NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

 v.

GERMAN ACOSTA-SALINAS,

 Defendant - Appellant.

No. 13-10452

D.C. No. CR 12-1495-TUC-CKJ

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Cindy K. Jorgenson, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted August 11, 2014

San Francisco, California

Before: SILVERMAN and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges, and WATSON, District 

Judge.** 

 

 *

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

 ** The Honorable Derrick Kahala Watson, District Judge for the U.S. 

District Court for the District of Hawaii, sitting by designation.

German Acosta-Salinas appeals his conviction by conditional guilty plea and 

sentence for illegal reentry after deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. He 

FILED

AUGUST 25 2014

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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challenges both the district court’s (1) denial of his 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d) motion 

collaterally attacking his prior deportation, and (2) 16-level sentencing 

enhancement based on a prior conviction for a “crime of violence.” 

The denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d) 

involves mixed questions of law and fact; we review the legal claims de novo and 

the district court’s findings of fact for clear error. United States v. Ramos, 623 F.3d 

672, 679-80 (9th Cir. 2010). We review de novo the district court’s determination 

that a prior conviction constitutes a “crime of violence” under the United States 

Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”). United States v. Gonzalez-Monterroso, 745 

F.3d 1237, 1243 (9th Cir. 2014). We affirm.

Acosta-Salinas moved to dismiss the indictment pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1326(d), arguing that his prior conviction for sexual abuse under Arizona Revised 

Statutes (“A.R.S.”) § 13-1404 was not a crime involving moral turpitude and that 

the immigration judge therefore incorrectly advised him that he was ineligible for 

relief. We apply the modified categorical approach. See United States v. 

Quintero-Junco, 754 F.3d 746, 751-52 (9th Cir. 2014). Pursuant to that approach, 

and upon consideration of Acosta-Salinas’ record of conviction, we conclude that 

both the immigration judge and district court correctly determined Acosta-Salinas’ 

sexual abuse conviction to be a crime of moral turpitude because Acosta-Salinas’ 
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intended sexual contact with the adult victim was without her consent and actually 

harmed her. See Gonzalez-Cervantes v. Holder, 709 F.3d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 

2013). The district court properly denied Acosta-Salinas’ Motion Challenging Prior

Deportation.

Acosta-Salinas also argues that his conviction for sexual abuse is not a 

“forcible sex offense” and that the district court erred in applying a 16-level 

enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) for a “crime of violence.” A 

conviction under A.R.S. § 13-1404 for non-consensual sexual contact with a person 

over fifteen years of age is a “forcible sex offense,” such that it constitutes a “crime 

of violence” for purposes of the enhancement. See Quintero-Junco, 754 F.3d at 

753-54. The sentence imposed by the district judge was not in error.

AFFIRMED.