a

GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to Congressional Requesters

January 2004 2010 CENSUS

Cost and Design 

Issues Need to Be 

Addressed Soon

GAO-04-37
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-37.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Patricia Dalton 

at (202) 512-6806 or daltonp@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-04-37, a report to 

congressional requesters 

January 2004

2010 CENSUS

Cost and Design Issues Need to Be 

Addressed Soon 

While preparations for the 2010 Census appear to be further along compared 

to a similar point prior to the 2000 Census, cost and design information had 

to be pieced together from various documents. The Bureau’s plans also lack 

a substantial amount of supporting analysis, budgetary transparency, and 

other information that made it difficult to verify the Bureau’s assertions 

concerning the costs and benefits of its proposed approach. Further, unlike 

in previous censuses, the Bureau does not intend to develop coverage 

measurement procedures that would allow it to adjust census data for 

certain purposes. Although its experience in 2000 shows that its coverage 

measurement methodology needs improvement, GAO believes the Bureau 

should have researched alternative approaches more thoroughly and 

disclosed the results of its research before making a decision. In designing 

the 2010 Census, the Bureau hoped to address several shortcomings of the 

2000 enumeration, namely to (1) increase the relevance and timeliness of 

data, (2) reduce operational risk, (3) increase coverage and accuracy, and 

(4) contain costs. To achieve these goals, three components—all new 

operations—are key to the Bureau’s plans for 2010. They include enhancing 

procedures for building the census address list and associated maps, 

replacing the census long-form questionnaire with a more frequent sample 

survey, and conducting a short-form-only census. 

Census Costs Are Increasing (Average Cost per Housing Unit in Constant Fiscal 2000 

Dollars) 

The Bureau’s approach has the potential to achieve the first three goals, but 

reducing operational risk could prove to be more difficult as each of the 

three components actually introduces new risks. The Bureau will also be 

challenged to control the cost of the 2010 Census, now estimated at over 

$11 billion. The current budget reporting process masks the long-term costs 

of the census, most of which will be incurred in 2010; making it difficult for 

Congress to monitor the Bureau’s planned expenditures. Certain actions by 

the Office of Management and Budget could produce greater fiscal 

transparency, and thus help inform congressional deliberations on how to 

best balance the need for an accurate census, with the need to ensure a 

reasonable cost for this endeavor. 

The key to a successful census is 

meticulous planning as it helps 

ensure greater cost-effectiveness. 

However, the 2000 and previous 

censuses have been marked by 

poor planning, which unnecessarily 

raised the costs and risks of those 

efforts. GAO was asked to 

(1) review the U.S. Census 

Bureau’s (Bureau) current plans 

for 2010 and whether they might 

address shortcomings of the 2000 

Census, (2) analyze the Bureau’s 

cost estimates, and (3) review the 

rigor of the Bureau’s 2010 planning 

process. 

GAO recommends that the 

Secretary of Commerce direct the 

Bureau to combine information on 

goals, costs, and other key planning 

elements into a single integrated 

project plan that is updated as 

needed. The Bureau should also 

study the feasibility of procedures 

that could allow it to adjust census 

results for those purposes where it 

is both legal and appropriate to do 

so. 

Further, the Director of the Office 

of Management and Budget should 

ensure that the Bureau take steps 

to improve the transparency of 

census life cycle costs. In 

commenting on a draft of this 

report, both agencies disagreed 

with our interpretation of key 

findings. They also disagreed with 

our recommendations. We believe 

our findings and recommendations 

still apply. 
Page i GAO-04-37 2010 Census

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Background 5

Scope and Methodology 7

2010 Design Has Potential, but Introduces New Risks 8

Escalating Census Costs Call for Transparent Budget Data and 

Better Reporting 17

2010 Planning Process Is Better Than Past Efforts, but Rigor Is 

Uneven 25

Conclusions 31

Recommendations for Executive Action 33

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 34

Appendixes

Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Commerce 41

Appendix II: Comments from the Office of Management and Budget 45

Appendix III: 2010 Census Planning Organization 47

Tables Table 1: The Three-Legged Stool Strategy Could Help the Bureau 

Progress toward Its Key Goals for the 2010 Census 10

Table 2: Projected Costs from June 2001 Estimate of Reengineering 

the 2010 Census 24

Figures Figure 1: Decennial Census Costs from 1970 through 2010 

(Projected) in Constant 2000 Dollars 18

Figure 2: Decennial Census Average Cost per Housing Unit (in 

Constant Fiscal Year 2000 Dollars) 19

Figure 3: 2000 Census Life Cycle Costs by Fiscal Year 20

Figure 4: Bureau’s June 2001 Estimating Methodology for Census 

2010 Life Cycle Costs 23

Figure 5: Decennial Management Division’s Organizational 

Structure for Planning the 2010 Census 48
Page ii GAO-04-37 2010 Census

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Page 1 GAO-04-37 2010 Census

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

January 15, 2004 Letr

The Honorable Wm. Lacy Clay

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Technology, 

Information Policy, Intergovernmental Relations

and the Census 

Committee on Government Reform

House of Representatives

The Honorable Danny K. Davis

The Honorable Charles A. Gonzales

The Honorable Carolyn B. Maloney

House of Representatives

In designing the 2010 Census, the U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) faces the 

daunting challenge of cost effectively counting a population that is growing 

steadily larger, more diverse, and increasingly difficult to enumerate, with a 

design that meets the sometimes competing requirements and interests of a 

vast spectrum of stakeholders that include Congress, government agencies, 

the statistical community, advocacy groups, and the public. 

Planning a successful census—one that is acceptable to Congress and 

other stakeholders and achieves desired outcomesrequires the Bureau to 

assess the lessons learned from past enumerations, identify initiatives that 

show promise for producing a better census while controlling costs, test 

the feasibility of these initiatives, and convince stakeholders of the value of 

the proposed plans.1

 However, the Bureau’s planning efforts for the 2000 

and earlier censuses contained a number of weaknesses that unnecessarily 

increased the cost and risk of those efforts. 

In January 2003, we named the 2010 Census a major performance and 

accountability challenge because of our growing concern over the 

numerous obstacles to a cost-effective head count. Already, current 

estimates of the cost of the 2010 Census exceed $11 billion. You asked us 

to examine the decision-making process for the 2010 Census. As agreed 

with your offices, our objectives for this report were to review the Bureau’s 

current plans for the 2010 Census and the extent to which they might 

1

 See, for example, U.S. General Accounting Office, 2000 Census: Progress Made on 

Design, but Risks Remain, GAO/GGD-97-142 (Washington, D.C.: July 14, 1997).
Page 2 GAO-04-37 2010 Census

address shortcomings with the 2000 Census, analyze the Bureau’s cost 

estimates, and assess the rigor of the Bureau’s 2010 planning process.

Results in Brief The Bureau’s preparations for the 2010 Census appear to be further along 

than at a similar point during the planning cycle for the 2000 Census. Still, 

considerable risks and uncertainties lie ahead. This does not necessarily 

mean that the Bureau’s design is flawed. Indeed, the difficulties in 

conducting a successful head count call for the Bureau to consider bold 

and innovative initiatives, and these are not risk free. However, the 

uncertainties could jeopardize a cost-effective head count if not addressed 

soon. 

In designing the 2010 Census, the Bureau had four goals in mind, based on 

its desire to address shortcomings with the 2000 enumeration: (1) increase 

the relevance and timeliness of data, (2) reduce operational risk, 

(3) increase coverage and accuracy, and (4) contain costs. To achieve 

these goals, three components—all new operations—are key to the 

Bureau’s plans for 2010: 

• enhancing procedures for building its address list, known as the Master 

Address File (MAF), and its associated geographic information system, 

called the Topologically Integrated Geographic Encoding and 

Referencing (TIGER) database;2

• replacing the census long-form questionnaire with the American 

Community Survey (ACS); and 

• conducting a short-form-only decennial census supported by early 

research and testing.

The Bureau’s approach has the potential to achieve all but its goal to reduce 

operational risk. However, this is no minor shortcoming as the Bureau’s 

2010 design actually introduces new risks as the Bureau will be challenged 

to (1) secure early congressional agreement on its design, (2) resolve 

methodological and other uncertainties surrounding ACS, and 

(3) successfully implement all three components of the Bureau’s design. 

Because the three components are interrelated (e.g., the ACS is critical to a 

2

 TIGER is a registered trademark of the U.S. Census Bureau.
Page 3 GAO-04-37 2010 Census

short-form-only census), failure to successfully carry out any one 

component of the plan could doom the success of the other two, thereby 

reducing the overall cost-effectiveness of the census. 

A fourth challenge will be slowing the mushrooming cost of the 2010 

Census, now estimated at more than $11.3 billion in current dollars. Put 

another way, it will cost the nation an estimated $72 to count each 

household in 2010, compared to $56 in 2000 and $13 in 1970 (in constant 

2000 dollars), in large part because it is getting increasingly difficult to 

locate people and get them to participate in the census. The growing cost 

of the head count, at a time when the nation is facing historic budget 

deficits, highlights the importance of congressional deliberations on the 

extent to which each additional dollar spent on the census results in better 

data, as well as how best to balance the need for a complete count, with the 

need to ensure the cost of a complete count does not become 

unreasonable. 

In a departure from previous decennial censuses, the Bureau has decided 

against developing coverage measurement procedures that would allow it 

to adjust 2010 Census data for certain purposes. Although its experience 

during the 2000 Census shows that its approach to measuring coverage 

needs to be improved, we believe the Bureau should have researched 

alternative methods more thoroughly and disclosed the results of its 

research before making its decision. 

Current budget reporting masks the long-term cost implications of the 

census, and this could hamper or delay discussions concerning cost 

containment alternatives because annual budget requests and information 

provided to Congress early in the decennial life cycle do not reflect the full 

cash consequences of the annual spending. Most of the early spending will 

be on planning and development costs, but most of the expenses will be 

incurred in 2010. As Congress begins funding the 2010 Census at relatively 

low levels, it will have implicitly accepted a future spike in costs without 

requiring the Bureau to define more clearly what those costs might be, why 

they are justified, and what alternatives might exist. Greater fiscal 

transparency, including more robust information on the Bureau’s 

underlying budget assumptions, could help policymakers control 

escalating census costs. 

In some respects, the Bureau’s planning for the 2010 Census appears to be 

more rigorous than that for the 2000 Census. For example, the Bureau has 

involved experienced staff in the design process, organized multidivision 
Page 4 GAO-04-37 2010 Census

planning groups, assigned roles and responsibilities, and taken steps to 

address issues such as the attrition of key experienced staff. Still, other 

aspects of a rigorous planning process were lacking. They include (1) a 

comprehensive project plan with information on operational milestones, 

measurable performance goals, and costs and (2) productivity and other 

data on the results of key operations from the 2000 Census to inform 

lessons learned for 2010. 

To improve the 2010 Census planning process, we recommend that the 

Secretary of Commerce direct the Bureau to consolidate information on 

goals, performance measures, costs, and other key planning elements into 

a single project plan that would be updated as needed. Further, to help 

ensure the nation has at its disposal the best possible data should there be 

problems with the quality of the census numbers, the Secretary should also 

direct the Bureau, with input from both majority and minority parties in the 

Senate and House of Representatives, to research the feasibility of 

procedures that could allow the Bureau to adjust census results for those 

purposes for which it is both legal and appropriate to do so and, if found to 

be feasible, test those procedures during the 2006 census test and 2008 

census dress rehearsal.

In addition, to highlight for Congress the long-term fiscal exposure 

associated with the census, signal emerging cost issues, and prompt 

congressional deliberations on affordability and trade-offs, we recommend 

that the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) ensure 

that the Bureau take steps to increase the transparency of census life cycle 

costs. Specific steps include displaying such information as updated 

estimates of census life cycle costs and the amount of money the Bureau 

expects to spend in each year of the cycle as a note in the Program and 

Financing schedule of the President’s budget. The information should also 

explain any material changes from previous budgets, the sensitivity of the 

cost figures to specific assumptions, and the likelihood of those 

assumptions. 

The Secretary of Commerce forwarded written comments from the U.S. 

Census Bureau on a draft of this report. The comments are reprinted in 

appendix I. The Bureau agreed that to bring closure on issues relevant to 

the 2010 Census, it was important to have informed discussions with 

stakeholders, especially Congress, but disagreed with the 

recommendations we believe are necessary for such discussions to be 

fruitful. However, based on our evaluation of the Bureau’s comments, we 

believe all of our recommendations still apply.
Page 5 GAO-04-37 2010 Census

For example, the Bureau took exception to our recommendation to 

improve the rigor of its planning process by developing a consolidated 

project plan, noting that existing documents already provide this 

information. We believe our recommendation is still pertinent because, 

while we agree with the Bureau that some of this information is already 

available, it is disjointed and one can only obtain it by piecing together 

several different documents, such as the Bureau’s budget submission and 

strategic plan. And even then, it would still lack such important 

information as performance goals. 

The Director of OMB also prepared written comments on a draft of this 

report that are reprinted in appendix II. OMB shared our view that the 

costs and risks associated with the 2010 Census must be carefully 

monitored and evaluated throughout the decade. OMB also agreed that it is 

essential to understand the key cost drivers and said that it is working with 

the Census Bureau to ensure the Bureau develops high-quality, transparent 

life cycle cost estimates. However, OMB disagreed with our 

recommendation that it highlight for Congress the long-term fiscal 

exposure associated with the census, noting that its existing internal 

procedures are sufficient. Nevertheless, we do not believe the information 

OMB currently reports to Congress is sufficiently timely or detailed to 

provide the level of transparency needed for effective congressional 

oversight and cost control, and thus stand by our recommendation. 

Background Thorough and comprehensive planning and preparation are crucial to the 

ultimate cost-effectiveness of any large, long-term project, particularly one 

with the scope, magnitude, and immutable deadlines of the decennial 

census. Indeed, the Bureau’s past experience has shown that the lack of 

proper planning can increase the costs and risks of downstream 

operations. Moreover, sound planning is critical to obtaining congressional 

support and funding because it helps demonstrate that the Bureau has 

chosen the optimal design given various trade-offs and constraints and that 

it will effectively manage operations and control costs. 

However, Congress, GAO, the Department of Commerce Inspector General, 

and even the Bureau itself have noted how the 2000 Census was marked by 

poor planning, which unnecessarily added to the cost, risk, and 

controversy of the last national head count. For example, our earlier work, 

and that of the Department of Commerce Inspector General, reported that 

in planning the 2000 Census, the Bureau, among other shortcomings,
Page 6 GAO-04-37 2010 Census

• did not involve key operations staff in the initial design phases;

• did not translate key performance goals into operational, measurable 

terms that could be used as a basis for planning; 

• did not develop and document a design until mid-decade; and

• initially failed to provide sufficient data to stakeholders on the likely 

effects of its initiatives for addressing the key goals for the census—

reduced costs and improved accuracy and equity.

Planning weaknesses were not limited to the 2000 Census. In fact, a variety 

of problems plagued the planning of the 1990 Census. 

To help prevent the Bureau from repeating those mistakes as it plans the 

2010 Census, in our October 2002 report, we recommended that the 

Secretary of Commerce direct the Bureau to provide comprehensive 

information backed by supporting documentation in its future funding 

requests for planning and development activities, including, but not limited 

to, 

• specific performance goals for the 2010 Census and information on how 

the Bureau’s programs would contribute to those goals;

• detailed information on program feasibility, priorities, and potential 

risks;

• key implementation issues and decision milestones; and

• performance measures.3

The consequences of a poorly planned census are high given the billions of 

dollars spent on the enterprise and the importance of collecting quality 

data. The Constitution requires a census as a basis for apportioning seats 

in the House of Representatives. Census data are also used to redraw 

congressional districts, allocate billions of dollars in federal assistance to 

state and local governments, and provide information for many other 

public and private sector purposes.

3

 U.S. General Accounting Office, 2000 Census: Lessons Learned for Planning a More 

Cost-Effective 2010 Census, GAO-03-40 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 31, 2002).
Page 7 GAO-04-37 2010 Census

Scope and 

Methodology

As agreed with your offices, our objectives for this report were to review 

the Bureau’s current plans for the 2010 Census and the extent to which they 

might address shortcomings with the 2000 Census, analyze the Bureau’s 

cost estimates, and assess the rigor of the Bureau’s 2010 planning process.

To achieve these three objectives, we interviewed officials from the 

Bureau’s Decennial Management Division and other units involved with 

planning the 2010 Census. We also reviewed relevant design and budget 

documents as well as our prior work and that of the Department of 

Commerce Inspector General, on planning the 2000 and earlier censuses.4

 

We also reviewed reports by the National Academy of Sciences on planning 

the 2010 Census.5

 We did not independently verify the cost information the 

Bureau provided. To help determine the key elements for successful 

project planning, we reviewed a number of guides to project management 

and business process reengineering. 6

Our work was performed from January through September 2003 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. We 

requested comments on a draft of this report from the Secretary of 

Commerce and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. On 

November 6, 2003, we received the Secretary’s written comments on the 

draft (see app. I). On October 14, 2003, the Director of OMB forwarded 

OMB’s comments on the draft (see app. II). They are addressed in the 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation section of this report.

4

 See, for example, U.S. General Accounting Office, 2000 Census: Progress Made on 

Design, but Risks Remain, GAO/GGD-97-142 (Washington, D.C.: July 14, 1997).

5

 National Research Council, Planning the 2010 Census: Second Interim Report 

(Washington, D.C.: July 22, 2003).

6

 The guides include: A Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge, Project 

Management Institute Standards Committee,  1996.

Project Management for Mission Critical Systems, a Handbook for Government 

Executives, Information Technology Resource Board, April 5, 2001.

Capability, Maturity Model Integration Project Planning Guide, Carnegie Mellon 

Software Engineering Institute, March 2001.

U.S. General Accounting Office, Business Process Reengineering Assessment Guide, 

GAO/AIMD-10.1.15 (Washington, D.C.: May 1997).
Page 8 GAO-04-37 2010 Census

2010 Design Has 

Potential, but 

Introduces New Risks

In designing the 2010 Census, Bureau officials had four principal goals in 

mind: (1) increase the relevance and timeliness of census long-form data, 

(2) reduce operational risk, (3) increase the coverage and accuracy of the 

census, and (4) contain costs. The goals were a direct response to 

problems the Bureau experienced in conducting the 2000 Census, such as 

untimely long-form data; inaccurate maps; coverage difficulties; and 

expensive, labor-intensive, and paper-laden field data collection. 

Census Reforms Have Three 

Key Components

The Bureau recognized that its traditional approach to counting the 

population was insufficient for meeting these four objectives. In its place, 

the Bureau developed what it believes is a paradigm shift to taking the 

census, basing its reform efforts on three interrelated components the 

Bureau refers to as a “three-legged stool.”

Modernizing and Enhancing the 

MAF/TIGER Address File and 

Geographic Database 

The mainstay of a successful census is an accurate address list and its 

associated maps. The Bureau uses MAF and TIGER to provide (1) maps for 

field operations and data reference, (2) the geographic location of every 

structure, (3) address lists for the decennial census, and (4) names and 

codes of entities for data tabulation and data for use by the commercial 

geographic information systems industry. 

The Bureau’s experience in conducting the 2000 Census highlighted the 

need to update and modernize MAF/TIGER prior to 2010. For example, the 

centerlines of streets in TIGER did not accurately reflect their true 

geographic locations, which could cause houses to be placed in the wrong 

census blocks. Also, according to the Bureau, the 1980s software used to 

develop TIGER is now outdated and cumbersome to update. To fix these 

and other problems, the Bureau launched the MAF/TIGER Enhancements 

Program (MTEP) as part of the 2010 Census modernization efforts. Its 

objectives include

• correcting the locations of each MAF address, street, and other map 

features;

• developing and deploying a new MAF/TIGER processing environment;

• expanding and encouraging geographic intergovernmental partnership 

programs;
Page 9 GAO-04-37 2010 Census

• implementing the Community Address Updating System (CAUS), an 

initiative to partner with local governments to update MAF data; and 

• initiating quality assurance evaluation activities.

The Bureau estimates the total cost for these five objectives to be 

$536 million. According to Bureau officials, while some elements of MAF 

will be improved as part of the overall MAF/TIGER enhancements 

program, the primary focus of the effort is on TIGER modernization and 

data correction. This modernization program will not reengineer the MAF 

process.

Implementing ACS to Collect 

Long-Form Data on an Ongoing, 

Annual Basis

ACS is intended to be a monthly survey of 250,000 households that would 

replace the long form used in past decennial censuses. According to the 

Bureau, the benefits of ACS include (1) more timely long-form data at 

detailed geographic levels that would be as accurate as subnational annual 

data from existing surveys, such as the Current Population and American 

Housing Surveys, and (2) the ability to improve the accuracy of the 

decennial census population counts by eliminating the long-form 

questionnaire.

The ACS data will be published annually for geographic areas with 

populations over 65,000; as a 3-year average for geographic areas with 

populations of 20,000 to 65,000; and as a 5-year average for geographic 

areas with populations under 20,000. According to the Bureau, because of 

the larger sample size associated with long-form data, the annual and 3-

year average data will be significantly less accurate than the long-form 

data. The 5-year data would be about as accurate as the long form.

Developing, Testing, and 

Implementing a Short-Form-Only 

Census; Taking Advantage of the 

Benefits Gained by the First Two 

Efforts

The Bureau believes that eliminating the long form will result in a number 

of benefits to decennial data collection and general field operations. For 

example, according to the Bureau, the reduction in paper will enable it to 

process data with three data capture centers instead of the four centers 

used during Census 2000. The Bureau also would not need as many local 

census offices, thereby allowing it to reduce the rolls of clerical and 

administrative staff. 

According to the Bureau, a short-form-only census also allows the Bureau 

to use such technology as handheld mobile computing devices so that 

enumerators can locate and update data on housing units, help conduct 

interviews, transmit data directly to the data capture centers, and receive 

regularly updated field assignments. The devices will be linked to the 
Page 10 GAO-04-37 2010 Census

satellite-based Global Positioning System (GPS) to enable field workers to 

locate addresses more precisely and efficiently. The Bureau also plans to 

incorporate changes that are not dependent on ACS and MAF/TIGER. For 

example, the Bureau plans to expand the respondents’ ability to complete 

their questionnaires via the Internet. 

2010 Design Is Linked to 

Goals, but Challenges 

Remain

As shown in table 1, the Bureau’s three-legged stool strategy is generally 

aligned with three of its four key goals for the 2010 Census and, if 

successful, could put the Bureau on track toward achieving them. 

Table 1: The Three-Legged Stool Strategy Could Help the Bureau Progress toward Its Key Goals for the 2010 Census

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Census Bureau data.

Less clear is how the Bureau will achieve its goal of reducing operational 

risk using its current plan. Although the Bureau’s position that early testing 

will enable it to identify and correct flaws is both a common sense business 

practice and supported by its past experience (assuming its testing 

Goal Strategy for achieving goal Rationale

Increase the relevance and 

timeliness of census long-form 

data

Implement ACS ACS, if implemented nationwide, is to replace the long form and provide 

annual data for areas with populations over 65,000 and multiyear 

averages for smaller geographic areas. This compares to the long 

form’s once-every-10-year data. 

Reduce operational risk Early planning and testing, 

short-form-only 

census questionnaire

The Bureau believes that testing a design early in the decade will 

identify design flaws and allow the Bureau to correct them early in the 

process. Also, a short-form-only census should be easier to implement 

since Bureau staff will only have to plan systems for one type of form 

and handle much less paper.

Increase coverage and 

accuracy

Short-form-only census, 

MAF/TIGER enhancements

The Bureau believes that a short-form-only census will increase the 

mail response rate by 8 percentage points because, historically, more 

people have responded to the short form than the long form, and the 

Bureau has found that the quality of the data is better when supplied 

directly by respondents. The Bureau also plans to do a targeted 

second mailing to nonresponders that should also boost the response 

rate. These efforts combined with other planned improvements, such 

as the MAF/TIGER enhancements, would improve overall accuracy 

and coverage.

Contain costs Short-form-only census The higher response rates produced by the short form will reduce the 

Bureau’s nonresponse follow-up workload, one of the largest drivers of 

census costs. The Bureau also believes that a short-form-only census 

will result in less paper, and thus enable the Bureau to get by with three 

rather than four data capture centers (as was the case in 2000) and 

fewer local census offices.
Page 11 GAO-04-37 2010 Census

program is adequately designed), as described below, the operational and 

other hurdles associated with successfully implementing the three-legged 

stool actually introduce new risks and challenges. This does not 

necessarily mean that the Bureau’s design is flawed. To the contrary, the 

obstacles to a cost-effective head count call for the Bureau to consider bold 

and innovative initiatives, and these are not risk free. 

At the same time, given the enormity of the census and all of its 

complexities, the three-legged stool by itself will not automatically 

guarantee the successful accomplishment of the Bureau’s goals. Our work 

on transforming agencies into high-performing organizations has 

underscored the importance of an agency’s leadership and core business 

practices. Critical success factors include, among others, effective 

communication strategies to ensure coordination, synergy, and integration; 

strategic planning; aligning the agency’s organization to be consistent with 

the goals and objectives established in the strategic plan; and effective 

performance, financial, acquisition, and information technology 

management. In all, the Bureau faces at least three key challenges.

Challenge #1: Securing 

Congressional Approval

Among the more significant challenges the Bureau faces is securing 

congressional approval for its proposed approach. As we noted in our 

January 2003 performance and accountability report, congressional 

support for the 2010 design is necessary to ensure adequate planning, 

testing, and funding levels.7

 Conversely, the lack of an agreed-upon design 

raises the risk that basic design elements might change in the years ahead, 

while the opportunities to test those changes and integrate them with other 

operations will diminish. In other words, in order for the Bureau to conduct 

proper planning and development activities, the basic design of the 2010 

Census needs to be stable.

According to the Bureau, a go/no-go decision on key aspects of the 

design—a short-form-only census and replacing the long form with ACS—

will need to be made around 2006. Bureau officials told us that if ACS were 

dropped after 2007, the Bureau would not be able to reinstate the long form 

with the short form in 2010 because of logistical obstacles. They noted that 

the Bureau is already testing the short-form-only census and, in late-2005 or 

early-2006, expects to sign a contract for data capture operations. If the 

7

 U.S. General Accounting Office, Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: 

Department of Commerce, GAO-03-97 (Washington, D.C.: January 2003). 
Page 12 GAO-04-37 2010 Census

Bureau had to revert to a long-form census at that point, it would add 

significant risks and costs to the 2010 Census. 

During the 2000 Census, the lack of an agreement between the 

administration and Congress on the fundamental design—and particularly, 

the Bureau’s planned use of sampling—increased the likelihood of an 

unsuccessful head count and was one of the principal reasons why, in 1997, 

we designated the 2000 Census a high-risk area. Members of Congress 

questioned the use of sampling and estimation for legal and methodological 

reasons. Contributing to Congress’s skepticism was the Bureau’s failure to 

provide sufficiently detailed data on the effects of its proposed approach. 

Although the U.S. Supreme Court settled the dispute in January 1999,8

 the 

Bureau ultimately wound up having to plan for both a “traditional” census 

and one involving sampling, which added to the costs and risks of the 2000 

decennial census.

To help secure congressional support for its 2010 reform efforts, it will be 

important for the Bureau to convincingly demonstrate that it has chosen 

the optimum design given various resource and other constraints and that 

it will effectively manage operations and costs. A critical first step in this 

regard is to have comprehensive and transparent information that lays out 

the specifics of the Bureau’s plans, explains their benefits, and supports 

assumptions. However, as discussed more fully in the next section, while 

the Bureau’s planning for the 2010 Census has improved compared with its 

efforts for the 2000 Census, certain information gaps remain. For example, 

the Bureau’s most recent budget submissions have not included complete 

life cycle cost estimates that could enable Congress to make more 

informed decisions about the cost implications of the three-legged stool 

design, including ACS. 

Challenge #2: Resolving 

Uncertainties That Surround 

ACS 

Most of the reforms, savings, and improvements in accuracy the Bureau 

anticipates will not be possible unless it conducts a short-form-only census. 

However, the Bureau’s planned replacement for the long form, ACS, faces 

methodological and other questions that need to be resolved soon.9

 

Consequently, the Bureau is taking a significant risk by pinning the success 

8 Department of Commerce vs. United States House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316 (1999).

9

 For a more complete discussion of ACS, see U.S. General Accounting Office, The 

American Community Survey: Accuracy and Timeliness Issues, GAO-02-956R

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30, 2002).
Page 13 GAO-04-37 2010 Census

of its reform efforts largely on a survey that may not be an adequate 

replacement for the long form. The Bureau believes that without ACS, it 

will need to repeat the Census 2000 design.

One methodological question is whether to administer ACS as a mandatory 

or voluntary survey. Under the Bureau’s current approach, survey 

recipients will be legally required to respond to ACS. However, in response 

to congressional concerns that a mandatory survey is intrusive, the Bureau 

tested conducting ACS as a voluntary survey. Based on the results of the 

test, the Bureau estimates that a voluntary survey could produce a 

response rate around 4.2 percentage points lower than a mandatory survey. 

The Bureau estimates that costs would increase by $59.2 million per year to 

maintain the same level of reliability achieved from a mandatory survey. 

Moreover, the Bureau’s efforts to ensure that ACS data will serve as a 

satisfactory replacement for the long-form data are not yet complete. 

Among the remaining issues, most of which are critical to the reliability of 

the small geographic area ACS data, are the following:

1. Benchmarking ACS data or small geographic areas to the population 

counts and characteristics from the 2010 short form. 

2. Inconsistency of ACS residency rules—which determine the 

geographic area in which a person is supposed to be counted—with 

those used for the census.

3. Consistency of ACS data with long-form data from the 2000 Census.

4. For multiyear averages of ACS data for small areas, consistency with 

annual ACS data for larger areas and utilization as a measure of change. 

Challenge #3: Successfully 

Implementing Each Leg of the 

Bureau’s Design

Each leg of the Bureau’s three-legged stool is dependent on the other; that 

is, the implementation of one leg allows the other two legs to operate 

successfully. For example, ACS is facilitated by first updating the 

MAF/TIGER database for the ACS sample. Similarly, as noted above, the 

Bureau’s plan to conduct a short-form-only enumeration depends on ACS. 

Consequently, the Bureau’s design assumes that by 2008, (1) ACS will be in 

place nationwide and producing data, (2) a GPS-aligned and modernized 

MAF/TIGER will be available, and (3) all reengineering efforts will be 

complete to allow for a true dress rehearsal. Completing any one of these 

tasks would be a considerable undertaking; for 2010, the Bureau plans to 

develop, refine, and integrate all three in the space of just a few years. 
Page 14 GAO-04-37 2010 Census

Moreover, the Bureau has no contingency plans other than to revert to a 

“traditional” census. According to the Bureau, while the failure of any one 

leg would not doom the census, it could jeopardize the Bureau’s goals. For 

example, if the MAF/TIGER modernization is not completed on schedule, 

the Bureau would be unable to employ the GPS-enabled handheld mobile 

computing devices that enumerators are to use when conducting 

nonresponse follow-up. This in turn could affect the efficiency of the effort 

and the quality of the data collected. In addition, the Bureau would not 

have time to conduct the research and testing necessary to improve the 

long form based on lessons learned in the 2000 Census.

The Bureau’s Plans for 

Measuring Accuracy and 

Coverage in 2010 

Because of limitations in census taking methods, some degree of error in 

the form of persons missed or counted more than once is inevitable. Since 

1980, the Bureau has used statistical methods to generate detailed 

measures of the undercounts of particular ethnic, racial, and other 

population groups. To assess the quality of population data for the 2000 

Census and to possibly adjust for any errors, the Bureau conducted the 

Accuracy and Coverage Evaluation (A.C.E.) program. Although the U.S. 

Supreme Court ruled in 1999 that the Census Act prohibited the use of 

statistical sampling for purposes of apportioning seats in the House of 

Representatives, the Court did not specifically address the use of statistical 

sampling for other purposes.10 

In March 2001, the Acting Director of the U.S. Census Bureau 

recommended to the Secretary of Commerce that only unadjusted data be 

released for purposes of congressional redistricting. The Acting Director 

made this recommendation when, after considerable research, the Bureau 

was unable to conclude that the adjusted data were more accurate for use 

in redistricting. Specifically, the Acting Director cited the apparent 

inconsistency in population growth over the decade as estimated by the 

A.C.E., and demographic analysis, which estimated the population using 

birth, death, and similar records. He noted that the inconsistency raised 

the possibility of an unidentified error in either the A.C.E. estimates or the 

census numbers, and the inconsistency could not be resolved prior to 

April 1, 2001, the legally mandated deadline for releasing redistricting data. 

Later that year, following additional research, the Acting Director decided 

against using adjusted census data for nonredistricting purposes, such as 

10 Department of Commerce v. United States House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316 (1999).
Page 15 GAO-04-37 2010 Census

allocating federal aid, because A.C.E. estimates failed to identify a 

significant number of people erroneously included in the census. The 

Acting Director noted that “this finding of substantial error, in conjunction 

with remaining uncertainties, necessitates that revisions, based on 

additional review and analysis, be made to the A.C.E. estimates before any 

potential uses of these data can be considered.”

As the Bureau turned toward the 2010 Census, it needed to decide whether 

it would have a coverage measurement program and how the results would 

be used. Because of the 1999 U.S. Supreme Court ruling noted earlier, the 

Bureau could not use coverage measurement results to adjust census data 

for purposes of congressional apportionment. However, adjusting census 

data for other purposes remained an open question.

In our January 2003 report on the objectives and results of the 2000 A.C.E. 

program, we noted that an evaluation of the accuracy and completeness of 

the census is critical given the many uses of census data, the importance of 

identifying the magnitude and characteristics of any undercounts and 

overcounts, and the cost of the census overall.11 We cautioned that the 

longer the 2010 planning process continues without a firm decision on the 

role of coverage measurement, the greater the risk of wasted resources and 

disappointing results. 

Consequently, we recommended that the Bureau, in conjunction with 

Congress and other stakeholders, come to an early decision on whether 

and how coverage measurement will be used in the 2010 Census. In 

reaching this decision, we recommended that the Bureau (1) demonstrate 

both the operational and technical feasibility of its coverage measurement 

methods, (2) determine the level of geography at which coverage can be 

reliably measured, (3) keep Congress and other stakeholders informed of 

its plans, and (4) adequately test its coverage measurement methodology 

prior to full implementation. 

The Bureau agreed with our recommendations, noting that we had 

identified important steps that should be followed in developing a coverage 

measurement methodology for the 2010 Census. While certain aspects of 

the Bureau’s coverage measurement plans are still being developed, the 

11 U.S. General Accounting Office, 2000 Census: Coverage Measurement Programs’ 

Results, Costs, and Lessons Learned, GAO-03-287 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 29, 2003).
Page 16 GAO-04-37 2010 Census

Bureau is not currently planning to develop a procedure that would allow it 

to adjust census numbers for purposes of redistricting. 

According to the Director of the U.S. Census Bureau, although the Bureau 

plans to evaluate the accuracy of the coverage it achieves in the 2010 

Census, its experience during the 2000 Census demonstrated “that the 

science is insufficiently advanced to allow making statistical adjustment to 

population counts of a successful decennial census in which the 

percentage of error is presumed to be so small that adjustment would 

introduce as much or more error than it was designed to correct.”

Furthermore, irrespective of whether it is both legal and appropriate to do 

so, the Bureau does not believe that it can both collect coverage 

measurement data and complete the analysis of those data’s accuracy in 

time to deliver the information to the states to meet their redistricting 

deadlines. 

Although the Bureau’s experience during the 2000 Census shows that its 

approach to measuring coverage needs to be improved if it is to be used to 

adjust census numbers, the Bureau has not yet determined the feasibility of 

refinements to the 2000 approach or alternative methodologies. 

Consequently, the Bureau’s decision on how coverage evaluation data will 

be used in 2010 appears to be premature. Indeed, while the Bureau has 

reported that the 2000 Census had better coverage compared to the 1990 

Census, as noted below, the U.S. population is becoming increasingly 

difficult to count, a factor that could affect the quality of the 2010 Census. 

More generally, the decennial census is an inherently fragile endeavor, 

where an accurate population count requires the near-perfect alignment of 

a myriad of factors ranging from the successful execution of dozens of 

census-taking operations to the public’s willingness to cooperate with 

enumerators. External factors such as the state of the economy and world 

events might also affect the outcome of the census. The bottom line is that 

while the census is under way, the tolerance for any breakdowns is quite 

small. 

Therefore, the Bureau’s ability to maintain the level of quality reported for 

the 2000 Census is far from guaranteed. Thus, to ensure that the nation 

uses the best available census data, it will be important for the Bureau to 

research procedures that depending on what the results of the coverage 

evaluation say about the quality of the census data, would allow 

adjustment, if necessary, for those purposes for which it is both legal and 
Page 17 GAO-04-37 2010 Census

appropriate to do so. The Bureau should conduct this effort on a timetable 

that allows it to adequately test and refine those procedures, as well as 

obtain input from both majority and minority parties in the Senate and 

House of Representatives. 

Escalating Census 

Costs Call for 

Transparent Budget 

Data and Better 

Reporting 

In June 2001, the Bureau estimated that the reengineered 2010 Census 

would cost $11.3 billion in current dollars. This would make the 2010 head 

count the most expensive in the nation’s history, even after adjusting for 

inflation. According to the Bureau estimates in June 2001, a repeat of the 

2000 approach would cost even more, over $11.7 billion. This estimate of 

repeating the 2000 approach was revised to approximately $12.2 billion in 

April 2003. Moreover, the actual cost of the census could end up 

considerably higher as the Bureau’s initial cost projections for previous 

censuses proved to be too low because of such factors as unforeseen 

operational problems or changes to the fundamental design. For example, 

while the Bureau estimated that the 2000 Census would cost around 

$4 billion using sampling, and that a traditional census without sampling 

would cost around $5 billion, the final price tag for the 2000 Census 

(without sampling) was over $6.5 billion. 

Census Costs Continue to 

Grow

The Bureau’s cost projections for the 2010 decennial census continue an 

escalating trend. As shown in figure 1, in constant 2000 dollars, the 

estimated $9.3 billion cost of the 2010 Census represents a tenfold jump 

over the $920 million spent on the 1970 Census (as noted above, the Bureau 

estimates the 2010 Census will cost $11.3 billion in current dollars).
Page 18 GAO-04-37 2010 Census

Figure 1: Decennial Census Costs from 1970 through 2010 (Projected) in Constant 

2000 Dollars 

Although some cost growth can be expected in part because the number of 

housing units—and hence the Bureau’s workload—has gotten larger, the 

cost growth has far exceeded the housing unit increase. The Bureau 

estimates that the number of housing units for the 2010 Census will 

increase by 10 percent over 2000 Census levels. Meanwhile, the average 

cost per housing unit for 2010 is expected to increase by approximately 29 

percent from 2000 levels (from $56 to $72), nearly five and a half times 

greater than the $13 it cost to count each household in 1970 (see fig. 2).12

12 These figures include the 10-year costs for ACS replacement for the census long form and 

the costs of MAF/TIGER.

0

2

4

6

8

10

1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

(projected)

Census year

Cost in billions of dollars

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Census Bureau figures.

.9

2.2

3.3

6.6

9.3
Page 19 GAO-04-37 2010 Census

Figure 2: Decennial Census Average Cost per Housing Unit (in Constant Fiscal Year 

2000 Dollars) 

As for previous censuses, the major cost for the 2010 Census is what the 

Bureau calls “field data collection and support systems.” Over half of 

decennial census life cycle costs are attributed to this area. Specific 

components include the costly and labor-intensive nonresponse follow-up 

operation as well as support activities such as the opening and staffing of 

hundreds of temporary local census offices. 

One reason why field data collection is so expensive is because the Bureau 

is finding it increasingly difficult to locate people and get them to 

participate in the census. According to Bureau officials, societal trends, 

such as the increasing number of respondents who do not speak English, 

the growing difficulty of finding respondents at home, and the general 

increase of privacy concerns, impede a cost-effective head count. Further, 

the legal requirement to count everyone leads the Bureau to employ 

operations that only marginally improve coverage but that are relatively 

expensive to conduct. 

Societal changes have also reduced the cost-effectiveness of the census, 

and it has become increasingly difficult to simply stay on par with the 

results of previous enumerations. For example, during the 1990 Census, 

the Bureau spent $0.88 per housing unit (in 2000 dollars) to market the 

80 Dollars per housing unit

60

40

20

0

1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

(projected) Census year

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Census Bureau figures.

13

24

32

56

72
Page 20 GAO-04-37 2010 Census

census and encourage participation and achieved a response rate of 65 

percent. During the 2000 Census, the Bureau spent $3.19 per housing unit 

(in 2000 dollars) to promote participation, but the response rate was 64 

percent. 

Cost Estimates Need 

Greater Transparency 

The constitutional mandate to count the nation’s population explicitly 

commits or “exposes” the government to spending money on the census 

each decade. In this way, the census is similar to other fiscal exposures 

such as retirement benefits, environmental cleanup costs, and the payment 

of Social Security benefits in that the government is obligated to a certain 

level of future outlays. 

Early in each census cycle, expenditures are relatively low as the Bureau 

plans the census and conducts various tests. As the decade continues, 

spending increases, spiking during the decennial year when costly data 

collection activities take place. As shown in figure 3, during the 2000 

Census, $4.1 billion—almost two-thirds of the money spent on the entire 

census—was spent in fiscal year 2000 alone. 

Figure 3: 2000 Census Life Cycle Costs by Fiscal Year 

Current budget reporting, however, does not always fully capture or require 

explicit consideration of some future fiscal exposures. In fact, this is 

particularly true with the census, as annual budget requests and reports 

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

(estimate)

Fiscal year

Dollars in millions

Source: GAO.

9 14 19 41 51 86

386

1,084

4,117

442 139 142 1
Page 21 GAO-04-37 2010 Census

provided to Congress early in the decennial census life cycle do not reflect 

the full cash consequences of the spending and policy decisions. Thus, as it 

begins funding the 2010 Census early in the decade at relatively low levels, 

Congress will have implicitly accepted a future spike in costs—essentially a 

balloon payment in 2010—without requiring the Bureau to clearly define 

what those costs might be, why they are justified, and what alternatives 

might exist.

As we noted in our January 2003 report on improving the budgetary focus 

on long-term costs and uncertainties, information on the existence and 

estimated cost of fiscal exposures needs to be considered along with other 

factors when making policy decisions.13 With respect to the census, not 

capturing the long-term costs of annual spending decisions limits 

Congress’s ability to control the government’s exposure at the time 

decisions are made, consider trade-offs with other national priorities, and 

curtail the growth in census costs. Consequently, fiscal transparency is 

critical to better reflect the magnitude of the government’s long-term 

spending on the census and signal unanticipated cost growth. Greater 

fiscal transparency can also facilitate an independent review and provide 

an opportunity to improve stakeholder confidence and commitment to the 

Bureau’s reengineered decennial census design.

Our January 2003 report noted that increased supplemental reporting could 

help improve fiscal transparency and described several options for how to 

accomplish this. Although that report recommended that OMB consider 

implementing these options governmentwide, at least two options could be 

adapted specifically for the Bureau and its parent agency, the Department 

of Commerce. The two options are (1) annually reporting the planned life 

cycle cash flow and explaining any material changes from previous plans 

(currently, the Bureau does not make this information available) and 

(2) setting triggers to signal when the amount of money expected to be 

spent in any one year exceeded a predetermined amount. Combined, these 

actions could prompt more explicit deliberations on the cost and 

affordability of the census and help inform specific cost control measures 

by Congress, if warranted. 

13 U.S. General Accounting Office, Fiscal Exposures: Improving the Budgetary Focus on 

Long-Term Costs and Uncertainties, GAO-03-213 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 24, 2003).
Page 22 GAO-04-37 2010 Census

More Information Needed 

on Underlying Budget 

Assumptions

The assumptions the Bureau used to develop the life cycle cost estimate 

could also benefit from greater transparency.14 More robust information 

on the likelihood that the values the Bureau assigned to key cost drivers 

might differ from those initially assumed, and the impact that any 

differences would have on the total life cycle cost, could provide Congress 

with better information on the range and probability of the fiscal exposure 

the nation faces from the upcoming census. 

As shown in figure 4, the Bureau derived the baseline for its 2010 cost 

estimate using the actual cost of the 2000 Census and assumptions about 

certain cost drivers, estimating the cost of the 2010 Census as if the Bureau 

were to repeat its 2000 design. The key assumptions include 

• a 35 percent decrease in enumerator productivity, 

• a pay rate increase for census workers from 2000 levels, 

• a mail-back response rate lower than Census 2000 levels,15 and 

• inflation.

14 OMB Circular A-94 provides guidelines for cost-benefit analysis of federal programs and 

recommends that agencies develop a sensitivity analysis for major projects with significant 

uncertainty. The circular provides a method for determining how sensitive outcomes are to 

changes in assumptions. 

15 A lower mail-back response rate means that more costly nonresponse follow-up activities 

are needed to obtain census data from a household.
Page 23 GAO-04-37 2010 Census

Figure 4: Bureau’s June 2001 Estimating Methodology for Census 2010 Life Cycle 

Costs

The projected costs and savings of repeating the 2000 design versus the 

Bureau’s approach based on the three-legged stool, are shown in table 2. 
Page 24 GAO-04-37 2010 Census

Table 2: Projected Costs from June 2001 Estimate of Reengineering the 2010 

Census

Source: U.S. Census Bureau.

Note: ACS and MAF/TIGER modernization spending is not included under the scenario of repeating 

the 2000 Census design for the 2010 Census. 

a

The Bureau revised its estimates in April 2003, but we did not have the breakdown by budget 

framework to revise this table.

Transparent information is especially important since decennial cost 

estimates are sensitive to many key assumptions. In fact, for the 2000 

Census, the Bureau’s supplemental funding request for $1.7 billion in fiscal 

year 2000 primarily involved changes in assumptions related to increased 

workload, reduced employee productivity, and increased advertising. 

Given the cost estimates’ sensitivity to key assumptions, greater 

transparency could be obtained by showing the range and likelihood of 

how true cost drivers could differ from those assumed and how those 

differences would affect estimates of total cost. Thus, if early research and 

testing show that response rates may be higher than originally anticipated, 

or that enumerator productivity could be better than expected, the Bureau 

can report on the nature of its changing assumptions and its effect on life 

cycle costs. Also important, by providing information on the likely 

accuracy of assumptions concerning cost drivers, the Bureau would better 

enable Congress to consider funding levels in an uncertain environment. 

Dollars in millions

Budget frameworks

 Repeated 

2000 Census 

design 

(baseline)

 Reengineered 

2010 Census 

(three-legged 

stool)

 Savings 

(increases) 

Program Development and 

Management 183 247 (64)

Data Content and Products 765 705 60 

Field Data Collection and Systems 7,880 5,640 2,240 

Address List Compilation 610 455 155 

Automated Data Processing 1,265 840 425 

Testing, Evaluation, and Rehearsal 391 467 (76)

Island Areas 163 153 10 

Marketing and Communications 468 518 (50)

ACS 1,720 (1,720)

MAF/TIGER 535 (535)

Total 11,725 11,280a 445 
Page 25 GAO-04-37 2010 Census

Other key areas in which changes in assumptions can greatly affect costs 

are salary rates for enumerators, the future price of handheld mobile 

computing devices, and inflation. 

Our prior work has described how agencies provide supporting 

information when developing budget assumptions. For example, the 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission identifies a basis and a certainty level for 

its budget assumptions used for internal reporting. A basis summarizes the 

facts that were evaluated to justify the assumption, while a certainty level 

depicts the likelihood of its occurrence as high, medium, or low.16 

Finally, it is important to have timely cost information for congressional 

decision making. The Bureau’s life cycle estimates were updated in April 

2003 after being first presented in June 2001—nearly a 2-year interval. In 

addition, when we requested additional information on life cycle costs the 

Bureau took several months to provide information on its life cycle cost 

estimates and assumptions, ultimately revising its total cost estimates 

before providing us with the data.

2010 Planning Process 

Is Better Than Past 

Efforts, but Rigor Is 

Uneven

The Bureau has taken several positive steps to correct problems 

encountered planning past censuses, and the Bureau appears to be further 

along in planning the 2010 Census than at this same point during the 2000 

Census cycle. Although an improvement over past efforts, the Bureau’s 

2010 planning process still contains certain weak points that if not 

addressed could undermine a cost-effective head count and make it more 

difficult to obtain the support of Congress and other stakeholders. 

The Bureau Improved Its 

Planning Process, but Key 

Elements Are Still Lacking

The characteristics of the census—long-term, large-scale, high-risk, costly, 

and politically sensitive—together make a cost-effective enumeration a 

monumental project management challenge, one that demands meticulous 

planning. To help determine the principal ingredients of successful project 

planning, we reviewed a number of guides to project management and 

business process reengineering. Although there is no one best approach to 

16 U.S. General Accounting Office, Managing for Results: Efforts to Strengthen the Link 

Between Resources and Results at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, GAO-03-258

(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 10, 2002). 
Page 26 GAO-04-37 2010 Census

project planning, the guides we reviewed contained many elements in 

common, including the following: 

• Developing a project plan. The plan should consider all phases of the 

project and should have clear and measurable goals; all assumptions, 

schedules, and deadlines clearly stated; and needed skills and resources 

identified. 

• Evaluating human resource implications. This includes assessing 

needed competencies and how they will be acquired and retained. 

• Involving stakeholders and incorporating lessons learned. 

Stakeholders—both internal and external to an organization—have 

skills and knowledge that could contribute to a project and should be 

involved in the decision-making process. An organization should focus 

on the highest priority stakeholder needs and mission goals. Evaluating 

past performance and capitalizing on lessons learned is also important 

for improving performance.

• Analyzing and mitigating risks. This involves identifying, analyzing, 

prioritizing, and documenting risks. Ideally, more than one alternative 

should be assessed. 

• Monitoring progress. Measurable performance goals should be 

identified and performance data should be gathered to determine how 

well the goals are being achieved.

The Bureau has made considerable progress in planning the 2010 Census, 

and some of the positive steps taken to date include the following efforts. 

• Early in the decade, senior Bureau staff considered various goals for the 

2010 Census and articulated a design strategy to achieve those goals. 

Senior Bureau officials collaborated on this initial design plan to set the 

stage for further refinements during later field testing and research 

activities.17

17 Details are documented in U.S. Census Bureau, Decennial Management Division, 

Reengineering the Decennial Census: The Vision of a Baseline Design for 2010

(Washington, D.C.: January 2003).
Page 27 GAO-04-37 2010 Census

• The Bureau has involved experienced staff in the design process 

through cross-divisional planning groups. Staff involved in these 

planning groups will ultimately be responsible for implementing the 

2010 Census. According to Bureau officials, this is a departure from the 

2000 Census planning effort when Bureau staff with little experience in 

conducting the census played a key role in designing the decennial 

census, which resulted in impractical reforms that could not be 

implemented. 

• The Bureau has recognized the importance of strategically managing its 

human capital to meet future requirements. The planning and 

development of the 2010 Census will take place at a time when the 

Bureau could find itself experiencing substantial employee turnover 

(three senior Bureau managers left the agency in 2002, and according to 

a report by the Department of Commerce Inspector General, the Bureau 

could lose through retirement around half of the senior staff who 

carried out the 2000 Census).18 The Bureau, as part of a broader risk 

assessment, plans to provide less experienced staff the opportunity to 

obtain operational experience prior to the actual 2010 Census. In 

addition, the Bureau has provided training in project management and 

has encouraged staff to take training courses in management and 

planning.

However, other aspects of the Bureau’s 2010 planning process could be 

improved. A more rigorous plan would better position the Bureau to fulfill 

its key objectives for the 2010 Census and help demonstrate to Congress 

and other stakeholders that it can effectively design and manage operations 

as well as control costs. 

18 U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Inspector General, Improving Our Measure of 

America: What Census 2000 Can Teach Us in Planning for 2010, OIG-14431 (Washington, 

D.C.: Spring 2002).
Page 28 GAO-04-37 2010 Census

Developing a Project Plan Although the Bureau has developed project plans for some of the key 

components of its 2010 strategy, the Bureau has not yet crafted an overall 

project plan that (1) includes milestones for completing key activities; 

(2) itemizes the estimated cost of each component; (3) articulates a clear 

system of coordination among project components; and (4) translates key 

goals into measurable, operational terms to provide meaningful guidance 

for planning and measuring progress. OMB Circular A-1119 specifies that an 

agency’s general goals should be sufficiently precise to direct and guide 

agency staff in actions that carry out the agency’s mission and aid the 

agency in developing annual performance goals. 

The importance of this information for improving accountability and 

performance can be seen, for example, in the Bureau’s principal goal to 

increase coverage and accuracy. Though laudable, the Bureau has yet to 

assign any numbers to this goal. This makes it difficult to evaluate the 

costs and benefits of alternative designs, determine the level of resources 

needed to achieve this goal, measure the Bureau’s progress, or hold 

managers accountable for results. 

Bureau managers provided us with several documents that pieced together 

present 2010 Census goals and strategies, life cycle costs, and schedules, 

but no single, comprehensive document exists that integrates this 

information. For example, the Bureau’s life cycle cost estimates and 

information on its performance goals were contained in two separate 

documents, making it hard to see the connection between cost and the 

Bureau’s objectives. Likewise, a draft document, entitled 2010 

Reengineered Census Milestone Schedule, included various milestones by 

fiscal quarter, but did not contain information on dependencies and 

interrelationships among the various aspects of the project. 

In its 2001 letter to the Bureau’s acting director, the National Academy of 

Sciences’ (NAS) Panel on Research on Future Census Methods raised 

similar concerns about the need for a coherent project plan. The panel 

noted that it wanted “to see a clearer case for components of the 2010 

census strategy, itemizing the goals, costs, and benefits of each initiative 

and indicating how they integrate and contribute to a high quality census.” 

To that end, NAS recommended that the Bureau develop what it called a 

business plan for 2010.

19 OMB Circular A-11, as revised July 2003, provides guidance to agencies on budget 

preparation, performance reporting, and capital asset acquisition.
Page 29 GAO-04-37 2010 Census

Incorporating Lessons Learned The Bureau is making an effort to develop and incorporate the lessons 

learned from the 2000 Census and, in fact, created an elaborate evaluation 

program to help inform this effort. Moreover, the Bureau chartered 11 

planning groups consisting of knowledgeable census staff (see app. III for 

the 2010 planning organization). However, the Bureau’s ability to build on 

the results of 2000 could be hampered by the fact that while the evaluation 

program assessed numerous aspects of the census, the Bureau still lacks 

data and information on the performance of key census activities, as well 

as on how specific census operations contributed to two of the Bureau’s 

key goals for 2000: improved accuracy and cost-effectiveness. 

For example, as noted earlier, the cost of the 2010 Census is increasing 

relative to 2000 partly because the Bureau expects nonresponse follow-up 

enumerators will be less productive in 2010. Because of various societal 

factors, it will simply take enumerators more time to complete their work. 

And yet, despite the importance of accurate productivity data to inform the 

Bureau’s planning and budgeting processes for 2010, the Bureau had 

trouble obtaining quality productivity data following the 2000 Census. 

Although the Bureau later committed additional resources to refine the 

numbers, the adjustment was coarse and addressed just one of the two 

known problems. Moreover, because of differences in the way the Bureau 

measured staffing levels and hours worked from census to census, none of 

the productivity data from the last few censuses are comparable.20 

Another area in which the Bureau lacks useful performance information is 

in the extent to which the dozen or so separate activities used to build MAF 

in 2000 contributed to its overall accuracy relative to one another. Without 

this information, the Bureau has limited data with which to guide 

investment and trade-off questions for 2010, such as which activity 

provided the biggest “bang for the buck” and should thus be repeated, or 

whether it would be more effective for the Bureau to improve accuracy and 

coverage by putting more resources into MAF-building activities or some 

other operation altogether, such as marketing. 

20 For more information on the difficulties the Bureau encountered generating reliable 

productivity data, see U.S. General Accounting Office, 2000 Census: Better Productivity 

Data Needed for Future Planning and Budgeting, GAO-02-4 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 4, 

2001).
Page 30 GAO-04-37 2010 Census

To date, the Bureau’s planning groups have incorporated a variety of 

lessons learned from the evaluations of the 2000 Census. As an example, 

the Coverage Improvement Planning Group observed an increase in 

inconsistent responses from 2000 Census compared to the previous census 

(e.g., some questionnaires were marked “uninhabited,” but individuals 

were enumerated at the sites). According to a Bureau official, one 

hypothesis for the higher rate of inconsistent responses was that 

enumerators were encouraged to fill in information even when not all of 

the relevant information was known. The Bureau plans to address this 

issue by building in “edits” to its planned handheld mobile computing 

devices so that inconsistent data cannot be entered.21 In addition, the 

Coverage Improvement Planning Group also looked at the 2000 Census 

experience to provide recommendations for the Bureau’s 2004 test. 

Analyzing and Mitigating Risks Risk management is important for preparing for contingencies or changes 

in the external operating environment. At the time of our review, the 

Bureau had completed a risk assessment of some aspects of its operations 

as part of its OMB Circular A-11, Exhibit 300 submission,22 and for certain 

aspects of the reengineering efforts.23 However, the Bureau had not 

developed a risk assessment that addressed the entire 2010 Census, 

including ACS and the MAF/TIGER modernization.

The risk assessment for the reengineering effort uses a consistent scoring 

system to assess the severity of the risks identified and addresses various 

contingencies and mitigation strategies, such as preparing for the 

retirement of key personnel and using succession planning to offset the 

attrition. The scoring system and how it was applied is clearly described in 

the plan, making it easy to evaluate the way it was used. 

However, the assessment does not provide extensive detail on the 

mitigation actions proposed. Also, it does not indicate how risks were 

identified and whether any risks were excluded. A notable exclusion was 

that it did not address the risks if ACS or MAF/TIGER fail or are not funded 

and the impact this might have on the census as a whole. 

21 For example, if an address is noted to be vacant, an error message will appear if the 

enumerator attempts to count people at that address.

22 Exhibit 300 is a capital asset plan required under OMB Circular A-11, Section 300.

23 U.S. Census Bureau, Decennial Management Division, 2010 Decennial Census Risk 

Management Plan (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 4, 2003).
Page 31 GAO-04-37 2010 Census

As mentioned earlier, the Bureau’s three-legged stool strategy assumes that 

all three legs must work together to achieve its goals. One of the reasons 

for doing a risk analysis is to prepare to make trade-offs when faced with 

inevitable budgetary pressures, operational delays, or other risks. Lacking 

information on trade-offs, the Bureau maintains that its only alternative to 

the reengineering is to repeat the 2000 Census design, an approach that 

Bureau officials believe will be extremely expensive. 

Conclusions The obstacles to conducting a cost-effective census have grown with each 

decade, and as the Bureau looks toward 2010, it confronts its biggest 

challenge yet. Consequently, the Bureau will need to balance the growing 

cost, complexity, and political sensitivity of the census with meticulous 

planning. As the Bureau’s past experience has shown, early investments in 

planning can help reduce the costs and risks of its downstream operations. 

Moreover, a rigorous plan is essential for securing early agreement 

between the Bureau and Congress on the Bureau’s fundamental strategy for 

2010. Congressional support—regardless of whether the Bureau’s current 

approach or an alternative is ultimately selected—is crucial for creating a 

stable environment in which to prepare for the census and avoiding a 

repeat of the 2000 Census when disagreement over the Bureau’s 

methodology led to late design changes and additional costs and risks. The 

Bureau has laid out an ambitious schedule of planning, testing, and 

evaluation for the coming years, culminating with a “dress rehearsal” in 

2008. While midcourse corrections are to be expected as a result of these 

efforts, it will be important for the Bureau to proceed with as few 

alterations to its fundamental strategy as possible so that all of the 

operations used in 2010 have been thoroughly road tested. 

The Bureau appears to be further along in planning the 2010 Census 

compared to a similar point during the 2000 Census cycle, and its efforts to 

enhance past planning practices are commendable. Focusing its activities 

on early design, research, and testing and organizing its reengineering 

activities around cross-divisional planning groups, are just some of the 

noteworthy improvements the Bureau has made. 

However, the Bureau’s plans for 2010, while not unreasonable on the 

surface, lack a substantial amount of supporting analysis, budgetary 

transparency, and other information, making it difficult for us, Congress, 

and other stakeholders to properly assess the feasibility of the Bureau’s 
Page 32 GAO-04-37 2010 Census

design and the extent to which it could lead to greater cost-effectiveness 

compared to alternative approaches. 

Questions surrounding the Bureau’s underlying budget assumptions; 

uncertainties over ACS; the failure to translate key goals into measurable, 

operational terms; and the lack of important performance data from the 

2000 Census to inform 2010 decision making are just some of the 

problematic aspects of the 2010 planning process. More than simply 

paperwork or documentation issues, this information is essential for 

improving the performance and accountability of the Bureau and of the 

decennial census in particular. 

To be sure, some challenges are to be expected in an endeavor as 

demanding as counting a population that is mobile and demographically 

complex and whose members reside under a multitude of living 

arrangements. Further, shortcomings with prior censuses call for the 

Bureau to consider bold initiatives for 2010 that entail some risk. However, 

if Congress is to accept and fund the Bureau’s approach—now estimated at 

more than $11 billion—then the Bureau needs to more effectively 

demonstrate that it has (1) selected a design that will lead to the most costeffective results and (2) establish a rigorous capacity to manage risks, 

control costs, and deliver a successful head count. Moreover, to ensure the 

nation uses the best available data, it will be important for the Bureau to 

research procedures that would allow it to adjust census results for 

purposes for which it is both legal and appropriate to do so, if it is 

determined that the adjusted figures would provide greater accuracy than 

the enumeration data. Such procedures could function as a safety net 

should there be problems with the initial census count.

It will also be important for policymakers to consider, early in the decade, 

the long-term costs associated with the census and finding the right 

balance between controlling mushrooming costs and improving accuracy. 

Although initial spending on the census is relatively low, it will accelerate 

in the years ahead, culminating with a balloon payment in 2010 when data 

collection and other costly operations take place. Greater fiscal 

transparency prior to getting locked into a particular level of spending 

could help inform deliberations on the extent to which (1) the cost of the 

census is reasonable, (2) trade-offs will need to be made with competing 

national priorities, and (3) additional dollars spent on the census yield 

better quality data. 
Page 33 GAO-04-37 2010 Census

Just over 6 years remain until Census Day 2010. While this might seem like 

an ample amount of time to shore up the Bureau’s planning process and 

take steps to control costs, past experience has shown that the chain of 

interrelated preparations that need to occur at specific times and in the 

right sequence leave little room for delay or missteps. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

To help control the cost of the 2010 Census and inform deliberations on the 

acceptability of those costs, we recommend that the Director of the Office 

of Management and Budget take steps to ensure that the Bureau improves 

the transparency of the fiscal exposure associated with the census. 

Specifically, OMB should ensure that the Bureau, in a notational item in the 

Program and Financing schedule of the President’s budget, include an 

updated estimate of the life cycle costs of the census and the amount of 

money the Bureau expects to spend in each year of the cycle, as well as an 

explanation of any material changes from previous plans. The information 

should also contain an analysis of the sensitivity of the cost figures to 

specific assumptions, including a range of values for key cost assumptions, 

their impact on total cost estimates of the census, the likelihood associated 

with those ranges, and their impact on the total estimated cost of the 

census. 

As part of this process, OMB should establish triggers that would signal 

when the yearly 2010 Census costs, total 2010 Census costs, or both 

exceeded some predetermined amount. In such instances, the Bureau 

should then be required to prepare a special report to Congress and OMB 

justifying why the additional costs were necessary and what alternatives 

were considered. 

Further, to enhance the Bureau’s performance and accountability, as well 

as to help convince Congress and other stakeholders that the Bureau has 

chosen an optimum design and will manage operations and control costs 

effectively, we recommend that the Secretary of Commerce direct the 

Bureau to improve the rigor of its planning process by developing an 

operational plan that consolidates budget, methodological, and other 

relevant information about the 2010 Census into a single, comprehensive 

project plan that would be updated as needed. Individual elements could 

include

• specific performance goals, how the Bureau’s efforts, procedures, and 

projects would contribute to those goals, and what performance 

measures would be used; 
Page 34 GAO-04-37 2010 Census

• risk and mitigation plans that fully address all significant potential risks;

• detailed milestone estimates that identify all significant 

interrelationships; and

• annually updated life cycle cost estimates, including a sensitivity 

analysis, and an explanation of significant changes in the assumptions 

on which these costs are based.

Moreover, to help ensure that the nation has at its disposal the best 

possible data should there be problems with the quality of 2010 Census, the 

Bureau, with input from both majority and minority parties in the Senate 

and House of Representatives, should research the feasibility of 

procedures that could allow it to adjust census results for those purposes 

for which it is both legal and appropriate to do so and, if found to be 

feasible, test those procedures during the 2006 census test and 2008 census 

dress rehearsal.

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

The Secretary of Commerce forwarded written comments from the U.S. 

Census Bureau on a draft of this report that we received November 6, 2003. 

The comments are reprinted in appendix I. The Bureau generally 

disagreed with many of our key findings, conclusions, and 

recommendations.

The Bureau believes that the report, in its discussion of escalating census 

costs, ignores the fact that a key cost driver is stakeholders’ demand for 

better accuracy. We agree with the Bureau that its mandate to count each 

and every resident in the face of countervailing societal trends is an 

important reason for the cost increases. As we noted in the report, societal 

changes have reduced the cost-effectiveness of the census, and it has 

become more and more difficult to stay on par with the results of previous 

enumerations. Similarly, we stated that “the legal requirement to count 

everyone leads the Bureau to employ operations that only marginally 

improve coverage but that are relatively expensive to conduct.” 

Further, we do not, as the Bureau asserts, treat the cost issue in a vacuum, 

and agree with the Bureau that little would be gained by focusing on the 

cost of the 2010 Census alone. Rather, any deliberations on the 2010 

Census need to focus on how changes in spending on the census might 

affect the quality of the count. Our draft report emphasized this exact point 

noting that “The growing cost of the head count, at a time when the nation 
Page 35 GAO-04-37 2010 Census

is facing historic budget deficits, highlights the importance of 

congressional deliberations on the extent to which each additional dollar 

spent on the census results in better data, as well as how best to balance 

the need for a complete count, with the need to ensure the cost of a 

complete count does not become unreasonable.” Similarly, we concluded 

that “it will also be important for policymakers to consider, early in the 

decade, the long-term costs associated with the census and finding the 

right balance between controlling mushrooming costs and improving 

accuracy.”

The Bureau also believes the report implies that the cost increases are 

caused by the reengineering effort. Our draft report did not state, nor did 

we intend to imply, that the reengineering effort would cause most of the 

projected cost increases for the 2010 Census. In fact, our report even notes 

that the Bureau's reengineering strategy has the potential to reduce costs 

relative to a design that would repeat the Census 2000 approach. To help 

clarify this point, we added text that describes how a repeat of the 2000 

approach would be more costly than the reengineered design, according to 

Bureau estimates. 

The Bureau disagreed with our recommendation to OMB regarding the 

need for greater budgetary transparency, noting that the real reason for the 

vagueness of out-year cost estimates stems from a fundamental difference 

of opinion between the administration and Congress over the appropriate 

time to share that information. We believe that it is important for the 

administration to provide details of out-year cost projections for the 

decennial census for the reason stated in our draft report: annual budget 

requests and reports provided to Congress early in the decennial census life 

cycle do not reflect the full cash consequences of the spending in later 

years of the decade. We understand that the Bureau has followed the 

administration’s guidance on providing out-year cost estimates; this is also 

why we directed our recommendation for greater fiscal transparency to 

OMB, which we discuss in greater detail below. 

The Bureau disagreed with our recommendation to improve the rigor of its 

planning process by developing an operational plan that consolidates 

budget, methodological, and other relevant information into a single, 

comprehensive project plan. The Bureau noted that these documents 

already exist and are widely available, and the Bureau already shares them 

with Congress, us, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) Panel on 

Research on Future Census Methods—the panel responsible for reviewing 

the census, and other stakeholders. 
Page 36 GAO-04-37 2010 Census

While we agree with the Bureau that some of this information is available 

(and we noted this fact in our draft report), it is piecemeal—one can only 

obtain it by cobbling together the Bureau’s budget submission, its strategic 

plan, and several other documents, and even then, key information such as 

performance goals would still be lacking. Further, although the Bureau 

notes that it has provided this information to the NAS panel, as we stated in 

our report, NAS, like us, also found the information wanting. As we 

described in the report, the panel shared our concerns over the need for a 

coherent project plan, and called on the Bureau to develop a business plan 

that among other things, itemized the goals, costs, and benefits of each 

census component and a describes how they contributed to a high-quality 

census. Whether it is called a business plan or a project plan, such 

information is not, as the Bureau maintains, simply “more process.” Quite 

the contrary, this information is essential for improving performance; 

facilitating a thorough, independent review of the Bureau’s plans; and 

demonstrating to Congress and other stakeholders that the Bureau can 

effectively design and manage operations and control costs. 

The Bureau incorrectly asserts that our report criticizes it for not 

completing the evaluations of the 2000 Census in a timely manner. Our 

report did not address this matter, although NAS’s Second Interim Report 

on Planning the 2010 Census urged the Bureau to “give high priority to 

evaluation studies” and complete them as expeditiously as possible. We 

agree that the Bureau’s planning staff do have access to the draft 

evaluations, and in fact, we noted in the report that they are using them in 

planning for the 2010 Census.

The key point, however, is the Bureau’s ability to build on the results of the 

2000 Census. This could be hampered by the fact that while the evaluation 

program assessed numerous aspects of the census, the Bureau still lacks 

data on the performance of key census activities as well as how specific 

census operations contributed to two of the Bureau’s key goals for 2000: 

improved accuracy and cost-effectiveness. 

The Bureau agreed with us that it is important to bring closure to the 

discussion on whether and how coverage measurement will be used in the 

2010 Census. However, the Bureau believes that the approach used for the 

2000 Census proved that it was not feasible to produce a final analysis of 

coverage measurement in time to meet redistricting requirements. We 

agree with the Bureau’s assessment that the coverage measurement 

approach used in the 2000 Census needs to be reworked. However, this 

should not preclude it from researching alternative approaches for the 2010 
Page 37 GAO-04-37 2010 Census

Census in light of the fact that the Bureau’s ability to maintain the level of 

quality reported for the 2000 Census is less than certain. 

Finally, the Bureau questioned our assessment that the only contingency 

plan for conducting the 2010 Census, if the reengineered effort fails, was to 

fall back on the Census 2000 methods. The Bureau maintains that the 2000 

Census was by most accounts a very successful census and, accordingly, 

the Bureau already has available the methods and procedures for taking an 

excellent census. Our report does not advocate the development of 

another set of census methods. Rather, we were trying to illustrate the 

challenge the Bureau faces in implementing its reengineering plans, where 

the failure of any one leg could compromise the other two, thereby 

requiring the Bureau to rely on the approach it used for the 2000 Census. 

According to Bureau officials, this in turn could make it difficult for the 

Bureau to accomplish its goals for the 2010 Census, which include cost 

containment and better quality data. 

On October 14, 2003, the Associate Director for General Government 

Programs, OMB, provided written comments on a draft of this report, 

which are reprinted in appendix II. OMB shared our view that the costs 

and risks associated with the 2010 Census must be carefully monitored and 

evaluated throughout the decade. OMB also agreed that it is essential to 

understand the key cost drivers and said that it is working with the U.S. 

Census Bureau to ensure that the Bureau develops high-quality, transparent 

life cycle cost estimates.

However, OMB disagreed with our recommendation that it ensure that the 

Bureau, include a notational item in the Program and Financing (P&F) 

schedule of the President’s Budget with an updated estimate of the life 

cycle costs of the census and the amount of money the Bureau expects to 

spend in each year of the cycle, as well as an explanation of any significant 

changes from previous plans. OMB believes that the Bureau’s report on the 

life cycle costs, which is updated regularly, is the best mechanism to 

present estimates of the total life cycle costs and explanations for any 

material changes from previous plans. Further, OMB noted that presenting 

this information in the P&F schedule is cumbersome and unnecessary 

because the Analytical Perspectives volume of the President’s Budget 

currently shows out-year estimates that incorporate anticipated 

programmatic changes of the Decennial Census within the Periodic 

Censuses and Program account.
Page 38 GAO-04-37 2010 Census

As noted in our report, we do not believe the information OMB currently 

reports to Congress is sufficiently timely or detailed to provide the level of 

transparency needed for effective congressional oversight and cost control. 

Indeed, while OMB cites the Bureau’s life cycle report, the document that 

we reviewed for this report took the Bureau nearly 2 years to revise. 

Moreover, the revised estimates, like the original estimates, overstated the 

life cycle cost estimate by $300 million because the Bureau did not take 

into account a surplus of that amount that it identified near the end of fiscal 

year 2000. Although the Bureau is to reissue the 2010 life cycle cost 

estimates early in calendar year 2004, the incorrect estimates will have 

been in circulation for more than 2 years.

Additionally, the information contained in the Analytical Perspectives 

volume of the President’s Budget is limited. For example, it only provides 

information on out-year estimates for 5 years. As a result, the volume will 

not include estimates for the high-cost year of 2010 until the release of the 

President’s fiscal year 2006 budget. Further, the Analytical Perspectives 

volume lacks information on the sensitivity of cost figures to specific 

assumptions and the likelihood of these estimates. It also does not contain 

any explanations of changes in cost estimates from year to year. Complete 

and transparent information on out-year costs is important to inform 

deliberations on the acceptability of these costs and to ensure that 

Congress understands the possible range of census life cycle costs.

OMB also disagreed with our recommendation to establish triggers to 

signal when the yearly 2010 Census costs, total 2010 Census costs, or both 

exceeded some predetermined amount. OMB noted that it has established 

internal procedures within its budget reviews to monitor 2010 Census costs 

and believes they are sufficient for ensuring that estimates are not 

exceeded without clear justification. OMB added that this justification 

could be included in the Bureau’s updates to its life cycle cost estimates.

Although OMB’s internal procedures might be sufficient for OMB’s 

requirements, they do little to address the fundamental need for greater 

fiscal transparency. Continued reliance on these procedures would inhibit 

independent review by congressional and other external stakeholders, as 

well as limit informed discussion of the trade-offs of dollars versus 

accuracy and what cost control measures, if any, might be needed to make 

the 2010 Census more affordable. 

In closing, OMB commented that the Bureau’s reengineering plan is being 

reviewed by NAS as well as seven advisory committees. OMB stated that 
Page 39 GAO-04-37 2010 Census

the analyses stemming from these reviews, such as NAS’s recently issued 

report on census planning, enhance the Bureau’s accountability and help 

ensure “that the ultimate 2010 Census design is optimal.”

We agree with OMB that NAS and the advisory committees are important 

for reviewing the Bureau’s plans and holding the Bureau accountable for a 

cost-effective census in 2010. And this is precisely why we made the 

recommendations that we did. Without a transparent budgeting and 

planning process, a thorough, independent review by these and other 

external groups would be difficult to impossible. That greater 

transparency is needed in both these areas is highlighted not just in our 

report, but in the very NAS study that OMB cites. Indeed, NAS found that 

“a major conclusion of the panel is that discussion of the 2010 Census 

design needs to be more fully informed by the evaluation of various tradeoffs—the costs and benefits of various reasonable approaches in order to 

make wise decisions.”24 

As agreed with your offices, unless you release its contents earlier, we plan 

no further distribution of this report until 30 days from its issue date. At 

that time we will send copies to other interested congressional committees, 

the Secretary of Commerce, the Director of the U.S. Census Bureau, and 

the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. Copies will be made 

available to others upon request. This report will also be available at no 

charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

24 National Research Council, Panel on Research on Future Census Methods, Committee on 

National Statistics, Planning the 2010 Census: Second Interim Report (Washington, D.C.: 

2003).
Page 40 GAO-04-37 2010 Census

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-6806 or daltonp@gao.gov or Robert Goldenkoff, 

Assistant Director, at (202) 512-2757 or goldenkoffr@gao.gov. Key 

contributors to this report were Richard Donaldson, Ty Mitchell, Robert 

Yetvin, and Christine Bonham. 

Patricia A. Dalton

Director

Strategic Issues 
Page 41 GAO-04-37 2010 Census

Appendix I

Comments from the Department of Apendxies

Commerce ApendxiI
Appendix I

Comments from the Department of 

Commerce

Page 42 GAO-04-37 2010 Census
Appendix I

Comments from the Department of 

Commerce

Page 43 GAO-04-37 2010 Census
Appendix I

Comments from the Department of 

Commerce

Page 44 GAO-04-37 2010 Census
Page 45 GAO-04-37 2010 Census

Appendix II

Comments from the Office of Management 

and Budget ApendxiI
Appendix II

Comments from the Office of Management 

and Budget

Page 46 GAO-04-37 2010 Census
Page 47 GAO-04-37 2010 Census

Appendix III

2010 Census Planning Organization ApendxiI

The U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) has given its Decennial Management 

Division responsibility for planning the 2010 Census, including the 

American Community Survey (ACS) and the Master Address 

File/Topologically Integrated Geographic Encoding and Referencing 

(MAF/TIGER) enhancements. The division established an executive 

steering committee, shown in figure 5, for this purpose.
Appendix III

2010 Census Planning Organization

Page 48 GAO-04-37 2010 Census

Figure 5: Decennial Management Division’s Organizational Structure for Planning the 2010 Census

Division Chiefs Forum Census Managers 

Group ACS Division Chiefs Corporate Address 

Coverage Strategy

(CACS) Group

2010 Census Planning American Community

Survey

Program Integration

Committee for

MAF/TIGER

Ad Hoc Member

Address List 

Consistency Group

Ad Hoc Member

Short Form Content

Development

Schedule Group

Executive Steering Committee 

for the 2010 Census

American Indian and

Alaska Native 

Planning Group

Language Program

Planning Group

ACS Team Leaders

Address List and

Mapping Strategy 

(ALMS) Group

Communications

Planning Group

Overseas Enumeration

Planning Group

POP/HHES 

Coordinating Committee

GPS 

Applications Strategy

(GPSAS) Group

Content Planning

Group

Race and Ethnicity

Planning Group

ACS Small Area 

Estimates Group 

Geographic Tabulations 

and Disseminations

Strategy Group 

Coverage Planning

Group

Self Response Options

Planning Group

ACS Sampling and

Weighting Group

Field Activities

Planning Group

Software and Systems

Planning Group

ACS Research

Group

Special Place/Group

Quarters Planning

Group

Source: U.S. Census Bureau.
Appendix III

2010 Census Planning Organization

Page 49 GAO-04-37 2010 Census

Each group under the 2010 Census planning organization has specific 

activities that it was charged with studying. Listed below are the research 

and development planning groups chartered at the time of our review and a 

list of these activities.

2010 Census Reengineering: 

Research and Development 

Planning Groups

The Content Planning Group

• determines alternatives for question wording and order;

• develops consistent questions across multiple response modes;

• develops consistent forms design across multiple response modes;

• researches use of administrative records for missing data;

• researches and documents analysis of tabulated items’ quality, including 

item response rate for misreported, underreported, or generally 

nonreported questions;

• researches other methods of imputing characteristics;

• researches information on administrative records and aggregate census 

tract modeling;

• explores attitudinal trends on the mailing package and questionnaire;

• develops alternative formats for race and Hispanic origin question 

layout;

• researches printing alternatives and new technologies;

• researches United States Postal Service requirements and alternative 

services related to addressing, barcodes, and delivery;

• coordinates content development and congressional approval of ACS;

• assesses appropriate questionnaire wording to ensure conformance 

with the enumeration and residence rules; and

• defines and assesses appropriate question wording for “usual home 

elsewhere” on any self-response and enumerator instrument(s).
Appendix III

2010 Census Planning Organization

Page 50 GAO-04-37 2010 Census

The Special Place/Group Quarters Planning Group

• reviews definitions of housing units and group quarters, including 

transient locations, and where necessary, modifies the definitions to 

reflect current living arrangements to reduce census classification 

errors;

• determines the best methods for implementing housing unit and group 

quarters definitions in 2010 Census operations that reduce decennial 

census classification errors;

• determines what operations are required to improve the accuracy of the 

current Census 2000 inventory file and the geographic reference base, 

including geographic assignment;

• determines what coverage improvement operations are required to 

ensure complete coverage of special places and group quarters;

• develops a process that ensures the integration of special place/group 

quarters addresses with housing unit addresses and subsequent updates 

into the MAF/TIGER system;

• determines the appropriate enumeration methods for the group quarters 

population;

• determines the appropriate enumeration method for embedded housing 

units within special place/group quarters that will reduce 2010 Census 

error;

• determines improvements to the enumeration process, including 

appropriate requirements regarding the implementation of mobile 

computing devices;

• determines questionnaire requirements;

• assesses the quality of administrative records for the group quarters 

population and determines how and if administrative records should be 

incorporated into the enumeration process; and

• determines privacy issues, legal issues, or both and solutions and 

identifies a process to implement these findings into operational 

procedures.
Appendix III

2010 Census Planning Organization

Page 51 GAO-04-37 2010 Census

The Self Response Options Planning Group

• identifies the optimal mix of options, including mail, Internet, and 

telephone, by which the public can respond to the census;

• identifies options for accommodating responses by people who believe 

they have not been counted by the traditional methods;

• identifies messages and methods to inform, advertise, and motivate 

census questionnaire response in a multimode self-response 

environment;

• determines the optimal mailing strategy;

• identifies methods and options for delivering a replacement 

questionnaire;

• examines methods for making the identification number shorter and 

easier to handle;

• develops an integrated self-response that optimizes requirements from 

other program areas, such as language and self-initiated response 

requirements; and

• develops strategies for accommodating response by people with 

disabilities.

The Overseas Enumeration Planning Group

• makes recommendations to the Bureau’s executive staff on key policy 

issues, such as applying residence rules overseas, goals of counting 

Americans living overseas, the definition of this universe, and 

conducting a count that would take a different form than the stateside 

enumeration;

• determines possible methods for enumerating Americans overseas in 

accordance with decisions on the policy issues;

• determines the type of evaluations that will be conducted to assess the 

quality of data captured during this operation; and

• defines a process and plan for consultations with stakeholders.
Appendix III

2010 Census Planning Organization

Page 52 GAO-04-37 2010 Census

The Field Activities Planning Group

• determines the optimal fit of new technologies, such as mobile 

computing devices, within the enumeration methods and processes;

• determines the optimal and most cost-effective field infrastructure to 

support field activities;

• determines the possible enumeration methods, such as Update/Leave, 

Urban Update/Leave, and Update/Enumerate and their feasibility for the 

2010 short-form-only census;

• determines how to apply the criteria established for the areas in which 

each type of enumeration method will be used;

• determines how best to target for special methods areas where mail 

delivery methods are not optimal, for example, areas where residents 

use post office boxes;

• determines the most effective special methods or tool kit approaches 

for enumerating housing units in hard to enumerate areas, such as gated 

communities;

• determines the most efficient use of the telephone data collection 

methodology to reduce personal field visits;

• determines the most effective management and implementation 

approach that will ensure integrated quality assurance in field activities;

• determines the best methodology for delineating assignment areas; and

• determines data requirements for field instruments relating to 

management and quality control needs.

The Coverage Planning Group

• proposes content rules for identifying which addresses to include in the 

2010 Census;

• proposes consistent and accurate approaches for improving matching 

rules to reduce duplication of addresses;
Appendix III

2010 Census Planning Organization

Page 53 GAO-04-37 2010 Census

• determines the appropriate use of administrative records for MAF 

activities, such as targeting and/or updating MAF;

• determines areas in which MAF and TIGER need improvement;

• determines best methods for targeting areas that need updating;

• develops requirements for the positional accuracy of MAF/TIGER in 

coordination with the Global Positioning System Applications Strategy 

Group;

• defines and assesses methods to improve the address list and coverage 

of the 2010 Census after mail-out address file is final;

• defines criteria for determining the areas in which each type of 

enumeration method will be used;

• in coordination with the Special Place/Group Quarters Planning Group, 

develops a process that ensures the integration of special place/group 

quarters addresses with housing unit addresses and subsequent updates 

of the MAF/TIGER system;

• reviews the enumeration and residence rules, taking into consideration 

implementation issues, and recommends appropriate revisions;

• defines and assesses appropriate methods for dealing with usual home 

elsewhere situations on all questionnaires and instruments;

• determines methods for avoiding multiple listings of persons within and 

between households;

• determines methods for improving within household coverage, 

including the Be Counted program;

• develops thresholds reasonable for count imputations; and

• determines best count imputation method, including the use of spatial 

analysis tools, to determine locational relationships.
Appendix III

2010 Census Planning Organization

Page 54 GAO-04-37 2010 Census

The Software and Systems Planning Group

• determines acceptable industry standards and practices for the software 

process;

• identifies and assesses alternative standards and practices for decennial 

applications for requirements development, software analysis and 

design, testing methods, quality assurance, configuration management, 

documentation of all components, and risk management;

• recommends standards and practices for the software process;

• identifies and assesses the need for a common data dictionary, including 

integrating it with the corporate meta-data project;

• recommends whether to develop a common data dictionary solution, 

and if adopted, develops a rationale for its use and defines its functional 

requirements;

• reviews deliverables and recommends requirements for the Technical 

Architecture and Infrastructure contract in preparation for development 

of the 2010 Census systems architecture;

• evaluates potential systems components;

• recommends approach for developing and selecting the 2010 Census 

physical architecture; 

• recommends physical architecture solution;

• for mobile computing devices (MCD),

• determines which operations will test the use of the MCDs,

• determines what functionality will be employed in MCDs for testing,

• determines which specific type(s) of MCDs and which software 

applications the Bureau will test, and

• considers the implications for field infrastructure, particularly with 

respect to the technology needed to support MCD applications;
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Page 55 GAO-04-37 2010 Census

• for Internet response mode,

• tests alternatives for validating/confirming receipt of census 

questionnaire/response,

• researches and tests mechanisms for respondents to generate e-mail 

to the Bureau,

• identifies options for e-mail to respondents with “census message,” 

questionnaire, or both,

• researches and tests alternatives for serving multiple forms (such as 

those needed for the language program and overseas enumeration),

• researches and tests use of census housing unit identification,

• determines effective ways to maintain security,

• researches and tests alternative interfaces, and

• identifies alternatives for meeting accessibility needs;

• for high technology data collection modes,

• researches ways to utilize Web television,

• researches ways to utilize kiosks, and

• identifies alternatives for meeting accessibility needs; and

• for telephone response modes,

• researches and tests alternatives for initial response by voice 

recognition/IVR/touch tone/agent assisted,

• tests alternatives for automated dial-up “census message,”

• researches and tests alternatives for languages,

• determines effective ways to maintain security, and

• identifies alternatives for meeting accessibility needs.
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Page 56 GAO-04-37 2010 Census

The Communications Planning Group

• determines how the public will be divided into groups in order to target 

specific messages;

• determines the most appropriate messages that will resonate with the 

Bureau’s audiences and motivate them to respond and the strategies for 

creating a brand (name/image) for the Bureau;

• develops innovative strategies using 2000 Census and ACS data to reach 

the 

• hard to count population,

• emerging populations,

• rural communities, and

• non-English-speaking populations;

• develops media strategies and messages for media outlets, operations 

that need specific advertising or publicity, and crisis communications 

management;

• considers 2010 Census cost implications; and

• determines the best methods for evaluating the effectiveness of the 

components of the integrated marketing strategy.

The Language Programs Planning Group

• researches the availability, design, and use of bilingual forms;

• researches and develops alternative operational testing requirements 

for

• alternatives for an English/Spanish mail-out questionnaire,

• the languages the 2010 Census will support,

• questionnaire assembly,
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Page 57 GAO-04-37 2010 Census

• process for requesting a questionnaire in a specific language,

• questionnaire/guide distribution,

• validation of a bilingual questionnaire,

• alternatives for a bilingual enumerator instrument,

• questionnaire data capture,

• data entry for all collection modes,

• accessibility for in-language respondents (Braille, audio, etc.), and 

• partnership responsibilities; and 

• considers Advisory Committee lessons learned and recommendations.

The Race and Ethnicity Planning Group

• determines if revised instructions to the questions on race and Hispanic 

origin convey the federal government’s distinction of race and Hispanic 

origin as two separate concepts that require responses that reflect the 

intent of each question;

• determines alternative wording to the questions on race and ethnicity;

• determines the type of analyses and evaluations needed to assess the 

quality of race and ethnicity data from the 2000 Census and ACS;

• determines if the exclusion of a “Some other race” response category in 

the question on race will affect race reporting;

• determines if changing the order of the race response categories affects 

race reporting;

• determines what effect the inclusion of examples for “Other Asian” and 

“Other Pacific Islander” have on race reporting;

• determines if the use of shortened response categories during telephone 

and other data collection modes will affect respondents’ understanding 

of the response options;
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Page 58 GAO-04-37 2010 Census

• determines whether alternative terminology (e.g., “Print race or races” 

instead of “Print category or categories”) will affect race reporting;

• determines whether a revised Hispanic question that does not include 

“Spanish” as an identifier will increase reporting of specific Hispanic 

origin responses in the “Other Hispanic” response category; and

• determines whether the inclusion of examples for detailed Hispanic 

groups will increase specified responses in the “Other Hispanic” 

response category.

The American Indian and Alaska Native (AIAN) Planning Group

• determines what enumeration methods will be tested in AIAN areas;

• determines outreach and partnership strategies for testing in AIAN 

areas;

• determines strategies and explores methodologies for improving 

coverage; and

• assesses developments or innovations needed for mapping and 

enumeration activities.

(450178)
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