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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

CANDY T. MARTIN 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1420 MDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 3, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-21-CR-0000095-2018

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., DUBOW, J., and PELLEGRINI*, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.: FILED MAY 08, 2019

Candy T. Martin (Martin) appeals from the judgment of sentence 

imposed by the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County (trial court)

after her jury conviction of Simple Assault as well as a trial court conviction of 

summary Harassment and Criminal Mischief.1 Specifically, she challenges the 

weight of the evidence to support her conviction of Simple Assault. We affirm.

We take the following pertinent legal and factual background from the 

trial court’s November 9, 2018 opinion and our independent review of the 

record. Deborah Baker (Baker) and Martin’s former husband, Kim Taylor 

(Taylor), share an apartment as roommates. The conviction at issue here 

arose out of a June 24, 2017 incident between Baker and Martin at the 

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1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2701(a), 2709(a)(1), and 3304(a)(2), respectively.
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apartment. At trial, Martin testified on her own behalf. Baker and Taylor 

testified on behalf of the Commonwealth.

Martin testified that she entered Baker’s apartment, in spite of warnings 

by Taylor and their daughter that she not do so, because Baker had called her 

a few days prior and Martin wanted to inquire about what she wanted. (See 

N.T. Trial, 5/10/18, at 88-89). According to her version of events, when she 

entered the apartment and asked Baker what she wanted, Baker immediately 

jumped off the couch, came toward her screaming for her to get out and 

grabbed her. (See id. at 89). She explained that she attempted to push 

Baker off, but that Baker maintained her grasp, looked like she was going to 

strike her, and they ended up by the window. (See id.). Martin said that she 

did not hit Baker. (See id. at 94).

Baker testified that Martin entered her home without her permission and 

that she repeatedly told her to get out. (See id. at 33). However, Baker 

maintained that when Martin refused to leave, she “took her by the arm and 

gently guided her to [the] door, showing her the exit,” and told her to get out. 

(Id.). Also according to Baker, as she led Martin to the door, Martin began 

pushing and kicking her, and “grabbed [her] glasses, scratched [her] face,” 

and “got her against the window where the AC was” located. (Id. at 33-34). 

Baker explained that she began “squeezing” Martin to free herself, but that 

Martin continued to “hit[], punch[], [and] shov[e]” her. (Id. at 34). Martin 

threatened Baker that she was going to push her out of the window, causing 
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the blinds to fall out and the air conditioner unit to fall two stories to the 

ground below. (See id.). Taylor eventually heard the yelling, broke apart the 

fight and successfully asked Martin to leave. Baker called 911. (See id.).

Taylor also testified that he was outside when Martin approached the 

apartment and that he and their daughter urged her not to enter the 

residence. (See id. at 65-66). He stated that after Martin entered the 

apartment, he heard Baker yelling at her to get out and he then saw the air 

conditioner fall out of the window. (See id. at 65). When Taylor entered the 

apartment, Martin had Baker “against the window and the wall,” and Baker 

was holding Martin’s shirt. (Id. at 66). Taylor broke them up.

Martin was convicted of the aforementioned charges. The trial court 

sentenced her to pay the costs of prosecution, a fine and restitution, and 

ordered her not to have any contact with Baker. Martin filed a post-sentence 

motion in which she argued that the verdict was against the weight of the 

evidence because “the evidence proved that [she] was not the initial aggressor 

in the incident and that any injuries to [] Baker or damage to her property 

that resulted from the altercation were the result of [] Martin acting in selfdefense.” (Martin’s Post-Sentence Motion, 7/13/18, at 1). The trial court 
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denied the post-sentence motion and Martin timely appealed.2 She and the 

trial court complied with Rule 1925. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Our review of Martin’s weight of the evidence claim is guided by the 

following legal principles. “One of the least assailable reasons for granting or 

denying a new trial is the lower court’s conviction that the verdict was or was 

not against the weight of the evidence and that a new trial should be granted 

in the interest of justice.” Commonwealth v. Soto, 202 A.3d 80, 97 (Pa. 

Super. 2018) (citation omitted). “The weight of the evidence is exclusively 

for the finder of fact, who is free to believe all, none or some of the evidence

and to determine the credibility of the witnesses.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 

172 A.3d 632, 642 (Pa. Super. 2017), appeal denied, 183 A.3d 970 (Pa. 2018)

(citation omitted). “[The] jury is free to disbelieve all of the defense’s 

testimony, and is free to believe all of the testimony of the Commonwealth’s 

witnesses . . . [and thereby] resolve any conflicts in the evidence.” 

Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 835 A.2d 720, 732 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation 

omitted). “Because the trial judge has had the opportunity to hear and see 

the evidence presented, an appellate court will give the gravest consideration 

to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial judge when reviewing a trial 

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2 “[A]ppellate review is limited to determining whether the trial court “palpably 

abused its discretion in ruling on the weight claim.” Commonwealth v. 

Champney, 832 A.2d 403, 408 (Pa. 2003), cert. denied, 542 U.S. 939 (2004) 

(citation omitted).
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court’s determination that the verdict is [or is not] against the weight of the 

evidence.” Id. at 643 (citation omitted). “It is well-settled that we cannot 

substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact.” Id. at 642 (citation 

omitted). Finally, “in order for a defendant to prevail on a challenge to the 

weight of the evidence, the evidence must be so tenuous, vague and uncertain 

that the verdict shocks the conscience of the court.” Id. at 643 (citation 

omitted).

Section 2701 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code provides, in pertinent 

part: “A person is guilty of assault if he . . . attempts to cause or intentionally, 

knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 

2701(a)(1). However, “[t]he use of force upon or toward another person is 

justifiable when the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary 

for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by such 

other person on the present occasion.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 505(a). “When a 

defendant introduces evidence of self-defense, the Commonwealth bears the 

burden of disproving such a defense beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

Commonwealth v. Rivera, 983 A.2d 1211, 1221 (Pa. 2009), cert. denied, 

560 U.S. 909 (2010) (citation omitted).

In the instant matter, Martin essentially argues that the jury should have 

believed her version of events over those of Baker. However, we conclude

that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found that the jury 

could reasonably decide that the Commonwealth disproved Martin’s claim of 
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self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. The Commonwealth introduced 

testimonial evidence that detailed the altercation between Martin and Baker 

that was contrary to Martin’s version of events. Specifically, Baker testified 

that she immediately asked Martin to leave when she entered the apartment, 

and that, in response, Martin attacked her, scratched her face, punched her 

eyeglasses off her, and threatened to push her out of the window, resulting in 

the air conditioner falling to the ground outside.

The jury was free to believe all, some or none of the above testimony. 

See Miller, supra at 642; see also Reynolds, supra at 732. Hence, the 

trial court properly exercised its discretion when it found that the jury could 

reasonably conclude that the Commonwealth disproved Martin’s claim of selfdefense beyond a reasonable doubt.3

 See 18 Pa.C.S. § 505(a); Rivera , 

supra at 1221. Accordingly, the trial court did not palpably abuse its 

discretion when it found that the jury’s verdict did not shock its sense of 

justice. (See Trial Ct. Op., at 8-9); see also Miller, supra at 642-43; 

Champney, supra at 200.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

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3 Even if the jury credited Martin’s testimony that she believed that Baker was 

going to hit her, the jury was free to find that she “did not reasonably believe 

that it was immediately necessary to use force to protect herself” before 

attacking Baker. 18 Pa.C.S. § 505(a).
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 05/08/2019