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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PALVINDRA SINGH, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney 

General, 

Respondent.

No. 20-72614 

Agency Nos. A208-549-493 

 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted February 14, 2022

**

San Francisco, California

Before: SILER,*** S.R. THOMAS, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.

Palvindra Singh (“Singh”) petitions to review the Board of Immigration 

Appeals’ (“BIA”) final removal order. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Eugene E. Siler, United States Circuit Judge for the 

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.

FILED

MAR 29 2022

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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1252. We deny the petition regarding the removal order because the BIA’s denial of 

asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against 

Torture (“CAT”) is supported by substantial evidence. Plancarte v. Garland, 9 F.4th 

1146, 1151 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Cordon-Garcia v. INS, 204 F.3d 985, 990 (9th 

Cir. 2000).

1. Singh claims he is entitled to asylum and withholding of removal as he cannot 

return to India “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on 

account of . . . membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” See 8 

U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A), 1158(b)(1)(A).

To establish eligibility for asylum based on past persecution, “an applicant 

must show: (1) an incident, or incidents, that rise to the level of persecution; (2) that 

is on account of one of the statutorily-protected grounds; and (3) is committed by 

the government or forces the government is either unable or unwilling to control.” 

Navas v. INS, 217 F.3d 646, 655-56 (9th Cir. 2000).1

Singh claims he was persecuted twice on account of his membership in the 

Bahujan Samaj Party (“BSP”), a minority political party; first, by a group of four 

men from a rival political party that physically assaulted him near his hometown; 

1 A similar, more stringent, standard applies to withholding of removal eligibility. 217 F.3d at 655. 

A petitioner requesting withholding of removal must show a clear probability of future 

persecution, which is presumed if the petitioner can establish past persecution. Id. 
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and second, by local police that hit him and tore his clothes, allegedly because of his 

affiliation with BSP. Both instances resulted in minor, temporary pain.

2 Considering 

these events, the BIA concluded that Singh suffered past persecution.

Establishing past persecution for either asylum or withholding of removal 

relief entitles the petitioner to a rebuttable presumption of future persecution. 8 

C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(b)(1); 1208.16(b)(1)(i). One way that the Department of 

Homeland Security (“DHS”) can rebut a petitioner’s presumption of future 

persecution is to demonstrate the “[petitioner] could avoid future persecution by 

relocating to another part of the [petitioner’s] country of nationality . . . and, under 

all circumstances, it would be reasonable to expect the [petitioner] to do so.” 8 C.F.R. 

§§ 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B); 1208.16(b)(1)(i)(B); see Singh v. Whitaker, 914 F.3d 654, 

661 (9th Cir. 2019).

DHS provided substantial evidence that Singh could reasonably relocate 

within India to avoid future persecution. The BIA agreed. There are regions in India 

where Singh’s party is the dominant and controlling party. In those regions, BSP 

members are not at risk of persecution on the basis of their political opinion.

Moreover, the law in India provides for freedom of movement and the government 

generally respects those rights. The BIA and IJ conducted an individualized analysis 

2 Following these encounters Singh fled to Mumbai, over 900 miles away from his home in Khutar, 

India, and boarded an international shipping vessel that eventually berthed in Davant, Louisiana.
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and reasonably concluded that Singh could relocate within India. Substantial 

evidence does not compel a contrary conclusion to the one reached by the BIA 

regarding Singh’s petition for asylum or withholding from removal.

2. Next, Singh argues the BIA failed to conduct a proper analysis of whether he 

is eligible for CAT relief. For CAT relief a petitioner must establish: (1) it is more 

likely than not he will suffer harm severe enough to constitute torture; and (2) the 

torture would occur at the hands of a government official, or with the acquiescence 

of a government official. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(2); 1208.18(a)(2), (a)(1). Further, 

a petitioner must demonstrate that he or she faces a “particularized threat” of torture, 

not a threat of torture in the abstract nor merely a showing that torture occurs in the 

country of removal. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2); see Almaghzar v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 

915, 922 (9th Cir. 2006). Singh does not meet his burden for CAT relief.

First, the two instances of violence against Singh do not constitute torture. 

Torture is “severe pain or suffering” resulting from extreme or cruel treatment. 8 

C.F.R. § 1208.18(a). Singh was hurt in the encounters; he had some abdominal 

discomfort both times and a bloody nose from his police interrogation. Afterwards 

Singh visited a doctor, obtained pain medication, and did not express any significant 

health concerns. Record evidence does not suggest he endured severe pain or

suffered. Singh, in short, was not tortured in the past.
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Second, even if Singh suffered torture in the past his demonstrated ability to 

reasonably relocate within India makes it improbable that he will face torture in the 

future. We have held that reasonable relocation is a relevant consideration when 

determining whether a petitioner is eligible for CAT protection. Singh, 914 F.3d at 

663. Substantial evidence shows that Singh is unlikely to be tortured for his political 

affiliation in other areas of India.

Third, to be eligible for CAT protection Singh must show that he faces a 

particularized threat of future torture. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). Singh has shown 

that political violence occurs in India, but he has failed to show how that amounts to 

a particularized threat to him should he be repatriated.

The administrative record demonstrates that Singh has not been tortured in the 

past, he is not likely to be tortured in the future, and he can reasonably relocate within 

India to mitigate the risk of future torture. 

The petition for review is denied and petitioner’s motion for stay of removal 

is denied as moot.