NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

File Name: 24a0268n.06

Case No. 23-1479

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

DANIEL MCCAUSLAND, et al.,

Plaintiffs - Appellants,

v.

CHARTER TOWNSHIP OF CANTON, et al.,

Defendants - Appellees.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

COURT FOR THE EASTERN 

DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

O P I N I O N

Before: MOORE, NALBANDIAN, and BLOOMEKATZ, Circuit Judges.

NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge. Public officials in Canton, Michigan, allegedly 

prevented Daniel and Robert McCausland from developing a plot of commercial land that they 

owned in the Township. So they sued the Charter Township of Canton, Toebe Construction, and 

five individuals on twelve counts, alleging various constitutional and common-law violations and 

seeking a writ of mandamus. The district court dismissed five counts and granted summary 

judgment to the defendants on the other seven. We AFFIRM.

I.

Daniel and Robert McCausland own property, on which they’ve been operating an auto 

service business since the 1970s, by Lotz Road in the Charter Township of Canton, Michigan. In 

1992, the property was rezoned to mid-rise development (MRD), requiring any development in 

the area to be at least six stories high. So to meet the area requirements for this kind of 
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development, the McCauslands purchased smaller parcels around their property, eventually 

accumulating a total of eighteen contiguous parcels. And a few years after the property was 

rezoned to MRD, it also became subject to the Township’s Corporate Park Overlay District zoning 

ordinances, meaning that all new development there would require approval as a “special land 

use.” This approval process involved an application by the property owner, preliminary site plan 

preparation, administrative review, public hearing, consideration from the planning commission, 

and then a final decision from the township board.

Under this regime, the McCauslands applied for and received vehicle-dealer licenses from 

the Township in 2006. Since then, they have submitted one more application: a 2018 application 

“for a special land use for a physical rehabilitation services clinic.” R. 15-11, Goulet Aff., p. 3, 

PageID 221. It was unanimously approved by both the planning commission and the township 

board. Although the McCauslands never submitted any applications that the Township denied, 

they claim preliminary conversations with the Township strongly discouraged them from filing a 

special-land-use application.

In 2015, Wayne County received funds from the State to improve Lotz Road and, following 

a public bidding process, awarded the project to Toebe Construction, a private LLC. While this 

project was underway, the McCauslands contracted with Toebe to have water-main and sewer 

lines extended to their property. Wayne County approved, but only if it happened while the road 

was under construction. Accordingly, Toebe’s proposal to the McCauslands explicitly stated that 

because of the paving schedule for the road improvements, everything would have to be completed 

by June 24, 2016, and if the utility extensions could not be completed by then, the proposal would 

become null and void. And it was the McCauslands’ responsibility to secure the proper permits 

from both Wayne County and the Township.
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The McCauslands hired Fairway, a private engineering firm, to prepare construction 

drawings for the review process. But in the interim, the Township discovered a critical error and 

informed the McCauslands that their drawings misstated the size of the water main they were

connecting to—it was 54 inches, not 24. The drawings Fairway had relied on (generated by another 

firm) were mistaken. Although the McCauslands had to revise their drawings and resubmit them 

for review, they were “able to successfully overcome” any “permit delays” this error might have 

caused. R. 68-2, D. McCausland Dep., pp. 95–96, PageID 1736–37. Wayne County issued an 

addendum to its permit recognizing the revisions on June 22.

But this was too late for Toebe, which informed the McCauslands the day before that it 

would not proceed with the installation. There were only three days left until the proposal’s June 

24 deadline for the project’s completion, and the McCauslands still lacked the required permits to 

move forward.

Although the McCauslands concede that it remains possible to develop their property 

within the existing zoning, they maintain that their property has been significantly devalued and 

that they have been unable to sell.

So in September 2018, the McCauslands sued the Township, several Township officials,1

and Toebe Construction under a general theory that the Township conspired with Toebe to prevent 

the McCauslands from connecting their properties to utilities in retaliation for their earlier refusal 

to grant the Township an easement. They alleged twelve counts in their complaint: procedural due 

process (Count I), substantive due process (Count II), Fifth Amendment takings (Count III), equal 

protection (Count IV), conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (Count V), due process under the 

1 For the rest of this opinion, we refer to the Township and the named officials in this suit 

collectively as “the Township.”
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Michigan constitution (Count VI), inverse condemnation (Count VII), a writ of mandamus (Count 

VIII), defamation (Count IX), tortious interference (Count X), a preliminary and permanent 

injunction (Count XI), and costs of litigation (Count XII).2

The Township filed a pre-answer motion to dismiss. The district court granted it in part, 

dismissing Count III as unripe and dismissing Counts XI and XII because neither were independent 

causes of action. The Township moved to reconsider, and the district court dismissed Count V for 

insufficient pleadings and Count VII as unripe.

Accordingly, the remaining seven counts went to discovery starting on April 10, 2020, with 

an initial deadline of October 30, 2020. And after three extensions, discovery closed on July 26, 

2021. Days before the July 26, 2021, discovery deadline, Toebe, with the plaintiffs’ concurrence,

asked for another extension of the discovery deadline. Thereafter, on September 10, 2021, the 

McCauslands moved to compel discovery, claiming that, despite their own efforts, the Township 

had not yet provided everything the McCauslands requested. In the meantime, Toebe and the 

Township each moved for summary judgment by the August 26, 2021, deadline.

By the time the court had a hearing on the summary-judgment motions, the motion to 

extend discovery, and the motion to compel, the McCauslands were able to depose four Township 

employees. The McCauslands also filed oppositions to summary judgment.

On October 24, 2022, the district court granted summary judgment to Toebe and the 

Township on all counts and denied the motion to compel discovery as moot. The court found that 

Toebe, as a private entity, is not liable for the constitutional violations in Counts I and IV and that,

2 The complaint is generally confusing, conclusory, and imprecise. For many counts in the 

complaint, plaintiffs make general allegations against all “Defendants” rather than pleading who 

exactly is responsible for what. This method of pleading is generally prohibited. See Boxill v. 

O’Grady, 935 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2019) (“Summary reference to a single, five-headed 

‘Defendants’ does not support a reasonable inference that each Defendant is liable.”).
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because Toebe is a party to the contract at issue in Count X, it cannot be subject to a cause of 

action for tortious interference.

As to the Township, the district court found that Counts I, II, and VI failed because the 

McCauslands showed no protected property right. Count IV fell for lack of a similarly situated 

comparator. Count VIII failed because the district court found that the McCauslands “have not 

offered any evidence or argument regarding any of the elements” necessary to establish their claim. 

R. 80, SJ Order, p. 24, PageID 2269. And finally, Counts IX and X failed because the McCauslands 

“did not specifically plead the defamatory statements on which their claim is based” and “fail[ed] 

to cite evidence of acts of tortious interference by any of the Canton Defendants.” Id. at 27, PageID 

2272.

The McCauslands moved to amend the judgment per Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

59(e), mainly arguing that (1) Toebe should be liable for constitutional violations as an agent of 

the Township, (2) they had a protected property interest because of their significant investments

of time and money, and (3) they did not have a full opportunity to conduct discovery. The district 

court denied their motion.

So the McCauslands timely appealed, arguing that the district court erred by dismissing 

Counts III and VII, by granting summary judgment to Toebe and the Township in Counts I, II, IV, 

and VI, and by granting summary judgment while the McCauslands still sought outstanding 

discovery.

II.

For counts dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), we review the 

existence of subject-matter jurisdiction de novo. Ammex, Inc. v. Cox, 351 F.3d 697, 702 (6th Cir. 

2003). And when there is a “factual attack” to the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction, we do 
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not presume that the plaintiffs’ factual allegations are true. United States v. Ritchie, 15 F.3d 592, 

598 (6th Cir. 1994). Instead, “the court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the 

existence of its power to hear the case.” Id.

We review grants of summary judgment de novo, viewing the evidence “in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing ‘all justifiable inferences’ in his favor.” Fisher v. 

Nissan N. Am., Inc., 951 F.3d 409, 416 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 

477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)). And we affirm when the movant nonetheless “shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

And although we normally review a district court’s denial of a motion to amend judgment 

under Rule 59(e) for abuse of discretion, see Intera Corp. v. Henderson, 428 F.3d 605, 619 (6th 

Cir. 2005), when the motion seeks reconsideration of a summary-judgment grant, we review de 

novo, Northland Ins. Co. v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 327 F.3d 448, 454–55 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing 

Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 167 F.3d 286, 289 (6th Cir. 1999); Columbia Gas Transmission, 

Corp. v. Ltd. Corp., 951 F.2d 110, 112 (6th Cir. 1991)).

Finally, we review a district court’s denial of discovery motions (and corresponding 

challenges that the district court granted summary judgment prematurely) for abuse of discretion. 

CenTra, Inc. v. Estrin, 538 F.3d 402, 419–20 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Vance ex rel. Hammons v. 

United States, 90 F.3d 1145, 1149 (6th Cir. 1996)). And a “district court abuses its discretion when 

it relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact, uses an erroneous legal standard, or improperly 

applies the law.” United States v. Dado, 759 F.3d 550, 559 (6th Cir. 2014) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted).
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A.

The McCauslands argue that their deposition testimony below “create[d] a question of fact” 

as to “whether Toebe Construction could be subject to liability for alleged constitutional violations 

as a private entity.” Appellant Br. at 40. Although their brief on appeal never specifies what kinds 

of constitutional violations they allege against Toebe, the proceedings below point to Counts I and 

IV (due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment). But “[i]t is undisputed 

that . . . Fourteenth Amendment protections, codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1983, are triggered only in 

the presence of state action,” Lansing v. City of Memphis, 202 F.3d 821, 828 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing 

Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156 (1978)), and Toebe is a private LLC.

We have three tests to determine whether a private party counts as a state actor: “(1) the 

public function test; (2) the state compulsion test; and (3) the symbiotic relationship or nexus test.” 

Id. Yet the McCauslands provide no evidence to support their argument, resting instead on the 

following conclusory assertions:

Here, plaintiffs testified that the Township exercised coercive power and/or 

significantly encouraged Toebe Construction not to perform under its contract. 

Plaintiffs’ testimony creates a question of fact as to whether Toebe Construction 

qualifies as a state actor under the state compulsion test. The district court therefore 

erred in granting summary judgment as to plaintiffs’ constitutional claims against 

Toebe Construction.

Appellant Br. at 40. The closest they get is a claim that they created a question of fact as to 

“whether Toebe Construction was acting as an agent of the Township.” Id. But they make no 

attempt to explain how this alleged agency relationship meets the requirements of the statecompulsion test.

Even if the McCauslands had properly identified the legal basis for their state-action 

argument, any such theory lacks evidentiary support. Specifically, the McCauslands fail to explain

how Toebe was an agent of the Township despite the fact that Toebe was a contractor for Wayne 
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County and not for the Township. The McCauslands were required to contract with Toebe because 

Wayne County had awarded Toebe the underlying Lotz Road contract. And the McCauslands have 

not identified any factual basis to show that the Township coerced Toebe’s decision to terminate 

the contract with the McCauslands. See R. 68-2, pp. 112–13, PageID 1753–54 (failing to identify 

anyone at the Township involved in Toebe’s decision to terminate the contract).

Thus, we can’t say that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Toebe. So

we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Toebe.

B.

On appeal, the McCauslands preserved six counts against the Township: three due-process 

claims, one equal-protection claim, and two takings claims.

1.

The McCauslands’ first claim is that the Township violated their constitutional rights to 

procedural and substantive due process.3 They make no claim that they have been deprived of any 

life or liberty interest. So to establish a procedural-due-process claim, the McCauslands must show 

that they (1) have a constitutionally protected property interest (2) they were deprived of by the 

state (3) without adequate procedural rights. Hahn v. Star Bank, 190 F.3d 708, 716 (6th Cir. 1999). 

And to establish a substantive-due-process claim, they must show that they have (1) a 

constitutionally protected property interest (2) that has been deprived through arbitrary and 

3 The McCauslands make both federal and state due-process claims. But typically, Michigan’s 

due-process “provision is coextensive with its federal counterpart.” Cummins v. Robinson 

Township, 770 N.W.2d 421, 438 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009) (citing People v. Sierb, 581 N.W.2d 219, 

220 (Mich. 1998) (explaining that the federal and state due-process clauses are 

“coextensive . . . [a]bsent definitive differences in the text . . . , common-law history that dictates 

different treatment, or other matters of particular state or local interest”). So, seeing no reason to 

depart from the general rule, we consider these claims together.
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capricious action. Braun v. Ann Arbor Charter Township, 519 F.3d 564, 573 (6th Cir. 2008). The 

McCauslands cannot establish either claim.

The McCauslands principally claim that they have a protected property right in specialland-use permits for the development of their property. Although property interests are protected 

by the Constitution, they themselves are not created by the Constitution but “by ‘an independent 

source such as state law.’” R.S.W.W., Inc. v. City of Keego Harbor, 397 F.3d 427, 435 (6th Cir. 

2005) (quoting Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)). So the existence 

of a constitutionally protected property interest “is traditionally a question of state law.” EJS 

Props., LLC v. City of Toledo, 698 F.3d 845, 855 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Logan v. Zimmerman 

Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 430 (1982)).

In Michigan, property rights vest only after a building permit has been issued, and the 

landowner has commenced “substantial construction.” Seguin v. City of Sterling Heights, 968 F.2d 

584, 591 (6th Cir. 1992) (citing City of Lansing v. Dawley, 225 N.W. 500 (Mich. 1929); Schubiner 

v. West Bloomfield Township, 351 N.W.2d 214, 219 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984)). And the McCauslands 

admitted that they never commenced substantial construction on any project at issue in this suit.

Nor did they “obtain special use permits to develop their property.” Reply Br. at 5. In fact, they 

never even applied for special-land-use permits during the relevant timeframe, despite the fact that 

the Township had granted them several special-land-use approvals in the past.

The McCauslands also overstate the constitutional import of informal “pre-application” 

meetings where Township personnel allegedly expressed hostility to their unsubmitted land-use 

requests. Appellant Br. at 45. As the McCauslands admit, the Township never relinquished its 

discretion to its personnel to deny them special-land-use permits, meaning a property interest 

cannot arise from the outcome of their unsubmitted applications. See Silver v. Franklin Twp. Bd. 
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of Zoning Appeals, 966 F.2d 1031, 1036 (6th Cir. 1992). So they have no constitutionally protected 

right in special-land-use permits to develop their property, even if they “invested a significant 

amount of time and money to assemble” parcels of land. Compare Appellant Br. at 42, with Bevan 

v. Brandon Township, 475 N.W.2d 37, 46 (Mich. 1991) (“Where building permits have been 

applied for, but have not been issued, vested rights are not acquired, even though significant sums 

may have been expended by the applicant.”).

The McCauslands also briefly suggest that they have a protected property right in a prior 

nonconforming use for outdoor storage. But even though a stipulation in state court permitted them 

to use their property for outdoor storage, this claimed right is not unconditional. Their outdoor 

storage was required to “be maintained in a neat [and] orderly condition,” restricted to a specific

area, and vehicle storage was limited to four storage trailers. On appeal, the McCauslands point to 

no evidence that the Township deprived them of this right arbitrarily or otherwise. Hahn, 190 F.3d 

at 716; Braun, 519 F.3d at 573. Although they point to deposition testimony to claim they were 

“ticketed repeatedly by the Township for having outside storage,” they offer no evidence that they 

had been ticketed while in compliance with the stipulated conditions of this right to outdoor 

storage. Appellant Br. at 49. So without a showing that the Township deprived them of a protected 

property interest, the McCauslands cannot establish due-process claims. Hahn, 190 F.3d at 716; 

Braun, 519 F.3d at 573.4

The district court properly granted summary judgment to the Township on all three dueprocess counts.

4 Although the district court granted summary judgment on the outdoor-storage issue for lack of 

jurisdiction, R. 80, SJ Order, p. 19, PageID 2264, “we may affirm on any grounds supported by 

the record even if different from the reasons of the district court,” Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, 

Inc. v. Am. Eagle Outfitters, Inc., 280 F.3d 619, 629 (6th Cir. 2002).
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2.

Second, the McCauslands claim that “the district court erred in granting summary judgment 

on plaintiffs’ equal-protection claim based upon the deposition testimony of the plaintiffs.” 

Appellant Br. at 50. To establish their equal-protection claim, the McCauslands must demonstrate 

that the government treated them “disparately as compared to similarly situated persons” and that 

this disparate treatment “burdens a fundamental right, targets a suspect class, or has no rational 

basis.” Reform Am. v. City of Detroit, 37 F.4th 1138, 1152 (6th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). The 

McCauslands do not claim that the Township has burdened a fundamental right or targeted a 

suspect class, so we review for rational basis. But their claim fails at the first step because they 

have identified no similarly situated comparators.

“When evaluating whether parties are similarly situated, courts should not demand exact 

correlation, but should instead seek relevant similarity.” EJS Props., 698 F.3d at 864–65 (citation 

and internal quotation marks omitted). The McCauslands point in particular to Sam’s Club, also 

in the Corporate Park Overlay District, which “the Township permitted . . . to provide automobile 

services and sell vehicles,” even though the McCauslands were not afforded the same luxury. 

Appellant Br. at 52. 

But their own admissions tacitly concede that Sam’s Club, unlike the McCauslands,

actually applied for the permit it received. Thus, as the district court correctly found, they “failed 

to identify anyone who is similarly situated vis a vis [sic] one critical component – Plaintiffs have 

not identified any other property owner who failed to apply for the approvals they desired” and 

nonetheless received them. R. 80, p. 23, PageID 2268. The McCauslands failed to demonstrate 

that the government treated them disparately as compared to anyone similarly situated, Reform 
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Am., 37 F.4th at 1152, so the district court properly granted summary judgment to the Township 

on equal protection.5

3.

Finally, the McCauslands argue that the district court should not have dismissed their 

federal regulatory-takings claim and their state-law inverse-condemnation claim. But neither claim 

was ripe, so the district court properly dismissed them for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See 

Arnett v. Myers, 281 F.3d 552, 562 (6th Cir. 2002).

A regulatory-takings claim is not ripe until after “the government entity charged with 

implementing the regulations has reached a final decision regarding the application of the 

regulations to the property at issue.” Id. (quoting Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Plan. Comm’n v. 

Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186 (1985), overruled on other grounds by Knick v. Township of 

Scott, 588 U.S. 180 (2019)).6 And under Michigan law, an inverse-condemnation claim is 

“premature[]” until the plaintiff has “obtained a final decision . . . regarding its request.” ElectroTech, Inc. v. H.F. Campbell Co., 445 N.W.2d 61, 77 (Mich. 1989).

The McCauslands, however, identify no final decision from the Township that they wish 

to challenge. Indeed, every final decision they’ve received has been favorable. Instead, the 

McCauslands argue that the district court erred in dismissing their claims because they “alleged a 

5 The McCauslands also ask us to address outdoor storage here, but they provide no evidence for 

their conclusory allegations that other businesses in the area were using their properties for outdoor 

storage beyond the scope of applicable permits. Without evidence that these other businesses 

should have been cited, we cannot find them similarly situated to the McCauslands, and the 

McCauslands cannot use them to establish their equal-protection claim.

6 Prior to Knick, under Williamson, a regulatory-takings claim was not ripe until (1) the government 

reached a final decision, 473 U.S. 172, 186 (1985), and (2) the plaintiff sought compensation 

through state procedures, id. at 194–95. Knick overruled the state-litigation requirement, 588 U.S. 

180, 206 (2019), making a federal forum available to plaintiffs earlier. But it did not disturb 

Williamson’s finality requirement. Id. at 188.
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claim under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause in their complaint” and “sufficient [sic] pled a 

claim for inverse condemnation pursuant to Michigan law.” Appellant Br. at 57, 59. While alleged 

claims might survive dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), see Bell Atl. Corp. 

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), they do not confer subject-matter jurisdiction to survive 

dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1), Wayside Church v. Van Buren County, 847 F.3d 812, 817 (6th Cir. 

2017) (“[W]here subject matter jurisdiction is challenged under Rule 12(b)(1), as it was here, the 

plaintiff has the burden of proving jurisdiction in order to survive the motion.” (emphasis added)

(citation omitted)).

So the district court properly dismissed both the takings claim and the inversecondemnation claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

C.

Aside from their discrete claims against Toebe and the Township, the McCauslands also 

argue that the district court abused its discretion by prematurely granting summary judgment while 

they “sought outstanding discovery.” Appellant Br. at 30–31.7 When reviewing these kinds of 

claims, we consider five main factors: (1) when the appellants learned of the issue subject to the 

desired discovery, (2) if the added discovery would have changed the ruling below, (3) the length 

7 A nonmovant generally opposes motions for summary judgment as premature for lack of 

sufficient discovery through Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d), which requires a showing “by 

affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, [the nonmovant] cannot present facts essential 

to justify its opposition.” After Toebe and the Township moved for summary judgment here, 

however, the McCauslands filed only a motion to compel outstanding discovery, including neither 

the requisite affidavit nor declaration. They discussed this motion at the summary judgment 

hearing, arguing “that summary judgment [wa]s premature at this point.” R. 93, SJ Hr’g Tr., pp. 

5–6, PageID 2403–04. With neither an affidavit nor a declaration filed with the district court, it is 

plausible that the McCauslands have failed to preserve this issue for appellate review. See United 

States v. One Harrington & Richardson Rifle, 378 F.3d 533, 535 (6th Cir. 2004) (order). But 

defendants argue the issue “on the merits.” And plaintiffs don’t prevail in any event.
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of the discovery period, (4) if the appellants were dilatory in their discovery efforts, and (5) if the 

appellees were responsive to discovery requests. CenTra, 538 F.3d at 420.

Here, the discovery period was extended three times and lasted over a year. Although the 

McCauslands complain that the Township “had been dilatory in their efforts to complete 

discovery,” Appellant Br. at 33, they didn’t move to compel discovery until September 10, 2021—

six weeks after the third and final discovery deadline. The McCauslands also had the opportunity 

to depose four Township employees before the summary judgment hearing but after they had filed 

their oppositions to the pending motions for summary judgment. And, at the summary judgment 

hearing, the McCauslands admitted that they were unable to schedule depositions of Toebe 

personnel primarily due to counsel’s schedule. R. 93, SJ Hr’g Tr., p. 6, PageID 2404. That said, 

the McCauslands identify several Township and Toebe personnel that they did not have the chance 

to depose that they believe would have provided relevant factual information.

The McCauslands principally contend that they needed more discovery for their “claim 

that the Township defendants told the Toebe Construction employees to pull off the [water-mainextension] project,” which they claim would bolster their argument that Toebe is constitutionally 

liable as a state actor. Appellant Br. at 34, 39.8 But this was no new issue. It was the basis for their 

constitutional claims against Toebe in the complaint they filed on September 12, 2018—at the very 

beginning of this suit.

8 The McCauslands broadly argue that they needed additional discovery for all of their claims; 

however, they fail to identify the missing information that was relevant to most of those claims.

The one exception is the McCauslands’ assertion that they needed to depose Charles Larocque

because he was “the reason why the plaintiffs’ water main extension project did not go forward.” 

Appellant Br. at 36. This information, however, would not have altered the district court’s 

conclusions—which we affirm on appeal—that the McCauslands’ claims failed due to lack of a 

property interest in a special-use permit, lack of a similarly situated property, and lack of a final 

determination by the Township. See supra Section II.B.
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Finally, but most importantly, additional discovery would not have changed the ruling 

below. Even if discovery revealed that the Township told Toebe not to complete the water-main 

project, the McCauslands have not identified any discovery that would alter the deficiencies in 

their claims: the lack of a property interest in the special-use permit, lack of a similarly situated 

property, and lack of a final determination by the Township. See supra Section II.B.

On this record, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion by declining to 

extend discovery for a fourth time before granting summary judgment to Toebe and the Township.9

III.

For the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM.

9 The McCauslands briefly claim that extra discovery would have “changed the court’s ruling 

below as to” their “request for a writ of mandamus (Count VIII)[, their] state claims for defamation 

(Count IX) and tortious interference with contract and/or business relations (Count X),” and 

supported their Monell claims against the Township. Appellant Br. at 37. But they do not 

accompany these claims with developed argumentation, so we find them forfeited. See McPherson 

v. Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989, 995–96 (6th Cir. 1997).