

be "personnel actions" within statutory scheme); Moon v. Philips, 854 F.2d

147, 150 (7th Cir. 1988) (supervisor ordering plaintiff to file false

report not conduct within exception).

The district court also correctly determined that Weber's due process

claim based on revocation of his security clearance did not amount to a

constitutional violation. See Department of Navy v.
-3-

Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528-29 (1988) (no right to security clearance;

therefore no right to Merit Systems Protection Board review of grant or

denial of clearance on due process grounds); Dorfmont v. Brown, 913 F.2d

1399, 1404 (9th Cir. 1990) (due process challenge to revocation of security

clearance not colorable constitutional claim), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 905

(1991).

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

A true copy.

Attest:

 CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT