14-1917-cv 

Vlad-Berindan v. Life Worx Inc. 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

SUMMARY ORDER 

Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed on or 

after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and 

this Court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a document filed with this Court, a 

party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an electronic database (with the notation “summary 

order”). A party citing a summary order must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by 

counsel. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the 

Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 28th

day of April, two thousand fifteen. 

PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, 

 GERARD E. LYNCH, 

 CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, 

 Circuit Judges. 

 

LUCIA VLAD-BERINDAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. No. 14-1917-cv 

LIFE WORX INC., JEAN N. HELLER, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

 

FOR LUCIA VLAD-BERINDAN: Lucia Vlad-Berindan, pro se, Ridgewood, NY. 

FOR LIFE WORX, INC.: Philip K. Davidoff, FordHarrison LLP, New 

York, NY. 

FOR JEAN N. HELLER: Joseph DeGiuseppe, Jr., Bleakley Platt & 

Schmidt, LLP, White Plains, NY. 

 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New 

York (Lois Bloom, Magistrate Judge). 
2 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED. 

Appellant Lucia Vlad-Berindan, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s April 30, 

2014 judgment dismissing her employment discrimination action under Title VII of the Civil Rights 

Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 

(“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12101 et seq., and various New York state laws for failure to state a claim, and denying her various 

motions. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the 

case, and the issues on appeal. 

“We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), 

construing the complaint liberally, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and 

drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.” Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 

152 (2d Cir. 2002). The complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible 

on its face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), and “allow[ ] the court to draw the 

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although all allegations contained in the complaint are assumed to be true, this 

tenet is “inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of 

action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice,” and pleadings that “are no more 

than conclusions . . . are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 678–79. 

 Upon review of the record and relevant law, we conclude that the District Court properly 

dismissed Vlad-Berindan’s complaint, substantially for the reason stated in its thorough and wellreasoned April 28, 2014 opinion—namely, Vlad-Berindan failed to establish that her untimely Title 

VII claims were entitled to equitable tolling. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); Zerilli-Edelglass v. N.Y.C. 

Transit Auth., 333 F.3d 74, 78, 80–81 (2d Cir. 2003). As to her remaining claims, Vlad-Berindan 

failed to raise any arguments on appeal and, accordingly, those claims are deemed to be abandoned. 

See LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 92–93 (2d Cir. 1995). In any event, Vlad-Berindan’s 

ADA and ADEA claims were unexhausted; her claims under the New York State Human Rights 

Law were barred by the election of remedies doctrine, see York v. Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., 

286 F.3d 122, 127 (2d Cir. 2002); N.Y. Exec. Law § 298; and the District Court properly declined to 

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). 

The District Court also properly denied as baseless Vlad-Berindan’s various motions to 

withdraw consent to jurisdiction by a magistrate judge, for recusal and for reconsideration, to strike 

defendants’ motion to dismiss, for sanctions, and for default judgment. 
3 

CONCLUSION

We have considered all of the arguments raised by Vlad-Berindan on appeal and find them 

to be without merit. For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the District Court’s April 30, 2014 

judgment. 

 FOR THE COURT: 

 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk