[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-12558

Non-Argument Calendar

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

DAN BELC, 

Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 5:22-cr-00008-MW-MJF-1

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2 Opinion of the Court 22-12558

Before JORDAN, BRANCH, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Dan Belc, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s 

order remanding his state court prosecution. The government 

responds by moving for summary affirmance, arguing that the 

district court correctly found that Belc’s notice of removal was 

untimely and without merit under any removal statute. Belc then 

filed several motions to strike the government’s motion for 

summary affirmance and its responses to his motions as untimely 

and for an invalid certificate of interested persons. We grant the 

government’s motion for summary affirmance and deny Belc’s 

motions to strike.1

I.

We review de novo whether the district court had subject 

matter jurisdiction after removal. Castleberry v. Goldome Credit 

Corp., 408 F.3d 773, 780–81 (11th Cir. 2005). Ordinarily, we lack 

jurisdiction to review an order remanding a case to state court, but 

when a case is removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442 or 1443, we

may review the remand order. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). Section 1443 

permits a defendant in a criminal state court action to remove the 

1 Belc also requests a writ of mandamus in his appellant brief, though he did 

not file an original petition in this appeal. In an earlier proceeding, we already 

denied his mandamus petition on the requested grounds. See In re: Dan Belc, 

No. 22-12639 (11th Cir. Nov. 1, 2022). To the extent Belc attempts to renew 

his mandamus request here, we deny.

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22-12558 Opinion of the Court 3

action to federal court if it is against a person who is denied or 

cannot enforce in the state courts “a right under any law providing 

for the equal civil rights of citizens of the United States, or of all 

persons within the jurisdiction thereof.” Id. § 1443(1).

We construe pro se pleadings liberally. Campbell v. Air 

Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168 (11th Cir. 2014). But “this leniency 

does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party, 

or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an 

action.” Id. at 1168–69 (quotation omitted). 

II.

Summary disposition is appropriate where “the position of 

one of the parties is clearly right as a matter of law so that there can 

be no substantial question as to the outcome of the case, or where, 

as is more frequently the case, the appeal is frivolous.” Groendyke 

Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969).2 Summary 

affirmance is warranted here, for two reasons.

First, Belc’s notice of removal was not timely. A notice of 

removal must be filed no later than thirty days after the 

arraignment in state court, or at any time before trial, whichever is 

earlier. 28 U.S.C. § 1455(b)(1). If a defendant shows good cause, a 

district court may enter an order granting a defendant leave to file 

a notice of removal later. Id. Belc filed his notice of removal over 

2 Decisions by the former Fifth Circuit handed down before October 1, 1981

are binding on this Court. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th 

Cir. 1981) (en banc).

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4 Opinion of the Court 22-12558

three years after his arraignment, well outside the thirty-day limit. 

And he does not argue that he had good cause for this delay.

Second, even if we could excuse Belc’s untimely notice of 

removal, he is not entitled to removal on the merits. To properly 

remove a case under § 1443(1), a petitioner must satisfy a 

two-prong test: he must show (1) that removal was based on a 

federal law “providing for specific civil rights stated in terms of 

racial equality,” and (2) that “he has been denied or cannot enforce 

that right in the state courts.” Alabama v. Conley, 245 F.3d 1292, 

1295 (11th Cir. 2001) (quotation omitted). 

As to the first prong, the “phrase any law providing for equal 

civil rights refers to laws providing for specific civil rights stated in 

terms of racial equality, and does not include rights of general 

application available to all persons or citizens.” Id. (alteration 

adopted and quotation omitted). A defendant’s “right to a fair trial 

and equal protection of the laws and his rights under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 do not arise from legislation providing for specific civil rights 

in terms of racial equality.” Id. (alteration adopted and quotation 

omitted).

For the second prong, the petitioner must show that he has 

been denied or cannot enforce that right in the state courts. Id. 

This must generally be “manifest in a formal expression of state 

law.” Id. at 1296 (quotation omitted). Charges “that the defendant 

is unable to obtain a fair trial in a particular state court are 

insufficient to support removal under § 1443(1).” Id. at 1298–99

(quotation omitted).

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22-12558 Opinion of the Court 5

Belc’s allegations of racial and national origin discrimination 

and violations of his constitutional rights are not based on a federal 

law “providing for specific civil rights stated in terms of racial 

equality.” Id. at 1295 (quotation omitted). Nor has Belc asserted 

that a state law prevents a state court from enforcing his rights. See 

id. His attempt to remove thus fails on the merits.

III.

Belc also moved to strike the government’s motion for 

summary affirmance and its responses to his motions on the 

grounds that they were untimely and included a defective 

certificate of interested persons. We deny these motions. The 

government’s motion was timely because it was filed within thirty 

days of Belc’s brief. See Fed. R. App. P. 31(a)(1); 11th Cir. R. 31-1(c). 

Each subsequent response was also timely, having been filed 

within ten days of Belc’s respective motion to strike. See Fed. R. 

App. P. 27(a)(3)(A). And the government’s certificate of interested 

persons was accurate.

* * *

Because the government’s position is clearly correct as a 

matter of law, summary affirmance is appropriate. We GRANT 

the government’s motion for summary affirmance and DENY 

Belc’s motions to strike.

AFFIRMED.

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