IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 15–2203

Filed March 9, 2018

STATE OF IOWA,

Appellee,

vs.

RENE ZARATE,

Appellant.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Buena Vista County, 

David A. Lester, Judge.

Defendant, a juvenile offender, challenges his sentence of life 

imprisonment with the possibility of parole after a minimum term of 

twenty-five years as cruel and unusual punishment under the Iowa and 

Federal Constitutions. DISTRICT COURT SENTENCE VACATED AND 

CASE REMANDED.

Alexander Smith and Benjamin Bergmann of Parrish Kruidenier 

Dunn Boles Gribble Gentry Brown & Bergmann L.L.P., Des Moines, for 

appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Louis S. Sloven, Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellee.

Joseph Fraioli and Rita Bettis of ACLU of Iowa, Des Moines, for 

amicus curiae.
2

ZAGER, Justice.

The defendant, convicted of first-degree murder as a juvenile 

offender, challenges his sentence of life in prison with the possibility of 

parole after serving a minimum term of twenty-five-years confinement as 

determined by the district court. By means of a motion to correct an 

illegal sentence, the defendant challenges the sentencing scheme for 

juvenile offenders convicted of first-degree murder set forth in Iowa Code 

section 902.1(2) under the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the 

Iowa Constitution. He argues that both the sentencing options and the 

factors that the sentencing court is required to consider under Iowa Code 

section 902.1(2) are unconstitutional given the language of the Iowa 

Constitution and prior federal and state precedent regarding juvenile 

sentencing. Alternatively, he claims that Iowa Code section 902.1(2) is 

unconstitutional as applied to his resentencing because the district court 

allowed the circumstances of his offense to overwhelm the analysis in its 

resentencing decision. For the reasons set forth below, we find that the 

only portion of Iowa Code section 902.1(2) that is unconstitutional under 

the Iowa Constitution is section 902.1(2)(a)(1), which provides the district 

court with the option to sentence a juvenile offender convicted of murder 

in the first degree to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. 

The remainder of Iowa Code section 902.1(2) is constitutional under the 

Iowa Constitution. However, we vacate Zarate’s sentence and remand for 

resentencing consistent with this opinion and our opinion in State v. 

Roby, 897 N.W.2d 127 (Iowa 2017), which was decided subsequent to 

Zarate’s resentencing.

I. Facts and Procedural Background.

Rene Zarate moved with his family from Mexico to Iowa when he

was about twelve years old. Zarate did not speak English and had below 
3

average intellectual abilities. He struggled with behavioral issues in 

school after moving to Iowa, and he began to associate with members of 

a criminal street gang known as Surano 13. Zarate also started 

consuming alcohol and using drugs, including cocaine, 

methamphetamine, marijuana, and glue. He had frequent contact with 

law enforcement and first entered the juvenile justice system when he 

was about fourteen years old. As a teenager, Zarate was involved in 

various criminal acts including burglary, theft, and criminal mischief. 

Consequently, he spent time in juvenile detention and on house arrest. 

Zarate also failed to successfully complete his required probation.

On the evening of May 1, 1999, fifteen-year old Zarate and some 

friends were drinking alcohol together in violation of Zarate’s probation 

conditions in a mobile home where Jorge Ramos rented a room. When 

Ramos arrived home in the early morning hours of May 2, he began to 

argue with one of Zarate’s friends after Ramos refused the friend’s

request for Ramos to drink with them. Ramos subsequently took the 

phone from the living room and went to his bedroom. After Ramos took 

the phone, Zarate became worried that Ramos was going to call the 

police on him and his friends, which could negatively affect his 

probation. Zarate became upset and made multiple attempts to attack 

Ramos. First, Zarate tried to attack Ramos with a screwdriver. However, 

a friend was able to take the screwdriver away. Next, Zarate tried to 

attack Ramos with a hatchet, but a friend was also able to take the 

hatchet away. Finally, Zarate went to a bedroom, removed a fishing knife 

he found from a tackle box, and stabbed Ramos with the knife. Ramos 

managed to stumble into the living room before he fell on a mattress on 

the floor. At this point, Zarate’s friends fled the mobile home. Zarate 
4

followed Ramos to the living room and proceeded to stab Ramos a total of 

fifty times, resulting in his death.

After killing Ramos, Zarate kicked and spat on Ramos’s body, 

laughing and calling Ramos names in Spanish. He then moved the body 

outside and covered it with blankets before attempting to get lighter fluid 

or gasoline from friends to burn the blankets and the body. When police 

officers arrived on the scene, Zarate initially lied to the police about his 

identity and provided them with false information before the police 

arrested him. After questioning, Zarate later confessed to murdering 

Ramos. On February 8, 2001, a jury convicted Zarate of murder in the 

first degree, a class “A” felony, in violation of Iowa Code section 707.2

(1999). Zarate was subsequently sentenced to mandatory life 

imprisonment without the possibility of parole pursuant to Iowa Code 

section 902.1(2).

In 2012, the United States Supreme Court decided Miller v. 

Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012), in which it 

held a sentencing scheme providing for mandatory life imprisonment 

without the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders violates the Eighth 

Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.

Additionally, the Court held that a sentencing court must make 

individualized sentencing decisions that consider the juvenile offender’s 

age and age-related characteristics before imposing “the harshest 

possible penalty for juveniles” of a life sentence without the possibility of 

parole. Id. at 489, 132 S. Ct. at 2475.

Following Miller, the Governor commuted the sentences of Zarate 

and all other juvenile offenders in Iowa serving mandatory sentences of 

life without parole to sentences of sixty years without parole and with no 

credit for earned time. See State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 110–11
5

(Iowa 2013). Consequently, Zarate filed a Motion to Correct Illegal 

Sentence. After Zarate filed that motion, we decided Ragland in which 

we found that Miller applied retroactively and held that the Governor’s 

commutations were de facto sentences of life without the possibility of 

parole that required the same individualized sentencing set forth in 

Miller. Id. at 119, 122. Therefore, juvenile offenders serving life 

sentences without parole were entitled to a resentencing hearing. Id. 

Zarate then filed a Supplemental Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence on 

March 7, 2014.

Prior to Zarate’s resentencing hearing, the Iowa legislature passed

a bill that the Governor signed into law changing Iowa Code section 

902.1(2) under which Zarate was originally sentenced. See 2015 Iowa 

Acts ch. 15, § 1 (codified at Iowa Code § 902.1(2) (effective Apr. 24, 

2015)). Under the revised law, a sentencing court has the option to 

sentence a juvenile offender convicted of first-degree murder to life 

imprisonment without the possibility of parole, life imprisonment with 

the possibility of parole after serving a minimum term of confinement as 

determined by the court, or life imprisonment with the immediate 

possibility of parole. Iowa Code § 902.1(2)(a)(1)–(3) (2016). Moreover, the 

law sets forth twenty-five sentencing factors for sentencing courts to 

consider in determining which of the aforementioned sentencing options 

to impose. See id. § 902.1(2)(b)(2)(a)–(v).

On June 3, 2015, the district court conducted a hearing 

concerning Zarate’s supplemental motion to correct his illegal sentence 

and request for a resentencing hearing. At the hearing, Zarate argued 

that Iowa Code section 902.1(2) violates the Iowa Constitution’s 

prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment under article I, 

section 17 because it takes away the district court’s discretion to 
6

determine sentences for juvenile offenders as required by Miller and 

Ragland. He also argued that the statute denies him a meaningful 

opportunity for release, even with the parole options, due to the existing 

statutes governing Iowa’s parole system. In response, the State asserted 

the district court is required to follow Iowa Code section 902.1(2) in 

sentencing Zarate because that statute provides Zarate with 

individualized sentencing by virtue of the factors listed in Iowa Code 

section 902.1(2)(b)(2).

On December 9, the district court ruled that Iowa Code section 

902.1(2) did not violate the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the 

Iowa Constitution. In doing so, the district court noted that neither

Miller nor our holding in State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378 (Iowa 2014),

prohibits sentencing juveniles to prison for the length of time the 

legislature sets forth for the crime, nor does either prohibit a legislatively 

imposed minimum time that juvenile offenders must serve in prison 

before becoming parole eligible.

Instead, the district court found that the precedent set forth in 

Miller, and our progeny of Miller cases, merely require a sentencing judge 

to follow an individualized process that allows for the consideration of 

mitigating circumstances related to the juvenile offender’s age and 

youthful characteristics. The district court held Iowa Code section 

902.1(2) complies with the individualized sentencing requirement by 

providing the sentencing court with options concerning the conditions 

placed on a term of life in prison for juvenile offenders convicted of firstdegree murder. Further, the district court found Iowa Code section 

902.1(2) provides the mandated individualized sentencing by requiring 

the sentencing court to consider the twenty-five factors listed in Iowa 

Code section 902.1(2)(b)(2)(a)–(v)—many of which, according to the 
7

district court, seemingly have either been taken directly from Miller or fall 

within the parameters of Miller. Likewise, the district court found the 

inclusion of possible aggravating factors in the law is permissible so long 

as the sentencing court also considers the required mitigating factors. 

Consequently, the district court held Iowa Code section 902.1(2) is 

constitutional on its face and is in accord with both Miller and Ragland.

Zarate’s resentencing hearing was held on December 18. Zarate 

requested a term-of-years sentence of thirty years with parole eligibility 

after a period of fifteen years despite acknowledging that this sentence 

would violate Iowa Code section 902.1(2). Meanwhile, the State asserted 

its belief that life without parole was still justifiable,1 though it 

acknowledged that the district court could choose life with the possibility 

of parole. The State also asked the district court to impose a mandatory 

minimum term of imprisonment before allowing for parole eligibility. In 

imposing Zarate’s sentence, the district court stated, “[Zarate’s] request 

for a fixed period of 30 years with a minimum of 15 years I still believe is 

unconstitutional. I don’t have the authority to do that” based on the 

sentencing options provided in section 902.1(2). The district court also 

found life without the possibility of parole would be an inappropriate 

sentence in Zarate’s case.

The district court ultimately decided to resentence Zarate under 

Iowa Code section 902.1(2)(a)(2) to life imprisonment with the possibility 

of parole after a minimum term of imprisonment of twenty-five years with 

credit for time already served under his previously imposed illegal 

 1At the time of Zarate’s resentencing, life without the possibility of parole was 

still a constitutional sentencing option. However, we have since found life without the 

possibility of parole for juvenile offenders is unconstitutional. See State v. Sweet, 879 

N.W.2d 811, 839 (Iowa 2016).
8

sentence. In reaching this decision, the district court stated, “I have 

taken into consideration the 25 factors I’m now supposed to consider 

under the existing statute, and the circumstances, I guess is the 

terminology they now use.” While the district court did not individually 

go through each factor, it did make statements about various 

circumstances that guided its decision. Specifically, the district court

noted Zarate’s age and involvement in the crime, the fact that Zarate did 

not seem to be a threat to the public or any other individual beyond his 

victim, Zarate’s degree of participation in the crime, Zarate’s intellectual 

and emotional capacity, his susceptibility to peer pressure, the violent 

aspect of the crime, his drug and alcohol abuse, and his acceptance of 

responsibility for the crime.

Finally, the district court stated, 

After considering all those foregoing factors, which I am for 

the record considering as mitigating factors just so we’re all 

clear, after considering those factors along with your 

improved behavior since you’ve been in prison during the 

last 10 years . . . lead me to conclude that you are entitled 

not only to have an opportunity at parole, but also that 

opportunity should be available to you at a fixed point in 

time in the future. I’ve chosen that point of time to be 

approximately 10 years from now just to ensure that you 

serve what I believe should be the minimum period of time 

for somebody that takes the life of another individual, 

whether that person is a juvenile or an adult.

Zarate appealed, and we retained the appeal.

On appeal, Zarate presents three issues. First, whether Iowa Code 

section 902.1(2)(a)(1)–(3) violates article I, section 17 of the Iowa 

Constitution, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. Second, 

whether the sentencing factors enumerated in Iowa Code section 

902.1(2)(b)(2)(a)–(v) violate article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution. 

Finally, if neither of these provisions is unconstitutional, whether 
9

Zarate’s resentencing was unconstitutional based on his claim that the 

district court allowed the circumstances of the crime to overwhelm the 

analysis, thereby preventing him from receiving a truly individualized 

sentence as is constitutionally required.

II. Standard of Review.

We may review a challenge that a sentence is illegal at any time.

Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 382; see also Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.24(5)(a). While we 

generally review challenges to illegal sentences for correction of errors at 

law, we apply de novo review for an allegation of an unconstitutional 

sentence. State v. Seats, 865 N.W.2d 545, 553 (Iowa 2015). Zarate’s 

first two challenges are categorical, so we apply de novo review. Finally, 

we review sentences that are within the statutory limits for an abuse of 

discretion, though this standard “is not forgiving of a deficiency in the 

constitutional right to a reasoned sentencing decision based on a proper 

hearing.” Roby, 897 N.W.2d at 138.

III. Analysis.

A. State and Federal Jurisprudence on Cruel and Unusual 

Punishment Regarding Juvenile Sentencing. The Eighth Amendment 

of the United States Constitution and article I, section 17 of the Iowa 

Constitution both prohibit cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. Const. 

amend. VIII; Iowa Const. art. I, § 17. Under both provisions, the right to 

be free from cruel and unusual punishment “ ‘flows from the basic 

“precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and 

proportioned” ’ to both the offender and the offense.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 

469, 132 S. Ct. at 2463 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560, 

125 S. Ct. 1183, 1190 (2005)); State v. Propps, 897 N.W.2d 91, 98 (Iowa 

2017). Over the past fifteen years, the United States Supreme Court has 

decided a trilogy of cases interpreting the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and 
10

Unusual Punishment Clause in relation to juvenile sentencing. See

Miller, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. 2455; Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 

130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010); Roper, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S. Ct. 1183. 

Additionally, we have decided a number of recent cases in line with the 

Supreme Court’s jurisprudence under the Iowa Constitution dealing with 

cruel and unusual punishment regarding juvenile sentencing. To 

analyze Zarate’s argument under the Iowa Constitution’s cruel and 

unusual punishment jurisprudence, we first review the federal and state 

jurisprudence necessary to give context to the analysis.

The Supreme Court’s trilogy of juvenile sentencing cases began 

with its 2005 holding in Roper that the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and 

Unusual Punishment Clause prohibits the imposition of capital 

punishment on juvenile offenders. 543 U.S. at 560, 125 S. Ct. at 1190. 

In Roper, the Court noted the differences in maturity, responsibility, 

susceptibility to negative influences, control, and character development 

between adult and juvenile offenders that “render suspect any conclusion 

that a juvenile falls among the worst offenders.” Id. at 569–70, 125 

S. Ct. at 1195. Five years later, the Supreme Court decided Graham, 

holding a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for juveniles 

convicted of nonhomicide offenses violates the Eighth Amendment. 560 

U.S. at 74, 130 S. Ct. at 2030. Finally, in 2012, the Supreme Court held 

in Miller that a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the 

possibility of parole for juvenile offenders violates the Eighth 

Amendment. 567 U.S. at 479, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. In doing so, the Court 

held that sentencing courts must make individualized sentencing 

decisions for juvenile offenders that consider their age and age-related 

characteristics before imposing “the harshest possible penalty for 
11

juveniles” of a life sentence without the possibility of parole. Id. at 489, 

132 S. Ct. at 2475.

In the wake of Miller, the Governor commuted the sentences of all 

juvenile offenders in Iowa serving mandatory sentences of life without 

parole to sentences of sixty years without parole and with no credit for 

earned time. See Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 110–11. Consequently, in 

Ragland, we held that Miller applied retroactively and that the Governor’s 

commutations were de facto sentences of life without the possibility of 

parole that required individualized sentencing as described in Miller. Id.

at 119, 122. Miller and our subsequent decision in Ragland launched a 

series of cases regarding juvenile sentencing under the Iowa 

Constitution.

First, in State v. Null, we held that Miller’s individualized 

sentencing requirement applied to a 52.5-year sentence because 

“geriatric release” after a lengthy term-of-years sentence for a juvenile 

offender fails to provide the juvenile with any meaningful opportunity to 

demonstrate his or her maturity and rehabilitation. 836 N.W.2d 41, 70–

71 (2013). Likewise, in State v. Pearson, we held that Miller’s 

individualized sentencing requirement applied under the Iowa 

Constitution to a minimum sentence of thirty-five years before parole 

eligibility for a juvenile offender convicted of nonhomicide offenses. 836 

N.W.2d 88, 96 (Iowa 2013).

Further, in Lyle, we held all mandatory minimum prison sentences 

for juvenile offenders are unconstitutional under article I, section 17 of 

the Iowa Constitution and found that “the sentencing of juveniles 

according to statutorily required mandatory minimums does not 

adequately serve the legitimate penological objectives in light of the 

child’s categorically diminished culpability.” 854 N.W.2d at 400–01. We 
12

also provided the following factors that a district court must use in 

determining whether the minimum period of incarceration without parole 

is warranted: 

(1) the age of the offender and the features of youthful 

behavior, such as “immaturity, impetuosity, and failure 

to appreciate risks and consequences”; (2) the particular 

“family and home environment” that surround the youth; 

(3) the circumstances of the particular crime and all 

circumstances relating to youth that may have played a 

role in the commission of the crime; (4) the challenges for

youthful offenders in navigating through the criminal 

process; and (5) the possibility of rehabilitation and the 

capacity for change.

854 N.W.2d at 404 n.10 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 477–78, 132 S. Ct. at 

2468).

In State v. Louisell, we reaffirmed 

that under both the United States Constitution and the Iowa 

Constitution, juveniles convicted of crimes must be afforded 

a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on 

demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation”—if a sentencing 

judge, exercising discretion, determines parole should be 

available.

865 N.W.2d 590, 602 (Iowa 2015) (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 75, 130 

S. Ct. at 2030). We also held that a fixed term-of-years sentence was not 

an option “[b]ecause there was no statutory authority for the determinate 

sentence” and “judges may only impose punishment authorized by the 

legislature within constitutional constraints.” Id. at 598. Additionally, 

we declined to address Louisell’s argument that her parole eligibility was 

illusory based on Iowa’s low rate of parole-eligible offenders who had 

actually been granted parole, asserting that this argument was not ripe 

for us to decide. Id. at 601–02.

In Seats, we expounded upon the factors a district court should 

consider as part of its discretionary sentencing in cases where it could 

sentence a juvenile to life in prison without the possibility of parole for 
13

first-degree murder. 865 N.W.2d at 556–57. These factors stem from 

our holding in Lyle and include the differences between children and 

adults, the family and home environment, the circumstances of the 

homicide offense, the role of substance abuse in the juvenile’s offense, 

and the fact that juveniles are more capable of rehabilitation than adults. 

Id. at 555–57. Additionally, we stressed that “the presumption for any 

sentencing judge is that the judge should sentence juveniles to life in 

prison with the possibility of parole for murder unless the other factors 

require a different sentence.” Id. at 555.

In State v. Sweet, we categorically banned sentencing juvenile 

offenders to life without the possibility of parole under article I, section 

17 of the Iowa Constitution. 879 N.W.2d 811, 839 (Iowa 2016). We 

noted that the Miller individualized sentencing hearing is inadequate in 

the context of sentencing juvenile offenders to life without the possibility 

of parole because that sentence required the sentencer to “do the 

impossible, namely, to determine whether the offender is ‘irretrievably 

corrupt’ at a time when even trained professionals with years of clinical 

experience would not attempt to make such a determination.” Id. at 837. 

Rather, the parole board, not the sentencer, is in the best position to 

determine whether the offender is incorrigibly corrupt. Id. at 839.

Finally, in Roby, we concluded article I, section 17 of the Iowa 

Constitution does not categorically prohibit imposing a minimum term of 

incarceration without the possibility of parole on a juvenile offender so 

long as the court only imposes it after considering relevant mitigating 

factors of youth. 897 N.W.2d at 143. We also sought to provide 

guidance on the Lyle sentencing factors, noting that they ordinarily work 

to mitigate punishment in order to help sentencing courts craft “a 

punishment that serves the best interests of the child and society.” Id. at 
14

144 (quoting Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 402). Further, we reiterated the 

differences between children and adults in sentencing, asserting

“[p]erceptions applicable to adult behavior cannot normally be used to 

draw conclusions from juvenile behavior.” Id. at 147.

B. Zarate’s Categorical Challenges. The court employs a twostep inquiry to a categorical challenge to a sentence. See Lyle, 854 

N.W.2d at 386. First, we examine “ ‘objective indicia of society’s 

standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state practice’ to 

determine whether there is a national consensus against the sentencing 

practice at issue.” Id. (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 61, 130 S. Ct. at 

2022). Second, we consider our controlling precedents and our 

interpretation of the Iowa Constitution’s text, history, meaning, and 

purpose to guide our own independent judgment on the constitutionality 

of the challenged sentence. Id. As part of our independent judgment, we 

also evaluate whether the challenged sentencing practice serves 

legitimate penological goals, as well as “the culpability of the offenders at 

issue in light of their crimes and characteristics, along with the severity 

of the punishment in question.” Id. (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 67, 

130 S. Ct. at 2026).

1. The constitutionality of Iowa Code section 902.1(2)(a)(1)–(3).

During the 2015 legislative session, the general assembly enacted and 

the Governor signed into law Senate File 448, which is codified at Iowa 

Code section 902.1. Iowa Code section 902.1(2)(a)(1)–(3) provides three 

sentencing options for juveniles convicted of first-degree murder: 

(1) Commitment to the director of the department of 

corrections for the rest of the defendant’s life with no 

possibility of parole unless the governor commutes the 

sentence to a term of years.
15

(2) Commitment to the custody of the director of the 

department of corrections for the rest of the defendant’s life 

with the possibility of parole after serving a minimum term of 

confinement as determined by the court.

(3) Commitment to the custody of the director of the 

department of corrections for the rest of the defendant’s life 

with the possibility of parole.

Iowa Code § 902.1(2)(a)(1)–(3).

Zarate argues that Iowa Code section 902.1(2)(a)(1)–(3) is 

unconstitutional because it does not provide sentencing judges with the 

opportunity to sentence juvenile offenders convicted of first-degree 

murder to a term-of-years sentence. Although the sentencing statute 

provides the sentencing court with flexibility to choose between set 

sentencing options, Zarate argues that the statute does not go far 

enough in creating judicial discretion to fashion juvenile sentences. 

Additionally, Zarate argues the sentencing options under section 

902.1(2)(a) are unconstitutional because they do not provide a 

meaningful opportunity for release under Miller and Ragland since life 

imprisonment with the possibility of parole is a de facto life sentence. 

Specifically, Zarate contends parole is merely illusory because the parole 

board is not required to annually review the status of an offender 

convicted of a class “A” felony, few inmates serving a life sentence with 

the possibility of parole have actually received parole, and 

the passage of Senate File 448 and the Governor’s 

commutation language make it clear that the legislature and 

[G]overnor do not intend to have a parole board that will 

consider the constitutional mitigating factors from Null, 

Ragland, Lyle, and Miller.

At the outset, we hold that Iowa Code section 902.1(2)(a)(1), which 

allows the sentencing court to sentence a juvenile offender to life 

imprisonment without the possibility of parole is unconstitutional based 

on our holding in Sweet. We categorically banned the sentence of life 
16

imprisonment without the possibility of parole for all juvenile offenders in 

Sweet, holding this sentence violated article I, section 17 of the Iowa 

Constitution. 879 N.W.2d at 839. However, this unconstitutional 

portion of the statute does not render the rest of section 902.1(2)(a)

unconstitutional.

“When parts of a statute or ordinance are constitutionally valid, 

but other discrete and identifiable parts are infirm, we may sever the 

offending portion from the enactment and leave the remainder intact.” 

Am. Dog Owners Ass’n v. City of Des Moines, 469 N.W.2d 416, 418 (Iowa 

1991) (per curiam). We “leave the valid parts in force on the assumption 

that the legislature would have intended those provisions to stand 

alone.” Breeden v. Iowa Dep’t of Corr., 887 N.W.2d 602, 608 (Iowa 2016)

(quoting Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of 

Interpretation, 98 Geo. L.J. 341, 384 (2010)); see also Iowa Code § 4.12 

(codifying the severability doctrine). In this case, the rest of Iowa Code 

section 902.1(2)(a) is constitutional based on the following two-prong 

inquiry we apply to categorical challenges. Thus, Iowa Code section 

902.1(2)(a)(2)–(3) remains valid and in force.

Beginning with the first prong of the analysis, an objective 

examination of legislative enactments and state practices demonstrates 

that there is not a national consensus against mandatorily sentencing 

juvenile offenders convicted of first-degree murder to life imprisonment 

with the immediate possibility of parole or life imprisonment with the 

possibility of parole after a set number of years. Instead, a survey of the 

juvenile sentencing laws of other states demonstrates a national trend in 

favor of sentencing juvenile offenders like Zarate to at least a sentence of 

life imprisonment with the possibility of parole after an established 

minimum term of confinement.
17

Five states have juvenile sentencing schemes that require courts to 

sentence juvenile offenders convicted of first-degree murder to at least 

life with the possibility of parole after serving a minimum term of 

confinement similar to the sentencing option listed in Iowa Code section 

902.1(2)(a)(2).2 Another ten states subject their juvenile offenders to the 

same mandatory life with the possibility of parole options as their 

convicted adult offenders, many of which require offenders to serve a 

minimum term of years before becoming parole eligible.3 Further, rather 

than provide sentencing courts with the ability to craft any sentence they 

desire as Zarate contends is the only constitutional way to comply with 

Miller and our juvenile sentencing jurisprudence, a number of states

have mandatory minimum sentences for juvenile homicide offenders.4

 2Ala. Code § 13A-6-2 (Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 

§ 13-751(A)(2) (Westlaw through 1st Reg. Sess. of 53rd Leg. (2017)); Ark. Code. Ann. 

§ 5-4-104 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess. & 1st Extraordinary Sess.); La. Stat. 

Ann. § 15:574.4(E)(1)(a) (Westlaw through 2017 2d Extraordinary Sess.); N.C. Gen. Stat.

Ann. § 15A-1340.19A (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.).

3Idaho Code Ann. § 18-4004 (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st Reg. Sess.); Md. 

Code Ann. Corr. Serv. § 7-301 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.); Minn. Stat. 

Ann. § 243.05 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. & 1st Spec. Sess.); N.D. Cent. Code 

Ann. § 12.1-32-01 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 

§ 2929.02(B)(1) (West, Westlaw through File 48 of 132d Gen. Assemb. (2017–2018)); 

Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 701.9 (West, Westlaw through 1st Reg. Sess. & 1st Spec. 

Sess. of 56th Leg. (2017)); 13 R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 13-8-13(a) (West, Westlaw through 

ch. 480 of Jan. 2017 Sess.); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); 

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-501(h)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st Reg. Sess.); Wis. 

Stat. Ann. § 973.014(1)(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2017 Act 135).

4See, e.g., Alaska Stat. Ann. § 12.55.125(a) (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st 

Reg. Sess. through 4th Spec. Sess. of 30th Leg.) (“A defendant convicted of murder in 

the first degree or murder of an unborn child under AS 11.41.150(a)(1) shall be 

sentenced to a definite term of imprisonment of at least 30 years . . . .”); Del. Code Ann. 

tit. 11, § 4209A (West, Westlaw through 81 Laws 2018) (“Any person who is convicted of 

first-degree murder for an offense that was committed before the person had reached 

the person’s eighteenth birthday shall be sentenced to a term of incarceration not less 

than 25 years . . . .”); Ind. Code Ann. § 35-50-2-3(a) (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st 

Reg. Sess.) (“A person who commits murder shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of 

between forty-five (45) and sixty-five (65) years, with the advisory sentence being fiftyfive (55) years.”); Me. Ann. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 1251 (Westlaw through 2017 1st Reg. Sess.
18

See generally Kallee Spooner & Michael S. Vaugh, Sentencing Juvenile 

Offenders: A 50-State Survey, 5 Va. J. Crim. L. 130, 146–50 (2017) 

(providing a detailed overview of the juvenile sentencing landscape postMiller). While we have done away with automatic mandatory minimum 

sentences of imprisonment for juvenile offenders in Iowa, an objective 

examination of other legislative enactments and state practices 

demonstrates that there is a national consensus in favor of requiring

juvenile offenders convicted of first-degree murder to serve a mandatory 

minimum term of confinement before becoming parole eligible.

Additionally, the decision of our legislature to implement Iowa 

Code section 902.1(2)(a) and provide the sentencing courts with greater 

discretion to determine when a juvenile offender serving life 

imprisonment with the possibility of parole can become parole eligible 

serves as objective indicia of Iowa’s standards regarding the challenged 

sentencing practice. As we noted in Lyle, the court owes “deference to 

the legislature when it expands the discretion of the court in juvenile 

sentencing.” 854 N.W.2d at 388. Unlike the cases we decide, which are 

limited to the record before us, “[t]he legislature is uniquely suited to 

identifying and adopting additional substantive and procedural 

__________________________________________

& 1st Spec. Sess. of 128th Leg.) (“A person convicted of the crime of murder shall be 

sentenced to imprisonment for life or for any term of years that is not less than 25.”); 

Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 565.033(1) (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st Reg. Sess. & 1st & 

2d Extraordinary Sess. of 99th Gen. Assemb.) (“A person found guilty of murder in the 

first degree who was under the age of eighteen at the time of the commission of the 

offense shall be sentenced to a term of life without eligibility for probation or parole as 

provided in section 565.034, life imprisonment with eligibility for parole, or not less 

than thirty years and not to exceed forty years imprisonment.”); Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. 

§ 28-105.02(1) (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st Reg. Sess.) (“Notwithstanding any 

other provision of law, the penalty for any person convicted of a Class 1A felony for an 

offense committed when such person was under the age of eighteen years shall be a 

maximum sentence of not greater than life imprisonment and a minimum sentence of 

not less than forty years’ imprisonment.”).
19

protections to further the constitutional recognition that ‘children are 

different.’ ” Roby, 897 N.W.2d at 144 (quoting Seats, 865 N.W.2d at 

555). Moreover, “[l]egislative judgments can be ‘the most reliable 

objective indicators of community standards for purposes of determining 

whether a punishment is cruel and unusual.’ ” Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 388 

(quoting State v. Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862, 873 (Iowa 2009)).

Here, the legislative decision to require mandatory life 

imprisonment with the possibility of parole, and to expand the discretion 

of sentencing courts by allowing them to make individualized 

determinations on when a juvenile offender convicted of first-degree 

murder is parole eligible, speaks to a consensus in Iowa in favor of the 

challenged sentencing practice. The legislature’s recognition of the need 

for some discretion in the juvenile sentencing process comports with our 

prior holdings dealing with the issue of juvenile sentencing in the 

aftermath of Miller. Iowa Code section 902.1(2)(a)(2)–(3) allows 

sentencing courts to craft individualized sentences for each juvenile 

offender so long as the juvenile offender is first sentenced to life 

imprisonment with some option for parole eligibility.

As the second step in our inquiry, we analyze the Iowa 

Constitution’s cruel and unusual punishment clause to determine if the

sentencing options at issue violate the cruel and unusual punishment 

clause in light of its text, meaning, purpose, and history. “We seek to 

interpret our constitution consistent with the object sought to be 

obtained at the time of adoption as disclosed by the circumstances.”

Chiodo v. Section 43.24 Panel, 846 N.W.2d 845, 851 (Iowa 2014).

However, originalism may not be the best guide for interpreting our 

constitution’s cruel and unusual punishment clause in light of the

changes to juvenile sentencing. Interpreting our constitution based on 
20

our founders’ intent would not support a categorical ban on life 

imprisonment without the possibility of parole eligibility because 

juveniles over the age of fourteen were tried and sentenced as adults 

when our constitution was adopted. See Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 390.

Nonetheless, other decisions in our history similarly point to the 

constitutionality of the sentencing practice at issue. Zarate’s argument 

that the statute is unconstitutional because it prevents a term-of-years 

sentence seeks to expand our categorical ban on mandatory minimum 

sentencing schemes in Lyle to an area of the law that we expressly stated 

was not included in the categorical ban. As we stated in Lyle, the 

categorical ban on mandatory minimums for juvenile offenders does not 

“prohibit the legislature from imposing a minimum time that youthful 

offenders must serve in prison before being eligible for parole.” Id. at 

403. We reiterated this again in Roby, holding there was no national or 

local consensus against imposing a minimum prison sentence on 

youthful offenders before they can become parole eligible, and “in our 

independent judgment article I, section 17 does not yet require abolition 

of the practice.” 897 N.W.2d at 143. Rather, our cruel and unusual 

punishment clause simply requires an individualized sentencing process 

instead of a one-size-fits-all sentencing scheme before the mandatory 

prison sentences can be applied. Id. Iowa Code section 902.1(2) meets 

this requirement because it instructs sentencing courts to employ an 

individualized review of each juvenile offender’s situation—including a 

consideration of the factors mandated in Miller, Lyle, and Seats—then 

allows the sentencing court to form a unique sentence with regards to 

parole eligibility for each juvenile offender.

Further, Iowa Code section 902.1(2)(a)(2)–(3)’s sentencing options 

align with the United States Supreme Court and this court’s recognition 
21

of “a fundamental and virtually inexorable difference between juveniles 

and adults for the purposes of punishment.” Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 393. 

This difference is reflected throughout Iowa Code section 902.1(2)(a)(2)–

(3), beginning with its different sentencing options for juveniles from

adults. While Iowa law mandates life without parole for adults who 

commit first-degree murder, the sentencing options provided in section 

902.1(2) provide no mandatory minimum period of incarceration for 

juvenile offenders who commit first-degree murder. Compare Iowa Code 

§ 902.1(1), with id. § 902.1(2)(a)(2)–(3). Moreover, in contrast to the 

mandatory life without parole for adult offenders who commit first-degree 

murder, juvenile offenders convicted of the same crime are provided with 

an individualized sentencing hearing that takes into account their youth 

and a number of other mitigating factors that provide juveniles with more 

leniency in the sentencing process. Compare id. § 902.1(1), with id.

§ 902.1(2)(b)(2)(a)–(v).

In addition to our understanding and interpretation of the Iowa 

Constitution, we also consider whether the challenged sentencing 

practice serves legitimate penological goals and the culpability of the 

offender at issue. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 386. These goals include 

rehabilitation, retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation. State v.

Oliver, 812 N.W.2d 636, 646 (Iowa 2012). While we have noted that 

penological justifications beyond rehabilitation carry less weight in the 

juvenile sentencing context, they still have some relevance and purpose 

in the sentencing process. See Roby, 897 N.W.2d at 154 (Zager, J., 

dissenting); Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 399–400. Even so, our juvenile 

sentencing jurisprudence focuses heavily on the goal of rehabilitation 

over all others due to the increased capacity of juveniles to reform in 

comparison to adults. See Roby, 897 N.W.2d at 147 (majority opinion).
22

The possibility of parole options presented in Iowa Code section 

902.1(2)(a)(2)–(3) align with our focus on rehabilitation and allow 

sentencing judges to acknowledge the fundamental concept of our 

juvenile sentencing jurisprudence that children are different from adults 

and should be treated differently due to their increased potential for 

rehabilitation. Consequently, sentencing courts can immediately declare 

a rehabilitated juvenile offender eligible for parole, or they can consider 

the changes a juvenile offender has made and subsequently subject him 

or her to a term of imprisonment first to ensure that these changes are 

permanent.

Furthermore, the statute’s sentencing options promote other 

legitimate penological goals like retribution, deterrence, and 

incapacitation. For example, in Roby, we stated, “it may be appropriate 

retribution to incarcerate a juvenile for a short time without the 

possibility of parole. Additionally, a sentencing judge could properly 

conclude a short term of guaranteed incarceration is necessary to protect 

the public.” Id. at 142. Iowa Code section 902.1(2)(a)(2)–(3) aligns with 

our statements about penological goals in Roby by allowing sentencing 

courts to subject juvenile offenders convicted of first-degree murder to a 

term of imprisonment before becoming parole eligible that considers the 

nature of the crime as one of many factors in the sentencing process. 

Requiring a sentencing court to sentence a juvenile offender convicted of 

first-degree murder to a definite term of years as Zarate requests, as 

opposed to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole, would hinder 

the sentencing court’s ability to protect society from offenders who show 

signs of recidivism that may require incapacitation until a parole board 

determines the offender’s rehabilitation.
23

Finally, Zarate’s claim that Iowa Code section 902.1(2) denies 

juvenile offenders convicted of first-degree murder a meaningful 

opportunity for parole is not ripe for adjudication because it is merely 

speculative. “A case is ripe for adjudication when it presents an actual, 

present controversy, as opposed to one that is merely hypothetical or 

speculative.” State v. Wade, 757 N.W.2d 618, 627 (Iowa 2008). The 

ripeness doctrine exists to avoid premature adjudication of issues that 

would entangle the courts in abstract disagreements over administrative 

policies. Id. For example, in Louisell, we declined on ripeness grounds to 

rule on the opportunity for meaningful release for parole eligible juvenile 

offenders in which the juvenile offender argued the opportunity was 

simply illusory due to the low number of juvenile offenders actually 

granted parole. 865 N.W.2d at 601–02. Yvette Louisell made this 

argument before being denied parole, and even after Louisell became 

eligible for parole as a result of our remand order, the question of her 

meaningful opportunity for release under a sentence of life imprisonment 

with the possibility of parole was still not ripe because she had not been 

denied parole in order to claim a legal violation. Id.

The same ripeness issue occurs in this case. Similar to Louisell, 

Zarate’s claim that life imprisonment with the possibility of parole for 

juvenile offenders under section 902.1(2)(a)(2)–(3) does not present a 

meaningful opportunity for release is speculative. Much of Zarate’s 

argument focuses on the alleged intentions of the specific legislature that 

passed Iowa Code section 902.1(2) and the Governor, who signed the bill 

into law. Zarate claims the legislature and Governor have an improper 

motive and intent to keep juvenile homicide offenders incarcerated, 

which denies juvenile offenders convicted of first-degree murder a 

meaningful opportunity for parole because the Governor and legislature 
24

have the power to appoint and confirm the parole board members under 

Iowa Code section 904A.3. However, parole board members must meet 

certain qualifications and are appointed for fixed terms. See Iowa Code 

§§ 904A.1–.2. Parole decisions are subject to legal standards. See id.

§§ 906.3–.4. Zarate has provided no basis for us to conclude that the 

parole board will fail to follow the law in a case that is presented to it, 

including his own.

To decide the issue of whether Iowa Code section 902.1(2) denies 

juvenile offenders with a meaningful opportunity for release when Zarate 

has not yet become parole eligible, or been denied parole, would require 

us to speculate about the actions of the parole board in the future. This 

abstract decision is not within our purview. Consequently, we reserve 

the issue of whether life imprisonment with the possibility of parole 

provides juvenile offenders who are eligible for immediate parole with a 

meaningful opportunity for release for another day.

2. The constitutionality of sentencing factors under Iowa Code 

section 902.1(2). Under Iowa Code section 902.1(2)(b)(2), in determining 

what sentence to impose,

the [sentencing] court shall consider all circumstances 

including but not limited to the following: 

(a) The impact of the offense on each victim, as 

defined by section 915.10, through the use of a victim 

impact statement, as defined in section 915.10, under any 

format permitted by section 915.13. The victim impact 

statement may include comment on the sentence of the 

defendant.

(b) The impact of the offense on the community.

(c) The threat to the safety of the public or any 

individual posed by the defendant.

(d) The degree of participation in the murder by the 

defendant.
25

(e) The nature of the offense.

(f) The defendant’s remorse.

(g) The defendant’s acceptance of responsibility.

(h) The severity of the offense, including any of the 

following:

(i) The commission of the murder while participating 

in another felony.

(ii) The number of victims.

(iii) The heinous, brutal, cruel manner of the murder, 

including whether the murder was the result of torture.

(i) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the 

criminality of the conduct.

(j) Whether the ability to conform the defendant’s 

conduct with the requirements of the law was substantially 

impaired.

(k) The level of maturity of the defendant.

(l) The intellectual and mental capacity of the 

defendant.

(m) The nature and extent of any prior juvenile 

delinquency or criminal history of the defendant, including 

the success or failure of previous attempts at rehabilitation.

(n) The mental health history of the defendant.

(o) The level of compulsion, duress, or influence 

exerted upon the defendant, but not to such an extent as to 

constitute a defense.

(p) The likelihood of the commission of further 

offenses by the defendant.

(q) The chronological age of the defendant and the 

features of youth, including immaturity, impetuosity, and 

failure to appreciate risks and consequences.

(r) The family and home environment that surrounded 

the defendant.

(s) The circumstances of the murder including the 

extent of the defendant’s participation in the conduct and 

the way familial and peer pressure may have affected the 

defendant.
26

(t) The competencies associated with youth, including 

but not limited to the defendant’s inability to deal with peace 

officers or the prosecution or the defendant’s incapacity to 

assist the defendant’s attorney in the defendant’s defense.

(u) The possibility of rehabilitation.

(v) Any other information considered relevant by the 

sentencing court.

Iowa Code § 902.1(2)(b)(2)(a)–(v).

Zarate argues that the sentencing factors found in Iowa Code 

section 902.1(2)(b)(2)(a)–(v) are unconstitutional because they require a 

sentencing court to consider factors beyond the mitigating factors 

established in Miller. Zarate is especially concerned that a sentencing 

court could weigh aggravating factors more heavily than mitigating 

factors despite the fact that the statute does not give certain factors more 

weight than others. We decline Zarate’s request for us to hold that the 

sentencing factors set forth in section 902.1(2)(b)(2)(a)–(v) are 

categorically unconstitutional. However, we do agree with Zarate that 

the use of the factors must comport with our juvenile sentencing 

jurisprudence in that the five factors set forth in Lyle must be considered 

as mitigating factors in the sentencing process. See Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 

404 n.10. We also hold that the district court’s consideration of any 

potential aggravating factors set forth in section 902.1(2)(b)(2)(a)–(v) shall

align with our juvenile sentencing jurisprudence so as not to overwhelm 

the mitigating factors associated with youth, especially the five factors of 

youth set forth in Lyle.

Under the first prong of our two-prong inquiry to a categorical 

challenge, an objective examination of legislative enactments and state 

practices demonstrates that there is a growing consensus toward 

enumerating set factors for sentencing courts to consider with regard to 

sentencing juvenile offenders convicted of first-degree murder. Similar to 
27

Iowa’s juvenile sentencing framework, nine other states have 

implemented a juvenile sentencing framework to comply with Miller that 

lists related, if not identical, sentencing factors to Iowa’s for a sentencing 

court to consider when sentencing juvenile offenders convicted of firstdegree murder.5

 5See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.1401(2)(a–j) (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st Reg. 

Sess. & Spec. “A” Sess. of 25th Leg.) (“In determining whether life imprisonment or a 

term of years equal to life imprisonment is an appropriate sentence, the court shall 

consider factors relevant to the offense and the defendant’s youth and attendant 

circumstances, including, but not limited to: (a) [t]he nature and circumstances of the 

offense committed by the defendant; (b) [t]he effect of the crime on the victim’s family 

and on the community; (c) [t]he defendant’s age, maturity, intellectual capacity, and 

mental and emotional health at the time of the offense; (d) [t]he defendant’s 

background, including his or her family, home, and community environment; (e) [t]he 

effect, if any, of immaturity, impetuosity, or failure to appreciate risks and 

consequences on the defendant’s participation in the offense; (f) [t]he extent of the 

defendant’s participation in the offense; (g) [t]he effect, if any, of familial pressure or 

peer pressure on the defendant’s actions; (h) [t]he nature and extent of the defendant’s 

prior criminal history; (i) [t]he effect, if any, of characteristics attributable to the 

defendant’s youth on the defendant’s judgment; (j) [t]he possibility of rehabilitating the 

defendant.”); 730 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/5-4.5-105(a)(1–9) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 100-

578 of 2018 Reg. Sess.) (“[W]hen a person commits an offense and the person is under 

18 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense, the court, at the sentencing 

hearing conducted under Section 5-4-1, shall consider the following additional factors 

in mitigation in determining the appropriate sentence: (1) the person’s age, impetuosity, 

and level of maturity at the time of the offense, including the ability to consider risks 

and consequences of behavior, and the presence of cognitive or developmental 

disability, or both, if any; (2) whether the person was subjected to outside pressure, 

including peer pressure, familial pressure, or negative influences; (3) the person’s 

family, home environment, educational and social background, including any history of 

parental neglect, physical abuse, or other childhood trauma; (4) the person’s potential 

for rehabilitation or evidence of rehabilitation, or both; (5) the circumstances of the 

offense; (6) the person’s degree of participation and specific role in the offense, including 

the level of planning by the defendant before the offense; (7) whether the person was 

able to meaningfully participate in his or her defense; (8) the person’s prior juvenile or 

criminal history; and (9) any other information the court finds relevant and reliable, 

including an expression of remorse, if appropriate. However, if the person on advice of 

counsel chooses not to make a statement, the court shall not consider a lack of an 

expression of remorse as an aggravating factor.”); La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 

878.1(C) (“At the [juvenile sentencing] hearing, the prosecution and defense shall be 

allowed to introduce any aggravating and mitigating evidence that is relevant to the 

charged offense or the character of the offender, including but not limited to the facts 

and circumstances of the crime, the criminal history of the offender, the offender’s level 

of family support, social history, and such other factors as the court may deem 

relevant.”); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 565.033(2) (“When assessing punishment in all first degree 
28

__________________________________________

murder cases in which the defendant was under the age of eighteen at the time of the 

commission of the offense or offenses, the judge in a jury-waived trial shall consider, or 

the judge shall include in instructions to the jury for it to consider, the following 

factors: (1) [t]he nature and circumstances of the offense committed by the defendant; 

(2) [t]he degree of the defendant’s culpability in light of his or her age and role in the 

offense; (3) [t]he defendant’s age, maturity, intellectual capacity, and mental and 

emotional health and development at the time of the offense; (4) [t]he defendant’s 

background, including his or her family, home, and community environment; (5) [t]he 

likelihood for rehabilitation of the defendant; (6) [t]he extent of the defendant’s 

participation in the offense; (7) [t]he effect of familial pressure or peer pressure on the 

defendant’s actions; (8) [t]he nature and extent of the defendant’s prior criminal history, 

including whether the offense was committed by a person with a prior record of 

conviction for murder in the first degree, or one or more serious assaultive criminal 

convictions; (9) [t]he effect of characteristics attributable to the defendant’s youth on the 

defendant’s judgment; and (10) [a] statement by the victim or the victim’s family 

member . . . .”); Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-105.02(2) (In determining the sentence of a 

juvenile offender convicted of a Class 1A felony, “the court shall consider mitigating 

factors which led to the commission of the offense. The convicted person may submit 

mitigating factors to the court, including, but not limited to: (a) [t]he convicted person’s 

age at the time of the offense; (b) [t]he impetuosity of the convicted person; (c) [t]he 

convicted person’s family and community environment; (d) [t]he convicted person’s 

ability to appreciate the risks and consequences of the conduct; (e) [t]he convicted 

person’s intellectual capacity; and (f) [t]he outcome of a comprehensive mental health 

evaluation of the convicted person conducted by an adolescent mental health 

professional licensed in this state. The evaluation shall include, but not be limited to, 

interviews with the convicted person’s family in order to learn about the convicted 

person’s prenatal history, developmental history, medical history, substance abuse 

treatment history, if any, social history, and psychological history.”); Nev. Rev. Stat.

Ann. § 176.017 (West, Westlaw through 79th Reg. Sess. (2017)) (“If a person is 

convicted as an adult for an offense that the person committed when he or she was less 

than 18 years of age, in addition to any other factor that the court is required to 

consider before imposing a sentence upon such a person, the court shall consider the 

differences between juvenile and adult offenders, including, without limitation, the 

diminished culpability of juveniles as compared to that of adults and the typical 

characteristics of youth.”); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 15A-1340.19B(c)(1)–(9) (West, Westlaw 

through 2017 Reg. Sess.) (“The defendant or the defendant’s counsel may submit 

mitigating circumstances to the court, including, but not limited to, the following 

factors: (1) [a]ge at the time of the offense; (2) [i]mmaturity; (3) [a]bility to appreciate the 

risks and consequences of the conduct; (4) [i]ntellectual capacity; (5) [p]rior record;

(6) [m]ental health; (7) [f]amilial or peer pressure exerted upon the defendant;

(8) [l]ikelihood that the defendant would benefit from rehabilitation in confinement; 

(9) [a]ny other mitigating factor or circumstance.”); W. Va. Code Ann. § 61-11-23(c)(1)–

(15) (West, Westlaw through 2017 3d Extraordinary Sess.) (“In addition to other factors 

required by law to be considered prior to the imposition of a sentence, in determining 

the appropriate sentence to be imposed on a person who has been transferred to the 

criminal jurisdiction of the court pursuant to section ten, article five, chapter forty-nine 

of this code and who has been subsequently tried and convicted of a felony offense as 

an adult, the court shall consider the following mitigating circumstances: (1) [a]ge at the 

time of the offense; (2) [i]mpetuosity; (3) [f]amily and community environment;
29

Likewise, the decision of our legislature to enumerate sentencing 

factors under Iowa Code section 902.1(2)(b)(2), and provide the 

sentencing courts with a plethora of factors to allow for greater discretion 

in crafting a juvenile sentence, serves as objective indicia of Iowa’s 

standards regarding the challenged sentencing factors. As we noted 

previously, the legislature is entitled to deference when it expands the 

court’s discretion in the juvenile sentencing realm. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 

388. Further, the legislature is in the best position to identify and adopt 

legal protections that advance our constitutional recognition that 

“children are different.” Roby, 897 N.W.2d at 144 (quoting Seats, 865 

N.W.2d at 555).

With regard to the second factor, examining our controlling 

precedents and interpretations of the Iowa Constitution’s text, history, 

meaning, and purpose, an examination of the sentencing factors 

enumerated in Iowa Code section 902.1(2)(b)(2)(a)–(v) supports our 

__________________________________________

(4) [a]bility to appreciate the risks and consequences of the conduct; (5) [i]ntellectual 

capacity; (6) [t]he outcomes of a comprehensive mental health evaluation conducted by 

[a] mental health professional licensed to treat adolescents in the State of West Virginia: 

Provided, that no provision of this section may be construed to require that a 

comprehensive mental health evaluation be conducted; (7) [p]eer or familial pressure; 

(8) [l]evel of participation in the offense; (9) [a]bility to participate meaningfully in his or 

her defense; (10) [c]apacity for rehabilitation; (11) [s]chool records and special education 

evaluations; (12) [t]rauma history; (13) [f]aith and community involvement; 

(14) [i]involvement in the child welfare system; and (15) [a]ny other mitigating factor or 

circumstances.); Ex parte Henderson, 144 So. 3d 1262, 1283–84 (Ala. 2013) (“We hold 

that a sentencing hearing for a juvenile convicted of a capital offense must now include 

consideration of: (1) the juvenile’s chronological age at the time of the offense and the 

hallmark features of youth, such as immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate 

risks and consequences; (2) the juvenile’s diminished culpability; (3) the circumstances 

of the offense; (4) the extent of the juvenile’s participation in the crime; (5) the juvenile’s 

family, home, and neighborhood environment; (6) the juvenile’s emotional maturity and 

development; (7) whether familial and/or peer pressure affected the juvenile; (8) the 

juvenile’s past exposure to violence; (9) the juvenile’s drug and alcohol history; (10) the 

juvenile’s ability to deal with the police; (11) the juvenile’s capacity to assist his or her 

attorney; (12) the juvenile’s mental-health history; (13) the juvenile’s potential for 

rehabilitation; and (14) any other relevant factor related to the juvenile’s youth.”).
30

decision that the statutory factors comport with our juvenile sentencing 

jurisprudence and the Iowa Constitution. In Seats, we expounded upon 

the five youth-related characteristics required under Miller and Lyle, 

holding that a sentencing court must consider the factors as “mitigating, 

not aggravating” when sentencing a juvenile offender. Seats, 865 N.W.2d 

at 555–57. In Roby, we again endorsed the use of these factors, noting 

that they “identify the primary reasons most juvenile offenders should 

not be sentenced without parole eligibility,” and they “must not normally 

be used to impose a minimum sentence of incarceration without parole 

unless expert evidence supports the use of the factors to reach such a 

result.” 897 N.W.2d at 147. A comparison of the Lyle factors we 

discussed in greater length in Seats and Roby, to those in Iowa Code 

section 902.1(2)(b)(2), demonstrates the statutory factors’ alignment with 

our juvenile sentencing jurisprudence. Cf. Sweet, 879 N.W.2d at 840 

(Cady, C.J., concurring specially) (noting these factors “addressed the 

constitutional deficiency identified in Miller and in our cases that

followed”).

The first Lyle factor requires a sentencing court to consider “the 

age of the offender and the features of youthful behavior, such as 

‘immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and 

consequences.’ ” 854 N.W.2d at 404 n.10 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 

477–78, 132 S. Ct. at 2468). In Seats, we asserted this consideration 

requires the sentencing judge to recognize that “children are 

constitutionally different from adults.” 865 N.W.2d at 556. In Roby, we 

elaborated further, stating this factor allows for the introduction of 

evidence at sentencing that speaks to the juvenile’s “maturity, 

deliberation of thought, and appreciation of risk-taking” and “is most 

meaningfully applied when based on qualified professional assessments 
31

of the offender’s decisional capacity.” 897 N.W.2d at 145. Similarly, the 

statutory factors require the sentencing judge to evaluate “[w]hether the 

ability to conform the defendant’s conduct with the requirements of the 

law was substantially impaired,” “[t]he level of maturity of the 

defendant,” “[t]he intellectual and mental capacity of the defendant,” 

“[t]he level of compulsion, duress, or influence exerted upon the 

defendant,” “[t]he chronological age of the defendant and the features of 

youth, including immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate the 

risks and consequences,” the effect of peer pressure on the defendant, 

and “[t]he competencies associated with youth, including but not limited 

to the defendant’s inability to deal with peace officers or the prosecution 

or the defendant’s incapacity to assist the defendant’s attorney in the 

defendant’s defense.” Iowa Code § 902.1(2)(b)(2)(j)–(l), (o), (q), (s).

Second, Lyle requires a sentencing judge to consider the juvenile’s 

family and home environment. 854 N.W.2d at 404 n.10. In Seats, we 

explained that this factor requires review of “any information regarding 

childhood abuse, parental neglect, personal and family drug or alcohol 

abuse, prior exposure to violence, lack of parental supervision, lack of an 

adequate education, and the juvenile’s susceptibility to psychological or 

emotional damage.” 865 N.W.2d at 556. Further, in Roby, we noted this 

factor “is not limited to extremely brutal or dysfunctional home 

environments, but considers the impact of all circumstances and all 

income and social backgrounds.” 897 N.W.2d at 146. The statutory

factors comply with our caselaw by requiring sentencing judges to 

consider the “mental health history of the defendant,” “[t]he family and 

home environment that surrounded the defendant,” and “[t]he 

circumstances of the murder including the extent of the defendant’s 
32

participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressure may 

have affected the defendant.” Iowa Code § 902.1(2)(b)(2)(n), (r)–(s).

Third, under Lyle, the sentencing judge must consider “the 

circumstances of the particular crime and all circumstances relating to 

youth that may have played a role in the commission of the crime.” 854 

N.W.2d at 404 n.10. With regard to homicide offenses, we stated that 

this requires the consideration of “the circumstances of the homicide 

offense, including the extent of [the juvenile’s] participation in the 

conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him.” 

Seats, 865 N.W.2d at 556 (alteration in original) (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. 

at 477, 132 S. Ct. at 2468). Also, in Roby, we noted that “[t]he 

aggravating circumstances of a crime that suggest an adult offender is 

depraved may only reveal a juvenile offender to be wildly immature and 

impetuous.” 897 N.W.2d at 146. Thus, “the circumstances of the crime 

do not necessarily weigh against mitigation when the crime caused grave 

harm or involved especially brutal circumstances.” Id. In accord with 

these holdings, Iowa Code section 902.1(2)(b)(2)(r)–(s) requires sentencing 

judges to consider the circumstances of the crime and the effects of 

familial and peer pressure. Moreover, comparable to our holding in 

Seats, the statute also requires sentencing judges to consider “[t]he 

degree of participation in the murder by the defendant,” “[t]he nature of 

the offense,” “[t]he severity of the offense, including any of the following: 

(i) [t]he commission of the murder while participating in another felony[,] 

(ii) [t]he number of victims, [and] (iii) [t]he heinous, brutal, cruel manner 

of the murder, including whether the murder was the result of torture.”

Iowa Code § 902.1(2)(b)(2)(d)–(e), (h)–(l).

Fourth, Lyle requires the sentencing court to consider “the 

challenges of youthful offenders in navigating through the criminal 
33

process.” 854 N.W.2d at 404 n.10. In Roby, we explained this factor 

“mitigates against punishment because juveniles are generally less 

capable of navigating through the criminal process than adult offenders,” 

which can affect the juvenile’s “general competency to stand trial or

relate more specifically to cognitive or other incapacities to withstand 

police interrogation.” 897 N.W.2d at 146–47. As noted previously, the 

statute takes this into consideration by requiring the sentencing judge to 

examine “[t]he competencies associated with youth, including but not 

limited to the defendant’s inability to deal with peace officers or the 

prosecution or the defendant’s incapacity to assist the defendant’s 

attorney in the defendant’s defense.” Iowa Code § 902.1(2)(b)(2)(t).

Finally, Lyle mandates the sentencing judge to consider “the 

possibility of rehabilitation and capacity for change.” 854 N.W.2d at 404 

n.10. We explained in Roby that this factor ordinarily supports 

mitigation because juveniles are more capable of rehabilitation. 897 

N.W.2d at 147. Iowa Code section 902.1(2) does this by requiring a 

sentencing judge to consider “[t]he nature and extent of any prior 

juvenile delinquency or criminal history of the defendant, including the 

success or failure of previous attempts at rehabilitation,” “[t]he likelihood 

of the commission of further offenses by the defendant,” and “[t]he

possibility of rehabilitation.” Iowa Code § 902.1(2)(b)(2)(m), (p), (u).

Despite these similarities, Zarate argues the statutory factors are 

unconstitutional because they do not explicitly state that the sentencing 

court must treat these factors as mitigating rather than aggravating. We 

agree that the sentencing court must treat the relevant factors associated 

with youth that we first set forth in Lyle as mitigating. However, the 

statute’s failure to explicitly state that these factors must be treated as 

mitigating does not render the sentencing factors unconstitutional. As 
34

we have already noted, our existing juvenile sentencing jurisprudence 

establishes that a sentencing court must consider the five Lyle factors in 

a mitigating fashion in the juvenile sentencing process, and the 

consideration of any potential aggravating factors, including the 

circumstances of the crime, cannot overwhelm the sentencing court’s 

analysis. See, e.g., Roby, 897 N.W.2d at 143–47. “We strive to interpret 

our statutes consistent with our case law.” State v. Carter, 618 N.W.2d 

374, 377 (Iowa 2000). In this case, we interpret the sentencing factors of 

Iowa Code section 902.1(2)(b)(2)(a)–(v) consistent with our caselaw to 

require sentencing courts to apply the statute according to our juvenile 

sentencing jurisprudence as laid out in this opinion.

Further, we reject Zarate’s overly broad interpretation of our 

holding in Null that children cannot be held to the same standard of 

culpability as adults in criminal sentencing. Under Zarate’s 

interpretation, it would be unconstitutional for a sentencing judge to 

consider any aggravating factors or the nature of the crime. This

interprets our holding far too broadly. See Null, 836 N.W.2d at 75. 

Nothing in the federal or state juvenile sentencing jurisprudence prevents 

sentencing courts from considering additional and/or aggravating factors 

beyond the factors established in Miller, as Zarate contends. In Miller, 

the Supreme Court stated that the sentencing court may consider “the 

nature of the[ ] crimes,” not just “age and age-related characteristics.” 

567 U.S. at 489, 132 S. Ct. at 2475. In Ragland, we held “the possibility 

of rehabilitation” was one of five sentencing factors, though not the only 

one to consider, 836 N.W.2d at 115 n.6 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. 478, 

132 S. Ct. at 2468), in contrast to Zarate’s argument that rehabilitation 

should be the primary focus of juvenile sentencing. In Seats, we 

expounded upon these factors to provide sentencing courts with certain 
35

factors it must consider as mitigating. 865 N.W.2d at 556–57. Yet we 

never barred the sentencing court from considering additional or 

aggravating factors. Id. at 555–57. Zarate himself noted in his reply 

brief that “[t]he court never limited what characteristics could be 

considered, it just stated that ‘the typical characteristics of youth . . . are 

to be regarded as mitigating, not aggravating factors.’ ” (quoting Null, 836 

N.W.2d at 75).

The fact of the matter is, “[c]riminal punishment can have different

goals, and choosing among them is within the legislature’s discretion.” 

Oliver, 812 N.W.2d at 646 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 71, 130 S. Ct. at 

2028). While the goal of deterrence carries less weight in the juvenile 

sentencing realm, it still has some weight depending on the 

circumstances of each case. See, e.g., Roby, 897 N.W.2d at 142; Lyle, 

854 N.W.2d at 399. Nevertheless, Zarate’s request that we hold the use 

of additional and/or aggravating factors beyond the mitigating youthrelated factors first established in Miller is unconstitutional would 

impede the legislature’s discretion and ability to promote goals for the 

criminal punishment of juvenile offenders other than rehabilitation.

The sentencing court’s ultimate goal is to decide which sentence 

“will provide maximum opportunity for the rehabilitation of the 

defendant, and for the protection of the community from further offenses 

by the defendant and others.” Iowa Code § 901.5. For a sentencing 

court to adequately meet this goal, the relevant information in the 

sentencing calculation may include aggravating factors. Otherwise, it 

would become seemingly impossible for the state to rebut the 

presumption “that the judge should sentence juveniles to life in prison 

with the possibility of parole unless the other factors require a different 
36

sentence” in order for the sentencing court to impose any minimum term 

of imprisonment before parole eligibility. Seats, 865 N.W.2d at 555.

While Zarate has improved his life during his time in prison, and 

may now be less culpable than other juvenile offenders given his 

circumstances, other juvenile offenders may still require incapacitation 

to prevent recidivism, or may require a longer sentence due to their 

culpability. The factors enumerated in Iowa Code section 902.1(2)(b)(2)

will assist the sentencing court in recognizing these differences between 

juvenile and adult offenders. Additionally, it will assist the sentencing 

court in balancing the competing goals of punishment and provide 

sentencing courts with a variety of case-specific factors to help them 

appropriately take these differences and goals into account when 

prescribing sentences. This creates a truly individualized sentencing 

hearing. Overall, “the Code in general [for juvenile sentencing] is replete 

with provisions vesting considerable discretion in courts to take action 

for the best interests of the child.” Roby, 897 N.W.2d at 141.

Ultimately, “[t]he constitutional analysis is not about excusing 

juvenile behavior, but imposing punishment in a way that is consistent 

with our understanding of humanity today.” Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 398. 

The sentencing factors enumerated in Iowa Code section 902.1(2)(b)(2)

meet this constitutional analysis by taking into account youth-related 

factors, while also recognizing that not all juvenile offenders are capable 

of rehabilitation or reintroduction into the community within a set term 

of years. More importantly, the listed factors provide the necessary 

individualized sentencing process for juvenile offenders by allowing 

sentencing courts to consider a wide array of factors on a case-by-case 

basis to craft an individualized sentence for each juvenile offender. 

Therefore, we affirm the district court on this issue with the additional 
37

mandate that the typical factors associated with youth as set forth in 

Lyle must be considered mitigating and that the circumstances of the 

crime or other aggravating factors may not overwhelm the mitigating 

factors.

C. Zarate’s As-Applied Challenge. Zarate argues we should 

vacate his sentence because the resentencing court inappropriately 

considered the sentencing factors under Iowa Code section 902.1(2)(b)(2)

in a manner that allowed the circumstances of his offense to overwhelm 

the sentencing analysis. On our review of the district court’s 

resentencing decision, we conclude the district court abused its 

discretion by imposing a mandatory minimum sentence of ten additional 

years of imprisonment based on the sentencing judge’s belief that there

“should be [a] minimum period of time [for imprisonment] for somebody 

that takes the life of another individual, whether that person is a juvenile 

or an adult.”

As we held in Roby, our abuse of discretion standard for sentences 

that are within the statutory limits “is not forgiving of a deficiency in the 

constitutional right to a reasoned sentencing decision based on a proper 

hearing.” 897 N.W.2d at 138. We have repeatedly stressed the 

constitutional mandate that juvenile offenders must receive an 

individualized hearing that takes into account the Lyle factors in a 

mitigating fashion. See, e.g., id. at 143–47. We have also maintained 

that “the presumption for any sentencing judge is that the judge should 

sentence juveniles to life in prison with the possibility of parole for 

murder unless the other factors require a different sentence.” Seats, 865 

N.W.2d at 555. After all, “most juvenile offenders should not be 

sentenced without parole eligibility. A sentence of incarceration without 

parole eligibility will be an uncommon result.” Roby, 897 N.W.2d at 147.
38

In this case, the district court deprived Zarate of his right to a truly 

individualized hearing that appropriately took into account the mitigating 

factors of his youth. We agree that the district court allowed the 

circumstances of Zarate’s offense to overwhelm its analysis. Rather than 

starting from the necessary presumption of life with the possibility of 

parole, the sentencing judge allowed the nature of Zarate’s offense to 

taint his analysis by imposing a mandatory minimum sentence of 

imprisonment due to his belief that there should be a minimum term of 

imprisonment for anyone who commits murder, regardless of their age at 

the time of the offense.

“[I]f a sentencing court fails to consider a relevant factor that 

should have received significant weight, gives significant weight to an 

improper or irrelevant factor, or considers only appropriate factors but 

nevertheless commits a clear error of judgment” a discretionary 

sentencing ruling may be an abuse of discretion. Id. at 138 (quoting 

People v. Hyatt, 891 N.W.2d 549, 578 (Mich. Ct. App. 2016)). Here, the 

sentencing judge had a predisposition to a mandatory minimum before 

parole eligibility for anyone who commits murder and inappropriately 

allowed this predisposition to accord improper weight to the nature of 

Zarate’s crime when considering the necessary sentencing factors.

Consequently, the sentencing judge failed to appropriately consider the 

relevant sentencing factors when he resentenced Zarate. As such, the 

sentencing judge did not provide Zarate with the constitutionally 

required individualized sentencing process that he is entitled to receive. 

Notably, since Zarate’s resentencing took place on December 28, 2015, 

the sentencing court did not have the benefit of our holdings in Sweet

and Roby to help guide its analysis. In light of these subsequent 

opinions, we must vacate Zarate’s sentence and remand for a 
39

resentencing that is consistent with our current juvenile sentencing 

jurisprudence and this opinion.

IV. Conclusion.

The only portion of Iowa Code section 902.1(2) that is 

unconstitutional under the Iowa Constitution is section 902.1(2)(a)(1), 

which gives the district court the sentencing option of life imprisonment 

without the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders convicted of firstdegree murder. The remainder of the sentencing options set forth in 

Iowa Code section 902.1(2)(a), and the sentencing factors listed in Iowa 

Code section 902.1(2)(b)(2)(a)–(v), are constitutional under the Iowa 

Constitution. However, for the aforementioned reasons, we vacate the 

sentence of the district court and remand for a resentencing that is 

consistent with our current juvenile sentencing jurisprudence and with 

this opinion.

DISTRICT COURT SENTENCE VACATED AND CASE 

REMANDED.

Cady, C.J. and Waterman and Mansfield, JJ. join this opinion. 

Hecht, J. files a concurring opinion in which Wiggins, J. joins. Appel, J. 

files a separate concurring opinion.
40

#15–2203, State v. Zarate

HECHT, Justice (concurring specially).

I agree with the majority’s determination that the sentence 

imposing a minimum term of incarceration must be vacated. Although I 

reach the same result as the majority, my rationale for doing so is 

different. For the reasons stated in my concurrence in State v. Roby, 897 

N.W.2d 127, 149 (Iowa 2017) (Hecht, J., concurring specially), I believe a 

mandatory minimum term of incarceration for a juvenile offender is 

categorically prohibited by article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution. 

Whether imposed by legislative mandate or by a sentencing court, the 

constitutional infirmity of mandatory minimum sentences for juvenile 

offenders is the same in my view. The timing of Rene Zarate’s parole, if 

any, from his life sentence should be left to the board of parole, the entity 

in the best position to discern whether he has shown maturation and 

rehabilitation.

Wiggins, J. joins this special concurrence.
41

#15–2203, State v. Zarate

APPEL, Justice (concurring specially).

I respectfully concur in the result only in this case.

First, I do not believe a judicially imposed twenty-five-year 

mandatory minimum sentence without possibility of parole for a juvenile 

offender passes constitutional muster. As will be pointed out below, 

such an approach is inconsistent with observations made in State v. 

Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378 (Iowa 2014). In Lyle, we declared “[a]fter the 

juvenile’s transient impetuosity ebbs and the juvenile matures and 

reforms, the incapacitation objective can no longer seriously be served” 

and the mandatory sentence becomes a “purposeless and needless 

imposition of pain and suffering.” Id. at 400 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 

433 U.S. 584, 592, 97 S. Ct. 2861, 2866 (1977) (second quote)). 

The mandatory sentence in the current case extends until the 

offender is forty-two years old, well beyond the time at which juvenile 

character is formed. It is inconsistent with the humane underpinnings of 

Graham v. Florida, where Justice Kennedy eloquently wrote about the 

role of hope for a meaningful life for a juvenile offender. 560 U.S. 48, 79, 

130 S. Ct. 2011, 2032 (2010) (“Life in prison without the possibility of 

parole gives no chance for fulfillment outside prison walls, no chance for 

reconciliation with society, no hope.”). And, under Lyle, a mandatory 

sentence significantly beyond the time of maturation for purposes of 

incapacity is “purposeless and needless.” 854 N.W.2d at 400 (quoting 

Coker, 433 U.S. at 592, 97 S. Ct. at 2866).

Second, I have come to the conclusion that predicting the future 

course of a juvenile offender, as psychiatrists have repeatedly warned us, 

is simply not possible with any degree of accuracy. See, e.g., Roper v. 

Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1197 (2005); Alex R. 
42

Piquero, Youth Matters: The Meaning of Miller for Theory, Research, and 

Policy Regarding Developmental/Life-Course Criminology, 39 New Eng. J. 

on Crim. & Civ. Confinement 347, 356–57 (2013); Laurence Steinberg & 

Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental 

Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 

Am. Psychologist 1009, 1014–16 (2003). Time and time again, 

professional organizations have repeatedly warned judges that prediction 

of the future course of an offender generally, and a youthful offender 

more particularly, is really impossible. See Elizabeth Cauffman et. al., 

Comparing the Stability of Psychopathy Scores in Adolescents Versus 

Adults: How Often Is “Fledgling Psychopathy” Misdiagnosed?, 22 Psychol. 

Pub. Pol’y & L. 77, 80, 88 (2016) (presenting American Psychological 

Association research showing that the majority of juveniles diagnosed 

with psychopathy are misdiagnosed, because psychopathic traits are 

most often transient). We should not expect judges to be any better at it 

than professionally trained psychiatrists. Indeed, I simply do not 

understand what equips judges to be better at making the prediction 

than experts. Instead of imposing mandatory minimums through an 

unreliable judicial guess, the constitutionally sound approach is to 

abolish mandatory minimum sentences on children and allow the parole 

board to make periodic judgments as to whether a child offender has 

demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation based on an observable track 

record.

I. Mandatory Minimum Incarceration to Age Forty-Two Is 

Contrary to Lyle Principles.

I do not believe a twenty-five-year mandatory minimum term, even 

if imposed by a judge, passes constitutional muster. A juvenile offender 

who is subject to a term of imprisonment is entitled to a meaningful 
43

opportunity to be heard to demonstrate maturity and rehabilitation. 

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012); 

Graham, 560 U.S. at 75, 130 S. Ct. at 2030; State v. Roby, 897 N.W.2d 

127, 140 (Iowa 2017); State v. Louisell, 865 N.W.2d 590, 602 (Iowa 2015); 

Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 381; State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 75 (Iowa 2013). 

The majority does not question this general principle. The question, 

then, is how to apply that principle in this case and in other cases 

involving juvenile offenders.

Neuroscience has established that the character of a juvenile 

offender is still being formed until the offender ages into the midtwenties. State v. Sweet, 879 N.W.2d 811, 837 (Iowa 2016); State v. 

Seats, 865 N.W.2d 545, 557 (Iowa 2015); Null, 836 N.W.2d at 55; see 

also Beth A. Colgan, Constitutional Line Drawing at the Intersection of 

Childhood and Crime, 9 Stan. J. C.R. & C.L. 79, 85 & n.26 (2013). At 

that point, character formation has generally been completed.

What do we do with respect to a juvenile offender who has been 

incarcerated but has reached the point at which character formation has 

been completed? We answered that question in Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378. 

There we declared, “After the juvenile’s transient impetuosity ebbs and 

the juvenile matures and reforms, the incapacitation objective can no 

longer seriously be served” and the mandatory sentence becomes a 

“purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering.” Id. at 400 

(quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 592, 97 S. Ct. at 2866 (second quote)).

As implied in Lyle, the timing of the meaningful opportunity to 

show maturity and rehabilitation is a critical element. See id. This is not 

a new concept. As noted by one observer, the United States Supreme 

Court in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 280, 100 S. Ct. 1133, 1142 

(1980), cited the prisoner’s eligibility for parole after twelve years as a 
44

factor in upholding a sentence from Eighth Amendment challenge. See

Sarah French Russell, Review for Release: Juvenile Offenders, State 

Parole Practices, and the Eighth Amendment, 89 Ind. L.J. 373, 381 (2014) 

[hereinafter Russell].

The American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code: Sentencing 

addresses the question of juvenile sentence length. Model Penal Code: 

Sentencing § 6.11A (Am. Law. Inst., Proposed Final Draft 2017). Under 

section 6.11A(g), the Model Penal Code provides that “[n]o sentence of 

imprisonment longer than [25] years may be imposed for any offense or 

combination of offenses.” Id. § 6.11A(g). Further, the Model Penal Code 

recommends a “second look” at juvenile sentences in all cases after ten 

years, with earlier consideration if warranted by the facts and 

circumstances. Id. § 6.11A(h). The commentary to the Model Penal Code 

emphasizes that juvenile eligibility for parole should be considered earlier 

than for adult offenders generally. Id. § 6.11A cmt. h. The Model Penal 

Code recognizes that “adolescents can generally be expected to change 

more rapidly in the immediate post-offense years, and to a greater 

absolute degree, than older offenders.” Id.

At the very most, the state may, perhaps, in appropriate 

circumstances constitutionally impose a mandatory term of 

imprisonment without possibility of parole on a juvenile offender who 

commits first-degree murder until the period of character formation is 

completed, or approximately until the offender’s age reaches the midtwenties. See Russell, 89 Ind. L.J. at 409 (urging parole eligibility after 

ten years of incarceration because “it would be logical to tie the timing of 

an initial review to when one can expect an individual to have obtained a 

fully mature brain and a more stable character”). After that point, the 

state must provide the offender with a meaningful opportunity to show 
45

maturity and rehabilitation. If such a showing can be made, holding an 

offender for purposes of incapacitation beyond that period is a 

“purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering.” Lyle, 854 

N.W.2d at 400 (quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 592, 97 S. Ct. at 2866).

Thus, under Lyle principles, there is no doubt that a twenty-fiveyear mandatory minimum sentence of a juvenile offender without the 

possibility of parole is constitutionally excessive under article I, section 

17 of the Iowa Constitution. Under this scheme, for instance, a 

seventeen-year-old offender would not be eligible for parole until age 

forty-two. Such a lengthy prison term without the possibility of parole 

does not provide the meaningful opportunity to be heard on the question 

of maturity and rehabilitation at the right time. A juvenile offender 

should be eligible for parole consideration after the period of character 

formation and time for meaningful observation, even for serious crimes. 

To the extent a mandatory minimum sentence may be imposed by the 

court, it may constitutionally extend only as necessary to ensure 

complete character formation and provide the state with a substantial 

opportunity to observe the development of the offender. I would thus 

vacate the sentence in this case and remand it for resentencing 

consistent with these principles. 

I do not think the constitutionally deficiency is cured by the fact 

that a judge is dragooned into the decision-making process. Our state 

trial court judges have many sterling qualities. They consistently strive 

to be patient, fair-minded, and impartial. They strive to exercise 

discretionary authority in a thoughtful way, each and every time. But if 

psychiatrists have declared to the world from the mountain tops that 

they are ill-equipped to make determinations regarding the prognosis of 

children who offend, why do we think judges will do a better job? We 
46

should not have the hubris to think judges can, in fact, do a good job 

with this impossible task, and we should not be so cynical as to 

knowingly assign an impossible job to them.

Of course, I do not suggest that all juvenile offenders are entitled to 

release once they are eligible for parole. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 75, 

130 S. Ct. at 2030; Sweet, 879 N.W.2d at 832. In any parole evaluation 

of a juvenile after a period of imprisonment, the evidence may be 

ambiguous or may even affirmatively show that the juvenile offender has 

not demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation. The operating principle, 

however, is that the juvenile offender must be provided a meaningful 

opportunity to demonstrate the maturity and rehabilitation necessary to 

support parole at the time that character formation has been completed. 

II. The Time Has Come for Categorical Rejection of Mandatory 

Minimums for Juveniles.

The second aspect of this case that is troubling is the development 

of a laundry list of factors to be considered by the district court in 

sentencing juvenile offenders. Our caselaw makes it clear that the 

vagaries of youth—the immaturity, the failure to appreciate risk, the peer 

pressure, and the lack of appreciation of consequences of actions—are all 

mitigating factors. Roby, 897 N.W.2d at 145; Sweet, 879 N.W.2d at 832–

33; State v. Pearson, 836 N.W.2d 88, 95 (Iowa 2013); Null, 836 N.W.2d at 

75. We have further emphasized that the nature of the underlying crime 

is not to overwhelm the analysis in juvenile sentencing. Seats, 865 

N.W.2d at 557; Null, 836 N.W.2d at 74–75. The legislative laundry list 

appears to be an effort to legislatively override the approach of these 

cases.

One approach, of course, is to simply declare that the legislative 

action of adding factors does not alter the approach in Seats, 865 N.W.2d 
47

at 557, Roby, 854 N.W.2d at 145, and our other juvenile cases. See, e.g.,

Sweet, 879 N.W.2d at 832–33; Louisell, 865 N.W.2d at 602; Pearson, 836 

N.W.2d at 95; Null, 836 N.W.2d at 75. Whether the legislature packages 

considerations as five factors or fifty factors is of no moment for the 

purposes of constitutional analysis. Indeed, many of the newly listed 

factors are redundant and overlapping, and in any case, the number of 

listed factors does not reflect arithmetically increasing constitutional 

importance.

Notwithstanding the slicing and dicing of additional factors that 

are now scattered in the statute, the more verbose legislative formulation 

has no impact on the constitutionally required approach established in 

Seats, Lyle, and Roby. That approach emphasizes that youth is a 

mitigating and not an aggravating factor, cautions sentencing courts not 

to give undue emphasis on the nature of the crime, and establishes that 

mandatory minimums should be the exception and not the rule in cases 

involving juvenile offenders.

But, as I noted in my special concurrence in Roby, 897 N.W.2d at 

150 (Appel, J., concurring specially), if implementation of the principles 

of State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107 (Iowa 2013), Lyle, Null, and Roby

prove inconsistent, confusing, difficult, or unworkable, it may be 

necessary to move to a more categorical approach utilized in Sweet, 879 

N.W.2d at 839. I believe the time has come to extend the categorical 

approach in Sweet to all statutory minimum sentences imposed by 

judges on juvenile offenders. Instead, with respect to juvenile offenders, 

consideration of whether the offender demonstrates maturation and 

rehabilitation should be left to the parole board.

What would the process look like if we applied Sweet to 

categorically ban minimum sentences for juvenile offenders? A 
48

meaningful opportunity to demonstrate maturation and rehabilitation 

implies at least two requirements.6 First, a meaningful opportunity to 

demonstrate maturation and release must occur no later than after the 

completion of character formation. Consideration for parole only when 

the juvenile offender reaches forty or fifty years of age is not timely.

In addition, the offender must have a meaningful opportunity to 

demonstrate rehabilitation and maturation. The focus of any meaningful 

opportunity must be rehabilitation and maturation of the offender. 

Further, the offender must have an opportunity to present substantive 

evidence to the parole board on rehabilitation and maturation. It would 

be premature at this time, however, to outline in detail precisely what a 

meaningful opportunity to be heard on the issue would look like, but it 

must be a broad enough channel to allow the offender a fair opportunity 

to make a case.7 Of course, the parole board would be under no 

obligation to release offenders when the offender has failed to make the 

case for rehabilitation and maturation.

III. Conclusion.

For the above reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the district 

court and remand for a vacation of the mandatory minimum sentence in 

this case.

 6I note that some authorities suggest that if the state is to provide juvenile 

offenders with a meaningful opportunity for reform, the offender must be incarcerated 

in “a correctional setting that promotes healthy psychological development.” Elizabeth 

Scott et al., Juvenile Sentencing Reform in a Constitutional Framework, 88 Temp. L. Rev. 

675, 712 (2016).

7There is a growing body of legal literature addressing the question. See 

generally Megan Annitto, Graham’s Gatekeeping and Beyond: Juvenile Sentencing 

Reform in the Wake of Graham and Miller, 80 Brook. L. Rev. 119, 134 (2014); Beth 

Caldwell, Creating Meaningful Opportunities for Release: Graham, Miller and California’s 

Youth Offender Parole Hearings, 40 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 245, 257 (2016).