UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-4789

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff – Appellee, 

 v. 

ANTHONY KEITH WILSON, 

 Defendant – Appellant, 

 

DONNA C. ADKINS; ALISIA H. AKBAR; CHERYL L. AMAKER; LACARIA 

BROWN; LUTHER BRYAN; CHASE MANHATTAN MORTGAGE CORPORATION; 

LAVACA COUNTY TEXAS; RANDY MARTIN; GEORGEAN MCCONNELL; 

JOSEPH E. MCCONNELL; CHRISTOPHER M. MORRIS; FLORENCE 

NOLLKAMPER; GUSSIE D. NOLLKAMPER; JOHN M. WARTHER; WELLS 

FARGO HOME MORTGAGE, INCORPORATED, 

 Parties-in-Interest. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Columbia. Cameron McGowan Currie, District 

Judge. (3:02-cr-00548-CMC-10) 

Submitted: April 23, 2009 Decided: May 8, 2009 

Before WILLIAMS, Chief Judge, DUNCAN, Circuit Judge, and John 

Preston BAILEY, Chief United States District Judge for the 

Northern District of West Virginia, sitting by designation. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 
Michael Chesser, Aiken, South Carolina, for Appellant. Beth 

Drake, Mark C. Moore, Jane Barrett Taylor, Assistant United 

States Attorneys, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 

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PER CURIAM: 

 Anthony Keith Wilson was convicted by a jury of 

conspiracy to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and 

fifty grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§§ 841(a)(1), 846 (2006), and was sentenced to 420 months in 

prison. Wilson appealed, challenging his conviction and 

sentence. We affirmed Wilson’s conviction and rejected claims 

relating to Wilson’s sentence, but because he was sentenced 

under the then-mandatory Sentencing Guidelines, vacated and 

remanded for resentencing consistent with United States v. 

Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). See United States v. Davis, 270 F. 

App’x 236 (4th Cir. March 17, 2008) (unpublished). 

 On remand, the district court imposed a 320-month 

variant sentence and Wilson timely appealed. Counsel for Wilson 

has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 

(1967), alleging that he has found no meritorious issues for 

appeal but asserting that Wilson’s variant sentence “was in 

excess of that necessary to comply with the purposes of 18 

U.S.C. 3553(a).” Wilson has filed a pro se supplemental brief 

asserting that: (i) the district court erred when it rejected 

several objections on remand under the mandate rule; (ii) his 

sentence on remand was imposed “based in part on the mandatory 

guideline system” because the district court refused to revisit 

Wilson’s previous objections to his Guidelines range 

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calculation; (iii) the district court erred when it allegedly 

failed to consider his objection regarding the Government’s 21 

U.S.C. § 851 (2006) information at his first sentencing; and 

(iv) his sentence is unreasonable because it “exceeded the 

statutory maximum by six years,” was based on drug amounts not 

foreseeable to him, and was based on pre-conspiracy conduct. 

The Government has declined to file a responding brief. Finding 

no error, we affirm the district court’s judgment. 

 In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the 

record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for 

review. First, because the vast majority of Wilson’s arguments 

were either litigated by Wilson on his first appeal and were 

rejected, or could have been litigated but were not, the mandate 

rule precludes their present consideration by this court. See

Volvo Trademark Holding Aktiebolaget v. Clark Mach. Co., 

510 F.3d 474, 481 (4th Cir. 2007) (“[A] remand proceeding is not 

the occasion for raising new arguments or legal theories.”); 

United States v. Bell, 5 F.3d 64, 66 (4th Cir. 1993) (stating 

that the mandate rule “forecloses relitigation of issues 

expressly or impliedly decided by the appellate court,” as well 

as “issues decided by the district court but foregone on 

appeal.”). 

 “[T]he doctrine [of the law of the case] posits that 

when a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should 

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continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the 

same case.” United States v. Aramony, 166 F.3d 655, 661 (4th 

Cir. 1999) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). The 

law of the case must be applied: 

in all subsequent proceedings in the same case in 

the trial court or on a later appeal . . . unless: 

(1) a subsequent trial produces substantially 

different evidence, (2) controlling authority has 

since made a contrary decision of law applicable to 

the issue, or (3) the prior decision was clearly 

erroneous and would work manifest injustice. 

Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see Doe v. 

Chao, 511 F.3d 461, 464-66 (4th Cir. 2007) (discussing mandate 

rule and its exceptions). Because Wilson’s claims do not fall 

within any of the above-mentioned exceptions, he may not raise 

these claims on this appeal. 

 We also reject Wilson’s challenges to the validity of 

the variant sentence imposed on remand. After Booker, a 

sentence is reviewed for reasonableness, using an abuse of 

discretion standard of review. Gall v. United States, 128 S. 

Ct. 586, 597 (2007). The first step in this review requires the 

court to ensure that the district court committed no significant 

procedural error. United States v. Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 161 

(4th Cir. 2008). Assuming the district court committed no 

significant procedural error, this court must next consider the 

substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed, taking into 

account the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 161-62. 

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 While an appellate court may presume that a sentence 

within the Guidelines range is reasonable, it may not presume 

that a sentence outside the Guidelines range is unreasonable. 

Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597; see United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 

210, 261 (4th Cir. 2008) (“[A] sentence that deviates from the 

Guidelines is reviewed under the same deferential abuse-ofdiscretion standard as a sentence imposed within the applicable 

guidelines range.”), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1312 (2009). 

Rather, in reviewing a sentence outside the Guidelines range, we 

“consider the extent of the deviation, but must give due 

deference to the district court's decision that the § 3553(a) 

factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.” Gall, 

128 S. Ct. at 597. Even if this court would have imposed a 

different sentence, this fact alone will not justify vacatur of 

the district court’s sentence. Id.

 We find the district court’s 320-month variant 

sentence to be reasonable. On remand, the district court 

entertained counsel’s argument regarding the weight that should 

be afforded the § 3553(a) factors, heard from Wilson’s mother, 

allowed Wilson an opportunity to allocute, and thoroughly 

considered the § 3553(a) factors before imposing Wilson’s 

sentence. We conclude that the district court adequately 

explained its rationale for imposing the variant sentence, and 

that the reasons relied upon by the district court are valid 

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considerations under § 3553(a) and justify the sentence imposed. 

See United States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 473-76 (4th Cir. 

2007). 

 Having reviewed the record in this case and finding no 

meritorious issues for review, we affirm the district court’s 

judgment. This court requires that counsel inform Wilson in 

writing of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United 

States for further review. If Wilson requests that a petition 

be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be 

frivolous, then counsel may move this court for leave to 

withdraw from representation. Counsel's motion must state that 

a copy thereof was served on Wilson. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before the court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED