IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-11529

JAIME R. PEREZ, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Defendant - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:18-CV-652

Before OWEN, Chief Judge, and SOUTHWICK and OLDHAM, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Jaime Perez, a federal prisoner, filed a lawsuit under the Federal Tort 

Claims Act. He says he received inadequate medical treatment for an injury 

sustained at work in a prison electric shop. The district court dismissed for lack 

of subject-matter jurisdiction, holding that the Inmate Accident Compensation 

Act provides the exclusive remedy for Perez’s claim. We agree.

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

March 31, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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I.

Perez is an inmate at the Federal Medical Center (the “Facility”) in Fort 

Worth, Texas. According to his complaint, Perez fractured his wrist “while at 

work in the Facility’s electric shop,” where he was employed as an electrician.

Perez alleges that the Facility’s medical staff failed to “properly perform the 

necessary follow ups and treatment,” causing him “to suffer through numerous 

surgeries and pain.” So he sued the Government for $1,000,000 under the 

Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”).

The Government moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(1), arguing that Perez’s “exclusive remedy lies under the Inmate Accident 

Compensation Act” (“IACA”), 18 U.S.C. § 4126. That’s because, the 

Government says, IACA’s administrative procedure provides the “sole remedy 

for relief” for an injury that occurs while at work in a federal prison. The 

Government also contested Perez’s version of events. Although the district 

court credited Perez’s account of the accident, it agreed with the Government 

that the compensation scheme established in IACA was Perez’s only path to 

compensation. The court granted the motion to dismiss. Perez timely appealed.

Our review is de novo. See Freeman v. United States, 556 F.3d 326, 334 

(5th Cir. 2009). 

II.

We affirm. The text of IACA as well as precedent make it clear that the 

district court was correct—for Perez, it’s the IACA compensation scheme or 

nothing at all.

A.

Let’s start with the text. IACA “authorize[s]” (but does not require) the 

Government to use certain funds to “pay[], under rules and regulations 

promulgated by the Attorney General, . . . compensation to inmates . . . for 

injuries suffered in any industry or in any work activity in connection with the 

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maintenance or operation of the institution in which the inmates are confined.” 

18 U.S.C. § 4126(c)(4). Exercising power delegated by the Attorney General, 

the Board of Directors of Federal Prison Industries, Inc. (a government entity) 

promulgated regulations establishing a system for reviewing and 

administering inmates’ claims for compensation. See 28 C.F.R. pt. 301.

The Supreme Court has explained that IACA and its corresponding 

regulations are a “comprehensive system to award payments for injuries.” 

United States v. Demko, 385 U.S. 149, 151 (1966). Because “there is a 

compensation statute that reasonably and fairly covers a particular group of 

workers”—here, inmates at work—IACA “is the exclusive remedy to protect 

that group.” Id. at 152. That means an inmate covered by IACA may not turn 

to the FTCA for relief. Id.

The dispositive question, then, is whether Perez falls within the class of 

workers covered by IACA. In other words, is his fractured wrist an “injur[y]

suffered . . . in any work activity in connection with the maintenance or 

operation of the institution in which [Perez was] confined”? 18 U.S.C. 

§ 4126(c)(4). We’ve previously held that “the cause of the injury is irrelevant so 

long as the injury itself occurred while the prisoner was on the job.” Aston v. 

United States, 625 F.2d 1210, 1211 (5th Cir. Unit B Sept. 1980). If the injury 

occurs “on the job,” a claim related to that injury falls within IACA. Id.

IACA applies here. The district court credited the allegations in Perez’s 

complaint that he worked as an electrician at the prison’s “electric shop,” and

that he fractured his wrist “while at work in the [F]acility’s electric shop.” 

Perez was therefore on the job when he was injured. So Aston tells us that

Perez falls within the class of injured prisoners contemplated by IACA.

(Precedent aside, this result is correct as a matter of common sense. Being at 

work must be a “work activity”—it’s the work activity on which all other work 

activities are predicated.)

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That’s the end of the inquiry. Perez was injured in a work activity. He is 

therefore one of the group of workers whose FTCA claims were replaced by the

administrative scheme promulgated under IACA.

B.

Perez counters that he is entitled to bring an FTCA claim because the 

IACA regulations preclude him from receiving any compensation. In 

particular, he says that he was actually injured while fighting outside of 

work—an assertion at odds with the allegations in his complaint. And because 

the regulations only provide for compensation for “work-related injuries,” 28 

C.F.R. § 301.101(b), not for injuries sustained during a fight, see id.

§ 301.301(d), he thinks he’d receive no money from the IACA process. 

There is no evidence in the record that Perez ever tried to lodge a claim 

through the compensation scheme. But even if he had, and even if he had been 

unsuccessful, that would not change today’s result.

The regulations promulgated under IACA offer compensation for certain 

“work-related injuries.” Id. § 301.101(b). That term includes “any injury . . . 

proximately caused by the actual performance of the inmate’s work 

assignment.” Id. § 301.102(a). But it does not extend to “injuries suffered away 

from the work location (e.g., while the claimant is going to or leaving work, or 

going to or coming from lunch outside of the work station or area).” Id.

§ 301.301(c). Nor does it cover “[i]njuries sustained by inmate workers willfully 

or with intent to injure someone else, or injuries suffered in any activity not 

related to the actual performance of the work assignment . . . .” Id. § 301.301(d).

In other words, the Attorney General has used his discretionary 

authority to provide compensation for only a subset of injuries caused by a 

“work activity.” An inmate who gets less money than he wants from the 

regulations may not turn to the FTCA for relief—he is covered by IACA, and 

IACA is exclusive. See Demko, 385 U.S. at 152–53 (rejecting the argument that 

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the FTCA remained available to inmates injured at work because IACA “was 

not comprehensive enough”); Ellis v. Fed. Prison Indus., 95 F.3d 54, 1996 WL 

460035, at *2 (5th Cir. July 30, 1996) (unpublished) (“The matter of awarding 

compensation . . . under the IACA is a matter for determination by the prison 

authorities, subject to the supervision of the Attorney General of the United 

States. The decision of the prison authorities, once made, is conclusive . . . .” 

(citation omitted)); cf. Gill v. United States, 641 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. Unit A Feb. 

1981) (per curiam) (federal employee covered by the exclusive provisions of the 

Federal Employees’ Compensation Act could not bring an FTCA claim for 

additional damages). 

If Perez wants compensation, he must proceed through the IACA 

process. See Thompson v. U.S. Fed. Prison Indus., 492 F.2d 1082, 1084 (5th 

Cir. 1974).

III.

One issue remains. After the Government filed its motion to dismiss, and 

again after the motion was granted, Perez asked the district court for 

permission to amend his complaint to include the allegations that he was 

injured fighting outside of the electric shop. The district court denied both 

requests to amend. Perez says that was in error.

The Government contends that Perez has forfeited any argument about 

the denied requests because those orders are not mentioned in Perez’s notice 

of appeal. We’re not convinced. Perez’s notice of appeal identifies the dismissal 

order as a basis for an appeal, and that order contains a justification for the 

denial of leave to amend. Particularly for a pro se plaintiff, that is sufficient to 

preserve the argument. See FED. R. APP. P. 3(c)(1)(B) (requiring that a notice 

of appeal “designate the judgment, order, or part thereof being appealed”);

Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 248–49 (1992) (“If a document . . . gives the notice 

required by Rule 3, it is effective as a notice of appeal.”).

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Still, reviewing the denial of leave to amend for abuse of discretion, see 

Word of Faith World Outreach Ctr. Church, Inc. v. Sawyer, 90 F.3d 118, 124 

(5th Cir. 1996), we find no reason to reverse. District courts “should freely give 

leave when justice so requires.” FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2). But here, Perez’s 

complaint, sworn under penalty of perjury to be true and correct, set out one 

set of facts. And, as the district court noted, the amended complaint sought “to 

wholly change th[ose] facts,” with no explanation for the revision. “[J]ustice” 

does not “require[]” a court to suborn perjury. The district court correctly 

denied the motions to amend.

* * *

The FTCA is unavailable to Perez. Sovereign immunity therefore bars 

his suit against the Government, and the district court lacked subject-matter 

jurisdiction over the case. See Freeman, 556 F.3d at 334–35.

AFFIRMED.

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