FEBRUARY 17, 2011

AUDIT REPORT

REPORT NO. IG-11-012 (ASSIGNMENT NO. A-09-011-00)

OFFICE OF AUDITS

REVIEW OF NASA’S ACQUISITION OF COMMERCIAL 

LAUNCH SERVICES 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration

 
REPORT NO. IG-11-012 

Final report released by:

Paul K. Martin

Inspector General

Acronyms 

COTS Commercial Orbital Transportation Services 

CRS Commercial Resupply Services 

DOD Department of Defense

EELV Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle 

ELV Expendable Launch Vehicle 

ESMD Exploration Systems Mission Directorate

GAO Government Accountability Office 

GLAST Gamma-ray Large Area Space Telescope

IBEX Interstellar Boundary Explorer 

ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

ICESat-II Ice, Cloud, and Land Elevation Satellite

IDIQ Indefinite-Delivery, Indefinite-Quantity

ISS International Space Station 

LADEE Lunar Atmosphere and Dust Environment Explorer 

LCROSS Lunar Crater Observation and Sensing Satellite

LRO Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter

LSP Launch Services Program 

NLS NASA Launch Services 

OCO Orbiting Carbon Observatory 

OIG Office of Inspector General

PPBE Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution 

SMAP Soil Moisture Active Passive 

SMD Science Mission Directorate 

SOMD Space Operations Mission Directorate 

ULA United Launch Alliance 
FEBRUARY 17, 2011

REPORT NO. IG-11-012 

OVERVIEW

REVIEW OF NASA’S ACQUISITION OF COMMERCIAL 

LAUNCH SERVICES 

The Issue

Commercial U.S. launch services providers compete domestically and internationally for 

contracts to carry satellites and other payloads into orbit using unmanned, single-use 

vehicles known as expendable launch vehicles (ELVs). However, since the late 1990s the 

global commercial launch market has generally declined following the downturn in the 

telecommunications services industry, which was the primary customer of the 

commercial space industry. Given this trend, U.S. launch services providers struggling to 

remain economically viable have been bolstered by the Commercial Space Act of 1998 

(Public Law 105-303), which requires NASA and other Federal agencies to plan missions 

and procure space transportation services from U.S. commercial providers to the 

maximum extent practicable. 

In particular, the U.S. market for medium-class launch vehicles, which are suited for 

many NASA science missions, has suffered from lack of demand and foreign 

competition.1

 New launch vehicles in this class are currently under development as part 

of NASA’s Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) Program, and NASA 

hopes to use these vehicles to resupply the International Space Station (ISS) on a 

commercially competitive basis. Although one such vehicle, Space Exploration 

Technologies Corporation’s (SpaceX) Falcon 9, had successful test flights in June 2010 

and December 2010, neither it nor any of the other vehicles currently under development 

are likely to be ready to launch NASA’s science missions until late 2013 or early 2014. 

Consequently, until that time NASA faces limited domestic availability of medium-class 

launch vehicles for its science missions, a situation exacerbated by the Department of 

Defense’s (DOD) decision to stop using the Delta II – the medium-class vehicle that has 

been NASA’s launch vehicle of choice for nearly 60 percent of its science missions over 

the last decade. Moreover, without orders from DOD there is not enough demand for

medium-class launch vehicles to sustain most domestic launch services providers. 

For the past decade, NASA’s Launch Services Program (LSP) Office has acquired 

commercial launch services using firm-fixed-price indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity 

(IDIQ) contracts under an overarching NASA Launch Services (NLS) contract initially 

awarded in June 2000 that expired on June 30, 2010. Pursuant to these contracts, 

 

1 Medium-class missions are typically satellite payloads between 1,500 and 3,200 kilograms (3,300 to 7,040 

pounds), respectively, launched to a 675-kilometer (approximately 405 miles) orbit around the Earth.
OVERVIEW

ii REPORT NO. IG-11-012 

U.S. service providers integrate, test, and launch NASA and NASA-sponsored payloads 

into orbit. Using these NLS contracts, NASA has launched science missions such as 

Kepler and the Gamma-ray Large Area Space Telescope (GLAST). Kepler is a NASA 

mission designed to survey the Milky Way Galaxy to detect and characterize Earth-size 

and smaller planets. GLAST, now known as Fermi, is a powerful space observatory that 

will explore some of the most extreme environments in the universe. 

The objective of our audit was to evaluate whether NASA’s LSP, through its 

implementation of NLS contracts, acquired ELVs within costs and timeframes established

by the contracts. We also evaluated whether NASA’s acquisition strategy for post-2010 

ELV procurements as set forth in an August 2009 report to Congress is cost-effective and 

the most advantageous to the Government. Details of the audit’s scope and methodology 

are in Appendix A. 

Results 

We found that NASA’s LSP acquired ELVs from 2008 through 2009 that were within 

costs and timeframes established by the NLS contracts. However, we also found that 

NASA’s published strategy for acquiring medium-class launch vehicles after 2010 may 

not be the most cost-effective or advantageous to the Government because it did not 

include as a possible option use of Minotaur, a launch vehicle that uses a U.S. 

Government-furnished rocket motor from decommissioned intercontinental ballistic 

missiles. 

Our analysis shows that use of the Minotaur for certain NASA science missions offers 

significant savings when compared to the available commercially provided intermediateclass launch vehicles cited in NASA’s report to Congress.2,3 Moreover, it also would be 

less expensive than SpaceX’s Falcon 9, which is still under development and not yet 

certified to carry NASA science missions. For example, if NASA used the Minotaur 

rather than Falcon 9 or the intermediate-class Atlas V for the Soil Moisture Active 

Passive (SMAP) mission scheduled for launch in November 2014, the Agency could save 

between $61 million and $156 million (see Appendix B).4

 

In response to this finding, NASA stated that use of the Minotaur for some of its science 

missions could have a negative impact on the domestic commercial rocket industry 

because it might discourage companies from entering the launch services market. 

However, as discussed above it is unlikely that reliable and competitively priced mediumclass launch vehicles will be available in time for the SMAP mission. Accordingly, while 

 

2 Intermediate-class launch vehicles can carry payloads weighing more than 3,500 kilograms 

(7,700 pounds).

3 “Strategy for Small- and Medium-Class Launch Services,” August 2009 (see Appendix C).

4 We based the estimated cost savings on the difference between the projected cost of a Minotaur IV, a 

Falcon 9, and an Atlas V ordered in 2012. 
OVERVIEW

REPORT NO. IG-11-012 iii

we appreciate the legal and policy reasons for promoting commercial launch providers, 

we believe that NASA should consider using the Minotaur as a launch vehicle for 

appropriate science missions until cost-effective and reliable commercial launch services 

are available. 

Launch Services Provided within Costs and Timeframes under the 2000–2010 

Contract 

Based on our review of 5 out of 21 missions under the NLS contracts, we determined that 

the LSP acquired ELVs that were within established budget and negotiated contract 

costs.5 Specifically, for the five missions in our sample that launched from June 2008 

through June 2009, we compared the actual launch services costs with total mission costs

and found that the total launch services costs were approximately 19 percent of total 

mission costs.

6

 In addition, we found that the LSP’s negotiated costs averaged 3 percent 

below what had been obligated by NASA.7

 

We also found that the LSP provided launch vehicles within the timeframes established 

by the contract. Specifically, for the five missions in our sample we compared the 

planned launch dates with actual launch dates and found that although all five missions 

experienced delays, these delays were related to technical issues with the project, not the 

acquisition or readiness of the launch vehicles.

NASA’s Published Acquisition Strategy for Launch Vehicles Did Not Include the 

Use of Minotaur for Medium-Class Launches 

In accordance with Section 621 of the NASA Authorization Act of 2008, NASA 

developed and submitted a report to Congress setting forth its acquisition strategy for 

providing domestic commercial launch services to support small- and medium-class 

missions of NASA’s Exploration Systems, Science, and Space Operations Mission 

Directorates (see Appendix C).8 The strategy involved extending the ordering period for 

existing NLS contracts from June 2010 through June 2020 to allow current launch 

services providers to offer launch vehicles that were not available at the time the initial 

contract was awarded and new launch services providers an opportunity to compete for 

 

5 See Appendix A for details of our sample.

6 Includes basic launch services (standard launch vehicle hardware, range coordination, etc.), missionunique services (requirements necessary to customize the basic vehicle to meet spacecraft and mission 

needs), integrated services (launch vehicle and payload processing, range safety, engineering and 

institutional support, and launch pad support), telemetry, and other costs such as pad infrastructure. 

7 This audit examined the LSP’s implementation of the NLS contract and did not evaluate the 

reasonableness of contract prices or how those contracts were procured. The Boeing Company reached a 

settlement in June 2006 to resolve criminal and civil allegations that the company improperly used 

competitor’s information to procure contracts for launch services from the Air Force and NASA, as well 

as unrelated allegations concerning Boeing’s relationship with an Air Force employee. As part of the 

settlement, Boeing agreed to pay $615 million, $106.7 million of which went to NASA. 

8 NASA’s “Strategy for Small- and Medium-Class Launch Services,” August 2009.
OVERVIEW

iv REPORT NO. IG-11-012 

future launch services contracts. NASA also plans to monitor development efforts of 

Orbital Sciences Corporation (Orbital) and SpaceX, the two commercial partners selected 

as part of the Agency’s COTS Program, to develop a new cargo transport capability to 

resupply the ISS after retirement of the Space Shuttle. Although NASA listed the 

Minotaur as a possible option to launch small-class science missions, the acquisition 

strategy laid out in the report to Congress did not discuss the Minotaur as a possible 

launch vehicle for NASA’s medium-class science missions. However, after the Office of 

Inspector General (OIG) provided NASA a draft copy of this report, the Agency informed 

us that “consistent with law and policy” it would consider using the Minotaur for 

medium-class missions. 

NASA’s published acquisition strategy assumes that in the next 4 years commercial 

companies will develop affordable medium-class launch vehicles under the COTS 

Program. Moreover, NASA anticipates that spreading fixed costs over a larger number of 

resupply flights for the ISS will result in competitively priced medium-class launch 

vehicles. Although launch vehicles developed for ISS resupply missions may indeed be 

feasible options for science missions requiring medium-class launch vehicles, none of 

these vehicles has yet been certified and there is a significant risk that delays and 

technical issues will arise during the certification process that will prevent their 

certification in time for the SMAP mission currently scheduled for 2014. 

The competitive award process for a mission’s launch vehicle typically results in a 

selection 30 months before a mission’s scheduled launch date. If commercial companies 

are unable to timely provide vehicles that meet NASA’s medium-class launch 

requirements, the Agency’s plan calls for choosing between two United Launch Alliance 

(ULA) vehicles: the medium-class Delta II and the intermediate-class Atlas V.9

 

However, there are significant issues with each of these options. 

First, the Delta II may not be available for NASA missions after 2011 because the Air 

Force has stopped using the vehicle in favor of larger intermediate-class launch vehicles 

such as the Atlas V that provide greater lift capability. Consequently, many of the 

components for the standard configuration Delta II are no longer being produced. 

According to NASA officials, restarting the Delta II production line to service NASA’s 

needs would be cost prohibitive. 

Second, the remaining unsold Delta IIs in ULA’s inventory are “7920 heavy” 

configuration models that can only be launched from Space Launch Complex 17B at 

Cape Canaveral Air Force Station in Florida. However, in order to reach polar orbit 

NASA launches most of its Earth science missions at the Western Test Range at 

Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. Heavy configuration Delta IIs could not be 

launched from this location without costly modifications to the launch pad infrastructure 

at Vandenberg. 

 

9 In December 2006, Boeing and Lockheed Martin Corporation combined their ELV businesses to form 

United Launch Alliance as a joint venture. 
OVERVIEW

REPORT NO. IG-11-012 v 

Third, if NASA uses the intermediate-class Atlas V instead of a medium-class launch 

vehicle, the Agency estimates that its costs will increase by an additional $100 million to 

$300 million per launch.

10 

In sum, the loss of the Delta II as a viable launch option means that NASA may be more 

likely to rely on intermediate-class launch vehicles like the Atlas V to meet its mediumclass launch requirements until Orbital, SpaceX, or another commercial entity produces a 

more cost-effective medium-class launch vehicle. Our analysis of NASA’s future 

medium-class launch manifest and launch vehicle options shows that using Minotaur 

launch vehicles would be significantly less expensive than using either an Atlas V or even 

SpaceX’s yet-to-be certified Falcon 9 and could provide a viable interim solution for 

several of NASA’s medium-class science missions planned from 2010 through 2020.11,12 

As previously noted, although new medium-class launch vehicles are in development 

from commercial providers, NASA LSP officials anticipate the earliest these vehicles 

could complete the required NASA certification is between late 2013 and early 2014. 

LSP officials told the OIG that a launch provider can be awarded a launch service task 

order before certification of its vehicle. Currently, the Falcon 9 is the only medium-class 

launch vehicle included in the NLS II contract, and the Falcon 9 flew its first two 

successful test flights in June and December 2010.13 However, if NASA selected the 

Falcon 9 for the SMAP mission prior to certification, the Agency would need to accept a 

significantly higher degree of risk and determine how to address potential cost increases 

and schedule delays that could result if technical issues were identified during the 

certification process. These potential cost increases are not included in the SMAP 

mission budget and if they materialized could affect the funding available for other 

Science Mission Directorate (SMD) missions. Figure 1 shows the various vehicles that 

could potentially be available for medium-class launches.

 

10 NASA estimates included in NASA’s NLS II Contract Limited Procurement Strategy dated April 2009 

are based on 2009 launch vehicle prices with a 10 percent annual escalation. 

11 NASA’s launch options are launch vehicles currently available for medium-class missions or vehicles that 

could be available in the near future if certified to fly NASA missions. The vehicle options include 

Taurus II, Falcon 9, Delta II Heavy, and Minotaur.

12 The NLS II Projected Mission Model is a planning document used to project NASA launch services 

requirements from 2011 through 2020. NLS II refers to an extension of the ordering period under the 

NLS contracts from June 2010 through June 2020. 

13 The Falcon 9 configurations can meet medium- or intermediate-class launch requirements.
OVERVIEW

vi REPORT NO. IG-11-012 

Figure 1. Current Launch Vehicles Potentially Available 

for Medium-Class Missions

Launch Vehicle Minotaur IV Falcon 9 Atlas V

Vehicle Class Small to Medium

Medium to 

Intermediate Intermediate

Projected Cost in 

2012 $50 million $111 million $206 million

Approximate Mass 

Capability (600 

kilometer, polar 

orbit) 1,100 kilograms 6,500 kilograms 6,800 kilograms

SMD personnel stated that launch requirements for some of the 13 medium-class 

missions included in the current NLS II Projected Mission Model potentially could be 

met by a Minotaur launch vehicle. We estimate the average cost of using Minotaurs for 

these science missions, currently scheduled for launch from 2012 through 2020, to be 

$63 million per launch as compared with $141 million per launch using a Falcon 9 and 

$264 million per launch for an intermediate-class Atlas V.14 Accordingly, NASA could 

save an average of $78 million to $200 million per launch by using a Minotaur rather than 

a Falcon 9 or an Atlas V, respectively, for launches occurring through 2020. 

 

14 OIG estimates include basic launch services, mission-unique services, integrated services (e.g., launch 

vehicle and payload processing, range safety, engineering and institutional support, and launch pad 

support), and telemetry.
OVERVIEW

REPORT NO. IG-11-012 vii

As mentioned previously, the competitive award process for a mission’s launch vehicle 

generally occurs 30 months before the scheduled launch date. Therefore, a late 2013 or 

early 2014 certification date for a new medium-class launch vehicle may be too late for 

the SMAP mission, which is scheduled to launch in November 2014. LSP officials

stated that a launch service task order can be awarded prior to certification. However, 

there are inherent schedule and cost risks associated with choosing an uncertified launch 

vehicle. NASA’s other science missions that will require a medium-class launch vehicle 

are scheduled for launch from 2015 through 2020 and therefore could potentially use new 

commercially developed medium-class launch vehicles such as the Falcon 9. However, if 

cost-effective commercial medium-class vehicles are not ready for flight in time for these 

other missions, NASA could save money by using Minotaurs instead of larger, more 

expensive Atlas V intermediate-class launch vehicle. 

Obstacles to Using Minotaur 

As noted above, after reviewing a draft of our audit report NASA officials told us that 

“consistent with law and policy” they will consider using the Minotaur for medium-class 

science missions on a case-by-case basis. They explained that for each mission they will 

first determine whether cost-effective commercial launch services that meet mission 

requirements are available and, depending on the results of that determination, may 

pursue using a Minotaur for a particular mission. They also expressed concern that using 

the Minotaur for multiple missions would threaten the viability of commercial providers 

of small- and medium-class launch services and may increase the number of bid protests 

on contract awards because commercial companies would argue that U.S. law and space 

transportation policy requires NASA to use U.S. commercial vendors to the maximum 

extent practicable. 

However, in January 2009 the NASA Administrator signed a memorandum stating that

use of a Minotaur launch vehicle for SMD’s Lunar Atmosphere and Dust Environment 

Explorer (LADEE) met the requirements of the Commercial Space Act and National 

Security Presidential Directive-40, “U.S. Space Transportation Policy,” December 21, 

2004. Moreover, NASA successfully defended this decision against a subsequent bid 

protest. 

The LADEE mission is a small, 284-kilogram satellite designed to orbit the Moon 

originally scheduled for a 2010 or 2011 launch. During its planning process, NASA 

evaluated a series of potential launch vehicles, including SpaceX’s Falcon 9 and 

Falcon 1e, and determined that the Minotaur launch vehicle best met NASA’s 

requirements. In October 2009, SpaceX filed a bid protest with the Government 

Accountability Office (GAO) claiming that the contract award to Orbital for the Minotaur 

violated the Commercial Space Act of 1998 because NASA unreasonably concluded that 

no cost-effective commercial launch services were available from U.S. providers. On 

February 1, 2010, GAO denied SpaceX’s protest, stating that NASA reasonably

concluded that cost-effective commercial alternatives to the use of the Minotaur for the 
OVERVIEW

viii REPORT NO. IG-11-012 

LADEE mission were not available. The LADEE mission is currently scheduled for 

launch in May 2013. 

Finally, current law allows NASA to use excess intercontinental ballistic missiles under 

certain circumstances. The Commercial Space Act of 1998 requires the NASA 

Administrator to obtain approval from the Secretary of Defense to use a Minotaur as a 

space transportation vehicle and to certify to Congress that the use of the Minotaur would 

result in cost savings to the Federal Government, meet all mission requirements, and be 

consistent with international obligations of the United States. In addition, Title 42, 

United States Code (U.S.C.), Section 14734 (Use of excess intercontinental ballistic 

missiles) provides NASA the option of using space vehicles derived from excess 

intercontinental ballistic missiles, such as the Minotaur. 

Management Action

We recommend that the Assistant Associate Administrator for Launch Services and the 

Associate Administrator for SMD evaluate whether cost-effective and mission-suitable 

commercial launch vehicles will be reasonably available when required for the SMAP 

mission scheduled for launch in November 2014. As part of this evaluation, they should 

consider whether the Minotaur could meet mission requirements and whether its use 

would result in a cost savings in accordance with the Commercial Space Act of 1998. In

addition, the Assistant Associate Administrator and the Associate Administrator should 

conduct a similar evaluation for each future medium-class science mission. 

In response to a draft of this report, the Associate Administrators for Science and Space 

Operations concurred with our recommendation and stated that the intent of the 

recommendation reflects NASA’s current process. The Associate Administrators also 

expressed concern with the impact that use of the Minotaur could have on the commercial 

space transportation industry. Nevertheless, they indicated that NASA will consider the 

Minotaur as a launch option for its science missions consistent with law and policy (see 

the Agency’s response in Appendix D). The Associate Administrators also provided 

technical comments to our draft report, which we incorporated into the report as 

appropriate. 

We commend NASA for making clear its commitment to considering economical 

alternatives like the Minotaur for its medium-class launch services requirements, 

especially in the current fiscally constrained environment. We consider NASA’s 

comments to be responsive to our recommendation and the recommendation to be 

resolved. We will close the recommendation upon completion and verification of the 

planned action. 
FEBRUARY 17, 2011

REPORT NO. IG-11-012 

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

Background _________________________________________ 1 

Objectives __________________________________________ 4 

RESULTS

NASA’s Launch Services Program Provided Launch Vehicles 

within Costs and Timeframes Established by Contract ______ 5 

NASA’s Acquisition Strategy for Medium-Class Launch Vehicles 

Did Not Include the Use of Minotaur Launch Vehicles _______ 8 

APPENDIX A 

Scope and Methodology_______________________________ 17

Review of Internal Controls ____________________________ 19

Prior Coverage ______________________________________ 19

APPENDIX B 

Potential Monetary Benefits ____________________________ 21

APPENDIX C 

Strategy for Small- and Medium-Class Launch Services ______ 24

APPENDIX D 

Management Comments ______________________________ 47

APPENDIX E 

Report Distribution___________________________________ 49

FEBRUARY 17, 2011

REPORT NO. IG-11-012 1 

INTRODUCTION

Background

The Commercial Space Act of 1998. To encourage the development of a commercial 

space industry in the United States, Congress enacted Public Law 105-303 (Title 42, 

United States Code, Section 14701), the Commercial Space Act of 1998. Section 201 of 

the Act requires NASA and other Federal agencies to plan missions and procure space 

transportation services from U.S. commercial providers to the maximum extent 

practicable. However, the Act also provides exceptions that allow the Federal 

Government to acquire space transportation services from noncommercial sources, such 

as the Department of Defense (DOD), on a case-by-case basis. Specifically, the Act 

states that the Federal Government is not required to acquire commercial space 

transportation services if: 

on a case-by-case basis, the [NASA] Administrator or, in the case of a national 

security issue, the Secretary of the Air Force, determines that— 

(1) a payload requires the unique capabilities of the Space Shuttle;

(2) cost effective space transportation services that meet specific mission requirements 

would not be reasonably available from United States commercial providers when 

required;

(3) the use of space transportation services from United States commercial providers 

poses an unacceptable risk of loss of a unique scientific opportunity;

(4) the use of space transportation services from United States commercial providers 

is inconsistent with national security objectives;

(5) the use of space transportation services from United States commercial providers 

is inconsistent with international agreements for international collaborative efforts 

relating to science and technology;

(6) it is more cost effective to transport a payload in conjunction with a test or 

demonstration of a space transportation vehicle owned by the Federal Government; or

(7) a payload can make use of the available cargo space on a Space Shuttle mission as 

a secondary payload, and such payload is consistent with the requirements of research, 

development, demonstration, scientific, commercial, and educational programs 

authorized by the Administrator.

NASA’s Launch Services Program (LSP) acquires launch services for NASA’s 

Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD) and Science Mission Directorate

(SMD) as well as for the national security community, the National Oceanic and 

Atmospheric Administration, and DOD. The principal objective of LSP is to provide 

safe, reliable, cost-effective, on-schedule processing, advanced analysis, integration, and 
INTRODUCTION

2 REPORT NO. IG-11-012 

launch services for NASA and NASA-sponsored payloads using expendable launch 

vehicles (ELVs). 

ELVs are designed to launch NASA science, DOD, commercial, and Federal agency 

payloads into space, are only used once, and their components typically are not recovered 

after launch. ELVs generally use two or more rocket stages, which fall back to Earth

when their engine burns are complete. Whatever an ELV carries above the final 

discarded stage is considered the payload. 

A payload’s weight, orbital destination, and purpose determine what size launch vehicle 

is required. Three classes of ELVs have traditionally been available to NASA: small, 

which can carry payloads weighing between 200 and 800 kilograms; medium, which can 

carry payloads weighing between 1,500 and 3,200 kilograms; and intermediate, which 

can carry payloads weighing more than 3,500 kilograms. 

Depending on the size of the payload, LSP acquires ELV launch services and directs the 

management and operation of NASA-owned launch sites and payload processing 

facilities. LSP-acquired launch vehicles are scheduled by NASA’s Flight Planning 

Board, which is composed of members from each of the NASA Mission Directorates, 

Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, and Office of the Chief Engineer. Through the 

Flight Planning Board process, all space access requirements and priorities are assessed to 

develop Flight Planning Board Manifests that meet the requirements and capabilities of 

the Agency. 

NASA Launch Services Contract. LSP awards multiple NASA Launch Services (NLS)

contracts to a variety of launch services providers. Once a year, existing and emerging 

domestic launch services providers may submit proposals to compete for launch services 

contracts. NLS contracts included firm-fixed-price indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity 

(IDIQ) contracts with negotiated not-to-exceed prices with United Launch Alliance 

(ULA) for Atlas and Delta launch services, Orbital Sciences Corporation (Orbital) for 

Pegasus and Taurus launch services, Space Exploration Technologies Corporation 

(SpaceX) for Falcon launch services, and Lockheed Martin for Athena launch services. 

The ordering period for the NLS contract expired June 2010. In preparation for the award 

of follow-on contracts to the current NLS contracts, LSP decided to continue to use the 

IDIQ task order contract method and extended the ordering period under the existing NLS 

contract from June 2010 through June 2020.15 Extending the ordering period allows 

current providers to offer launch vehicles currently under contract as well as new launch 

vehicles that were not available at the time of the award of the base contract.16 The 

extension also gives new providers an opportunity to offer launch vehicles and compete 

to provide future launch services. Launch services for new missions are added through 

 

15 This extension is referred to as “NLS II.”

16 ULA’s Delta II was not offered under NLS II.
INTRODUCTION

REPORT NO. IG-11-012 3 

the issuance of solicitations that result in the award of a firm-fixed-price launch service 

task order. 

On September 4, 2009, NASA issued a request for proposals for potential launch services 

for launches scheduled from 2010 through 2020. Contractor proposals were received on 

October 19, 2009, and contract awards were made on September 23 and 24, 2010. The 

mission model in Table 1 below was included in the request for proposal to identify

potential launch services requirements for the NLS II contract. 

Table 1. Projected NLS II NASA Missions 

Launch 

Vehicle Class

Projected Number of Missions by Launch Year

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Total SMDb

Small 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 5 5

Medium 0 0 0 1 2 1 2 2 3 2 13 13

Intermediate 0 0 1 1 1 3 2 2 2 2 14 9

Total 0 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 4 32 27

Minotaurpossible 

missions

a 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 6 a Medium-class missions that, as of summer 2009, SMD personnel stated may fit on a Minotaur launch vehicle. b Number of SMD missions out of the total number of NASA missions. 

NASA projects that the value of NLS contracts will increase from $5 billion to 

$15 billion under NLS II. NASA’s projection was based on 2009 prices with a 10 percent 

annual escalation to estimate the cumulative maximum contract value of the NLS II 

contract through 2020. Under the previous contract, NASA computed an average of 

$115 million for each medium-class mission from 1999 through 2010.17 According to 

NASA officials, medium-class launch vehicles are projected to cost approximately 

$200 million per launch under the NLS II contract, a 74 percent increase over 1999-2010 

average launch costs.

18 Although actual contractor cost data was not available, industry 

studies and NASA officials stated that the cost of manufacturing launch vehicles, the 

overall decline in global demand, and the cost of developing and maintaining launch pad 

infrastructure contribute to the projected increase in launch services costs. 

Declining Commercial Market. We found that the limited global demand for 

U.S. commercial launch vehicles and NASA’s projected 13 medium-class launches for 

2010 through 2020 may not provide enough business for U.S. launch providers to remain 

 

17 NASA’s projection was included in the NLS II Contract Limited Procurement Strategy, April 28, 2009, 

which calculated the NLS medium-class contract value of $1.38 billion, divided by 12 medium-class 

missions resulted in an average of $115 million per mission. 

18 NASA’s projection was included in the NLS II Contract Limited Procurement Strategy, April 28, 2009, 

which calculated the NLS II medium-class contract value of $3.00 billion, divided by 15 medium-class 

missions resulted in an average of $200 million per mission.
INTRODUCTION

4 REPORT NO. IG-11-012 

viable. For example, according to the Federal Aviation Administration only 4 of 23 

(17 percent) commercial launches around the world from January through September 

2009 used U.S. launch providers. The other 19 launches (83 percent) obtained services 

from foreign launch providers in Russia and Europe. 

Federal Aviation Administration data and space industry studies show that foreign launch 

providers, some of which receive extensive government support, can offer launch services 

with the same or greater performance at a lower cost than U.S. launch providers. NASA 

and space industry studies indicate that launch vehicles from U.S. providers will remain 

more expensive than foreign launch vehicles as long as the worldwide demand for 

U.S.-manufactured launch vehicles continues to decline and U.S. launch providers are 

required to pay for launch pad infrastructure costs. 

National Security Presidential Directive-40 allows the Secretary of Defense to provide 

funds for fixed costs incurred by launch services providers supplying intermediate-class 

launch vehicles as part of the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) Program.19 

Currently, DOD pays the entire launch pad infrastructure cost for EELVs such as the 

Atlas V, vehicles capable of carrying intermediate and larger payloads. However, the 

U.S. Government does not provide the same financial support for small- and mediumclass launch vehicles. Without Government funding for infrastructure such as launch 

pads, most U.S. vehicles will remain too expensive to compete with similar vehicles 

provided by other nations. 

Program Oversight. The Assistant Associate Administrator for Launch Services, Space 

Operations Mission Directorate (SOMD), is responsible for oversight, program 

requirements, evaluation, and assessment of the LSP. In coordination with the Flight 

Planning Board, the Assistant Associate Administrator approves class of service, launch 

date, launch site, and publication of the monthly Flight Planning Board Manifest. A 

program manager and the LSP Office, located at Kennedy Space Center, assist in the 

execution of the LSP. Kennedy also provides personnel, facilities, and resources in 

support of LSP’s procurements to include safety and mission assurance functions. 

Objectives

The overall objectives of this audit were to evaluate whether NASA’s LSP acquired

ELVs within costs and timeframes established by the NLS contracts. We also evaluated

whether the acquisition strategy NASA provided to Congress for post-2010 ELV 

procurements was cost-effective and the most advantageous to the Government. See 

Appendix A for details of the audit’s scope and methodology, our review of internal 

controls, and a list of prior coverage. 

 

19 The EELV Program is jointly funded between the Air Force and the commercial space industry.
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-11-012 5 

NASA’S LAUNCH SERVICES PROGRAM PROVIDED 

LAUNCH VEHICLES WITHIN COSTS AND 

TIMEFRAMES ESTABLISHED BY CONTRACT

NASA’s LSP provided ELVs that were within negotiated costs and timeframes for 

launches between 2008 and 2009. Our review of the five NASA missions launched 

from June 2008 through June 2009 with services provided by LSP found that launch 

services costs were approximately 19 percent of total mission costs, which was 

below the 20 percent budgeted by the SMD.

20 In addition, launch vehicles for small-,

medium-, and intermediate-class missions were available within timeframes 

specified by the contract. 

Launch Vehicles Provided within Cost

To evaluate the costs of ELVs acquired by LSP, we selected 5 of the 21 missions

scheduled to launch from 2008 through 2012.21 These five NASA science missions 

launched from June 2008 through June 2009 and used the following launch vehicles and 

providers: 

• Interstellar Boundary Explorer (IBEX) – Pegasus XL (Orbital),

• Orbiting Carbon Observatory (OCO) – Taurus XL (Orbital), 

• Gamma-ray Large Area Space Telescope (GLAST) and Kepler – Delta II (ULA), 

for two launches, and 

• Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO) and Lunar Crater Observation and Sensing 

Satellite (LCROSS) – Atlas V (ULA).

To determine whether LSP provided ELVs within negotiated costs for these five 

missions, we compared the total mission costs with launch services costs. We found that 

the total launch services costs for the five missions were 19 percent of total mission costs

(see Table 2 for details of the five missions’ costs). Total mission costs for the five 

missions ranged from $185 million to $549 million, with launch services costs from 

 

20 Includes basic launch services (standard launch vehicle hardware, range coordination, etc.), missionunique services (requirements necessary to customize the basic vehicle to meet spacecraft and mission 

needs), integrated services (launch vehicle and payload processing, range safety, engineering and 

institutional support, and launch pad support), telemetry, and other costs such as pad infrastructure. 

21 The 21 launches scheduled from 2008 through 2012 included NASA, Air Force, and National Oceanic 

and Atmospheric Administration missions. Of the 9 missions launched from June 2008 through June 

2009, 5 were NASA missions. 
RESULTS

6 REPORT NO. IG-11-012 

$39 million for a small-class launch vehicle to $128 million for an intermediate-class 

launch vehicle.22 

Table 2. Launch Services Costs and Total Mission Costs

Mission

Launch 

Vehicle 

Class Launch Date

Mission 

Costs

Launch 

Services 

Costs

Launch Services’

Portion of 

(Dollars in millions) Mission Costs 

GLAST Medium June 11, 2008 $503.4 $ 80.4 16 percent

IBEX Small Oct. 19, 2008 185.0 39.1 21 percent

OCO Small Feb. 24, 2009 271.9 52.3 19 percent

Kepler Medium March 6, 2009 472.5 82.3 17 percent

LRO/LCROSS Intermediate June 18, 2009 549.4 128.4 23 percent

 Average $396.5 $ 76.5 19 percent

As shown in the table, three of the five launches we reviewed were below the 20 percent 

of the overall mission costs budgeted by SMD, as was the overall average of all five

missions. Further, we compared launch service task order costs with the net obligation 

authority in the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE) documents for 

the five missions in our sample.23 We found that the average launch service task order

costs for all five launches from June 2008 through June 2009 were 3 percent below basic 

launch services and mission-unique costs established by the net obligation authority in the 

planning documents. 

Launch Vehicles Provided on Time

LSP acquired and made available ELVs for small-, medium-, and intermediate-class

missions within timeframes established by the NLS contracts. Our review of NASA’s 

2009 Major Program Annual Report concerning delayed launches confirmed that the 

delays in the missions were due to technical issues with the projects and not related to the 

acquisition or readiness of the LSP-provided ELVs. Table 3 compares planned launch 

dates with actual launch dates for the five NASA missions that we reviewed. 

 

22 Total mission costs consisted of basic launch services plus mission-unique costs, integrated services,

telemetry, and other costs.

23 Launch service task order costs consist of basic launch services and mission-unique costs. Also, net 

obligation authority is the amount that NASA obligated to cover launch service task order costs. 
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-11-012 7 

Table 3. Initial Launch Dates and Actual Launch Dates 

Mission

Initial 

Launch Date

Actual 

Launch Date

Delay 

(Days) Cause of Delay

GLAST Sept. 30, 2007 June 11, 2008 255 project development

IBEX June 15, 2008 Oct. 19, 2008 126 project testing

OCO Sept. 30, 2008 Feb. 24, 2009 147 project development

Kepler June 30, 2008 March 6, 2009 249 project development

LRO/LCROSS Oct. 30, 2008 June 18, 2009 231 project testing 

 Average delay 202

NASA’s 2009 Major Program Annual Report stated that project development and testing 

delayed mission launches by an average of 202 days for the five missions we examined. 

For example: 

• The GLAST Project was rebaselined due to cost overruns and schedule delays 

associated with the development of the avionics system, the Large Area Telescope 

instrument, and the Command and Data Handling subsystem. 

• The IBEX Project was rebaselined on September 6, 2006, for launch in the third 

quarter of 2008 to accommodate favorable Moon geometry. 

• The OCO Project experienced difficulties with the subcontractor for its primary 

instrument, which resulted in a 4-month launch delay.24 As a result, NASA 

decided to finish the instrument work in-house at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, 

which contributed to increases in cost and schedule delays. 

• The Kepler Project underwent a major restructuring during fiscal year 2006 

because of cost overruns and contractor workforce problems. The contractor’s 

inefficiencies resulted in increased programmatic costs and schedule delays. 

• The LRO/LCROSS Project was delayed because of a nutation problem with LRO 

(nutation is an attitude stability problem that could cause spacecraft pointing 

errors or even result in tumbling and loss of spacecraft). Because Delta II’s upper 

stage is spin-stabilized, which could initiate a nutation problem with LRO, the 

launch vehicle was changed from a Delta II to an Atlas V, increasing the LRO 

budget by $15 million. 

 

24 The OCO Project was a NASA satellite mission that launched on an Orbital Taurus XL. On February 24, 

2009, the OCO mission was lost in a launch failure when the fairing failed to separate from the Taurus 

launch vehicle during ascent.
RESULTS

8 REPORT NO. IG-11-012 

NASA’S ACQUISITION STRATEGY FOR MEDIUMCLASS LAUNCH VEHICLES DID NOT INCLUDE 

THE USE OF MINOTAUR LAUNCH VEHICLES

NASA’s acquisition strategy for medium-class launch services is based on an 

assumption that commercial partners will be able to develop affordable mediumclass launch vehicles to replace the Agency’s vehicle of choice, the Delta II, which is 

no longer in production. According to NASA officials, contingency plans would 

choose between the five available 7920 heavy configuration Delta IIs remaining in

ULA’s inventory and the more powerful and expensive Atlas V, an intermediateclass launch vehicle, until commercial U.S. launch providers can develop a new 

medium-class launch vehicle. However, heavy configuration Delta IIs can only 

launch from Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, not the location from which NASA 

science missions are typically launched. Therefore, NASA would likely use 

intermediate-class launch vehicles until an affordable commercially provided 

medium-class vehicle is available. NASA officials estimated in the NLS II Contract 

Limited Procurement Strategy Meeting, April 28, 2009, that the cost of an 

intermediate-class launch vehicle like the Atlas V will be approximately 

$300 million as opposed to an estimated $200 million for a medium-class launch 

vehicle like the Delta II. 

We found that in its acquisition strategy and related contingency plans, NASA did 

not identify the Minotaur launch vehicle as a possible option to meet its mediumclass launch needs during this interim period. DOD uses Minotaur launch vehicles, 

which are derived from the motors of decommissioned U.S. intercontinental ballistic 

missiles (ICBMs), to satisfy some of its small- and medium-class mission 

requirements. Including the Minotaur in NASA’s acquisition strategy for mediumclass missions could provide NASA a less expensive alternative than an 

intermediate-class vehicle and could be a viable interim solution for some of its 

medium-class science missions scheduled for 2010 through 2020. 

Our analysis shows that launch services costs in 2012, using a Minotaur IV would be 

between $61 million and $156 million less per launch than using Falcon 9 or Atlas V 

intermediate-class launch vehicle.

25 As a result, NASA could realize substantial 

savings by using Minotaur for appropriate medium-class science missions scheduled 

for launch through 2020 if cost-effective commercial alternatives are not available. 

NASA’s reluctance to consider the Minotaur revolves around its concern that use of 

Minotaurs may discourage commercial providers from entering or participating in the 

 

25 $61 million to $156 million is the difference between the price of ordering a Falcon 9 or an EELV in 

2012, estimated at $111 million and $206 million, respectively, and the Minotaur price of $50 million. 
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-11-012 9 

launch services market. Most commercial providers enter the market with smallclass vehicles for which demand is limited. According to NASA officials, if 

potential commercial launch providers perceive a further lack of launch opportunities 

due to the Government’s use of existing Minotaurs in the small- and medium-class 

market, they may be reluctant to bid on launch services contracts in the future. In 

addition, NASA officials said that commercial launch providers would likely protest 

any contract award for a Minotaur launch vehicle on the ground that U.S. law and 

transportation policy requires NASA to use U.S. commercial vendors to acquire 

space transportation services to the maximum extent practicable. 

NASA’s Acquisition Strategy 

Section 621 of the NASA Authorization Act of 2008 required NASA to develop a 

strategy for providing domestic commercial launch services in support of small- and 

medium-class missions of NASA’s Exploration Systems, Science, and Space Operations 

Mission Directorates. As set forth in an August 2009 report to Congress (see 

Appendix C), NASA’s strategy for small-class launch services is to seek competition 

through a mix of existing providers under contract and new providers currently working 

to demonstrate that they are able to meet NASA’s mission requirements. 

Strategy for Small-Class Launch Services. In September 2009, NASA extended the 

ordering period under existing NLS contracts from June 2010 through June 2020. The 

extension, referred to as NLS II, gives both current and new providers an opportunity to 

offer launch vehicles through June 2020. According to NASA officials, small-class 

launch vehicles are important because, historically, new commercial launch services 

providers have started with smaller vehicles before moving on to develop larger ones. 

Orbital and SpaceX provide small-class launch vehicles – the Pegasus and Taurus 

(Orbital) and Falcon 1 (SpaceX) – under NLS contracts. Under NLS II contracts, existing 

and new launch services providers that meet minimum contract requirements can submit 

proposals to furnish launch services for NASA and NASA-sponsored payloads. 

However, NASA officials said there may not be enough business in this class of launches 

to sustain more than one or two commercial providers. For example, NASA’s NLS II 

Projected Mission Model identifies only five small-class missions from 2010 through 

2020. NASA estimates that each launch using a small-class launch vehicle will cost 

approximately $100 million under NLS II contracts.26 Under the previous NLS contracts, 

each launch using a small-class launch vehicle cost approximately $48 million.

27

 

26 NASA’s projection included in NASA’s NLS II Contract Limited Procurement Strategy, April 28, 2009, 

is based on 2009 launch services prices with a 10 percent annual escalation. 

27 OIG cost projection based on the average cost of four small-class NASA missions scheduled to launch 

from 2008 through 2012. The IBEX mission cost $39.1 million and flew on a Pegasus. The OCO 

mission cost $52.3 million and flew on a Taurus XL. The NuSTAR mission, estimated to cost 

$35.8 million, and the Glory mission costing $64.4 million had not flown as of January 2011.
RESULTS

10 REPORT NO. IG-11-012 

Strategy for Medium-Class Launch Services. NASA’s strategy for medium-class

launch services is linked to development activities currently underway as part of the 

Agency’s Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) Program. The COTS 

Program is a partnership between NASA and two commercial partners (Orbital and 

SpaceX) to develop a new cargo transport capability to resupply the International Space 

Station (ISS) after termination of the Space Shuttle Program. In December 2008, the 

Agency awarded both companies Commercial Resupply Services (CRS) fixed-price 

contracts. At the time of award, NASA ordered eight flights valued at about $1.9 billion 

from Orbital and 12 flights valued at about $1.6 billion from SpaceX. NASA anticipates 

that spreading fixed costs over a larger number of resupply flights for the ISS under the 

CRS contracts will result in competitively priced medium-class launch vehicles. 

However, COTS Program management told the OIG that Orbital and SpaceX were not 

currently developing launch vehicles with all of the capabilities typically required by 

NASA science missions. Therefore, launch vehicles developed for ISS resupply missions 

will need additional capabilities before they can fully meet requirements to serve as 

launch vehicles for NASA’s medium-class science missions. 

Moreover, launch vehicles currently under development for ISS resupply missions are 

unlikely to be certified in time for at least the first of NASA’s upcoming medium-class

science missions. NASA policy requires that new launch vehicles pass a launch vehicle 

certification process to ensure the launch vehicle meets NASA’s risk category 

requirements and that those risks are mitigated.

28 SpaceX’s Falcon 9 is currently the only 

medium-class launch vehicle available on the NLS II contracts and LSP officials said they 

expect it to be certified for science missions between late 2013 and early 2014. LSP and 

SMD officials told us that standard practice is for NASA to competitively award a 

contract for a mission’s launch vehicle 30 months before a mission’s scheduled launch 

date. Therefore, under that timetable NASA should award a launch vehicle contract for 

the Soil Moisture Active Passive (SMAP) mission, which is planned for a November

2014 launch, in May 2012, two years before the Falcon 9 is expected to be certified. 

Consequently, it appears unlikely the Falcon 9 or any other medium-class launch vehicle

currently under development will be certified prior to making a decision on a launch 

vehicle for the SMAP mission. 

LSP officials stated that a launch service task order can be awarded prior to certification. 

However, there are inherent schedule and cost risks associated with choosing an 

uncertified launch vehicle. If the Falcon 9 is selected for the SMAP mission prior to 

certification, NASA would need to determine how to address potential cost increases and 

schedule delays that could result from technical issues identified during the certification 

 

28 NASA Policy Directive 8610.7D, “Launch Services Risk Mitigation Policy for NASA-Owned and/or 

NASA-Sponsored Payloads/Missions,” January 31, 2008, requires the Agency to certify that new launch 

vehicles meet NASA’s risk category requirements, to include the completion of three successful flights 

and performance parameters. Two of the three successful flights are required to be consecutive.
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-11-012 11

process. These potential increases are currently not included in the SMAP mission 

budget and could affect the availability of funds for other science missions. 

NASA had 13 medium-class missions forecast for launch from 2010 through 2020.29

ULA’s Delta II is the only medium-class launch vehicle currently available under the 

original NLS contracts and only five Delta IIs remain available for NASA missions. 

Moreover, these remaining Delta IIs are the heavy configuration models, the highest 

performance Delta II. This version of the Delta II can only be launched from Space 

Launch Complex 17B at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station in Florida, which does not 

allow launches to polar orbits. Missions requiring polar orbits (including SMAP and the 

Ice, Cloud, and Land Elevation Satellite [ICESat-II]) must be launched elsewhere, such as 

Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. In addition, NASA officials said they expect 

that in 2012 the total cost of the Delta II heavy launch vehicle will be approximately the 

same as a larger Atlas V intermediate-class launch vehicle. 

NASA uses the Atlas V for its intermediate-class missions. The Atlas V is part of a 

group of EELVs jointly funded between the Air Force and the commercial space industry 

that are capable of carrying intermediate and higher-level payloads. We project the 

average cost of Atlas V intermediate-class launch services under NLS II contracts 

beginning in 2012 will be approximately $206 million per launch compared with the cost 

of approximately $161 million per launch under the previous NLS contracts. 

We assessed the costs of using Atlas V intermediate-class launch vehicles to satisfy 

launch requirements of NASA’s medium-class missions using an interactive mission cost 

analysis tool developed by the OIG (see Appendix A for details of the tool). Our analysis 

found that SMD would need to increase its annual budget by approximately $6 billion

over 10 years or eliminate 8 of the 34 missions (24 percent) planned for 2010 through 

2020 to satisfy its medium-class launch requirements if it used intermediate-class launch 

vehicles. Based on our analysis, in late August 2009 the SMD revised its Projected 

Mission Model and reduced NASA’s launch manifest for science missions for 2010 

through 2020 from 34 to 27 missions. 

Currently, DOD pays the entire launch infrastructure cost for EELVs. However, NASA 

may be required to pay a share of costs associated with base support and infrastructure for 

EELVs after 2012. National Security Presidential Directive-40, “U.S. Space 

Transportation Policy,” December 21, 2004, requires the Secretary of Defense, the 

Director of Central Intelligence, and the NASA Administrator to evaluate the long-term 

requirements, funding, and management responsibilities for EELVs and infrastructure. 

The Directive states: 

That evaluation shall include recommending a proportionate shift of the existing 

funding responsibility of the Secretary of Defense to reflect any change to the balance 

 

29 NASA’s NLS II Projected Mission Model for 2010 through 2020 as of August 31, 2009, identified 

5 small-class, 13 medium-class, and 14 intermediate-class missions. 
RESULTS

12 REPORT NO. IG-11-012 

between national security and civil missions employing an Evolved Expendable 

Launch Vehicle. 

If the decision is made to have NASA share in the funding for launch services 

infrastructure, we estimate that it could result in an average increase of $100 million for 

each NASA EELV mission (see Appendix B). 

Use of Minotaur IV Launch Vehicles Less Costly for NASA’s 

Medium-Class Missions

NASA’s “Strategy for Small- and Medium-Class Launch Services” lists the Delta II and 

Atlas V launch vehicles as alternatives for providing medium-class launch services until 

commercial partners are able to develop affordable medium-class launch vehicles. 

NASA’s strategy did not include using Minotaur IV launch vehicles to satisfy launch 

requirements for medium-class missions projected for 2010 through 2020. We concluded 

that the Minotaur launch vehicle would be a less expensive alternative for medium-class 

launch services for select NASA science missions from 2012 through 2020 at an average

cost of approximately $63 million per launch. 

DOD uses Minotaur launch vehicles to satisfy some of its small- and medium-class 

mission launch requirements. Although manufactured in the United States by Orbital, 

Minotaur launch vehicles are not considered commercial ELVs and are less expensive 

because they use Government-furnished solid-fueled rocket motors from decommissioned 

Peacekeeper ICBMs. 

If NASA were to use Minotaurs for its projected science missions during the next 

10 years, launch services costs would average between $78 million and $200 million less 

per launch compared to using a Falcon 9 or an Atlas V intermediate-class launch vehicle. 

Including the Minotaur in NASA’s acquisition strategy for medium-class missions would 

provide NASA with a cost-effective and proven launch option. Table 4 and the following 

paragraphs provide a comparison of Orbital’s Minotaur IV, SpaceX’s Falcon 9, and

ULA’s Atlas V and Delta II launch vehicles. 
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-11-012 13

Table 4. NASA’s Available Alternatives for Medium-Class Launch Requirements in 2012 

Minotaur IV Falcon 9 Atlas V Delta IIa

Class

Small to 

medium

Medium to 

Intermediate Intermediate Medium

Performance 

Risk Low Unknown Low Low

Pad 

Infrastructure

California, 

Florida, Alaska, 

Virginia Florida

California, 

Florida Floridab

Infrastructure 

Costs (2009) None, portable Unknown

DOD pays 

$161 million/year

NASA pays 

$50 million/year

Launch 

Schedule Open N/A Backlogged Open

Average Cost 

2012-2020 $63 million $141 million $264 million $200 millionc

a Many Delta II components are no longer in production. b The five remaining Delta II rockets are the 7920 heavy configurations that can only launch from Florida.

 

c NASA’s projection based on 2009 launch services prices with a 10 percent annual escalation.

Minotaur IV. NASA considers the Minotaur IV a small-class launch vehicle. However, 

SMD personnel stated that some of the 13 medium-class missions included in NASA’s 

NLS II Projected Mission Model for 2010 through 2020 could potentially fit on a 

Minotaur IV launch vehicle. In addition, the Minotaur has a significant flight history with 

an excellent success rate. NASA has also assessed Minotaur IV schedule risk and 

considered it low. Lastly, we determined that the cost for launch services in 2012 using 

Minotaur IV launch vehicles would be approximately $50 million per launch. 

Falcon 9. SpaceX’s Falcon 9 is a medium- to intermediate-class launch vehicle that is 

still in development. SpaceX has had two successful flights of the Falcon 9, in June 2010 

and December 2010, and the vehicle is included in NASA’s NLS II contracts. Currently, 

SpaceX does not have a launch facility at Vandenberg and a determination of 

performance risk for the vehicle has not yet been made. The estimated cost in 2012, for a 

Falcon 9 is approximately $111 million per launch. 

Atlas V. ULA’s Atlas V is an intermediate-class launch vehicle and NASA’s

contingency plan is to use the Atlas V for future medium-class missions if new mediumclass launch vehicles currently in development are not available in time. The Atlas V can 

meet the technical requirements for mass and trajectory for all 13 projected medium-class

missions. In addition, NASA officials said the Atlas V’s performance risk is low because 

it is certified to carry high-priority payloads and has a significant flight history with an 
RESULTS

14 REPORT NO. IG-11-012 

excellent success rate. We estimated that launch services costs in 2012, using an Atlas V 

launch vehicle will be approximately $206 million per launch under NLS II contracts. 

Delta II. ULA’s Delta II is a medium-class launch vehicle. Delta II was the only 

medium-class launch vehicle available under the original NLS contracts. However, there 

is no Delta II under the NLS II contract and only five Delta IIs remain in ULA’s 

inventory, and all five are the heavy configuration that can only launch from Cape 

Canaveral Air Force Station. Delta II can meet the technical requirements for mass and 

trajectory for some of the 13 projected medium-class missions. In addition, the Delta II

has been NASA’s launch vehicle of choice for nearly 60 percent of its science missions. 

It is certified to carry high-priority payloads and has a significant flight history with an 

excellent success rate. NASA projected that using medium-class Delta II launch vehicles 

could cost approximately $200 million per launch. 

As noted earlier, Delta IIs are no longer being produced. Accordingly, if NASA wanted 

to continue using the Delta II after the unsold inventory is depleted, ULA would need to 

restart production of the major components of the Delta II launch vehicle, which would 

increase the cost and delay the schedule for medium-class missions. NASA officials 

estimate that the costs of restarting and sustaining production lines and launch pad 

infrastructure for the Delta II would make the total cost for that vehicle approximately the 

same as using the larger Atlas V. 

Obstacles to Using Minotaur Launch Vehicles

U.S. law and space transportation policy require NASA to use U.S. commercial vendors 

to acquire space transportation services to the maximum extent practicable. However, 

Title 42, United States Code (U.S.C.), Section 14734 (Use of excess intercontinental 

ballistic missiles) provides NASA the option of using space vehicles derived from excess 

ICBMs, such as the Minotaur. In accordance with the Commercial Space Act of 1998, 

the NASA Administrator can seek approval from the Secretary of Defense to use a 

Minotaur as a space transportation vehicle. However, the Administrator must certify to 

Congress that the use of the Minotaur would result in cost savings to the Federal 

Government, meet all mission requirements, and be consistent with international 

obligations of the United States. 

In January 2009, the NASA Administrator signed a memorandum stating that the use of a 

Minotaur launch vehicle for the LADEE mission met Commercial Space Act and U.S. 

Space Transportation Policy requirements. This mission required launch services to 

transport the LADEE spacecraft into a circular lunar orbit to analyze the lunar atmosphere 

and to test communications capabilities from lunar orbit. NASA evaluated potential 

launch vehicles for this mission based on four criteria: technical capability, risk, 

schedule, and cost. NASA’s launch vehicle evaluations included the Minotaur V, a 

five-stage launch vehicle consisting of three stages that use Government-furnished 
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-11-012 15

components from decommissioned Peacekeeper ICBMs, and two launch vehicles offered 

by SpaceX – the Falcon 1e and Falcon 9. NASA concluded that the Minotaur V and 

Falcon 9 launch vehicles could meet the LADEE mission’s technical requirements, but 

the Falcon 1e launch vehicle was not capable of achieving the required trans-lunar orbit. 

Although neither the Minotaur V nor the Falcon 9 has a NASA flight history, NASA

concluded that the Minotaur V had the lowest technical and schedule risk given the 

Government’s experience with the Minotaur V’s design and the scheduled launches of its 

predecessor, the Minotaur IV. NASA concluded that the projected costs for the Falcon 9, 

in light of the anticipated Government oversight required to ensure a successful mission, 

would be approximately twice those for the Minotaur V. Based on these findings, NASA 

concluded that there were no cost-effective commercial launch services available from 

U.S. providers for the LADEE mission. 

In August 2009, the Air Force issued a delivery order to Orbital under its IDIQ contract 

for launch services for the LADEE mission using a Minotaur V.30 SMD personnel stated 

that Air Force launch services costs for the LADEE mission would be approximately 

$46 million, which is comparable to costs for launch services provided by LSP under the 

NLS contracts. 

In October 2009, SpaceX filed a bid protest with the Government Accountability Office 

(GAO) claiming that the contract award to Orbital for the Minotaur V violated the 

Commercial Space Act of 1998. SpaceX argued that NASA unreasonably concluded that 

no cost-effective commercial launch services were available from U.S. providers. On 

February 1, 2010, GAO denied SpaceX’s protest, stating that NASA reasonably 

concluded that cost-effective commercial alternatives to the use of ICBM assets for 

launch services were not available. 

Conclusion

Under NASA’s published acquisition strategy for launch services, the Agency indicated it 

may use more costly intermediate-class launch vehicles for its medium-class science 

missions planned for 2010 through 2020. Our analysis shows that Minotaur launch 

vehicles could provide NASA a significantly less expensive alternative than these 

intermediate-class vehicles and therefore should be considered. Moreover, the Falcon 9, 

the only medium-class commercial vehicle currently in a position to be certified within 

the next several years, would cost at least twice as much as a Minotaur and therefore 

NASA would need to carefully consider whether its use is “cost effective” as that phrase 

is used in the Commercial Space Act of 1998. 

 

30 Minotaur launch vehicles are available through the U.S. Air Force’s Orbital/Suborbital Program 2 

contract. The contract is administered by the U.S. Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center, Space 

Development and Test Wing, located at Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico. 
RESULTS

16 REPORT NO. IG-11-012 

Recommendation, Management’s Response, and Evaluation of 

Management’s Response

Recommendation. The Assistant Associate Administrator for Launch Services and the 

Associate Administrator for SMD should evaluate whether cost-effective and missionsuitable commercial launch vehicles would be reasonably available when required for the 

SMAP mission scheduled for launch in November 2014. As part of this evaluation, they 

should consider whether the Minotaur could meet mission requirements and whether its 

use would result in cost savings in accordance with the Commercial Space Act of 1998. 

In addition, the Assistant Associate Administrator and the Associate Administrator

should conduct a similar evaluation for each future medium-class science mission. 

Management’s Response. The Associate Administrators for Science and Space 

Operations concurred with our recommendation and stated that the intent of the 

recommendation reflects NASA’s current processes. The Associate Administrators also 

expressed concern with Minotaur’s impact on the commercial space transportation 

industry; however, they stated that Minotaur will continue to be considered as a launch 

services option consistent with law and policy. 

Evaluation of Management’s Response. The Associate Administrators’ planned action 

is responsive. The recommendation is resolved and will be closed upon completion and 

verification of the proposed action. 
APPENDIXES

REPORT NO. IG-11-012 17

APPENDIX A 

Scope and Methodology

We performed this audit from March 2009 through November 2010 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan 

and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the 

evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on 

our audit objectives. 

We interviewed management officials from LSP, the Commercial Crew and Cargo 

Program Office, SMD, SOMD, and ESMD. We discussed areas related to LSP’s future 

acquisition strategy; NLS contract costs, technical performance, risk, and schedule 

requirements; the status of ISS CRS contract efforts; and SMD’s and ESMD’s budget 

estimates and future mission requirements. 

Evaluation of ELVs Provided under the NLS Contract. To evaluate costs and 

timeliness of ELVs provided by NASA’s LSP, we selected 5 out of 21 missions

scheduled to launch from 2008 through 2012. The five missions we selected for our 

sample were NASA-only missions, with services provided by LSP. We also ensured that 

our sample included all classes of launch vehicles covered under the previous NLS 

contract. Our sample consisted of the following: 

• two small-class missions,

o one using a Pegasus XL (Orbital) launch vehicle,

o one using a Taurus XL (Orbital) launch vehicle;

• two medium-class missions using Delta II (ULA) launch vehicles; and 

• one intermediate-class mission using an Atlas V (ULA) launch vehicle.

To evaluate whether LSP acquired ELVs that were cost-effective for the five missions, 

we compared the total launch services costs from the May 5, 2009, “Planning, 

Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE)” data with total mission cost from the 

Major Annual Program Report data in the 2010 NASA Budget. 

We also compared the individual launch service task order costs with the net obligation 

authority for basic launch services and mission-unique costs in the May 2009 PPBE data. 
APPENDIX A 

18 REPORT NO. IG-11-012 

To evaluate whether LSP-provided ELVs were timely for the five missions, we reviewed

and compared NASA’s 2009 Major Annual Program Report’s initial launch dates with 

actual launch dates. 

Evaluation of Post-2010 Strategy. To evaluate whether NASA’s acquisition strategy 

for ELVs after 2010 is cost-effective and the most advantageous to the Government, we 

reviewed the draft and final NASA reports, “Strategy for Small- and Medium-Class 

Launch Services,” dated February and August 2009, respectively (the final report is in 

Appendix C). In addition, we requested that SMD personnel identify medium-class 

missions included in NASA’s NLS II Projected Mission Model for 2010 through 2020 

that could be potentially satisfied with Minotaur IV launch vehicles. We also compared 

NASA’s projected costs for small-, medium-, and intermediate-class launch vehicles 

under the NLS II contract with FY 2009 budget data from SMD and the U.S. Air Force

for Minotaur IV launch vehicles. See Appendix B for details on the potential monetary 

benefits that we identified.

To assess the cost of using intermediate-class launch vehicles to satisfy launch 

requirements of NASA’s medium-class missions, we developed an interactive mission 

cost analysis tool that compares mission and launch vehicle cost data with budgets. The 

tool uses NASA contract requirements, annual budgets, project development inflation, 

technological change costs, inflationary schedule change, project size, number of projects, 

average years to develop projects, average launch services costs, and assignment of 

launch vehicles to projects. In addition, the tool computes budget requirements to cover 

future mission costs, formulates cost avoidance based on assignment of launch vehicles, 

predicts impact on the number of future missions, and displays the cumulative budget 

deficit or gain. We used the tool to analyze the NLS II Projected Mission Model, dated 

August 3, 2009, that included 38 (34 SMD) ELV missions. On August 28, 2009, we 

provided SMD and LSP officials our cost analysis tool and shared our results. On 

August 31, 2009, SMD personnel provided us a revised Projected Mission Model that 

reduced NASA’s launch manifest from 38 to 32 (27 SMD) missions for 2010 through 

2020. 

Launch Vehicles under Development. To determine whether commercial launch 

vehicles under development would be available and certified for NASA’s medium-class 

science missions when required, we discussed the issue with LSP and SMD officials. We 

compared Orbital and SpaceX’s COTS development milestones on file in the COTS 

Program Office with the scheduled launches of medium-class science missions included 

in NASA’s mission model for 2010 through 2020. Using COTS milestones, we 

developed a timeline that estimated the launch vehicle selection and certification dates for 

the SMAP mission. We compared SMAP’s estimated launch vehicle selection dates with

LSP’s estimated launch vehicle certification dates to determine whether developmental 

launch vehicles would be available for the SMAP mission when required. 
APPENDIX A 

REPORT NO. IG-11-012 19

Use of Computer-Processed Data. We assessed the reliability of computer-processed 

data used to perform this audit by comparing contract cost data, PPBE data, and cost data

in NASA’s Business Warehouse application from LSP, SMD, and ESMD. We also 

analyzed Air Force budget data for FY 1999 through FY 2013, contained in Exhibit R-2, 

“RDT&E [Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation] Budget Item Justification,” 

February 2008, which we obtained from the Defense Technical Information Center in 

May 2009. We compared the Air Force budget data with budget information in NASA’s 

procurement strategy documents. Although we did not test the general or application 

controls of any of these systems, we did compare the data with contract data and 

procurement strategy documents and determined that the data was valid and reliable to 

support our objectives and conclusions.

Review of Internal Controls

We reviewed and evaluated the internal controls associated with documentation of launch 

services requirements, the achievement of milestones, and cost reviews. We found no 

internal control deficiencies in any of the three areas. 

Prior Coverage

During the last 5 years, GAO has issued seven reports related to the subject of this report. 

These reports can be accessed at http://www.gao.gov. 

Government Accountability Office

“NASA: Medium Launch Transition Strategy Leverages Ongoing Investments but Is Not 

Without Risk” (GAO-11-107, November 22, 2010) 

“NASA: Commercial Partners Are Making Progress, but Face Aggressive Schedules to 

Demonstrate Critical Space Station Cargo Transport Capabilities” (GAO-09-618, 

June 16, 2009) 

“NASA: Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects” (GAO-09-306SP, March 2, 2009) 

“Space Acquisitions: Uncertainties in the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle Program 

Pose Management and Oversight Challenges” (GAO-08-1039, September 26, 2008) 

“Space Acquisitions: Actions Needed to Expand and Sustain Use of Best Practices” 

(GAO-07-730T, April 19, 2007) 

“Space Acquisitions: DOD Needs to Take More Action to Address Unrealistic Initial 

Cost Estimates of Space Systems” (GAO-07-96, November 17, 2006) 
APPENDIX A 

20 REPORT NO. IG-11-012 

Government Accountability Office (continued)

“Space Acquisitions: Improvements Needed in Space Systems Acquisitions and Keys to 

Achieving Them” (GAO-06-626T, April 6, 2006) 
APPENDIX B 

REPORT NO. IG-11-012 21

POTENTIAL MONETARY 

BENEFITS

The use of Minotaur IV launch vehicles, derived from the rocket motors of 

decommissioned ICBMs, could be a cost-effective interim solution for some of the 13 

medium-class science missions planned in NASA’s NLS II Projected Mission Model 

through 2020. We learned, through discussions with SOMD officials, that the Air Force 

had 35 to 38 Minotaurs in its inventory as of November 2010. In the summer of 2009, 

SMD personnel stated that some medium-class missions included in the NLS II mission 

model may fit on a Minotaur IV launch vehicle. By using a Minotaur for SMAP instead 

of a Falcon 9 or an Atlas V, NASA could potentially save between $61 million and 

$156 million per launch if NASA determines that a Minotaur IV meets mission, 

technical, risk, and schedule requirements. 

Atlas V to Satisfy NASA’s Medium-Class Launch Requirements

Based on our evaluation of LSP’s presentation, “NLS II Contract Limited Procurement 

Strategy Meeting (PSM),” April 28, 2009, NASA determined the maximum average cost 

over the next 10 years of using an intermediate-class Atlas V at approximately 

$300 million per mission. 

We performed a detailed analysis of LSP’s PPBE using the maximum net obligation 

authority from May 26, 2009, for two missions: SMAP and ICESat-II. These missions 

were identified by SMD as two missions that were possible candidates for a 

Minotaur IV.

31 To project the price of what an Atlas V would cost for SMAP ordered in 

2012, we used an annual escalation of 6 percent (inflation) that projected the average at 

$206 million. 

However, we noticed that the PPBE estimates did not include Atlas V launch pad 

infrastructure costs. Because the Air Force charged NASA a user fee to cover 

infrastructure costs for Delta II launches, we believe that the Air Force may charge a 

similar user fee for Atlas V. Based on the ULA’s not-to-exceed NLS II prices, the 

Atlas V pad infrastructure costs for the SMAP mission could reach $128 million, for a

total cost of $334 million for the SMAP mission using Atlas V. 

The following cost comparison chart also illustrates the cost trend for SMAP (ordered in 

2012 and expected to launch in 2014), ICESat-II (ordered in 2013 and expected to launch 

 

31 Following the issuance of the draft of this report, SMD officials stated that ICESat-II now exceeds the 

capability of Minotaur IV. 
APPENDIX B 

22 REPORT NO. IG-11-012 

$47 $50 $53 $56 $59 $63 $66 $70 $74 $79

$104 $111 $117 $124 $132

$140 $148 $157 $166 $176

$195 $206 $219 $232

$246

$261

$276

$293

$310

$329

$0

$50

$100

$150

$200

$250

$300

$350

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

Cost of Using Minotaur IV, ATLAS V, and Falcon 9 

Minotaur IV Falcon 9 Atlas V

in 2015), and other (2014–2020) medium-class missions without Atlas V pad 

infrastructure costs.

Meeting Launch Requirements for Medium-Class Missions

Based on our review of launch services costs related to the LADEE mission scheduled for 

launch in May 2013, and considering inflation, we believe that launch services costs for 

SMAP on a Minotaur IV will be approximately $50 million per launch as opposed to the 

$111 million for a Falcon 9 and $206 million projected for an Atlas V. If NASA 

determines that a Minotaur IV meets technical, risk, and schedule requirements for the 

medium-class missions included in the NLS II Projected Mission Model, NASA could 

avoid spending between $61 million and $156 million per launch, depending on the 

launch vehicle. 

In December 2008, SMD, in collaboration with SOMD, recommended the Minotaur V 

launch vehicle for the LADEE mission. Through discussion with SMD officials, we 

estimated costs for LADEE at approximately $46 million, which is comparable to costs 

for launch services provided by LSP under the NLS contract. Services encompassed

basic launch services, mission-unique services, integrated services (e.g., launch vehicle 
APPENDIX B 

REPORT NO. IG-11-012 23

and payload processing, range safety, engineering and institutional support, and launch 

pad support), and telemetry. 

We based our cost estimate of using a Minotaur IV for future launch services on 

LADEE’s mission cost of $46 million. We applied an annual escalation of 6 percent 

(inflation) to estimate that the average cost of using a Minotaur over the next 10 years 

would be approximately $63 million per launch. 

Although new medium-class ELVs (Falcon 9 and Taurus II) are in development, LSP 

officials anticipate the earliest one could complete certification is April 2014. An April 

2014 certification date may be too late for the SMAP mission, scheduled for November 

2014. In addition, LSP and SMD officials stated that the competitive award of a launch 

vehicle for a mission should occur 30 months before the mission’s scheduled launch date. 

This report recommends that LSP and SMD consider using a Minotaur IV for the SMAP

mission, which is planned for launch in November 2014, as well as the other mediumclass missions identified by SMD. If NASA determines that a Minotaur IV can satisfy 

the mission, technical, risk, and schedule requirements of these medium-class missions, 

and an affordable U.S. commercial medium-class launch vehicle is not available 

approximately 30 months before the missions’ planned launch dates, the potential 

monetary benefits could range from $78 million to $200 million per launch. 
APPENDIX C 

24 REPORT NO. IG-11-012 

STRATEGY FOR SMALL- AND 

MEDIUM-CLASS LAUNCH 

SERVICES
APPENDIX C 

REPORT NO. IG-11-012 25
APPENDIX C 

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APPENDIX C 

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APPENDIX C 

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APPENDIX C 

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APPENDIX C 

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APPENDIX C 

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APPENDIX C 

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APPENDIX C 

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APPENDIX C 

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APPENDIX C 

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APPENDIX C 

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APPENDIX C 

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APPENDIX C 

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APPENDIX C 

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APPENDIX C 

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APPENDIX C 

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APPENDIX C 

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APPENDIX C 

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APPENDIX C 

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APPENDIX C 

46 REPORT NO. IG-11-012 
APPENDIX D 

REPORT NO. IG-11-012 47

MANAGEMENT COMMENTS
APPENDIX D 

48 REPORT NO. IG-11-012 
APPENDIX E 

REPORT NO. IG-11-012 49

REPORT DISTRIBUTION

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Administrator

Deputy Administrator

Chief of Staff

Associate Administrator for Exploration Systems

Associate Administrator for Science 

Deputy Associate Administrator for Programs

Associate Administrator for Space Operations

Assistant Associate Administrator for Launch Services 

Director, Kennedy Space Center 

Non-NASA Organizations and Individuals

Office of Management and Budget

Deputy Associate Director, Energy and Science Division

Branch Chief, Science and Space Programs Branch

Government Accountability Office 

Director, NASA Financial Management, Office of Financial Management and 

Assurance

Director, NASA Issues, Office of Acquisition and Sourcing Management 

Congressional Committees and Subcommittees, Chairman and 

Ranking Member

Senate Committee on Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies

Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation

Subcommittee on Science and Space

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

House Committee on Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies

House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

Subcommittee on Government Organization, Efficiency, and Financial Management

House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight 

Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics 

REPORT NO. IG-11-012 51

Major Contributors to the Report: 

Raymond Tolomeo, Director, Science and Aeronautics Research Directorate

Larry Chisley, Project Manager

Arnold Pettis, Data Mining Specialist/Statistician

Wayne Emberton, Auditor 

Michael Brant, Auditor 

Earl Baker, Legal Support 
FEBRUARY 17, 2011

REPORT No. IG-11-012 

OFFICE OF AUDITS

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

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