VIETNAM STUDIES 

The 'War in the 

Northern Provinces 

1966-1968 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 
VIETNAM STUDIES 

THE WAR IN THE 

NORTHERN PROVINCES 

1966-1968 

by 

Lieutenant General Willard Pearson 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

WASHINGTON, D.C., 1991 
Library of CongTess Catalog Number: 75--23360 

First Printed 1975----CMH Pub 90-24 

.'(11'" salt by tht Supc::rinu:ndtnt or DocumC'IIU, U.S. rrnmrm Printing Officr 

\\'uhington. D,C. 20402 
Foreword 

The United States Army has met an unusually complex challenge in Southeast Asia. In conjunction with the other services, 

the Army has fought in support of a national policy of assisting an 

emerging nation to develop governmental processes of its own 

choosing. free of outside coercion. In addition to the usual problems 

of waging armed conflict, the assignment in Southeast Asia has 

required superimposing the immensely sophisticated tasks of a 

modem army upon an underdeveloped environment and adapting 

them to demands covering a wide spectrum. These involved helping to fulfill the basic needs of an agrarian population, dealing 

with the frustrations of antiguerrilla operations, and conducting 

conventional campaigns against well-trained and determined regular units. 

Although this assignment has officially ended. the U.S. Army 

must prepare for olher challenges that may lie ahead. While cog· 

niunt that history never repeats itself exact1y and that no army 

ever profited from trying to meet a new challenge in terms of the 

old one, the Anny nevertheless stands to benefit immensely from 

a study of i.ts experience, its shortcomings no less than its achievemenu. 

Aware that some years must elapse before the official histories 

will provide a detailed and objective analysis of the experience in 

Southeast Asia, we have sought a forum whaeby some of the more 

salient aspects of that experience can be made available now. At 

the request of the Chief of Staff, a representative group of ~nior 

officers who ~rved in important posLs in Vietnam and who will 

carry a heavy burden of day-to-day responsibilities has prepared a 

~ries of monographs. These studies should be of great value in 

helping the Army develop future operational concepts while at 

the same time contributing to the historical record and providing 

the American public with an interim report on the performance 

of men and officen who have responded, as others have through 

our history, to exacting and trying demands. 

All monographs in the series are based primarily on official 

records, with additional material from published and unpublished 

secondary works, from debriefing reporu and interviews with key 

participanu. and from the personal experience of the author. To 

ill 
facilitate security clearance, annotation and detailed bibliography 

have been omitted from the published version; a fully documented 

account with bibliography is filed with the U.s. Army Center of 

Military History. 

The reader should be reminded that most of the writing was 

accomplished while the war in Vietnam was at its peak, and the 

monographs frequently refer to events of the past as if they were 

taking place in the present. 

The author of this monograph, Lieutenant General Willard 

Pearson, played a significant role in the events he so graphically 

describes. During the Tel offensive of 1968 he organized a MACV 

Forward Command Post and directed its deployment to Phu Bai 

in the 1 Corps Tactical Zone. He later served as Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff of XXIV Army Corps, an enlarged and 

reorganized outgrowth of MACV Forward. In 1966, on an earlier 

tour of duty in Vietnam, General Pearson commanded the lst 

Brigade of the IOlst Airborne Division. Under General Pearson's 

command, the brigade saw action in ten different provinces and 

earned a Presidential Unit Citation. A veteran of World War II 

and the Korean conflict, General Pearson is presently Superintendent of the Valley Forge Military Academy and Jr. College, Wayne, 

Pennsylvania. 

15 March 1974 

Washington, D.C. 

iv 

VERNE L. BOWERS 

Major General, USA 

The Adjutant General 
Preface 

The North Vietnamese Army units deployed just north of the 

demilitarized zone in 1966 posed a serious and continuing threat to 

the security of Quang Tri and Thua Thien, the two northernmost 

provinces of South Vietnam. This is an account of the North Viet· 

namese attempts to seize control of these two provinces and of the 

responst: of the Free World Military Assistance Forces. The period 

covered by this narrative is from the spring of 1966 to the spring 

'of 1968 and is the story, primarily. of U.S. Army units. 

Particular appreciation is due Major John F. Reid, Infantry, 

who researched and compiled the initial draft of the narrative and 

Specialist 7 Gary L. Neal, who was the author's stenographer during 

the critical months of the Tet offensive at Phu Bai in February 

and March 1968 and who four years later typed the final draft for 

the author at Headquarters, V Corps, Frankfurt, Germany. 

Wayne. Pennsylvania 

15 March 1974 

v 

W1LLARD PEARSON 

Lieutenant General, US Anny 

Contents 

Chapter 

I. EARLY DEVELOPMENTS 

Background .. . . . . .. . ......... ... . 

The Northern Border, 1965-1967 ..... ... . ....... . 

Continuing Activity Along the Demilitarhed Zone 

II. PREPARING FOR A SHOWDOWN ...... . 

The Anti-Infiltration System .... . . 

Free World FOf'tes ..... . 

The Growth 0/ Logistic Facilities . ................. . 

Upgrading of the Jlietnamese Army Forces . ... . 

111. THE BLEAK PICTURE ....................... . 

Operation Niagara. ... . ........... . .. . . 

The BaHle of Kht Sanh-Opening Round .. 

The Tet Offensive-First Phase .............. . 

The BaHle for Hue ..... . . . . . . .. . ............ . 

Intelligence .. .... .... .. . .. .. . . . .......... . 

Battle fOT Quang TTj .............. . 

Enemy Attacks on the Logistical System ... . 

Task Force Clearwater .. . ........... . ......... . 

IV. U.S. RESPONSE TO THE TET OFFENSIVE 

Planning lor the Reliel 01 Khe Sanh ......... ...... . 

Single Manager lor Air Concept . ........... ........ . 

V. KHE SANH AND PEGASUS .. . .................. . 

VI. 

VU. 

Planning for Pegasus ... . .................... . 

Operation Orders .. ......... . .. .. .... ........ . 

THE FREE WORLD COUNTEROFFENSIVE .. . 

Opening 0peTalions ......................... . 

Bacle. to A Shau ..... ............. . 

ANALYSIS OF NORTH VIETNAMESE GOALS AND 

FAILURES .. 

Intelligence ... ............ . . .................. . 

Organization for Combat ...... . ..•••... . .. •. . . .... 

Airmobility ................... . ... . ... . .... .. . 

Supe-rior Firepower ............................... . 

Communications ... . ......................... . 

Logistics .................. . ................. . 

Improuem'ent 0/ Vietnamese Armed Forces . ... .. . . . 

vii 

Page 

3 

3 

6 

15 

21 

21 

2. 

26 

28 

29 

31 

32 

37 

39 

48 

50 

57 

62 

66 

68 

71 

73 

78 

79 

81 

81 

89 

93 

97 

98 

101 

101 

102 

102 

103 
The Other War 

Conclusion 

GLOSSARY 

INDEX 

Charts 

P(Jge 

105 

107 

108 

III 

No. Pagt 

J. U.S. fI,'larine and Popul;u' Forces Combined Action Platoon 

Organization Headquarters 25 

2. Khe Sanh Task. Force-january- March 1968 36 

3. 1st Air Ca\'alry Division Organil.ation for Operation PEGASUS 82 

4. Buildup of Opposing Maneuver Battalions in I Corps Tactical Zone 98 

5. Su bordinate Units to 3d Marine Amphibious Force 100 

6. 1 Corps Vietnamese Organization 104 

Diagrams 

I. Linear Obstacle 

2. Sample Tactical Application 

Maps 

I . I Corps Tactical Zone .. 

2. Northern Quang Tri Province 

3. Hill Fight Area 

4. Hill Fights, April-May 1967 

5. Enemy Operations.--Khe Sanh, December 

1968 . 

I 967-january 

6. The Baule of Hue-Enemy Anack, 30-31 january 1968 .... 

7. The Battle of Hue- Friendly Situation, 24-25 February 

1968 . .. .. .. . ...... . .... .. ...... ... . . 

8. The Battle of Quang Tri City- Enemy Attack, 31 january 

1968 ... . . . . . . ..... . 

9. The Battle of Quang Tri City---Counterauack, 31 januaryI February 1968 .. .... . .. . 

10. The Baule of Lang Vei- Enemy Attack, 7 February 1968 

11. Relief of Khe Sanh- Operation PEGASUS, I April 1968 

12. Relief or Khe Sanh- Operation PEGASUS, 2-4 April 1968 

13. Relief of Khe Sanh- Operation PECA ~US , 5-6 April 1968 

14. Relief of Khe Sanh-Operation PEGASUS, 7-8 April 1968 

15. The Battle of A Shau Valley- Friendly Situation, 19 April12 May 1968 .. ....... . 

viii 

22 

24 

5 

10 

16 

17 

42 

52 

54 

74 

84 

86 

87 

88 

90 
Illustrations 

Aerial View of A Shau Spttial Forces Camp . 

17S-mm. Gun .......................... . 

Headquarters, Task. Force Oregon, at Chu Lai . . .. . 

Aerial View of Khe Sanh in Quang Tri ......... , .. 

Balance Pressure Sensor System ......... . ........•.•. . .••.. 

Aerial View of Highway North of Da Nang . .. .. . .. .. .. . 

Aerial View of Section of Citadel Wall in Hue . . . . . . . .. . .... . 

Aerial View of Ruins of Hue ...... . ..... . ........... . .... . 

Aerial View of Quang Tri ................... . ..... . 

UH-l B Gunship of ht Cavalry Division .............. . 

U.s. Engineen Repairing Approach to Brid~ . . . . .. 

A LARC--S Comes Ashore ............ . . ................ . 

LARC--S Operators Off Wunder ~ach .................... . 

Cargo Craft and Patrol Boat ....... . ... . .......... , ..... . 

River Patrol Boat .......... . . .. . .......... . 

Landing Craft. Medium .. . . . .. .. 

The 1st Cavalry Division Disembarks 

sion ......... . .......... . 

From UH-l for a Misp .. , 

7 

II 

12 

19 

25 

27 

58 

48 

51 

56 

57 

60 

61 

62 

63 

64 

85 

THE WAR IN 

THE NORTHERN PROVINCES 

CHAPTER I 

Early Developments 

Background 

Quang Tri and Thua Thien, the northernmost provinces of the 

Republic of Vietnam, are m OTe than 450 miles from Saigon, the 

capital. They are bordered on the north by the demilitarized zone, 

on the south by Quang Nam Province, on the east by the South 

China Sea, and on the west by the mountainous Laotian frontier. 

Except for the narrow piedmont coastal plains, the terrain is 

dominated by hills and the Annamite Mountains. The highlands, 

characterized by steep slopes, sharp crests, and narrow valleys, are 

covered mainl y by a dense broadleaf evergreen forest. Most of the 

peaks aTe from 4,000 to 7,000 feet high, but some rise above 8,000 

feet. The narrow coastal plains flanking the highlands on the east 

are compartmented by rocky headlands and consist of belts of sand 

dunes and, in areas where the soil is suitable, rice fi elds. 

From the crests that mark the drainage divide in the highlands, 

streams flow either east towards the South China Sea or west into 

Laos or Cambodia. Those flowing eastward are swift and follow 

short courses through deep narrow valleys over rocky bottoms until 

they reach the coastal plains, where they slow down and disperse 

over silty and sandy bottoms. The westward flowing streams follow 

longer traces, sometimes through deep canyons, other times through 

poorly drained valleys that. like the coastal plains in the east, are 

subject to seasonal flooding. 

From a military point of view, operations were most affected by 

the rugged, forested mountains and hills, and the seasonally flooded 

lowland plains with their dense pattern of agricultural features. 

]t was in the canopied forest, steep rugged mountains, dense undergrowth, and jungle along the demilitarized zone at the Rock Pile, 

Khe Sanh, and A Shau that much of the heavy fighting was to 

take place. 

Weather played a dominant role in operations--particularly 

d uring the Tel offensive and subsequent opera tions at Khe Sanh 

and A Shau. The northeastern coast of South Vietnam and the 

adjacent Laotian panhandle are under the prevailing influence of a 

monsoon climate characterized by distinct wet and dry seasons. 
4 THE WAR IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES 

Generall y, the time of the southwest monsoon [rom May through 

September is a dry, hot. and dusty season in the mountain plateau 

and plains of the nonheast coast. Across the mountains to the west 

in the Laotian panhandle, this same season brings heavy and frequent prec ipitation, high humidity, maximum cloudiness of the 

cumulus type permitting relatively good visibility and, except 

at the greater elevations, high tempera tures. In contrast the north· 

east monsoon from November to mid-March carries th e wet season to the coastal region of Vietnam whil e across the mountains 

in Laos the weather is hot and dry. During the wei season in the 

northern provinces temperatures often drop to 45 degrees, requiring issuance of warm clothing to the troops-an important logistical 

consideration. 

Separating these major seasons are short transitional periods. 

From January through April the mountain pl ateau and northeast 

coast are also subject to the "crachin," a period of low cloud, fog, 

and drizzle or light rain which reduces ce ilings and visibility. 

Another aspect of the weather is the combination of torrential 

rain and flash floods, which created flood conditions for units in 

base areas and on the march alike. The floods COSt lives. damaged 

and destroyed property, and remained a contingency that commanders always had to be prepared to meet. In I Corps Tactical 

Zone both the northeast and the sourneaSl monsoons exerted an 

influence on military operations unmatched elsewhere in Vietnam. 

Transportation facilities in the region were poorly developed. 

Only one all-weather road, Route 9, connected the coast of Quang 

Tri province with the western mountains. In Thua Thien an ex· 

tremely primitive road, Route 547, ran south and west from 

Hue into the A Shau Valley. The major north·south rood was High. 

way I, which Tan nOTth from the port of Da Nang in Quang Nam 

Province through the Hai Van Pass to Hue. From Hue the road 

continued north through the towns of Quang Tri and Dong Ha to 

Cio Linh, almost at the demilitarized zone, thence on into North 

Vietnam. North of the Hai Van Pass there were no all-weather 

ports, (M.p 1) 

By far the most important city in the region was Hue, the 

ancient imperial capital of Vietnam in Thua Thien Province about 

twelve kilometers from the sea. A city with a population of more 

than 100,000, it was the center of a serious Buddhist uprising in 

March of 1966. 

The war in Vietnam was a fluid one with no front lines. The 

enemy was tough, versatile. tenacious, and cunning. He possessed 

strong entrenchments in the villages, mountain hideouts. and jungle 

redoubts. He was difficult to find and identify. At one end of the 
EARLY DEVELOPMENTS 5 

I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE 

---- _ .... ,--. ___ ""'''''0 __ ', 

"' -""-'>f J. '" , 0 'I --r--"~"" ,i, .. """",,". " 

L. ... os 

II CORPS 

MAP 1 

sp«trum he merged into the civilian population as an agent or 

guerrilla or civil official wearing no uniform, unarmed, and supported by a military political organization. At the other end of the 

spectrum he was a uniformed member of the regular North Vietnamese Army. The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong fighters 

possessed as much courage and motivation as any foe to face the 

American soldier. They proved a formidable adversary. 

The composition of the U.S. military forces opposing the North 

Vietnamese was heterogeneous. The U.S. Marine Corps units were 

the .first committed. As the enemy threat developed, U.S. Army 

artillery units were deployed north to reinforce the marines. The 

artillery was followed by other tactica l, combat support, and combat service support elements, including a chemical smoke generator 

company. These, like the artillery reinforcements, came under 
6 THE WAR IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES 

o~rational contl"ol of the commanding general of the III Marine 

AmphihjC'us Force. The U.S. Navy provided logistical support for 

the marines from lhe sea as well as along the inland waterways. 

Air operations were undertaken by the Air Force. Navy, Marine 

Corps, and Vietnamese Air Force while the Army and Marine 

Corps furnished helicopter units. 

It was necessary to integrate these diverse U.S. forces with the 

equally diverse Vietnamese forces that included the Army of Vietnam, Regional Forces, Popular Forces, Civilian Irregular Defense 

Group. Vietnamese Air Force, and Navy elements. All came under 

Vietnamese commanders responsive to headquarters in Saigon. 

The demilitarized zone served as a line of demarcation between 

air and ground commanders. The air forces were responsible for 

the area north of the zone and the grou nd forces for the area south 

of it. Initially Marine gound elements had to obtain authority from 

the Air Force before firing counterbattery fire against North Vietnamese Army artillery just across the demilitarized zone and well 

within range of Marine Corps artillery. Later, responsibility for the 

area north of the zone was given to the Marine forces out to the 

range of their artillery, and thereafter, the U.S. Air Force coordinated with the ground troops prior to ex.ecuting strikes in 

the area falling within range of the Marine artillery. 

The Northern Border, /965-/967 

The first American combat forces were committed to the I 

Corps Tactical Zone in March of 1965 when two U.S. Marine battalions landed at Da Nang. Initially employed for the defense of 

the airbase at that city, lhe Marine battalions began limited offensive operations in April. 

By the end of June 1965 the Marine strength had increased to 

seven battalions and was designated the III Marine Amphibious 

Force, under the command of Major General Lewis W. Walt, who 

also commanded the Third Marine Division. Operating from bases 

at Chu wi, Da Nang, and Phu Sai near Hue, the Marines conducted operations against the enemy. The most successfu l of these, 

Operation STARLICHT, resulted in the virtual destruction of two 

enemy battalions trapped against the South China Sea near Chu 

wi. 

By the spring of 1966, however, a new threat developed as the 

enemy began preparations for what appeared to be a major attack 

across the demilitarized zone. The enemy opened his offensive in 

March 1966 when the 95B and tOlC Regiments of the North Vietnamese Army attacked a Special Forces camp located in the remote 

A Shall Valley in western Thua Thien province. 
EARLY DEVELOPMENTS 7 

AulAL VIEW Of' A SHAU SPECIAL FORCES CAMP 

After three days of valiant and heavy fighting in extreme 

weather, the Civilian Irregul ar Defense Group forces and a small 

detachment of U.S. and Vietnamese Special Forces abandoned the 

camp. Men of the Special Forces, Marine, Air Force, and Army helicopter units performed bravely in supporting and withdrawing 

these troops. Short of troops and helicopters and threatened by a 

major invasion along the demilitarized zone, General William C. 

Westmoreland, Commander, U.S. Military Assistance command, 

Vietnam, decided against reinforcing or reoccupying the remote 

camp of A Shau. Two years would pass before any Free World 

Forces would be able to return to this valley. After the United 

States abandoned the camp. North Vietnamese moved into 

the A Shau Valley and began to develop major logistical bases and 

to construct roads into Laos to tie in with the extensive network 

of trafficable routes leading [rom North Vietnam. During 1966, 

more than 58,000 men, the equal of five divisions, infiltrated South 

Vietnam. The enemy's strength throughout South Vietnam at the 

end of 1966 exceeded 280,000 and was augmented with an esti· 

mated 80,000 additional political cadre. 

As the number of enemy personnel increased, so too did the 
8 THE WAR IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES 

quality of encmy anns. A marked increase in the number of lightweight RPG2 rocket launchers which had been first employed in 

1964 was noted. In attacks against the Special Forces camp at Khe 

Sanh and Ute Da Nang Airfield in January 1966, the use of 120-mm. 

mortars almost doubled the distance hom which the enemy could 

conduct mortar attacks against these Free World installations. This 

ability sharply magnified U.S. base defense problems. Viet Cong 

and local guerrilla forces began to appear with the AK47, a Chinese 

Communist copy of the Soviet AK47 assault rifle. a highly effective 

automatic weapon. 

U.S. commanders marked the infiltration of new enemy divi· 

sions and lhe stOCkpiling of equipment. In studying the enemy 

situation General Westmoreland concluded that the enemy intended to open a new front in nonhern I Corps to divert Free 

World Forces from the heavily populated region around Saigon 

which was the enemy's preferred objective. General Westmoreland 

also believed that the enemy hoped to seize and hold the northern 

areas as a base for a so-called. liberation regime that could be parlayed into a winning "compromise" in future peace talks. The ultimate goal appeared to be the seizure of complete control of the two 

northern provinces. From the enemy point of view. the northern 

provinces of I Corps had advantageous feaLUres. Thua Thien province was in a state of critical political unrest, and the South Vietnamese government control of the province was severely challenged 

by dissident elements. From March until mid-summer of 1966. the 

government experienced a series of political crises as the Struggle 

Movement of militant Buddhists and sLUdents resorted to riots and 

civil disorders throughOut the country; the situation was particularly acute in Hue and Da Nang. 

The antigovernment movement was infiltrated by Communists 

and it appeared at the time to be taking over the northern portion 

of the country. In an effort to quell the trouble, the Saigon government removed the I Corps Commander, Lieutenant General 

Nguyen Chanh Thi, but mass protests nevertheless spread and continued until mid-summer. 

Premier Nguyen Cao Ky flew to Da Nang in an attempt to end 

the rebdlion there. In mid-April, a national political congress met 

in Saigon to adopt a program designed to meet the Buddhists' demands. The demonstrations soon ended, and by mid-May government troops regained control of Da Nang. Even so. the' aftermath 

of biuerness and disaffection lingered. and the loyalty of many 

Vietnamese army troops in the northern region remained questionable since some had actively supported the rebel movement. 

One other factor which drew the attention of the Communists 
EARLY DEVELOPMENTS 9 

to northern I Corps was its proximity to North Vietnam and the 

subsequent need for shorter land routes for resupply and reinforcement. 

In early 1966, the Communists transferred Quang Tri and Thua 

Thien provinces from their Region Five headquarters in the Central Highlands and placed them under Region Four, which included 

the area just north or the demilitarized zone in North Vietnam. 

This move was considered a possible indication that the Communists hopt:d to place the two provinces within North Vietnam's 

boundary as a bargaining point in any peace negotiations. The fact 

that the city of Hue is in one of these provinces was of considerable 

importance, and, to this day, Hue remains the traditional cultural 

and religious center of South Vietnam and of great psychological 

importance to the Vietnamese. 

With North Vietnamese entering Quang Tri province from the 

north and west in divisional strength and with the U.S. Marines, 

U.S. Army, and South Vietnamese pushing north and west from the 

coast, a major clash seemed inevitable. The Free World Forces had 

watched the enemy buildup and advance closely from March 

through June and by mid-July were prepared to act. 

Opera.tion Hastings 

The major clash between the allies and the invading North 

Vietnamese occurred in July 1966. For several weeks before this 

time Marine reconnaissance teams had been sighting groups of 

North Vietnamese near the village of Cam La in the east central 

part of Quang Tri Province. By early July reconnaissance teams in 

the Cam La area were almost invariably finding themselves in contact with large enemy unitS. Interrogation of prisoners and analyses 

of captured enemy documents confirmed that no fewer than 5,000 

regulars of the 324B Division of the North Vietnamese Army were 

in South Vielnam. preparing to overrun Quang Tri Province. 

To counter the coming attack General Walt, Commander of 

the III Marine Amphibious Force, had available only one reinforced Marine division, the Third, a Vietnamese Army division, 

the First, and some smaller Vietnamese Marine units. General 

Walt's other Marine division, the First. was fully occupied with 

security and pacification operations in southern I Corps. 

On July II, the Marine and South Vietnamese commanders met 

in Hue to plan an operation to counter the enemy threat. The 

direct result was Operation HASTINGS, the largest operation of the 

war to date and one involving more than 8,000 Marines. 3.000 

South Vielnamese, and perhaps as many as 12,500 enemy troops. 

The operation. under the command of Brigadier General 1..0-
10 

, 

\ 

, 

v. 

MAP 2 

THE WAR IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES 

, 111 .. ~1£ T •••• 

.' , , NORTHERN QUANG TRI 

PROVINCE 

-_ 

Of'fRATION HASTINGS 

Q-C :::, ... 

... _--- 00 .. __ - • .,,,.., 

_~_"" __ n ......... ,_ 

well E. English, United States Marine Corps. began at 0800 on 

July 15 when lhe Marines executed a heliborne assault to secure 

landing sites to the rear of the North Vielnamese positions. (Map 

2) The first lift enjoyed a relatively uneventful landing. but contact became heavy as subsequent lifts touched down. Using these 

contactS and intelligence acquired by reconnaissance units of both 

the Marines and Vietnam Anny, the commanders were able to 

position forces in areas where they could achieve excellent results. 

Many enemy positions were ovelTun and large quantities of equipment, clothing. and other supplies were captured. 

The enemy initially chose to stand and fight but soon revised 

his thinking and attempted 10 evade the Marine and Vietnamese 

Army forces. The marines uncovered several recently abandoned 

company-size bivouac areas with everything inlact except the weapons, indicating that a large unit \ ... as probably trying to evade the 

task force. A regimental. or division-size command post was discovered with supplies for 500 men in the Dong Ha Mountains. It 

was surmised that Operation HASTINCS had pre-empted a major 

enemy attack. U.S. forces, together with the Vietnamese, had joined 

the battle with sufficient knowledge about the enemy to hold the 

initiative from lhe first day. 
EARLY DEVELOPMENTS 11 

175.UM. GUN 

The Continui71g Threat of Invasion 

By the end of July the 324B Division was withdrawing across 

the demilitarized zone to North Vietnam. Certain elements of the 

division had suffered severely, but the division itself remained intact. The North Vietnamese had been forced into action before 

they had completed their deployment, but they retained their unity 

and control. Other North Vietnamese units which had not been 

involved in the battle remained poised in remote mountain retreats or just across the border. 

Late in August the 324B Division of the North Vietnamese 

Army returned to Quang Tri Province, positioning itself deep in 

the jungles of the westero mountains. The Marines countered 

with Operation PRAIRIE, an extensive project designed to check the 

threat of another Communist move into the populated eastern 

region. 

By October the marines had been forced to shift more of their 

forces north to the demilitarized area. Third Marine Division 

Headquarters was moved from Da Nang to Phu Bat near Hue with 

a forward commmand post at Dong Ha while the First Marine 

Division was stretched to cover all of I Corps south of Thua Thien. 
12 THE WAR IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES 

HEADQUARTERS, TASK. FORCE OREGON, AT Guu LAI 

At this point the first U.S. Army combat unitS were introduced 

into the northern I Corps Tactical Zone. They consisted of several 

batteries with 175-mm. guns and IOS·mm. self-propelled howitzers. 

These were employed to provide long-range fire support. bombardment into and across the demilitarized zone, or, in the case of the 

howitzers, direct support (or ground troops. More substantial reinforcements would be needed if the northern provinces were to be 

held. The enemy had increased his forces in I Corps from 23 main 

force battalions in the summer of 1966 to 52 by the end of the year. 

General Walt, with his forces stretched to the limit and short of helicopter and logistical assets, was unable to do more than hold his 

own. 

Planm'ng for Reinforcements 

During February and March of 1967 the level of combat ro~ 

sharply in the demilitarized zone area as the marines attempted to 

keep the enemy off balance. On 25 February General Westmore· 

land granted permission for the artillery of the III Marine Amphibious Force to fire against purely military targets in, and north 

of, the demilitarized zone. The enemy responded with a heavy 
EARLY DEVELOPMENTS 13 

artillery barrage of his own against allied fire bases at Gio Linh, 

Con Thien. and Camp Carroll. 

At t.his point. with intelligence sources indicating another major 

enemy offensive along the demilitarized zone, General Westmore· 

land instructed the staff of the Military Assistance Command, Viet· 

nam. to prepare plans for a task force of four U.S. Army brigades, 

later reduced to three, with their appropriate supporting units. for 

deployment into I Corps. 

When the enemy made several damaging attacks on Vietnamese 

Army units in the La Vang area in early April. General Westmore· 

land decided that the time for reinforcements had come. Major 

General William B. Rosson was assigned as commander of the new 

I Corps Task Force, designated Task Force OIlECON. 

Task Force Oregon 

The organization and movement to the north of Task Force 

OREGON are worthy of some attention as the first deployment of 

large army units into I Corps. On 19 February General Rosson 

assembled a small group of officers and enlisted men to provide the 

nucleus of a planning staff for Task Force ORECON. This group 

immediately began operational and logistical planning in close coordination with III Marine Amphibious Force and U.S. Army, 

Vietnam. As the newly constilUted staff began its work, General 

Westmoreland sent the major subordinate commands specific in· 

structions outlining their roles in the plan. 

While the task force planning staff proceeded with its work, the 

units that were earmarked to become a part of Task Force ORECON 

continued their normal operations. A1J the task force component 

elements were identified and mutual co-ordination and liaison es· 

tablished between units and planning staff, the units in no way 

disrupted their combat activities or altered operations underway. 

This formation of a provisional infantry division in a war zone 

while the component element of the new division continued to 

fight the war was in itself unique, and reflected a responsiveness. 

resourcefulness. and flexibility of Army leadership in meeting 

battlefield contingencies. 

The brigades initiaJly selected were the 1st Brigade. IOlst Air· 

borne Division, the 196th Light Infantry Brigade, and the 3d 

Brigade, 25th Infantry Division. The units had varying times of 

between 24 and 48 hours in which to assemble at different loca· 

tions. 

The provisional division was tailored to have basically the same 

capabilities as a standard infantry division. For simplicity in or· 
14 THE WAR I N THE NORTHERN PROVINCES 

ganization and ease in formation of the task force, the designated 

brigades with their organic battalions, separate companies, and detachmentS were adopted intact. Adjustments were mflde as necessary to insure that all capabilities of an infantry division were 

achieved. As an example, the 2d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry 

Regiment, was used as an infamry division cavalry squadron. 

Since the squadrons of the l11h Armored Cavalry did not have an 

organic air cavalry troop, Troop C of the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry, which was an air troop. was added to the troop list. 

Similar steps to structure division support were taken by the 

planners in artillery and aviation. Engineer support requirements 

were met by combining the direct support engineer companies of 

each brigade with general engineer support increments from a 

combat engineer battalion. A provisional signal support battalion 

was also constructed by combining organic elements with attachments from the lst Signal Brigade. The planning staff provision of 

military intelligence and military police support units followed the 

same pattern. 

A unique method was used to establish combat service support 

for the provisional division. While an intact comba t brigade could 

be taken out of an existing division, it was not feasible to lift a support command from a division, leaving the division without 

needed support. Fortunately the two independent brigades in the 

task force had their own organic division support, but there were 

no separate division size support commands available [or inclusion 

in the new organization. A5 a result a tailored task force support 

command was created. 

The units for the support command were drawn mainly from 

organizations, personnel, and equipment of the 1st Logistical Command. While these units were on duty with the task force, they lost 

their identity as 1st Logistical Command units and became Task 

Force OREGON troops. As such, they introduced several innovations, 

notably in the medical and aircraft maintenance areas. in providing 

logistical support for the task force. 

The backup support to the task force, other than aircraft maintenance, was provided by the lst Logistical Command through a 

general support group in the Chu Lai area. This group provided 

supply, maintenance, medical, and transportation support. When 

a brigade was to operate away from the Chu Lai base area, a forward support element was provided by the support gT0up of the 

1st Logistical Command. This command became the link with existing naval and Marine support elements in the area. Colonel 

Robert B. Pridgen, Commander of the Task Force Support Command. was responsible for providing backup support [or the brigade 
EARLY DEVELOPMENTS 15 

and direct support to all the units comprising the task force base 

other than the brigades. 

The area selected to receive the task force already had a welldeveloped support complex lhat was capable of supporting the 

30,000 troops expected to be located in the Chu Lai area. The 

facilities included an airstrip able to handle jets; four ramps for 

landing ships, tank (LST's); three ramps for landing ships, utility 

(LSU's) ; a barge discharge pier; and a pipe line for off-shore discharge of petroleum, oils, and lubricants. The Duc Pho area to the 

south was less well equipped. This southern portion of the Task 

Force OIlECON area of operation lacked an airfield to handle the 

C-UO, adequate landlines of communications, and sufficient beach 

and pier facilities. Since these limiting factors were noted during 

initial planning. on ly smaller-sized forces were assigned to the Duc 

Pho area until the difficulties could be surmounted. 

Deployment of the (ask force to I Corps began on 12 April. The 

predesignated units and individuals of the task force assemblt:d at 

specified airfields and ports for final equipping and preparation for 

transportation north. The deployment was made by battalion combat team incremems to the Chu Lai airfield. The heavier equipped 

units proceeded by sea to the Chu Lai port. The Air Force provided 

C-l!W sorties and the Navy furnished LST's. Careful scheduling 

paid off in the orderly and systematic arrival of many different 

units and increments from multiple departure points in 11 and III 

Corps Tactical Zones. 

The deployment of the Army's Task Force ORECON to the 

southern part of I Corps permitted the marines to concentrate 

their forces further north where the enemy build-up was becoming 

omi.nous. On 26 April, lhe Commanding Genera l, 1st Marine Division, turned over responsibility for the defense of [he Chu Lai 

Airbase and logistics complex with the surrounding tactical area of 

responsibility to General Rosson, the Commanding General of 

Task Force OREGON. 

Continuing Activity AI01lg The Demilitarized Zone 

As Army reinforcements deployed into southern I Corps. more 

and more Marine units were shifted north. Bases and logistical 

facilities in the demilitarized zone region were rapidly developed 

and expanded. Dong HOI, the largest of these installations, served 

as the command and control center for operations along the demilitarized zone. Eight miles southwest of Dong HOI was Camp Carroll. a large artillery base. Another smaller artillery base was 

located at the Rock Pile, ten miles west of C."lmp C.uroll. Both of 
16 

MAP 3 

THE WAR IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES 

HILL FIGHT AREA 

R(I..lEf' GUIDE 

_ A_IIOO ..... .. 0 Il00 .. Il00 ... , . .. 

0 000 1.600 _' ... 

~_·OO ""'''' 

'! j " U' '-,( "--o., !-. --r.(.~".:: .. t .... 

these bases supported batteries of U.S. Army 175-mm. guns. The 

western anchor of the defense line was the Khe Sanh Combat Base 

near Dong Tri Mountain in the formidable Annamite Mountains. 

The principal eastern bases were Gia Linh and Con Thien just 

south of the Ben Hai Rive .. 

Throughout the following year the enemy concentrated his 

efforts first on western Quang Tri, then on the east, and then again 

on the west. His initial efforts in Quang Tri province centered 

around the Khe Sanh plateau, ideal terrain for the North Vietnam-
EARLY DEVELOI'MENTS 

HILL FIGHTS 

(COne.pl of Operollonl' 

Apt!l -~a, ".1 

<::::: A • ., . I . n ... 

c:::J A ___ .... 

c:::J_IOIOO _' ••• 

0 --IlOO ", .... , 

'{! !", .. U 

~ I.,...,.. ..... 

MAP 4 

17 

ese. The TUgged mountainous countryside provided a natural infiltration route. Most of the mountain trails were hidden by three 

canopies of jungle up to 60 feet high, dense elephant grass, and 

bamboo thickets. Concealment from reconnaissance aircraft was 

good, and the heavy jungle undergrowth limited ground observation to five meters in most places. The mOSt conspicious terrain 

feature is Dong Tri Mountain, at 1,015 meters the highest ~ak in 

the region. Four smaller hills.-Hill 881 North, Hill 861. Hill 

558, and Hill 881 South-dominated the main avenues of approach 

to the base. It was on and around these smaller hills that most of the 

significant battles were fought during the first phase of what was to 

become the long and stubborn struggle for Khe Sanh. (Map J) 

The battles began late in April when a Marine forward observer 

party became engaged with a large enemy force north of Hill 861. It 

is now believed that the marines prematurely triggered a major 

enemy attempt to overrun Khe Sanh. At least one regiment of the 

North Vietnamese 325C Division, it was soon discovered, was well 

dug-in in the vicinity of Hill 861 and was preparing to launch a 

ground attack against the combat base. In a series of hard·fought 
18 THE WAR IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES 

battles known as "The Hill Fights" the Marine units, supported by 

massive air strikes and artillery, pushed the North Vietnamese out 

of the hill complex. Losses on both sides were heavy. The 325C was 

badly hurt and (or a time presented no further threat to the Khe 

Sanh area. (Map 4) 

The Battle for CO'l Thien 

The action now shifted close to the eastern area of the demilitarized zone near the town of Con Thien, located two miles south of 

the zone. Con Thien was a small defensive position situated atop 

Hill 558, ten miles northwest on Dong Ha. From this perch, the 

marines had a commanding view of any activity in the area. The 

position was never manned by more than a reinforced battalion but 

always had from one (0 three battalions near by which could be 

used to outRank any enemy attempts to storm the strong point. 

Con Thien was to become the anchor for the western end of a 

barrier six hundred meters wide extending eastward some eight 

miles to Gio Linh. This strip was to be a part of the strong point 

obstacle system and was to be bulldozed Rat to aid in visual observation. Obstacles were to be used to cana lize the enemy and to pr~ 

vide protection for the various electronic sensor devices placed 

along the strip to indicate the presence of some type of activity. 

Strong points such as Con Thien were to serve as patrol bases, fire 

support bases, and stations for monitoring the sensors. 

Beginning in May 1967 the enemy made repeated attempts to 

capture or destroy the Marine base at Con Thien. The marines 

countered with Operation HICKORY, a multibattalion sweep which 

soon developed into a number of fierce sma ll unit engagements. 

The North Vietnamese opposing the marines were well·trained and 

well·equipped. Many were observed to be wearing Hak jackets and 

steel helmets, and some employed Harne throwers. 

In July the enemy introduced a new weapon, the 152·mm. 

artillery piece. Fired from the demilitarized zone or from North 

Vietnam, it was lhe heaviest artillery weapon yet employed by the 

North Vietnamese. The marines countered with increased use of 

their own artillery, air strikes, and naval gunfire. 

During September the enemy concentrated his attacks by fire 

against Con Thien itself. The shelling reached a peak during the 

week of 19- 27 September when 3,077 morlar, artillery, and rocket 

rounds fell on the base. The Marine and Army artillery replied 

with well·executed counterbattery fire. This response, together 

with air strikes, appeared to give the enemy pause and his attacks 

slackened. 
EARLY DEVELOPMENTS 19 

A£ItlAL VIEW OF KH£ SANH IN QUANC TRI 

Khe Sanh Again 

While enemy activity abated in the east, it Aared again in the 

western demilitarized area near Khe Sanh. During December, a 

surge of enemy activity in the area brought reporu by Marine 

reconnaissance teams that large groups of North Vietnamese 

soldiers were moving into the area of the combat base. This time 

the enemy was not passing through but appeared to be moving in 

to stay. The number of clashes between Marine patrols and enemy 

units increased_ The Marine companies that were dug-in on the 

outposts of Hil1 881 S and Hill 861 reported receiving increased 
20 THE WAR IN THE NORTHERN PROYINCES 

enemy fire, and Khe Sanh base itself was subjected to probes along 

the perimeter. (Map4) Reconnaissance sweeps turned up evidence 

that the enemy was entrenching; many caches o( enemy supplies 

were found and fresh foxholes located. Trails giving evidence of 

recent heavy use were discovered. The year closed on an ominous 

note, with mote and heavier fighting in the offing. 
CHAPTER Il 

Preparing For A Showdown 

BefoTt: considering the climactic battles of 1968 it is well to 

consider several significant developments in the I Corps Tactical 

Zone: the project for an anti·infiltration system. the increasing use 

of other Free World Forces. the buildup of logistical facilities in 

the area north of the Hai Van Pass, and the upgTading of the Vietnamese Anny in the northern provinces. 

The Anti-Infiltration System 

The anti-infiltration system, popularly known as the McNamara 

Line or Electric Fence, was envisioned as a 40-kilometer-long physical barrier supported by early warning devicrs and carefully 

selected fortified positions constructed on key tcrrain and manned 

as appropriate. It was intended to counter the massive infiltration 

of North Vietnamese troops and equipment across the demilita· 

rized lOne. The sensors, early warning devices. were designed to be 

used in a linear obstacle field. (Diagram 1) The balance pressure 

system would indicate any increase in weight, such as that produced 

by a person walking over it. The infrared intrusion detector op· 

erated in a manner similar to burglar detectors or an electric eye 

used to open the door of many business establishments. Unat· 

tended seismic detectors were used to note and report earth vibrations such as those caused by a group of men walking down a trail. 

Acoustic sensors transmitted the sound when men stepped on small 

explosive devices. 

The majority o[ the firepower supporting the system came from 

artillery. tactical air fire, and naval gunfire. The system was designed to reduce the need for costly operations in an area constantly 

subjected to enemy-directed artillery and mortar fire from adjacent 

sanctuaries. The marines also hoped to use the anti.infiltration 

system to detect enemy incursions and movements at greater ranges. 

The system was an overall effort to counter both enemy infiltration 

and direct invasion by making enemy movement across the demilitarized zone simultaneously more expensive for the attacker and 

less expensive for the defender. 

Work on the project began in April 1967. AJ the year pro-
22 THE WAR I N THE NORTHERN PROVINCES 

D U.OR .... M I - LINEAR OBSTACLE 

XENON SEARCHLIGHT 

- --- £. ,..- ..:::::. ,,- - _AN PP~_R~DAR -

DEVICE __ ~. _-",m",u C .... BLE 

300 M. 

COMMUNIC .... TiONS 

-/ 

gressed, both the intensity of the enemy's mortar, artillery, and 

rocket fire and the changing military situation slowed down the 

development of the strong points and the construction of obstacles. 

The project was shelved when the buildup of U.S. forces in I Corps 

pre-empted the logistical support needed to supply the construction 

material. 

Although the barrier was never completed, certain portions of 

it were sufficiently developed to permit their use. The defense 

positions along the line were turned over to the Vietnamese Army, 

thereby freeing the American troops for mobile operations. Some 

of the early warning devices later used during the siege of Khe Sanh 

were reported to be effective. The information derived from the 

sensors provided targeting data for bombing and artillery strikes. 

While alone no deterrent to enemy movement, they provided a 

portion of the information that enabled friendly forces to bring 

the enemy under fire. (Diagram 2) The monitoring devices could 

be dropped from planes and helicopters, hung in trees, placed along 

river banks, or buried underground. 

In 1970 Congressional hearings were called to discuss the value 

of the instruments. They were credited with saving many lives by 

giving ground troops early warnings of attack. The sensors were 

credited further with increasing enemy personnel and equipment 
PREPARING FOR A SHOWDOWN 23 

,. --

-::-

/ 

A' 

• 

BALANCE PRESSUR£ SENSOR SYSTEM 

losses as well as providing the Army with combat surveillance that 

worked by day or night. They were said to improve the effectiveness 

of air interdiction of enemy truck borne troops and supplies and to 
24 

s 

THE WAR IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES 

DIAGRAM 2-SAMPLE TACTICA L ApPLI CATION 

REQUEST FOR ARTILLERY ATIACK 

READOUT 1 

OPERATOR 

conserve manpower. Some tTOOP commanders stated that the use of 

the sensors permitted them to fight a major battle without the 

presence of their men. The sensors contributed to what was a difficult and, possibly the most important, task: finding the enemy 

and keeping track of his movements. 

Fru World Forces 

Aside from the conventional U.S. Army organizations. other 

U.S. and Free World Military Assistance Forces contributed to the 

failure of the North Vietnamese to achieve significant success in 

I Corps. Among these were the U,S. Special Forces, the Vietnamese 

Civilian Irregular Defense Group. the Vietnamese Special Forces, 

the Republic of Korea Marines, and the Australian Advisors. 

(Cha,' J) 

The U.S. Special Forces in Vietnam were prominent in their 

advisory Tole in which they assisted the Vietnamese Special Forces 

in organizing, training and leading Civilian Irregular Derense 

Group companies on operational missions. These companies had 
PREPA}UNG FOR A SHOWDOWN 

CHART I- U.S. MARINE AND POPULAR FORCES COMBINED ACTION 

PLATOON ORANIUTfON 

25 

HEADQUARTERS t _ PI.toon leider, Sera .. nt, Vletn.mese 

~ Popular Forces 

HQ E1.£MENT l- AdViser, Sera"nt U.S. M.C. 

U.HU 

USN ."''''' CM,,~" I I II I '"'" ..... , USMC R.dlo Operator Redlo Operator 

Aut. "'Iloon Le.der 

3 COMSINED ACTION SQUADS 

Totll: l~ U.S. Mlnn" 

35 VIetnamese Popullr fOfc..' 

'" "'" 

more than 5,000 men in I Corps and usually operated from isolated 

Special Forces camp5,like that at Lang Vei. The U.S. Special Forces 

often provided the means of reporting enemy activities in sparsely 

populated areas of the country. Not as well known were the U.s. 

Special Forces' long-range patrol teams which roamed the areas 

normally thought as being under enemy control. These teams pro--

vided much valuable information on enemy locations and activities. 

On occasion they harassed the enemy by conducting ambushes or 

raids in areas where the enemy felt himself secure. 

After the United States, the nation which supplied the greatest 

amount of assistance to the Republic of Vietnam was the Republic 

of Korea. This aid was particularly significant in light of the potentially explosive security situation that existed along the Republic's 

borders with the Communist Regime of North Korea. It was also 

indicative of the concern which the Republic of Korea manifested 

for the freedom, progress, and liberty of its Asian contemporaries, 
26 THE WAR IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES 

The Koreans entered 1 Corps Tactical Zone in August of 1966 

when the Korean 2d Marine (Dragon) Brigade moved south of 

Chu Lai in northern Quang Ngai Province. Previously this unit had 

assumed the role of mobile tfouble-shooter and had moved from 

its first location at Cam Ranh Bay to Tuy Hoa, then to the new 

zone south of Chl! Lai. In 1966 and the fOllowing year, the brigade 

was in the vicinity of Hoi An, Quang Nam Province. Each time. 

the brigade's arrival in I Corps enabled the U.S. Marines to shift 

their forces further north where the continuing and increasing 

threat of invasion across the demilitarized zone existed. 

The Koreans proved themselves adept in establishing rapport 

with tbe local population by stressing the kinship of aspirations 

and the "brotherhood" of the Asiatic peoples. Because many of the 

Korean troops had agricultural backgrounds, a natural kinship developed with the rural inhabitants of South Vietnam. Improvements in farming teChniques and village accommodations resulted. 

Korean forces conducted a number of the most imaginative and 

skillful operations of the war. They proved themselves to be masters 

in the patient collection of intelligence and in the effective use of it. 

The Growth of Logistic Facilities 

The development of logistic facilities had a great influence on 

the war in the northern provinces. The deployment of major Army 

units into I Corps in 1967 required the establishment of a support 

facility at Da Nang to furnish supplies peculiar to the Army. 

Eventually thiS organization assumed responsibility for Army support activities in ehu Lai and was required to establish a subordinate support command in the Phu Bai area with a forward 

support area at Dong Ha. In each of these areas, construction of 

troop billets, storage aa-eas, roads, water supply systems, and various 

other facilities was required to provide adequate support for combat operations. 

Before 1967. at General Westmoreland's direction, a campaign 

planning group had been established at United States Army, Vietnam, Headquarters. By mid-January 1967 this group had a con· 

tingency plan for troops, ports, roads, airfields, pipelines, combat 

support units, and service support units. The plan included requirements for a force about the size of the Free World Military 

Force that eventually deployed to I Corps. This foresight provided 

a detailed plan that was adaptable to the situation which developed 

in the northern provinces. 

Logistic support in northern I Corps was dependent upon 

hazardous coastal shipping systems running north from the great 
PREPARING FOR A SHOWDOWN 27 

::... 

• 

-

AERIAL VIEW OF HIClIWAY NORTH OF DA NANC 

deep-water port of Da Nang to several shallower off-loading points 

in the vicinity of Hue and Dong Ha. The huge quantities of construct:-::'! material required to build fortifications south of the de-
28 THE WAR IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES 

militarized zone greatly taxed these already overloaded facilities 

and resources. To meet the existing requirements and plans for 

major operations in the A Shau Valley and other enemy base areas 

in the north during 1968, the number of landing craft sites north 

of the Hai Van Pass was increased to.IS and tonnage capacity was 

increased ten-fold from 540 tons per day to 5,550. 

A most ambitious Tood project was the opening of coastal Route 

1 along its entire length from the demilitarized zone to Saigon. This 

undertaking involved a series of military and engineering operations by many units stationed along the route, first to secure the 

road in the various tactical areas of operation, then to replace destroyed bridges and repair damaged sections of the route. Major 

sections of the road in the Da Nang area of Quang Nam Province 

of I Corps had been secured in the spring of 1965, when U.S. 

Marine units first moved into the area. In the spring of 1967, the 

3d Marine Division secured the section north of the Hai Van Pass 

in Thua Thien and Quang Tri Provinces. Meanwhile. in the 

southern provinces of I Corps, Task Force OREGON cleared the sec· 

tion running from northern Quang Ngai through Quang Tin and 

into the southern part of Quang Nam Province. 

Upgrading of tlu: Vietnamese Army F01'ces 

During 1967. the role of the 1st Vietnamese Army Division in 

I Corps expanded. In an effort to assist the division in adopting a 

larger role and to assume increased responsibility, planners took 

certain steps to increase its firepower. Starting in September 1967, 

the 1st Vietnamese Division's firepower was supplemented by the 

provision of such crew-served weapons as the 106-mm. recoilless 

rifle. GO-mm. mortars. and the modern M60 machine gun. Later in 

the year the division was further strengthened by the issue of the 

MI6 rifle. There followed a noticeable increase in the morale of the 

division. With this greatly improved firepower. the division could 

be counted on for a larger part in the battles in the northern zone. 

A regiment of the Vietnamese 1st Division later relieved the 

marines occupying a sector of the defenses facing the demilitarized 

zone. 

The Vietnamese 1st Division was given priority for this equipment in order to increase its firepower and to minimize the number 

of U.S. forces needed in northern I Corps, where the war continued 

to intensify. In the following year, the same process was repeated 

w~th the Vietnamese 2d Division in the southern portion of I Corps 

TacQ.cal Zone. When their firepower was upgraded in similar fashion. ihey in turn assumed a larger combat role. 
CHAPTER III 

The Bleak Picture 

Beginning in December 1967, reports were received of massive 

enemy troop movements throughout the country and along the 

surrounding infiltration routes. T he enemy continued to move his 

mai n forces ·towards Sa igon, Da Nang, Hue, Khe Sanh, the demilitarized zone, and a number of provincial and district capitals. The 

number of terrorist incidents rose sharply, as did the number of 

times Army units made contact with the enemy. By January of 1968, 

the enemy was well into his winter-spring campaign which he had 

begun in October o[ 1967. Numerous reports were rece ived about 

a major offensive to be undertaken either before or after Tet. 

Early in 1968 Khe Sanh again became the focal point of enemy 

activity in I Corps. All evidence pointed to a Nonh Vietnamese 

offensive similar to the one in 1967. onl y on a much larger scale. 

Various intelligence sources indica ted that North Vietnamese units, 

which usually came down and skirted the combat base outside of 

artillery range, were moving into the Khe Sanh area to stay. At first, 

the reports showed an influx of individual regiments, but then of a 

division. The establishment of a front headquarters indicated that 

at least two North Vietnamese divisions were in the vicinity. 

This buildup around Khe Sanh drastically altered the security 

picture at the base. The road over which the base received its 

supplies had been cut since August 1967. Enemy activity intensified, 

and b«ause of increased use of antiaircraft fire, it was no longer 

possible for U.S. forces to fly-in supplies with immunity. The bulk 

of the 135 tons of supplies required dail y had to be parachuted to 

the Marine and South Vietnamese forces defending the base. 

The main enemy forces in the area were identified as the 325C 

North Vietnamese Army Division, which had moved back into the 

region north of Hill 88 1 North, and a newcomer, the 304th North 

Vietnamese Division, which had crossed over from Laos and estab· 

lished positions southwest of the base. The 304th, an elite homeguard division from Hanoi, had been a participant at Dien Bien 

Phu. In addition, one regiment of the 324th North Vietnamese 

Division was located in the central demilitarized area some ten to 

fifteen miles from Khe Sanh, fulfilling a supply role. In the early 

stages of the siege of Khe Sanh, the presence of the 320th Division 
30 THE WAR IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES 

was confirmed north of the Rock Pile within easy reinforcing 

distance of the enemy Khe Sanh forces. The 304th and 325C 

Divisions were known to have armored unilS with them and were 

supported by the North Vietnamese 68th and 164th Artillery 

Regiments. 

In other sections of I Corps Tactical Zone, intelligence indicated 

the presence of the 2d North Vietnamese Army Division in the 

vicinity of Da Nang, the 5th and 324B Division in the vicinity of 

Hue, and elements of the 308th and 34lst Divisions in the northeastern regions of the corps area. For his planned attack on Hue. the 

enemy had an unhampered route and ready access to his logistical 

bases throughout the A Shau Valley. There were no Free World 

Forces outposts in the A Shau like that at Khe Sanh to the north in 

Quang Tri Province. 

One of the many intelligence indicators of the vast increase in 

the movements of enemy troops was a U.S. Air Force report of truck 

sightings during the period. The reports showed that for the first 

nine months of 1967 there was a monthly average of 480 truck 

sightings; sightings surged to 1,116 in October; 3,823 in November; 

and 6,!H5 in December. This trend was in sharp contrast to the 

monthly average of 256 sightings during the final three months of 

1966. The Air Force also stated that although enemy activity was on 

the rise throughout the southern infiltration corridors and tactical 

zone, the most serious threat appeared in the tactical area of 

responSibility of the III Marine Amphibious Force in northern 1 

Corps. 

During mid-January 1968, the undeniable threat in the Khe 

Sanh area prompted the greatest concern. Not only had the enemy 

positioned a large number of forces around Khe Sanh, but intelligence sources reported that Routes 92 and 9 in Laos showed signs of 

an increased logistical movement into that area, indicating the area 

had become a pivot point for operations leading towards Khe Sanh. 

While it was recognized that the disposition of enemy forces in the 

Khe Sanh area was a very real threat to the marines at Khe Sanh, it 

was also seen as an undeniable opportunity to direct concentrated 

air strikes against known enemy positions on a sustained basis. 

Still another sign of reviving North Vietnamese interest in Khe 

Sanh appeared earlier on 2 January 1968 when a Marine listening 

post at the combat base reponed sighting six unidentified persons 

nearby. A . patrol dispatched to check out the unidentified men 

killed five when they failed to respond to a challenge. Later the 

five killed were identified as a North Vietnamese Army regimental 

commander, his operations officer, the signal officer, and two other 

officers. That these key men would undenake such a mission reflected high-level enemy interest in the base. 
THE BLEAK PICTURE 31 

Op~ration Niagara 

None of these developments went unnoticed in Saigon where 

General Westmoreland and Headquarters, Military Assistance 

Command, Vietnam, were monitoring closely all information as it 

became available. On 5 January 1968, Ceneral 'Westmoreland 

directed his principal operations and intelligence officers to plan for 

a massive aerial bombardment program to counter the rapidly 

increasing threat in the north. The following morning, Saturday, 

6 January, Ceneral Westmoreland directed that the name NJACARA 

be given to this fire support plan. The name was felt to be particularly appropriate because the support concept called for aerial 

bombs and artillery shells to fall in such volume as to suggest the 

falls from which the operation drew its name. 

Two days later, General Westmoreland further amplified his 

instructions by directing that the operation be planned in two 

distinct phases. NIAGARA I was to entail a comprehensive intelligence 

effort to locate the enemy in the area of interest. NIAGARA 11 was to 

consist of co-ordinated heavy 8-52 tactical air strikes on a roundthe-clock basis against the located targets. Ceneral Westmoreland 

directed that the intelligence required to support this effort should 

encompass everything available from all sources. This support 

would include the resources of all United States Navy, United 

States Marine Corps, and United States Air Force strike. reconnaissance, and electronic warfare aircraft. In addition to normal ground 

intelligence-gathering activities, unattended electronic ground sen· 

sor devices were to be used extensively. 

On 6 January 1968, while considering the plans for NJACARA, 

Ceneral Westmoreland advised the Commanding Ceneral of III 

Marine Amphibious Force: 

The anticipated build-up of enemy forces in the western DMZ area 

provides an opportunity to plan a comprehensive intelligence coIlection effort and to make preparation ror coordination of B-52 and 

tactical airstrikes. We shoufd be prepared to surprise and disrupt enemy 

plans for an offensive against Khe Sanh with heavy bombing attacks on 

a sustained basis. 

Concerned as General Westmoreland was about that portion of I 

Corps immediately south of the western end of the demilitarized 

zone, he was all too aware that this was only one area where enemy 

activity was intensifying. Information becoming available at an 

enlarged rate indicated that a major enemy offensive within the 

next few weeks was a certainty. 

In January 1968 the forces defending the Khe Sanh area included three battalions of the 26th Marine Regiment under the 

command of Colonel David E. Lownds. In addition to the maneuver 
32 THE WAR IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES 

units in the Khe Sanh Combat Base, an impressive aTTay of artillery 

and armor was present. Direct support was provided by 4.2·in. 

mortars, IOS-mm. howitzers, 15S·mlll. howitzers. and 175·mm. guns. 

These sixteen 175-mm. guns provided support by the U.S. Marine 

positions at Camp Carroll and the Rock Pile. Five tanks having 90· 

mm. guns for their main armament had been present since before 

Route 9 was closed. Two Omos platoons were also at the base. The 

Ontos is a lightly armored track vehicle armed with six I06·mm. 

recoilless rifles, These highly mobile vehicles could be rapidly 

mustered at any threatened point. Originally designed as a tank 

killer. the Ontos was primarily used in Vietnam by the marines to 

support the infantry. These allied forces faced an estimated 15,000 

to 20,000 enemy soldiers assigned to two North Vietnamese Army 

divisions in the immediate area, a third division within striking 

distance in the demilitarized zone, and a fourth one nearby in Laos. 

Outside of the combat base itself, there were several areas of 

tactical importance. The most critical points were the hill outposts. 

Both Major Genera l Rathvon M. Tompkins, Commanding General, 

tid Marine Division, and Colonel Lownds, Commanding Officer of 

the Khe Sanh Combat Base. were well aware of what had happened 

at Dien Bien Phu when the Viet Minh owned the mountains and 

the French owned the valley. They therefore considered it essential 

that the hills around Khe Sanh remain in the hands of the marines. 

Hill 881 S. Hill 861, and Hill 950 had been occupied by the marines 

at the beginning of the year. This arrangement still left access for 

the North Vietnamese to the Roa Quan Valley which ran between 

Hill 86 1 and Hill 950. The regimental commander countered this 

opening with the newly arrived 2d Marine Battalion. Hill 558 was a 

small knob centered in the northwest approach. The regimental 

commander placed one company on this hill to control that approach. Even with this unit in position, a flaw remained in the 

northern screen. A portion of Hill 861 projected up to block line of 

sight between Hill 558 and Hill 861. This stretch of high ground 

prevented the two units from supporting each other by fire. thus 

leaving a corridor through which the North Vietnamese could move 

to outRank either marine outpost. This shortcoming was identified 

and within a week a company was put on this ridgeline at a point 

approximately 400 to 500 meters northeast of Hill 861. Thus, the 

valley Roor was under surveillance by marines from all the key hills. 

The Battle of Khe Sa71h-Operling Round 

The Battle of Khe Sanh began at 0530, 21 January 1968, just 

eight days before the enemy launched his Tet offensive. The North 
THE BLEAK PICTURE 

MAP 5 

-, , 

, 

ENEMY OPERATIONS 

KHE SANH 

OK._. 191'1'---, 19" ~o..lo. ___ 

i ' , I 

, 

Vi~tnam~s~ Army forC~5 hammered th~ Kh~ Sanb Combat Base 

with rocket, mortar, artill ery, small arms, and automatic w~a}X>n5 

fir~. (Map.5) Hundreds of 82·mm. mortar rounds and 122-mm. 

rock~ts slammed into th~ combat ba~. Virtually all of th~ base's 

ammunition stock and a substantial portion of th~ fuel suppli~s w~r~ 

destroyed. Th~ actions around Kh~ Sanh Combat Ba~, when 
34 THE WAR IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES 

flashed to the world, touched off a political and public uproar as to 

whether or not the position should be held. 

In South Vietnam where the decisions were made. General 

Westmoreland and Lieutenant General Robert E. Cushman, Jr.. 

Commander of III l\'larine Amphibious Force, "after discussing all 

aspect.s of the situation, were in complete agreement from the start," 

The ba~. with its outpoSt, blocked the main avenue of approach 

into eastern Quang Tri province. The desired solution to the 

problem, using airmobile assaults in strength, was not possible 

owing to lack of both personne l and aircraft. Had they been available, the weather would have complicated such an operation before 

March or April. Not to be overlooked was the possibility of drawing 

a major enemy force into a position where it could be decisively 

destroyed. Another consideration in the decision was that the 

defense of Khe Sanh could be envisioned as a classic example of 

economy of force. It seemed certain that two crack North Vietnamese Army divisions which might have been used elsewhere in the 

province could be contained by one reinforced Marine regiment 

with a major assist from air and artillery strikes. In addition to these 

two d ivisions, two other enemy divisions, held in reserve by the 

enemy, were never committed because the situation failed to develop in the enemy's favor. 

General \Vestmore]and had but two choices, to stay and reinforce or get out. He chose to stay. In his Report on the War in Vietnam, General Westmoreland told why: 

The question was whether we could afford the troops to reinforce, keep 

Ihem supplied by air, and defeat an enemy far superior in numbers as 

we waited for the weather to clear, buill forward bases. and made other 

preparations for an overland relief expedition. I believed we could do 

all these things. With the concurrence of lhe III Mari ne Amphibious 

Commander. LTG Roben E. Cushman. Jr., I made the decision to 

reinforce and hold the area while destroying lhe enemy with our 

massive firepower and to prepare (or offensive operations when the 

weather hearne favorable. 

Meanwhile. at Khe Sanh, the battle was progressing. On 22 

January, enemy mortar fire was placed on Khe Sanh and Hill 881. 

The enemy firing positions were in turn taken under fire by tactical 

air and grollnd artillery. Two resupply helicopters and an Air Force 

fighter.bomber were lost to enemy ground fire. To the west, across 

the Laotian border, an enemy force of three battalions assaulted 

and overran a friend ly Laotian unit positioned astride Route 9. 

The enemy attack against the Laotian position had been supported by seven annored vehicles which had approached along the 

road. Such a target would normally have received priority effort for 
THE BLEAK PICTURE 85 

destruction by air, but the weather would not pennit it. A flareship, 

a forward air controller, and two B-57s circled the position attempt· 

ing to get a clear enough view of the action on the ground to hit the 

attackers, The forward air controller described the weather: "The 

scene was low overcast, probably up to around 2.000 to 3,000 feet 

solid, with high overcast based at about 12.000 feet or so. We were 

unable to work visually in the area at all .... " 

The Laotian troops, their families, and other local inhabitanu 

evacuated the overrun position and withdrew to the east. They 

eventually reached t,he Special Forces camp at Lang Vei where the 

soldiers were added to the defensive effort. Although the com· 

mander of the Laotians had been a reliable source of information 

for some time prior to the attack, his report that tanks were a part 

of the attacki ng force was not accepted. Tracks of some type of ve· 

hicles could be observed from the air, but the weather prevented 

confirmation of the presence of tanks, 

Also on 22 January. the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines. was moved 

into the Khe Sanh area and instructed to establish positions 1500 

meters southwest of the landing strip at a rock quarry. Five days 

later, the final battalion allotted to Khe Sanh reported for duty. 

This unit, the 37th Vietnamese Army Ranger Battalion, was positioned along the eastern portion of the perimeter. At this point 

enemy activity subsided and remained fairly quiet for some days, 

The U.S. and Vietnamese forces, however, remained quite active, 

particularly in the air. 

On 21 January 1968, the day the enemy attack began, General 

Westmoreland decided that the time had come to shift from the 

planning phase, N,AGARA I, to the strike phase, N'ACARA II and, 

accordingly, executed it. At 0930 the following day, the 7th Air 

Force reported the operation had commenced. Aerial bombardment and resupply became the heart of the defensive plan for Khe 

Sanh, 

At the same time General Westmoreland ordered the initiation 

of NIACARA II, the other actions were being taken to strengthen the 

Free World Force's position in northern I Corps. The 1st Cavalry 

Division (Airmobile) moved a forward command post to the 

vicinity of Phu Bai, ten kilometers south of Hue, on Route I. The 

same day that the 7th Air Force announced the start of NIACARA, the 

1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) Headquarters arrived at Phu Bai 

and opened for business under the opera tional control of the III 

Marine Amphibious Force. This timely reinforcement provided the 

commander of the III Marine Amphibious Forces with the necessary 

forces to subsequently thwart the enemy's major objective of capturing the citie'\ of Hue and Quang Tri. 
36 THE WAR IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES 

CHART 2-KHF. SANH TASK FORCE 

JANUARy- MARCH 1966 

3d AT 8n 8155 How 

(Mar) 1 PrOY 0 (Mar) 

3d Recon en 

(M.r) III 

I 

6A~" 37 ~R.ng.r 

"T--=>rJ3d Tank 8n Det ~44 Arty (Army) (M.rl 

'r--'13d C.". Group 

(M.r) Det 0 65 Arty (Army) 

~,PJ 

"",,,,;l>I6th SF (Army) 

MAJOR COMBAT ELEMENTS AT KHE SANH COMBAT BASE 

In further reaction to the enemy buildup in northern I Corps. 

on 25 January General Westmoreland directed th e establishment of 

a Military Assistance Command Vietnam Forward Command Post 

in the I Corps area as soon as possible (The role this headquarters 

played in subsequent events is described in Chapter IV.) 

As January drew to a close. the Free World Forces at Khe Sanh 

took stock. (Chart 2) All three battalions of the 26th Marine 

Regiment werc present. The lst Battalion, 9th Marines, lu Battalion, ~th Marines, and the 37th Vietnamese Army Ranger Battalion were also present. A Civilian Irregular Defense Croup company 

with its U.S. Army Special Forces advisers and the supporting 

aircraft control radar detachment representing the U.S. Air Force 

rounded out the 6,000 or so men in and around the base. 

While the marines waited, they filled s.-tndbags. dug deeper 

trenches, reinforced bunkers, conducted loca l security patrols, and 

in general established a pattern that would remain unbroken for 

the next two momhs. While the enemy did not launch a major 

attack against the Khe Sanh Combat Base at the same time as the 

T~t offensive, he continued to pour indirect fire into all of the U.S. 

and Vielllamesc Army positions. Fallowing Td, during the first 

week in February, the North Vietnamese mounted three of its 

heaviest ground attacks. These fights on the hill OIllPOSLS were 

extremel y biller. The North Vietnamese continued to prepare 

positions for their long.range artillery pieces as well as for countless 

smaller supporting weapons. They established numerous supply 
THE BLEAK PICTURE 37 

depotS and began construction of their intricate siege works. This 

intensive buildup continued long after most of the fighting associated with the Tet offensive was over. During the entire time, the 

heavy enemy bombardment of the base and its outpoSts COni inued. 

The Tet Offensive-First Phase 

The most important of the Vietnamese holidays, Tet> began 29 

January in 1968. The lunar new year season marks the beginning of 

spring and by the solar calendar usually falls toward the end of January or in early February. Work among the Vietnamese usually 

stops for the first three days of Tel and the festival begins with 

veneration of the family shrine and public worship. The entire 

population participate in celebrations, feasts, visits, and gay noisy 

public gatherings. Tet is traditionally a time of good feeling and 

family unity. 

The Vietnamese in Hue and the surrounding areas planned the 

traditional celebration of Tet in late January 1968. A Tet cease-fire, 

traditional throughout the years of fighting in Vietnam, went into 

effect at 6 p.m. on 29 January. Many Army of Vietnam soldiers and 

most Republic of Vietnam government officials were on leave or off 

duty and enjoying the holiday season with their families. 

After discussions between President of the Republic of Vietnam 

Nguyen Van Thieu and U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, Ceneral Westmoreland took part in issuance of a joint declaration of a 

36-hour cease-fire to be effective from the evening of 29 January 

through the morning of 31 January. Keenly aware of the ominous 

situation in the north, Ceneral Westmoreland made an exception 

in the case of I Corps where the increased enemy activity seriously 

imperiled the U.S. positions in the region. The Viet Cong, at the 

same time, announced a seven-day Tel l!uce to last ITom 27 January to the early morning of 3 February. Under the cover of this 

premeditated subterfuge, the enemy launched attacks of unprecedented scope. 

On the night of 30 January, the North Vietnamese Army and 

Viet Cong forces violated the truce and struck many of the populated areas of South Vietnam. It was their largest attack so far-the 

infamous Tet offensive of 1968. The enemy altack was begun in I 

and II Corps twenty-rour hours ahead of the attack in the remainder 

of the country. The enemy main attack kicked off late on the 30th 

ar;'d ·the early morning hours of 31 January, employing over 80,000 

North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops. Major assaults were made 

against Saigon, Quang Tri, Hue, Da Nang, Nha Trang, Qui Nhon. 

Kontum City, Ban Me Thuot, My Tho, Can Tho and Ben Tre. The 
38 THE WAR IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES 

AERIAl. VIE\.,. OF SECTION OF CITADEL \VALL IN H UE 

enemy drive was successful in penetrat ing the cities in strength, but, 

in most cities, Regional and Popular Forces and the South Vietnam-
THE BLEAK PICTURE 39 

THE BATTLE OF HUE 

ENEMY ATTACK 

30-,1 JO ..... , It68 

<Cl::::: ....... ... 4II_1t ___ .. 

I ........... . 

MAP 6 

ese Army threw back the enemy thrusts within two or three days. 

In some cases, however, heavy fighting continued for some time, 

especially in the cities of Ban Me Tlmot, Ben Tre, Can Tho, l:Iue. 

Kontum City, and Saigon. 

The Battle for Hue 

Hue, with a population of more than 100,000, as stated earlier, 

is the third largest dty in South Vietnam. It lies a hundred kilometers south of the demilitarized zone and ten kilometers west of 

the coast. The Huang or Perfume River, running from the southwest to the coast, divides the populated area. The Citadel, a walled 

city of about three square kilometers and comprising about two-
40 T H E WAR I N THE NORTHERN PROVI NCES 

thirds of the city, lies on lhe north bank, and the other third of the 

cit)' lies on the south. A railroad bridge on the west and the Nguyen 

Hoang Bridge, over which Route I passes, connect lhe twO sections. 

The Citadel is surro unded by rivers on all four sides. It is further 

protected by a moat which encircles perhaps 75 percent of the interior city. The moat is reinforced by twO massive stone walls. 

Because of the widespread truce violations by the enemy. the 

U.S. Military Assistance Command and the Joint General Staff of 

Ihe Republic of Vietnam officiall y terminated lhe cease·fire on O 

January. In northern I Corps, Brigadier General Ngo Quang 

Troung. the commanding genera l of the 1st Vietnamese Army 

Infantry Division, improved security measures and instituted a 

series of alerts which placed his uni ts in a Slate of increased readi· 

ness. As a result, the division headquarters in the northeast comer 

of the Hue Citadel was on alert on 30 January. At 0340 hours, 31 

January, the enemy initiated a closely co-ordinated rocket, mortar, 

and grou nd assa ult agai nst Hue. Attacking with seven to ten 

battalions, the enemy struck selected targets within the city, both 

north and south of the Huong River. (Map 6) 

The enemy had carefully se lected the time for his attack. In 

addition to the fact that most military units would normally be at 

reduced strength because of the hoi idays, the weather favored the 

attacker. The northeast monsoon produced foul weather which 

hampered resupply operations and grounded most of the air support which otherwise would have given the Free World Forces 

considerable help. 

Under conceal ment of low fog. the enemy regular units. com· 

prising both Viet Cong and North Vietnamese, were able to infiltrate the city o f Hue with the help of accomplices inside. The troops 

quickly captured most of that portion of the city on the south bank 

of the Huong Ri ver and seized the greater part of the northern half 

including the Imperial Citadel. While the division staff of the 1st 

Vietnamese Army Division , ... as on 100 percent alert at the division 

compound in the northeast corner of the Hue Citadel. only a 

skeleton sta ff of the U.S. Advisory Team of the Vietnamese Army 

1st Division was on duty at 1st Division Headquarters in the Cita· 

del. The remaining members were pinned down in the Military 

Assistance Command. Vietnam, compound in southern Hue by the 

initial enemy assaults. Genera l Troung's action in northern Hue 

preserved the commands and staff structure of the division. Many of 

his officers who lived in southern Hue probably would not have 

been able to make their way to division headquarters once this 

battle started. Their presence provided a garrison sufficient when 

reinforced by the Hac Bao or Black Panther Company to prevent 
THE BLEAK PICTURE 41 

the headquarters from being overrun by the attacking enemy force. 

The Hoc Boa or Black Panther Company was an all-volunteer unit 

used as the division reaction force. 

An enemy ground attack was launched against the Military 

Assistance Command, Vietnam, compound located south of the 

river in southern Hue by elements of the 4th North Vietnamese 

Army Regiment. Following the rocket and mortar attack, the 804lh 

Battalion assaulted the northeast corner of the compound but was 

repelled by small arms and automatic weapons fire. A second 

attack made against the southeast corner approximately an hour 

later was also repulsed. 

To the north of the Huong River, the 800th and S02d Battalions of the 6th North Vietnamese Army Regiment assaulted the 

Citadel. These two battalions drove from the sOllthwesttowards the 

1st Vietnamese Army Division Headquarters. At four o'clock in the 

morning, the SOOth Battalion was blocked by the 1st Vietnamese 

Army Division Hac Bao or Black Panther company at the Hue city 

airfield. After a brief engagement with the Hac Bao, the SOOth 

Battalion ,vas diverted south. The 802d Battalion was more successful, having penetrated the 1st Vietnamese Army Division compound and occupied the medical company cantonment area. The 

Hac Bao Company ",'as called to the compound and together with 

the 200-man division Staff drove the enemy out of the compound. 

By daylight, the two battalions of the 6th North Vietname~ Regiment, reinforced by the 12th Sapper Battalion, had occupied the 

Citadel except for the 1st Vietnamese Army Division Headquarters. 

As daylight broke over the emb'l.ttled city, the enemy had 

control of all but the northern corner of Hue. That is to say, the 6th 

Regiment controlled the population. The enemy had not attained 

his two objectives-the;: 1st Vietnamese Army Division Headquarters in the Citadel or the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, 

compound. But in these two friendly pockets of resistance the 

picture was dark. The red and blue banner with the gold star of the 

Viet Cong could be seen Hying in the Citadel Hag tower. 

Also among the holdouts were the scattered Regional Force and 

Popular Force units, though many were surrounded and cut off 

[rom friendly elements. Particularly important was the retention 

of the LeU (Landing Craft, Utility) ramp, and the 1st Signal 

Brigade's multichannel rapid relay complex. The former comprised the logistical key to the city of Hue; the latter, the communications gateway from Khe Sanh and Hue to the south. Outside the 

city, the North Vietnamese established blocking positions to stop 

any reinforcements by U.S. and Vietnamese Army forces to the 

embattled elements in Hue City. In southern Hue, the entire area 
42 

~S/l 

, , 

THE BATTLE OF HUE 

FRIENDLY SITUATION 

24-25 ""''--' It .. 

""'-'r' ? -' " t~.....,.~I"· I.,~ .... 

MAP 7 

THE WAR IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES 

, r"., 

was se ized and occupied, except for the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, compound by elements of the 4th North Vietnamese Regiment. 

Action was immediately taken to relieve the pressure on the twO 

compounds. (Map 7) The 1st Marine Division committed units of 

the 1st Marine Regiment as a reaction force to aid the Free World 

Forces under attack in Hue. General Troung ordered his 3d Regi. 

ment, 1st Airborne Task Force, and the 3d Troop. 7th Cavalry, to 

move to th e Citadel. EnrOllte these reaction forces encountered 

intense small arms and automatic weapons fire as they neared the 

city. The 806lh North Vietnamese Army Battalion was occupying 

positions blocking Highway I northwest of Hue. The S04th Battalion with elements of the Co B, Sapper Battalion and the K4B 
THE BLEAK PICTURE 

Battalion was in southern Hue. The SlOth Battalion had established blocking positions astride Highway 1 leading southwest from 

Hue. The Free World Forces fought through these obstacles but 

agai n slowed as they encountered intense fire 700 meters south of 

the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, compound. However, 

they continued on and reached the compound. Company A, 1st 

Battalion, 1st Marines, was the lead element enrOllle to Hue from 

Phu Bai along Route l. 

This company was followed by the Command Group o£ lst Battalion, lst Marines. which arrived at the compound at 1400. During 

the next three days, three more Marine companies. two Marine 

battalion command groups. and a Marine regimental command 

group arrived in the compound. A Marine tank platoon was also 

present. The marines made an attempt to cross the river on 31 

J anuary but were repulsed by the well dug-in enemy. 

On 31 January. the mission of the marines was altered. giving 

the lst Vietnamese Army Division. which was in an area on the 

north side of the river, responsibility for that area. While two 

baualions of the 3d Vietnamese Army Regiment moved east along 

the northern bank of the Huong River, two Vietnamese Army 

Airborne Battalions and the Cwalry Troop fought their way into 

the lst Vietnamese Division Headquarters compound in the northeast corner of the Citadel. 

On I February. the Vietnamese forces initiated offensive operations to clear the enemy from his entrenched positions inside the 

Citadel, and the marines opened operations to clear their area 

south of the river with particular attention to securing the landing 

craft ramp. The following day. the 3d Brigade. lst Cavalry Division, 

moved into the operations area to seal off Hue City along the west 

and north. 

During the early portion of the battle. the weather had been 

reasona:'ly good. 2 February proved to be a turning point and conditions following that date became increasingly worse. The temperature fell into the 50's, which is quite cool for that part of the 

cOllntry. The prevalent misty drizzle occasionall y turned into a cold 

drenching rain. As clouds closed in and heavy ground fog developed. it became difficult to use heavy fire support properly. Tactical 

air operations were severely limited and lhe majority of fire support 

missions fell on the howitzer batteries and supporting naval gunfire. 

Although less restricted by the poor visibility than aircraft. the 

artillery still had to be used with even greater precision. Even then 

the forward ground observers were occasionally required to radio 

corrections to firing batteries based on sound rather than sight. 

During the period from 7 to II February the enemy units in and 
44 T H E WAR IN T H E NORTHERN PROVINCES 

around th e Citadel continued to offer stiff resistance. The 60 percent 

of the Citadel still in enemy hands included the west wall through 

which the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong were able to bring in 

reinforcements and additional supplies each night. The enemy was 

also using steel-bottomed boats to bring in supplies along the river. 

The 3d Brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division arrived on 2 

February and was assigned the mission of blocking the enemy 

approaches into the city from the north and west. The brigade had 

air assaulted into a landing zone about 10 kilometers northwest of 

Hue on Highway I. They then worked their way south and east 

towards Hue. The men were tiring. As one trooper put it early in 

the battle, "We had gotten less than six hours sleep in the past 48 

hours. We didn't have any water and the river water was tOO muddy 

to drink." 

Jt was some time before the pressure was to let up on the men 

of the 2d Battalion, 12th Cava lry, of the 3d Brigade. On 4 February, 

the entire battalion conducted a daring night march through light 

mist and ankle-deep water towards high ground behind the enemy 

lines. At six the next morning, understandably exhausted, the battalion mounted th eir hill objective overlooking a valley still six 

kilometers west of Hue. 

On 5 February, the 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry, established positions on the high ground giving them excellent observation of the 

main enemy routes in and out of Hue. From that position, they were 

able to interdict all daylight movement of th e enemy by calling 

artillery down on the plains below. The battalion remained in this 

location, restricting and disrupting enemy movement until 9 February. Duri ng the same period, the 5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry, was 

conducting search operations along enemy rolltes west of that area, 

then controll ed by the 2d of the 12th Cavalry. On 7 February, the 

5th Battalion made contact with the deeply entrenched enemy who 

had reoccupied the area from which the 2d Battali on, 12th Cavalry, 

had previously expell ed them. Progress was halted by the stubborn 

resistance of the enemy at this point. The following day, the 5th 

Battalion, 7th Cavalry, tried agai n to breach the enemy's defense 

but was halted by heavy vol umes of enemy automatic weapons and 

mortar fire. On 9 February, 5th Battalion remained in its position 

as a holding force to contain th e enemy while the 2d Battalion, 12th 

Cavalry, left their locat ion on the high ground and attacked northward toward their sister battalion. Enemy resistance stiffened as 

the battalion entered th e village of Thong Bon Tri. Fighting continued throughout the day, and the infantry slowly moved northward. 

As the fighting raged in the cities and towns and along the rice 
THE BLEAK I'ICTURE 45 

paddies and rivers in I Corps Tactical Zone, General Creighton w. 

Abrams, deputy commander of lhe Military Assistance Command, 

and General Cushman conferred on 8 February in preparation for 

a conference between General \Vestmoreland and General Cushman on 0 February. The resuiL was the concurrent movement of the 

two battalions of the lOin Airborne Division into t Corps, one by 

air to Phu Bai to join the Marine Task Force X·RAY operating in 

the solllhern part of Thua Thien Province, the other by sea to Da 

Nang. The second baltalion was t."lsked to secure the U.S. 35th 

Engineer Battalion as it moved north repairing Highway 1 from 

Oa Nang to Phu Bai. 

The South Vietnamese also increased their commitment to the 

recapture of Hue. Two battalions reinforced with the Vietnamese 

Army Cavalry Troop, 1st Division Reconnaissance Company, and 

the elite Black Panther Compmly succeeded in securing the airfield at Hue and then deployed south of the division headquarters 

in the Citadel. The following day, the remaining troops of the 4th 

Battalion and the 9th Airborne Baualion were airlirted into the 

city from Dong Ha and Quang Tri. 

Meanwhile, the 1st Air Cavalry battalions remained in their 

positions through 11 and 12 February, blocking enemy routes and 

disrupting all visible movement by liberal use of artillery and air· 

strikes. On 12 February, the 5th Battalion again attacked the wellfortified enemy. By nightfall, there had been no substantial change 

in the opposing forces' positions. The cavalry battalions remained 

in their general locations until 19 February, conducting aggressive 

probes of the enemy positions and blocking the enemy's movement. 

The 3d Brigade had been reinforced with the 2d Battalion, 

50lst Airborne, which began actively patrolling the vicinity on 19 

February. Also on 19 February, the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry. was 

relieved from ilS base deFense mi~ion at Camp Evans and was de· 

ployed south to the area of operations on 20 February. The 3d 

Brigade, controlling four battalions by 20 February, continued to 

search north and south of the initial contact area and prepared to 

attack eastward towards Hue the next day. According to the brigade's plan, the twO 7th Cwalry battalions were to push into the 

area of enemy resistance at Thon Que Chu. the 2d Battalion, 50lst 

Airborne, would advance in the center while the 2d Battalion, 12th 

Cavalry, would advance northward with two companies held as 

brigade reserve. 

During the night the four battalions moved into their attack 

positions and at the break of dawn on 21 February began their 

attack. The advance continued. with COntact becoming increasingly 

heavy as the enemy contested every foot of ground. Air strikes, 
46 THE WAR IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES 

naval gunfire, artillery, and helicopter gunships helped overwhelm the stubborn enemy and permitted the advancing infantry 

to maintain steady momentum as they pushed the North Vietnamese back. Before darkness. the battalions had all reached their 

objectives and were within five kilometers of Hue. 

That night the battalions went into ddensive perimeters, 

poised to continue the attack. On 22 February, the lst Battalion, 

7th Cavalry, remained in the baule area to search out by-passed 

pockets of enemy resistance while the other three battalions pushed 

their attack eastward 10 a point approximately two and a half kilometers from Hue. Heavy resistance was encountered in the afternoon but the battalions forced the stubbornly fighting North 

Vietnamese eastward as they continued their advance. Again on 23 

February, the 3d Brigade pressed its attack and moved astride the 

enemy's avenues of escape from Hue. Throughout the day, enemy 

forces continued their stubborn resistance with mortars, rockets, 

and heavy automatic weapons fire. The attack was continued on 24 

February against the desperate but weakening enemy forces. 

The marines had been conducting clearing operations throughout southeast Hue. Marine elements, after securing the area around 

the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, compound had fanned 

out east and west along the southern bank of the river. The 2d 

Banalion, 5th Marines, moved west then south, destroying bridges 

over the Phu Cam to prevent the enemy from using them as a 

means to enter the area. Although additional sweeps were conducted south of Hue, on 10 February, the area south of the river 

was declared secure. The marines then concentrated on the area 

north of the river. 

On 12 February the marines displaced the 1st Battalion, 5th 

Marines, across the river by helicopters and LCU's. This battalion 

relieved the 1st Vietnamese Airborne Task Force in the southeastern section of the Citadel. At the same time, two battalions of 

Vietname~ marines moved into the southwest corner of the Citadel 

with the mission to sweep east. The buildup of friendly forces in 

the walled city added pressure on the enemy, who in turn doubled 

his efforts to accomplish his own mission. From 13 to 22 February 

the: battle swayed back and forth as the U.S. marines, Vietnamese 

marines, and Vietnamese Anny 1st Division bore down on the 

North Vietnamese: and Viet Cong within Hue. Ground artillery 

and U.S. naval gunfire were used in heavy measure to support the 

U.S. and Vietnamese combat force efforts to drive the enemy out 

of well-entrenched positions within the city. 

During the period 17-22 February, additional pressure was 

brought to bear against the enemy. The 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry, 
THE BLEAK PICTURE 47 

continued to press in from the west. On 19 February, the commanding genera l of the 1st Marine Division's Task Force X-RAY 

was given responsibility for co-ordination of all fire support in the 

city. Two days later, the 1st Cavalry Division's area of operation was 

extended south to the Huong River and east to the western wail of 

the Citadel. As the Cavalry moved to fill this area, they effectively 

cut off the remaining major enemy supply route and precipitated 

a rapid deterioration of the enemy's strength. 

During the night of 23-24 February, the 2d Battalion, ~d Vietnamese Regiment, executed a surprise night attack weSlward along 

the wall in the southeastern section of the Citadel. The enemy was 

knocked off balance by the attack but once it began, he fought 

savagely. The South Vietnamese persisted and never lost the momentum their surprise action had given them. During the night 

they forced the North Vietnamese to pull back. Included in the 

ground regained that night was the plot upon which stood the Citadel flag pole. At 0500 on the 24th, the yellow and red flag of South 

Vietnam replaced the Viet Cong banner which had flown from the 

flag pole for twenty·five days. 

At 0500 the next morning, following a thorough artillery preparation, the final enemy position was overrun. With the 10S5 of this 

last toehold in the southwest corner of the Citadel, the remnants 

of the ten battalion enemy force that had attacked and seized the 

city either fled or became casualties. The Citadel was secure, and 

the battle of Hue was officially over. 

During the relief of the siege of Hue, the forward headquarters 

of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, considered directing the commanding general of the 1st Air Cavalry Division to 

establish a forward command post in the city of Hue, co-located 

with the embauled headquarters of General Troung, commanding 

general of the 1st Vietnam Army Division. The objective was to 

establish within the city a major U.S. headquarters with sufficient 

command and control, air mObility, and artillery resources to coordinate and apply the forces necessary to break the siege. Briga· 

dier General Oscar E. Davis, the assistant division commander of 

the 1st Cavalry Division, was designated as the Hue co-ordinator 

for the forward headquarters and co-located with General Troung. 

General Davis was to assess the situation and recommend directly 

to General Abrams resources needed to recapture the Citadel. Genera l Davis's recommendations to divert certain troops to critical 

areas, to co-ordinate air and artillery support, and to accelerate 

supply procedures were decisive. Within 72 hours of his arrival at 

Genera l Troung's headquarters, the siege of Hue was lifted. 

The recapture of Hue had been a particularly bitter fight. The 
48 THE WAR IN TBE NORTH ERN PROVINCES 

AERIAL VIEW OF R UINS OF H UE 

battle had formed with fOUT U.S. Army battalions, three U.S. 

Marine Corps balta lions, and eleven Vietnamese baualions on one 

side and lcn North Viel11 amcse and Viet Cong battalions on the 

other. It involved house-to-house fighting similar to that in Europe 

a quarter of a century before. There was extensive damage to the 

city where some 11 6,000 civilians became homeless. h was an expensive baule in terms of human life. The enemy lost 5,000 soldiers 

within the city and an additional 3,000 in the surrounding clashes. 

An extremely harsh price was the loss of life among lhe civilian 

population. This loss ,,,as the direct result of a systemat ic selection 

process followed by the Communists during the 26 days they occupied the city. In lhe wake of the offensive 5,800 civilians , ... ere 

dead or missing. More than 2,800 of these persons were found in 

single or mass graves during Ihe months followi ng the attack. Many 

of these victims were chosen because of their positions and loya lty 

to the Sa igon government. As Ceneral \Veslllloreland poillled a lit, 

·'This was a terrifying indication of what well might occur should 

the Communists succeed in gaining control of South Vietnam." 

bltelligence 

As the battl e for Hue developed, it became rapidly apparent to 

commanders on the scene that the 3d Brigade of the 1st Cavalry 
THE BLEAK PICTURE 49 

Division had taken on an unusually large enemy force north and 

west of the city. Numerous documents captu red during the action 

indicated the presence of elements of Ihree unexpened North Vietnamese Army regiments and several loca l units of regimental size. 

The profusion of varying documents revealed that the enemy was 

using this portion of Quang Tri Province as a staging area for 

actions in Hue. In the last days of the battle. prisoners , ... ere captured representing Ihe 6th North Vietnamese Army Regiment. the 

24th Regiment of the 304th North Vietnamese Division, the 29 th 

Regiment of the 325C Nonh Vietnamese Division, and the 

99th Regiment of the 3248 North Vi etnamese Division. Interrogation disclosed that the latter three units had begun moving into the 

area between II and 20 February to reinforce the weakening local 

forces. What was surprising was that each of these regiments came 

from one of the enemy divisions located around Khc Sanh or other 

demilitarized zone areas. Their presence in the vic inity of Hue had 

been previously unsuspected. The aggressive actions of the 3d Brigade of the 1st Cava lry Division had seriously disrupted the enemy 

plans not on ly in Hue itself, but quite naturally in those other areas 

which supplied reinforcing units. 

Shortly after the open ing of the enemy's T el offensive, the U.S. 

Army made an accelerated effort to obtain an indication of enemy 

intentions through compilation of opinions of senior South Viet· 

namese officers. Possibly these officers , ... ould be more likely than 

Americans to discern the thinking of their brothers to the north . 

Named Operation LEAl' FROG, the project produced information 

acq uired by a team of four U.S. officers who visited each division in 

all four corps areas, except the 1st Vietnamese Army Division, 

which was tot.."tlly committed in Hue at the time. 

Almost without exception the South Vietn:lmese Army offic~rs 

saw the attacks as politica lly rather than militarily motivated. Most 

of the senior Vietnamese commanders fel t the enemy was auempt· 

iog to obtain a positi on of strength fTom which he could better 

achieve his go.'1ls at any future peace talks. A small er group of 

officers saw the enemy objective as being the discred iting of the 

South Vietnamese and U.S. military pO\ver to protect the I>opul alion. With the exception of the divisions in III Corps, all commanders felt the offensive , ... as an all-out effort using everything 

ava ilable. Throughout the country, the enemy carried between 

three and eigh t days of food, and many officers reasoned the enemy 

intended to win within that lime. 

Another matter of inquiry was the degree of surprise ga ined by 

the enemy in these assaults. Na turally, those installations not 

attacked in the earl y morning hours of 30 J anuary had the one-day 
50 THE WAR I N THE NORTHERN PROVINCES 

warning given by the first-day attacks. Many other Vietnamese 

Army commanders had recovered enemy documents weeks, even 

months before, that warned of attacks on cities in their area. There 

were other general indicators of coming attacks during the Tel 

period. Some units received agent, outpost. defector, or prisoner 

reports in the hOllrs immediately prior to the attack. 

In some instances, although definite information was not avail· 

able to ac'Curately predict the time and place of enemy assaults, 

prudent Vietnamese commanders had anticipated the likelihood of 

such assaults and prepared accordingly. Already d iscussed was the 

decision of the 1st Vietnamese Army Division Commander to keep 

his division staff on alert in Hue-an action which contributed 

significantl y to the division's eventual success in repulsing the 

enemy's savage attack. Another forLUnate action was taken by the 

Vietnamese 2d Division in Quang Ngai which ca lled a practice 

alert for the early morning hOUTS of 31 January. Although apparently not called as a result of any warning. the alert had con· 

siderable effect in either delaying or disrupting attacks in their 

area. 

Further re-evaluation of the enemy situation led to the conclusion that the Tet actions were due a change in enemy objectives 

resulting from the realization that time, once an ally. had begun to 

work against the Communists. Intelligence analysts believed that 

the enemy had developed two basic objectives as of February 1968. 

Those goals were to win the war by a political and psychological 

campaign and to gain and maintain control of the people. To accomplish these goals the intelligence people reasoned that the 

enemy had set for himself three basic tasks. The first was to present 

a constant threat in widely separated areas. The second was to 

cause as many Ct1sualties as possible among U.S .. Free World. and 

Vietnamese forces. The final task was to ga in military victories for 

propaganda purposes. 

To achieve these aims the enemy had placed the equivalent of 

four divisions in the vic inity of the demilitarized zone. An addi· 

tional ovcrstrcngthcned division was located elsewhere in the northern two provinces. The actions at Qu:mg Tri and Hue were 

conducted by these troops in an attempt to regain control of the 

population. 

Battle for Quang Tri 

While the struggle for Hue was the most spectacular battle of 

the Tet period in northern I Corps. it was by no means the only 

one. At Quang Tri City further north the enemy made a determined attempt to duplicate his initial success at Hue. 

(/ 

, 
THE BLEAK PICTURE 51 

AERIAL VIEW Of" Q UANG TRI 

Quang Tri City is the provincial capital for the northernmost 

province of South Vietnam. Like Hue, it is located on Route I 

about 10 kilometers inland from the Gulf of Tonkin. The city is 

positioned along the east bank of the Thach Han River some 25 

kilometers south of the demilitarized zone. 

On the evening o[ 30 January 1968, a pl atoon-size unit of the 

enemy 10th Sapper Battal ion infiltrated the city. The unit's mission was to crea te confusion within the city by committing acts of 

destruction and sa bOlage while the main ground attack was being 

launched by the 8 l2th North Vietnamese Regiment. 

The enemy assault was to have started al 0200 on 31 January 

and accordingly the sa ppers went into action at that time. This of 

course revealed their presence and intentions. Fortunately. the 

ground attack by the 812th North Vietnamese Regiment was de· 

layed because of difficulties imposed by the rain. swollen streams, 

and lack of familarity with the area. As a result, Regional and 

Popular Forces and elemen ts of the 1st Vietnamese Army R egi. 

ment who composed the internal defense forces of the city were 

able to concentrate on the sappers before the mai n atlack took 

place. 

The 812th Regiment began its attack at 0420 on a multiple 

front. The K-4 Battalion attacked from the east, penetrating the 

city at several points. This battalion was to make the mai n assault 

and had the mission of securing the left gate of the Quang Tri 

Citadel wall and the province section headquarters. (Map 8) This 
52 THE WAR IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES 

THE BATTLE OF QUANG TRI CITY 

ENEMY ATTACI( 

III J"_,, Illsa <b ......... _,. u,*,,_ . __ .. 

MAP 8 
THE BLEAK PICTURE 53 

same battalion was expected to destroy the artillery unit within 

the compound and occupy the city prison. 

The K-6 Battalion struck from the Southeast between Highway 

I and the railroad. The mission of this battalion was to attack the 

Vietnamese Army compound in the La Vang base area soUlh of the 

city. The K- 5 Battalion was the enemy's regimental reserve and 

was to occupy positions southeast of Quang Tri City. 

The 814th Battalion, a Viet Cong unit assigned to the North 

Vietnamese Army, was [0 playa secondary role in the attack. Upon 

completion of the occupation of the city, it would occupy the whole 

city, aJlowing the remainder of the regiment to redeploy in a crescent formation on the southern side of Quang Tri to block Vietnamese Army and U.S. forces that were expected to come in as 

reinforcementS from the vicinity of Hue. The fifth enemy battalion, K- 8, also appears to have had a supporting role during the 

attack. ItS mission was apparently to block Vietnamese units from 

reinforcing the city from the north and to reinforce the battalion 

committed in the northern ponion of the city. 

The brunt of the attack fell on the defending Vietnamese Army 

forces in and around the city. These forces were composed of 

the 1st Vietnamese Regiment, an attached Armored Personnel Carrier Troop. the 9th Army of Vietnam Airborne Battalion, and the 

police and Popular Force clementS in the city. The 1st Regiment 

had two of its own battalions and the Airborne Battalion north and 

northwest of the city protecting revolutionary development areas. 

A third battalion of the regiment was located northeast of Quang 

Tri while a fourth battalion was in the city itself. 

As the 814th Viet Cong Battalion attacked Quang Tri from the 

northeast, it was decisively engaged by the 9th Airborne Battalion 

and was unable to enter the city. However, the pressure on the 

defending Vietnamese Army forces remained heavy and, fighting 

for every foot of gTou nd, they were forced to pull back into the 

city. Although the enemy had been unable to take over the city, 

they exerted great pressure on its defenders and at noon of the 

31st the outcome of the battle remained uncertain. 

The Vietnamese forces were not entirely on their own at Quang 

T i City. On 25 January the 1st Brigade of the 1st Cava lry Division, 

COl1manded by Colonel Donald V. Rattan, had been moved into 

th~~ area from position near Hue and Phu Bai. Since 17 January, 

the brigade's mission had been to launch attacks into a known 

enemy base area located roughly 15 kilometers southwest of Quang 

Tri City. The brigade had all additional mission to block approaches into the city from the southwest but was primarily concerned with its offensive mission and accordingly had two fire bases, 
54 

~I/ I 

MAP 9 

THE WAR IN THE NORTHERN PR.OVINCES 

" .. 

31 ~t, 1968-1 r,b'.Qf, 1961 

AI 0.; . ..... __'''''''. 
THE BLEAK PICTURE 55 

one 15 kilometers west of the city and one in the middle of the 

enemy base area. The action of the 814th Viet Cong Battalion 

redirected the attention of the cavalry troops. 

Shortly after noon on 31 January, the senior adviser to the 

Province Chief, Mr. Robert Brewer, held a conference with the 

1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division Commander, Colonel Rattan, and 

the senior U.S. adviser to the Vietnamese 1st Regiment. The situation in the city was still in doubt. The enemy had infiltrated at 

least a battalion into the city and its defending forces were in need 

of immediate assistance. At the time, it appeared that the enemy 

was reinforcing from the east and had established fire support positions on the eastern fringes of the city. 

At the time of the assault, the brigade headquarters at Landing 

Zone BEllY and other landing zones in addition to the Vietnamese 

Army base camp at La Vang had come under sporadic rocket and 

mortar attacks. A dense fog blanketed the area. Despite these factors, the brigade was able to react quickly to the new situation. The 

1st Battalion of the 8th Cavalry could not be moved from its 

mountain top position in the enemy base area because of the dense 

fog. Also, the 1st Battalion, 502d Airborne, of the 10Ist Airborne 

Division which was under operation control of the 1St Brigade, 1st 

Cavalry Division, continued its base de£ense mission and tactical 

operation just west of Quang Tri. (Map 9) 

This development left only the 1st Battalion of the 12th Cavalry 

and the 1st Battalion of the 5th Cavalry for use against the attacking 

enemy. Each of these battalions had opened new fire bases to the 

west of the city, along the river valley leading to Khe Sanh, on 30 

January. At approximately 1345 on 30 January, the battalions were 

directed to close out the new fire bases and launch their assaults as 

soon as possible to reduce the enemy's ability to bring additional 

forces into the city by blocking avenues of approach and eliminating 

enemy support. The two elements would also block or impede 

withdrawal of enemy forces already in the city. By 1555, the cavalry 

battalions had air assaulted into five locations northeast, east, and 

southeast of the city. Mr. Brewer's insistence that enemy troops 

were in these areas proved to be correct. The he licopters received 

intense enemy fire as they landed their troops east of the city. ContaCl continued until 1900 as the surprised and confused enemy 

fought with machine guns, mortars, and recoilless rifles. The cavalry air assaults had straddled lhe heavy weapons support of the 

K-4 Battalion, and the enemy battalion found itself heavily engaged on the eastern edge of Quang Tri by the Vietnamese Army 

and in its rear, among its support elements, by the cavalry. Caught 

between these forces, it was quickly rendered ineffective. 
56 THE WAR IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES 

UH - I B GUNSHIP 0.' 1ST CAVALRY D IVISION 

Shortly after the 12th Cavalry jumped, two companies of the 

1st of the 5th Cavalry air-assaulted southeast of Quang Tri. They 

quickly became heavily engaged by the enemy. Another enemy battalion, the K- 6. found itself wedged between the Vietnamese Army 

forces and the cavalrymen. The enemy sustained a terrific pounding 

from helicopter gunships and artillery as the 1st Brigade scout helicopters brought in aerial rocket artillery. As darkness fell, it became apparelll that the shattered enemy had had enough. He 

attempted to break contact and withdraw. Because it was difficult 

to withdraw large units through the cavalry, enemy forces rapidly 

broke down imo small groups, and some individuals attempted to 

get away among the crowds of fleeing refugees. Clashes continued 

throughout the night. 

Through the 1st or Febmary, the disorganized enemy units 

sought to avoid contact. They had suffered a terrible mauling from 

the Vietnamese Army defenders within Quang Tri and had been 

demoralized by the air·assaults, gunships, and ground attacks of the 

1st Cavalry Division. Aerial rocket artillery and helicopter gunships 

experienced unusual success against the enemy troops. 

By noon on I February, Quang Tri City had been cleared of the 

enemy and the 1St Brigade immediately initiated pursuit. Moving 

in ever increasing concentric circles centered on the city, 1st Brigade 

elements relentleSSly harried the demoralized enemy. Numerous 
THE BLEAK PICTURE 57 

U.S. ENCINEERS REP .... IRINC ApPRO .... CH TO BRIDGE 

heavy contacts with large well-armed enemy forces south of Quang 

Tri were made. Other units of the 1st Brigade made smaller contacts. This pursuit continued throughout the first ten days of February. 

The city of Quang Tri was without a doubt one of the major ob· 

jectives of the Tel offensive. Three fa ctors contributed to the U.S. 

and Vietnamese success; the tenacious defense within and around 

the city on the part of all of the Vietnamese rorces; the timely and 

accurate tactical intelligence of the enemy locations provided to the 

1st Brigade by the province senior adviser, Mr. Brewer; and the air 

mobile tactics of the 1st Cavalry Division. The enemy paid a high 

price for his failure. He lost more than 900 soldiers killed and al· 

most 100 captured in addition to heavy losses in weapons, am· 

munition, and equipment. 

Enemy Allacks 0'1 the Logistical System 

Concurrently with assaults on Hue and Quang Tri City and his 

continued pressure on Khe Sanh, the enemy struck at the more vul· 

nerable roads, bridges, and waterways used to supply the friendly 

positions in the I Corps Tactical Zone. While a reinrorced regiment 

of U.S. Mari nes tied down three or rour enemy divisions around 

Khe Sanh, two enemy divisions were in northeast Quang Tri Prov· 
58 THE WAR IN THE NORTHERN PROVlNCES 

ince and elements of three additional divisions were operating 

along the coasta l plains from Quang Tri City south to the Hai Van 

Pass, stopping all traffic carrying supplies north on Highway 1. An 

8·inch oil pipe line used to transport aviation fuel from Tan My 

to Hue was cut, and the 50,OOO-gallon capacity storage tanks at 

Tan My were destroyed. 

The bulk of supplies shipped to Hue from Da Nang were 

moved by tank landing ships (LST's). These supplies were transported from the large LST's via the Huang River to Hue and via 

the eua Viet River to Dong Ha by smaller utility landing craft 

(LCU). With the commencement of the Tel offensive. the enemy 

began a series of harassing attacks to disrupt the delivery of supplies over these inland waterways. 

The only secure terminals for delivery of supplies were the airports at Quang Tri and Phu Bai. The full use of these facilities was 

prevented by poor weather. The U.S. forces were using 2,600 tons 

of supplies a day, excluding bulk petroleum items, and an additional 1,000 tons a day were required to reconstitute stocks needed 

for a counteroffensive to relieve Khe Sanh. 

The logistic situation was critical. Military developments in 

northern South Vietnam required an influx of combat troops at a 

rate that, of necessity, exceeded the capability to create a supply 

base for their logistical support in an orderly and economical 

fashion. The fundamental approach to support in Vietnam was to 

have the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, establish the 

basic policies for all services and to have each service implement 

the basic policy in accordance with the requirements for that particular service. 

To economize as much as possible. planners also decided that 

support would be conducted on an area basis [or all common supplies. In effect this meant that the Navy, which had responsibility 

for area supply in I Corps Tactical Zone, would provide common 

supply items such ;:s food and gasoline. This basic decision remained unchanged although variation in troop densities among 

the regions caused occasional modification. 

When the enemy opened his Tel offensive, he placed an additional burden on the U.S. supply system then extant in I Corps and 

already strained to the breaking point. Colonel Daniel F. Munster, 

a logistics officer for the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, 

determined the amount of supplies his units consumed each day 

and realized he must have additiona l tonnage to reconstitute stocks 

and to build up (or the counteroffensive to relieve Khe Sanh which 

was tentatively planned to begin I April 1968. 

During January and February approximately 45,000 U.S. Army 
TH E BLEAK PICTURE 59 

troops had deployed into I Corps. Colonel Munster and his fellow 

planners had to provide 3.600 tons of supplies daily in an area 

where existing supply lines were just barely able to keep up with 

current requirements. Furthermore, this tonnage did not include 

bulk needs for petroleum. oils, and lubricants. Key decisions were 

made and implemented during a thirty-day period to stabilize the 

situation and prepare for the counteroffensive. 

The first decision was that only essentials were to be brought 

in. As General Abrams observed, "Anyone who brings in non· 

essentials is interfering with the conduct of the war." This decision 

limited the use of the available means of transportation to moving 

only combat essential items into northern I Corps: only "beans, 

bullets and gasoline." P.X. items, beer. and furniture had to be 

deferred. Second, the important supply line closed by the enemy 

actions at the Hai Van Pass had to be reopened. This task was 

accomplished through simultaneous ground attacks from friendly 

bases along Highway I north and south of the blocked pass. 

The highway was then repaired and improved. A traffic manage· 

ment agency was established at Headquarters, III Marine Amphibious Force, in Da Nang to co-ordinate convoys moving north and 

south along this critical stretch of Highway l. This activity was 

later moved to the forward headquarters of the Military Assistance 

Command. Vietnam, and renamed the Convoy Control Center. The 

first convoy to move north from DOl Nang on the reopened road 

contained 155 vehicles and set out on 1 March 1968. The actua l 

volume of supplies moved over Route I was less than satisfactory 

and the subject of concern to the headquarters of the Provincial 

Corps, Vietnam. The reopened road had a rated capacity of 250 

tons a day, but engineering problems and shortage of cargo vehicles 

continued. 

The next project of importance was the restoration of the fuel 

line from Tan My to Hue. and initiation of rep.'lirs on the 50,000-

barrel storage facility at Tan My. Both of these requirements were 

accomplished. but most important of all was the establishment of a 

logistical over-the-shore or LOTS facility east of Quang Tri and 

construction o[ a two-lane road to connect the beach with Highway 

I. The LOTS facility was a major accompl ishment. Amphibious 

lighterage units. terminal service units. U.S. Army Transportation 

Corps companies. Na'/Y Sea bees, and a Marine Fuel detachment all 

worked together at tOp speed to produce what proved to be the 

key logistical facility in the area. A POL (petroleum, oils, and 

lubricants) line laid from the beach to Highway I and then north 

to Dong Ha became the principal supply line for the U.S. Army 

troops. Sea lines were laid to accept bulk POL; extensive ammuni· 
60 

• 

,. • 

'II 

-0 

•• 

THE WAR I N THE NORTHERN PROVINCES 

' .. - .. , . A LARe - 5 CoMES AsHORE 

tion and fuel storage areas were developed; a helicopter refueling 

and lift-off point was constructed. Supplies of all types were brought 

ashore from deep draft ships by amphibious resupply cargo barges 

(BARC's) and amphibious resupply cargo lighters (LARC's). 

These large amphibious vehicles proved ideal for such work. 

Tank landing ships (LST's) and other landing craft were discharged over a ponton causeway. Each day convoys of transportalion truck units moved the cargo inland from lhe beach storage to 

the forward support bases of the combat divisions. Although originally some skeptical observers predicted that daily receipts would 

Ilot exceed 350 short tons, the LOTS facility, later designated Utah 

Beach, often greatly exceeded this amount as shown below: 

16 Marth 860 Short Ton. 

17 March "" Shon Ton. 

.. MITch .. , Shorl ToOl 

" March 1232 Shon Tons 

" March .. " Shorl ToOl 

22 March 81. Shorl Tons 

,. March 1514 Shorl Toni 

" March 1000 Sbort Toni 

The U.S. Army's 159th Transportation Battalion (Terminal), 
THE BLEAK PICTURE 61 

LARC - 5 OPERATIONS On' WUNDER BEACH 

commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Charles H, Sunder, was the 

major unit on the beach. Because of the remarkable achlevem~nts 

of the supply and transportation ~rsonnel 01 all the services on 

the beach, the facility became known as Wunder Beach and the 

men o[ the 159th Battalion as Sunder's Wonders. 

An unusual occurrence connected with the establishment o( 
62 THE WAR IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES 

CARGO CRAFT AND P .... TROL BoAT 

logistic facilities was the crossing of the North Vietnamese and U.S. 

main supply routes north of Hue in early 1968. The North Vietnamese main supply route originated north of the demilitarized 

zone and ran south along the coast to the vicinity of Hue. The 

establishment of a major U.s. supply point at Wunder Beach generated a supply route from the beach inland to the operating forces. 

Where these two main supply routes crossed, the U.S. efforts to keep 

the supplies moving interdicted the enemy supply route. 

lt was decided to improve the capability of the U.S. Air Force 

to handle larger numbers of (TOOPS and supplies at the Phu Bai 

airbase. The Air Force met this challenge by deploying longerrange navigational equipment and additional personnel. The 

marines also assisted by making emergency repairs to extend the 

runway, by increasing the number of parking ramps, and by improving administrative facilities. As the weather improved, air delivery of supplies increased. By mid·March supplies were being 

received in sufficient quantities to satisfy daily needs and build up 

stocks for the counteroffensive. 

T ask Force C learwaler 

A vital pan of the 10giSlic effort in northern I Corps was the 
THE BLEAK PICTURE 6! 

RIVER PATROL BoAT 

development of uninterrupted inland water lines of communication. The intense struggle for Hue underscored the importance of 

these supply lines. Logistic watercraft using the Huong River to 

deliver supplies to Hue were subjected to heavy punishment by 

rockets, automatic weapons fire, and mines. 

The enemy launched a large·scale assault against the vitally 

important routes on the Huong and eua Viet Rivers in northern I 

Corps. The intensity of these continuing attacks became so great 

that on 20 February 1968, General Abrams, the deputy commander of the forward headquarters of the Military Assistance 

Command, requested that a naval task force be organized ·to coordinate the protection of the watercraft using the rivers to resupply Hue and Dong Ha. 

In rapid response to this request, Rear Admiral Kenneth L. 

Veth, Commander of Naval Forces, Vietnam, organized Task Force 

CLEARWATER whase hea~quarters was operational at Tan My on 

24 February. Captain Gerald W. Smith, U.S. Navy, was designated 

the task force commander and was placed under the operational 

control of the commanding general of the III Marine Amphibious 

Force. The initial forces assigned to the Task Force CLEARWATER 
64 THE WAR IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES 

' .. 

. -:t 1 '. , 

• I 

• """", 

included river patrol boats o[ nava l Task Force 116, hel icopter 

gun ships, attack aircraft, artillery. and grou nd security troops. The 

task Coree €;oncemratcd on organizing and protecting shipping on 

the Huang River between Tan My and Hue and on the Cua Viet 

River between the port at ella Viet and the base at Dong Ha. 

Even after the establishment of Task Force CLEARWATER, enemy 

forces continued to harass and ambush utility craft as they moved 

their supplies along the river. At the end of February the enemy 

tineal was Still impressive, but it was apparent that many of the 

planned attacks weTe thwarted by the protective procedures practiced by Task Force CLEARWATER, 

C:.ptain Smith divided Task Force CLEARWATER into the Hue 

River security group and the Dong Ha River security group. On 2 

March, in recognition or the enlarged importance that the northern 

Dong Ha River group was assuming. Captain Smith moved his headquarters rrom Tan My to Clia Viel. The original taclics lIsed by the 

task rorce called ror the operation or convoys protected by patrol 

boats and helicopter gun ships with security forces used to react in 

cases or ambush. The Hue River security group received convoys 

which were formed at Tan My while the Dong Ha Security group 
THE BLEAK PICTURE 65 

r ece ived them from Cua Viet. \Vh en formed, the convoys consisted 

of an escort unit and a movement unit, both und er the command of 

a designated convoy commander. The escort unit was to provide for 

the uninterrupted transit of the movement unit by employi ng mine 

countermeasures and direct fire support and by co-ordinating air· 

craft, artillery, and gu n fire support. 

The nature of Task Force CLEARWATER operations can be under· 

stood from this log da ted 26 February 1968: 

I. Today"$ convoy of 3 LCU'$, 2 Bladderboat.s and LCM-8 escorted 

by 4- PBRs. 1 LCM-8 and 4- VNN junks. The convoy departed Tan 

My for Hue at 0830H. Preplanned artillery missions were fired into 

known ambush sites as the convoy "'tme under B-40/ 41 allack ... Fire 

I"a$ suppressed by combined fire of gunships, PBRs and convoy craft. 

LCU 1574 received one 8-40/41 rou nd in me port side of coxswain 

lIat wounding 2 USA. When the COllvoy cleared lhe ambush site the 

area was taken under fire by 81mm mortar. 

2. When the convoy arrived at Hue at 11 20H tank trucks and cargo 

trucks were available and offlooding commenced immediately. 

3. At I300H convoy of LCUs. 3 empty Bladderboats. and 1 LCM-8 

departed Hue for Tan My ... gunships provided continual harassment 

fire into previous ambush si tes as convoy passed. At 1310 the last LCM 

in the convoy came under R/ R fire but the round fell short. Suppressing fire was immediate from PBRs and gu nships .... The remai n· der of the transit was withou t incident .... 

Not all convoys were as fortunate. On the following day, 27 

February, a util ity landing craft bearing explosives was hit with a 

8-40 rocket, and the craft exploded with such force that the nearest 

escort river patrol boat was also disabled. 

ru the security situation along the waterways gradually im· 

proved, convoying was discontinued, first on lhe Huang River and 

then on the eua Viet. The emphasis was shifted to sweeps by river 

patrol boats and mine clearing operations. In early March. the ta$k 

(orce took th e offensive and began using river patrol boats and 

armored troop carriers for troop insertions and gun fire support. 

Since the enemy's ability to cond uct ambushes was limited by the 

presence of more friendly forces along the bank, he attempted to 

compensate by the increased use of mines. To hinder the enemy 

night emplacement of mines, patrols on the eua Vi et River often 

began during the hours of darkness. 
CHAPTER IV 

u.s. Response to the TET Offensive 

One of the commander's most powerful tools in influencing the 

outcome of any action is his personal presence at a critical time and 

place. A5 the intentions of the enemy in northern I Corps came into 

sharper focus, General Westmoreland on 25 January directed that 

a Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Forward Command Post, 

be set up in the 1 Corps Tactical Zone. This move provided the 

commander with a field headquarters to observe. direct. and if 

necessary. control operations in the threatened northern provinces. 

General Creighton W. Abrams, designated Commander, U.S. Mili· 

tary Assistance Command Vietnam Forward, provided the requisite 

command presence with his arrival at the new post on 13 February 

1968. Major General Willard Pearson, Assistant Chief of Staff for 

Operations, was designated Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff 

of the forward command post. About half the personnel required to 

staff the organization were selected from H eadquarters, U.S. Army, 

Vietnam; 7th U.S. Air Force; and Naval Forces, Vietnam. Additional personnel came from Headquarters, Military Assistance Command, itself and from other field agencies. 

The area of primary interest for the forward command POSt was 

the threatened northern provinces of Quang Tri and Thua Thien. 

The forward command post was established at Phu Rai near 

Hue. The 3d Marine Division rear echelon relocated from this site 

north to Dong Ha, and thus a minimum of preparation was required before the command post could move in. 

Lieutenant Colonel Wallace J. Gross, deputy headquarters 

commandant of the forward command post, arrived at Phu Bai on 

28 January to plan for the arrival of the headquarters. Colonel GrOM 

was the first member of the new command to arrive. The next day a 

contingent of 17 officers and 14 enlisted men, led by Brigadier 

General Salve H. Matheson, operations officer for the forward post, 

arrived at Phu Bai. General Matheson remained in charge of the 

advance party until the command group arrived. The group was 

augmented by a communications element of the 459th Signal Battalion, 1st Signal Brigade, which arrived on 28 and 29 January. At 

2045, on 29 January, communications were established between 

Military Assistance Command at Tan Son Nhut near Saigon and the 

forward command post at Phu Bai. 
U.S. RESPONSE TO T HE TET OFFENSIVE 67 

On ~O Janudry, the staff of the forward command post began 

functioning from Room 21-103 in the Military Assistance Command 

headquarters at Tan Son Nhut. The staff determined what additional personnel and equ ipment would be required to opera te the 

(onvard command poSt, requested the principal appoi ntments to 611 

these requirements. and phased personnel, supplies, and equip· 

ment into the field headquarters at Phu Bai. By 2 February, staff 

personnel and a headquarters support unit reported to Phu Bai. 

General Abrams arrived at the ~1 ilitary Assistance command post on 

~ February and two days later assumed operational control of the 

1st Cavalry Division and all other U.S. Army forces deploying to the 

two northern provinces. The accomplish ment of organizing, activating, staffing, and deploying such a headquan ers during a period of 

intense enemy activity was a tribu te to the ability of the organizi ng 

staff. 

At the command post the following priorities \~ere promptly 

established: to reduce the siege of Hue, to open lines of communications and stOCkpile needed suppl ies for future operations. to rece ive 

U.S. Army reinforcements being deployed into the northern provo 

inces from other corps, and to initiate planning for the relief of the 

Khe Sanh combat base. 

In the ensuing weeks the equivalent of one U.S. Army corps 

moved into the "heart of Marine land" and came under the operational control of the Mili tary Assistance Command forwa rd post. 

Although Genera l Abrams was best recogn ized in Army circles as a 

tough soldier with a sol id background in logistics, as the commander 

of the forward post he proved his other talentS as a diplomat and 

statesman of the first rank. Enroute to his new headquarters from 

Saigon he visited the headquarters of the III Mari ne Amphibious 

Force and while there he and Genera l Cushman. the Marine 

commander. decided the fight would be aga inst the enemy and not 

an interservice one. Considering the crucial nalure of the situation 

prevailing at the time , a surprising degree of harmony keynoted 

Army and Marine operations during the follo\~ing months of inten· 

sive fighting. 

~s a modus operandi . the dispatch of messages by the forward 

~fili{ary Assistance Command to the commanding genera l of the 

III Marine Amphibious Force. recommended operational and logistical actions to improve the combat capabilities of forces in northern 

I Corps. Information copies of such messages went to the commander 

of the Military Assistance Command in Saigon. One example of this 

procedure took place during the siege of I-Iue and involved artillery 

support. General Abrams dispatched a message to the commanding 

general of the III Marine Amphibious Force. with an inrormation 
68 THE WAR IN THE NORTHERN I' ROVI NCES 

copy to Saigon. recommending that one battery of 8·inch howitzers 

be deployed from southern I Corps where enemy activity had 

subsided to the Phu Bai aTea to provide heavy artillery needed to 

breach the walls around the Hue Citadel. The requested battery 

was immediately relieved of its current mission and flown to Phu 

Bai in support of the operation. 

The day General Abrams arrived at Phu Bai, 13 February, the 

decision was made to deploy the undentrength lOlst Airborne 

Division into the aTea o[ operati on of the forward command post. 

The airborne division was minus a brigade which remained in III 

Corps and a baualion task force operating in II Corps. Within 

weeks the 3d Brigade. 82d Airborne Division, ftew in from Fort 

Bragg. North Carolina. and came under control of the 10 1st Airborne Division. Another major unit programed into I Corps was the 

27th U.S. Marine Corps Regimental Landing T eam airlifted from 

California which arrived 23 February. 

Planning jor the Relief of Kh e Sanh 

As the immedi ate T et emergency became less critical. the 

Military Assistance Command. Vietnam. Forward Command Post 

began to plan for the relief of Khe Sanh. This planning continued as 

the siege of Hue was reduced. as U.S. Army reinforcements were 

deployed into the area, and as lines of communication were opened 

and stOCkpiles reconstituted. When it became apparent that the 

logistica l-over-the-shore (LOTS) supply facility could comfortably 

discharge over 1.000 tons a day. I April was set as D-day for the 

relief of Khe Sanh. 

Before the end of February a concept for the rel ief of Kh e Sanh 

was presented by the forward command poSt staff to the recently 

appointed d eputy commander. General William B. Rosson. and 

subsequently to Genera l Abrams and General Cushman. It was 

rellned and used as a basis {or concurrent planning by the major 

subordinate commands of the Military Assistance Command [orward poSt. 

On 10 March 1968 the Military Assistance Command. Vietnam. 

Forward Command POst was redesignated Provisional Corps. Vietnam. The following press relea~ dated 8 March outlines the 

command relationships of the new headquarters: 

General William C. Westmoreland. Commander of the U.S. Military 

Assistance Command. Vietnam. an nounced today the formation of a 

new headquarters to assist in the command and control of U.S. units 

in the nonhero part of the First Corps Tactical Zone. 

The new headquarters will be commanded by Anny Lieutenant 
U.S. RESPONSE TO THE TET OFFENSIVE 69 

General William B. Rosson and will be designated as Provisional Corps, 

Vietnam. It will no doubt be more widely known to Military personnel 

by its short title of "Prov Corps, V." 

The headquarters staff will consist mainly of Anny and /I.·farine Corps 

personnel. though it also will contain some Navy and Air Force officers. 

l 'he new headquarters will exercise operational control of U.S. military 

ground units in the northern provinces of Quang Tri and Thua Thien. 

The Provisional Corps will be subordinate to Marine Lieutenant Gen· 

eral Robert E. Cushman, Commanding General of the Third Marine 

Amphibious Force in Da Nang, who has several other senior tactical 

units reporting to him. It will serve as a tactical echelon between 

General Cushman and the Commanders of the U.S. Army and Marine 

Divisions in the northern area. Gener.tl Cushman's area of responsibilities will remain unchanged. General Rosson will also have coordinating functions with the highly 

regarded First Vietnamese Division which is deployed in the area. 

Most of the personne l in the new headquarters will come [rom the 

MACV Forward Headquarters which was established in the area several 

weeks ago under command of General Creighton W. Abrams. General 

Abrams, who is General Westmoreland's deputy, has effected coordination among the Army, Navy, Marine and Air Force units in the area. 

Since his assigned task is virtually complete, he ,"'ill now return to his 

1I0rma i duties in Saigon and the forward headquarters will cease to 

exist. 

At 1201 hours, 10 March 1968, Provisional Corps, Vietnam, 

became operational at Phu Rai under command of Lieutenant 

General Rosson. The corps assumed operationa l control of two 

Army and one Marine Corps divisions and Task Force CLEARWATER, 

together with other combat and service support units. Major Ceneral Willard Pearson remained as the deputy commander and chief 

of staff, and Brigadier General Lawrence H. Caruthers assumed 

command of the artillery of Provisional Corps, Vietnam. Subsequently, Major General Raymond G. Davis, U.S. Marine Corps, 

bC(ame the deputy commander of Provisional Corps, Vietnam. 

The day he assumed command, General Rosson briefed General 

Westmoreland on the planned operations for the corps. Three 

distinct operational L1rget areas were presented: the elimination of 

enemy forces in the Con Thien-Cio Linh area north of Dong Ha; 

the opening of Route 9 with the subsequent relief o[ Khe San 

Combat Base; and an assault into the A Shau Valley. General West· 

moreland approved the operations in the Con Thien- Gio Linh area 

to be followed immediately by the Khe Sanh operation. The A 

Shau opera tion was to be conducted as a reconnaissance-in-force 

operation at a later date. 

The corps planned to begin the Con Thien- Cio Linh operation 

first and to follow it immediately, on or about I April, with the Khe 

Sanh operation. The outline for the Khe Sanh plan provided that 
70 THE WAR IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES 

the 1st Cavalry Division would conduct air assaults while the 1st 

Marine Regiment and Vietnamese Army Task Force would execute 

an overland attack. At the same lime. Route 547 from Hue to the A 

Shau Valley would be interdicted by air strikes and the valley itself 

subjected to additional air reconnaissance in order to locate targets 

[or air and artillery strikes. General Westmoreland approved these 

plans. The Army's 1st Cavalry Division under the command of 

Major General John J. Tolson, III, was aSSigned overall operational 

responsibility for the relid of Khe Sanh. The offensive plan was 

called Operation PECASUS after the winged horse of Greek mythol· 

ogy. 

On 15 March, General Rosson's headquarters requested the 

participation of a Vietnamese Army task force in the Khe Sanh 

operation. This step was recommended not only for sound military 

reasons, but also because it was considered desirable to have major 

Vietnamese troops particip..ue in the relief of Khe Sanh. A task force 

of three airborne battalions was made available on 28 March. 

On 16 March, :l logistical planning group was formed at the 

headquarters of the Provisional Corps to determine requirements 

for the offensive. The three divisions under the Provisional Corps, 

the iOlst Airborne. the 1st Air Cava lry, and the 3d Marine were 

directed to send representatives, and the III Marine Amphibious 

Force was requested to send a representative to speak for the Da 

Nang SUPIX>rt Command, Navy Support Activity, Da Nang, and the 

Fleet Logistic Command. 

To reduce the time required for helicopters to transfer supplies 

from airfields to troop field positions, airfields had to be as close as 

JX>Ssible to operational areas. The less time required per trip, the 

fewer helicopters would be required. Accordingly, the planning 

group concluded that PEGASUS should receive logistical support from 

a base operated by the U.s. Anny Support Command near Ca Lu. 

To insure continuous support, the base was to be prestocked before 

I April. To meet this goal, the logistical base was established 21 

March and the next day the first of daily convoys fTom Dong Ha 

made its supply rUIl to Ca Lu. 

At Ca Lu engineers began to COIlStruct an area for an ammuni· 

tion Storage facility, bunkers, helicopter revetments, a road network 

for the supply base, fields of fire around the perimeter to improve 

security, and an area for petroleum, oil, and lubricants; construction 

of the airstrip began at the same time. 

Communications planning for Operation PEGASUS indicated a 

need to considerably upgrade the established system. The terrain in 

the operational area and distances over which the signals must 

travel dictated that a signal hill be established. The 1st Cavalry 
U.S. RESPONSE TO THE TET OFFENSIVE 71 

Division prepared and secured the complex, while the United 

States Army, Vietnam, and the III Marine Amphibious Force 

provided the needed equipment. This [eat was accomplished with 

signal resources not under the control of the headquarters of the 

Provisional Corps, Vietnam. When the Military Assistance Command. Vielllam, Forward Command Post had been established, it 

had made do with signal support provided by other unilS. During 

February 1968. the 459th Signal Banalion had grown to support the 

command posts needs. \Vhen the Provisional Corps was activated, 

this function continued and expanded. The 459th Signal Battalion, 

redesignated the 63d Signal Battalion. had then assumed direct 

support of the headquarters of the Provisional Corps in addition to 

ilS other missions. To facilitate this change, the battalion was 

removed from the operational control of the 21st Signal Group at 

Nha Trang and instructed to answer directly to the U.S. Army's 1st 

Signal Brigade. 

Headquarters. U.S. Army. Vietnam, directed the Provisional 

Corps signal officer to function as its area communications C(K)rdinator and representative for the northern two provinces of I Corps. 

This arrangement gave the Provisional Corps signal officer access to 

more communications support than normally available to a corps 

headquarters. Although somewhat unorthodox. the system proved 

highly efficient in actual practice. 

The improvement of communications systems had earlier been 

extended into Khe Sanh ilSe lf. The deputy commanding general of 

U.S. Army, Vietnam. directed the 1st Signal Brigade to establish a 

tactical tropospheric scatter system from Khe Sanh. The system 

provided teletypewriter and voice circuilS of the highest quality and 

the 1st Signal Brigade kept the system in service throughout the 

campaign. 

Single Manager lor A ir Concept 

On 8 March 1968 General Westmoreland designated his deputy 

for air operations, General William W. Momyer. U.S. Air Force. as 

the single manager for control of tactical air resources in South 

Vietnam to include all U.S. Marine fixed-wing strike and reconnais· 

sance aircraft. This action was taken as a result of the buildup of 

Army forces in I Corps. the corresponding concentration of tactical 

air sorties in support of these forces. and an overriding requirement 

to maintain maximum flexibility in allocating air resources during 

the particularly critical period following the Communist Tel offensive. 

A look at the statistics on the air operations supporting the 
72 THE WAR IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES 

ground forces at Klle Sanh hom mid-Jan uary until the end of March 

1968 pointed out the need fOT a single focal point in co-ordinating 

the air effort. During this period there were nearly 10,000 Air Force 

fighter strikes, over 5,000 Navy and 7,000 Marine strikes, and over 

2.500 B-52 strikes, for a total of more than 24,500 air strikes. 

General Westmoreland's decision ran directly counter to Marine 

doctrine and tradition and was not welcomed by the H I Marine 

Amphibious Force. The commanding general of the force opposed 

the single manager concept on the grounds that it was neither 

doctrinally nor functionally suited to his requiremenu. However, as 

the situation in I Corps changed, the concept was implemented on 

10 March 1968 as approved by the Pacific commander in chief. The 

system actually became effective about 1 April 1968. 

Integrated with the tactical air operation was the air resupply 

of troops at Khc Sanh. The rollowing table shows the number o( 

personnel and lons of supplies airlirted into Khc Sanh in March 

1968. 

D .. , $bon TOll. Pcnonnd 

, Man:b , .. .. ....... '" 30 

• M."" , .. " • March . 21 • 21 

9 March ,.;, ,. 

10 March '" '16 

16 March ......... 172 

17 March . 

20 March . . ......... 292+~8 '" barn:ls POL 

21 March 247 +554 barrels POL 

2S March ......... 24 March .......... '" 

25 March '" ,,, 

26 March 

27 March '" 16' 

28 March 148.6 

29 March ,,, 

'0 March .. "" 

Clearly the close air suppon and air resupply by the U.S. Air 

Force and Marine Corps as well as helicopter supply operations by 

the U.S. Army played a major role in the defeat of the North Vietnamese Army during the Khe Sanh operation. 
CHAPTER V 

Khe Sanh and PEGASUS 

The base at Khe Sanh remained relatively quiet throughout the 

first week of the enemy Tel offensive, but the lull ended with a 

heavy ground attack on the morning of 5 February. The enemy 

penetrated the perimeter of the position on Hill a61A, and the resulting hand-la-hand combat drove the enemy back. A second 

attempt to overrun the position was less successful than the first. 

EIst:where the North Vietnamese wefe more successful when, on 7 

February. they struck at the Special Forces camp at Lang VeL 

The Lang Vei Special Forces Camp was located astride Route 9 

some nine kilometers west of Khe Sanh Village. Beginning about 

1800 on 6 February. the camp was subjected to an unusually intense 

mortar and artillery barrage. The defenders immediately responded 

with counter fire from the camp and requested supporting fire from 

the Khe Sanh Combat Base. 

The enemy ground attack began about midnight on the morning 

of 7 February. The initial force to reach the protective wire around 

the perimeter included two of the approximately twelve Russian 

manufactured PT -76 amphibious tanks. The two armored vehicles 

were sighted in the outer wire on the southern side of the camp, 

taken under fire, and knocked out. (Map 10) 

The armor defeating weapons in the camp consisted of two 106-

mm. recoilless riRes, a few 57-mm. recoilless rifles, and 100 light 

antitank weapons known as LAW'S. The LAW is designed to be 

fired once and discarded. These special weapons had been provided 

to the camp shortly before Lhe attack as a result of intelligence 

reports which indicated that an attack was imminent and that 

armored vehicles would most likely be involved. Because of the newness of the weapons, few of the indigenous personnel and only half 

of the Americans had had the opportunity to fire the weapon before 

the attack. One survivor reported that several LAW'S failed to fire. 

This may have been due to lack of training or to improper storage. 

Additional tanks moved around the destroyed vehicles and 

overran the company manning the southern sector. The friendly 

troops pulled back, but continued fighting. They fought the tanks 

with small arms, machine guns, hand grenades, and antitank weap-
74 THE WAR TN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES 

THE BATTLE OF LANG VEl 

ENEMY ATTACK 

7 Flbrua., 1968 '< ( ........ 1. o •• ,,.,_ 

-:+ n .... "'''''''' "rio 

u ..... , .... . .. "''''''''' ! ..... , ... 0"1 

MAP 10 

ons. As the attack continued, the defenders were forced to continue 

their withdrawal from the forward positions. They fe-formed in 

pockets and continued to resist and fire at the enemy troops and 

tanks as they moved through the camp. As the enemy soldiers 

adva nced, they used explosive charges to demolish the fortifications 

within the camp. The enemy tanks used their 76·mm. main guns 

against the combat positions and tactical operations center in the 

camp. 

As the battle continued, air strikes were called in. When day 

broke over the battlefield, the defenders located in the operations 

center called for and received air support to assist them in breaking 

out of the still surrounded position. Their escape was aided by a 

rescue force that had returned to the camp to help extract survivors. 

By day's end the camp had been evacuated and all surviving personnel extracted. 

As the Lang Vei ballie progressed, the Marines were requested 

to implement their contingency plan to reinforce the Special Forces 

camp. However, because of the fear that this attack was but a part of 

an all-out general altack in the area, Lang Vei was not reinforced. 

By noon on the 7th, General Westmoreland was being briefed on 

the need to evacuate the survivors. Also at the meeting were General 

Cushman and General Tompkins. General Westmoreland directed 
KHE SANH AND PEGASUS 75 

that aircraft be made available to suppon the reaction force, and 

that a£temoon the extraction took place. 

When 7 February came to an end, the Lang Vei Camp was 

empty. Almost half of the 500 defcnders were dead or missing. The 

survivors left behind them seven destroyed enemy tanks and at least 

as many enemy casualties as they themselves had suffered. The 

enemy attack stopped at thc camp. It did not cominue ean toward 

Khe Sanh. 

At Khe Sanh the marines wcre monitoring the baule at Lang 

Vei. After the seriously wounded had been evacuated by helicopter, 

the remaining survivors and many refugees moved ean on foot. On 

the moming of 8 February some !,OOO refugees, including the Lang 

Vei survivors and Laotian !3d Baualion troops who had withdrawn 

from their auacked position on 2! January. appeared at the £Tont 

gate of the Khe Sanh perimeter. At first denied admittance, the 

people were later searched and permitted to enter. Most were soon 

evacuated out of the area with the Laotians being returned to thcir 

own country. 

At 0420, 8 February, a reinfol'"Ccd enemy battalion assaulted a 

platoon position oC the 9th Marine Regiment. The marines were 

forced back from that portion of their perimeter which bore the 

brunt of the assault, but maintained comrol of most of the position. 

A comp..1ny·sized counterattack at mid-morning restored the position, but the Marine commander at Khe Sanh decided to evacuate 

that platoon position because of its exposed location. 

Enemy pressure on the Khe Sanh Combat Base continued 

during the following two weeks but not in the form of any major 

ground attacks. Probes, minor clashes, and sniping incidents occurred daily although the main enemy interest appeared to be the 

consolidation of his position and preparation for an all-out effort. 

In attempts to deter these preparations by artillery and air strikes, 

the marines lyere themselves hindered by the weather. 

During this period Khe Sanh and its surrounding outposts continued to be supplied almost entirely by air. Marine and Air Force 

cargo aircraft made numerous daily Tuns to keep the base pro· 

visioned, to bring in replacement tToops, and to take out wounded. 

The pilots had to brave both poor weather and intense enemy 

antiaircraft fire to accomplish these tasks. 

On 10 February, a Marine C-l!O, loaded with fuel containers. 

was laced with bullets just before touching down on the runway. 

The aircraft was lost along with some of the passengers and crew. 

This incident caused major revisions in the off-loading procedure. 

As a result of this loss and the damage inAicted on other aircraft 
76 THE WAR IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES 

while on the ground, landings of the large C-130 type aircraft were 

suspended at Khe Sanh on 211 February. 

Operation NIAGARA II continued throughout this period. This 

intensive air interdiction campa ign continued to provide excellent 

results. The high volume reconnaissance missions, added to other 

intelligence sources, recommended an average of alieaSl 150 targets 

per day. On 15 February. one of the most lucrative targets, an 

ammunition Storage area, was pinpointed 19 kilometers south southwest of Khe Sanh in the Co Roc Mountain region. Flight after flight 

of strike aircraft were directed into the iU"ea throughout a 24-hour 

period. Many secondary explosions and fires revealed additional 

stOCkpiles which weTe in turn auacked. In all, it proved to be a good 

day's work resulting in over 1,000 secondary explosions and fires, 

some of which continued twO and one·half hours after a series of 

strikes had been completed. 

Air operations on the logistical side also progressed. Following 

the termination of C-130 aircraft landings. the Air Force introduced 

a new procedure to continue supplying the main Kht: Sanh base. 

Known as the Low Altitude Parachute Extraction System or LAPES, 

this sel£<ontained method of delivery had been put to good u~ 

while the air strip was being repaired in late 1967. The name of the 

system accura tely described lhe technique. As the aircraft came in 

low over the airstrip, the pilot opened the tail gate and released a 

reefed cargo parachute which was connected to the pallet mounted 

cargo in the a ircraft. When the pilot electrically cut the reefi ng line. 

it caused the parachute to fully deploy and inflate. The parachute 

then jerked the pallets out of the aircraft over the roller system 

mounted on the aircraft floor. After a five· to ten·foot drop. the cargo 

skidded to a halt on the runway. Experienced pilau could consis· 

temly leave their loads in a 25·meter square. 

A second technique was also used to deliver cargo by aircraft 

without actually landing. This method, known as the Ground 

Proximity Extraction System or GPES. was used less frequently 

than the low altitude system. In th e GPES delivery. as the C-130 

aircraft came in low over the airstrip, the pilot would try to snag an 

arresting line on the grou nd similar to the line a navy pilot uses in' 

landing on an a ircra ft carrier. The ground line then jerked the 

cargo from the opened rear of the aircraft, 

About 65 deliveries using the low altitude and gTOund proximity 

systems were made before Khe Sanh was relieved and resupply 

effected by way of Route 9. By far. the majority of the supplies for 

the base were delivered by parachute because weather was too poor 

to permit the visual flying required for the two extraction type 

systems. 
KI-IE SANH AND PEGASUS 77 

Another aspect of the air operations was the last leg of the resupply system in which helicopters picked up su pplies at Dong Ha 

and carried them to the outposts on the surrounding hills. They 

faced lhe same problems as did the fixed-wing pilots, but to a 

greater degree. The low-fiying hel icopter pilots were more vulnerable than their higher fiying, faster fellow aviators. Because of the 

additiona l exposure, helico pters soon were escorted by strike aircraft to provide suppressive fire as they dropped off su pplies and 

picked up troops. 

Helicopters were greatly affected by the wea ther. When the helicopters were grounded, life became hard on the marines in the outposts. One period of weather \.,.hen the helicopters could not fl y 

persisted for nine days and crea ted such a water shortage that one 

sma ll position was alLlhorized to conduct a two-hour march to obtain wa lcr from the nearest stream. The patrol surprised a group of 

enemy soldi ers and eliminated many of them. 

Fighting on lhe gTollnd in Operation SCOTLAND, a Marine 

designation, continued through the end of February. The last day of 

the month, 29 February, General Tompkins and Colonel Lownds 

pieced together the relevant (acu to reason that a big enemy push 

was imminent. Each day brough t better weather and longer fl ying 

hours. Numerous intelligence reports pointed to a massing of North 

Vietnamese uniu at three points around the main base. Although 

the enemy had fail ed to gain control of the hill outpOSts, he could 

not afford to let the weather improve much more be£ore he acted. 

During the early evening hOUTS of 29 February, a string of sensors indicated a major movement of troops along Route 9. The fire 

support control center at the base directed all ava il able assets against 

the area. The firePJwer was massive. Artillery, radar-guided fighter 

bombers, and minor and major B-52 strikes PJunded the enemy's 

route of march. 

A battalion of the 304th North Vietnamese Army Divison made 

the first strike at 2130 on 29 February. The 37th Vietnamese Army 

Ranger Battalion received the brunt of the initial assa ult, and all 

available supporting fire was given lhe rangers. Hit with this cancelllra ted firepower, the enemy was unabl e [Q breach the outer 

defenses. H is second attempt two hours later met a similar [ale. So 

did the third at 0315 on I March. The supporting fires had prevented the assault waves from gaining momentum. 

Although the enemy continued to harass the base, to probe the 

weakness along the perimeter, and to shell it from a distance, he had 

changed his basic taClics. He assumed a less aggressive posture and 

began wa iting for the Marine patrols to come to him. But this did 

not help him either. As time passed and the weather improved, in-
78 THE WAR IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES 

dications by mid-March were that major North Vietnamese Army 

units were leaving the area aTOund Khe Sanh. 

The Marine's last significam clash during Operation ScOTLAND 

took place on 30 March when a company, moving under a closely 

co-ordinatcd artillery support package, swept 850 meters south of 

the Khe Sanh perimeter and assaulted a heavily fortified enemy 

position. Surprise was with the attackers. however, and the marines 

drove the enemy Qut of his positions, destroyed the fortifications. 

and returned to their base. 

Planning lor Pegasus 

The next day at 0800. ScoTU.ND was officially ended. At that 

time, the operational control of the 26th Marine Regiment at Khe 

Sanh passed to the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) which initiated 

Operation PEGASUS. The details of this operation are covered in 

Chapter V. 

Elsewhere in northern I Corps Tactical Zone, it became apparent during late March that the enemy was continuing to build his 

base areas along Route 547 and had constructed an alternate route, 

547A, from the A Shau Valley east towards Hue. These routes provided the enemy with a major artery for the movement of troops, 

supplies, and equipment out of the valley and into the denser jungle 

area between the valley and Hue. Reconnaissance of the area revealed a sophisticated communications system using wire lines and 

the presence of heavy automatic and antiaircraft weapons. Numerous caches of weapons, ammunition, and other equipment had been 

located by elements of the lOlst Airborne Division operating along 

Route 547 tlnd 547A west of Hue. These caches indicated the presence of S7-mm. antiaircraft cannons and tracked vehides, probably 

tanks, in the area. Ceneral Westmoreland, after his 17 March visit to 

Provisional Corps, Vietnam, directed B-52 tactical airstrikes to interdict Route 547 and 547A. 

Final preparations were being made for relieving the siege of 

Khe Sanh by the reinforced 1st Cavalry Division. On 22 March 

General Rosson held a meeting with division commanders at Camp 

Evans, 15 kilometers southeast of Quang Tri City and formulated 

plans for the relief of 1st Cavalry Division elements from their area 

of operation along the coastal areas of Quang Tri Province by units 

of the lOIst Airborne Division. To insure that a sufficient force 

would be available to offset a new enemy threat at Hue, General 

Rosson requested that the Vietnamese Marine Task Force be retained at Hue. If the force could not be retained, he requested that 

a fourth Vietnamese Airborne Battalion and U.S. forces be made 
KHE SANH AND PEGASUS 79 

available for employment in the Hue area. General Cushman for· 

warded General Rosson's report to General Westmoreland with a 

recommendation that the airborne task force be raised to four 

battalions for the Con Thien-Gio Linh operation. The Con Thien 

operation was envisioned as a deception plan for Operation PEGASUS. 

This operation would also place the airborne task (orce closer to the 

ultimate zone of action in the Khe Sanh Operation. 

General Rosson, Captain Smith, the commanding officer of Task 

Force CLEARWATER, and the Commander of the Naval Support 

Activity in Da Nang met at the III Marine Amphibious Force 

headquarters with General Cushman to discuss the deception plan 

and to determine the details of its implementation and its effect on 

logistical support in northern I Corps Tactical Zone. 

OperatiOtl Orders 

The Third Marine Division issued its operation order on 25 

March to cover both the Con Thien-Gio Linh operation, which 

would be executed in conjunction with U.S. Army elements and the 

1st Vietnamese Division, and Operation PEGASUS. The 4th Marine 

Regiment was to secure Route 9 and provide convoy security in its 

area. The 9th Marine Regiment was to provide security for Route 9 

in its sector. The 12th Marine Regiment was instructed to support 

the attack o[ the 1st Cavalry Division within its artillery capabilities. 

As the emeny activity around Khe Sanh tapered off, it appeared 

that Operation PEGASUS might go much quicker than originally 

anticipated. If true, this would relieve elements of the 1st Cavalry 

Division for earlier commitment to attacks in the A Shau Valley 

area. General Westmoreland expressed the view that Operation 

PEGASUS was to exact the maximum destruction of enemy forces and 

faci lities, and its duration would therefore have to depend on the 

tactical situation as it developed. General Cushman and General 

Rosson assured General \Vestmoreland that all preparations for 

Operation PEGASUS would be ready for the planned I April attack. 

General Westmoreland also approved the concept ror a later opera· 

tion in the A Shall Valley presented by the III Marine Amphibious 

Force. Thlls, the logistical planning for the operation into the A 

Shall Valley was conducted concurrently with logistical support for 

PEGASUS and it was envisioned that the second operation would 

continue as a smooth transition from the first. 

Provisional Corps, Vietnam, Operation Plan 1- 68 was redesig· 

nated Operation Order 1- 68 with D-day, H·hour, established as 

01001 April. General Tompkins, Commanding General, 3d Marine 

Division, ordered the execution of a deception operation with D-day, 
80 THE WAR IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES 

H·hour, established as 0600 on 30 March. The U.S. elements 

participating in the combined operation were designated Task 

Force KILO and the Vietnamese Army portion of the operation designated LAM SON 203. The deception operation envisioned a task 

force attacking northeast from Dong Ha toward the demilitarized 

lone. 

As the final co-ordination was being accomplished to insure all 

units were ready fOT the pending operation, some elements were 

already at work. In addition to the U.S. Air Force actions in preparation for the operation. the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry of the 1st 

Cavalry Division, was directing strikes to eliminate antiaircraft 

positions in the area before the airmobile division committed the 

bulk of its helicopters. Heavy U.S. Air Force strikes had stripped 

away much of the concealment needed by the enemy. With the 

addition of the reconnaissance squadron of the 1st Cavalry Division. 

the effectiveness of artillery and air strikes directed against the 

enemy antiaircraft positions was almost total. As the final hours of 

March ticked away. the Free World Forces awaited the signal to 

strike. 
CHAPTER VI 

The Free World Counteroffensive 

Ope'li71g OperatioNS 

At 0600.30 March, U.S. Army, Marine, and Vietnamese Army 

forces initiated their planned deception operation northeast of Dong 

Ha. The U.S. element consisted of the 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry; 

Company C, 2d Battalion, 34th Armor; Company A. 1st Battalion, 

502d Airborne. IOlst Airborne Division; and 2d Battalion, 4th 

Marine Regiment; all controlled by the 3d Marine Division. The 

Vietnamese Army elemem consisted o[ the 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry, and the 3d Battalion, 1st Infantry, under the control of the 1st 

Vietnamese Army Infantry Division. The maneuver elements at· 

tacked generally north toward the demilitarized zone along the 

coastal plains near Cia Linh. All units reached their objectives that 

afternoon. Following only light action, tht: ope:ration was terminat«l 

on the afternoon of I May. 

The broad concept for the relief of Khe Sanh envisioned the 1St 

Cavalry Division attacking west from Ca Lu to seize the high ground 

along Highway 9 in a series of successive air mobile assaults. Concurrently the marines were to s«ure and repair Highway 9 leading 

to Khe Sanh. Under the single manager concept for air, intensive 

clost: air support was to assist the attack.s, together "'ith massive B-52 

strikes prior to and during the assault. Major units reinforcing tht: 

1st Cavalry Division were the 1st Marine Regiment with three 

battalions and an airborne task force of three battalions, plus tht: 

supporting combat and servict: units. (Chart J) 

Operation PECASUS began at 0700 on I April with U.S. Army, 

U.S. Marint:. and Vietnamt:se forct:S moving out from Ca Lu along 

Highway 9 toward the Khe Sanh Combat Base. The 1st Cavalry 

Division attacked with a combination of air and ground assaults to 

clt:ar and st:cure the road and removt: the enemy from tht: area of 

operation. During the morning hours, the two lead Marine battalions moved out according to plan, pushing west from Ca Lu. 

Delayed by weather, it was not until 1300 that tht: initial wavt:s of 

1st C.walry Division helicopters placed men of the 3d Brigadt: of tht: 

Cavalry on a series or landing zones as close as five milt:s to Kht: 

Sanh. (Map Il) 
CHART 3- lsT AIR CA\,ALR\· DIVISION ORGANIZATION .. OR OPERATION 

xx 

y 

ACO 

CG MG John J. Tolson 

ADC BG RiChard L. lrb

ADC BG Osear E. Davls 

r--------r--------.------L-.---------r

"' 

~IACO 

COl. John F. 

SU,nnard 

"' "' 

~"~"'H 2~IACD 

Wne of Command 

Wne of Cootdlnatlon 

Col. Joseph C. 

McDonough 

"' 3~IACD 

Col. Hubert S. 

C.mpbell 

III 

Col. Davi

Lownd

MAJOR MANEUVER ELEMENTS AND COMMANDERS 
THE FREE WORLD COUNTEROFFENSIVE 83 

fHE 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION DISOfBARKS IrQ11l UH - 18 lor a mission. 

The 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, advanced westward on the north 

side of Route 9 while the 2d Battalion. 3d Marines, advanced on the 

south side of the road. As the Marines progressed and cleared Route 

9 and the nearby terrain of enemy troops. engineer companies 

began repairing the road. They cleared one and a half kilometers of 

road and constructed four by-passes the first day. Throughout the 

operational area, the Americans spent a quiet night in rapidly 

prepared defensive positions. 

Although Operation NIAGARA had been terminated with the 

beginning of PEGASUS, air support continued. The first day of the 

operation. eight B-52 raids were Aown to assist the ground forces. 

Four of the missions were in the vicinity of Khe Sanh. Poor weather 

in the early daylight hours limited tactical fighter support to 66 sorties. Eight U.S. Air Force C-130 and four C-123 cargo aircraft 

delivered 115 tons the first day and 24 helicopter missions boosted 

the slim to JUSt under 150 tons. An additional 44 personnel joined 

the combat base by way of C-123 aircraft, which were still permitted 

to land on the strip. 

On 2 April operations began at 0655 with two Marine battalions 

resuming their advance along either side of Route 9 toward Khe 

Sanh. Contact with the enemy was minimal. The 2d Battalion, 7th 

Cavalry, began an air assault at 1300. The late starting time was 
84 

RELIEF OF KHE SANH 

OPERATION PEGASUS 

(Sc"'''''''fc NO.1) 

I "'1'.11 1"1 

MAP II 

THE WAR IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES 

attributed to ground fog, haze, and low hanging clouds. These 

unfavorable Hying conditions continued throughout the operation. 

The 1st Battalion, I st Marines, remained ncar the air field nonh 

of Ca Lu, which had been designated Landing Zone STUD. The 

Marine unit rClldned this mission For the duration of the operation. 

The Army. Navy, and Marine engineer units continued their 

work along Route 9. On 2 April they cleared almost three kilom· 

eters of the road and completed two bridges and two morc bypasses. 

(Map 12) 

The sustained air support included 36 8-52 aircraft delivering 

six strikes. five of which were in the immediate vicinity of Khc 

Sanh Combat Base. In spite of the unfavorable flying weather, 142 

tactical air sorties were Aown by Air Force. Navy. and Marine aircra ft in support of the ground troops conducting PEGASUS. Air Force 

cargo aircraft dropped 91.4 tons of supplies into Khe Sanh and 

helicopters raised the total tonnage to 162. 

On 3 April the tempo of the operation picked up somewhat. The 

marines continued westward along Route 9 with the engineers 

working furiously right on their heels. The 1st Cavalry's 3d Brigade 

continued operations in the vicinity of the landing zones they had 

occupied during the first day. The 2d Brigade of the 1st Cavalry 
THE FREE WORLD COUNTE.ROFFENSIVE 85 

Division air-assaulted in the PEGASUS area o( operations one day 

ahead of schedule with the 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry, going into 

Landing Zone TOM and the 2d Batlalion, 12th Cavalry, moving 

first to Landing Zone STUD by CH-47 helicopters, then rel oading 

into smaller UH-I H helicopters for an air assault into Landing 

Zone WIIARTON. The 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry, then flew into 

Landing Zone WIIARTO:"'. Both landing zones received artillery and 

rocket fire (rom enemy positions during the moves, but the troops 

were not to be easily diverted. By the end of the day, all 2d Brigade 

troops and three batteries of the lst Baltalion, 77th Artillery, were 

in position. At that time, other artillery batteries in position in· 

cluded Battery C, 21st Artillery, which had followed the air assault 

troops into Landing Zone CATES, and B Bauery, 21st Artillery, 

which had followed into Landing Zone MIKE on D-day. Battery A, 

21st Artillery, joined tbe 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry, at Landing Zone 

TIIOR on 2 April. 

During the fourth day, April 4, the enemy resistance continued 

at a moderate level. The marines maintained their westward attack 

along the main supply route and the Third Brigade kept up pressure on enemy elements around the established landing zones. The 

1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry, initiated an attack on an enemy battalion 

occupying positions in an old French fort. 

On the same day, elements of the 26th Marine Regiment began 

their first major offensive move in weeks, attacking out of the Khe 

Sanh Combat Base. Preceded by extensive artill ery preparation, at 

0600 the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, assaulted southeast towards 

their objective, Hill 471. The hill was secured by 1720 that day. 

The fifth day, 5 April, opened with an enemy attack on Hi1l471, 

which the Marines had occupied the previous afternoon. At 0515 

the 7th Battalion, 66th Regiment, 304th North Vietnamese Division, charged up the hill. The fight was one of the highlights of 

Operation PEGASUS and was quite one-sided. Assisted by tremendous 

artillery and close air support. the marines cut down large numbers 

of the attackers while suffering few casualties themselves. (Map H) 

Elsewhere, except for the 1st Cavalry Division's 2d Brigade, the 

operation followed a routine pattern. The marines and the 2d 

Battalion, 7th Cavalry, maintained their westward movemelll. 

meeting moderate opposition along Route 9. The engineers had 

reconstructed a total of 5.5 kilometers of the road, completing four 

bridges and twelve by-passes. 

The Marine advance along the main supply route continued 

through 6 April. The 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry, maintained its drive 

west and met stubborn enemy resistance occasioning the heaviest 

fighting of the operation thus far. Following a day-long battle. the 
86 THE WAR IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES 

RELIEF OF KHE SANH 

OPERATION PEGASUS 

(Scftl_IIC No. 21 

2-. ,,' 1961 

MAP 12 

_/~="",~\,~ V 1 Co .. 

~I ttlZ ""k, 

, 

cava lry finally drove the enemy out of his defensive positions, capturing 121 individual and 10 crew ~rved weapons. 

The 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry, was airlifted from Landing 

Zone TIMOTHY to Hill 471 and effected relief of the In Battalion, 

9th Marines, at noon. The marines then opened a clearing altack to 

the northwest. 

Meanwhile the 1st Battalion of the 5th Cavalry was encollntering 

stiff resistance at an old French fort about 15 kilometers due east of 

Khe Saoh. On the sixth day of Operation PEGASUS the 1st of the 5th 

was extracted and the 2d Battalion of the 5th Cavalry picked up the 

mission of seizing the strongly defended position. The fort finally 

fell on 7 April thus eliminating the final known enemy stTOngpoint 

between the advance cavalry troopers and Khe Sanh. 

Little further significant COntaCt was to occur during the final 

days of the operation. The remainder of Operation PECASUS was 

directed at opening the main supply route and sifting through the 

debris of battle. The retreating enemy continued to offer some 

resistance, but without spirit. 

The seventh day, 7 April, witnessed a further lessening of enemy 

strength in the area of operations. Ground probes against fTiendly 

positions continued but fewer reports were made of attacks by enemyartillery. 

At 0800 on 8 April, the relief of the Khe Sanh Combat Base was 
THE FREE WORLD COUNTEROFFENSIVE 

RELIEF OF KHE SANH 

OPERATION PEGASUS 

{Sc/OI"",11c No.l l 

5--6.p,lIltll 

"'2.6"0'''''-

°Kln .. 1S 

L .... yo! 

MAP 13 

87 

accomplished as the 3d Brigade airlifted its command post into the 

base and assumed the mission of securing the position. The 2d 

Battalion, 7th Cavalry, cleared Route 9 to the base and linked up 

with the marines. 

By this time it was apparent that the enemy had chosen .to fiee 

rather than face the highly mobile Americans. Vast amounts of new 

equipment were abandoned in place by the North Vietnamese as 

they hastily retreated. 

Nevertheless, the enemy maintained some order in his with· 

drawal. At 0350 on 8 April, an element of the Vietnamese Army 

Airborne Task Force near the command post of the 3d Vietnamese 

Airborne Battalion was attacked. For over four hours the dash 

continued before the enemy withdrew leaving almost 75 dead 

behind. Later that afternoon, the 3d, 6th, and 8th Vietnamese 

Army Airborne Task Force closed in at Landing Zone SNAKE and 

began operations along Route 9 to the west. 

The final battle of the operation took place on Easter Sunday, 

14 April. The location was ironically between Hills 881 S and 881 N 

where the battle for Khe Sanh had started on 20 January. The 3d 

Battalion, 26th Marines, attacked from Hill 881 S to seize Hill 881 

N and met heavy resistance. The marines prevailed, and the enemy 

withdrew leaving over 100 dead behind. (Map 14) 

On 10 April, General Rosson had visited General Tolson, the 
88 

RELIEF OF KHE SANH 

Of'[RATlON PEGASUS 

($eM_lie I<t ... l 

1-1"",U 1961 

THE WAR IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES 

",:::::::=::::~l'd 841 CI' 

MAP 14 

[J1I't .. lZ 'IIIM r10n 

ell c.tu 

commanding general of the 1st Cavalry Division, and told him to 

begin extracting units from PEGASUS to continue preparations for 

the assault into the A Shau Valley. The weather in the valley was 

ideal for airmobile operations at the time. and General Rosson was 

anxious to get the new action underway before the end of the 

month. 

The next day. II April, Route 9 was officially declared open at 

1600. The engineers had rebuilt 14 kilometers of road, replaced 9 

key bridges. and constructed 17 by-passes. General Westmoreland 

described their achievement as herculean. 

At 0800. on April 15, Operation PEGASUS and Operation LAM 

SoN 207 A were officially ended. The 2d Brigade came under the 

operationa l control of the 3d Marine Division, joined Task Force 

GweK, and initiated Operation ScOTLAND 11 in the vicinity of Khe 

Sanh. The Vietnamese Army Airborne Task Force relocated to Hue. 

The rapid and sllccessful conclusion of Operation PECASUS can 

be laid first to detailed planning and preparation. Second, the 

enemy was either unable to, or did not know how to, react against 

airmobile maneuvering of large numbers of combat troops and supporting artillery around and behind enemy positions. Third, an 

unprecedented degree of bomber and fighter air support was provided to the ground forces, and this combat power punched the 
THE FREE WORLD COUNTER.OFFENSIVE 89 

enemy along the front line and throughout positions to his rear. 

Over 100,000 tons of bombs and 150,000 rounds of artillery were 

expended during the operation. More important, this ordnance was 

expended in response to excellent intelligence. Fourth, the ability 

to keep Khe Sanh and the troops in the field supplied was consider· 

able. Fifth, of extreme significance was the determination and 

courage of the individual fighting man in the ranks. 

Back to A Shau 

Operation PEGASUS and the relief of Khe Sanh had been planned 

with an eye toward continuing the momentum of selected maneuver 

elements in a reconnaissance in force into the A Shau Valley. By 12 

April the Provisional Corps, Vietnam, had completed a plan calling 

for the 1st Cavalry Division in co-operation with the 1st Vietnamese 

Army Division to conduct an airmobile offensive into the valley on 

17 April. 

During a visit to the headquarters of the Provisional Corps on 

14 April, General Westmoreland chose from a hat the name DELAWARE for the operation. The plan for the operation was presented to 

General Westmoreland, and, while he reaffirmed his desire to go 

ahead with it, he disapproved the scheduled draw-down of all major 

units of the 1st Cavalry Division in the Khe Sanh area. General 

Tolson, Commanding General of the 1st Cavalry Division, General 

Troung, Commanding General of the 1st Vietnamese Army Division, and Major General 01 into M. Barsanti. Commanding General 

of the IOIst Airborne Division, presented their plans for their divisions' role in Operation DELAWARE. General Rosson and General 

Cushman then developed a revised plan according to General Westmoreland's guidance. After a visit to the 1st Vietnamese Army 

Division, General Westmoreland returned to Phu Bai and approved 

the revised plan. The resulting operation plan 3-68 for Operation 

DELAWARE and Operation LAM SON 216 was published by the 

Provisional Corps on 16 April. 

The 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry of the lst Cavalry Division, had 

been conducting extensive aerial reconnaissance in the DELAWARE 

area of operations during the final phases of PEGASUS. The lOlst 

Airborne Division and the 1st Cavalry Division published instructions to bring their plans into line with the modified Provisional 

Corps plan on 15 and 17 April, respectively. Extensive l>-52 strikes 

conducted between 14-19 April preceded the initiation of the 

operation to eliminate antiaircraft positions located during the reconnaissance phase. The 1st Brigade, lOlst Airborne Division, began moving west on 16 April and the Vietnamese Army Airborne 
90 

THE BATTLE OF A SHAU 

VALLEY 

FRIENDLY SITUATION 

19 April-I:!: Maf 1.68 

<><_ .. - ""Ioaf"_ ..... '_ ... __ ,. ~~ ... --

THE WAR IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCE.'" 

C~, , 'y''"'''-.-1----,---'. I ! 1·'Ut 

- r iii • lltlUlCu .. 

MAP 15 

Task Force joined the IOlst in moves to position units for the coordinated airmobile and ground attacks. 

The operation began on the morning of 19 April. Extensive 

8-52 tactical air and artillery fire paved the way for the initial air 

assault into the A Shau Valley by the 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division. Nevertheless, the antiaircraft fires that met the helicopterborne troops were intense. 

To the east, the 1st Brigade, IOlst Airborne Division, began its 

drive westward along Route 547, shifting out of CARENTAN II into 

Operati(m DELAWARE. The 2d Battalion, 327th Infantry, attacked 

southwest along the road. They were followed by an air assault of 

lhe 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry, into a landing zone near the 

junction of Route 547 and 547 A. The next day, the 3d Brigad~. 

1st Cavalry Division, continued to deploy into the northern A 

Shau Valley as the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, pushed southeast 

from their landing zone and the 5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry, moved 
THE FREE WORLD COUNTEROFFENSIVE 91 

to block Route 548 which entered the valley from Laos to the west. 

The 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry. began an air assault to establish a 

landing zone further south in the valley. The 6th Vietnamese Army 

Airborne Battalion airlanded into the landing zone held by the 1st 

Battalion, 327th Infantry, and immediately made contact with the 

enemy upon moving out from the landing zone. (Map 1') 

On the third day of the operation, 21 April. contact with the 

enemy continued as the cavalry unitS worked deeper into the valley. 

Just before noon, Company B, 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, discovered 

an enemy maintenance area which included a Soviet-manufactured 

bulldozer that was still operational. The 2d Battalion. 502d Infantry, air-assaulted into the area around the road junction to reinforce 

the 1st Battalion, 327th, and the 6th Vietnam Army Airborne 

Battalion. 

During the initial days of the operation, the weather had been 

poor. Flying conditions were not as favorable as had been expected, 

and the helicopter assaultS and Air Force cargo resupply missions 

were accomplished at no little risk to those involved. Conditions 

improved on 22 April and plans were advanced to assault the 

A Luoi airfield and the central portion o( the valley. This insertion 

took place on 24 April when the 2d Battalion, 8th Cavalry, occupied a landing zone two kilometers south ·of the airfield. The 1st 

Brigade then began sweeping the surrounding area with the 1st 

Battalion, 12th Cavalry, to the south and east: the 2d Baltalion, 8th 

Cavalry, to the south and west; while the 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry. 

secured the landing zone. 

To the south of the airfield a cache of soph isticated radio and 

wire communications equipment was found, indicating the advanced level of communications used by the enemy in the area. 

Other caches were discovered by the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, to 

the north. Vehicles, ammunition, and three 37-mm. antiaircraft 

weapons were among the haul. Operation DELAWARE was spoiling 

the enemy's supply depots in the A Shau Valley. 

During the rest of April, the buildup of friendly forces and 

supplies continued around the A Luoi airfield. The 3d Vietnamese 

Army Regimental Task Force joined the 1st Cavalry Division elements in exploiting the caches throughout the valley. 

As the month of May came to A Shau, enemy resistance lessened 

while Operation DELAWARE. units continued to find new enemy 

caches. By the end of the operation, the supplies denied to the 

enemy reached staggering proportions. On 2 May, the first cargo 

aircraft, a C-7 A or Caribou transport landed at the A Luoi field, 

and on 4 May, a large C-130 landed. Aerial drop of supplies continued in order to fill supply stocks at the position. 
92 THE WAR IN THE NORTHER.N PROVINCES 

The link-up between the cavalry forces in the valley and those 

moving west along Routes 547 and 547 A took place on 12 May. 

Company C. 1st Battalion , 12th Cavalry, represented the valley elements while the 3d Vietnamese Army Airborne Battalion was the 

lead unit in the westward moving forces. The meeting point was in 

the Rao Nhc Valley some ten kilometers east-northeast of A Luoi 

and 25 kilometers southwest of Hue. 

The extraction of the U.S. and Vietname~ from the A Shau 

began on 10 May and Operation DELAWARE terminated 17 May. 

The enemy had suffered over 850 casualties and had lost huge stockpiles of supplies. Any serious attempt by the enemy to conduct 

major offensive operations out of the A Shau base area would now 

require many months of additional preparation. 

General Rosson labeled Operation DELAWARE: 

... one of the most audacious, skillfully executed and successful combat 

undertakings o( the Vietnam war ... it is significant that from its inceplion DELAWARE was a combined effort entailing association of the 1st 

Cavalry Division and the!Jd ARVN Regiment, 1st ARVN Division, on 

the one hand, and the IOlst Airborne Division and the 3d ARVN Airborne Task Force on the other. The outstanding resulu achieved 

through teamwork on the part of these combined forces reflect great 

credit on their leadership, professionalism, and unsurpassed fighting 

7eal. 

The A Shau Valley campaign occurred after fTiendly forces had 

been absent ITom that area for two years. In a way, this operation 

signaled an end of one phase of the conflict. It marked the loss of 

enemy control of a long·held fortress and also demonstrated the 

control which the U.S. and South Vietnamese forces were re-estabIishing in the wake of the enemy's Tet offensive. 
CHAPTER VII 

Analysis of North Vietnamese 

Goals and Failures 

The goals of the North Vietnamese in South Vietnam are 

summarized in Ho Chi Minh's three-point battle cry: "Defend the 

North, Free the South, and Unite the Country." This simple cry 

had much patriotic and emotional appeal, particularly since the 

U.S. forces wefe described as imperialists who had replaced the 

French, the former rulers of Vietnam. In the determination of 

military strategy and tactics and the political maneuvering to attain 

this goal, simplicity tended to fade away. 

During 1964, the first Viet Cong division-size unit was formed 

and committed to combat. The Hanoi high command also decided 

to standardize the weapons used by its forces in the south, thus 

simplifying battlefield supply problems and increasing firepower. 

This step did have one drawback in that it required the Hanoi 

government to send greater tonnages of ammunition south to support the automatic weapons. 

The North Vietnamese by December 1964 had reached the decision to escalate their reach for control of the south to the third and 

final phase of Ho Chi Minh's classical theory of revolution. They 

shifted from guerrilla warfare to a general offensive using major 

field maneuver units. The formation of the Viet Cong division and 

introduction of North Vietnamese Army units into the south were 

unmistakable evidence of this shift. 

It was doubtful that the South Vietnamese could contain this 

increasing threat without substantial assistance. Measures were 

taken to provide the necessary help to strengthen the government 

and assist the Armed Forces. Limited numbers of U.S. Marine and 

U.S. Army airborne troops were deployed to South Vietnam in 

March 1965 to provide this assistance. Starting in July 1965, substantial numbers of U.S. Marine and Army ground forces were being deployed in South Vietnam along with required Air Force and 

Navy supporting forces. Thus, the pattern of enemy buildup and 

friendly counterbuildup was established. 

The step-for·step counter to offensive enemy moves had thwarted 

Hanoi's aims and eventually resulted in Hanoi's apparent decision 
94 THE WAR IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES 

to attempt to gain their desired end through political means. In 

the summer of 1967, North Vietnam's Vo Nguyen Giap must have 

reached the decision that it would be necessary for his forces to win 

a significant military advantage before the start of any peace talks. 

The 1968 enemy winter-spring campaign, planned in late 1967, 

appears to have had two major phases. In the initial phase. a series 

of attacks on Free World Military Assistance Forces and installalions in remote areas would lake place. These attacks were designed 

to draw major U.S. and South Vietnamese forces out of their 

defensive positions around the principal cities. The double-edged 

second phase was to consist, first, of a major attack on South Vietnam's larger cities in the expectation that the liberators would 

receive much popular support and, second, of a major attack 

directed eastward from Laos along Route 9 to capture or destroy all 

friendly positions from the Laotian border east to the sea. 

This was a major change in enemy strategy. It was a result of the 

enemy's desire to repeat his 1954 success at Dien Bien Phu. As mentioned earlier, it was an admission or realization that time, once an 

ally. was no longer on his side. 

A reassessment of the situation, made by the highest level of the 

Hanoi government, seemed to cause a significant redirection of 

goals. The enemy leadership both in Hanoi and South Vietnam 

took a hard critical look at how things were going in the fall of 1967. 

North Vietnamese combat operations had been largely unsuccessful. 

Despite his best effortS. his strength was de<:lining. and his control of 

the population in South Vietnam was de<:reasing. Approximately 40 

percent of the population was under North Vietnamese Army control in 1965, but this proportion had fallen to between 15 and 20 

percent by September of 1967. Loss of population control meant a 

loss in manpower, revenues, and supplies. The North Vietnamese 

and Viet Cong would have to make up this deficit through greater 

demands on the people still under their control. Such demands 

would not further endear the North Vietnamese Army to the people. 

The relationship was already strained by the subjection of the 

population to more frequent military and psychological pressures 

by the Free World Military Assistance Forces. 

The North Vietnamese Army troops had seen enough of the big 

picture to realize they were having little success. As a result, morale 

was declining drastically. Rather than generating the desired feeling 

of accomplishment among itS troops, the Hanoi government's warof-attrition policy was fostering a sense of despair. As the need for 

a North Vietnamese Army success to discredit the government of 

South Vietnam increased, the prospect of ga ining such success had 

decreased. 
ANALYSIS OF NORTH VIETNAMESE COALS AND FAILURES 95 

During 1966, the North Vietnamese Army suffered approxi· 

mately 9~,OOO killed. An estimated ~5 percent of this figure comprises men who died of wounds or were permanently disabled as a 

result of combat actions. In 1967, the casualty figure climbed to over 

145,000. During 1966 and 1967, the enemy had a total of 2118,000 

peTSOnnellosses. At the end of 1967, his duty strength was estimated 

between 210,000 and 2115,000. Comparison of losses to present.forduty strength at the beginning of 1968 indicated a personnel problem of staggering proportions. 

]t seemed obvious that continuation of the old war-of-attrition 

strategy could not possibly lead to success. After consideration of 

these adverse trends, the enemy adopted a new goal with these 

objectives: to win the war by a political and psychological campaign 

and to gain and maintain control of the people. 

The North Vietnamese most probably chose to seek their hoped· 

for military victory, which they felt must precede peace talks, in the 

Khe Sanh area for a number of reasons. Since the target area was 

just across the demilitarized zone, in close proximity to good staging 

areaS in Laos, the enemy could build up military strength and concentrate his forces outside the boundaries of South Vietnam. The 

remoteness of the area would complicate U.S. and Vietnamese 

Army resupply and support problems while at the same time 

lavoring the North Vietnamese Army logistical situation. Also, the 

reaction forces coming to the aid of the attacked position would be 

exposed to ambush and destruction at numerous locations between 

Hue, Da Nang, and Khe Sanh. Once drawn into the fight, these 

reaction forces would be far removed from the cities which the 

North Vietnamese planned to attack. As noted earlier, the section of 

Route I between Quang Tri City and Hue had been a constant 

thorn in the Hesh of the French Army during its prosecution of the 

Indochina War, and it was from this stretch of road that Bernard 

Fall drew the title of his book, Street Without Joy.. Finally, another 

reason for choosing the Khe Sanh region was that this area was historically an influential Communist stronghold. 

To perform the mil itary operation, the enemy had brought four 

divisions plus support troops into the vicinity of Khe Sanh. ]n the 

area nonh of Hill 881 N, the enemy had deployed the !l25C North 

Vietnamese Army division. Southwest of Khe Sanh was the !l04th 

North Vietnamese Army Division and in the demilitarized zone area 

north of the Rock Pile was the 320th North Vietnamese Army 

Division. The fourth division was across the Laotian border to the 

west. Also around Khe Sanh were an estimated one to three 

armored battalions, possibly from the 20~d Armored Regiment; the 

68th Artillery Regiment; and elements of the 164th Artillery Regi-
96 THE WAR IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES 

menl. Intelligence reports had funher indicated the pr~ence of at 

least 27 PT - 76 tanks. numerous 240·mm. rocket launchers and 122-

mm. assault guns, antiaircraft weapons, and at least one communication relay sileo 

From the enemy point of view, his revised plan for the domination of the SQulh should have created a significant defeat for the 

U.S. if Kht Sanh had gone the same way Dien Bien Phu went fOUTteen years before. However, the enemy had made a few serious 

crrors in his planning. High-level enemy documents of a self-analysis nature attest to these errors. He expected massive popular 

uprisings as his tTOOpS entered the cities and further expected large 

numbers of Vietnamese Armed Forces to defect to his ranks. In both 

these expectations he was entirely disappointed. 

Having failed in his Tel offensive in the spring of 1968, the 

enemy attempted to regain momentum by maintaining constant 

pressure on the urban areas through continuous interdiction of 

lines of communication, through the imposition of a tight economic 

blockade, and through the destTuction of the administrative control 

held by the government of South Vietnam. These enemy measures 

were meant to cause the people to demonstrate and rebel. Enemy 

pre·positioned and thoroughly trained political cadres could then 

step in and assume leadership and control of the people. 

The enemy winter·spring campaign, of which Tel was the 

high-water mark, was a "Battle of the Bulge" attempt to reverse the 

trends of the war and create a favorable political and psychological 

position that would ultimately lead to the collapse of the govern. 

ment of the Republic of Vietnam. As of June 1968, his military 

efforts to achieve this goal had been totally unsuccessful. To obtain 

a military victory, it remained necessary for him to trigger a general 

uprising culminating in a successful coup d'etat. Such success was 

impossible unless the enemy could regain his momentum and win 

the support of both the population and the armed forces of South 

Vietnam. In June of 1968, there was nothing to indicate he could 

gain such support. In (act the opposite effect prevailed. The Tel 

offensive was the " Pearl Harbor" of South Vietnam, arousing and 

uniting the people against the Communists. This public attitude 

t·esulted in large part from the ruthlessness of the Viet Cong and 

enabled the Vietnamese government to mobilize its manpower on a 

much greater scale. 

There were a number of reasons for the U.S. success in defeating 

North Vietnamese attempts to take over the two nonhern provinces 

of South Vietnam. These included : the acquisition and analysis of 

enemy intelligence; the organization of forces to counter the enemy 

threat; air mobility; the superior ground and air firepower possessed 
ANALYSIS OF NORTH VIETNAMESE COALS AND FAILURES 97 

by the Free World Military Assistance Forces; good communications; logistical support; the improvement, modest as it was, of 

Vietnamese Army forces; and finally, the co-ordinated actions of the 

divers Free World Force elements which operated to contain and 

defeat the enemy. 

Intelligence 

Information about the enemy is an invaluable asset in any military conRict and proved itself especially so in Vietnam. In a conventional struggle, one can at least engage the enemy; that is, observe 

him and take him under fire, even if his immediate intentions, 

strength, equipment, and unit organizations are unknown. In the 

guerrilla environment of South Vietnam two very critical unknown 

factors existed. It was difficult to know where and who the enemy 

was. In the populated areas, much importance was placed on determining who the enemy was while in the unpopulated regions, the 

problem was learning where the enemy was. 

The intelligence effort was increased in response to the enemy 

concentration of forces in and around northern I Corps. Civilian 

agents, military patrols, long-range reconnaissance patrols, aerial 

observers particularly from helicopters, the Civilian Irregular Defense Group forces at Lang Vei, Special Forces teams operating in 

the A Shau Valley, and radio interceptors provided a steady stream 

of information about the enemy's activities. 

An extensive reconnaissance program in early January was initiated to obtain as much information as possible about the enemy. 

This effort. code-named NIAGARA I, included all sources of information, and aimed at developing target information about the enemy 

in northern I Corps and the adjacent area immediately to the weSt 

of the Laotian border. The information was derived from, among 

additional sources, aerial and ground searches, interrogation of 

prisoners and other persons that may have been in or passed 

through the area. and study of captured enemy documents. 

After the enemy's Tel offensive in 1968, Operation LEAP FROG 

was instituted as an accelerated effort to obtain intelligence indicating the enemy's goals in the campaign. Such k.nowledge would 

identify his future moves, thus making possible the formulation of 

friendly countermoves. 

Allied intelligence analysis concluded that the attacks were 

politically motivated and a.imed at seizing the urban areas, at the 

replacemem of Republic of Vietnam officials with members of the 

Viet Cong infrastructure. and possibly. after having established a 

position of power from which to negotiate, at suing for a coalition 

government. 
98 

90 

80 

70 

60 

THE WAR IN THE NORTHERN PROVI NCES 

CHART 4--BUILDUP OF OPPOSINO MANEUVER fiATIAUONS IN 

I CORPS TACTICAL ZoNE I 

92 

30 2. 

10 Jr~~ 

BNS. JAN 67 JUN 68 

• This graph displays only infantry type maneuver Intl.lions. 

Organization lor Combat 

The responses to this intelligence were reRected in the continued gradual movement of the III arine Amphibious Force into 

the northern segment of the corps area and the influx of United 
ANALYSIS OF NORTH VIETNAMESE GOALS AND FAILURES 99 

States Army and Republic of Korea Army troops in an effort to 

increase the density of the Free World Forces in the threatened 

area. The Military Assistance Command and Command Post was 

initially organized to control the deployment of a U.S. Army corps 

into the area. The organization and deployment of Task Force 

OREeoN and the headquarters of Provisional Corps, Vietnam, have 

already been discussed. In May of 1968, there were 98 maneuver 

battalions in the corps area of which 26 were U.S. Marine Corps, 

~I were U.S. Army, ~7 were Vietnamese, and 4 were Republic of 

Korea. This total, 196, was somewhat above the June figure and is 

indicative of the Auid situation. (Chart 4) 

The U.S. maneuver battalions were assigned to the 1st and 3d 

Marine Divisions, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), IOlst Airborne Division, and the Americal Division; the Vietnamese Army 

battalions were normally assigned to, or under, the operational 

control of the lst and 2d Vietnamese Army Divisions and the 51st 

Independent Infantry Regiment. The four Republic of Korea battalions were under the 2d Republic of Korea Marine Brigade which, 

although not under the operational control of the III Marine Amphibious Force, was generally treated as such for planning and co· 

ordinating purposes. 

The flexibility of the III Marine Amphibious Force organizalion was attested to by the mix of Army and Marine units under 

various command echelons. Both Army and Marine battalions were 

considered to be basically interchangeable during the preparation 

of operation plans. Reporting directly to the III Marine Amphibious Force were Provisional Corps, Vietnam; C Company, 5th U.S. 

of operation plans. Reporting directly to the III Marine Amphibious Force were Provisional Corps, Vietnam; C Company, 5th U.S. 

Special Forces; 1st Marine Air Wing; 1st Marine Division; 23d or 

Americal Division, and, informally, the 2d Republic of Korea 

Marine Brigade. (Chart ') 

Within Provisional Corps, Vietnam, were three divisions. The 

3d Marine Division was reinforced from three to five Marine Regiments and, in May 1968, reinforced by the 2d Brigade, 1st .Air 

Cavalry Division. The 1st Air Cavalry Division had its two organic 

brigades and the 196th Light Infantry Brigade. The IOlst Airborne 

Division had two organic brigades and the 3d Brigade. 82d Airborne Division. The organization for combat of Army and Marine 

units was dictated by the tactical situation. 

The flexibility of the U.S. forces, and their ability to shift Army, 

Navy, and Marine combat and combat support units among the 

variOliS headquarters in response to changes in the tactical situation 

was a major contribution to the sllccess of operations against the 
CHART 5-SUBOROINATE UNITS TO 3D MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE 

I 

I 

J. I I 

~ . MAW I 

I I 

I ~:',ll ~ 1f~ I ~~ ~'- 

~~ .. ~~~ Q. 

COMMAND---

COROINATtON - - --
ANALYSIS OF NORTH VIETNAMESE GOALS AND FAILURES 101 

enemy in I Corps. This flexibility also facilitated the implementation of cross-servicing agreements. 

Airmohilil), 

Airmobility provided a proportionate increase in the combat 

potential of combat units. From a tactical point of view, the helicopter gave unit commanders a new dimension in warfare-vertical 

envelopment of an enemy's rear or flank. For centuries commanders have sought to outflank their enemies, by foot, by cavalry, 

and even by elephants-and more recently by tanks and by airborne 

forces. The helicopter provided this ability to U.S. forces in Vietnam on an unprecedented scale. The 85 knots per hour helicopter 

placed troops at decisive points in time to influence the outcome 

of the baule. This ability had a multiplying effect on U.S. combat 

power. 

The helicopter was the work horse o[ the Vietnam War. Despite 

the helicopter's sensitivity to weather conditions, its versatility gave 

it great value in combat operations. In addition to being faster than 

ground vehicles, it had the important advantage of being able to 

disregard the ruggedness of terrain. The helicopter rescued people 

from minefields, plucked them from the water, captured prisoners 

of war, and evacuated casualties from the scene of battle to supporting hospitals, including naval hospitals afloat. 

Superior Firepower 

The massive firepower available to units of the Free World 

Military Assistance Forces dominated actions in the air, on the 

ground, and at sea. Artillery, aerial rocket artillery, naval gun fire, 

tactical fighter·bombers, and stragetic bombers brought awesome 

destructive power to bear on enemy units. 

Following the target acquisition program under NIAGARA I the 

successive artillery and air firepower operation was designated 

NIAGARA II. The massive close air support provided under the 

single manager concept for air is described in the concluding pages 

of Chapter IV. 

8-52 raids were an important factor in the program. The heavy 

bombing raids generated many casualties and created fear and low 

morale among enemy troops while bolstering morale within 

friendly units. The raids forced enemy units of battalion and regimental size to evacuate elaborately prepared positions, thus abandoning sites in which considerable resources had been invested. 
102 THE WAR IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES 

Communications 

The upswing of activity along the demilitarized zone and within 

the two northern provinces demanded a vast and rapid increase in 

teletype and voice communications channels to handle expansion 

of operational and logistical traffic. The influx of additional Marine 

unitS. two Army divisions, plus associated combat service support 

and combat support units, and the eventual organization of the 

Military Assistance Forward Command Post succeeded by the Provisional Corps, Vietnam, added to the need for expanded communications. 

Within a 50-day period, U.S. Army. Vietnam, organized the 

65d Signal Battalion, 1st Signal Brigade of the Strategic Communications Command, concurrently with the organization of the Military Assistance Forward Command Post and the Provisional Corps, 

Vietnam. During that short time frame the unit grew from a headquarters nucleus in Phu Bai to a 1300-man, three company battalion. With tactical and mobile contingency equipment flown in 

from various areas in Vietnam and Thailand, the battalion established command control and area communications for Military 

Assistance Command Post Forward, Provisional Corps, and the III 

Marine Amph ibious Force. At the same time, U.S. Air Force elements provided a 60<hannel system from Dong Ha to Phu Bai and 

thence to Da Nang, furnishing the needed communications gateway to the commanders of the U.S. Military Assistance Command 

and the U.S. Army, Vietnam, through the Defense Communications System. 

During Operations PECASUS and DELAWARE, when the tactical 

command posts of the lOlst Airborne and lst Cava lry Divisions 

moved into the Ca Lu and A Shau area, mobile 12- and 24<hannel 

very high frequency radio relay and tropospheric scatter systems 

were extended to these field locations From Phu Bai. 

Logistics 

Moving large troop units into the undeveloped northern region 

required prodigious effort in construction of logistical facilities and 

in operational planning down to the finest details. Maneuvering o[ 

combat troops placed enormous strain on the transportation capa· 

bilities, and resupplying the troops in new distant locations was a 

fonnidable task. 

Logistical planning kept pace with the buildup of U.S. forces 

in I Corps. Procedures were developed by the U.S. Navy for the 

initial support to Army units deployed north. As the Military Assistance Forward Command Post and the equivalent of a U.S. army 
ANALYSIS OF NORTH VIETNAMESE GOALS AND FAILURES lO~ 

corps deployed to the 1st Corps Tactical Zone, a forward area 

support base was organized at Da Nang to support them and handle 

the heavy volume of supplies. 

Transportation was improved as Highway I reopened and the 

fuel pipeline was restored. A logistical-over-the-shore (LOTS) 

facility was constructed, and a new pipeline laid from the LOTS 

facility into Dong Ha. Finally the Phu Bai airport had been expanded to increase its tonnage handling. 

In general, resupply was accomplished by surface means to the 

maximum extent possible. However, some operations required 

aerial supply for certain elements of a unit or even for the entire 

unit. This need prevailed at the garrison at Khe Sanh. The calculation of aerial resupply capabilities was for this reason an important 

step in planning. 

The advantage of surprise in military operations could easily 

be lost if impending actions were revealed by pre·stocking supplies 

in a new operational area. It was therefore necessary to move vast 

amounts of supplies into a new area at the same time the combat 

troops moved in. This generated major Auctuations in requirements 

for aircraft and trucks during the deployment period. 

In allocating resources available to conduct resupply during an 

upcoming operation, there were many opportunities to substitute 

one resource for another. Operation PEGASUS was an example of 

this fact. The Khe Sanh garrison was entirely supplied by cargo 

aircraft, its outposts by helicopter. The closing relief forces were 

supplied by air or truck convoy, depending upon their proximity 

to Route 9 and the engineers' progress in rebuilding the route. 

Although there is little restmblance between a C-lSO cargo aircraft, a CH-47 helicopter, and the engineer bulldozer-supply truck 

combination, from a logistical standpoint, they accomplished the 

same thing. It was a matter of stlecting the most economical means 

or simply using what was available. 

Improvement 0/ Vietnamese Armed Forces 

While units of the Free World Military Assistance Forces 

shouldered the burden of containing the enemy offensives, modest 

gains were made in improving the combat capability of Republic of 

Vietnam military forces. This feat was accomplished by providing 

military advisers to help Vietnamese commanders solve the complexities of tactical and logistical problems. Changes were made in 

the military school system to more adequately address contemporary problems. (Chart 6) 

Another step was to revamp the promotion system for better 
104 THE WAR IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES 

CH,\.RT 6---J CORPS VIETNAMESE ORGANIZATION 

xxx 

xx 

~ARVN 

Dlst Ollt .,,, .,,, Oltt 

DIVISIONS, PROVINCES, AND DISTRICTS 

recognition of the merit of officers and noncommissioned officers. 

The senior Vietnamese officers began to summarily relieve incompetents, reprimand weakness in subordinate's leadership, and give 

recognition to superior performance. One statistical measure of 

the general improvement of the military forces was the decreasing 

desertion rate. Another measure, and a significant one, was the 

growing number of Vietnamese units that earned the United States 

Presidential Unit Citation for their heroic actions in combat. During and following the 1968 Tel offensive, the military forces of 

South Vietnam acquitted themselves adequately. In many cases, 

such as that of the 1st Vietnamese Division in Hue, they fought 

with distinction. 

Along with the qualitative betterment of personnel, strides were 

taken in improving the equipment of the armed forces. Vietnamization began with the issue of the MI6 riRe, mainstay weapon of 

U.S. ground ~rvices, to Vietnamese Army units. Better machine 

guns, mortars, and other crew-served weapons were added to the 

Vietnamese Army inventory. In addition to these weapons, the 

issue of aircraft, boats, helicopters. tanks. and armored personnel 

carriers improved the ability of the Vietnamese to reposition their 

forces as required by changes in the tactical situation. The morale 
ANALYSIS OF NORTH VIETNAMESE GOALS AND FAILURES 105 

of the Vietnamese rose greatly upon receipt of this modern equipment. 

Each Saturday morning, the commanding general of the III 

Marine Amphibious Force was briefed on Vietnamese Army operations by the U.S. advisers to I Corps. Following the briefing, a 

commander's conference was held at the headquarters of General 

Hoang Xuan Lam to discuss malleTS of mutual concern. The 

agenda, usually distributed in advance, covered planned operations, 

both unilateral and combined, which required COoOrdination and 

cooOperation of Free World Military Assistance support. The extensive exchange of liaison officers down to battalion level, when 

required, was a common practice throughout I Corps. 

The U.S. commanders worked closely with the Vietname~ 

commanders adjacent to their areas of responsibility and provided 

ex.cellent support on a routine basis. The co-operation was extended to other Free World Military commanders as in the case 

of Brigadier General Kim Yun Sang of the 2d Republic of Korea 

Marine Brigade. 

By 1968. combined operations were becoming the rule rather 

than the ex.ception. Operations PEGASUS and DELAWARE were prime 

examples of such operations conducted in I Corps during the first 

four months of 1968. 

Co-operation between Vietnamese Army and Free World Military Assistance Forces also extended to logistics and training. Vietnamese Army elements operating with U.S. units received logistical 

support from those units. On the training side, two examples serve 

to demonstrate the mutual benefit derived from this practice. In 

1967, the 3d Battalion. 6th Vietnamese Regiment, trained companies of the newly aITived 198th U.S. Infantry Brigade in Viet 

Cong tactics, the detection of mines and booby traps, and the techniques of Viet Cong village search. That same year, the Sd Marine 

Division trained 2.430 men of the 2d Vietname~ Army Regiment 

in u~ of the M16 riRe. 

Co-ordination of artillery fires and air strikes with one another 

were also accomplished by Vietnamese, U.s., and Free World Military Assistance Forces throughout I Corps. This co-ordination was 

done at the division level in both the 1st and 2d Vietnamese Divi· 

sion areas, and included U.S. naval gun fire. 

The Other War 

The failure o[ the North Vietnamese to gain control of the 

population of South Vietnam was not an outcome of unsuccessful 

combat actions alone. Also contributing to their failure was the fact 
106 THE WAR IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES 

that the South Vietnamese government developed many programs 

supporting the economic. social, and political goals of the population. To obtain popular support, the government announced these 

new programs after the 8 February 1966 Honolulu Conference. The 

government pronouncement called on all citizens of South Vietnam 

to work together to develop the country: 

We must bring about a true social revolution and construct a modern 

society in which every man can know that he has a future ... To those 

future citizens of a free. democratic South Vietnam now fighting with 

the Viet Cong. we take this occasion to say come and join in this 

national revolutionary adventure: 

--come safely to join us through the Open Arms Programs. 

-stOP killing your brothers, sisters, their elden, and their children, 

--come and work through constitutional democracy to build together 

that life of dignity, freed-om, and peace those in the North would deny 

the people of Vietnam. 

Along with implementation of a new constitution, the government established the revolutionary development progyam to initiate the social, economic, and political reforms needed to improve 

the life of the rural population, and to strengthen their confidence 

in the government and iu resistance to the Viet Cong. The program 

sent teams of 59 men, armed for self-defense, into recently secured 

areas to help establish local security, weed out any remaining Viet 

Cong, and initiate a development program. 

Two additional actions that had good results were the Chieu 

Hoi or Open Arms Progran and the Doan Ket or National Reconciliation Program. The former program began as early as 196~ 

when more than 5,700 Viet Cong accepted the opportunity to return to the government during the initial four months of the 

declared amnesty period. As additional combat tTOOPS took the field 

against the enemy, the number of enemy soldiers rallying to the 

government increased. 

When a man returned to the government under this program, 

he was interviewed to determine his sincerity, rewarded for any 

weapons or equipment turned in, and placed in are-education 

program through which he learned the aims and purposes o[ the 

government of South Vietnam and the role of the Free World 

Military Assistance Forces in the war. An added bonus in this 

program was the fact that an estimated ~O percent of the returnees 

then served in the government armed forces. 

The .second program, Doar! Ket, offered more to the middle and 

upper ranks of the enemy hierarchy than the Chieu Hoi amnesty 

program. This program included provisions that returnees would 

be employed in accordance with their ability, presumably in pasi-
ANALYSIS OF NORTH VIETNAMESE COALS AND FAILURES 107 

tions at a level comparable to those they had in the enemy system. 

This added a bit to the motivation of senior persons who might be 

inclined to terminate their relationship with the enemy. This proSTarn also included a re-educational process before personnel were 

declared STaduates and returned to full citizenship status. 

Conclusion 

The North Vietnamese failed to achieve victory in the northern 

provinces in 1968 because their efforts to gain and retain control 

of the population and the government of South Vietnam were obstructed by determined U.S. and Free World Military Assistance 

Forces. During the critical period when the enemy upgraded his 

operations from insurgency and guerrilla actions to a full·scale conventional invasion, enemy aims were thwarted! by military action. 

The success of the Free World Forces can be attributed to their 

flexibility in organization and tactics to meet the ever changing 

enemy situation and their mutual co-operation in conducting combined operations against the foe. The success was also due to the 

steady improvement of the South Vietnamese Armed Forces-a 

long-term goal of the headquarters of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. The establishment of programs to win the allegiance of the people to their government by eliminating the 

social, political, and economic injustices which provided a fertile 

environment for insurgency also furthered success. 

A final tribute must be paid to the fighting heart of the individual soldier, sailor, marine. airman. and civilian who faced the 

dangers of a cruel enemy. Although scientists have invented 

weapons that have revolutionized warfare, they have not been able 

to replace the soldier on the ground. He was aggressive, physically 

fit, eager to fight, with pride in his profession and compassion for 

the Vietnamese people- a superb fighter in the finest traditions of 

great Americans, great patriots, and great soldiers. 
ABN 

ACD 

ADC 

AMERl 

AMMO 

ARTY 

ARVN 

AT 

BARe 

nDE 

Bladder boat 

BN 

B40/41 

C.A. 

CAV 

ClOG 

CH-47 

CO 

CP 

CRP 

CTZ 

C-7A or Caribou 

C-123 

C-130 

DMZ 

FFV 

Flareship 

FSB 

FWMAF 

HOW 

HQ 

LARC 

LAW 

Glossary 

Airborne 

1st Air Cavalry Division 

Assistant division commander 

Americal Division 

Ammunation 

Artillery 

Army, Republic of Vietnam 

Antitank 

Barge, Amphibious Resupply Cargo 

Brigade 

lnllatable non-sel{.propelled watercraft 

Battalion 

Grenade propelled by rocket 

Combined Action 

Cavalry 

Civilian Irregular Defense Group (Vietnamese) 

Cargo helicopter 

Company 

Command post 

Co,!" 

Corps tactical zone 

Small cargo aircraft 

Medium cargo aircraft 

Large cargo aircraft 

Demilitarized zone 

Field Force. Vietnam 

Aircraft configured to drop illumination flares 

Fire support base 

Free World MiliwTY Assistance Forces 

Howitzer 

Headquarten 

Lighter, amphibious. resupply cargo 

Light anti·tank weapon 
GLOSSARY 

LCU 

LCM 

LOTS 

LST 

LZ 

MACV 

MACV FWD 

III MAF 

MAR 

MAW 

MI6 

NVA 

OnlOl 

PBR 

PCV 

POL 

PROV 

PT-76 

QUAD-50 

Readout 

RECON 

ROK 

RPG 

RR 

s.ab<cs 

SF 

Signal Hill 

SVN 

T<t 

TF 

TOC 

UH-IH 

USA 

Landing cralt, utility 

Landing craft, mechanized 

Logislical-over-the-shore 

Landing ship, tank 

Landing lone 

J09 

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam 

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Forward Command Post 

III Marine Amphibious Force 

Marine 

Marine Air Wing 

Rapid firing light automatic rifle 

North Vietnamese Army 

6-Tubed l06-mm. recoilless rifle 

Patrol boat, river 

Provisional Corps, Vietnam 

Petroleum, oil, lubricants 

Provisional 

Russian manufactured light amphibious tank 

4 barrelled 50·Ca liber air defense machine gun 

A device that displays in digits data computed or 

registered 

Reconnaissance 

Republic of Korea 

Rocket propelled grenade 

Recoilless rifle 

Na,'y construction battalion 

Special Forces 

High terrain upon which communication antennas are mounted 

South Vietnam 

Lunar new year 

Task Force 

Tactical operations center 

Utility helicopter 

United States Anny 
110 

USAF 

USARV 

USMC 

USN 

VC 

VN 

VNN 

X-RAY 

THE WAR. IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES 

United States Air Force 

United States Army, Vietnam 

United States Marine Corps 

United States Navy 

Viet Cong 

Vietnamese 

Vietnamese ,Navy 

A Marine task force in 1968 
Index 

A Luoi airfield: 91 

A Shau : 3. 6-7. 28 • .50. 69-70. 78-79. 88-

92.97, 102 

Abrana. General Creighton W .: 45. 47. 

59. 63. 66-69 

AOI)uMic Knson: 21 

AdviKn. military: 10~ . 105 

Air openllions: 6. 18. 60. 71-72. 74-77. 

80-81.83--85.88.90-91. 101 

Airborne Regiment. SO III: " 5 

Aircrafl. See (J/jO HeliooptCTII. 

8- 52: 31. 72. 90. 101 

C-7A: 91 

C-123: n 

C-1.50: 15.75-76.85.91 

electronic warfare: ~I 

AirfitJd.: B. 15. 26. 91 

Airmobile Divisions 

h i Cavalry: ~5. U .... H. 47-49. 53. 55-

57.67.70.78-81.8+-85.87.89-92. 

99. 102 

82d Airborne: 68. 99 

10ist Airborne: 45. 55. 66. 10. 7B. BI. 

89-90.92. 99. 102 

!iO'2d Airborne: 81 

Americal Oivhion : 99 

AmphibiOln re.upply cargo barges 

(BARC's): 60 

Am phibious rrsupply cargo lighten 

(LARC's): 60 

Annamite Mountain.: . 16 

Anli·infiltra tion Iyltem: 21- 24 

Armor Regiment. ~4th : 81 

Artillery piece, 152·mm.: 18 

Artillery Regimenll 

211t : 85 

77th : ~ 

AUllnlian adviK r.: N 

Ibn Me Thuol: ~1. 39 

Banantl. Major General Olinto M.: 89 

Ben I·lai Ri,'cr: 16 

Ben Tre: 37. 39 

Brcwer. Robert : 55. 57 

Buddhists: 4. 8 

Bunker. Ellsworth : ~7 

Ca Lu: 70. BI. B4. 102 

Cam Lo: 9 

Cam Ranh Bay: 26 

Camp Carroll: U. 15. 32 

Camp Evans: 0. 78 

Can Tho: 37. 39 

Carut hers. Brigadier Ceneral Lawrence 

H.: 69 

CasuaLt ies: 48. 75. 95 

Cavalry Regiments 

lit Ai r: 45-46 

5th: 55-56. 81. 84-86 

7th: 4 ...... 6. 83. 85. 87. 90-91 

8th: 55. 9 1 

9th: 14 

11th Armored : 14 

12th: 44-45. 55-56. 85-86. 9 1- 92 

Chemical smoke generator compan i" : 5 

Chu La i: 6. 1+-15. 26 

Citadel: 39-47. 68 

Co Roc Mountains: 76 

Combat acrvice support elemen ts: 5. 14 

Communications: 13. 41. 6&.67. 70-71. 

9 1. 96. 102 

Con T hien : ~. 16. lB. 69. 79 

Congrcssion31 hearings: 22 

Convoy Control Center: 59 

CoIn·OYI. riveT: 64-65 

Corps taclical lones 

I: 4. 6. 8-9. 11 - 12. IS. 21-22. 2 ..... 26. 

28-31. 35-37. "0. 45, SO. 57-59. 62. 

66-68.71-72.78-79.97. 101. 103. lOS 

II : 15.37 

III: 15 

Crach in : " 

Cua Viet Ri\'cr: 58. 6~ 

Cushman. Ueutenant Ceneral Robel E.: 

34. 45. 67-{i9. H. 79. 89 

Da Nang: 4. ti. 8. 11 .26-29. 37. 45. 59. 

69-70. 79. 95. 102-03 
112 THE WAR IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES 

l)avis, Brigadie r General O$CaT E,: 47 

Davis. Major General Raymond G" 

USMC: 69 

Defense ComniuniClllioll$ Sptem : 102 

Dcmilitari1.ed lone; 6-7. 11-13, 15,21,29, 

50-5 1, SO. 95 

Dien Bic n I'hu ; .!I2. 9~, 9G 

Dong Ha : 4, 11 . 15. 26-27, ~5, 58. 63-64. 

66, 70, 77. 80-81, 102 

Dong Ha Mountains: 10 

Dong Ha Rivc:r: 64 

Dong TTi Mounta in: 16- 17 

Due Pho: 15 

Early wamiug dC\'icc$: 21-22 

Electric f ener: 21 

Engineer Ba!lalion, 351h : 5 

English, Brigadier General Lowell E.: 

')-10 

Fall, Ikrnard: 95 

Flak jackets, enemy: 18 

name throwers, enemy: 18 

Fleet Logistic Command: 70 

Free World Forces: 9, 2 1, 2 .... 26. 36, "0. 

42-43,80,94,97,99, 101, 103. 10'..-

07 

General support group: 1-1 

Ciap, Vo Nguyen: 94 

Cia Linh: ", 13, 16. 18, 69, 79, 81 

Cross, LiclltC':Tlalll Colonel Wallace J.: 66 

Ground Proximity Extraction System: 76 

C ue rrillas: 5, 8. 9' 

Cuns. ]75·mm.: ]2, ]6,32 

Hai V3n Pass: 4.28.58-59 

l13noi: 911-94 

He]icopters: 6-7. ]0, 12. ' 4. 46. 55- 56. 60. 

64 ,70.75,81.83-85, 9G-91 , 97. ]01. 

103 

H ighway I: 42-45.53. 58-59. 103 

H ighway 9: 81 

Hill 47 1: 85-86 

Hill 558: 17, 18.32 

Hill 8til : 17. 19, 32. 7' 

Hill 88 1 North : 17 , .H, 87, 95 

H ill 88 1 South: ]7, 19,32,34,87 

Hill 950: 32 

Hill Fights: 18 

1-10 Chi Minh: 93 

Hoi An : 26 

H owitzers. IOS·mm, sclf.propelkd: ]2,32 

]-lowil1.el"ll. 155·mm ,: 32 

H ue: 4, 8, 9, 27, 29, 35, 37, 39-50. 53, 57-

59,62-64,67-68,70,78-79,88, 95 

H uo ng Rivcr: 39-41, 43, 47, 58. ~5 

Infantry Brigadcs 

lsI : 53, 56-57. 91 

2d: 84-85, 88, 99 

3d: 13, 43--46, 48, 84, 86, 90, 9!} 

]96111: 13, 99 

198th: 105 

]"fantry Division. 2!o1ll: " 

]nf3ntry Regime'lIS 

327th : 90-9] 

,,02<.1 : 9] 

Infl1lred intTu$ion detector: 21 

]nte llige nce: 13-14.29-31, 48-50,57, 73, 

76-77, 89, 96-97 

Jungle: 3-'1, 17 

khe Sallh : 3.8, 16-20,22,29-36,4 1. 49, 

['5,57-58,72. 8]. 86-89. 95-96 

Khe Sanh Combat Base: ]6, 32-33, 56, 

67-7 ], 73-BO, 83-84. 85-86. 103 

KonlUm City: 37, 39 

Ky. Nguyen Cao: 8 

La Vang: ] 3, 53. 55 

Lam. Genel1l l Ho;ang Xuan : 105 

Lam San 203: 80 

Landiug crdt, utility (LeU): 41,46 

Landing ship. tank (LST): IS, 58, 60 

Landillg ship, ut ility (LSU): ]5 

Land ing Will'S 

fif.TTv: 55 

CATF..s: 85 

Mil":: 85 

SNAKr.: 87 

STI,lD: 84-85 

'1'110 11 : 85 

T ' MOT'U': 86 

WIIA~TO N: 85 

Lang Vei: 25, 35, 73-75, 97 

Laos: 7,29,34-35,9],94-95 

Laotian 33d B3l1alio n : 75 

LAW's: 73 

Libo::ration r~ime : 8 

Logisti(al Command, ht : 14 ,70 

Logisticl: 12,14,2],26-28,41,57-65, 7G7[ , 102- 03 

LOTS fad lily: 60, 103 
INDEX 

Low Atticud~ Parachute Extnction Sy,· 

tern (LA PES): 76 

Lownds, Colonel David E.: 51-32,77 

Machine gun, MOO: 28 

MaNaman Line: 21 

MatheMln, Brigadier Ccnenl Salve: 1-1 .: 66 

Military police l upport : 14 

Mom)<cr, Genenl William W., USAF: 

71 

Monsoons: s--4, 40 

Mortars, 6O·mm,: 28 

Mortars, 82·mm.: " 

Mortan, 120·mm.: 8 

Munlter, Colonel Daniel F.: 58-39 

My Tho: " 

Nation al Reronciliation Program: 100 

Nayal gunfir~: 43,46.101, lOS 

Navy Support Activity, Da Nang: 70 

Nha Tnng: ", 71 

North Victname.e Anny: 5-6. 18- 19,32-

34, n, 40, 48, 94 

2d Divilion: SO 

5th D[vilion: ~ 

304th Di .. ision: 29·30, 49, 77. 85. 95 

308th Diyision: 30 

320th Diyision : 29,95 

324B Division : 9. 11,29-30,49 

~ DiYision: 17- 18,29-50, 49, 95 

14lst Divi.ion: 30 

4th Regiment: 41-42 

6th Regiment: 41 .49 

6811, Amaored Regiment : 3(1, 95 

95B Regimfilt: 6 

10lC Regiment: 6 

l&tth Artillery Regiment: SO, 95 

203d Armored Regiment: 95 

812th Regiment : 51 

K4B Battalion : 42-43, 51. 53 

K-5 Batt.lion : 53 

K-6 Battalion: 53, 56 

K-8 Batulion: 53 

lOCh Sapper Satlalion : 51 

12th Sapper Battalion : 41-42 

800Ch Battalion: 4 1 

802d Blllalion : 41 

804th Battalion : 41-42 

80tith Baualion: 42 

810lh Battalion: 43 

OntOl: '2 

Open AI'1I1J Prognm: 100 

Openlions 

DT.1JIWAIlt:: 89-92, 102, 105 

IlAsnscs: 9 

I-IICKOav: 18 

Lt." Sos 216: 89 

LUI' hoc;: 49, 97 

NIAC .... ,A I: 31, 35. 83. 97, 101 

NIM:AIlA II : 31, 35, 76, 101 

11 3 

P.;CASUS: 70, 79, 81. 83-89, 102-03, 105 

PIlAIII.I£: II 

ScoTUNO: 77. 88 

STAlL/CIIT: 6 

Patrol boat.1: 63-65 

Pcarson, Major Genenl Willard: 66,69 

Perfume River: 39 

Pelroleum, oib, and lubrieauu: IS, 59, 

70 

Phu iJai: 6, 11.26,35,43, 45,53,58, 62, 

66-69, 102-63 

Phu Cam: '10 

I'ipc: Jines: 15,26,5&-59, 103 

Poru: 4. IS, 26-27 

Pridgen, Colon~1 Robert 8.: 14 

Provbiona l Corps, Vietnam: 68-7 1, 79, 

89, 99, 102 

Pro~isional infa ntry di .. i$ion: 13--14 

Quang Nam Province: s--4, 26, 28 

Quang Npi Province: 25, 28, 50 

Quang Tti: 4, 16, 35, 31, 45, 50-51, 53, 

56-59. 69, 95 

Quang Tri Province: s--4, 9, 11 ,28,34, 

49, 57, 66, 78 

Qui Nhon: 37 

Rao Nho Valley: 92 

Rattan, Colonel Donald V.: 53, 55 

Rtport on tlrt War in VielnGm: 34 

Republic of Korca: 25 

Republic of Korea Army: 99 

Republic of Korca 2d (Dragon) Marine 

Uripde: 24, 26. 99. 105 

Rcpublic of Vietn:un Air Force: 6 

Republic of Vietnam Army: 6, 10,21-22, 

48, 55, 97, 10)-05, 107 

I ... Division : 9, 28, 4(), 43, 45-47, 50, 

69, 79, 81, 89, 92, 99 

2d Di .. i5ion: 28, 50, 99 

I ... InfantrY Rc-gimcnt : 81 

I ... Rl:giment: 5 1, 53, 55 

2d Inbntry Regiment: 81, 105 

6th RegimCllt: lOS 
114 THE WAR IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES 

Re public of ViC-Inam Army--CO,ninued 

7th Cava lry Rc-gimcm: 42 

5 1st Independent Infantry Regiment: 

99 

9th Airborne Battalion : 55 

$7th Range r Halla lion: 55-56, 77 

ht Airborne Tuk Force: 42, 46, 88-89 

3d Airborne Task. Force: 87 

3d Army Regimental Task Force: 9 . 

61h Airborne Task Force: 87 

8th Airborne Tuk " oree: 87 

Black Panther (Hac 8ao) Company: 

4()-.41,45 

Cavalry Troop: 43, 45 

~publi c of Viemam Civilian Irregular 

Odens.e Group: 6-7. 24, 36, 97 

Republic of Vietnam Joint Gcncr:a! Sull: 

Republic " of Vielnam Marine Task force : 

78 

Republic of Vicmam Navy: 6 

Republic of Vietnam Popular ForcC1I: 6, 

38, 41 ,51,55 

Republic of Vietnam Regional Forces: 

6, sa, 41, 51 

Republic of Vietnam Special Forces: 6-8. 

,. 

RiAc. IOO·mm. r«Oil1css: 28, 73 

RiAc. AK47 Soviet asuult: 8 

RiAc, MIG: 28, ~5 

River supply linel: 6'-65 

Roa Quan Valley: '2 

Road COnstruction : 28 

Rock Pile: 3. IS. '0. '2, 95 

Rockel launche rs 

240-mm.: 96 

RPG2: 8 

Rockeu, 122·mm.: 33 

Rosson, Major General William D.: I~, 

IS, 68-70, 78-79, 87-89. 92 

Route 1: 28, 40, 4~, 51, 59, 95 

Route 9: 4, '2. '4, 69, 76-77. 79, 83-85, 

87-88, 94, 10' 

Route 547: 4, 70, 78, 90, 92 

Route 548: 91 

Saigon: 6, 8, 28-29. 37, '9, 67-68 

Sang. Brigadier General Kim Vun : 105 

Se.Ix."CS: 59 

Sensor devices: 18,21- 24. ' I 

Signal 8:aualions 

6~d: 71, 102 

459th: 71 

Signal Brigade, lit: 14,66,71, 102 

Signal Group, 21st: 71 

Smith. Captain Gerald W., USN: 63-64 

Sout h China Sea: , 

Strategic Communications Command: 

IO\! 

Strut Withoul l try: 95 

Struggle Movement: 8 

Sunder, Lieutenam Colonel Charla H .: 

61 

Tan My: 58-59, 63-64 

Tan Son Nhut: 66 

Tanks: '2,35.73,96 

Task Force: Support Command: 14-15 

Tatk Forces 

I Corps: l ' 

116 (Navy): 64 

CLf;AIIWATJ';II: 62-65, 69, 79 

GUCI(: 88 

KILO: 80 

OIl.[CO!ll : 13-15. 28, 99 

Tel offensive: ',29,52, '6-37. 49-50, 57-

58,68, 71. 73, 92. 96, 104 

Thach Han Ri,'cr: 51 

T hailand: 102 

Thi. Lieutena nt Genenl Nguyen Chanh: 

8 

Thon Que Chui: 45 

Thong Bon Ttj: 44 

Thua Thien : 11 

Thua Thien Provin(C': ~, 6, 8-9, 28, 

45, 66, 69 

Tolson. Major General John J., III: 70. 

87, 89 

Tompkins, Major General Ratlwon M.: 

'2, 74, 77. 79 

Tnnsportation Battalion, 159th: 60-61 

Tnn$portation Corpl: 59-60 

Troung. Brigadier General Ngo Quang: 

~O. 42, 47, 89 

T uy Hna : 26 

United State. Air Force: 6. 15, ' 1, '5-36, 

62, 72, 80 

United States Air f orce. 7th: 66 

United States Marine Corps: 5. 10, 17-18, 

26.28,31,48.57,74, 102 

111 Amphibious Fora: 6, 9, 12-1',30- 'I. 31- '5, 59, 63. 67. 69-72. 79, 98-

99. 102. 105 

ht Air Wing: 99 

1st Division: 9. 11, 15, 42,99 
INDEX 

United States Marine Corpt---Col'ltinl,lt<! 

3d Division: 6, 9, II , 28, 32, 66, 70, 79, 

81,88.99, 105 

I" Regimtnt: 42-43. 70, 81. 83-IH 

3d Regiment : 83 

4th Regiment : 79 

5th Rtgiment : 46 

9th Regiment: 3:'-5(1, 7:', 79, 8:.-86 

12th Rt:giment: 79 

!SIb Regime-nt: 36 

26th Regiment : ' 1,.56,78,85,87 

2d Battalion : 32 

27th Regimental LandinI Team: 68 

T;uk .'orce X,RAy! 45, 47 

feoonnai.uance teams: 9, 19 

United States Military A$lillanoe Com, 

mand: 7, !S, 24, 3 1. 36, 4()..43, 45-47, 

58-59,63, 66-68, ii, 99, 102, ]07 

115 

Unitt<! States Navy: 6. ]5, 'I, 58-:'9, 6~ 

6:', 66, 70 

United Statl's SpedaJ .'orlD: 2 .... 25, 35-

36, is-74. 97. 99 

Utah Beach: 60 

Veth, Rear Admiral Kenneth 1-: 63 

Viel ConI: 5, S7. 40, H, 46, 48, 53, 55, 

94, 96-97, 106 

W.all, Major General l..cwis W.: 6. 9, 12 

Weather: S-4, 3 .... 35. 40, 43, 58. 62. 75, 

77,83,88,91. 101 

Westmoreland, General William C.: 7-8, 

12-13.26,31,3 .... 37, 45, 48. 66, 68-72 

74. 78, 79, 88-89 

Wundcr Beach: 61-62 

1l' U.s. OOVERNMENT PRtNTlNG OFACe. l1i1111 2111-877120005