Also befor e the Court ar e “ARule 67 Motion to W ithdraw F unds From 1 Ammendale L iving Tr

ust Court Escrow Ac count” [Dkt. #33] and the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgme nt [ Dkt. #34]. The Court denies the for mer motion beca

use the e scrow a ccount perta ined to civil liti g ation befor e the United States D istrict Court for the District of Ma ryland, a matte r o ve r whic h th is C ourt ha s n o ju ri sd ic tio n. Th e Court

de nie s th e latte r m oti on

be c a us e it fails to comply

with Rule 56 of the Fe dera l Rules of Civil Procedur e and L ocal Civil Rule 7(h). 1 D A V ID K IS S I, Plaintiff,
v . DAVI D PANZ ER, et al .,

De fe nd ants . UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE D ISTRIC T OF CO LU M BIA

Ci v il A c ti o nN o . 0 8
- 1 8 7 0 ( RB W)

M EM OR

AN DU M OP IN ION This matter is befor e the Court on the joint motion to di smiss filed on behalf of defe ndants EMC Mortga g e Corporation and David Panzer, Esq. For the re asons discussed 1 below, the Court will g rant the de fenda nts’ motion and will dis miss thi s action as a g ainst all the defe ndants. I . BA CKGROUND In o rd e r t o p la c e the a lle g atio ns of the pla int if

f’ s c omp la int

in c on te xt, th e Court

re fe rs to a prior de cision in a related ca se:

P l ai n tiff David Kissi (" Kissi") a nd his wife, Edith R. Truvillion (" Tr uv ill ion " ), purc ha se d r e a l pro pe rt y at 43 03 Amme nd a le Roa d in Be ltsvil le, Mary

land (the " Ammendale Roa d proper ty ") in Dece mber 1 9 9 9 f o r $ 1 1 0 , 0 0 0 w i th f

un d i n g f r o m A m e r i qu e s to f

C a l i f o r n i a . InThe de fenda nts have attached to their

opposition t o the plaintiff’s motion for 2 summary judgme nt a copy

of the August 13, 2009 Opinion of the Mary land Court of Specia l Appea ls. SeeOpposition to P laintiff’s Motion for Summary J udg ment, Ex . A. This Opinion has no be ari ngon

the matte rs be fo re thi s Co ur t. 2 2004, Kissi and Truvillion secure d a mortg ag e on t h e p roperty of $ 2 1 0 , 0 0 0 f r o mW e l l s F ar g o B an k , N
. A
. , o f w h i c ha p p r o x i m at e l y $ 100,000 was a cash pay

ment to the mortg ag ors. On August 16, 2004, Truvillion ex ecute d a Promissory Note, and both Kissi and Truvillion executed a Deed of

Trust secur ing the Promissory Note. The Pr omissor

y No te pr ov ide d f

or an a dju sta

ble int e re st r ate . E MC Mortg ag e Corporation (" EMC") be came the holder of the Promissory Not e, and EMC app oi nt ed J os eph V. Bu on ass is si , I I("Buon ass is si ") and other s as substitute trustees in J uly 2005. Kissi v. EMC MortgageCorp. , 627 F. Supp. 2d 27, 29-30 (D .D.C. 2009) (interna l citations to the
rec ord omitted), appeal dock eted, N o. 09 -7 07 7 ( D. C. C ir . July 21 , 2 00 9) . T he pla int if

f a nd his wife de faulted on the loan, and on July 27, 2005, Buona ssissi and the other substitute trustees initiated forec losure proc eeding s in the Circuit Court for Prince Ge org e’s County , Maryland. Id. David Panzer, Esq. (“ Panzer”) r epre sented EMC in the fore closure c ase a nd in the appea l of the fore closure c ase be fore the Mary land Court of Specia l Appeals. Memorandum in Support of 2 EMC Mortga g e Corporation and David Panzer’s Joint M otion to Dism iss (“De fs.’ Mem.” ), Ex hibit (“Ex.”) 1 (“Panzer D ecl.” ) ¶ 4. In th is a c tio n, the pla int if f a lle g e s th at E MC, Panze r, and the se ve n o the r d e fe nd ants “conspire d in bad fa ith to fraudulently acquir e the [p]l aintiff’s pr operty located at 4303 Ammendale Rd., B eltsville, MD” in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1952 and 1957 (2006). Complaint (“Compl.”) at 2. He fur

ther a lleg es that Elias and Cec ilia Osefo pur chase d the Ammendale Road proper ty at a f orec losure sale for $310,000 a nd, in turn, sold the property to Patrick Ogbeide f

or $421,000 in a transa ction involving Willi am Ampofo, B enedic t Akaneg bu and Ava lar SmartThis matter wa s removed to this Court from the Superior Court of the District of 3 Columbi a on Oc tober 29, 2008. Notice of Removal [Dkt. #1] . Although summonses we re issued by the Superior Court for

all the def

endants, see id. , Ex . 1 (summonses), it does not appea r that the def

endants we re e ver se rved. F or purpose s of this Memorandum Opinion, howeve r, the Court presumes without dec iding that se rvice of proc ess has be en ef fec ted prope rly

on all the de fe nd ants . Th e de fe nd ants a lso argue fo r d ism iss a l of the c omp la int

on the g ro un d th at it s 4 claims are barr ed under

the doctrine of re s judicata a nd the issues raise d there in are barr ed under the doctrine of collate ral e stoppel. SeeDef s.’ Mem. at 13-19. T he Court pre viously decide d that (continued...) 3 Choice Realty
. Id. Acc ordingto the plaintiff, “the [d]efenda nts have de veloped a

pattern of

takingvarious assets of mainly

Afric an Amer ican pr operty owner s throug h perjury

and fa lse prete nses.” Id. at 3. Th e Os e fo s a lle g e dly

ob ta ine d “ a

su bs idi zed int e re st r ate loa

n b e c a us e the y ha d s wo rn

fa lse ly that 4303 Ammendale w as g oing to be their principa l residenc e,” yet they “neve r lived there even though F eder al/Maryland cr edit statutes require homeowner s who are benef iciarie s of g overnme nt housing programs to stay put in such proper

ties as their princ ipal residenc e[s] .” Id
. at2
. “T h e n ew b uy er , P at ri ckOgb i ed e[ , ] s u b s equ en t l y

l o s tth e s am e p ro p erty

th ro u gh fore closure in 2008 a fter c laiming it as his principa l residenc e, but neve r living in it, there by defr audingthe lender .” Id. at 3. In this action, the plaintiff dema nds “82% of

the net proc eeds” of the Ose fos’ sale of the Ammendale Roa d proper ty to Ogbiede, plus dama g es of $10 million. Id . at 3.

I I . DI SCUS SI ON 3 On No ve mbe r 5 , 2 00 8, EM C and Panze r f ile d a joi nt m oti on

to d ism iss on

thr e e g ro un ds : (1) that the Court lac ks persona l jurisdiction over them, (2) that venue in this district is im proper , and (3) that the complaint fa ils to st ate a claim upon which r elief c an be grante d. Def s.’ Mem. at 4(...continued) 4 the plaintiff ca

nnot challeng e in this court the dec ision of the Circuit Court for Prince G eorg e’s County , Maryland with respe ct to the fore closure sa le of the A mmendale Road pr operty or any issues or claims ar ising ther efr om. See Kissi v. EMC Mortgage Corp. , 627 F. Supp. 2d at 32-34. For this reason, the Court will deny the plaintiff’s motions to amend the c omplaint [ Dkt. #27, 30], as the proposed ame nded plea dings se ek to re litigate matters which a lrea dy have be en decide d by

the Mary land cour ts or which could have bee n pursued in those c ourts.

4 7-13, 19-22. On D ece mber 1, 2008, the pla intiff filed a doc ument entitled, “A 28 USC § 1746 Af fi davit (# 19 01 ) S up ple me nt t o O pp os iti on to D ism iss Re qu e st f

or Tr ans fe r t o M ary

land ” [Dk t. #6 ], w ithe xhibi ts, wh ic h th e Court c on str ue s c oll e c tiv e ly

a s h is o pp os iti on

to t he de fe nd ants ’ mot ion to d ism iss (“ Pl. ’s Op p’ n” ). Ho we ve r, thi s o pp os iti on of fe rs no me anin g fu l r e sp on se to the ar g uments the defe ndants set forth in their motion. Instead, the pla intiff’s submission perta ins almost entirely

to the criminal and ba

nkruptcy proce eding s in the United States District Court and the United States B ankruptc y Court for the District of

Mary land, and r efe rs to parties who ar e not named de fenda nts to thi s action. Se e ge ne ra lly Pl.’s Opp’n at 1-5. The Mary land proce eding s have c oncluded, a nd this Court has no authority to reviewthem or to relieve the pla int if f o f t he ir c on se qu e nc e s. Be cause the plaintiff’s opposition fails to addre ss the defe ndants’ ar g uments, the Court may treat the defe ndants’ motion as conc eded. See Palmer v. G MAC Commerc ial Mortgage , 628 F. S u p p . 2 d 1 8 6 , 1 9 3 (D
. D. C
. 2 0 0 9 ) ( ci t i n g Fox v . Am. Airlines, Inc ., 295 F. Supp. 2d 56, 58 (D.D.C. 2003), aff’d , 3 89 F .3 d 1 29 1 ( D. C. C ir . 2 00 4) ) ( “ Whe re a pa rt y a dd re sse s so me but no t a ll arguments raised in a

motion to di smiss, courts in thi s district treat such a rguments as
c on c e de d. ” ); De lan e

yv . D ist ric t of Colum bia , 612 F. Supp. 2d 38, 41 n.3 (D.D .C. 2009) (gra nti nga s c on c e de d tw o mo tio ns to d ism iss be c a us e the pla int if

f f a ile d to fi le a

re sp on se to the m) ; Bu gg s v . P owe ll , 293 F. Supp. 2d 135, 141 (D.D .C. 2003) (holding that “whe n a plaintiff5

files an opposition to a dispositi ve motion and addr esses only cer tain arguments raised by

the defe ndant, a c ourt may

treat those arguments that the plaintiff fa iled to addre ss as conc eded” ); Stephenson v . Cox , 223 F. Supp. 2d 119, 122 (D.D .C. 2002) (dismissing var ious counts of complaint as conc eded, notingthat “[t] he cour t’s role is not to act as a

n advocate for the plaintiff and construc t leg al ar g uments on his behalf in orde r to counter those in the motion to di smiss.”). Ne v erth el es s , b ec au s e t h e p l ai n t i ff i s p ro ce ed i n g pr o s e , the Court will address e ach a rgument b r i e f l y. A. TheCou rt La c k s P e rso na l J

ur isd ic tio n O v e r th e De

fe nd an ts “A District of

Columbi a cour

t may exercise pe rsonal jurisdiction over a person domiciled in, org anized under the laws of, or maintaining his or its principa l place of business in, the District of Columbia as to any claim for r elief.” D.C. Code § 13-422 (2001) . I t is the plaintiff’s burden to make a pr im a fa c ieshowing that the Court has per sonal jurisdiction over the defe ndants. See F

irst C hicago Int’l v. U

nited Exc h. Co. , 836 F.2d 1375, 1378- 79 (D.C. Cir. 19 88 ); W alton v. Bureau of Prisons , 533 F. Supp. 2d 107, 112 (D.D .C. 2008). Moreove r, the “[p] laintiff must alleg e spec ific fa cts on which pe rsonal jurisdiction can be based; [he] cannot rely on conclusory

alleg ations.” Mo or e v . M otz , 437 F. Supp. 2d 88, 91 (D.D .C. 2006) (citations omitted). The c omplaint makes no alleg ations as to defe ndants’ domicile in, org anization under the laws of, or

the maintenanc e of a

principal plac e of business in the District of Columbi a. Panzer is “ an atto rn e y

e mpl oye d b y

the law f ir m G re e nb e rgTr a

ur ig , L L P[,]” De fs .’ Me m., Panze r D e c l. ¶ 1, and “ is a reside nt of the Commonwealth of Virg inia,” id. ¶ 3. EMC “is a Te x as cor poration, incorpora ted in Texas, with its principal plac e of business in Te x as.” D efs.’ Mem., Ex. 26

(Campbell Dec l.) ¶ 3. Althoug h EMC has a re g istered a g ent in Mary land, id. ¶ 4, it has no re cord of havingbeen se rved pr ocess, id. ¶ 5. The pla intiff lists a Maryland addr ess for e ach of the
rema ining de fenda

nts. SeeCompl. at 1 (caption). In this sit uation, the Court must eng ag e in a two- part inquiry to determine whether

it may exercise pe rsonal jurisdiction over non- resident de fenda nts. First, the Court must determine whether jurisdiction may

be exerc ised under the District of Columbia’s long- arm statute. See GTE New Media Serv

s., Inc. v . BellSouth Corp. , 199 F.3d 1343, 1347 ( D.C. Cir. 2000). Second, the Court mus t de te rm ine wh e the r t he e xer c ise of

pe rs on a l juri sd ic tio n s atis fi e s th e re qu ir e me nts of due pr ocess. Id. (c i t i n g Un ite d S tates v . F e rra ra , 5 4 F .3 d 8 25 , 8 28 (D .C. Cir . 1 99 5) ). Th is second c omponent of the a naly sis turns on whether a defe ndant’s “minimum contacts” with the District of Columbia establish that “the maintena nce of the suit does not offend tr aditional notions of fair play

and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. W ashington , 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1 94 5) (i nte rn a l qu otatio n ma rk s and c itatio ns omi tte d) . T he se min imum c on ta c ts mus t ari se from “some act by

which the de fenda

nt purposefully

avails [hims elf] of the privileg e of
c on du c tin ga c tiv iti e s w ith in t he fo rum State , th

us inv ok ingthe be ne fi ts a nd pr ote c tio ns of

its laws.” Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Super. Ct. of C al., Solano Ct

y. , 480 U.S. 102, 109 (1988) (qu o t i n g Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz , 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)). In other wor ds, “the de fe nd ant’ s c on du c t and

c onne c tio n w iththe fo rum Sta te are su c h th at [he ] sho uld re a so na bly anticipate be ing ha led into court there .” W orld-W ide Volkswagen Corp. v. W oodson , 4 44 U. S. 286, 297 (1980). The District of Columbia long -ar m statute allows the Court to exercise per sonal jurisdiction over a non- resident de fenda nt with reg ard to a

claim ar ising fr om the defe ndant’s7

conduct in: (1) transac ting business in the District of Columbia;

(2) contra ctingto supply service s in the District of Columbia; (3) causingtortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or omission i n the District of Columbia; (4) causing tortious injury in the District of Columbi a b y an act or omi ssi on outsi de th e Di str ic t of

Col umb ia

if he re g ula rl y does or solicits business, eng ag es in any other pe rsistent course of conduct, or derive s substantial r evenue from g oods used or c on s umed, or ser vices re ndere d, in the District of Columbi a; (5) having an interest in, using, or possessing rea l proper ty in the District of Columbia; (6) contra ct i n g t o i n sure or act a s surety

for or on any person, proper ty , or risk, contra ct, obligation, or ag ree ment located, e xec ute d, or to be pe rf

or me d with in t

he Di str ic t of

Col umb ia at t he ti me of contra cting , unless the par ties otherwise pr ovide in writing; or ( 7 ) marital or pare nt and ch il d r e lati o n s h ip in

th e D is tr ic t of Co lumb ia [. ] D.C. Code § 13-423(a ) (2001)
. Although E MC and Panzer may have tr ansac ted business or contr acte d to supply service s in t he Di str ic t of

Col umb ia , it

do e s n ot a

pp e ar t hat e ith e r h a s d on e so wi th r e sp e c t to the e ve nts g iving r ise to the plaintiff’s c auses of action. As noted a

bove, the plaintiff lists a Mar yland
a dd re ss f or e a c h o f t he re ma ini ngde fe nd ants , a nd the y are no t a lle g e d to c on du c t bu sin e ss,
s u p p l y s e r v i c e s , o r t o h av e c a

u s e d th e p l a i n t i f

f t o rt i o u s i n

j ur y i nth e D i s tr i c to f

C o l u mb i a . In addition, the Ammendale Roa d proper ty is located in B eltsville, Maryland, and a ny transac tion involving this proper

ty nece ssarily

occur red in Mar

yland. Moreove r, not only the fore closure pr oc e e din g s b ut a lso any

oth e r l iti g atio n p e rt a ini ngto t he pla int if

f’ s inte re st i n th e Amme nd a le Road proper

ty took place in the state and f eder al cour

ts in Maryland. Notwithstanding the plaintiff’s alleg ed re sidence in the District of Columbia, he does not appe ar to have suff ere d any8

injury in the District of Columbia with respec t to the Ammendale Road pr operty . Absent any meaning ful contac ts with the District of Columbi a, this Court’s exercise of pe rsonal jurisdiction
ov e r t he de fe nd ants wo uld

no t c omp or

t w ithdu e pr oc e ss. The Court there fore conclude s that it cannot exercise pe rsonal jurisdiction over Panzer and EMC, nor any

of the re maining de fenda nts. Se e, e .g., Bu esge ns v . B ro wn , 567 F. Supp. 2d 26 , 3 6 ( D. D. C. 2 00 8) (c on c lud ingthat e xer c ise of pe rs on a l juri sd ic tio n w a s im pr op e r a bs e nt a showing of a r elationship betwee n the plaintiff’s a lleg ations and cla ims ag ainst a def endant a nd the Di str ic t of

Col umb ia ); Cornell v. Kellner , 539 F. Supp. 2d 311, 315 (D.D .C. 2008) (c on c lud ingthat de fe nd ant’ s e mpl oy me nt w iththe Inte rn a l Re ve nu e Se rv ic e , whic h is headqua rtere d in the District of Columbia, is not a sufficient conta ct to support the exercise of persona l jurisdiction under the District’s long -ar m statute). B. Venuein This District Is Improper Where, a s here , the district court’s jurisdiction “is founde d only on diversity

of citizenship,” a civil action may be brought only

in: (1 ) a jud ic ia l di str ic t w he re any de fe nd ant r e sid e s, if

a ll d e fe nd ants reside in the sa

me State, (2) a

judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions g iving r ise to the claim occ urre d, or a substantial part of pr operty that is the subject of the action is situated, or (3) a judi cial dis trict in which any defe ndant is subject to persona l jurisdiction at the time the action is commenc ed, if ther e is no district in which the ac tion may

otherwise be broug ht. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (2006)
. No ne of the de fe nd ants re sid e in t he Di str ic t of

Col umb ia , a

nd the e ve nts g ivi ngri se to the pla int if

f’ s c la ims oc c ur

re d in Mary land . F ur the r, a ll the pa

rt ie s to thi s a c tio n e ith e r a c tiv e ly pa rt ic ipate d in

or we re pa rt ie s to c ourt

pr oc e e din g s o r r e a l e state tr ans a c tio ns pe rt a ini ngto9

proper ty located in Ma

ryland. On this rec ord, the Court must conclude that venue in this district is improper, as it is appar ent that this action could and should have been br oug ht in the United States District Court for the District of Ma ryland. Havingrea ched this conc lusion, the Court has the option of transfe rringthis action to the proper venue if doing so w ould be in the intere st of justice, or dismissing the a ction. 28 U.S.C. § 1406 (2006). The Court concludes that no meaning ful purpose w ould be serve d by transfe rring this action, and it will therefor e be dismissed bec ause the complaint fails to state a c laim upon which re lief ca

n be g rante d. C. The Complaint

Fails to Stat e a Claim Upon W hich Relief Can Be G ranted “[W ]hen ruling on a

defe ndant’s motion to dism iss, a judge must acce pt as true a ll of the fac tual alleg ations contained in the c omplaint.” Atherton v. District of Columbia Off ice of the Mayor , 5 6 7 F. 3 d

6 7 2 , 6 8 1 (D
. C
. C i r. 2 0 0 9 ) ( qu o t i n g Erickson v . Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)) (i nte rn a l qu otatio n ma

rk s o mitte d) . A lth ou g h “ de ta ile d f a c tua l a lle g atio ns ” are no t r e qu ir e d to wi ths tand a Rul e 12 (b )( 6) mot ion , a

pla int if f m us t of fe r “ mor e tha

n la be ls a nd c on c lus ion s” to provide “ g rounds” of

“entitle[ment] to relief.” Be ll A tl. Cor p. v . Two mb ly , 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Or , as the Supreme Court more re cently stated, “[t] o survive a motion to dismiss , a
c omp la int mus t c on ta in s uf

fi c ie nt f a c tua l matte r, a c c e pte d a s tr ue , to ‘s tate a

c la im t o r e lie f t

hat is plausible on its face .’” As hc ro ft v. Iqbal , __ U.S. __, __, 129 S.C t. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Twom bly , 550 U.S. at 570). A c laim is facially plausible “whe n the plaintiff plea ds fac tual content that allows the c ourt to draw a rea sonable infe renc e that the de fenda nt is li able f

or the misconduct alleg ed.” Id
. (qu o t i n g Twom bly , 550 U.S. at 556). A c omplaint alleg ing f acts whic h
are “‘me rely

consistent with’ a de fenda nt’s liability , . . . ‘stops short of the line betwe en10

possibili ty

and plausibility

of ‘e ntitlement to relief.’” Id. (qu o t i n g Twom bly 550 U.S. at 557) (bra ckets omitted). 1. The Complaint Fails to Alleg e F raud a nd Conspiracy A par ty alleg ing f

raud “ must state with particularity the circ umstances c onstitut ing fra ud.” F ed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Thus, the pleade r g ener ally must “state the time, place and conte nt of the fa lse mis re pr e se ntatio ns , th e fa c t mi sr e pr e se nte d a nd wh at w a s r e ta ine d o r g ive n u p a s a conseque nce of

the fra ud.” Ellipso, Inc. v. Mann , 460 F. Supp. 2d 99, 105 (D.D .C. 2006) (citing Kow al v . M

CI Com mc ’n s Co rp ., 16 F.3d 1271, 1278 ( D.C. Cir. 1994)). As to the plaintiff’s c ivil conspiracy alleg ation, the eleme nts of this claim are “ (1) a n
a g re e me nt b e tw e e n tw o o r m or e pe rs on s; ( 2) to p art ic ipate in a n unla wf ul a c t, o r a

lawf ul a c t in an unlawf ul manner; (3) an injury

cause d by

an unlawf

ul overt ac t perfor

med by one of the parties to the a g ree ment; (4) which ove rt ac t was done pur suant to and in furthe ranc e of the common scheme .” Halberstam v. W elch , 705 F.2d 472, 477 ( D.C. Cir. 1983). Conclusory alleg ations of an a g ree ment will not suffice. Brady v. Livingood , 360 F. Supp. 2d 94, 104 (D .D .C. 20 04 ) ( me re a lle g atio n th at de fe nd ants “ a g re e d amon gthe mse lve s” to s ub je c t pl a int if

f t o discriminatory

acts, without alleg ing f

acts sug g esting that the def endants we re a ctingin conce rt in further ance of a sha

red g oal of discr iminating ag ainst him not sufficient) (f ootnote and
c itatio ns omi tte d) ; Grave s v. United States , 961 F. Supp. 314, 321 (D.D .C. 1997) (dismissing claim wher e plaintiff mer ely alleg ed that his forme r employ er “ colluded” w ith the Depar tment of Education to keep him undere mploy ed, without putting for th “any fac ts showing the e x istence or establishment of an a g ree ment”). Her e, the plaintiff’ s alleg ations of fra ud and conspira cy

are , at best, conc lusory . He11

mere ly alleg es that the “ [d] efe ndants conspire d in bad fa ith to fraudulently acquir e the [p] laintiff’s prope rty

located a t 4303 Ammendale Road, B eltsville, MD.” Compl. at 2. Absent alleg ations as to the time, place and conte nt of the def endants’ a lleg ed fr audulent ac ts, the fra ud claim has be en inade quately pled and f

ails to survive the def

endants’ motion to dismiss
. See, e.g., Kissi v. EMC MortgageCorp. , 6 27 F . Su pp . 2 d at 27 , 3 4- 35 ; U. S. e xre l. B ro wn v . A ra ma rk Cor p . , 5 9 1 F. S u

p p . 2 d 6 8 , 7 5 (D
. D. C
. 2 0 0 8 ) ( qu o t i n g U.S. ex rel. Joseph v . Cannon , 642 F.2d 1373, 1385 (D.C. Cir. 1981)) ( dismiss ing two c ounts of complaint for a bsence of alleg ations “re g arding

‘the time, plac e and c ontent of the fa lse misrepre sentations, the fa ct[s] misrepre sented and what was obtained or g iven up as a

conseque nce of

the fra ud’”) . Simi larly , the plaintiff’s conclusory

alleg ation that “the joint [d] efe ndants . . . conspire d to rip off him and his spouse,” Compl. at 2, is i nadequa

te. Se e Mc Cre ar

yv . H e ath , No. 04-0623 (PL F) , 2005 WL3276257, at
* 5 (D
. D. C
. S ep t . 2 6 , 2 0 0 5 ) ( d i s m i s s i n g co n s p i ra cy cl ai mwh er e t h e “ co mp l ai n tfa i l [ ed ] t o al l ege the exist ence of any

events, c onversations, or documents indicatingthat there was e ver a n ag ree ment or ‘mee ting of the minds’ betwee n any

of the de fenda

nts . . .”). Nowhe re in the
co mp l ai n td o es th e p l ai n t i ff al l ege th e e x i s t en ce o f a nagr ee m en tam o n g th e d ef en d an t s t o en gage in an unlawf

ul act or a n overt a ct done pur suant to and in furthe ranc e of the ir common scheme
. Acc ording ly , the Court conclude s that the complaint fails to ade quately alleg e the f

raud and conspira cy

claims, and, ther efor e, these claims must be dismiss ed. 2. There I s No Private Rig ht of Action Unde r 18 U.S.C. §§ 1952 and 1957 I t is unlawful for a

person to eng ag e in interstate tr avel or use the mail to furthe r a
rac ketee ringenter

prise, see18 U.S.C. § 1952(a) (2006) , or knowing ly to eng ag e “in a

monetary transac tion in criminally

derive d proper

ty ” excee ding $10,000 in va lue, 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a)12

(2 00 6) . G e ne ra lly , “ in t

he c ri min a l c on te xt, th e Sup re me Court ha s r e fu se d to imp ly

a pr ivate rig ht of ac tion in ‘a bare criminal statute.’” Prunte v. Univ ersal Music Group , 484 F. Supp. 2d 3 2 , 4 2 (D
. D. C
. 2 0 0 6 ) ( qu o t i n g Cor t v . A sh , 422 U.S. 66, 79-80 (1975)) . And these c riminal statutes upon which the plaintiff r elies do not cre ate a private r ight of

action. See Lucas-Cooper v. Palme tto GBA , No. 1:05-cv- 00959, 2006 WL2583407 at *10 (N.D . Ohio Sept. 7, 2006) (conc luding that 18 U.S.C. § 1957 is a cr iminal statute “which g rant[s] no expli cit private r ight of
a c tio n” ); Thompson v. Kramer , No. 93-2290, 1994 WL725953, at *15 (E.D. Pa. D ec. 29, 1994) (conc luding that 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 and 1957 “ provide by their plain languag e for

criminal pe na lti e s b ut n ot f

or pr ivate c a

us e s o f a c tio n” ); Ba rre tt v . Ci ty of A lle nto wn , 152 F.R.D. 50, 56 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (“N o civil action has be en held to exist under . . . 18 U.S.C. § 1952[ .]”); Schwartz v. F.S. &O. Assocs., Inc ., No. 90-1606, 1991 WL208056, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y . Sept. 27, 19 91 ) ( fi nd ingthat vi olatio ns of 18 U. S.C. §§ 19 52 , 1 95 6 a nd 19 57 do no t c re ate pr ivate ri g hts of ac tion). The Court conc ludes, there fore , that the plaintiff’s c laims under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1952 and 1957 must be dismissed.A sepa rate Orde r dismissing this action was issued by the Court on September 30, 5 2009. 13 I I I . CONCLUSI ON F or the fo re g oin gre a so ns , th e Cou rt c on c lud e s th at it

la c ks pe rs on a l juri sd ic tio n o ve r a ll the de fe nd ants and

that ve nu e in t

his dis tr ic t is imp ro pe r. Mo re ov e r, e ve n if the se de fe c ts c ou ld be c ur e d, wh ic h th e y

c ann ot, the c omp la int

is s ub je c t to dis mis sa l be c a

us e it f a ils to s tate c la ims up on wh ic h r e lie f c an b e g ra

nte d. Ac c or din g ly , th e Court wi ll gra nt t he de fe nd ants ’ m oti on

to dismiss , and will dismiss the complaint without prejudice
. 5

/ s / REGGI E B. WAL TON United States District J udg e