Filed 8/16/21 In re Jaylen F. CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This opinion has 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re JAYLEN F., A Person

Coming Under the Juvenile 

Court Law.

B311399

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

T.G.,

Defendant and Appellant.

Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No.

18CCJP00780B

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Nichelle Blackwell, Temporary Judge. 

Affirmed.

Linda J. Vogel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,

for Defendant and Appellant.

Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, and Jessica S. Mitchell, Deputy 

County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

INTRODUCTION

T.G. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order 

terminating her parental rights to nine-year old Jaylen F. under 

Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 366.26. She does not 

contest the merits of the court’s decision. Instead, mother argues 

the Department of Children and Family Services (Department) 

did not satisfy its duty of further inquiry under the Indian Child 

Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.; ICWA) because it 

failed to ask her maternal great aunt about Jaylen’s possible 

Native American ancestry. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

An abridged statement of facts is presented because this 

appeal is limited to a single issue regarding compliance with 

ICWA.

Mother has four children: Teanna born in 2002; Dylan born 

in 2007; Aaliyah born in 2008; and Jaylen born in 2012. All four 

children have different fathers. J.F. (father) is Jaylen’s father. 

Only Jaylen is the subject of this appeal; father did not challenge 

the termination of his parental rights to Jaylen.

1. Prior Dependency Proceedings

Since 2004, mother has been involved in numerous 

dependency proceedings pertaining to Teanna, Dylan, and 

Aaliyah based on substantiated allegations of drug abuse, 

physical abuse, emotional abuse, caretaker absence, mental 

health problems, and general neglect. For example, in 2004 

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code.
3

Teanna was detained from mother and declared a dependent of 

the court due to mother’s drug use at the time of the child’s birth 

and mother’s severe anger management problems. As another 

example, in 2010 Dylan and Aaliyah were detained from mother 

and declared dependents of the court due to mother’s auditory 

hallucinations and psychiatric hospitalization. Ultimately, 

mother’s reunification efforts with these children were not 

successful. The court ordered Teanna into a permanent plan of 

legal guardianship. Mother’s parental rights to Dylan were 

terminated and mother never reunified with Aaliyah.

2. Dependency Proceedings Involving Jaylen and 

Compliance with ICWA

In May 2014, Jaylen was detained from mother. The 

following month, the court declared Jaylen a dependent. In 

August 2015, the court terminated jurisdiction over Jaylen with a 

custody order granting sole legal and physical custody to mother.

In February 2017, Jaylen was detained from mother and father.

Two months later, Jaylen was returned to his parents’ custody 

and jurisdiction was terminated.

On February 4, 2018, the family came to the Department’s 

attention again after mother was arrested for trying to gouge out 

father’s eyes and smother him with a blanket while Jaylen and 

Aaliyah were nearby. In response to mother’s arrest, the 

Department initiated this action by filing a petition under section 

300, subdivisions (a) and (b) on behalf of Jaylen and Aaliyah.

According to the ICWA-010(A) forms attached to the petition, on 

February 5, 2018 mother told a Department social worker that 

Jaylen and Aaliyah have no known Indian ancestry. The 

February 7, 2018 detention report confirms that ICWA does not 

apply, and states that when mother was asked about Indian 
4

ancestry she indicated that “there is no ICWA status on the 

family.” Further, based on the Department’s review of the 

CWS/CMS database, on August 16, 2010 another juvenile court 

found that ICWA did not apply to mother.

At the February 8, 2018 detention hearing, mother and 

father appeared and were appointed counsel. Mother’s counsel 

stated, “Your Honor, I believe ICWA findings were made already 

previously for the children Aaliyah and Jaylen. I wasn’t sure if 

the court required them but I can fill [the ICWA-020 forms] out 

after the hearing.” The court replied it needed the forms filled out 

again for mother. The following discussion then took place 

between the court and mother: 

Court: “For mother, do you have any Native American 

Indian ancestry, ma’am?”

Mother: “Yes, I do.”

Court: “What is the tribe?”

Mother: “I haven’t [done] my research yet and got on 

ancestry.com.”

Court: “Oh, how do you know?”

Mother: “History of my grandparents and grandmother.”

Court: “What is the name of the tribe?”

Mother: “I just told you I don’t know. I can’t tell you 

specifically.”

Court: “Tribes are entitled to receive notice when children 

are detained, so we need to have a name of a tribe in order 

to have notice. Do you have contact information?”

Mother: “I’ll definitely get it for you.”

Mother’s counsel informed the court he could provide 

mother with the ICWA-020 form to fill out. Mother replied, “Do I 

got it in my blood? We need that?” The court responded that “at 
5

this time” it would defer ICWA findings as to Jaylen regarding 

mother and noted father had no Indian heritage. While the court 

was making its detention findings, mother stated, “I’m walking 

out.” The court ordered the children detained under the 

Department’s supervision with monitored visitation for the 

parents. The court also ordered the Department to “further 

interview the mother regarding the ICWA issue.”

After the February 8, 2018 hearing, father and mother filed 

their ICWA-020 forms. Father checked the box next to “I have no 

Indian ancestry as far as I know.” Mother checked the box next to 

“I am or may be a member of, or eligible for membership in, a 

federally recognized Indian tribe.” Mother did not, however,

identify a tribe or provide the name and contact information of 

any relative. In addition, mother did not check the box indicating 

that one or more of her parents, grandparents, or other lineal 

ancestors is or was a member of a federally recognized tribe.

On March 27, 2018, a dependency investigator (DI) called 

mother to discuss her claim of possible Indian ancestry. The DI 

began the telephone interview by asking mother about her claim 

of possible Indian ancestry to which mother replied she had 

Native American ancestry. When asked if she knew the name of 

the tribe, mother stated there was supposed to be an 

investigation regarding her heritage and it was not her job to do 

the investigation. After the DI tried to explain the process of 

investigating a parent’s claim of Native American ancestry, 

mother denied knowing what tribe she was affiliated with. The 

DI then asked mother if she could provide the Department with 

the names of any relatives and their telephone numbers for 

purposes of its further investigation into her claim. At first, 

mother said she had the names and telephone numbers of those 
6

relatives. But when the DI asked mother to provide the relatives’ 

information, mother stated “not now.”

Mother and father appeared with counsel at a June 13, 

2018 hearing. During the hearing, the Department informed the 

court the investigation as to mother’s claim of possible Native 

American heritage was still pending. The Department explained 

that although it tried to follow up with mother to obtain more 

information about a particular tribe and any relatives that could 

assist its investigation, mother stated she did not know if she 

could provide the information to the Department.

During the June 13, 2018 hearing, the court asked mother’s 

counsel whether he had ICWA information “[b]ecause my 

understanding of this is that the mother is making contrary 

statements.” Mother’s counsel responded that mother indicated 

the social worker never approached her or never asked her for 

any information. The court replied, “All right. I’m going to make 

a finding that this child [Aaliyah] is not an Indian child and 

neither is the child Jaylen. The mother filed an ICWA document 

[on] February 17, 2017 in [a prior] case when it was first here 

before it closed and she clearly marked the part of the box D, 

stating that she has no [Indian] ancestry, as far as she knows.

Now I see that she did submit another ICWA form on February 8, 

2018, a year later, checking the box that she may be a member or 

eligible for membership in a tribe. Yet, none of that information 

was ever disclosed in 2017. And a finding was made in 2017 that 

the mother denied Indian heritage.” The court added it “will not 

allow parents to play fast and loose with the court by making 

contradictory statements in order to delay proceedings or create 

undue havoc on the proceedings because then [the] doctrine of 

disentitlement will come into play.” The court stated it would 
7

“maintain the previous order and findings made on February 17, 

2017, based on mother’s ICWA statement, which she signed 

under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California 

that she has no Indian heritage.”

The court also determined the Department “is not required 

to give any further notice, because the mother has already stated 

she has no Indian heritage and she made that statement under 

penalty of perjury” and, therefore, the Department “need not 

further investigate this matter.” The court emphasized that if 

any investigation were to be done, it would be a perjury 

investigation regarding mother telling the truth. The court’s June 

13, 2018 minute order states that it “does not have a reason to 

know that [Jaylen] is an Indian Child, as defined under ICWA, 

and does not order notice to any tribe or the BIA. Parents are to 

keep the Department, their Attorney and the Court aware of any 

new information relating to possible ICWA status.”

At the August 1, 2018 jurisdiction and disposition hearing, 

the court found jurisdiction over Jaylen and Aaliyah based upon 

several counts asserted in the first amended petition. As to 

mother, the court sustained count a-1 (history of violent 

altercations between mother and father), counts a-2, b-2, and j-1 

(mother’s physical abuse of Aaliyah), and count c-1 (mother’s 

emotional abuse of Aaliyah). The court found that mother’s 

testimony “is completely without merit and lacks credibility.” The 

court declared the children dependents of the court and found the 

bypass provisions of section 361.5 applied because mother had 

inflicted severe physical abuse on Aaliyah, Jaylen witnessed the 

physical abuse, mother failed to reunify with Teanna and Dylan, 

and mother’s parental rights over Dylan had been severed. The 

court also observed that despite the Department’s extensive 
8

efforts over 14 years to assist mother in providing her children 

with a safe home, those efforts had not helped. All the review 

hearing reports after August 1, 2018 stated that ICWA did not 

apply. 

By January 2019 Jaylen was living in a foster home. On 

February 12, 2019, a social worker spoke with mother’s maternal 

great aunt, Mary J., about having visits with Jaylen. She was 

unable to visit with Jaylen at that time, however, because she 

was in the process of relocating. The record does not indicate 

whether the social worker asked the great aunt if mother or 

Jaylen had Native American ancestry.

In August 2019 Jaylen was placed in the foster home of Ms. 

L. and Mr. C. And in September 2019 mother’s great aunt 

withdrew her Resource Family Approval (RFA) application due to 

her inability to obtain a criminal waiver. Following the 

withdrawal of her RFA application, the great aunt stopped 

visiting Jaylen and no longer had any contact with the child.

Shortly thereafter, the Department recommended Jaylen receive 

permanent placement services while receiving adoptive planning 

in his current placement with Ms. L. and Mr. C. Jaylen continued 

doing well in their home and Ms. L. and Mr. C. remained 

committed to adopting him. He got along well with their family

and did well in school. Due to COVID-19 restrictions, mother had 

inconsistent monitored visits with Jaylen; her most recent visit 

was in November 2020.

After multiple continuances, the court held the contested 

section 366.26 hearing on March 22, 2021. At the beginning of the 

hearing, mother’s counsel informed the court that mother, who 

was present, suggested she wanted to discharge him and 

represent herself because she considered him racist,
9

unprofessional, “and a host other things.” The court responded 

that mother had been very recalcitrant in the past, counsel had 

been very thorough, and this was “simply another ruse” on 

mother’s part to delay the termination of her parental rights. The 

court emphasized that mother “has repeatedly engaged in efforts 

that tend to sabotage Jaylen’s placement.”

During the hearing, mother accused the Department of not 

liking her and being racist. As for the court, mother said “the 

judge needs to be investigated because she’s lying under her own 

oath in the United States, California, in the judicial system.” 

Regarding mother’s purported Indian heritage, mother reminded 

the court it “wouldn’t believe a word I said. Two years ago you 

said you [were] going to find me unbelievable because I told you I 

had Indian in my heritage.” At the end of the hearing the court 

found by clear and convincing evidence that Jaylen was 

adoptable, no exception to adoption applied, and terminated 

mother’s and father’s parental rights. The court also designated

Ms. L. and Mr. C. as Jaylen’s prospective adoptive parents.

Mother filed a timely notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

Mother contends the order terminating her parental rights 

must be reversed because the Department should have further 

inquired of mother’s great aunt about Jaylen’s possible Indian 

heritage. We disagree.

1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

“The section 366.26 hearing is a critical late stage in a 

dependency proceeding. The child has been under juvenile court 

jurisdiction for an extended period following the dispositional 

order, and the court has held one or more review hearings to 
10

consider a return to parental custody. [Citation.] At the section

366.26 hearing, the focus shifts away from family reunification

and toward the selection and implementation of a permanent

plan for the child. [Citation.] ... If adoption is likely, the court is

required to terminate parental rights, unless specified

circumstances compel a finding that termination would be

detrimental to the child.” (In re S.B. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 529, 532.)

“ICWA reflects ‘a congressional determination to protect

Indian children and to promote the stability and security of

Indian tribes and families by establishing minimum federal

standards that a state court ... must follow before removing an

Indian child from his or her family.’ [Citation.] Both ICWA and

the Welfare and Institutions Code define an ‘Indian child’ as ‘any

unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a

member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an

Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian

tribe.’ ” (In re D.F. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 558, 565, fn. omitted

(D.F.).)

A juvenile court has an affirmative and continuing duty to 

determine whether ICWA applies to a child’s dependency 

proceedings. (§ 224.2, subd. (a); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 

5.481(a).) Although the record must show the court considered 

the issue, the court’s finding about whether ICWA applies may be 

express or implied. (In re Asia L. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 498, 

506.) 

The duties imposed by ICWA on the juvenile court and the

county welfare agency can be separated into three phases: (1) a

duty to inquire, (2) a duty of further inquiry, and (3) a duty to

provide ICWA notice. (D.F., supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 566.) The 

initial duty to inquire “includes, but is not limited to, asking the 
11

child, parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family 

members, others who have an interest in the child, and the party 

reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may be, 

an Indian child and where the child, the parents, or Indian 

custodian is domiciled.” (§ 224.2, subd. (b).) In addition to the

initial duty of inquiry, a duty of further inquiry arises if the court 

or social worker “has reason to believe that an Indian child is 

involved in a proceeding.” (Id., subd. (e).) This duty of further 

inquiry includes interviewing parents and extended family 

members to gather certain information, contacting the Bureau of 

Indian Affairs and State Department of Social Services for 

assistance in identifying the tribes in which the child might be a 

member or be eligible for membership, and “[c]ontacting the tribe 

or tribes and any other person [who] may reasonably be expected 

to have information regarding the child’s membership, 

citizenship status, or eligibility.” (Id., subd. (e)(1)‒(2); see Cal. 

Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(4) [same requirements].) Once the 

court or social worker “knows or has reason to know” that an 

Indian child is involved in the dependency proceedings, 

California law requires notice pursuant to ICWA be given to the 

parent, legal guardian, Indian custodian, and the child’s tribe. 

(§ 224.3, subd. (a); see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(c)(1) [notice 

is required “[i]f it is known or there is reason to know [that] an 

Indian child is involved in a proceeding listed in rule 5.480”].) 

When the facts are undisputed, the appellate court

independently reviews whether the requirements of ICWA have

been satisfied. (In re A.M. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 303, 314.) The

appellate court reviews the juvenile court’s ICWA findings under

the substantial evidence test and determines whether the

juvenile court’s order is supported by “reasonable, credible
12

evidence of solid value.” (Ibid.) The juvenile court’s orders and

findings must be upheld if any substantial evidence, contradicted

or uncontradicted, supports them, and all conflicts in the

evidence must be resolved in favor of affirmance. (Ibid.)

2. The juvenile court and the Department satisfied their 

ICWA inquiry obligations.

At the February 8, 2018 detention hearing, mother told the 

court she had Native American ancestry but could not identify a 

tribe or the name and contact information of any relatives who 

could provide that information. In addition, on her ICWA-020

form mother checked the box next to “I am or may be a member 

of, or eligible for membership in, a federally recognized Indian 

tribe” but did not identify a tribe or provide the name and contact 

information of any relative. Based on mother’s statements, the 

court deferred making ICWA findings and ordered the 

Department to interview mother regarding ICWA. By doing so, 

the court concluded, in effect, that the information provided by 

mother had triggered the duty of further inquiry.

Citing In re Austin J. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 870, the

Department argues mother’s vague and evasive statements that

she may have Indian ancestry did not trigger a duty of further

inquiry. In Austin J., the Court of Appeal concluded that

statements by the mother, both orally and on her ICWA-020

form, that she may have Cherokee ancestry, and similar

statements by the maternal aunt, did not trigger the duty of

further inquiry. (Id. at pp. 888–889.) The court held: “[T]he fact

disclosed through the social worker’s initial inquiry regarding the

possibility that the children are Indian children—that Mother

may have Cherokee ancestry—is insufficient by itself to provide a

reason to believe that either the children or their parents are
13

members of, or eligible for membership in, an Indian tribe.

Therefore, the statute imposed no duty to make further inquiry.”

(Id. at p. 889.)

In In re T.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 275 the Court of Appeal

disagreed with Austin J.’s conclusion that a mere possibility of

Indian ancestry was not enough to trigger the duty of further

inquiry. (T.G., at p. 294.) The T.G. court concluded the phrase

“reason to believe” must be interpreted broadly such that a

parent’s affirmative statement of Indian ancestry alone

constitutes a reason to believe an Indian child may be involved

and triggers the duty of further inquiry. (Id. at pp. 294–297.)

We need not weigh in on the conflict between Austin J. and

T.G. because the juvenile court in this case directed the 

Department to conduct an ICWA inquiry and, we conclude, the 

Department satisfied its duty of further inquiry.

The first time anyone suggested mother or Jaylen had 

Indian ancestry was mother’s off-handed comment at the 

February 2018 detention hearing that mother thought she had 

Native American Indian ancestry based on her grandparents’ 

background. But that comment was followed by mother’s 

statement that she did not know the name of the tribe and would 

provide the court with contact information at another time. And 

mother’s subsequently filed ICWA-020 form provided no facts to 

support her claim of possible Indian ancestry. For his part, father 

reported having no known Indian ancestry.

On March 27, 2018, a Department investigator called 

mother to discuss her claim of possible Indian ancestry. When 

asked if she knew the name of the tribe, mother did not know 

what tribe she was affiliated with and stated it was not her job to 

do the investigation. The investigator then asked mother if she 
14

could provide the Department with the names of any relatives 

and their telephone numbers for purposes of its further 

investigation into her claim. Mother initially indicated she had 

the names and telephone numbers of relatives. When pressed by 

the investigator to provide the names and telephone numbers of 

those relatives, however, mother stated “ ‘not now.’ ”

Moreover, during the June 13, 2018 hearing, the 

Department informed the court that although it tried to follow up 

with mother to obtain more information about a particular tribe 

and any relatives that could assist its investigation, mother did 

not know if she could provide the information to the Department. 

Mother and her attorney attended the June 13 hearing, and 

neither suggested mother had any additional information on 

possible Indian ancestry. There is also no indication in the record 

that mother provided the Department additional information 

about her possible Indian heritage at a subsequent hearing, or 

during a subsequent conversation with a Department social 

worker or investigator.

To be sure, mother contends that at some point after the 

June 13, 2018 hearing, the Department had reason to know or 

believe Jaylen was an Indian child and it failed to ask mother’s 

great aunt about the child’s possible Native American ancestry.

We have several responses to this argument. First, as mother 

acknowledges, great aunts are not considered “extended family 

members” under ICWA. Thus, the duty to further inquire under 

ICWA did not extend to mother’s great aunt and, in any event, 

there is no basis to conclude she had any information about 

mother’s or Jaylen’s possible Indian ancestry. (See In re D.S. 

(2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1053; 25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); § 224.1, 

subd. (c).)
15

Second, on June 13, 2018 the court made an express finding 

that mother’s claim of Indian ancestry was not credible and this 

finding is supported by substantial evidence. (See In re N.M.

(2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 253, 261–262, 267 [notice not required 

where juvenile court found the mother’s claims of tribal 

affiliation not credible].) The juvenile court case file contained the 

2010 finding that ICWA was not applicable, as well as mother’s 

February 17, 2017 representation in another dependency case 

and February 5, 2018 representation in this case that mother and 

Jaylen have no Indian ancestry. Mother presents no reason why 

the court could not reasonably rely on this evidence to make a 

finding ICWA does not apply. Instead, she focuses on the absence 

of evidence that, after June 13, 2018, the Department made any 

further inquiry regarding her renewed claim of Indian ancestry. 

Viewed either as a substantial evidence issue or as a duty of 

inquiry issue, mother has shown no error. The court’s implicit

finding made at the March 2021 section 366.26 hearing that 

ICWA does not apply remains supported by the court’s prior June 

2018 finding and mother’s prior representations. At most, by 

March 2021 there was a conflict in the evidence concerning 

mother’s or Jaylen’s possible Indian heritage. Certainly, the court 

could reasonably find mother’s vague assertion of possible Indian 

ancestry not credible when made with no supporting new 

information and when mother had previously admitted having no 

Indian ancestry. Thus, substantial evidence supports the implicit 

finding there was no reason to know or believe Jaylen is or may 

be an Indian child when the court terminated mother’s parental 

rights in March 2021.

2

2 Because the information available to the Department after its further 
16

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

LAVIN, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

EGERTON, J.

HILL, J.*

inquiry did not meet any of the statutory reason-to-know criteria of 

section 224.2, subdivision (d), the duty to give formal ICWA notice 

under section 224.3 never arose.

* Judge of the Santa Barbara County Superior Court, assigned by the 

Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 

Constitution.