Report to the Ranking Minority

Member, Committee on Commerce,

Science, and Transportation,

U.S. Senate

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

December 2001 NATIONAL

AIRSPACE SYSTEM

Long-Term Capacity

Planning Needed

Despite Recent

Reduction in Flight

Delays

GAO-02-185
Page i GAO-02-185 Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Background 4

Diverse Set of Initiatives Was Under Way to Address Delays 8

Capacity to Be Added in Next 10 Years Will Likely Have Limited

Effect in Keeping Delays From Rising to Previous Levels 16

Other Measures Needed to Help Reduce Delays Are More Difficult

to Implement but May Be More Viable in Light of Recent Events 22

Conclusions 29

Recommendations 30

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 31

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 34

Appendix II Initiatives by DOT, FAA, and Selected Airlines and

Airports to Address Flight Delays 36

Appendix III Description of Delay-Reducing Measures Not

Included in FAA’s Operational Evolution Plan 50

Category 1: Adding Airport Infrastructure 50

Category 2: Managing Demand 52

Category 3: Using Ground Alternatives 57

Appendix IV GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 59

GAO Contacts 59

Acknowledgments 59

Tables

Table 1: Examples of Government Initiatives to Reduce Flight

Delays 9

Table 2: Examples of Airline Initiatives to Reduce Flight Delays 10

Table 3: Examples of Airport Initiatives to Reduce Flight Delays 11

Table 4: Projected Capacity Increases at the Most Delay-Prone

Airports 18

Contents
Page ii GAO-02-185 Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed

Table 5: List of Potential Measures—Not in the OEP—to Reduce

the Airport Capacity Gap 23

Abbreviations

AAAE American Association of Airport Executives

ACI-NA Airports Council International - North America

ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast

AIR-21 Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform

Act for the 21st Century

ATC air traffic control

AVOSS Aircraft Vortex Spacing System

DDTC Digital Display Taxi Clearance

DOD Department of Defense

DOT Department of Transportation

EIS Environmental Impact Statement

FAA Federal Aviation Administration

FFP1 Free Flight Phase 1

FLIR Forward Looking Infrared Radar

GA general aviation

GPS Global Positioning System
Page iii GAO-02-185 Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed

HUGS Heads-Up Guidance System

ILS Instrument Landing System

ITWS Integrated Terminal Weather System

LAAS Local Area Augmentation System

LAHSO Land-and-Hold Short Operations

MASSPORT Massachusetts Port Authority

MII majority-in-interest

NAS National Airspace System

NATCA National Air Traffic Controllers Association

NIMS National Airspace System Information Management 

System

NOCC National Operations Control Center

OCC Operations Control Center

OEP Operational Evolution Plan

OST Office of the Secretary of Transportation

PFC passenger facility charge

PRM Precision Runway Monitor

RNAV area navigation

SOIA Simultaneous Offset Instrument Approach

TAAP Tactical Altitude Assignment Program

TARGETS terminal area route generation, evaluation and 

traffic simulation

TRACON Terminal Approach Radar Control
Page 1 GAO-02-185 Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed

December 14, 2001

The Honorable John McCain

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Commerce,

 Science, and Transportation

United States Senate

Dear Senator McCain:

In recent years, airline flight delays have been among the most vexing

problems in the national transportation system. They reached

unprecedented levels in 2000, when one flight in four was delayed.

Although bad weather has historically been the main cause of delays, a

growing reason has been the inability of the nation’s air transport system

to efficiently absorb all of the aircraft trying to use limited airspace or

trying to take off or land at busy airports.

Recent events—most notably the terrorist attacks on buildings in New

York City and Washington, D.C., using hijacked airliners, and the

economic slowdown that preceded these attacks—have changed the

extent of the delay problem, at least for the short term. With many airlines

cutting their flights by 20 percent or more, the air transport system is

having less difficulty absorbing the volume of flights. Whether the volume

of flights will continue at these lowered levels is unknown. However, it is

likely that a more robust economy and less public apprehension about

flying will lead to renewed demands on the air transport system. If so,

concerns about delays—and the actions being taken to address them—

may once again command national attention.

Addressing delay problems requires action by several sectors of the

aviation community because no single entity has the authority or ability to

solve delay-related problems. The federal government, especially through

the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and its parent agency, the

Department of Transportation (DOT), plays a major role by operating the

nation’s air traffic control system, distributing federal funding for airports,

and setting operating standards for commercial aircraft and airports.

However, the nation’s airports are primarily owned and operated by local

units of government, so that decisions about such steps as expanding

airport capacity are primarily local in nature. The nation’s airlines also

play a key role. Their business decisions have a strong effect on the

volume and routing of flights, the type and size of aircraft used, and the

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, DC 20548
Page 2 GAO-02-185 Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed

degree to which aircraft are upgraded to take advantage of new

technology.

You asked us to examine the aviation community’s efforts to reduce

delays. As agreed with your office, we focused our work on the following

questions:

• What initiatives are planned or under way by the federal government,

airlines, and airports to address flight delays?

• What effect are these initiatives likely to have on reducing delays?

• What other options are available to address delay problems?

Our work involved extensive consultation with various stakeholder groups

in the aviation community, including airlines, airports, local governments,

industry associations, employee organizations, federal regulatory agencies,

and aviation researchers. We contacted officials from DOT, FAA, 8 major

airlines, and 18 large airports that experience major congestion and delays

to identify the main initiatives planned or under way to address congestion

and delay problems. As we were conducting our work, FAA released a

plan, called the Operational Evolution Plan, incorporating many of these

initiatives, and we focused much of our remaining efforts on analyzing this

plan. Our gathering of information and FAA’s issuance of the Operational

Evolution Plan both occurred before the September 11, 2001, terrorist

attacks, and the initiatives that actually move forward as well as the plan

itself are subject to change. To assess the likely impact that current and

planned initiatives will have on reducing delays, we relied on the extensive

body of work we have conducted on aviation over the past decade, the

views of FAA and other stakeholders, and evaluations and studies

conducted by other researchers. We used these same types of sources in

identifying other measures for addressing delay problems. Appendix I

explains our scope and methodology in more detail. Our work, which we

conducted from October 2000 through October 2001, was done in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

The federal government, airlines, and airports have a diverse set of

initiatives under way to address flight delays. Examples of these initiatives

include adding new runways, finding new ways to safely accommodate

more aircraft in the skies, and doing more to coordinate efforts to adjust to

spring and summer storms. Although most of these efforts were developed

separately, FAA has since incorporated many of them into a plan, called

the Operational Evolution Plan, which is designed to give more focus to

these initiatives. FAA acknowledged that the plan is not intended as a final

Results in Brief
Page 3 GAO-02-185 Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed

solution to congestion and delay problems. The plan focuses on initiatives

that can be implemented within 10 years and generally excludes any

approaches that lack widespread support across stakeholder groups. FAA

acts as the plan’s coordinator, though the various stakeholders continue to

retain responsibility for individual initiatives. FAA has made a good start

in implementing the plan and believes that the steps taken to date have

had some effect in the delay reductions that occurred in the first 6 months

of 2001.

The current initiatives, if successfully carried out, will add a substantial

amount of capacity to the nation’s air transport system. Even so, these

efforts are unlikely to prevent delays from becoming worse unless reduced

traffic levels following the September 11 terrorist attacks persist over the

long term. One key reason is that a number of the most delay-prone

airports have limited ability to increase their capacity, especially in the

form of adding new runways—the main capacity-building element of the

Operational Evolution Plan. Many of the most delay-prone airports, such

as La Guardia, Newark, Kennedy, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and

Philadelphia, would find it difficult to build an additional runway either

because they are out of room or they would face intense local opposition.

Persistent delays at key airports such as these will continue to act as

“choke points” that slow air traffic moving throughout the system. Thus,

the system will have difficulty handling growth, even if this growth is

considerably less robust than what was forecasted before the terrorist

attacks. If growth should match the earlier, very robust forecasts, the

delay problem will only be more pronounced.

The air transport system has long-term needs that require attention beyond

the initiatives currently under way. Other measures exist—some perhaps

made more viable by the recent terrorist attacks. These measures consist

of three main types. The first involves adding new capacity—not by adding

runways to existing capacity-constrained airports, but rather by building

entirely new airports or using other nearby airports that have available

capacity. The second involves ways to manage and distribute demand

within the system’s existing capacity. Examples include limiting the

number of takeoffs and landings during peak periods or limiting the ability

of aircraft, other than those operated by airlines, to use especially

crowded or sensitive airports (under current law, all aircraft have equal

access to even the largest airports). The third involves developing other

modes of intercity travel, such as, but not limited to, high-speed rail where

metropolitan areas are relatively close together. These measures would

require extensive change; may conflict with the interests of one or more of

the key stakeholder groups; and, in many cases, would be costly.
Page 4 GAO-02-185 Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed

With the rising need to consider these three measures, either because of

the increasing demand on the air transport system or because of the need

to develop options that meet security and other concerns prompted by the

terrorist attacks, the federal government will need to assume a central

role. This role should include identifying the measures that are most

appropriate for individual situations, framing the discussion, and moving

forward with the best solutions. DOT has recognized the need for more

and better long-range planning on the potential use of such measures, but

its efforts are currently just in the beginning stages of development. The

current hiatus in air traffic growth represents an opportunity for such

planning to take place.

We are recommending that the Secretary of Transportation begin a more

extensive evaluation of initiatives to address flight delays, including

intermodal solutions, such as high-speed rail where appropriate, and a

dialogue with the aviation community and other transportation

stakeholders as a basis for developing a comprehensive blueprint for

addressing the long-term needs of the nation’s air transport system.

We provided a draft of this report to DOT for its review and comment. In

responding, both DOT and FAA officials generally concurred with the facts

as presented in the draft report. They also provided some technical

clarifications, which have been incorporated. Neither agency commented

on the report’s conclusions or recommendations.

In 2000, an unprecedented number of delays and cancellations in

commercial airline flights occurred. At 31 of the nation’s busiest airports,

28 percent of the domestic flights arrived late.1

 Certain flights were almost

always late; for example, in December 2000, 146 regularly scheduled

flights were late 80 percent or more of the time. The percentage of delayed

flights declined to 24 percent in the first 6 months of 2001. According to

FAA and others, the decline likely reflected various factors, such as better

weather, fewer flying passengers because of the economic slowdown, a

 1

In the past, there was no single, agreed-upon definition of delay, resulting in markedly

different figures about the extent of the problem. To the degree possible, our figures are

based on the definition used by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics, a DOT agency.

Under this definition, a flight is late when it arrives at the gate 15 minutes or more after its

scheduled arrival time. (Canceled flights are also included.) In March 2001, FAA’s

Administrator announced that FAA would also adopt this definition. Our figures are based

on domestic flights of the nation’s 10 largest airlines (United, American, Delta, Northwest,

Southwest, US Airways, Continental, TWA, America West, and Alaska).

Background
Page 5 GAO-02-185 Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed

strike that idled one carrier’s aircraft for several months,2 a reduced

demand on the system, and actions taken to better manage the nation’s

airways. The September 11 terrorist hijacking of four commercial airliners

has further contributed to a drop in air passengers and scheduled flights,

with major airlines cutting the number of flights by 20 percent or more and

one carrier, Midway Airlines, ceasing operations entirely.

Although recent events may have moved airport congestion off center

stage as a major national issue, delays remain a pervasive problem, in part

because of the interdependence of the nation’s airports. The effect of

delays can quickly spread beyond those airports where delays tend to

occur most often, such as New York’s La Guardia, Chicago O’Hare,

Newark, and Atlanta Hartsfield. Delays at such airports, particularly those

with large numbers of flights, can quickly create a “ripple” effect of delays

that affect many airports across the country. For example, flights

scheduled to take off for such airports may find themselves being held at

the departing airport because there is no airspace to accommodate the

flight. Similarly, an aircraft late in leaving the airport where delays are

occurring may be late in arriving at its destination, thus delaying the

departure time for the aircraft’s next flight. The September 11 attacks may

also have added a new dimension to delays because the more thorough

screening of airline passengers at ticket counters and security check

points now takes additional time. So far, FAA and airlines have addressed

this issue by telling passengers to arrive earlier for their flights and to be

prepared for longer processing times. Whether additional security will

affect the timeliness of aircraft flights has yet to be determined.

Delays have many causes, but weather is the most prevalent. Figures

compiled by FAA indicate that weather causes about 70 percent of the

delays each year. Apart from weather, the next main cause is lack of

capacity3

—that is, the inability of the air transport system to handle the

amount of traffic seeking to use it.4

 Capacity can be measured in a variety

 2

The strike affected Comair, a regional subsidiary of Delta Air Lines, grounding its airplanes

for nearly 3 months. Comair, which is based at Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky International

Airport, operated 119 aircraft when the strike began.

3

In this report, our use of the term “capacity” refers to both types of measures—takeoffs

and landings at airports, and the number of aircraft that can be safely managed when they

are in the air.

4

Besides weather and capacity, other causes for delay include air traffic control equipment

problems (such as radar problems), runway closures (such as for construction), and a

variety of other miscellaneous reasons.
Page 6 GAO-02-185 Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed

of ways. At individual airports, one measure is the maximum number of

safe takeoffs and landings that can be conducted in a given period, such as

15 minutes or 1 hour. FAA has established such a capacity benchmark at

each of 31 of the nation’s busiest airports.5

 FAA’s data on capacity and

demand at these airports show that even in optimum weather conditions,

16 airports have at least three 15-minute periods each day when demand

exceeds capacity. Weather and capacity problems are often linked,

because bad weather can further erode capacity. For example, some

airports have parallel runways that are too close together for simultaneous

operations in bad weather. When weather worsens, only one of the two

runways can be used at any given time, thereby reducing the number of

aircraft that can take off and land. FAA’s data show that in bad weather, 22

of the 31 airports have at least three 15-minute periods when demand

exceeds capacity. Another measure of capacity, apart from the capacity of

individual airports, is the number of aircraft that can be in a given portion

of commercial airspace. For safe operations, aircraft must maintain

certain distances from each other and remain within authorized airspace.

If too many aircraft are trying to use the same airspace, some must wait,

either on the ground or en route.

FAA’s most recent long-term growth projections, which date from before

the September 11 terrorist hijackings, anticipated considerable growth in

demand for air travel. FAA projected that the number of passengers served

by U.S. airlines would rise by more than 40 percent, to more than 1 billion

annually by 2010. What effect, if any, the terrorist hijackings will have on

long-term growth still remains to be seen. To accommodate the increased

number of passengers it was projecting, FAA expected airlines to increase

the size of the total fleet by about 2,600 jets—an increase of about 50

percent.6

 The fastest-growing segment of the fleet is expected to be

smaller aircraft called regional jets—that is, jets with 32 to 70 seats but

generally with ranges of 1,000 miles or more. As we have pointed out in

previous work, the growing use of regional jets in addition to turbojet

aircraft currently flying has already added to congestion and delays,

according to published studies and experts, but the precise amount has

 5

Together, these 31 airports accounted for almost 70 percent of all enplanements (paying

passengers) in 1999.

6

Estimates of future passenger and aircraft growth are based on FAA forecasts made in

2001. They are subject to change on the basis of economic and other factors.
Page 7 GAO-02-185 Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed

not been determined and likely varies from airport to airport.7 Besides

airlines, other parts of the aviation community are also likely to place

increasing demands on the air traffic system. FAA expected increases of

about 50 percent in the number of cargo aircraft and the number of

smaller general aviation8

 jets, such as corporate jets and jets operated by

air taxi or charter services. Some industry analysts have suggested that in

the wake of the terrorist hijackings, corporations may make increasing use

of such jets, which often use the same airports as those used by airlines.

All three groups that are most heavily involved in addressing delay-related

problems—federal agencies, airlines, and airports—have important roles.

As the agency in charge of the air traffic control system, FAA has the lead

role in developing technological and other solutions to airspace issues.

FAA and DOT are also an important source of funding. Through the

Airport Improvement Program, FAA provided $1.95 billion in grants to

airports in fiscal year 2000, and through its Facilities and Equipment

appropriation, it pays for such things as improvements to the air traffic

control system. FAA and the Office of the Secretary of Transportation

(OST) monitor access rights to airports as well as the landing fees that

airports can charge. FAA also grants authority for airports to levy

passenger facility charges (PFC),9

 which were a source of more than $1.5

billion in revenue for airports in calendar year 2000. Airlines and airports

are also important decisionmakers and funding sources. For example,

changes in air traffic control technology may require airlines to make

substantial investments in new technology for their aircraft. However, the

recently enacted $15 billion federal assistance package for the airline

industry illustrates the airlines’ dire financial conditions, particularly after

the events of September 11. Accordingly, airlines may have a difficult time

making investments in air traffic control technology for their aircraft.

Similarly, while infrastructure improvements such as new runways often

receive federal support, much of the funding is raised at the local level.

 7

Aviation Competition: Regional Jet Service Yet to Reach Many Small Communities

(GAO-01-344, Feb. 14, 2001).

8

FAA considers general aviation to be all aviation other than scheduled airlines or military

aircraft.

9

PFCs were first instituted in 1992. With FAA approval, airports can collect up to $4.50 per

enplaned passenger. These charges are collected as part of the price of an airline ticket.
Page 8 GAO-02-185 Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed

Government, airlines, and airports have undertaken a wide range of

initiatives to address flight delays and increase the capacity of the air

transport system. The stakeholders we contacted—DOT and FAA, 8

airlines, and 18 of the most delay-prone airports—identified 158 separate

initiatives under way.10 Earlier this year, FAA issued the Operational

Evolution Plan (OEP), which is designed to give more focus to some of the

diverse initiatives under way. FAA’s role, in addition to continuing to

spearhead the initiatives for which it is directly responsible, is to act as

overall coordinator for implementing the OEP. FAA believes that the OEP

actions already implemented have contributed to the reduction in flight

delays experienced in the first 6 months of 2001. Challenges still lie ahead

in other areas, such as introducing new technology, adding new runways,

funding billions of dollars of investment, and developing ways to help

measure what the efforts are accomplishing.

The initiatives cited by DOT and FAA, airlines, and airports include steps

for addressing both weather-related and capacity-related delays.

Considerable efforts were under way to address weather-related problems,

which is the major cause of delays. For example, to deal with the problems

arising from thunderstorms and other severe weather in the spring and

summer, FAA launched a program called Spring/Summer. Among other

things, this program led to daily telephone conference calls between FAA

and airline officials to discuss weather and other conditions that might

affect the smooth flow of air traffic. The program also led to a new effort

to predict severe weather affecting aircraft. Examples of initiatives

directly related to capacity included an individual airport’s plans to build

new runways, taxiways, or gates; airlines’ efforts to adjust schedules to

relieve congestion at some hubs; and FAA’s efforts to seek greater use of

Canadian and military airspace. Some initiatives dealt with both weather

and capacity. For example, FAA is testing a system that would allow the

use of satellite navigation for landing approaches in all types of weather

conditions. This system, if successful, will allow airports to operate at

higher capacity in bad weather.

To an extent, the initiatives begun by each of the three stakeholder groups

have different emphases. FAA and DOT initiatives emphasize improving

 10The information regarding initiatives at DOT, FAA, airlines, and airports was gathered

before September 11, 2001. We recognize the drop in air travel following the terrorist

attacks may result in some of the initiatives being scaled back or even set aside.

Diverse Set of

Initiatives Was Under

Way to Address

Delays

Government, Airlines, and

Airports Started a Variety

of Initiatives on Their Own
Page 9 GAO-02-185 Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed

the ability to handle more aircraft in the air, airline initiatives emphasize

making adjustments to airline operations, and airport initiatives emphasize

increasing the capacity for more takeoffs and landings through more

runways and other infrastructure. The initiatives that stakeholders cited

are summarized briefly below; appendix II contains a detailed list of the

initiatives and their status.

DOT and FAA officials identified 29 initiatives under way at their agencies.

These initiatives can be grouped into three categories—adding capacity to

the system, identifying specific problems contributing to delays, and

identifying ways to better manage and coordinate responses to delays.

Table 1 provides examples of each category. Some of these initiatives were

completed, such as a benchmarking study to provide a better indication of

the number of takeoffs and landings that can be supported at 31 of the

busiest airports in the national airport system. However, most of the

initiatives were ongoing or long-term projects. Some, such as reevaluating

what is being done to deal with severe spring and summer weather, will be

done annually or as needed. Longer term efforts include redesigning the

airspace surrounding major metropolitan areas and developing technology

that allows greater use of existing runways in low-visibility conditions.

Table 1: Examples of Government Initiatives to Reduce Flight Delays

Type of initiative Examples

Enhancing capacity Implementing new procedures, such as allowing

selected flights to operate at lower, less-congested

altitudes.

Developing new technology, such as improved satellite

navigation capabilities that enable aircraft to travel

closer together.

Identifying problems and

solutions

Developing benchmarks for better determining how

many takeoffs and landings can be supported at various

airports.

Managing delays Improving communication between key airline and air

traffic control officials through multiple conference calls

each day to examine weather and other delay factors

and work out solutions for congestion in the national

airspace system.

Source: GAO analysis of agency information.

Initiatives identified by the eight airlines generally fell into one of three

categories—scheduling, weather and dispatch, and testing of new

technology. (See table 2 for examples.) In some cases, these initiatives

were tied to those of other stakeholders. For example, the main

technology-testing initiatives involved airline participation in the

DOT and FAA Initiatives

Airline Initiatives
Page 10 GAO-02-185 Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed

government initiatives previously discussed. Most of these initiatives were

ongoing or long-term projects.

Table 2: Examples of Airline Initiatives to Reduce Flight Delays

Type of initiative Examples

Scheduling Moving flights to off-peak times at hub airports to reduce

airspace and ramp congestion during peak hours.

Adjusting flight times throughout the route network to reflect

actual gate-to-gate departure and arrival times.

Weather and dispatch Investing in meteorological technology to assist in poor weather

planning and turbulence avoidance.

Developing technology that allows dispatchers to produce new

flight plans for flights that are already aloft.

Testing technology Participating in FAA-sponsored efforts to identify arrival routes

and improve aircraft flow at a hub airport.

Testing new approaches for linking data between airplanes and

air traffic control.

Source: GAO analysis of airline information.

The 18 delay-prone airports we contacted identified a wide range of

initiatives that varied from airport to airport, reflecting such differences as

the relative amount of congestion and the airport’s ability to add

infrastructure. Although each airport had a different set of concerns

regarding delays, the initiatives generally fell into three areas: new

runways and taxiways, terminals and gate space, and new technology to

promote efficient use of the airport. (See table 3 for examples.) As with

initiatives for the two other stakeholder groups, most of these projects

were still in process when we completed our review.

Airport Initiatives
Page 11 GAO-02-185 Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed

Table 3: Examples of Airport Initiatives to Reduce Flight Delays

Type of initiative Examples

Runways and taxiways Building new runways and extensions to existing

runways.

Building new taxiways.

Adding high-speed exits from existing runways.

Terminals and gate space Adding terminals and/or gates.

Changing gate leasing arrangements to allow maximum

flexibility during high-demand periods.

New technology to promote

efficient airport use

Funding new FAA-developed weather information system.

Installing additional navigational aids.

Installing new runway monitoring systems for greater

runway use in low-visibility conditions.

Source: GAO analysis of airport information.

FAA designed the OEP to provide a more focused and more coordinated

approach to congestion and delay problems. The previously described

initiatives were generally begun independently rather than as a

collaborative response to a systemwide problem. Although FAA previously

had made efforts to develop more coordination and cooperation among

the stakeholder groups,11 the OEP was FAA’s attempt to align its activities

with those of other stakeholder groups using such approaches as

collaborative decisionmaking, specific timelines for completing actions,

and designation of accountability. The OEP does not replace or eliminate

the previously described initiatives; rather, it incorporates many of them

into “operational solutions” designed to address specific goals.

Responsibility for the various actions is still shared among the various

segments of the aviation community. As the overall coordinator for this

effort, FAA faces challenges in ensuring a consistent funding stream for

the federal government’s portion of the activities and developing

performance measures that will help gauge the extent to which these

operational solutions are reducing delays.

 11For example, FAA took steps to involve aviation community stakeholders in various

planning efforts and individual programs, and it also published numerous plans, such as the

annual Aviation Capacity Enhancement Plan, which combined various FAA projects into

one document.

FAA’s Operational

Evolution Plan Attempts to

Bring Greater Focus to

Stakeholders’ Efforts
Page 12 GAO-02-185 Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed

The OEP focuses on four goals, each with a set of operational solutions.

The four goals and the types of operational solutions included for each

goal are as follows:

• Increasing arrival and departure rates. Increasing the number of flight

arrivals and departures during a given period is an effort to keep pace with

demand at many key airports. Fifteen of the nation’s busiest airports suffer

from insufficient capacity to meet peak demands, according to FAA. The

plan proposes seven solutions to increase the arrival and departure rate,

including building new runways and coordinating efficient surface

movement.

• Increasing flexibility in the en route environment. This goal is aimed at

easing congestion in the air and providing more operating flexibility for

pilots. En route congestion occurs, according to FAA, because routes are

tied to ground-based navigational aids, controller workloads are limited by

manual monitoring of aircraft, and current aircraft separation standards

do not account for advances in aircraft capability. The plan proposes eight

solutions, including reducing aircraft separation; working collaboratively

with users to manage congestion; and providing access to additional

airspace, such as military operating areas.

• Increasing flexibility en route during severe weather. Thunderstorm

activity—especially around busy airports—can cause problems for aircraft

that are en route. The inability to predict the precise location, movement,

and severity of hazardous weather can hamper air traffic managers and

pilots alike. Improved equipment and procedures could better pinpoint

weather characteristics and their impacts and lead to improved flight

management and ultimately fewer delays. The plan proposes solutions to

provide better hazardous weather data and to respond effectively to

hazardous weather.

• Maintaining airport arrival and departure rates in all weather conditions. A

significant portion of delays occur when local airport weather reduces

arrival and departure rates. The plan calls for maintaining a constant rate

of aircraft arrivals and departures, regardless of weather conditions. To

meet this goal, the plan proposes such solutions as reconfiguring runways,

developing ways to safely space aircraft closer together, and maintaining

runway use in reduced visibility.

The OEP’s operational solutions incorporate most of the separate

initiatives identified by the stakeholder groups. FAA officials emphasized

that the OEP is subject to change, including revisions as a result of the

The OEP Incorporates Many

Existing Initiatives
Page 13 GAO-02-185 Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed

September 11 terrorist activities. The OEP’s operational solutions do not

include all types of actions that have been advanced as possible solutions

to the delay problem. FAA acknowledged that the OEP was not meant to

be an end-all that would solve all delay problems, but was instead a more

limited document dealing with near-term operational solutions. The

solutions included in the OEP have widespread support across

stakeholder groups and do not include any initiatives for which FAA could

not obtain consensus from key aviation stakeholders. In addition, FAA

specifically limited the types of measures included in the OEP to those

that (1) will add new capacity and (2) can be implemented within 10 years.

For example, the OEP’s operational solutions include new runways that

airports like Seattle-Tacoma and Lambert-St. Louis currently expect to

complete by 2010. The OEP does not include all measures that have been

advanced as possible solutions to the delay problem, such as new airports

or high-speed ground transportation alternatives. The OEP also does not

include administrative, regulatory, or market-based approaches that are

largely for the purpose of managing existing capacity more efficiently,

such as setting limits on the number of flights that could be flown to and

from specific airports.

FAA has made a good start in developing the OEP and in taking the initial

efforts to implement it. FAA followed a highly collaborative process in

developing the plan. It encouraged input from stakeholders in a variety of

ways, circulated drafts to various segments of the industry for comment,

and revised those drafts to reflect the comments received. The final plan,

issued in June 2001, establishes timelines for individual components of the

plan and includes actions and decisions required by the different

stakeholders. Lines of accountability have also been established within

FAA. For example, a team of senior FAA personnel, chaired by the Acting

Deputy Administrator, is to lead the implementation and be responsible

for setting priorities, monitoring benefits and methods for measuring

improvements, and engaging the aviation community leaders in key

decisions.12

FAA officials believed that actions under way were already having an

effect on reducing delays. During the first 6 months of 2001, 24 percent of

major airlines’ flights arrived 15 minutes or more after their scheduled

 12The OEP also establishes lines of responsibility for the specific improvements

anticipated. This responsibility is assigned to the heads of seven FAA units that are

responsible for the various outcomes.

Although Off to a Strong Start,

the OEP Will Need to Meet

Several Key Challenges
Page 14 GAO-02-185 Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed

arrival at 31 of the nation’s busiest airports, compared with 28 percent

during the first 6 months of 2000. FAA officials believe that a combination

of factors is responsible for this drop, including much more favorable

weather conditions during the spring of 2001. They also cited the

Spring/Summer initiative, which addresses weather issues resulting from

spring and summer storms, as an example of a collaborative effort among

airlines and various FAA organizations that helped reduce the amount of

delays. Another effort they cited was the choke-points initiative, under

which FAA made aircraft routing changes, added technology, changed

procedures, and modified traffic management strategies to reduce the

impact of congestion in seven highly congested areas in the national

airspace system.

Many of the actions included in the OEP, including those that will add the

most capacity, are still under way. Security and other concerns raised in

light of the September terrorist attacks may have some effect on the

initiatives. For example, initiatives allowing pilots greater flexibility in

determining their route of flight or to use restricted military airspace will

be affected by increased security concerns. Apart from concerns raised

over the terrorist attacks, FAA and other stakeholders face the following

challenges on several key fronts in implementing the actions in the OEP:

• Introducing new technology. A number of the OEP’s efforts center on

introducing new technology to allow aircraft to take off, travel, and land

more closely together. For example, FAA is testing a satellite navigation

system that would allow for instrument landings in all weather conditions.

Our past reviews have shown that over the past two decades, FAA has

encountered numerous problems in introducing new technologies, with

many projects running years behind schedule. Because of the size,

complexity, cost, and problem-plagued past of FAA’s modernization

programs, we have designated these programs as a high-risk information

technology investment since 1995.13 The continued risks are sizable, in part

because many technology-related projects under the OEP are still a

number of years from being fully developed and will need to be integrated

with existing technology. For example, we recently reported that FAA will

 13See, for example, Air Traffic Control: Role of FAA’s Modernization Program in

Reducing Delays and Congestion (GAO-01-725T, May 10, 2001) and High-Risk Series: An

Update (GAO-01-263, Jan. 2001).
Page 15 GAO-02-185 Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed

face a technical challenge in ensuring that the components of its Free

Flight initiative can work with other air traffic control systems.14

• Overcoming barriers to building new runways. FAA estimates that 50 to 55

percent of total capacity to be added under the OEP will come from

runway projects at 15 of the nation’s 31 busiest airports, such as Detroit,

Minneapolis, St. Louis, and Atlanta. Six of these runways are currently

under construction; the rest are in some stage of the planning, design, and

review process. The process of planning and building a runway typically

takes 10 years under the best of circumstances, and some of the projects

still face legal challenges from local groups opposed to the projects

because of environmental and other concerns.

• Obtaining sufficient funding. Successful implementation of actions

included in the OEP hinges on the availability of funding from several

sources, including FAA, airlines, and airports. The full cost of the OEP is

unknown. FAA estimates that over the period of 2001 to 2010, its portion

of the cost will be about $88.5 billion—$11.5 billion in federal funding for

facilities and equipment, and $77 billion in operations to deliver services.

To help make this funding available, FAA officials told us they were

adjusting priorities and developing future budget requests around the plan.

Other significant funding will need to come from airlines and airports. For

example, before benefits of new air traffic control technology can be fully

realized, aircraft must receive new equipment. As the recent economic

slowdown and the terrorist attacks have shown, the airline industry is

subject to periods of profit and loss. If new equipment comes on-line at a

time when airlines think they cannot afford to buy it, the planned benefit

may not materialize. Similarly, infrastructure projects at airports usually

require a substantial amount of local funding. Adding a runway at a major

metropolitan airport, for example, could cost $1 billion or more, only part

of which is federally funded. In the wake of the terrorist attacks, some

airports have already begun to reevaluate expansion plans and capital

expenditures, reportedly in response to concerns about increased

expenditures for security and declining airline and passenger fees to pay

for improvements.

 14Free Flight is a project for giving pilots greater freedom to select their own flight path and

speed. See National Airspace System: Free Flight Tools Show Promise, but

Implementation Challenges Remain (GAO-01-932, Aug. 31, 2001).
Page 16 GAO-02-185 Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed

• Establishing accountability through performance indicators. The OEP

recognizes that, along with designating who is to be responsible for each

action, performance indicators are needed to assess what the action is

accomplishing. For example, under the Free Flight initiative, FAA has

established direct routings15 as one performance indicator and set a goal of

increasing these routings by 15 percent in the first year of implementation.

At this early stage of the OEP, FAA is still in the process of developing

most performance indicators. Having sound performance indicators is of

particular importance if funding becomes limited, because these indicators

can help determine which actions are likely to yield the best results for the

dollars expended and where to redirect resources should doing so become

necessary.

If fully implemented, the actions to be taken under the OEP will add

substantially to the system’s capacity but are unlikely to keep delays from

rising again unless air traffic remains at substantially lower levels than

anticipated over the long term. If the industry rebounds to the point that

FAA’s earlier projections about air traffic growth turn out to be correct,

many of the busiest airports will be unable to keep pace with rising

demand, even with their increased capacity. If the recovery is less robust,

the system still will have difficulty because a number of delay-prone

airports have limited ability to expand their capacity to meet even modest

increases in demand. Many of the most delay-prone airports have already

run out of room for adding other runways or will soon run out of room to

do so. These delay-prone airports cause delays that ripple throughout the

system. If problems at these airports are not alleviated, this ripple effect

will continue, causing delays at airports that may have addressed their

own capacity problems. Finally, competitive pressures within the airline

industry may still lead airlines to continue using operations strategies that

are vulnerable to delays. These pressures currently motivate airlines to

schedule flights that fully use available air transport system capacity

during those times of day in which they perceive consumers most want to

fly. At delay-prone Newark International Airport, for example, after one

airline recently decided to reduce schedule delays by trimming the number

of peak-hour flights, rival airlines quickly responded by adding more peakhour flights of their own.

 15Direct routings allow pilots to take the most direct route to their destinations, rather than

routes typically used in the airspace system.

Capacity to Be Added

in Next 10 Years Will

Likely Have Limited

Effect in Keeping

Delays From Rising to

Previous Levels
Page 17 GAO-02-185 Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed

Even if all OEP actions are successfully completed, key airports in the

system will likely lose ground in their ability to meet demand. Under the

growth projections made before the terrorist hijackings, FAA forecasted

that between 2001 and 2010, demand would increase faster than capacity

at 20 of the nation’s 31 busiest airports. For these airports, the ability to

make significant headway in adding capacity is primarily related to one

factor—adding a runway. FAA estimates that the 14 airports adding a

runway by 2010 will see capacity increases averaging 34.9 percent. By

contrast, the 16 airports not adding a runway will see a capacity increase

averaging 6.3 percent.16

FAA expects that at least half of the capacity gain from OEP initiatives will

come from the new runways included in the plan. Some industry sources

have suggested that even more runways should be built by 2010, saying

that 50 miles of new runways at the top 25 delay-prone airports—the

equivalent of 1 runway at each airport—would solve the system’s capacity

problems. Airport stakeholder groups are calling for streamlining the

procedures and reducing the time necessary for approving runways, which

now takes at least 10 years to plan and complete. Proposed legislation has

been introduced in the Congress to help shorten this process.17

Relying on adding runways to increase capacity at busy metropolitan

airports, however, will likely have a limited effect over the long term.

Some airports can accommodate additional runways, but many cannot.

Denver International Airport is an example of a location with substantial

expansion potential. Located in a sparsely populated area away from the

metropolitan area, the airport has ample room to add capacity. The airport

is currently building a new 16,000-foot runway to add to its five existing

runways and can accommodate six more runways in its present

configuration. By contrast, other airports, such as Los Angeles,

Washington Reagan National, La Guardia, and San Francisco have little

capacity to expand and would find it difficult to build even one more

runway, either because they lack the space or because they would face

 16A new 7,800-foot runway opened at Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport in October

2000. FAA estimates that this airport will see a 60-percent capacity increase between 2001

and 2010.

17The Aviation Delay Prevention Act (S. 633) would, among other things, eliminate

duplicative requirements in the environmental review process; it would also make certain

projects, designated as National Capacity Projects, ineligible for federal funding if the

airport does not initiate its planning and environmental review process for these projects in

a timely manner.

Many Airports Cannot

Significantly Expand

Capacity
Page 18 GAO-02-185 Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed

intense opposition from adjacent communities. For this reason, many

airports will likely face delay problems even if demand turns out to be

much lower than FAA projected.

Of particular concern are key delay-prone airports—that is, those airports

that experience the highest number of delays per 1,000 flight operations

(takeoffs and landings). The seven airports that experienced the highest

rate of delays in 2000 are shown in table 4. Among these, Chicago O’Hare

indicates that it can add another runway, although it too faces intense

opposition if it attempts to do so.18 FAA’s April 2001 Benchmarking Study

concluded that of these seven airports, all but Boston Logan would still

have significant passenger delays in 2010, largely because the gains in

capacity during this decade will be relatively low. For example, according

to FAA projections, the three New York airports—La Guardia, Newark,

and Kennedy—will experience relatively small capacity gains during this

decade—just 7 percent for Newark and 3 percent each for the other two

airports.

Table 4: Projected Capacity Increases at the Most Delay-Prone Airports

Airport

Ranking by delays per

1,000 operations

(2000)

Projected percentage

increase in capacity

through 2010

New York - La Guardia 1 3%

Newark International 2 7

Chicago O’Hare International 3 12

San Francisco International 4 3

Boston Logan International 5 4

Philadelphia International 6 11

New York - Kennedy

International

7 3

Source: FAA’s Operational Evolution Plan.

Even for airports where a runway addition is possible, other factors make

that alternative less desirable. Cost is one such factor. Some airports are

surrounded by development that is extremely difficult and expensive to

displace. For example, a new 9,000-foot runway currently under

 18Boston Logan has a runway under construction; Philadelphia completed a runway in 1999.

FAA’s projections included both of these runways. However, the runway at Boston Logan is

to reduce delays in certain runway configurations and is not expected to increase the

optimum capacity of the airport. The Philadelphia runway is only 5,000 feet in length and

was designed for smaller and slower aircraft.
Page 19 GAO-02-185 Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed

construction at St. Louis-Lambert Field will cost an estimated $1.1 billion,

in large part due to the required displacement of over 2,000 homes,

businesses, churches, and schools around the airport. Similarly, a new

9,000-foot runway under way at Atlanta Hartsfield will cost an estimated

$1.3 billion, again largely due to the costs of relocating structures and

highways. By contrast, the new 16,000-foot runway at Denver—where

ample open land is available—will cost just $171 million.

Another factor is the expansion potential over the longer term. Even if

many airports like Atlanta Hartsfield, Chicago O’Hare, and St. LouisLambert Field are able to add another runway or reconfigure existing

ones, continued growth in air traffic would mean that the airports would

need to expand once again. At some point, these locations will have to

consider other alternatives because the cost of adding another runway will

be too expensive and environmentally unacceptable. For those locations

where capacity is constrained and options to add runways are limited or

nonexistent, that time has already come.

Because the airports in the national system are so interdependent,

continued shortfalls in capacity at key airports over the long term will

likely perpetuate the delay problem throughout the entire system. The

system’s interdependency comes from the hub-and-spoke routing pattern

under which most airlines operate. Under this pattern, airlines schedule

many flights to arrive at one airport (the hub) from other cities on their

network (the spokes) during a short period of time. While the aircraft are

on the ground, passengers transported to the hub connect to flights going

to their final destination. These groups of arrivals and departures happen

several times a day. This approach allows an airline to serve more cities

than it could through a “point-to-point” approach that does not use a hub

as a transfer point.

The interdependency inherent in this hub-and-spoke approach sets up a

ripple effect in which delays at a hub can quickly affect not only flights to

and from that airport, but also flights throughout the entire network. This

ripple effect is illustrated by a scenario that is based on actual operations

reported by FAA’s research and development center. In the scenario, a

demand/capacity imbalance at Newark International Airport resulted in a

backup of five aircraft trying to land at the airport. These aircraft had to be

kept in holding patterns above the airport until they could land. Because of

the backup, FAA’s New York en route center (which controls air traffic

going in and out of Newark and other area airports) notified the adjoining

Cleveland en route center that it could not accept more aircraft bound for

Continued Capacity

Shortfalls at Key Airports

Will Affect the Broader Air

Transport System
Page 20 GAO-02-185 Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed

Newark until the aircraft in holding patterns around Newark were able to

land. As flights began to back up, many aircraft were affected, whether or

not they had Newark as their specific destination, because they were also

seeking to use part of the backed-up airspace. Within 20 minutes, the delay

in landing these 5 planes at Newark affected as many as 250 flights, some

as far away as the West Coast.

Thus, continued difficulties at some hubs can have repercussions at

airports that have successfully addressed their own local capacity

problems. Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport offers a good

example. In 2000, Phoenix put an additional runway into service, and the

airport now has sufficient capacity to allow flights to take off on time.

However, the airport ranks among the top 15 in the United States for flight

delays. According to airport officials, most of the delays at Phoenix are the

result of delays and cancellations at other airports—circumstances

unrelated to the capacity at Phoenix.

Competition in the airline industry is another factor that may limit the

effect that new capacity will have on reducing delays. Competition may

have such an impact because it encourages airlines to take maximum

advantage of capacity during the times that offer the greatest advantage.

Capacity at an airport is relatively constant throughout the day because

the airport theoretically can handle the same number of takeoffs and

landings each hour. However, airlines are generally motivated not to

stretch out their schedules throughout the day, but rather to concentrate

their operations in certain peak periods. One reason airlines follow this

practice is that they establish schedules that try to maximize what they

perceive consumers want, such as flights that leave early and late in the

business day. Another reason airlines follow this practice is that in order

to conduct efficient hub-and-spoke operations, they try to schedule as

many flights as possible to arrive at the hub airport at about the same time

and then to depart at about the same time a short while later. By doing so,

they minimize the amount of time that transferring passengers have to

spend waiting for their connecting flights.

There are ample illustrations of the ways in which these competitive

pressures lead airlines to make decisions that can potentially worsen delay

problems, rather than reduce them. For example:

• When the opportunity came to submit applications for new flights

operating in and out of La Guardia Airport, an airport that has had delay

problems for years, airlines submitted proposals to add more than 600

Effect of Added Capacity

May Be Negated as

Airlines Seek to Use Added

Capacity to Their

Competitive Advantage
Page 21 GAO-02-185 Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed

flights.19 Airline officials said they did so because of consumer demand for

service to and from New York.

• To help reduce delays at Newark International Airport, Continental

Airlines began using larger aircraft on some routes, allowing the airline to

reduce the number of scheduled flights. However, several other airlines

soon filled the vacated slots with flights of their own.

• As Continental Airlines did in Newark, United Airlines began using larger

aircraft and scheduling fewer flights to help address persistent delays in

San Francisco. Here, too, other airlines soon filled the vacated slots.

Airlines make their decisions after considering many factors, so examples

such as these cannot be taken as clear signals of what they will choose to

do in the future, especially during the current slowdown in passenger

demand. However, one scenario that must be considered is that these

competitive pressures will quickly fill any openings that are considered to

be economically advantageous. In this sense, the added capacity may

mirror what transportation engineers and the traveling public have often

noted about adding new highways in congested areas—that is, the

additional capacity quickly induces more people to drive, thereby leaving

traffic conditions little better than they were before.

 19The Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century, Public Law

106-181, phased out slots at La Guardia Airport by 2007 and allowed for immediate

exemptions from the slot rules for new entrant airlines and flights serving small

communities. Within a short time, the airport was overwhelmed with applications from

airlines asking for exemptions for over 600 flights to and from the airport. Because the

requests far exceeded the capacity of La Guardia, FAA, in cooperation with the airport,

developed a temporary lottery to allocate a limited number of slots while a study of marketbased and administrative alternatives was undertaken. Until further notice, FAA has

indefinitely suspended the latter study because of the reduction in aircraft operations at

La Guardia following the terrorist attacks on September 11.
Page 22 GAO-02-185 Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed

Because OEP actions will likely not be sufficient on their own to resolve

the delay problem over the long term, aviation stakeholders and

policymakers will likely have to consider additional measures to enhance

capacity and alleviate delays. A range of other measures is available, such

as building new airports or developing alternative ground transportation

systems. These measures are not new, but they have received rather

limited attention relative to incremental steps that are being taken, largely

because they require more extensive change that could conflict with the

interests of one or more key stakeholder groups, such as airlines or local

communities. Some of these measures, such as transportation alternatives

like high-speed rail, may have become more viable in light of security and

other considerations stemming from the recent terrorist hijackings. With

the rising need for considering these measures, the Congress and DOT will

need to assume a central role in identifying which measures are most

appropriate for given situations, framing the discussion about them, and

moving forward with the best solutions.

Other measures—not now part of the OEP—exist as potential solutions to

alleviate delays. These measures, which have been cited by various

researchers and policy organizations over the last decade, basically fall

into three categories. The first category involves various other measures

for adding airport infrastructure besides adding runways to existing

airports, such as building new airports or using nearby underdeveloped

regional airports. The second category involves approaches to better

manage and distribute air traffic demand within the system’s existing

capacity. These include administrative and regulatory actions, such as

limiting the number of takeoffs and landings during peak traffic periods or

restricting the types of aircraft allowed to land, and market-based

approaches, such as charging aircraft higher fees to land at peak times

than at slack times. The third category includes developing alternative

modes of intercity travel other than air transportation, such as high-speed

rail. Table 5 provides a brief explanation of each of these measures, and

appendix III contains more detailed information on each measure.

Other Measures

Needed to Help

Reduce Delays Are

More Difficult to

Implement but May

Be More Viable in

Light of Recent

Events

Variety of Other Measures

Could Meet Capacity

Needs
Page 23 GAO-02-185 Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed

Table 5: List of Potential Measures—Not in the OEP—to Reduce the Airport Capacity Gap

Measures Brief explanation

Category 1: Adding airport infrastructure

Building new airports in metropolitan areas. This measure involves new airports within metropolitan areas to provide

additional capacity, especially where the existing airport has little

expansion potential. This measure has recent limited use since only two

major new airports—at Dallas-Fort Worth and Denver—have been built in

large metropolitan areas since 1973.

Developing “wayports.” A network of 4 to 10 wayports across the nation, each located on the

fringe of or outside of a major congested metropolitan area, would serve

mainly as transfer points for passengers connecting to other locations but

also as cargo, mail, and maintenance facilities. This measure has not

been used.

Developing regional airports. Existing regional airports located within 50 miles of metropolitan hubs

would be developed to take advantage of unused system capacity. This

measure has seen limited use around major hub airports. A system of

regional airports exists in the Los Angeles area and is being

contemplated at several airports surrounding Boston Logan Airport.

Category 2: Managing demand

Adopting market-based approaches. This measure involves setting airport landing fees to bring flight demand

into line with available capacity. This approach could involve setting

higher landing fees during peak traffic periods in an attempt to get airport

users to use alternative airports, alter their flight schedules, or fly larger

aircraft. This approach is not in place at any major U.S. airport, although

it is being considered at La Guardia Airport.

Using administrative and regulatory approaches. Government regulators, airlines, or airports would manage demand

through (1) restrictions on the number of takeoffs and landings (slots)

during peak traffic periods, (2) voluntary flight schedule adjustments to

even out peak periods of demand, (3) restrictions on the use of smaller

aircraft at busy airports, and (4) more flexible policies governing airport

gate access and airlines’ control over airport capital development

projects. Two of these measures—slot control and voluntary schedule

adjustments—are being used to a limited degree at a few U.S. airports,

such as Newark (voluntary schedule adjustments) and New York’s La

Guardia and Kennedy airports (slot control).

Category 3: Using ground transportation alternatives

Building high-speed, intercity ground transportation. Building high-speed ground transportation (e.g., rail) between populous

cities within 200 miles of each other may free up capacity at congested

airports by reducing the air traffic demand at those locations. Such trains

could travel at speeds of 200 mph or more. Technologically, high-speed

rail has proven successful in Europe and Asia; efforts are under way in

the United States to develop high-speed rail in several designated

corridors.

Connecting nearby airports with high-speed ground

transportation.

Using high-speed ground transportation to connect congested airports

with underused airports nearby could accommodate passenger transfers

within the current hub-and-spoke system. This measure has not been

done in the United States.

Source: GAO analysis of previous studies.
Page 24 GAO-02-185 Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed

The applicability of any particular measure is likely to vary by location,

considering the circumstances at each major airport. There is no “one-sizefits-all” solution; rather, substantially reducing delays will probably require

a combination of measures spread out over time. For example, the

airspace surrounding the greater New York metropolitan area is perhaps

the most congested airspace in the nation. The three major airports in the

area (La Guardia, Newark, and Kennedy), which currently are among the

nation’s most delay-prone airports, are expected to experience substantial

air traffic growth during this decade. But these airports have very limited

expansion potential, largely because they cannot realistically build new

runways. Building new airports or developing regional airports to serve

the area may be long-term solutions, but they will likely take many years to

materialize. In the meantime, other short-term measures would need to be

considered as passenger demand increases, such as ways to use existing

facilities more efficiently. This is the direction that FAA and the New

York/New Jersey Port Authority, which owns and operates the three area

airports, were moving before the drop in passenger demand following the

events of September 11. FAA and the Port Authority had been considering

market-based and administrative approaches for La Guardia but have

temporarily suspended deliberations on this issue. Because major airports

in other locations may face different circumstances than the New York

airports face, they may need an entirely different set of solutions to

address flight delays.

While these other measures may hold promise for addressing capacity

problems, adopting any of them is likely to be a more daunting challenge

than implementing initiatives in the OEP. Accomplishing the OEP’s

initiatives will not be easy, but the opportunity for success is enhanced

because FAA has the support of major aviation stakeholders on nearly all

of the initiatives.20 By contrast, gaining consensus on any of these other

measures will be much more difficult because they change the nature of

the system to the degree that each one could adversely affect the interests

of one or more key aviation stakeholder groups—including passengers; air

carriers; and aircraft operators, airports, and local communities. For

example:

 20The exception is adding runways at airports where, although airports are moving forward

with these projects, they face substantial opposition in some nearby communities that

consider themselves adversely affected.

Adopting Other Measures

Is Likely to Be More

Difficult Than

Implementing Initiatives in

the OEP
Page 25 GAO-02-185 Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed

• Large infrastructure projects, such as new airports that are located in

metropolitan areas, could create major controversy. Such projects are

often opposed by adjacent communities that are fearful of noise,

displacement, or other environmental concerns. Also, finding suitable sites

for such projects in crowded metropolitan areas—with enough land that is

compatible with other potential land uses—may be difficult. Airlines may

oppose some types of infrastructure projects if they fear that the projects

would adversely affect them. For example, an airline with a dominant

market position at a major hub airport may oppose building an additional

airport nearby because the dominant carrier may view it as an opportunity

for their competitors to enter the market in that area.

• Administrative, regulatory, and other measures for managing the demand

for existing capacity could generate opposition from various sources as

well. Airlines may oppose such measures if they perceive that these

measures would restrict their choices in determining rates, schedules, and

aircraft sizes—all of which could affect their profits and competitive status

relative to other airlines. Smaller communities may also oppose such

measures, fearing that commercial air service to and from their airports

may be reduced or curtailed because airlines would react by choosing

more profitable routes for the limited number of airport slots available.

Cost, a factor to be weighed in adding runways to existing airports, is also

an important consideration when building a new airport. For example, the

last major new airport—the Denver International Airport completed in

1995—cost almost $5 billion to build. This cost would have been greater

had the airport been located closer to the city, but since it was located on

open land away from established communities, the costs of noise

mitigation and other land-use issues were minimized. Also, the

construction of fast-rail service in populated metropolitan corridors is

likely to be costly. For example, Amtrak estimates the cost to construct

fast-rail service in federally designated, high-speed corridors and the

Northeast Corridor of the United States will be about $50 billion to $70

billion.

Although these measures for the most part have not received widespread

consideration, some have come into play in limited situations. Where this

has been the case, the wide disagreement among stakeholders regarding

the best course of action illustrates the extent of controversy that can be

present in weighing the various measures. Here are several examples:
Page 26 GAO-02-185 Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed

• In Chicago, where additional airport capacity has been under

consideration for years, an intense debate has ensued regarding whether

to build a new airport south of Chicago or add runways to O’Hare, which is

located in an area of dense development. The city, which owns and

operates O’Hare, recently unveiled a $6.3 billion plan that includes adding

and relocating runways. The two dominant airlines at O’Hare—United and

American—and several congressional members favor this plan. Illinois,

several communities adjacent to O’Hare, and other congressional

members opposed the additional runways at O’Hare due to environmental

and land-use concerns and instead favored building a new airport to be

built at Peotone, Illinois, located about 35 miles southwest of downtown

Chicago.

• Atlanta is planning a $5.5 billion upgrade to Hartsfield International

Airport, including adding a fifth runway at a cost of about $1.3 billion. The

airport is constrained by adjacent highways and development, making

modifications expensive. At a recent national meeting of airport

executives, Atlanta’s Aviation General Manager for Hartsfield Airport was

asked why a new airport located north of the city—on a large tract of land

outside of Atlanta that is already owned by the city—was not considered

more seriously as an alternative to the expansion project. He cited the

unlikely financial backing of the airport’s dominant carrier—Delta

Airlines—as the major barrier to considering an option other than adding

capacity at Hartsfield.

• In Los Angeles, the master plan for the Los Angeles International Airport

calls for (1) reconfiguring and extending its runways and adding taxiways

to increase capacity and (2) shifting a larger percentage of the area’s air

traffic to surrounding regional airports, such as Orange County’s John

Wayne Airport, Ontario, and Burbank-Glendale. The city also proposes

high-speed rail service from Los Angeles International to facilitate the use

of surrounding airports. Local officials and several Members of Congress

favor no expansion at Los Angeles International and shifting even more

flights to the outlying airports. At the same time, the outlying airports must

overcome existing limitations. For example, the terminal at BurbankGlendale does not meet FAA standards (too close to the runway) and

needs to be replaced, but city officials in Burbank have indicated they will

oppose a new terminal. The Ontario Airport is limited by the state to

125,000 operations annually. Also, significant interest has been shown in

using the former Marine Corps Air Station at El Toro, but its use has been

opposed by local factions because of noise and other concerns; FAA and

others also have concerns about the runway configuration there because

of mountainous terrain around the airport.
Page 27 GAO-02-185 Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed

• Lambert Field in St. Louis is undertaking a major runway project, which—

at $1.1 billion—is one of the most costly runway projects of any currently

under way nationwide. Mid-America Airport—which the federal

government has spent about $216 million to develop21 over the last

decade—is located about 24 miles from St. Louis, has modest but new

terminal facilities, and has two runways (8,000 feet and 10,000 feet)

capable of accommodating the largest aircraft in operation today. The only

airline serving the airport in 2001 discontinued service at Mid-America in

early December 2001. American Airlines, which has a major hub in St.

Louis, supports the runway expansion project at Lambert, rather than

using the facilities at Mid-America.

Although consideration of these other measures is likely to be

controversial, developments stemming from the September terrorist

attacks may make some of them more viable. For example, a shift in

public opinion in favor of ground transportation for relatively short trips

(150 to 300 miles) may make high-speed rail a more viable option for some

high-density corridors, despite the cost and the dislocation it would bring

for communities where new, better rail lines would need to be built.

Similarly, the need for greater security controls on air traffic flying in

sensitive locations, such as Washington, D.C., and New York City, may

increase support for some administrative solutions, such as limiting the

extent to which corporate jets and other general aviation aircraft can use

airports that are already crowded because of commercial airline flights. In

2000, smaller general aviation aircraft and unscheduled air taxi service

accounted for about 44 percent of the air traffic at Washington Reagan

National Airport and about one-third of all traffic at La Guardia.

If satisfactory progress in addressing airline delays could be made through

the initiatives in the OEP, the existing federal effort, spearheaded largely

by FAA, might be sufficient. However, needed solutions, both short and

long term, appear likely to include measures not included in the OEP.

Because these measures are more controversial and include modes of

transportation other than aviation, the federal government—particularly

DOT—will need to take an expanded role.

 21Since its development at Scott Air Force Base, Mid-America has received $156 million in

grants from FAA through the Airport Improvement Program and the Military Airport

Program. The Department of Defense has also provided $60 million to relocate a large

housing complex from the airport grounds.

Addressing the Full Range

of Measures Means

Greater Involvement by

DOT as a Strategic Planner
Page 28 GAO-02-185 Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed

DOT has recognized the need for more long-range strategic planning on air

transport system issues and has efforts under way to address this need.

For the most part, these efforts are currently on hold in the aftermath of

the September 11 terrorist attacks because FAA has focused its immediate

efforts on other matters. One effort that continues, however, began in mid2001 when DOT’s Deputy Secretary convened a working group—

comprised of senior officials within the Department—to address aviation

congestion, delays, and competition issues. Specific goals, responsibilities,

and the scope of the working group were still being developed. On August

21, 2001, FAA and OST began another effort when they published in the

Federal Register a request for comments on market-based solutions for

relieving flight congestion and delays. This request is part of a DOT effort

to collect data and conduct an analysis of market-based pricing at airports.

The request asked respondents to set aside consideration of the current

legal framework in suggesting ways that demand management may be

used as one component of a delay-reducing strategy. The comment period

for this notice was to have closed on November 19, 2001. However, given

the decline in air traffic after September 11, DOT has suspended the

closing date for comments. Once DOT has a better understanding of the

long-term impact of the events of September 11, they will publish a new

closing date for comments.

Although actions like these are positive steps toward alleviating airport

congestion and flight delays, what is still missing is a long-term plan or

blueprint to guide the development of the entire national air transport

system. Various researchers and policy organizations have suggested the

need for such a plan and have recommended that it involve several critical

steps, including the following:

• A thorough assessment of all potential measures and their applicability to

the various circumstances and needs of each region. The advantages and

disadvantages of each measure and the barriers to implementation would

be clearly delineated.

• Close collaboration among airlines, airports, and other key stakeholder

groups.

• Legislative, regulatory, and administrative actions needed to implement

the plan.

• An innovative investment strategy, including federal incentives and

leverage needed to encourage the use of recommended measures.

Choosing many of the measures is the prerogative of local governments,
Page 29 GAO-02-185 Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed

airports, and airlines, but the federal government can influence the

stakeholders’ decisionmaking using a variety of financial, administrative,

and regulatory means. For example, although average aircraft size is

determined by individual airlines, the government can help shape these

decisions by allowing changes in landing fees and airport restrictions at

selected locations to encourage the use of larger aircraft at crowded

airports or encourage smaller aircraft to use nearby airports that have

excess capacity.22 Similarly, the federal government can provide additional

funding for targeted options, such as enhancing reliever airports, or make

financing of airport infrastructure contingent on stakeholders’ support of

other options deemed beneficial.

To date, few of these elements have been included in DOT’s planning

efforts. Except for the effort to study market-based solutions for relieving

delays, DOT at this time does not have plans to perform detailed analyses

of other potential solutions, such as new airports and alternative ground

transportation, in the context of a strategy for increasing national airspace

capacity. Such analyses are a critical prerequisite to developing a blueprint

for guiding the development of the air transport system, according to

others who have studied this area. Also, the direction and planned

outcome of DOT’s strategic planning efforts are unclear. DOT has not

decided, for example, whether—as part of its strategic planning—to

develop a blueprint of potential measures that are needed to address the

capacity needs in specific locations (e.g., a set of measures for addressing

problems in the crowded Northeast or long-range alternatives in locations

where incremental additions to existing airports are growing more

limited).

FAA’s Operational Evolution Plan is a positive step in addressing needed

capacity-enhancing actions. But if the recent economic slump and the

challenges posed by the September 11 terrorist attacks turn out to be only

a temporary pause in the growth of air traffic, the plan will fall far short of

meeting the system’s growing needs. Unless passenger traffic remains at

the current reduced levels over the long term, which seems unlikely,

bolder more controversial measures—such as new airports and

administrative and market-based approaches—will have to be considered.

Exploring such measures is important because many of the nation’s key

 22By law, all aircraft—general aviation, corporate, and air carriers—have equal landing

access rights. This applies to small and large aircraft alike. When they land, regulations

require that airports charge them in a nondiscriminatory, reasonable basis—typically, on

the landed weight of each aircraft.

Conclusions
Page 30 GAO-02-185 Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed

airports cannot significantly add to their capacity. Eventually, even

airports that either currently have enough capacity or can perhaps add a

runway to increase capacity will have to consider other measures such as

these.

While the nation’s attention is now justifiably focused on many other

issues of aviation safety and security, now is also a good time to begin

laying the groundwork for considering these additional delay-reducing

measures. The current drop in air traffic represents an opportunity to

develop plans for keeping the air transport system ahead of the curve of

potential future growth. A carefully considered blueprint is needed to

guide future actions for the next 20 years and beyond. Selecting a set of

measures to solve the nation’s flight delay problem involves difficult

choices with considerable impact on the interests of the various

stakeholder groups—the flying public, airlines, airports, and nearby

communities. In addition, because of the interdependence of airports in

the system, a national perspective is needed—one that considers the needs

of the entire system while also considering the individual needs and

circumstances of various locations. For some parts of the country, these

unique needs and circumstances may require considering intermodal

solutions, such as high-speed rail as an alternative to air travel.

DOT and the Congress both have key roles to play in bringing about

needed changes to sustain a safe, sound, properly managed, and affordable

air transport system. Because of the breadth of its management of all

transportation modes, DOT is in a unique position to lead this effort.

DOT’s recent efforts are a start toward developing such a strategic

planning effort, but additional steps will be needed to provide the kind of

necessary blueprint for the future. DOT needs to work closely with the

Congress in formulating its approach, because ultimately the Congress

may have to make difficult choices that will please some stakeholders and

displease others. Now is the time to begin these efforts in earnest.

We recommend that the Secretary of Transportation include the following

as part of DOT’s current strategic planning for airspace capacity:

• An evaluation of the capacity-enhancing measures (including the measures

we discuss in this report) that are not in the OEP, such as building new

airports, managing air traffic demand, and using other modes identified for

increasing capacity. The evaluation should be done in the context of the

situations or locations where such options would be most applicable

considering key airport characteristics, circumstances, and expansion

Recommendations
Page 31 GAO-02-185 Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed

potential. Barriers and potential legislative actions should be delineated

for each measure.

• Collaboration and discussions—similar to the efforts made in formulating

the OEP—on prospective measures with airlines, airports, and other key

players in the aviation community.

• A blueprint for effectively addressing capacity issues and reducing delays

in the nation’s air transport system. This blueprint, which would be a guide

for future development of the system, should focus on both short-term

(less than 10 years) and long-term (10 to 40 years) measures needed and

address the specific measures applicable for each critical location as a

means for achieving a viable national system. Where necessary, this

blueprint should also consider addressing aviation delay problems by

using other modes of transportation, such as high-speed rail.

• An innovative investment strategy, which includes an analysis of potential

incentives that the federal government can bring to bear to encourage

aviation stakeholders to adopt measures identified in the blueprint.

Consideration should be given to financial incentives, such as targeting

more funds to certain kinds of projects or types of airports, as well as

incentives that would involve modification of existing regulatory and

administrative requirements, such as allowing changes in the methods of

determining landing fees.

We provided a draft of this report to DOT and FAA for their review and

comment. The two agencies generally concurred with the facts presented

in the draft report. They provided some technical clarifications, which we

have incorporated into this report where appropriate.

Neither agency specifically commented on the draft report’s conclusions

and recommendations; for the most part, they did not discuss the

additional measures that we recommended for consideration in

developing a blueprint for future capacity enhancement. FAA did provide

comments on one of the measures—the wayport concept. FAA said a

panel of DOT and FAA experts had examined the near-term benefits of the

wayport concept in the late 1980s. The panel concluded in 1990 that

wayports would provide little or no benefit at the time because new hubs

were not needed and airlines would be unwilling to use them. In its

response, FAA also noted that airlines jealously guard their transfer

functions and have ambitious expansion plans at their current hubs to

meet future demand. Because wayports would mainly be transfer points

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation
Page 32 GAO-02-185 Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed

for passengers, FAA said, the absence of originating passengers would

lead to relatively low concessions and would mean airports would have to

charge higher landing fees and rents to remain fiscally sound.

As we indicated in this report, we remain impartial as to which measures

are the best ones to adopt in any long-term plan for the air transport

system. However, we are concerned that FAA’s response misses a key

point: in the long term, a successful strategy requires a careful look at

measures other than expanding current hubs. Because so many key

airports are severely restricted in their ability to add runways, other

options must figure into long-term plans, even if they appear to have little

merit in the short term. The panel may or may not have been correct in

deciding that wayports were not desirable in 1990, but since then,

dramatic changes have occurred in the system, such as rapidly escalating

costs for and increasing local opposition to new runway construction at

crowded hub airports. In addition, the rapid growth of regional airlines,

regional jets, passenger enplanements, and cargo and express mail

services have changed the aviation environment. In light of these changes

and the conditions and circumstances that are likely to exist in the air

transport system in the next 40 years and beyond, we believe all of these

measures, including wayports, deserve a fresh look.

The judgments and decisions that are eventually rendered about these

measures also need to be rooted in an in-depth, data-rich analysis. In this

regard, FAA’s current position about wayports appears lacking. For

example, FAA has performed no quantitative analyses or conceptual

modeling to support its conclusion about the impact of wayports on

airport revenues and fees and airline competitiveness. In the years since

the DOT/FAA panel examined the wayport concept, three major studies

performed by reputable aviation experts outside FAA have concluded that

wayports merit further study. Like us, these experts have not endorsed

wayports but have called for developing more detailed information to

make a sound decision. In the end, developing a meaningful blueprint to

enhance capacity for the 21st century will require an expansive vision, a

clear understanding of the realities facing the air transport system, and a

sound evaluative approach that considers a broad range of possible

solutions.

As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents

earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 7 days after the

date of this report. At that time, we will send copies of the report to the

Secretary of Transportation; the Administrator, Federal Aviation
Page 33 GAO-02-185 Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed

Administration; and interested Members of Congress. Copies will be made

available to others upon request.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me

at (202) 512-3650. Appendix IV lists key contacts and contributors to this

report.

Sincerely yours,

Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D.

Director, Physical Infrastructure
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 34 GAO-02-185 Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed

We examined efforts made by aviation stakeholders to reduce airline flight

delays. Our efforts concentrated on three questions: (1) What initiatives

are planned or under way by the federal government, airlines, and airports

to address flight delays? (2) What effect are these initiatives likely to have

on reducing delays? (3) What other options are available to address delay

problems?

To determine what initiatives were planned or under way by the

Department of Transportation (DOT) and the Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA), we primarily spoke with program-level officials. To

obtain a preliminary list of efforts, we reviewed congressional hearings,

examined FAA and DOT publications, viewed FAA and DOT Web sites,

reviewed academic and research studies, and read articles in the aviation

press. From the list compiled from these sources, we held teleconferences

and discussions with officials directly responsible for the programs

leading the efforts. These included representatives from the offices of Free

Flight Phase 1; System Capacity; and Communications, Navigation, and

Surveillance. We also asked these officials and higher level officials to

provide any other initiatives not on our preliminary list.

To learn about airline initiatives, we contacted the Air Transport

Association and the Regional Airline Association to discuss approaches to

reducing flight delays. In addition, we obtained contacts at the airlines

from these organizations and held discussions with representatives from

American, Atlantic Coast, Atlantic Southeast, Continental, Delta, Federal

Express, Northwest, Southwest, United, and US Airways to discuss inhouse efforts to address flight delays.

To learn about airport initiatives to reduce delays and add capacity, we

met with representatives of the Airports Council International - North

America and obtained the names and contact information of the council’s

members who were responsible for addressing delay issues. On the basis

of this information, we held discussions with representatives of airports in

Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Dallas-Ft. Worth, Las Vegas, Los Angeles, Miami,

Minneapolis-St. Paul, New York, Newark, Philadelphia, Phoenix,

Pittsburgh, San Diego, San Francisco, and Seattle. We also visited Atlanta

Hartsfield, Boston Logan, Chicago O’Hare, Dallas-Ft. Worth, MinneapolisSt. Paul, New York Kennedy and La Guardia, and Newark airports.

To examine the extent to which the initiatives will likely reduce flight

delays, we reviewed congressional hearings, examined FAA statistics on

demand and capacity growth, and held discussions with FAA and DOT

officials. We also reviewed studies critiquing actions under way and

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 35 GAO-02-185 Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed

planned as well as forecasts on future airline activity and demand. We

obtained FAA data on demand and capacity growth at different airports

and followed up with FAA officials to obtain additional insight on their

reports and data. We used reports from such organizations as the

Transportation Research Board and San Francisco International Airport,

and we also used articles in journals that described trends in air traffic

demand and how current initiatives impacted those trends. We reviewed

congressional hearings at which representatives of federal agencies,

airlines, and airports reported how different efforts would affect delays.

We also contacted aviation experts affiliated with the Airport Consultants

Council, which is an airport industry consulting trade association, to

discuss the impact of these initiatives.

To learn of other options available to address delays, we went to a large

variety of sources. Using information from more than a decade of work

that we had conducted on air transportation issues, as well as information

we obtained in our work for this particular study, we identified a broad

range of studies conducted by various researchers. We also reviewed

assessments of these options by FAA, airports, and the DOT Office of the

Inspector General. We also discussed these options with FAA officials as

well as with various interest groups to discuss the advantages and

disadvantages of each option.
Appendix II: Initiatives by DOT, FAA, and

Selected Airlines and Airports to Address

Flight Delays

Page 36 GAO-02-185 Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed

Initiative sponsor and description Objective Status

Federal government procedures and technology - Department of Transportation

Study of demand management

techniques

A presidential directive issued on 12/7/00

directed the Department of Transportation

(DOT) and the Federal Aviation Administration

(FAA) to (1) study market-based congestion

pricing and other demand management

solutions to reduce delays and (2) undertake a

policy analysis of how these solutions might

be implemented, their potential impact, and

any statutory impediments.

Ongoing.

In a June 12, 2001, Federal Register

notice, FAA requested comments on

demand-management options that could

be used to replace the temporary

administrative limits on aircraft

operations at La Guardia. Comments

were due on October 12, 2001;

however, FAA has indefinitely

suspended this review.

In an August 21, 2001, Federal Register

notice, DOT requested comments on

using market-based approaches to

relieve flight delays and congestion at

busy airports. Comments were due on

November 19, 2001; however, DOT has

indefinitely suspended this review.

Task force on short-term accommodation

of the Wendell H. Ford Aviation

Investment and Reform Act for the 21st

Century (AIR-21) slot exemptions at La

Guardia Airport

FAA, DOT, and the New York/New Jersey

Port Authority, working collaboratively,

implemented an interim procedure to

reallocate (on a lottery basis) schedule slots to

airlines at La Guardia.

Completed.

FAA has reallocated 159 AIR-21 slots to

13 carriers under an interim plan that

became effective on 1/31/01.

Federal government procedures and technology - Federal Aviation Administration

FAA air traffic organization An executive order issued on 12/7/00

established a “performance-based

organization” within FAA that is designed to

increase the efficiency of the air traffic control

(ATC) system.

Ongoing.

FAA is developing an implementation

plan and conducting a nationwide search

for a chief operating officer.

National Airspace System (NAS)

operational evolution plan

FAA and MITRE are developing a 10-year

plan to address long-term, system capacity

issues and solutions for airports, airlines, and

the federal government.

Ongoing.

FAA completed version 3.0 of the

operational evolution plan, which was

released in June 2001.

National airspace redesign This is a long-term initiative to reconfigure

NAS airspace routing and use, thereby

improving system efficiency. Short-term efforts

focus on relieving congestion at critical “choke

points” in the Northeast.

Ongoing.

Completion of the NAS redesign project

is expected by the end of fiscal year

2006. To date, seven choke points in the

Northeast have been identified by a

group of airlines, FAA management, and

the National Air Traffic Controllers

Association (NATCA). Twenty-one action

items were identified to address

problems at the choke points, of which

11 have been implemented. All action

items should be completed by 7/31/02.

National traffic management evaluation A team of FAA and Air Transport Association

representatives visited 34 air traffic facilities

between July 19 and August 6, 1999.

Participants evaluated air traffic management

throughout these facilities.

Completed.

The team identified 165 action items

related to individual facilities, FAA’s

Command Center, and the NAS. The

items were completed by 7/28/00.

Appendix II: Initiatives by DOT, FAA, and

Selected Airlines and Airports to Address

Flight Delays
Appendix II: Initiatives by DOT, FAA, and

Selected Airlines and Airports to Address

Flight Delays

Page 37 GAO-02-185 Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed

Initiative sponsor and description Objective Status

Spring/Summer 2000 evaluation of air

traffic

Beginning in late 1999, FAA began studying

ways to reduce delays for spring/summer

2000 and beyond. Action items focused on

improving communications between FAA and

airlines, using available airspace more

efficiently, using new technologies,

establishing a strategic planning Web page for

FAA’s Command Center, and providing realtime weather information to users.

Ongoing.

The procedures to address these action

items were implemented in March 2000,

and a formal evaluation was completed

in December 2000. Actions were taken

to improve procedures for

spring/summer 2001, with an emphasis

on additional training of FAA and

aviation users. This evaluation will be

conducted annually.

Spring/Summer Tactical Altitude

Assignment Program (TAAP)

FAA is engaged in a pilot program involving

120 city-pairs to test the feasibility of allowing

aircraft to operate at lower, less congested

altitudes.

Ongoing.

Test results have been positive, and

FAA has reached an agreement with

NATCA on proposed procedural

changes. After completing training for

controllers and pilots, TAAP was

implemented at some facilities following

a formal testing period.

Spring/Summer convective forecasting This effort was undertaken to improve the

ability to predict severe weather, ultimately

resulting in better aircraft routing. It (1) collects

weather information from the National

Weather Service, airlines, and 20 central

weather service units and (2) develops a

collaborative convective forecast product,

which is disseminated to FAA and user

facilities.

Ongoing.

The collection and dissemination

process is in place. FAA has evaluated

efforts from the year 2000 and has

implemented changes and conducted

training for the upcoming convective

season. These efforts will be evaluated

annually.

Spring/Summer use of Canadian

airspace

This initiative is designed to enhance the use

of Canadian airspace by U.S. air carriers

through (1) new procedures for the automatic

transfer of flight plan data between FAA and

NavCanada ATC facilities and (2) an updated

structure of overflight fees for airlines using

Canadian airspace.

Ongoing.

FAA has implemented procedures to

ensure that NavCanada ATC facilities

have adequate ATC staff before U.S.

planes are routed over Canadian

airspace. This effort has already helped

relieve congestion at the Cleveland and

Minneapolis centers. FAA and

NavCanada are currently discussing

expanded use of Canadian airspace and

overflight fees.

Spring/Summer centralized operational

authority

This is an effort to improve communications

among FAA’s Command Center, its ATC

facilities, and airlines to smooth the flow of

flights in the NAS.

Completed.

FAA’s Command Center holds several

teleconferences daily with ATC

managers and air carriers to discuss

weather conditions and other factors

causing delays at specific locations and

to determine appropriate solutions for

congestion in the NAS.

Spring/Summer use of military airspace FAA and the Department of Defense (DOD)

are studying the potential for the expanded

use of DOD-designated airspace for

commercial purposes. The initiative involves

using new military airspace routes along the

East Coast, improving procedures to reduce

the effect on NAS operations from military

Ongoing.

DOD is releasing some airspace for

commercial use at certain times of the

day, mainly in areas east of the

Mississippi. Discussions are continuing

on further use of military airspace by

commercial carriers.
Appendix II: Initiatives by DOT, FAA, and

Selected Airlines and Airports to Address

Flight Delays

Page 38 GAO-02-185 Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed

Initiative sponsor and description Objective Status

operations in the Buckeye Military Operations

Area (located in the Ohio Valley), and

centralizing information on special-use

airspace.

Airport capacity studies This is a long-term initiative with FAA, airport

operators, and aviation industry groups

forming airport capacity design teams at

various airports to identify and evaluate

alternative means, including procedural and

technological innovations, and to enhance

existing airport capacity to handle future

demand.

Ongoing.

Several reports have been issued. Since

1998, capacity reports or tactical

initiative studies have been produced for

six airports. Three more studies are in

progress.

Airport capacity—benchmark arrival and

departure throughput

FAA analyzed the capacity of 31 key airports

in the NAS.

Completed.

In April 2001, FAA released its final

report on all of the airports that it studied.

Airport capacity—Aviation System

Capacity Improvement

This program is designed to focus government

and industry efforts on specific enhancements

(e.g., traffic flow and hardware problems)

needed to improve the free flow of traffic in the

NAS.

Ongoing.

FAA has identified Houston Bush

Intercontinental Airport for a

demonstration project which started in

fiscal year 2001. The project will look at

expanding the use of flight management

systems and global positioning system

(GPS) capabilities to accommodate

additional traffic resulting from the

construction of a new runway.

Military Airport Program This program provides financial assistance to

civilian sponsors of military airfields that are

converted to civilian or joint military-civilian

use to enhance airport system capacity and

reduce flight delays. AIR-21 authorized adding

3 airports to the program (from 12 to 15

participants).

Completed.

FAA selected three new airports on

1/8/01.

• Mather Air Force Base as a backup

airport for Sacramento International’s

cargo and general aviation (GA) traffic

• March Air Force Base as a backup

airport for Los Angeles International’s

cargo traffic

• Gray Army Airfield as a joint-use

commercial service (primary) airport

for Killeen, Temple, and Fort Hood,

TX

Free Flight ProgramsaFree Flight (Phase 1) began in 1998 to make

ATC less restrictive by using new technology

and improved procedures. During Free Flight

Phase 1,b

 FAA plans to deploy various

decision support tools at its facilities and

selected airports.

Ongoing.

“Free flight” tools are being used at

select locations throughout the system

and results are being evaluated. Phase 1

is scheduled for completion in 2002.

Safe Flight 21 This federal government and industry effort

was initiated to evaluate and validate the

capabilities of advanced communications,

navigation, and surveillance technologies to

improve airport safety, capacity, and

efficiency. Airport moving map displays in the

cockpit will improve surface situational

awareness for pilots; other technology will

enable pilots and controllers to approach ideal

Ongoing.

Two years of operational demonstrations

and flights were successful in Alaska

and the Ohio Valley region. Automatic

Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast

(ADS-B)c

 services are now being

provided in the Bethel, AK, area and test

infrastructure has been established in

Memphis, TN, and Louisville, KY.
Appendix II: Initiatives by DOT, FAA, and

Selected Airlines and Airports to Address

Flight Delays

Page 39 GAO-02-185 Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed

Initiative sponsor and description Objective Status

aircraft-to-aircraft separations to land aircraft

more efficiently.

Additional operational demonstrations

and evaluations are planned. A preferred

ADS-B link technology will be selected in

2001.

En-route Automation Modernization This effort involves the replacement of legacy

software and interfaces that make up the flight

data processing and radar data processing

automation systems.

Ongoing.

This program began in early 2000 and

completion is targeted for 2008. Funding

in fiscal year 2001 is for initial analyses

and a functional audit for the program.

Airway Facilities Enhancements Three facilities-related initiatives to address

flight delays:

• National Operations Control Center

(NOCC) to coordinate information between

the Command Center and the field

• NAS Infrastructure Management System

(NIMS), an information system to collect

and deliver NAS information

• Three regional Operations Control Centers

(OCC) to coordinate and prioritize NAS

equipment (surveillance, communications,

navigation, and telecommunications);

operations; and management actions within

their domains

Ongoing.

NOCC opened at the Command Center

in March 1999. Deployment of NIMS is

expected in 2003 and completion is

expected in 2005. The three regional

OCCs opened in June 2001, and full

capabilities are expected to be in place

in 2003.

Streamline and accelerate the

development and implementation of

navigation procedures

This initiative focuses on consolidating and

streamlining the development and approval of

navigation procedures and routes. On a test

basis, FAA and carriers are using the terminal

area route generation, evaluation, and traffic

simulation (TARGETS) tool to create area

navigation (RNAV) arrival and departure

procedures.

Ongoing.

TARGETS is being tested at eight major

airports, and FAA expects to distribute

the process and tools to other airports in

the future.

Aviation System Performance Metrics This initiative focuses on developing

meaningful operational performance measures

to help manage the NAS and improve

operational efficiency. Through a designated

reporting system, 10 participating carriers

provide FAA with times for taxi-out, takeoff,

on-ground, and taxi-in data at 21 airports. FAA

then provides these data to its ATC facilities

and to airports and airlines.

Ongoing.

Data have been generated and

disseminated since January 2000, but

the system is still being validated. FAA is

developing 18 new metrics related to the

Command Center’s operations—11 have

been agreed upon by FAA and the

airlines, and the remaining 7 are still

being examined.

Local Area Augmentation System (LAAS)

Satellite Navigation

When operational, LAAS is expected to yield

the high accuracy, availability, and integrity

needed for category I, II, and III precision

approaches (instrument landings) in all

weather conditions. If successful, FAA plans to

purchase up to 160 LAAS installations (46

category I and 114 category III). Also, LAAS

can increase the use of existing airports that

currently are not available due to restricted

areas or approaches.

Ongoing.

Using a LAAS test prototype, FAA has

flown over 240 approaches with a

Boeing 727 and a Falcon 20 aircraft.

FAA expects to have at least one

category I LAAS installed and authorized

for public use by 2002 and a category III

LAAS available by late 2005. Full

deployment of LAAS is scheduled to

begin in 2002 and be completed by

2010.
Appendix II: Initiatives by DOT, FAA, and

Selected Airlines and Airports to Address

Flight Delays

Page 40 GAO-02-185 Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed

Initiative sponsor and description Objective Status

Improving environmental approval process - Federal Aviation Administration

Streamline and expedite environmental

reviews for airport capacity projects

This project will identify environmental delays,

streamline environmental procedures, and

expedite Environmental Impact Statements

(EIS) for major runway projects at large hub

primary airports.

Ongoing.

In April, FAA submitted its Report to

Congress on the environmental review of

airport improvement projects. FAA will

assign an EIS team of experts to each

new major EIS and improve interagency

environmental coordination at state and

federal levels. It will also increase

environmental resources through new

hires in the Airports Office, reimbursable

agreements with airports to fund

expedited EISs, and amendments of

existing third-party contracts for more

consultant support. FAA also plans to

reduce the amounts and types of

environmental documentation required

and to issue a “best practices” guide.

Improving environmental approval process - American Association of Airport Executives (AAAE) and Airports Council

International-North America (ACI-NA)

Expedited Airport System Enhancement The goal of this proposal is to speed runway

construction and other critical expansion

projects at the nation’s most congested

airports by both streamlining and expediting

current environmental reviews.

Ongoing.

AAAE and ACI-NA introduced the

legislative proposal to the Congress and

the administration in March 2001.

Airline initiatives

American Airlines and American Eagle Major improvements recently completed or

under way include:

• Assigning (isolating) specific aircraft to a

limited number of hub routes to minimize

the domino effect of delays at one hub on

another hub

• Testing the prototype of AVOSS, a wake

turbulence detection system, at Dallas-Fort

Worth International Airport

• Adjusting flight times throughout its system

to reflect the longer gate-to-gate departure

and arrival times being experienced

• Reviewing and adjusting the schedule of

American Eagle operations to minimize

crowding in ramp areas

• Testing of data-link capabilities between

aircraft and ATCs

Completed.

• The isolation policy has been

implemented at Chicago O’Hare.

• AVOSS was tested at Dallas-Fort

Worth International Airport with

positive results.

Ongoing.

• American’s flight times (as well as

those of American Eagle) are

reviewed continuously and revised

with published schedules.

• Ramp operations are continuously

reviewed to improve operational

efficiency.

• Data-link capabilities are being tested

on four of American’s 767 aircraft

serving European destinations; FAA

tests are planned for the Miami

Center in 2002 with over 24 of

American’s 737-800 aircraft.

Continental Airlines Major improvements recently completed or

under way include:

• Adjusting flight schedules at Newark to

even out travel peaks

• Adjusting the level of service to some small

and medium-sized cities to relieve

congestion in some of their hubs

Completed.

• Adjustments to Continental’s flight

schedules at Newark were made in

2000.

• Service adjustments were made in

2000.

• The airline was successful in
Appendix II: Initiatives by DOT, FAA, and

Selected Airlines and Airports to Address

Flight Delays

Page 41 GAO-02-185 Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed

Initiative sponsor and description Objective Status

• Collaborating with FAA and the Port

Authority on new equipment at Newark and

other New York metropolitan area airports

• Adjusting flight times throughout its system

to reflect actual gate-to-gate departure and

arrival times

obtaining the Integrated Terminal

Weather System (ITWS) prototype at

Newark, which benefits all New York

area airports.

Ongoing.

• Continental’s nationwide flight times

are reviewed six times each year and

adjusted as necessary.

Delta Airlines and

Atlantic Southeast Airlines

Major improvements recently completed or

under way include:

• Coordinating between Delta and Atlanta

ATC to increase capacity at its Atlanta hub

through schedule changes for Delta and its

commuter affiliates

• Assigning (isolating) specific aircraft to a

limited number of hub routes to minimize

the domino effect of delays at one hub on

another hub

• Adjusting the schedule structure at Atlanta

Hartsfield Airport for spring 2001 to even

out travel peaks

• Adjusting flight times throughout its system

to reflect actual gate-to-gate departure and

arrival times

• Installing Heads-Up Guidance System

(HUGS) on its aircraft as a navigational aid

during poor visibility weather conditions

Completed.

• Coordination has occurred with the

ATC to improve capacity at the

Atlanta hub, and Delta has

rescheduled propeller aircraft traffic

outside of jet arrival and departure

banks to improve flow.

• Delta has assigned (isolated) specific

aircraft to specific city-pair routes

each day to minimize the domino

effect of delays at any single major

airport.

• Adjustments to Delta’s schedule were

made in early 2001.

Ongoing.

• Delta’s flight times (as well as those of

owned subsidiaries ComAir and

Atlantic Southeast) are reviewed

continuously and revised four times

each year.

• Delta’s new 737-800 aircraft and the

regional jets for ComAir and Atlantic

Southeast are being delivered with

the HUGS installed. The MD-88 fleet

will be retrofitted in the future.

Federal Express (FedEx) Major improvements recently completed or

under way include:

• Canceling service to La Guardia

• Installing LAAS at Memphis for GPS

arrivals

• Investing in HUGS and forward looking

infrared radar (FLIR) for operations in poor

visibility weather conditions

• Participating in Safe Flight 21 to identify

special arrival routes to improve aircraft

flow at Memphis

Completed.

• FedEx cancelled its service to La

Guardia in 1999 and is confining its

New York operations to Newark, JFK,

and Stewart.

Ongoing.

• LAAS at Memphis is operational, and

FedEx has equipped one aircraft with

a GPS landing system for testing GPS

approaches.

• Research continues on the use of

HUGS and FLIR.

• Operational evaluation of Safe Flight

21 surface situational awareness

applications conducted in 2001, and

additional demonstrations at Memphis

are planned for 2002.

Northwest Airlines Major improvements recently completed or

under way include:

• Investing in technology for the

meteorological department to assist in poor

Completed.

• Northwest’s meteorological

department began using turbulence

avoidance systems to plan alternative
Appendix II: Initiatives by DOT, FAA, and

Selected Airlines and Airports to Address

Flight Delays

Page 42 GAO-02-185 Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed

Initiative sponsor and description Objective Status

weather planning and turbulence avoidance

• Participating extensively in FAA’s

spring/summer initiative through its internal

Strategic Planning Team

• Adjusting flight times throughout its system

to reflect actual gate-to-gate departure and

arrival times

• Providing additional service to satellite

airports around the Boston area

routing.

Ongoing.

• Northwest’s Strategic Planning Team

will continue to work with FAA to

establish procedures.

• Northwest’s flight times are adjusted

eight times each year.

• Service levels have risen at

Manchester, NH, and Portland, ME, in

the last year.

Southwest Airlines Major improvements recently completed or

under way include:

• Flying into and out of congested airports

during periods of low demand

• Adjusting flight times throughout its system

to reflect actual gate-to-gate departure and

arrival times

• Developing an in-house flight planning

system using Jeppesen data and on-line

weather information to provide flight

planning documentation to pilots

• Developing the position of air traffic

specialist for the dispatch office to interface

with the FAA Command Center

• Using less congested airports around

metropolitan areas and withdrawing from

San Francisco International Airport

• Forming the in-house Punctuality Team to

study on-time performance and find ways to

reduce delays and cancellations

• Exploring ways to use data-links to provide

more accurate, timely information to pilots

Completed.

• Schedule revisions were incorporated

into the January 2001 schedule for

the most congested airports served by

Southwest. The schedule published in

June 2001 reflected additional

revisions.

• Termination of service at San

Francisco International Airport

occurred on 3/5/01. The business

approach at Southwest is generally

designed to serve outlying airports.

• In-house flight planning system was

implemented in 1997.

• The air traffic specialist position was

filled in December 2000.

Ongoing.

• Flight times are continuously

reviewed, and revisions are

incorporated into published

schedules.

• Recommendations from Southwest’s

Punctuality Team will be submitted on

a periodic basis.

• Studies of data-link use are still in

progress.

United Airlines and

Atlantic Coast Airlines (United Express)

Major improvements recently completed or

under way include:

• Assigning (isolating) aircraft between

specific city-pairs to minimize the impact of

delays at a single airport on other routes in

the system

• Revising ramp parking assignments for

regional aircraft at Dulles International

Airport to reduce taxi times

• Adjusting flight times throughout its system

to reflect actual gate-to-gate departure and

arrival times

• Using Digital Display Taxi Clearance

(DDTC) at Dulles to digitally provide taxi

times and routes to the cockpit

• Attempting to reintroduce Land-and-HoldShort Operations (LAHSO) at O’Hare to

increase runway capacity

Completed.

• Aircraft have been isolated in a limited

number of markets.

• The strategic parking plan at Dulles

has been implemented, reducing taxi

times for regional aircraft by up to 50

percent.

Ongoing.

• Flight times are continuously

reviewed, and revisions are

incorporated into published

schedules.

• The experience with DDTC was

successful; attempts are under way to

get similar systems installed at other

locations.

• United is working with FAA, NATCA,

and the Air Line Pilots Association to
Appendix II: Initiatives by DOT, FAA, and

Selected Airlines and Airports to Address

Flight Delays

Page 43 GAO-02-185 Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed

Initiative sponsor and description Objective Status

agree on the use of LAHSO at

O’Hare.

US Airways Major improvements recently completed or

under way include:

• Isolating aircraft routes that pass through

Philadelphia and La Guardia to isolate

systemwide delays

• Developing a “slot-swapping” model to

reduce specific flight and overall system

delays

• Deploying surface movement technology at

congested airports to reduce ground

congestion and taxi times.

• Increasing the number of available backup

aircraft from 11 to 16

• Redesigning the schedule structure and

reducing service at its Philadelphia hub to

match departure and arrival activity to the

capacity of the airport

• Adjusting flight times throughout its system

to reflect actual gate-to-gate departures and

arrivals

• Developing aloft technology for dispatchers

to revise the flight plans of flights that are

already en route

• Obtaining larger Airbus A-321 aircraft to

reduce frequency in selected markets

• Working with FAA, airport managers, and

ATC personnel to implement new

technology to enable dual landings on

parallel runways during poor weather

conditions

• Pursuing initiatives with FAA regarding air

traffic and airspace management

• Implementing 21 additional initiatives to

improve schedule reliability, including

severe weather recovery plans, aircraft use

improvements, crew scheduling, navigation

capabilities, and other technological

investments

Completed.

• Philadelphia and La Guardia aircraft

are isolated to the extent possible.

• An improved slot-swapping system

was implemented to enable US

Airways’ air traffic manager to make

decisions more quickly.

• The surface movement advisor

technology has been installed at

Philadelphia.

• Additional backup aircraft were added

in August 2000.

• Changes to the Philadelphia schedule

structure were implemented in June

2001.

Ongoing.

• Flight times are reviewed

continuously, and revisions are

incorporated into published

schedules.

• Aloft technology capability is planned

for implementation in 2002.

• The first A-321 aircraft began service

in February 2001, with more deliveries

planned through the end of the year.

• Philadelphia’s precision runway

monitor is installed and certified, but is

not in operation. Work for similar

technology at the Pittsburgh and

Charlotte hubs is ongoing.

• US Airways is in the process of

implementing 21 additional initiatives

to improve schedule reliability; it

continues to work with FAA on air

traffic and airspace management.

Increasing airport physical capacity

Atlanta Hartsfield International Airport Major improvements recently completed or

under way include:

• Reconstructing runway 9R-27L

• Constructing and expanding taxiways

• Upgrading runway and taxiway

intersections to facilitate movement of long

wheelbase aircraft

• Installing an Interference Monitoring and

Direction Finding System to reduce radio

frequency interference

• Constructing a new fifth runway

Completed.

• Runway reconstruction was

completed in 1999.

Ongoing.

• Taxiway N5 and angled exit taxiway

M14 are scheduled for completion in

2002; runway 8R taxiway will be

completed and taxiway L will be

extended in 2003.

• Intersection upgrades scheduled for

completion in 2002.

• The interference monitoring system

will be active in 2002.
Appendix II: Initiatives by DOT, FAA, and

Selected Airlines and Airports to Address

Flight Delays

Page 44 GAO-02-185 Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed

Initiative sponsor and description Objective Status

• EIS for the new runway was issued in

September 2001; it is scheduled for

completion in 2005.

Boston Logan International Airport Major improvements recently completed or

under way include:

• Adding a second ground control station to

aid controllers

• Implementing a new gate-leasing policy—

airlines must “use or lose”

• Constructing a new 5,000-foot runway for

turboprops

• Promoting the use of regional airports to

reduce flight demand at Logan

• Adding a centerfield taxiway

Completed.

• The ground control station is currently

operational on an as- needed basis.

• The “use or lose” policy is in effect for

US Airways, American, Delta, and

United.

Ongoing.

• The new runway and centerfield

taxiway are undergoing environmental

review.

• Efforts to promote regional airports

began approximately 4 years ago;

Massachusetts is spending $500,000

in 2001 for a public marketing

campaign.

Chicago O’Hare International Airport Major improvements recently completed or

under way include:

• Initiating the World Gateway Program,

which includes construction of 2 new

terminals, the reconstruction of 2

concourses (adding 20 to 30 gates), and

the extension and reconfiguration of

taxiways

• Undertaking the Chicago Airport System

Strategic Capacity Initiative to share costs

with FAA for installation of navigation aids

and surface movement management

systems.

Ongoing.

• The World Gateway Program is

currently under environmental review

and is scheduled for completion in

2008.

• The technology initiative is under FAA

review; equipment installation is

expected to be completed in 2006.

Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport Major improvements recently completed or

under way include:

• Using an ongoing capacity enhancement

design team to develop capacity-enhancing

options

• Employing new navigation and

communication technologies to shorten

flight times

• Removing runway restrictions to allow

greater use of regional jets

• Constructing a new runway

Ongoing.

• The capacity enhancement team

meets monthly.

• New navigation and communications

technologies are being installed and

tested.

• Removal of runway restrictions is

under environmental review.

• The design layout for the new runway

is being reviewed.

John F. Kennedy International Airport

(New York)

Major improvements recently completed or

under way include:

• Studying jet blasts to more precisely

determine the minimum intervals between

aircraft departures and arrivals

• Constructing an “air train” between JFK

Airport and Manhattan/Long Island that will

relieve congestion at La Guardia

• Upgrading a runway to category II/III

• Improving the southwest quadrant taxiway

• Installing a new precision runway monitor

(PRM) to increase landing efficiency

Completed.

• The jet blast study has been

completed and separations have been

reduced.

Ongoing.

• The “air train” will connect with the

N.Y. subway system and commuter

rail by 2002 and make a second

connection by 2003.

• The runway upgrade is in design

testing.

• Taxiway improvements are under
Appendix II: Initiatives by DOT, FAA, and

Selected Airlines and Airports to Address

Flight Delays

Page 45 GAO-02-185 Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed

Initiative sponsor and description Objective Status

• Obtaining Port Authority funding of the

ITWS

• Creating an ongoing capacity enhancement

task force

• Working with FAA to redesign airspace over

New York to reduce operating restrictions

and conflicts with other area airports

design.

• Construction of the PRM began in

June 2001 and is scheduled for

commissioning in mid-2002.

• The Port Authority is currently funding

a prototype ITWS while FAA develops

a production system that is planned

for installation in 2002.

• The task force meets quarterly.

• The airspace redesign is planned for

completion by 2007.

La Guardia International Airport

(New York)

Major improvements recently completed or

under way include:

• Collaborating with FAA to implement a “slot

lottery”

• Strengthening the runway deck to

accommodate larger aircraft

• Removing obstacles to the runway to

increase aircraft weight restrictions and

increase passenger capacity

• Obtaining Port Authority funding for the

ITWS

• Using an ongoing capacity enhancement

task force

• Working with FAA to redesign airspace over

New York to reduce operating restrictions

and conflicts with other area airports

Completed.

• The slot lottery became effective on

1/31/01.

• Deck strengthening has been recently

completed.

• A major obstacle was recently

removed.

Ongoing.

• The Port Authority is currently funding

a prototype ITWS while FAA develops

a production system that is planned

for installation in 2002.

• The task force meets quarterly.

• The airspace redesign is planned for

completion by 2007.

Lambert-St. Louis International Airport Major improvements recently completed or

under way include:

• Adding two high-speed exits for the north

parallel runway

• Building a new terminal with12 new gates

• Installing a PRM to enable the use of two

runways during bad weather conditions

• Installing a converging runway display aid

to assist controllers during the worst

weather conditions

• Building a new, third parallel runway

• Maintaining control of gates at the new

terminal to ensure maximum flexibility

Completed.

• The high-speed exits were added in

1999.

• The new terminal opened in 1998.

• The PRM was installed in 1999.

• The converging runway display aid is

operational.

Ongoing.

• The new runway should be completed

in 2005.

• The airport is maintaining control of

the gates as they are added.

Las Vegas McCarran International Airport Major improvements recently completed or

under way include:

• Relocating the threshold on one runway to

eliminate crossing of the airport’s two

runways.

• Adding 10 more gates.

• Adding an infield taxiway to improve

movements to the north and south

Ongoing.

• FAA has approved the relocation of

the threshold and is now working with

the Air Transport Association to obtain

concurrence from the airlines.

• The additional 10 gates will be

operational in 2004.

• The taxiway addition is being

designed and has an estimated

completion date of late 2003.

Los Angeles International Airport Major improvements recently completed or

under way include:

• Developing a new airport master plan with

the preferred option to increase runway

Ongoing.

• The preliminary EIS was released in

January 2001 and was out for public

comment from 1/18/01 through
Appendix II: Initiatives by DOT, FAA, and

Selected Airlines and Airports to Address

Flight Delays

Page 46 GAO-02-185 Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed

Initiative sponsor and description Objective Status

separation

• Adding 50 to 75 gates

• Encouraging the use of the nearby Ontario

Airport to reduce congestion at Los Angeles

International Airport

7/26/01. The project is to be

completed by 2015.

• The master plan for Los Angeles

International Airport and the EIS plan

are being revised to reflect the

addition of gates.

• To encourage the use of Ontario

Airport, Los Angeles International

Airport is supporting an application by

United Parcel Service for freight

service from Ontario to China.

Miami International Airport Major improvements recently completed or

under way include:

• Adding a new 8,600-foot runway

• Replacing the spoke-shaped concourse

with a linear terminal to ease ground

movements to gates and adding 32 to 33

commuter gates

• Constructing a new international concourse

with 14 gates

• Reconfiguring the north/south taxiway to

create a midfield hold pad to add more hold

space and ease ground congestion

Ongoing.

• The runway has received its

environmental approvals, and its

design is complete. Scheduled

completion date is mid-to-late 2002.

• The new linear terminal is scheduled

for completion in 2006.

• The design for the international

concourse is scheduled for

completion by 2007.

• The hold pad should be completed in

2003.

Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport Major improvements recently completed or

under way include:

• Building a new runway

• Building a new terminal with up to 16 new

gates and expanding an existing terminal to

add 12 to 13 mainline gates and 29 regional

jet gates

• Maintaining control of the gates at the new

terminal to ensure maximum flexibility

• Reconfiguring taxiways to avoid runway

crossings

• Improving deicing pads to allow

simultaneous deicing of up to six aircraft at

the ends of the runways

Ongoing.

• The new runway should be completed

in December 2003.

• The new terminal was opened in May

2001, and the existing terminal

expansion should be completed in

2002.

• The airport is maintaining control of

gates at the new terminal as they are

built.

• The taxiway reconfiguration should be

completed in December 2003.

• The deicing pads should be

completed in December 2003.

Newark International Airport Major improvements recently completed or

under way include:

• Extending a runway

• Constructing a new ATC tower

• Removing runway obstacles to allow the

increased use of the crosswind runway

• Introducing new approach procedures

• Obtaining Port Authority funding for ITWS

• Establishing an ongoing capacity

enhancement task force

• Working with FAA to redesign airspace over

New York to reduce operating restrictions

and conflicts with other area airports

Completed.

• The runway extension was completed

in 1999.

Ongoing.

• A new tower is under construction by

FAA.

• Proceedings to remove the obstacles

are under way.

• New approach procedures are under

development.

• The Port Authority is funding a

prototype ITWS while FAA develops a

production system that is planned for

installation in 2002.

• The task force meets quarterly.

• The airspace redesign is planned for

completion by 2007.
Appendix II: Initiatives by DOT, FAA, and

Selected Airlines and Airports to Address

Flight Delays

Page 47 GAO-02-185 Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed

Initiative sponsor and description Objective Status

Philadelphia International Airport Major improvements recently completed or

under way include:

• Constructing a new 5,000-foot runway for

commuter and GA aircraft

• Adding a new visual approach to runway

27L to increase the number of aircraft able

to land

• Installing a PRM system

• Adding a new deicing pad capable of

deicing seven aircraft simultaneously

• Constructing 2 new terminal buildings—an

international terminal that will add 12

widebody gates and a commuter terminal

that will add 38 gates; an expansion to a

third concourse will add 4 more gates

• Construction of two new ramp control

towers

• Participating with an ongoing capacity

enhancement task force

• Collaborating with FAA on airspace

redesign

Completed.

• The new runway became operational

in December 1999.

• The visual approach was first used in

1999.

Ongoing.

• The PRM is installed and certification

is expected by the end of 2001.

• The deicing pad will be completed in

late 2001.

• The international terminal should be

completed in early 2002, and the

commuter terminal was completed in

June 2001. Four additional gates on

concourse D will be completed in late

December 2001 or early 2002.

• The first ramp control tower was

completed in July 2001, and the

second should be operational by the

end of 2001.

• The capacity task force meets every 3

months.

• The airspace redesign group meets

approximately every 2 months, and

the redesign of airspace is scheduled

to be completed in about 5 years.

Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport Major improvements recently completed or

under way include:

• Adding a new 7,800-foot runway

• Reconstructing and extending two major

runways

• Widening and adding taxiways

• Adding concourses and gates in existing

and new terminals

• Eliminating hangars for GA aircraft and

offering GA hangars at nearby reliever

airports on a priority basis

• Constructing a new combined Terminal

Radar Approach Control (TRACON) facility

and tower to allow installation of a PRM

system and the Standard Terminal

Automation Replacement System

• Relocating GA fixed based operators to the

south side of the airport

• Increasing the number of instrument

landing systems (ILS)

Completed.

• The new runway became operational

in October 2000.

Ongoing.

• Runway reconstruction will be

completed by 2002.

• Taxiway improvements will be

completed by 2002.

• The new terminal will be completed in

2008.

• Most GA hangars were removed in

June 2000; the remaining hangars

should be removed as replacement

space becomes available.

• The tower and TRACON projects are

under discussion with FAA.

• Relocation of fixed based operators’

facilities is scheduled for completion

in 2002.

• The remaining ILS is to be added with

runway reconstruction.

Greater Pittsburgh International Airport Major improvements recently completed or

under way include:

• Adding a centerline, touchdown zone, and

guard lights to a crosswind runway to

reduce aircraft separation

• Improving taxiway lighting

• Rebuilding and rehabilitating taxiways to

Completed.

• The runway lighting was completed in

2001.

• The taxiway lighting improvements

were completed in 2001.

Ongoing.

• Taxiway E is being planned and will
Appendix II: Initiatives by DOT, FAA, and

Selected Airlines and Airports to Address

Flight Delays

Page 48 GAO-02-185 Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed

Initiative sponsor and description Objective Status

reduce hold short and deicing delays

• Adding a fourth runway

be completed in 2002. Taxiways F

and P were completed in 2001.

Taxiway Y was completed in summer

2000.

• The new runway is in the early

planning stage.

San Diego International Airport Major improvements recently completed or

under way include:

• Lengthening the main taxiway

• Constructing a new concourse with 10

additional gates

Ongoing.

• The taxiway will be completed in

2002.

• The new concourse is undergoing

environmental review and is

scheduled for completion by 2005.

San Francisco International Airport Major improvements recently completed or

under way include:

• Concluding a voluntary agreement with

United Airlines to refine its flight schedule

• Introducing a PRM and a simultaneous

offset instrument approach (SOIA)

• Realigning a runway to provide full capacity

operations in all weather conditions

Completed.

• The refined schedule with United

Airlines was implemented in

November 2000.

Ongoing.

• Installation of the PRM and the SOIA

is under way.

• The runway reconfiguration is

undergoing environmental analysis.

Seattle-Tacoma International Airport Major improvements recently completed or

under way include:

• Constructing an additional runway

• Replacing an old concourse and adding

seven gates

Ongoing.

• The runway is undergoing

environmental review and

construction is scheduled for

completion in 2006.

• The new concourse is scheduled for

completion by 2003.

Miscellaneous initiatives with indirect impact – Federal Aviation Administration

Challenger Session 2000 This November 2000 seminar brought

together aviation community participants to

exchange views on approaches to reduce

flight delays.

Completed.

A transcript of the seminar proceedings

was prepared and made available on the

Internet.

Miscellaneous initiatives with indirect impact – Department of Transportation

“Best practices” for improving the air

travel experience

The Office of the Secretary of Transportation

(OST) initiated this project to identify (1) the

“best practices” used by airlines and airports

to improve consumer access to flight

information and (2) the services that minimize

the adverse effects of flight delays and

cancellations on consumers.

Completed.

A report on best practices was released

in October 2000.

Recommendations of the Air Carrier OnTime Reporting Advisory CommitteeDOT initiated this committee to address

requirements in AIR-21 that the Department

take steps to consider changes to current ontime reporting by airlines (14 CFR part 234) to

provide clear information to the public about

the nature and the sources of flight delays and

cancellations.

Completed.

The initial recommendation was sent to

the Secretary on 11/29/00. In

accordance with the recommendations

of the task force, OST and FAA staff are

now informally working with the industry

to test the reporting of categories of

sources of delays and cancellations.

Ultimately, a rulemaking will be required

to implement AIR-21’s requirement to

modify part 234 to include the nature and
Appendix II: Initiatives by DOT, FAA, and

Selected Airlines and Airports to Address

Flight Delays

Page 49 GAO-02-185 Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed

Initiative sponsor and description Objective Status

sources of flight delays and

cancellations.

Plane Talk fact sheet This document provides consumers with

information to help them reduce their chances

of encountering flight delays and assist them

in coping with delays.

Completed.

This document was issued on 11/2/00

and is available on the Internet and in

hard copy. It is the latest in a series of

fact sheets for air travelers, which are

issued by DOT’s Aviation Consumer

Protection Division.

Enhanced information regarding carrier

rankings in terms of flight delays,

cancellations, and consumer complaints

in connection with DOT’s monthly Air

Travel Consumer Report

This monthly report provides consumers with

information to make a more informed choice

when making a flight reservation.

Completed.

This information is now provided in

DOT’s monthly Air Travel Consumer

Report available on the Internet.

a

“Free flight” is defined as a safe and efficient operating capability under instrument flight rules in

which the pilots have the freedom to select their flight path and speed. Air traffic restrictions are only

imposed to ensure separation between planes, keep an airplane from exceeding an airport’s capacity,

prevent unauthorized flight through special use airspace, and ensure flight safety. Restrictions to

correct the identified problem are limited in extent and duration. Any activity that removes restrictions

represents a move toward free flight.

b

Free Flight Phase 1 (FFP1) provides for the limited deployment of five initial core capabilities—User

Request Evaluation Tool, traffic management advisor, passive Final Approach Spacing Tool,

collaborative decisionmaking, and surface movement advisor—to manage risk while incrementally

providing early benefits to users. FFP1 is chartered to implement capabilities that provide early,

measurable benefits to the aviation community and provide a vital impetus to the agency’s use of free

flight.

c

ADS-B uses satellite navigation to enable aircraft to broadcast such information as identification,

position, altitude, velocity, and intent. This broadcast information may be received and processed by

other aircraft or ground systems via data-links to improve situational awareness, the ability to avoid

conflicts, surveillance, and management of air and ground traffic.

Source: GAO analysis of agency, airline, and airport data.
Appendix III: Description of Delay-Reducing

Measures Not Included in FAA’s Operational

Evolution Plan

Page 50 GAO-02-185 Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed

Presented below are additional details about each of the seven measures

listed in table 5 of this report. Also shown is additional information from

previous studies that have examined—and in some cases advocated—one

or more of these measures.

This measure, which involves adding new airports in metropolitan areas to

augment existing congested airports, has the potential to profoundly

impact the capacity of the entire system, according to past studies. These

studies say that building new airports in congested metropolitan areas

holds perhaps the greatest promise for providing the capacity needed to

meet rapid passenger growth. Also, multiple airports in certain areas, like

those that exist in New York and the greater Los Angeles area, each have

their own full-service patterns and can offer passengers convenience and

improved accessibility. However, past studies were not optimistic about

the probability that many new airports will materialize, given a number of

formidable barriers, which include (1) finding a suitable site that does not

conflict with other potential uses of the land, (2) overcoming concerns

about noise and other environmental problems in sensitive areas, (3)

providing adequate landside access (e.g., roads), (4) justifying the large

investment required to build a new facility, and (5) gaining the support and

financial backing from incumbent airlines.

Several past studies have discussed the development of a new type of

airport, called “wayports,” which differ from conventional airports in that

they are further removed from large metropolitan areas and serve a special

purpose. Under the wayport concept, such airports would be developed—

either by using existing underused regional airports and former military

bases or by building new airports—to supplement the current capacity

needs of congested or capacity-constrained major hubs. Wayports are

envisioned to be potentially large facilities—located on the fringe of or

away from large metropolitan areas and near smaller cities (100,000 to

200,000 population)—that would serve mainly as transfer points for longdistance air travel routes. Except for nonstop service from one city to

another (called “city pairs”), all flights would connect at these points to

accomplish passenger transfer. As envisioned, service between these

transfer points could be supplied either by large aircraft or by

Appendix III: Description of Delay-Reducing

Measures Not Included in FAA’s Operational

Evolution Plan

Category 1: Adding

Airport Infrastructure

Measure 1: Add New

Airports in Metropolitan

Areas With High Traffic

Volume

Measure 2: Develop a New

Type of Airport to Serve as

Transfer Points
Appendix III: Description of Delay-Reducing

Measures Not Included in FAA’s Operational

Evolution Plan

Page 51 GAO-02-185 Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed

conventional aircraft operating on a high-frequency schedule. Connection

between wayports and major cities in the region could be provided by

short-haul aircraft or high-speed ground transportation, such as rail or

highway. Wayports would be regional multimodal transportation hubs

offering connections to surrounding cities by whatever means of transport

that would be cost-effective. They would also serve as cargo and mail

handling centers.

Building wayports may not face the degree of opposition that building new

airports would—especially from local communities—because wayports

would be further away from large urban centers. Also, some studies have

suggested that wayports would be less costly than comparable airports

built in major metropolitan areas, could provide more open competition

among airlines, and would likely result in less airspace congestion because

of their location further away from congested metropolitan areas.

However, the wayport concept has never been tried and gaining

acceptance from airlines, sponsoring authorities, and affected

communities might prove difficult.

This measure involves the creation of more regional airports at underused

airports located about 50 miles from congested metropolitan airports.

Many such underused facilities already exist throughout the nation. These

regional airports could be used in two scenarios. Under one scenario, the

regional airports would be similar to wayports, except on a smaller scale.

They would be used mainly for transfer passengers, particularly at large,

congested hubs that have a large percentage of transfer passengers. Under

the second scenario, a network of regional airports located around a major

congested hub would take origin and destination passengers diverted from

the large hub. The regional airports around Boston Logan Airport are an

example. The Massachusetts Port Authority (MASSPORT), which operates

Logan, is working with state aviation directors and transportation agencies

to make more efficient use of regional airports around Logan, including

Manchester (New Hampshire), Worcester (Massachusetts), and T.F. Green

(Providence, Rhode Island), to steer millions of new origin and destination

passengers to these airports by 2010. All of these regional airports are

within an hour’s drive of Logan. Mid-America Airport near St. Louis is

another example of a potential candidate for a regional airport for St.

Louis-Lambert Field—a major hub for American Airlines. Located just 24

miles from downtown St. Louis, Mid-America is a joint-use civilian and

military facility colocated with Scott Air Force Base. It has two, wellspaced runways over 8,000 feet long; it has substantial excess capacity.

Measure 3: Develop

Regional Airports That Are

Underused
Appendix III: Description of Delay-Reducing

Measures Not Included in FAA’s Operational

Evolution Plan

Page 52 GAO-02-185 Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed

Regardless of which scenario is used, the implementation of this measure

could provide needed system capacity and accommodate some of the

growth in air travel over the short term without adding significantly to the

congestion and delay now experienced at the busiest metropolitan

airports, according to past studies. Also, the cost to upgrade and expand

the existing facilities would likely be less than new airports and possibly

somewhat less than wayports. To the extent that regional airports were

located in less densely populated areas, concerns with noise and

conflicting land use may be less than at large metropolitan airports. Like

the previous two measures, however, this measure would require at least

one airline to commit to incorporating a regional airport into its long-range

hubbing service system. Similarly, the airport must secure the financial

resources necessary to develop the airport to its full capacity.

This measure relies on market forces to redistribute flight demand and

allocate existing airport resources efficiently. Past studies and current

literature suggest that the current airport access policies and the approach

for determining landing fees have created some incentives that lead to the

inefficient use of existing capacity at many congested airports. Two

policies in particular have been cited as influencing airline behavior in this

regard. The first policy deals with an aircraft’s access to airports, the

second with the fees that airports can charge for landing. By law, all

aircraft—corporate and other general aviation aircraft, cargo carriers, and

airlines—have equal landing access rights. This applies to small and large

aircraft alike. When they land, laws and regulations require that airports

charge the aircraft operators in a nondiscriminatory, reasonable basis—

generally on the landed weight of each aircraft.23 Although this fee

structure is fine for noncongested airports, it can have profound

consequences at congested ones. Some economists and industry

representatives contend that these policies allow airlines—which are

driven by competitive pressures and profit-maximizing motives—to

 23Weights of different types of aircraft are based on manufacturers’ specifications; airplanes

are not weighed upon arrival or departure from an airport. Fees are charged only for

landings; there are no takeoff fees.

Category 2: Managing

Demand

Measure 1: Adopt MarketBased Mechanisms
Appendix III: Description of Delay-Reducing

Measures Not Included in FAA’s Operational

Evolution Plan

Page 53 GAO-02-185 Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed

overschedule flights at busy airports during peak hours and use smaller

aircraft and more frequent flights to meet passenger demand. They also

contend that the current system provides little incentive for airlines or

general aviation aircraft to use other nearby airports that have underused

capacity.

Two market-based methods are most commonly mentioned to alter the

behavior of airlines and passengers at congested airports to better ensure

that existing capacity is used efficiently—differential pricing and auctions.

Adopting a differential pricing approach would mean that landing fees

would be higher at times when demand exceeded the availability of

landing slots and lower at other times. An auction approach would allow

airports to periodically auction a fixed number of takeoff and landing

slots—equal to the airport’s capacity—to the highest bidders. For

example, an airport, in conjunction with FAA, could determine its perquarter-hour takeoff and landing capacity, and a competitive bidding

process among carriers could determine fees during each period. The two

methods differ to a degree in the simplicity of implementation and the

certainty they would provide about congestion levels. Of the two,

differential pricing is the simpler to implement, but this method provides

less certainty about congestion levels. Auctioning takeoff and landing slots

provides greater certainty about congestion levels, but entails a more

complex design and may be more costly to operate.

Because of increased congestion and delays at some airports, airport

managers and FAA were seriously studying this option before September

11, 2001. For example, FAA and the New York/New Jersey Port Authority

were studying market-based and administrative solutions for use at La

Guardia to bring demand and airport capacity into alignment and reduce

delays. It was anticipated that some form of demand management

approach would be adopted there sometime next year. However, citing the

significant decrease in operations at La Guardia following the terrorist

attacks, FAA has suspended this study.

Proponents of a market-based approach cite several advantages, namely

that (1) this approach will bring about needed changes without artificial or

forced administrative or regulatory changes, (2) the costs of implementing

it are relatively modest, and (3) increased revenues derived from various

forms of congestion pricing can be used by airports to fund needed capital

development projects. Critics say this approach could increase passenger

ticket prices; reduce access for financially weaker small carriers; and

adversely affect service to small communities, which would be less likely

than large cities to retain their service to the capacity-constrained airports.
Appendix III: Description of Delay-Reducing

Measures Not Included in FAA’s Operational

Evolution Plan

Page 54 GAO-02-185 Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed

Past studies have mentioned a number of administrative and regulatory

methods to manage flight demand. These methods include maintaining or

expanding slot restrictions, adjusting airline flight schedules, diverting

smaller aircraft to reliever airports, using larger aircraft at congested

airports, and developing more flexible gate access policies. Each method

is described below.

Since 1969, four airports—La Guardia, JFK International, Washington

Reagan National, and Chicago O’Hare—have operated under a slot system,

whereby the number of flight operations is capped and takeoff and landing

rights (slots) are allocated administratively.24 Such systems are often done

through grandfathering, a lottery, or some other nonmarket mechanism.

These slots have been somewhat effective in controlling delays at these

airports. However, provisions in the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment

and Reform Act for the 21st Century (AIR-21) would eliminate the slot

system at three of these airports by 2007. At La Guardia, AIR-21 provided

immediate exemptions from the slot system for flights by new entrants

and flights serving small communities. Almost immediately, the airport

was overwhelmed with applications for over 600 new flights to and from

the airport. Because the requests far exceeded the capacity of La Guardia,

FAA in cooperation with the airport implemented a temporary lottery to

allocate a limited number of slots and requested that a study of marketbased alternatives be completed. However, due to the reduction in aircraft

operations at La Guardia following the terrorist attacks this year, FAA has

delayed this study until the long-term impact of September 11 on traffic at

La Guardia is better understood.

Researchers have concluded that slot systems can be effective in

controlling congestion at busy airports, but they also note that potentially

slot systems can pose barriers to competition and adversely affect service

to smaller communities, which are two important congressional concerns.

An alternative to using slot systems is to have airlines make voluntary

flight schedule adjustments to even out periods of peak demand. In an

attempt to reduce congestion, some airlines have recently done this on

their own in limited situations. However, they are prohibited by antitrust

provisions of current law from discussing flight schedules with other

airlines. Two bills before the Congress (H.R. 1407 and S. 633) would allow

 24Newark International Airport was among those airports chosen for slot restrictions in

1969. Newark abandoned the slot system in 1970.

Measure 2: Using

Administrative or

Regulatory Methods

Using Slot Restrictions

Adjusting Airline Flight

Schedules
Appendix III: Description of Delay-Reducing

Measures Not Included in FAA’s Operational

Evolution Plan

Page 55 GAO-02-185 Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed

air carriers to discuss voluntary flight schedule changes at congested

airports to reduce delays.25

The ability of airlines to agree on schedule adjustments to even out peaks

in air traffic at crowded airports is uncertain. Historically, critics point to

the failure of airline scheduling committees that existed for the same

purpose in the 1970s and 1980s. The committees—made up of airlines

serving the four slot-controlled airports—worked reasonably well before

deregulation in 1978, but afterwards the committees found it increasingly

difficult to agree on voluntary adjustments. Deregulation brought fierce

competition and a sizable drop in passenger fares, a corresponding growth

in passenger demand, and increased profit opportunities. This caused

airline overscheduling during congested times to satisfy passenger demand

and maximize profits. As experience has shown, voluntary flight schedule

adjustments by one airline can create slots for other airlines to add to their

schedules.

This measure would require much of the general aviation aircraft

(including corporate aircraft) and aircraft involved in air taxi service to

shift from congested airports to nearby reliever airports, which are

underused. Currently, smaller aircraft account for at least 25 percent of all

air traffic at most of the congested airports in the nation—many of which

have expensive runway projects under way. For example, general aviation

aircraft and air taxi flights at four severely capacity-constrained airports,

La Guardia, Kennedy, Philadelphia, and Boston Logan, account for about

31, 34, 41, and 46 percent of the total operations at each airport,

respectively.

Diverting smaller aircraft away from congested metropolitan airports to

reliever airports could free up capacity for use by larger commercial air

traffic. For example, congestion pricing mechanisms implemented at

Boston Logan in 1988 and the three New York airports (Kennedy, Newark,

and La Guardia) in 1968 produced sizable results. Much of the general

aviation aircraft abandoned Logan for secondary airports, and delays at

Boston Logan dropped. After a $25 premium fee was imposed for peakhour use of runways at the three New York airports, general aviation

 25S. 633 would allow only DOT to convene a meeting of the airlines to discuss schedules.

The FAA Administrator would chair the meeting and serve as an intermediary between the

airlines for any delay-reduction offers.

Diverting Smaller General

Aviation and Other Aircraft to

Reliever Airports
Appendix III: Description of Delay-Reducing

Measures Not Included in FAA’s Operational

Evolution Plan

Page 56 GAO-02-185 Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed

aircraft use dropped 30 percent.26 Adopting this kind of measure on a

nationwide basis would likely require a change in the law that requires

airports to provide equal access to all aircraft.

Through regulatory means, this measure would require airlines to fly

larger aircraft into congested airports that are currently being served with

smaller aircraft. Currently, airlines decide the size of aircraft to fly on their

routes. The average size of aircraft serving airports today is getting

progressively smaller, because airlines are using smaller aircraft and more

frequent flights to meet passenger preferences. For example, in 1999, there

were actually 10 fewer seats per aircraft, on average, than in 1993. In 2000,

at La Guardia, one of the most congested airports in America, 5 percent of

the passengers traveled on 25 percent of the planes—a reality of the

incentives to which the airlines are reacting.

Flying larger aircraft (that were full or nearly full) into congested airports

could allow airlines to accommodate more passenger growth and

potentially decrease flight frequencies, which ultimately could decrease

delays and improve the use of existing facilities at crowded airports.

However, the unilateral imposition of administrative restrictions by

airports on the size of aircraft allowed into congested airports could

violate provisions of current laws that require airports to allow equal

access to all aircraft. Implementation would likely require a change in

such statutory provisions.

This measure would require altering contractual arrangements or use

agreements between airlines and airports, which specify the air carriers’

use of the airports’ facilities. The nature and longevity of two agreements

in particular—gate leasing arrangements and majority-in-interest (MII)

clauses—can potentially result in the inefficient use of airport facilities

and may prevent the airport from undertaking capacity-enhancing capital

projects. The terms of gate leasing arrangements can be particularly

critical in ensuring the efficient use of airport capacity. By law, airports

are forbidden from denying an air carrier reasonable access to airport

facilities. However, some large commercial airports have long-term

“exclusive use” agreements with airlines for most of their gates, which

means that even if a gate is not in use, no other airline can use it without

 26These congestion pricing mechanisms at Boston Logan Airport were found to be illegal by

a federal district court because, among other things, they had a discriminatory effect on

smaller aircraft. In addition, the Department had ruled, as an outcome of an administrative

proceeding, that the landing fees at Boston Logan were illegal.

Using Larger Aircraft

Developing More Flexible Gate

Access Policies
Appendix III: Description of Delay-Reducing

Measures Not Included in FAA’s Operational

Evolution Plan

Page 57 GAO-02-185 Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed

permission from the signatory airline. According to DOT, this practice is

contrary to the legal requirement for reasonable access. By locking up all

of the gates, even if they are underused, airlines can limit capacity at

affected congested airports, and, if prevalent at a number of airports, can

effectively limit the capacity of the entire system. Restrictive practices at

exclusive use gates are becoming less prevalent also due to the passenger

facility charge (PFC) program requirement that competitive access must

be ensured at a carrier’s exclusively leased gates if that carrier uses PFCfinanced gates. Modification of MII clauses is equally important in

ensuring that future capacity can be realized. Current MII clauses give

dominant airlines at an airport “veto” power, in effect, over large capital

projects that can increase capacity.

Encouraging or even requiring airports to develop more flexible, shorter

term gate and MII agreements is a way to better ensure that existing

airport capacity is enhanced.27 However, this practice would not be doable

immediately in many cases, since use agreements between airlines and

airports are usually long-term contracts. Airports cannot unilaterally

renegotiate shorter or more flexible agreements until these long-term

agreements expire.

Unlike other measures that concentrate on enhancing capacity through

airport improvements, this category of measures would enhance airport

capacity by providing alternative transportation modes to move

passengers from one location to another.

This measure would involve developing high-speed ground transportation,

such as rail, between large metropolitan cities. A portion of a congested

airport’s capacity may be freed up by diverting some shorter distance

travel demand to high-speed ground transportation. As an alternative to air

travel, this measure would be focused mainly on high-density routes of 200

to 500 miles. DOT has designated 11 high-speed rail corridors in U.S.

locations, such as the Northeast, California, Chicago, and the Pacific

Northwest. Work is under way at several locations, most notably in the

Northeast Corridor, and, when completed, could provide viable

 27In accordance with AIR-21 and its newly required competition plans for airports, DOT has

required airports to describe how they would make exclusive use gates available to

requesting carriers and how they might modify their MII clauses so that signatory carriers

could not impede or delay competition-enhancing capital construction projects.

Category 3: Using

Ground Alternatives

Measure 1: Build HighSpeed Intercity Ground

Transportation
Appendix III: Description of Delay-Reducing

Measures Not Included in FAA’s Operational

Evolution Plan

Page 58 GAO-02-185 Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed

alternatives to air travel, thereby alleviating the pressure on the air

transport system.

High-speed trains have been used successfully in Europe and Asia and

have proven to be viable alternatives for air travel in some cases. For

example, the French Railway company recently initiated service between

Paris and Marseilles via a high-speed train; this service reduces the travel

time for the 500-mile trip from 5 to 3 hours by rail. The train is expected to

siphon off as much as one-fourth of the 2.5 million passengers who travel

by air between these cities each year. Already, one airline serving this

route has discontinued its service between the two cities due to the added

competition of the new rail service.

Although this measure has been tried successfully in Europe and Asia, its

cost-effectiveness and technical feasibility in this country have not been

demonstrated. For example, trains on Amtrak’s Metroliner service

between New York and Washington, D.C., travel up to 125 miles per hour

for portions of the trip. However, Amtrak’s estimate of the cost to fully

develop the federally designated high-speed rail corridors and the

Northeast Corridor is $50 billion to $70 billion over 20 years. Whether

ridership will be sufficient to cover this cost is unknown. In the end,

competitive rates and comparable portal-to-portal travel time would be

keys to the success of this alternative.

Another possible application of high-speed ground transportation is to

facilitate passenger movement between airports or from city centers to

new airports located on the fringe or outside of the metropolitan area. For

example, in the long term, MASSPORT plans to connect Boston Logan

International Airport to five nearby regional airports by ground

transportation, using Logan for long-haul flights and the regional airports

for short- and medium-haul flights. One study also suggested that highspeed surface transportation could help the development of wayports,

since it would provide links to major cities in the region served without

imposing a burden on the airspace and runways at the wayport. Like the

previous measure, the cost-effectiveness of such systems would have to be

demonstrated in the context of an overall regional airport system to

increase capacity.

Measure 2: Provide HighSpeed Ground

Transportation

Connections for Airports
Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff

Acknowledgments

Page 59 GAO-02-185 Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed

Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D. (202) 512-3650

Randall B. Williamson, (206) 287-4860

In addition to those named above, Karyn I. Angulo, Jonathan Bachman,

Steven N. Calvo, Jay Cherlow, JayEtta Z. Hecker, David Hooper,

Christopher M. Jones, Joseph D. Kile, Steven C. Martin, LuAnn Moy, and

Stanley G. Stenersen made significant contributions to this report.

Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff

Acknowledgments

GAO Contacts

Acknowledgments

(390001)
The General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of Congress, exists to

support Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help

improve the performance and accountability of the federal government for the

American people. GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal

programs and policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other

assistance to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding

decisions. GAO’s commitment to good government is reflected in its core values

of accountability, integrity, and reliability.

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents is through the

Internet. GAO’s Web site (www.gao.gov) contains abstracts and full-text files of

current reports and testimony and an expanding archive of older products. The

Web site features a search engine to help you locate documents using key words

and phrases. You can print these documents in their entirety, including charts and

other graphics.

Each day, GAO issues a list of newly released reports, testimony, and

correspondence. GAO posts this list, known as “Today’s Reports,” on its Web site

daily. The list contains links to the full-text document files. To have GAO E-mail

this list to you every afternoon, go to our home page and complete the easy-to-use

electronic order form found under “To Order GAO Products.”

The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 each. A

check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of Documents.

GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or more copies mailed to a

single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders should be sent to:

U.S. General Accounting Office

P.O. Box 37050

Washington, D.C. 20013

To order by phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000

TDD: (301) 413-0006

Fax: (202) 258-4066

GAO Building

Room 1100, 700 4th Street, NW (corner of 4th and G Streets, NW)

Washington, D.C. 20013

Contact:

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm,

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov, or

1-800-424-5454 (automated answering system).

Jeff Nelligan, Managing Director, NelliganJ@gao.gov (202) 512-4800

U.S. General Accounting Office, 441 G. Street NW, Room 7149,

Washington, D.C. 20548

GAO’s Mission

Obtaining Copies of

GAO Reports and

Testimony

Order by Mail or Phone

Visit GAO’s Document

Distribution Center

To Report Fraud,

Waste, and Abuse in

Federal Programs

Public Affairs