IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 22-0218

Filed April 13, 2022

IN THE INTEREST OF A.M.,

Minor Child,

C.F., Mother,

Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, Stephen A. Owen, 

District Associate Judge.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to a child. 

AFFIRMED.

Brian T. Bappe of Bappe Law Office, Nevada, for appellant mother.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Toby J. Gordon, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee State.

Andrew Meyer of Newbrough Law Firm, LLP, Ames, attorney and guardian 

ad litem for minor child.

Considered by Bower, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Chicchelly, JJ.
2

VAITHESWARAN, Judge.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to a child, born in 

2020. She contends (1) the department of human services failed to make 

reasonable efforts toward reunification; (2) termination was not in the child’s best 

interests; and (3) she should have been afforded an exception to termination based 

on her bond with the child.

Shortly after his birth, the child “suffered severe head and lung injuries at 

the hands of his father.”

1

 A.M., 2021 WL 5106043, at *1. The district court ordered 

the child removed from parental care. The parents stipulated to his adjudication 

as a child in need of assistance. The court later afforded the mother a six-month 

extension to facilitate reunification. In time, the court ordered termination of her 

parental rights. The child remained out of the mother’s care from the time of 

removal through the termination hearing thirteen months later. 

The mother does not challenge the ground for termination cited by the 

district court. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(h) (2021) (requiring proof of several 

elements, including proof the child cannot be returned to parental custody). But 

her challenge to the department’s reasonable-efforts obligation is effectively a 

challenge to that ground. See In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492–93 (Iowa 2000)

(noting certain specified grounds for termination “contain a common element which 

implicates the reasonable effort requirement” and stating, “The State must show 

 

1 The father’s parental rights were terminated before the mother’s. He appealed, 

and this court affirmed the termination. In re A.M., No. 21-1225, 2021 WL 

5106043, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 3, 2021). An earlier opinion addressed service 

of process on the father. See In re A.M., No. 21-0772, 2021 WL 3660866, at *1 

(Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 18, 2021).
3

reasonable efforts as a part of its ultimate proof the child cannot be safely returned 

to the care of a parent.”).2 We will consider the mother’s reasonable-efforts 

argument in that context.

The mother appears to argue that she was entitled to more visits with the 

child. At the same time, she testified there were no services the department should 

have offered that it did not. In any event, the mother failed to fully participate in 

the visits she was given. The department case manager testified she was 

scheduled for eighteen visits between the previous hearing and the termination 

hearing and she only attended “one or two.” In light of her minimal participation in 

scheduled visits, we conclude the department did not violate its reasonable-efforts 

mandate by failing to increase the number of visits. We further conclude the State 

proved that the child could not be returned to her custody as required by section 

232.116(1)(h).

Termination must be in the child’s best interests. See Iowa Code 

§ 232.116(2). The mother argues termination was not in the child’s best interests 

because “she had routine contact with the child and she was an active participant 

in visitation services.” The number of missed visits undercuts that assertion. The 

mother also contends the child’s father was the parent who was responsible for 

the abuse. True. But the department reported that she “continue[d] to support [the 

child]’s abuser” and had not “gained insight into how continuing a relationship with 

[the child’s] abuser put [the child] in harm’s way.” In the department words, the 

mother “minimize[d] the abuse [the child] endured.”

 

2 The lettering of those grounds was modified following the court’s opinion in that 

case.
4

The mother conceded she “sided with” the father when the department tried 

to “blame” him, even though the child “ended up in the hospital near dead.” Her 

belated recognition that there was “no excuse for” that is less persuasive than the 

department’s assessment of her caretaking abilities. The agency reported that she 

could not “be relied upon to meet all of [the child’s] daily needs and assure [the 

child’s] medical needs” were “met on a consistent basis.” The case manager 

testified, the child would “likely always have these needs” and, given the mother’s 

“lack of engagement . . . throughout the case,” reunification would place him “at 

significant risk of harm.” 

Six additional months of services would not have alleviated the concerns, 

as the mother urges. The mother received a six-month extension, and her 

participation in services during that period waned rather than improved. On our de 

novo review, we conclude termination was in the child’s best interests. 

We are left with the question of whether an exception to termination was 

warranted based on the parent-child bond. See id. § 232.116(3)(c). The child was 

removed from parental care less than three weeks after his birth. The department 

reported that while the mother was “able to be attentive and affectionate towards”

the child during supervised visits, she appeared “to have more of a sibling 

attachment . . . than a parent-child bond.” Given the child’s serious medical needs 

and the mother’s disengagement from services designed to attune her to those 

needs, we conclude the exception to termination was appropriately not invoked.

We affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights to the child.

AFFIRMED.