J-S26022-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Appellee

v.

MONROE YOUNG,

Appellant

: IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 1663 EDA 2013

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 3, 2013, 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, 

Criminal Division, at No. CP-51-CR-0009297-2010.

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., SHOGAN and FITZGERALD*, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED JANUARY 25, 2017

Appellant, Monroe Young, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered following his convictions of one count each of possession with intent 

to deliver a controlled substance (“PWID”), possession of a firearm by a 

prohibited person (“VUFA”), criminal use of communication facility, 

possession of a controlled substance, possessing an instrument of crime 

(“PIC”), and possession of a firearm with altered manufacturer’s number. 

This case returns to us on remand from our Supreme Court for further 

consideration in light of its opinion in Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 140 A.3d 

 

*

 Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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651 (Pa. 2016).1 Upon review, we vacate the judgment of sentence and 

remand to the trial court for resentencing.

The trial court summarized the history of this case as follows:

On June 2, 2010, Police Officer Cruz, Police Officer Turner, 

and Police Officer Kelly received information from another 

investigation which led them to the area of 3300 North 22nd

Street, in the city and county of Philadelphia. N.T., 9/11/12 

p. 11. They met with a Confidential Informant (“CI”) 01195, 

who had been used in over 50 investigations involving narcotics, 

which had produced over 50 arrests. N.T., 9/11/12 pp. 8-10. 

The CI was searched for contraband and currency. N.T., 

9/11/12 p. 11. Once cleared, the CI was supplied $40.00 in prerecorded buy money and the CI placed a call to 267-595-XXXX, 

which the CI knew to be [Appellant’s] cell phone number. N.T., 

9/11/12 p. 11. [Appellant] answered the call and instructed the 

CI to proceed to a property located on [the] 3300 block of North 

22nd Street. N.T., 9/11/12 p. 12.

The police and the CI arrived at the location sometime 

between 3:15 p.m. and 6:15 p.m. N.T., 9/11/12 p. 13. The CI 

was released in the area and met up with [Appellant], engaging 

in a brief conversation lasting approximately one minute, and 

then handing [Appellant] the prerecorded buy money. N.T., 

9/11/12 pp. 13-14. Officer Cruz observed the entire transaction 

from approximately 35-40 feet away in his vehicle. N.T., 

9/11/12 pp. 13, 27 and N.T, 9/12/12 p. 22. As Officer Cruz 

continued to watch, the CI followed [Appellant] to 3325 North 

22nd Street where they both entered the property. N.T., 9/11/12 

pp. 13-14. They remained inside the property for approximately 

two minutes and then exited the property together. N.T., 

9/11/12 pp. 14-15. [Appellant] was wearing a white t-shirt, blue 

jean shorts that came to the knee, and orange and white shell 

top sneakers. N.T., 9/11/12 p. 40. The CI left the area and met 

with police at a predetermined location. The CI gave police five 

 

1

 In Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 140 A.3d 651 (Pa. 2016), our Supreme 

Court held “that [the mandatory minimum sentencing prescription under 42 

Pa.C.S. §] 9718 is irremediably unconstitutional on its face, non-severable, 

and void[,]” in light of Alleyne v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013). 

Wolfe, 140 A.3d at 663.
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black packets containing crack cocaine that [Appellant] had sold 

him in exchange for the pre-recorded buy money. N.T., 9/11/12 

p. 13, 30.

On June 3, 2010, the police returned to 3325 North 22nd

Street with CI 01195 sometime between 2:15 p.m. and 5:45 

p.m. N.T., p. 15, 27. [Appellant] was sitting on the porch. 

N.T., 9/11/12 p. 16. [Appellant] was wearing a white t-shirt, 

blue jean shorts that came to the knee, and orange and white 

shell top sneakers. N.T., 9/11/12 p. 40. This was the identical 

clothing and shoes [Appellant] wore the previous day. N.T., 

9/11/12 p. 40. The CI was searched for currency and 

contraband and given $20.00 pre-recorded buy money. N.T., 

9/11/12 p. 15. The CI went to 3325 North 22nd Street, engaged 

in a brief conversation with [Appellant] sitting on the porch, and 

handed [Appellant] the pre-recorded buy money. N.T., 9/11/12 

p. 16. [Appellant] entered the property and remained inside for 

a few minutes. N.T., 9/11/12 p. 16. [Appellant] exited the 

property and handed the CI unidentified small objects. N.T., 

9/11/12 p. 16. The CI left the area and met with police. N.T., 

9/11/12 p. 16. The CI was searched and possessed four clear 

plastic packets containing crack cocaine. N.T., 9/11/12 p. 17. 

Officer Cruz observed this transaction. N.T., 9/11/12 pp. 34-36. 

Based on these observations, the police applied and obtained a 

search warrant for 3325 North 22nd Street. N.T., 9/11/12, pp. 

17, 18.

On June 4, 2010, the police set up surveillance at 3325 

North 22nd Street. N.T., 9/11/12 p. 18. At approximately 3:55 

p.m., [Appellant] arrived in a burgundy Mercury Sable with a 

Pennsylvania license plate. N.T., 9/11/12 p. 18. [Appellant] 

wore the same clothing from June 2nd and June 3rd. N.T., 

9/11/12 p. 43. [Appellant] and an unidentified black female 

exited the vehicle. N.T., 9/11/12 p. 18 and N.T., 9/12/12 p. 65. 

[Appellant] used a key to enter the property. N.T., 9/11/12 p. 

18. The police arrived soon after to execute the search warrant 

and knocked on the door. N.T., 9/11/12 p. 19. An unknown 

female began yelling “Country, Country” from the front window 

of the property. N.T., 9/11/12 p. 19 and N.T., 9/12/12 pp. 24-

25. The police entered the property and observed [Appellant] 

exiting Apartment B located on the first floor towards the rear of 

the row home. N.T., 9/11/12., pp. 19, 20, 38. [Appellant] was 

stopped midexit. N.T., 9/11/12 pp. 20, 21, 38 and N.T., 
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9/12/12 p. 43. Recovered from his person were: two keys, one 

that opened the front door of the house and the other that 

opened [A]partment B, and a cell phone.1 N.T., 9/11/12 pp. 20, 

21, 38 and N.T., 9/12/12 p. 43. The police called the same 

telephone number used by the CI on June 2, 2010, 267-595-

XXXX, and [Appellant’s] phone rang and the word “Country” 

appeared on the screen. N.T., 9/11/12 p. 21.

1 [Appellant’s] mother testified that she gave him 

the color-coded keys that unlocked the front door of 

3325 North 22nd Street and Apartment B. N.T., 

9/12/12 pp. 101-103.

The police entered Apartment B and saw an open can on 

the kitchen table. N.T., 9/11/12 p. 22. The can contained one 

clear Ziploc packet with red markings on it that contained three 

black packets and forty clear packets (identical to the packets 

from the purchases of June 2nd and June 3rd 2010), all containing 

crack cocaine. N.T., 9/11/12 p. 22 and 9/12/12 pp. 28-29. The 

can also contained one clear Ziploc packet with spades on it 

containing bulk crack cocaine. N.T., 9/11/12 p. 22. [Appellant] 

moved a bed into the bedroom and also had “some of his stuff” 

in the apartment. N.T., 9/12/12 pp. 104, 106. On the bed was 

one clear Ziploc packet with purple markings with the words 

“purple ladies,” containing marijuana. N.T., 9/11/12 p. 22 and 

N.T., 9/12/12 p. 29. The police recovered various items in and 

on the dresser in the apartment, including a letter with the name 

of Country Black, a letter in the name of Monroe Young, a 

Pennsylvania identification card with the name Monroe Young 

Junior, a semi-automatic handgun with an obliterated serial 

number, bullets, and $303.00 in United States currency. N.T., 

9/11/12 p. 22, 24 and N.T., 9/12/12 pp. 30-31, 41-42. The 

correspondence was addressed to 3419 North 22nd Street. N.T., 

9/12/12 pp. 41-42.2 The handgun and the bullets were 

recovered from the same drawer of the dresser. N.T., 9/12/12 

p. 35. A deed with the address of 3325 North 22nd Street listing 

the names of Anthony Floyd and Monroe Young was found on the 

dresser.3 N.T., 9/12/12 pp. 37-41. There was male clothing 

observed inside the drawers of the dresser. N.T., 9/11/12 p. 24. 

No other person stayed with [Appellant] in the apartment. N.T., 

9/12/12 pp. 106-107.
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2

 [Appellant’s] mother testified that he was residing 

at both 3419 North 22nd Street with his mother and 

at 3325 North 22nd Street Apartment B. N.T., 

9/12/12 pp. 92-107.

3 The deed was identified as a lease during the 

motions hearing on September 11, 2012. This 

misidentification was clarified at trial. N.T., 9/12/12 

pp. 36-41, 50.

Trial Court Opinion, 12/10/13, at 3-6 (footnotes in original).

On September 12, 2012, at the conclusion of a nonjury trial, Appellant 

was convicted of the crimes stated above. On January 3, 2013, the trial 

court sentenced Appellant to serve concurrent terms of incarceration of five 

to ten years for the conviction of PWID,2two to five years for the conviction 

of VUFA, and one and one-half to three years for the conviction of criminal 

use of a communication facility. No further penalty was imposed on the 

convictions of possession of controlled substance, PIC, and possession of a 

firearm with altered manufacturer’s number.3 Appellant’s post-sentence 

motion, which included a challenge to the weight of the evidence, was 

denied by operation of law. Appellant then brought a timely appeal.

On September 29, 2014, this Court affirmed the judgment of sentence 

in an unpublished memorandum decision. Commonwealth v. Young, 107 

 

2

 The trial court sentenced Appellant to a mandatory minimum of five years 

of incarceration on his conviction of PWID pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9712.1.

3 We observe that the United State Supreme Court’s decision in Alleyne

was filed on June 17, 2013, approximately six months after Appellant was 

sentenced in this matter.
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A.3d 239, 1663 EDA 2013 (Pa. Super. filed September 29, 2014) 

(unpublished memorandum). Specifically, this Court found no merit to 

Appellant’s issues challenging (1) whether there was sufficient evidence to 

support the verdicts for the gun offense, (2) whether the verdict was against 

the weight of the evidence, and (3) whether the trial court erred in imposing 

a mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9712.1 for 

Appellant’s conviction of PWID because he was allegedly not in possession of 

the firearm. With regard to the imposition of the mandatory minimum 

sentence, this panel relied upon subsection (a) of section 9712.14and 

stated:

Appellant proceeded in a nonjury trial and evidence of the 

constructive possession of the firearm was introduced at trial. In 

this respect, the trial court, sitting as the finder of fact, found 

that Appellant constructively possessed the gun in the dresser. 

Trial Court Opinion, 12/10/13, at 7-9. Thus, the trial court, in 

 

4

 The relevant portion of the statute provided as follows:

§ 9712.1. Sentences for certain drug offenses committed 

with firearms.

(a) Mandatory sentence.--Any person who is convicted of a 

violation of section 13(a)(30) of the . . . Controlled Substance, 

Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, when at the time of the offense 

the person or the person’s accomplice is in physical possession 

or control of a firearm, whether visible, concealed about the 

person or the person’s accomplice or within the actor’s or 

accomplice’s reach or in close proximity to the controlled 

substance, shall likewise be sentenced to a minimum sentence of 

at least five years of total confinement.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9712.1(a).
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finding Appellant guilty of the firearm charges, found beyond a 

reasonable doubt that Appellant constructively possessed the 

firearm, which is an analogue to constructive control, thereby 

triggering the mandatory minimum. Accordingly, Appellant’s 

contrary argument lacks merit.

Young, 1663 EDA 2013, at 14 (unpublished memorandum).5

Thereafter, on October 29, 2014, Appellant filed with our Supreme 

Court a petition for allowance of appeal. In an order filed September 6, 

2016, our Supreme Court granted the petition for allowance of appeal 

limited to Appellant’s issue pertaining to whether the mandatory sentence 

imposed by the trial court was illegal, vacated this Court’s previous decision 

in this matter, and remanded to this Court for reconsideration in light of 

Wolfe. Commonwealth v. Young, 145 A.3d 1155, 551 EAL 2014 (Pa. 

filed September 6, 2016).6 The Supreme Court denied allocatur as to 

 

5

 We note that while this matter was initially pending before this panel, our 

Court issued its decision in Commonwealth v. Newman, 99 A.3d 86 (Pa. 

Super. 2014) (en banc), which found that Alleyne rendered the mandatory 

minimum sentencing provision at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9712.1 unconstitutional 

because subsection (c) of that statute permitted the trial court to determine 

at sentencing whether the elements necessary to increase the mandatory 

minimum sentence, i.e., the defendant possessed or was in close proximity 

to a firearm while selling drugs, were proven by a preponderance of the 

evidence. However, we observe that the defendant in Newman was 

convicted by a jury, whereas the Appellant in the instant matter was 

convicted by the trial judge serving as the finder of fact.

6

 Our Supreme Court’s order provides as follows:

AND NOW, this 6th day of September, 2016, the Petition 

for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED, LIMITED TO the issue set 

forth below. Allocatur is DENIED as to all remaining issues. 

The issue, rephrased for clarity, is:
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Appellant’s other issues. Because our Supreme Court’s order granted 

allowance of appeal only for reconsideration of our decision on the 

sentencing issue in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Wolfe, we 

confine our review to that issue.

Appellant’s issue challenges the legality of his sentence, therefore, we 

begin by setting forth our standard of review. “Issues relating to the legality 

of a sentence are questions of law[; as a result, o]ur standard of review over 

such questions is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary.” 

Commonwealth v. Delvalle, 74 A.3d 1081, 1087 (Pa. Super. 2013) 

(citations omitted). If no statutory authorization exists for a particular 

sentence, that sentence is illegal and subject to correction. 

Commonwealth v. Leverette, 911 A.2d 998, 1001 (Pa. Super. 2006) 

(citing Commonwealth v. Johnson, 910 A.2d 60 (Pa. Super. 2006)). An 

illegal sentence must be vacated. Id.

We begin by observing that, in Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 117 

A.3d 247 (Pa. 2015), our Supreme Court held the mandatory minimum 

sentencing provision under 18 Pa.C.S. § 6317 (requiring a mandatory 

 

Whether the mandatory sentence imposed by the 

trial court was illegal pursuant to Alleyne?

The judgment of sentence is VACATED, and the matter is 

REMANDED to the Superior Court for reconsideration in light of 

Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 140 A.3d 651 (Pa. 2016).

Supreme Court Order, 551 EAL 2014, 9/6/16, at 1.
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minimum sentence if certain controlled substances crimes that occurred 

within 1,000 feet of a school) to be unconstitutional pursuant to Alleyne, 

because the statute required that operative facts be determined by a judge 

at sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence. The Court concluded that 

the statute could not be made constitutional through severance by the 

judiciary. Hopkins, 117 A.3d at 262. In so doing, the Court found the 

defective provisions of the statute to be too fundamental to the sentencing 

statute to permit severance. See id. at 259-260 (“[I]t cannot be stressed 

enough that the legislature intended that Section 6317 be a sentencing 

provision and not a substantive offense”) and 262 (“[T]he General Assembly 

has made clear that the provisions of Section 6317 are not to be elements of 

the crime and no substitute process can fix that.”).

Subsequently, our Supreme Court issued its decision in Wolfe, which 

concerned the mandatory minimum sentencing provision under 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 9718 (requiring a mandatory minimum sentence for certain convictions 

including involuntary deviate sexual intercourse). In Wolfe, the Court 

stated, “[W]e reaffirm our decision in Hopkins in all material respects and 

conclude that it applies here.” Wolfe, 140 A.3d at 660. The Court 

specifically disavowed the Commonwealth’s argument that Section 9718 
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does not require judicial fact-finding and that Section 9718(a),7standing 

alone, is all that is required to impose the mandatory minimum sentence. 

Id. Rather, the Court in Wolfe stated:

To the contrary, Section 9718 does plainly and explicitly require 

judicial fact-finding in its subsection (c). See 42 Pa.C.S. 

§9718(c) (“The applicability of this section shall be determined 

at sentencing . . . by a preponderance of the evidence.”). 

Moreover, since subsection (c) is integral to the statute, Section 

9718(a) does not stand alone.

Id. at 660-661.8 The Wolfe Court ultimately held, “[W]e reaffirm Hopkins

and find that Section 9718 is irremediably unconstitutional on its face, nonseverable, and void.” Id. at 663.

 

7

 42 Pa.C.S. § 9718(a) provided, in relevant part, as follows:

(a) Mandatory sentence.

(1) A person convicted of the following offenses when the victim 

is less than 16 years of age shall be sentenced to a mandatory 

term of imprisonment as follows:

* * *

18 Pa.C.S. § 3123 (relating to involuntary deviate sexual 

intercourse)-not less than ten years.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9718(a).

8

 42 Pa.C.S. § 9718(c) provides as follows:

(c) Proof at sentencing. — The provisions of this section shall 

not be an element of the crime, and notice of the provisions of 

this section to the defendant shall not be required prior to 

conviction, but reasonable notice of the Commonwealth’s 

intention to proceed under this section shall be provided after 
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During the pendency of our review of this matter via remand, on 

December 28, 2016, our Supreme Court filed its decision in 

Commonwealth v. Barnes, ___ A.3d ___, 36 EAP 2015, 2016 WL 7449232 

(Pa. 2016), which addressed the constitutionality of the exact statute 

presently before this panel, i.e., 42 Pa.C.S. 9712.1. In Barnes, the 

appellant was charged with PWID, possession of a firearm prohibited, and 

other related charges. Barnes, at *1. The appellant waived his right to a 

jury trial and proceeded to a bench trial. Id. The trial court found him 

guilty of the crimes charged. Id. The trial court sentenced the appellant to 

a term of incarceration of five to ten years on the PWID conviction, which 

 

conviction and before sentencing. The applicability of this 

section shall be determined at sentencing. The court shall 

consider any evidence presented at trial and shall afford the 

Commonwealth and the defendant an opportunity to present any 

necessary additional evidence and shall determine, by a 

preponderance of the evidence, if this section is applicable.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9718(c). The unconstitutional language set forth above is 

almost identical to the following language utilized in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9712.1(c):

(c) Proof at sentencing. — Provisions of this section shall not 

be an element of the crime, and notice thereof to the defendant 

shall not be required prior to conviction, but reasonable notice of 

the Commonwealth’s intention to proceed under this section 

shall be provided after conviction and before sentencing. The 

applicability of this section shall be determined at sentencing. 

The court shall consider any evidence presented at trial and shall 

afford the Commonwealth and the defendant an opportunity to 

present any necessary additional evidence and shall determine, 

by a preponderance of the evidence, if this section is applicable.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9712.1(c).
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included a five-year mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 9712.1, based on the trial court’s finding that he was in constructive 

possession of drugs “in close proximity to” a firearm. Id. No further penalty 

was imposed for the other convictions. Id.

The pertinent issue before our Supreme Court in Barnes was whether 

the appellant was entitled to resentencing in light of the fact that he failed to 

preserve his Alleyne sentencing issue for appeal. Barnes, at *2. Before 

embarking on its analysis, the Court in Barnes stated the following:

If we determine that an Alleyne challenge is not waivable 

on direct appeal, then [the a]ppellant is entitled to resentencing, 

as the Commonwealth concedes that our prior decisions 

interpreting Alleyne render Section 9712.1 unconstitutional on 

its face. Specifically, in Commonwealth v. Wolfe, we stated 

that “[t]he effect of Alleyne’s new rule was to invalidate a range 

of Pennsylvania sentencing statutes predicating mandatory 

minimum penalties upon non-elemental facts and requiring such 

facts to be determined by a preponderance of the evidence at 

sentencing.” 140 A.3d 651, 653 (Pa. 2016) (holding 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 9718 violated Alleyne because it required imposition of a tenyear mandatory minimum sentence for an involuntary deviant 

sexual assault conviction based on an additional fact (that the 

victim was less than sixteen years of age) found at sentencing 

and proven only by a preponderance of the evidence); see also 

Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 117 A.3d 247 (Pa. 2015) (finding 

18 Pa.C.S. § 6317 constitutionally infirm for similar reasons). 

Section 9712.1, under which [the a]ppellant was sentenced, 

contains the identical constitutional infirmities as the now void 

provisions at issue in Wolfe and Hopkins. Accordingly, [the 

a]ppellant’s sentence violated Alleyne, and our ability to afford 

relief rises or falls on issue preservation.

Barnes, at *3.
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After reviewing the pertinent authority related to issue preservation for 

challenges to the legality of a sentence, the Barnes Court held that Alleyne

should be applied to cases pending on appeal when Alleyne was decided. 

Specifically, the Court stated, “Alleyne declared a new rule of law that was 

announced while [the a]ppellant’s direct appeal was pending and which 

rendered [the a]ppellant’s mandatory minimum sentence unconstitutional. 

Based on this Court’s precedent, [the a]ppellant is entitled to relief.” 

Barnes, at *5.

The Court then explained as follows:

Based on the mandatory nature of Section 9712.1, at the time of 

sentencing, the sentencing court was without authority to enter 

any other sentence. As that sentencing provision has now been 

rendered unconstitutional on its face by Hopkins and Wolfe, it 

is as if that statutory authority never existed. See Wolfe, 140 

A.3d at 661 (quoting 16 C.J.S. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 265 

(2016)) (“[A]n unconstitutional, non-severable statute is ‘not a 

law, has no existence, is a nullity, or has no force or effect or is 

inoperative.’”). Accordingly, we hereby adopt the lead opinion in 

[Commonwealth v. Foster, 17 A.3d 332 (Pa. 2011) (plurality)] 

and definitively hold that where the mandatory minimum 

sentencing authority on which the sentencing court relied is 

rendered void on its face, and no separate mandatory authority 

supported the sentence, any sentence entered under such 

purported authority is an illegal sentence for issue preservation 

purposes on direct appeal. Thus, [the a]ppellant is entitled to 

resentencing notwithstanding his failure to preserve his issue 

prior to seeking our review.

As we find that [the a]ppellant’s challenge to his sentence 

is not waived, and because the Commonwealth concedes that 

[the a]ppellant’s sentence is unconstitutional under Alleyne, we 

vacate [the a]ppellant’s judgment of sentence and remand to 
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the trial court for resentencing without application of 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 9712.1.

Barnes, at *5. In light of the foregoing precedent by our Supreme Court, 

we are constrained to vacate Appellant’s PWID sentence issued by the 

sentencing court as it included a mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to 

42 Pa.C.S. § 9712.1.

On remand, the trial court is instructed to resentence Appellant on the 

PWID conviction without reference to the mandatory minimum sentencing 

statute. However, because we are vacating a sentence in a multipleconviction case, which may upset the overall sentencing scheme, we vacate 

the entire judgment of sentence. See Commonwealth v. Thur, 906 A.2d 

552, 569 (Pa. Super. 2006) (explaining that “[i]f our disposition upsets the 

overall sentencing scheme of the trial court, we must remand so that the 

court can restructure its sentence plan.”); Commonwealth v. Deshong, 

850 A.2d 712, 714 (Pa. Super. 2004) (stating that “[w]hen a disposition by 

an appellate court alters the sentencing scheme [of a lower court], the entire 

sentence should be vacated and the matter remanded for resentencing.”). 

See also Commonwealth v. Goldhammer, 517 A.2d 1280 (Pa. 1986) 

(explaining that upon remand, the sentencing court may reconsider the 

entire sentence where the appellate court’s ruling altered the trial court’s 

sentencing scheme.). Hence, we vacate the judgment of sentence and 

remand for resentencing. Because our Supreme Court denied Appellant’s 
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petition for allowance of appeal regarding Appellant’s remaining issues, our 

previous disposition as to those claims stands.

Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded for resentencing. 

Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/25/2017