NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SABRA ALBRITTON, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

TIFFANY & BOSCO PA; et al., 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 13-16464 

D.C. No. 4:12-cv-00924-HCE 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Hector C. Estrada, Magistrate Judge, Presiding**

Submitted February 13, 2018***

Before: LEAVY, FERNANDEZ, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges. 

This matter has been stayed since August 11, 2017, pending issuance of the 

mandate in Ho v. ReconTrust Co., N.A., No. 10-56884, or further order of the 

court. We hereby lift the stay.

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the magistrate judge.

*** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

FEB 26 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 13-16464 

Sabra Albritton appeals pro se from the district court’s order dismissing her 

action alleging Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) claims. We have 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Kwan v. SanMedica 

Int’l, 854 F.3d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 2017). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Albritton’s FDCPA claims against the 

Bank of New York Mellon Corp. (“BNYM”) because Albritton failed to allege 

facts sufficient to show that BNYM was a “debt collector” under the FDCPA. See

15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F)(ii) (excluding from the definition of “debt collector” a 

creditor collecting debts on its own behalf).

The district court properly dismissed Albritton’s FDCPA claims against the 

remaining defendants because Albritton failed to allege facts sufficient to state 

plausible claims for relief under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d-1692g. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (to avoid dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient 

factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 

face” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

We do not consider the district court’s denial of Albritton’s request for a 

temporary restraining order because the denial is not appealable. See Hunt v. Nat’l 

Broadcasting Co., 872 F.2d 289, 292 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he denial of a temporary 

restraining order is not generally appealable unless it effectively decides the merits 
3 13-16464 

of the case . . . .” (citation omitted)).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to take judicial 

notice of the endorsements of the note because Albritton failed to show that this 

information was relevant and “not subject to reasonable dispute.” Fed. R. Evid. 

201(b); United States v. Woods, 335 F.3d 993, 1000-01 (9th Cir. 2003) (setting 

forth standard of review).

We reject as without merit Albritton’s contentions regarding judicial bias. 

Albritton’s request for a permanent injunction, set forth in the opening brief, 

is denied. 

Albritton’s request for sanctions, set forth in Albritton’s objection to the 

notice of bankruptcy (Docket Entry No. 30), is denied.

AFFIRMED.