2014 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

11-14-2014

Marco Robertson v. Charles Samuels

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 14-1768

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Recommended Citation

"Marco Robertson v. Charles Samuels" (2014). 2014 Decisions. Paper 1164.

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DLD-029 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 14-1768

___________

MARCO MIGUEL ROBERTSON,

Appellant

v.

CHARLES SAMUELS, Jr. FBOP Director; WARDEN LEWISBURG USP; 

CLINICAL DIRECTOR KEVIN L. PIGOS, DR., USP LEWISBURG

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil No. 13-cv-02500)

District Judge: Honorable A. Richard Caputo

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)

or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

November 6, 2014

Before: FISHER, SHWARTZ and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: November 14, 2014)

_________

OPINION*

_________

PER CURIAM

 

*

 This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
2

Marco Miguel Robertson, a federal inmate proceeding pro se, appeals from the 

District Court’s order granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss two of the three 

defendants, and denying Robertson’s motion for a protective order. For the reasons set 

forth below, we will summarily affirm. See L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.

I.

Robertson filed a complaint, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, against Charles 

Samuels, the director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, and J.E. Thomas and Dr. Kevin 

Pigos, the warden and clinical medical director at the United States Penitentiary, 

Lewisburg, Pennsylvania. Robertson alleges that he was beaten by his cellmate at the 

direction of the prison staff, suffering severe injuries that required emergency medical 

care. According to Robertson, he received inadequate medical care following the injury, 

and was denied neurosurgery by Pigos. Robertson also alleges that he continues to be 

assaulted, tortured, and “gassed” by prison staff. In his complaint, however, Robertson

fails to allege any specific facts against Samuels and Thomas, and implicates Pigos only 

in the complaints regarding his medical care. In addition to financial compensation for 

his injuries, Robertson seeks relocation to a different facility that can address his “brain 

trauma,” and seeks to be kept out of general population out of fear for his safety.

As part of their initial screening, the District Court dismissed the complaint 

against Samuels and Thomas without prejudice to Robertson’s filing an amended 

complaint. Robertson, instead, filed a “Motion For a Protective/Restraining Order 

Against USP Lewisburg” in which he substantially repeats the allegations found in his 
3

complaint, requests a transfer to another facility, and asks the court to oversee his medical 

treatment. The District Court treated Robertson’s motion as a request for a preliminary 

injunction, and denied it, concluding that Robertson had not demonstrated any of the 

requirements for an injunction. Robertson appeals. 

II.

To the extent Robertson appeals the denial of his motion for a 

protective/restraining order, we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). See

United States v. Santtini, 963 F.2d 585, 590 (3d Cir. 1992). To the extent he appeals the 

dismissal of the complaint against defendants Samuels and Thomas, we lack jurisdiction 

because the order did not dismiss the complaint against all defendants; the case against 

Pigos remains pending in the District Court. See Berckeley Inv. Grp., Ltd. v. Colkitt, 259 

F.3d 135, 144-46 (3d Cir. 2001).

We review a District Court’s denial of a preliminary injunction for abuse of 

discretion, but review the underlying factual findings for clear error and examine legal 

conclusions de novo. K.A. v. Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist., 710 F.3d 99, 105 (3d Cir. 

2013). However, we may not exercise jurisdiction over the District Court’s order 

granting the motion to dismiss defendants Samuels and Thomas because claims against 

Pigos remain pending in the District Court. We may summarily affirm if the appeal does 

not present a substantial question. See L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
4

III.

Robertson’s motion, seeking an order directing defendants to transfer him to a 

different facility, and to provide medical care, is properly considered as a motion for an 

injunction. See Cohen v. Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Med. and Dentistry of N.J., 867 F.2d 

1455, 1465 n.9 (3d Cir. 1989). “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must 

establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable 

harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and 

that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 

555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Because of the intractable problems of prison administration, a 

request for injunctive relief in the prison context must be viewed with considerable 

caution. Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1995); see also Imprisoned Citizens 

Union v. Ridge, 169 F.3d 178, 185 (3d Cir. 1999). 

Upon review we conclude that the District Court did not err in finding that a 

preliminary injunction was not warranted on the record before it. In his motion, 

Robertson ultimately sought the same injunctive relief outlined in his complaint and 

substantially relied on the same factual allegations found within his complaint. While 

Robertson alleges in both his complaint and the injunction motion that he continues to 

suffer physical abuse, including assaults, torture, and gassing, he fails to identify any of 

the named defendants as the perpetrators of these abuses. Robertson’s allegation that 

Pigos denied him necessary “neurosurgery” is the only potential constitutional claim 

specifically attributed to any of the named defendants. Moreover, Robertson’s medical
5

claim merely states that he was denied “neurosurgery” without specifying what surgery 

he allegedly needs, why he needs the surgery, why it was denied, and what medical 

advice or opinion he is basing his claim upon. Given Robertson’s failure to sufficiently

plead his claims, his apparent unwillingness to amend his pleading upon instruction, and 

the subsequent dismissal of many of his claims, it is unclear that Robertson will succeed 

on the merits.

Robertson has also failed to show that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm. The 

motion seeking a protective order substantially repeats the allegations in the complaint. 

There is no indication that Robertson has suffered any additional harm that “cannot be 

redressed by a legal or an equitable remedy following a trial,” Instant Air Freight Co. v. 

Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 801 (3d Cir. 1989), and certainly no “clear showing of 

immediate irreparable injury,” Acierno v. New Castle County, 40 F.3d 645, 655 (3d Cir. 

1994) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Finally, we agree with the District Court that Robertson has failed to show that the 

balance of equities tips in his favor or that public interest would be served by granting the 

injunction. On the contrary, as the District Court reasoned, granting the injunction would 

require the federal courts to interfere in the administration of the Federal Bureau of 

Prisons to manage the incarceration and medical treatment of a single inmate. Given the 

Supreme Court’s instruction that “federal courts ought to afford appropriate deference 

and flexibility to state officials trying to manage a volatile environment,” injunctive relief 
6

at this stage could result in harm to the nonmoving party and would not be in the public 

interest. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995)

IV.

We conclude that this appeal presents no substantial question, and we will affirm 

the judgment of the District Court.