IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs August 7, 2001

REGINALD WEBB v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County

No. P-21318 Bernie Weinman, Judge

No. W2000-01895-CCA-R3-PC - Filed August 27, 2001

Petitioner appeals the denial of post-conviction relief by the Shelby County Criminal Court. He

contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel at his jury trial where he was convicted of

second degree murder. We affirm. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

JOE G.RILEY, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which DAVID G.HAYES and ALAN E.GLENN,

JJ., joined.

Russell C. Rutledge, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Reginald Webb.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Laura McMullen Ford, Assistant Attorney

General; William L. Gibbons, District Attorney General; and Betsy L. Carnesale, Assistant District

Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee. 

OPINION

Petitioner testified at the post-conviction hearing that his trial counsel was ineffective by (1)

withdrawing a motion to suppress his statements made to authorities; (2) not calling Willie Miller

as a trial witness since Miller would have exonerated the petitioner; and (3) forcing or otherwise

improperly advising him to testify at his trial. No other witnesses were presented by petitioner on

his behalf at the post-conviction hearing. 

Trial counsel testified at the post-conviction hearing that she met with the petitioner sixteen

(16) times at the county jail prior to trial. Trial counsel testified that she had no legal basis to

suppress the statements to authorities, and that the statements were somewhat self-serving since

petitioner denied being involved in the shooting. She further testified that Willie Miller had
-2-

previously given incriminating statements about the petitioner to authorities, told her investigator

that “he had seen Mr. Webb do the shooting,” and subsequently told her that “he didn’t know

anything.” Trial counsel did not believe Miller would be a helpful witness. Finally, trial counsel

testified that she in no way forced the petitioner to testify but simply explained to him the advantages

and disadvantages of doing so. She stated it was the petitioner’s choice to testify at his trial. 

The post-conviction court promptly entered model findings of fact and conclusions of law

addressing each issue raised by petitioner. It found, giving credibility to the testimony of trial

counsel, that the withdrawal of the motion to suppress, the failure to call Miller as a witness, and the

advice given to petitioner about testifying were proper and within the range of competency

demanded by an attorney in a criminal case. 

This court reviews a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under the standards of Baxter

v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930 (Tenn. 1975), and Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct.

2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). The petitioner has the burden to prove that (1) the attorney’s

performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient performance resulted in prejudice to the defendant

so as to deprive him of a fair trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064; Goad v. State,

938 S.W.2d 363, 369 (Tenn. 1996). The post-conviction court’s findings of fact on post-conviction

hearings are conclusive on appeal unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. State v. Burns, 6

S.W.3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999). 

Here, the evidence does not preponderate against the findings of the trial court. Petitioner

has failed to establish any deficiency by trial counsel. Furthermore, as to the failure to call Miller

as a witness, petitioner has failed to establish prejudice since Miller was not called as a witness in

the post-conviction hearing. See Black v. State, 794 S.W.2d 752, 757 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990).

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

___________________________________ 

JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE