Report to Congressional Requesters

United States General Accounting Office 

GAO 

November 2003 AVIATION SECURITY 

Federal Air Marshal 

Service Is Addressing 

Challenges of Its 

Expanded Mission and 

Workforce, but 

Additional Actions 

Needed 

GAO-04-242 
To deploy its expanded workforce by July 1, 2002, a deadline set by the 

Deputy Secretary of Transportation, the Service used expedited procedures 

to obtain interim secret security clearances for air marshal candidates and 

provided abbreviated training for them. These procedures allowed 

candidates with interim clearances to work until they received their final 

top-secret clearances. Because of a governmentwide demand for clearances,

nearly a quarter of the active air marshals had not received their top-secret 

clearances as of July 2003; but by October 2003, only about 3 percent were 

awaiting their top-secret clearances. To train its expanded workforce before 

the Deputy Secretary’s deployment deadline, the Service incrementally 

revised and abbreviated its curriculum. 

The Service has begun to develop management information, policies, and 

procedures to support its expanded workforce and mission, but it has not 

yet completed this major effort. For example, it replaced a manual system 

for scheduling flight duty with an automated system, but it has not yet 

developed an automated means to monitor the effectiveness of its 

scheduling controls designed to prevent air marshals’ fatigue. In addition, it 

has gathered and used information on potential security incidents and on air 

marshals’ reasons for separation from the Service to improve its operations 

and workforce management. However, some of this information is not clear 

or detailed enough to facilitate follow-up. Finally, the Service has 

implemented policies needed to support its expansion. 

The Service is likely to face challenges in implementing changes resulting 

from its mergers into DHS and ICE, including changes to its roles, 

responsibilities, and training and to its procedures for coordinating with 

TSA’s security organizations, as well as administrative changes. GAO’s 

recent work on mergers and organizational transformations proposes 

several key practices—set implementation goals, establish a communication 

strategy, and involve employees to obtain their ideas—and associated 

implementation steps that could help the Service implement such changes. 

Training Air Marshal Candidates to Shoot from a Seated Position 

To help strengthen aviation 

security after the September 11, 

2001, terrorist attacks, the 

Congress expanded the size and 

mission of the Federal Air Marshal 

Service (the Service) and located 

the Service within the newly 

created Transportation Security 

Administration (TSA). Between 

November 2001 and July 1, 2002, 

the Service grew from fewer than 

50 air marshals to thousands, and 

its mission expanded to include the 

protection of domestic as well as 

international flights. In March 

2003, the Service, with TSA, 

merged into the new Department of

Homeland Security (DHS); and in 

November 2003, it was transferred 

from TSA and merged into DHS’s 

Bureau of Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement (ICE). GAO 

looked at operational and 

management control issues that 

emerged during the rapid 

expansion of the Service, 

specifically addressing its (1) 

background check procedures and 

training; (2) management 

information, policies, and 

procedures; and (3) challenges 

likely to result from its mergers 

into DHS and ICE. 

GAO is making recommendations 

designed to improve the Service’s 

data on flight duty and information 

on separations. DHS agreed with 

GAO’s recommendations and 

expressed a commitment to 

continuous improvement as the 

Service moves forward. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-242.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Gerald L. 

Dillingham at (202) 512-2834 or 

dillinghamg@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-04-242, a report to 

congressional requesters 

November 2003 

AVIATION SECURITY 

Federal Air Marshal Service Is 

Addressing Challenges of Its Expanded 

Mission and Workforce, but Additional 

Actions Needed 
Page i GAO-04-242 Federal Air Marshal Service 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 5

Expediting Background Checks and Training Enabled the Service 

to Meet the Deputy Secretary’s Deployment Deadline 7

Management Information, Policies, and Procedures Have Not Kept 

Pace with Expanded Operations 13

Key Practices and Implementation Steps Can Help Address Merger 

Implementation Challenges 24

Conclusions 28

Recommendations for Executive Action 28

Agency Comments 29

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 31 

Appendix II Demographic Profile of the Federal Air Marshal 

Service 35 

Appendix III Locations of the Federal Air Marshal Service’s 

21 Field Offices and Training Facility 37 

Appendix IV Events Affecting the Federal Air Marshal Service, 

September 2001 through October 2002 38 

Appendix V Mission-Related Incidents Reported by Federal Air 

Marshals, by Broad Categories, September 15, 2001 —

September 16, 2003 39 

Appendix VI Key Practices and Implementation Steps for 

Mergers and Organizational Transformations 40 

Contents 
Page ii GAO-04-242 Federal Air Marshal Service 

Appendix VII Contacts and Acknowledgments 41 

GAO Contacts 41

Acknowledgments 41

Figures 

Figure 1: Federal Air Marshal Service Workforce by Gender, by 

Percentage, as of August 2003. 35

Figure 2: Federal Air Marshal Service Workforce by Age, by 

Percentage, as of August 2003. 35

Figure 3: Federal Air Marshal Service Workforce by Race, by 

Percentage, as of August 2003. 36

Abbreviations 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DOT Department of Transportation 

FAA Federal Aviation Administration 

IG Inspector General 

ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

LEAP law enforcement availability pay 

OPM Office of Personnel Management 

PDA personal digital assistants 

TSA Transportation Security Administration 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately. 
Page 1 GAO-04-242 Federal Air Marshal Service 

November 19, 2003 

The Honorable Christopher Shays 

Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, 

 Emerging Threats and International Relations 

Committee on Government Reform 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Diane E. Watson 

House of Representatives 

Within 10 months of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the 

United States, the number of federal air marshals grew from fewer than 50 

to thousands;1

 and within 2 years, the Federal Air Marshal Service (the 

Service) underwent three organizational transfers. More specifically, the 

Congress, through a provision of the Aviation and Transportation Security 

Act, enacted on November 19, 2001,2

 authorized a dramatic expansion of 

the Service’s mission and workforce and transferred authority over the 

Service from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to the 

Transportation Security Administration (TSA). Under this legislation, the 

Service’s mission grew from preventing hijackings on international flights 

to protecting passengers, crews, and aircraft from terrorist activities on 

both domestic and international flights. Additionally, the Deputy Secretary 

of Transportation set a goal of hiring, training, and deploying thousands of 

new air marshals by July 1, 2002. After the passage of the Homeland 

Security Act, the Service moved with TSA from the Department of 

Transportation (DOT) to the newly created Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) on March 1, 2003. Finally, in September 2003, the Secretary 

of Homeland Security announced that the Service would be transferred 

from TSA to the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), 

another law enforcement agency within the new department. Following 

this transfer, which was supposed to take place on November 2, 2003, the 

Secretary said that the Bureau’s three law enforcement workforces—air 

marshals, immigration agents, and customs agents—would be crosstrained to create a “surge capacity” for responding to security threats. 

 1

The exact number of federal air marshals is classified. 

2

Public Law 107-71, November 19, 2001. 

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, DC 20548 
Page 2 GAO-04-242 Federal Air Marshal Service 

The rapid expansion of the Service led to a number of operational and 

management control issues, which surfaced in national media reports of 

allegations that the Service conducted inadequate background checks on 

newly hired air marshals, slashed its training program to expedite the air 

marshals’ deployment, and failed to meet the needs of its air marshal 

workforce. For example, the Service allegedly over- or underscheduled air 

marshals for flight duty and reneged on promises of transfers to 

alternative locations, thereby creating dissatisfaction with the Service that, 

according to some reports, led to a flood of air marshal resignations. 

Within the context of these allegations, our objective was to look at 

operational and management control issues related to the Service’s 

expansion. We also considered implications of the Service’s organizational 

realignment. Specifically, as agreed with your offices, we addressed the 

following questions: 

• What procedures for obtaining background checks and providing training 

did the Service use to expedite the deployment of its expanded workforce 

to meet the Deputy Secretary’s July 2002 deadline? 

• To what extent has the Service developed management information and 

policies and procedures to support its expanded mission and workforce? 

• What challenges is the Service likely to face as a result of its recent 

mergers into DHS and ICE? 

To answer these questions, we analyzed program data; interviewed Service 

and TSA officials; and reviewed documentation from the Service and TSA 

on background checks and training; scheduling, mission incidents, 

employee misconduct, and separations; and reviewed several workforce 

policies and procedures. We also visited several facilities to look at the 

Service’s operational and management control practices and documents, 

including the Federal Air Marshal training facility and Human Resource 

Center in New Jersey, the Federal Air Marshal headquarters office in 

Virginia, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in New Mexico, 

and the Federal Air Marshal field office in Texas. To guide our assessment 

of the Service’s training, management information, and policies and 

procedures, we reviewed key GAO documents on internal controls and 

human capital management. These include our Standards for Internal 

Control in the Federal Government (GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1, November 

1999), Internal Control Management and Evaluation Tool (GAO-01-1008G, 

August 2001), Human Capital: A Guide for Assessing Strategic Training and 

Development Efforts in the Federal Government (GAO-03-893G, July 
Page 3 GAO-04-242 Federal Air Marshal Service 

2003), and Model of Strategic Human Capital Management (GAO-02-373SP, 

March 2002). In addition, we used our report, Results-Oriented Cultures: 

Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and Organizational 

Transformations (GAO-03-669, July 2003), to provide a framework for 

evaluating the Service’s challenges in merging into DHS. We also reviewed 

a March 2003 report by the DOT Inspector General (IG), which evaluated 

the Service’s selection and hiring process, training program, and 

scheduling process. Finally, we discussed the governmentwide 

background investigation process with the Office of Personnel 

Management (OPM). Our analysis of the operational and management 

control issues related to the Service’s expansion focuses primarily on the 

period from November 2001 through September 2003, when the Service 

was part of TSA; our assessment of the challenges related to the Service’s 

mergers is, in part, prospective. We conducted our review from September 

2002 through October 2003 in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. See appendix I for a more detailed 

discussion of our scope and methodology. 

The Service used expedited procedures for obtaining background checks 

and abbreviated the training for air marshals so that it could deploy its 

expanded workforce by the Deputy Secretary’s July 2002 deadline. Under 

the expedited background check procedures, which other federal agencies 

also often use, candidates who pass preliminary background checks are 

able, within about 24 hours, to obtain interim secret security clearances 

that allow them to work until their full background checks are completed. 

Thousands of candidates underwent preliminary background checks, and 

the majority of them obtained interim security clearances. Obtaining final 

top-secret clearances has taken longer—sometimes up to a year—and as 

of July 2003, nearly a quarter of the active air marshals were still operating 

under interim clearances. By October 2003, about 3 percent of active air 

marshals were still awaiting their top-secret clearances. OPM attributed 

the delays to the governmentwide demand for security clearances after 

September 11, 2001. To deploy the necessary number of air marshal 

candidates by the Deputy Secretary’s deadline, the Service identified the 

skills critical for initial deployment and incrementally revised and 

abbreviated its training curriculum between October 2001 and July 2002. 

Then, to ensure that all newly hired air marshals were provided with 

training in advanced skills, the Service established an additional 4-week 

course and required all candidates hired after October 2001 to complete 

the training by mid-2004. It is unclear how the Service’s transfer to the 

Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement will affect this 

requirement. 

Results in Brief 
Page 4 GAO-04-242 Federal Air Marshal Service 

The Service has begun to develop management information, policies, and 

procedures to support its expanded mission and workforce, but it has not 

yet completed this major effort. For example, it has replaced the manual 

system that it formerly used to schedule fewer than 50 air marshals for 

flight duty with an automated system that it can use to schedule thousands 

of air marshals on thousands of flights; however, it has not yet developed 

an automated means to monitor the effectiveness of controls designed to 

prevent overscheduling so that air marshals do not become fatigued. 

Preventing fatigue is important because, if air marshals are not alert, their 

ability to carry out their mission may be diminished. The Service has made 

effective use of some management information—by, for example, 

establishing a liaison with the airlines after air marshals’ mission reports 

indicated problems with coordination and communication. However, 

supervisors’ summaries of air marshals’ reasons for separating—as of July 

2003, about 10 percent of newly hired marshals had separated—are not 

detailed enough for management to identify and respond to specific 

problems, such as dissatisfaction with the Service’s transfer policy. The 

Service initially lacked a means of obtaining input from its employees for 

use in improving its operations and management, but it has started to 

implement such processes. Finally, the Service has implemented policies 

and procedures needed to support its expansion from a single office with a 

budget of about $4.4 million in fiscal year 2001 to an organization with 21 

field offices and a budget of $545 million in fiscal year 2003. For example, 

it implemented a policy on transfers between field offices and issued a 

written dress code policy. We are recommending that the Service 

automate the comparison of actual hours worked with scheduled hours to 

monitor the effectiveness of its scheduling controls and develop improved 

information on air marshals’ reasons for separation. The Department of 

Homeland Security agreed that information on actual hours worked 

should be automated and acknowledged a need to improve the quality of 

the information the Service collects from departing air marshals. 

The Service is likely to face challenges in implementing changes resulting 

from its mergers into the new Department of Homeland Security in March 

2003 and into the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement in 

November 2003. While the new department, within the context of guidance 

from the Congress and the administration, is primarily responsible for 

determining what changes will occur, the Service is responsible for 

implementing them. At this time, changes are likely in the roles, 

responsibilities, and training of air marshals, assuming that the Secretary 

of Homeland Security’s plan to cross-train the Bureau’s three law 

enforcement workforces is implemented so that each group can perform 

the others’ responsibilities. Developing procedures for coordinating with 
Page 5 GAO-04-242 Federal Air Marshal Service 

TSA will also be important to help ensure a comprehensive, unified 

approach to aviation security, now that the Service is separated 

organizationally from the other groups with aviation security functions in 

TSA. Finally, changes will be needed to resolve differences in the pay 

systems and compensation of air marshals, immigration agents, and 

customs agents. Our recent work on mergers and organizational 

transformations proposes several key practices—setting implementation 

goals and a time line to build momentum and show progress from day one, 

establishing a communication strategy to create shared expectations and 

report related progress, and involving employees to obtain their ideas and 

gain their ownership for the transformation—and associated 

implementation steps that can assist the Service as it addresses the 

challenges in merging into the department and the Bureau. In an earlier 

report, we recommended these and other key practices to the department.3

FAA’s Federal Air Marshal program expanded the Sky Marshal program, 

which was established as part of the Customs Service in the 1970s to deter 

hijackings to and from Cuba. Shortly after TWA Flight 847 was hijacked in 

Athens, Greece, in June 1985, then President Ronald Reagan called for an 

expansion of the Sky Marshal program. On August 8, 1985, the Congress 

enacted the International Security and Development Cooperation Act,4

which established the statutory basis for the program within DOT, which 

further delegated the responsibility to FAA.5

 Since then, the Federal Air 

Marshal program has provided specially trained, armed teams of civil 

aviation security specialists for deployment worldwide on antihijacking 

missions. 

As a result of the events of September 11, 2001, the President and the 

Congress decided to rapidly expand the Service. On September 17, 2001, 

FAA began to develop a plan to recruit federal air marshals in 

unprecedented numbers. Accordingly, FAA designed a process and put 

together a team of specialists, incorporating resources from its Human 

Resource Management, Aviation Medical, Civil Aviation Security, and 

Federal Air Marshal Training organizations to implement the recruitment 

 3

U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: Management Challenges Facing 

Federal Leadership, GAO-03-260 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 20, 2002). 

4

Public Law 99-83, August 8, 1985. 

5

49 C.F.R. Sec. 1.47(p)(1). 

Background 
Page 6 GAO-04-242 Federal Air Marshal Service 

process. The process was designed to ensure that each air marshal 

candidate met the medical entry standards, passed DOT’s drug-testing 

program, and was preliminarily judged suitable to obtain a top-secret 

clearance, which is required for permanent employment with the Service. 

As part of the assessment, each candidate was required to participate in a 

security interview with an investigator from FAA, OPM, or the U.S. 

Investigative Services (an OPM contractor6

), as well as interviews with 

representatives of FAA’s Office of Human Resource Management and the 

Service. In October 2001, FAA implemented this recruitment process, and 

the Deputy Secretary of Transportation also set July 1, 2002, as the 

deadline for recruiting, hiring, and training enough federal air marshals to 

provide coverage on flights that posed high security risks. In November 

2001, after the Aviation and Transportation Security Act was passed, TSA 

assumed FAA’s responsibilities for aviation security and supported FAA’s 

recruitment effort through July 2002. 

Between October 2001 and July 2002, TSA received nearly 200,000 

applications for federal air marshal positions. Thousands of applicants 

were assessed for employment, and TSA, through OPM, initiated full 

background investigations for top-secret clearances. Other federal 

agencies also made law enforcement officers available to augment the 

Service until TSA could hire, train, and deploy the first few classes of new 

air marshals. See appendix II for a demographic profile of the Service’s 

expanded workforce. 

With expansion, the Service’s annual budget grew from $4.4 million for 

fiscal year 2001 to $545 million for fiscal year 2003. Currently, the Service 

operates a headquarters office in Virginia, 21 field offices, and a 

specialized air marshal training and human resource facility in Atlantic 

City, New Jersey. Basic law enforcement training takes place at the 

Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Artesia, New Mexico. See 

appendix III for a map of these facilities and appendix IV for a time line of 

the major organizational events affecting the Service since September 11, 

2001. 

DHS brings together some 23 federal agencies comprising over 100 

organizations, including the Federal Air Marshal Service, in what the 

department describes as the most significant transformation of the U.S. 

 6

OPM contracts primarily with U.S. Investigative Services to check the applicants’ personal 

records and often to conduct face-to-face interview with friends, colleagues, and family. 
Page 7 GAO-04-242 Federal Air Marshal Service 

government since the merger in 1947 of the various branches of the armed 

forces into the Department of Defense. DHS is divided into five 

directorates, one of which, Border and Transportation Security, includes 

both TSA and ICE. Among other organizations, ICE includes a portion of 

the former Immigration and Naturalization Service, now called the Bureau 

of Citizenship and Immigration Services; the U.S. Customs Service now 

called Customs and Border Protection; and, as of November 2, 2003, the 

Federal Air Marshal Service. 

To expedite the deployment of thousands of air marshals, the Service 

obtained preliminary background checks and provided abbreviated 

training before deploying air marshal candidates on flights. As a result, the 

Service was able to meet the Deputy Secretary’s deployment deadline and 

carry out its mission. 

To deploy its expanded workforce as quickly as possible between October 

2001 and June 2002, the Service followed the same expedited background 

check procedures that federal agencies have used since 1995, when 

Executive Order 12968 authorized the temporary use of interim security 

clearances.7

 Under these procedures, candidates who require security 

clearances and pass preliminary background checks may, within about 24 

hours, obtain interim security clearances that allow them to work until 

their full background checks have been completed and they obtain their 

final clearances. A preliminary background check consists of an interview 

with a security specialist; a review of an applicant’s responses to a 

standard questionnaire for national security positions; a criminal history 

check, based on fingerprints and a review of biographical data from 

 7

Executive Order 12968, dated August 2, 1995, authorizes agencies to grant employees 

temporary eligibility for access to classified information while the initial investigation is 

under way. When such eligibility is granted, the initial investigation shall be expedited. 

Expediting 

Background Checks 

and Training Enabled 

the Service to Meet 

the Deputy 

Secretary’s 

Deployment Deadline 

Initial Deployment Was 

Swift, but Completion of 

Final Background 

Investigations Has Been 

Slow 
Page 8 GAO-04-242 Federal Air Marshal Service 

National Crime Information Center files;8 and credit reports. An interim 

security clearance may be revoked at any time if unfavorable information 

is identified during an investigation. 

Between October 2001 and July 2002, thousands of candidates were 

assessed for employment, and TSA, through OPM, initiated full 

background investigations for top-secret clearances. According to TSA 

management, the majority of the candidates passed the preliminary 

background checks and obtained interim security clearances that allowed 

them to work while their full background checks were being completed. 

Less than a quarter of the candidates did not pass the preliminary checks 

because of bankruptcy, bad credit, or other problems. TSA placed these 

candidates on a “pending/ready” list and did not allow them to work as air 

marshals, but it pursued full background investigations for them because 

many of the issues identified during preliminary background checks are 

minor and are favorably resolved during full background investigations. 

Full background checks for thousands of candidates identified a small 

number as unsuitable. In June 2003, the Service placed 80 air marshal 

candidates on administrative leave while TSA resolved issues that 

surfaced during full background investigations. By August 2003, 47 of 

these candidates had received their top-secret clearances and have since 

been returned to flight status. Of the 33 remaining candidates, 19 have 

been denied clearances, and the Service is taking steps to terminate their 

employment; 4 have been approved for, but have not yet received, topsecret clearances; 7 have resigned; and the remaining 3 are awaiting TSA’s 

approval of their top-secret clearances. The Service said it has continued 

to identify some candidates as unsuitable, and as of October 2003, 14 air 

marshals were on administrative leave because of issues that surfaced 

during full background checks. When definitive information for each of 

these cases is obtained, the Service said, the air marshal would be 

returned to flight status or steps would be taken to terminate the air 

marshal’s employment. 

During our review, we found that the background investigations used to 

grant top-secret clearances for air marshals were not being expedited as 

 8

The National Crime Information Center is a computerized index of criminal justice 

information (i.e., information on criminal record histories, fugitives, stolen properties, 

missing persons) located at Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Criminal Justice 

Information Services Division in Clarksburg, West Virginia. It is available to federal, state, 

and local law enforcement and other criminal justice agencies 24 hours a day, 365 days a 

year. 
Page 9 GAO-04-242 Federal Air Marshal Service 

requested. According to TSA, an expedited background investigation costs 

$3,195 and should be completed within 75 days, whereas a regular 

background check costs $2,700 and should be completed within 120 days. 

Consequently, for every 1,000 background investigations, the Service paid 

a premium of about $495,000. TSA paid the expedited fees to OPM up 

front, as required,9

 but as of July 2003, about 23 percent of the air marshals 

were still operating under interim security clearances.10 Some candidates 

had been awaiting final clearances for up to a year. The Service told us in 

April 2003 that it had, on numerous occasions, raised concerns about the 

delays in processing final security clearances but had met with little 

success. Additionally, the Service said that its efforts to reclaim the 

difference in cost were unsuccessful. DHS said that TSA’s Credentialing 

Office had taken steps since June 2003 to ensure that every active air 

marshal was operating under a top-secret clearance; and as of October 

2003, about 3 percent of the active air marshals were operating under 

interim security clearances. 

According to OPM, the primary reason for these clearance-processing 

delays is that the agency has received an unprecedented number of 

requests for background investigations governmentwide since September 

2001.11 For fiscal year 2002, OPM’s data indicated that the average 

processing time for 75-day expedited background checks was 96 days. 

OPM said that the expedited requests received higher-priority processing 

than the regular (120-day) background checks, resulting in faster 

turnaround for services related to the expedited requests. OPM added that 

its contractor charges premiums for expedited requests because the costs 

for these requests are higher. Consequently, according to OPM, no price 

adjustments are made when overall deadlines are missed. 

While the Service is not responsible for the delays in completing air 

marshals’ full background investigations, we found that it could have 

 9

OPM bills an agency for the full amount of an investigation at the time the investigation is 

scheduled. 

10TSA’s Credentialing Program Office is responsible for adjudicating the results of air 

marshals’ background investigations. This function was formerly under TSA’s Office of 

Security. 

11In his statement on June 3, 2003, before the Subcommittee on Homeland Security, House 

Committee on Appropriations, the Associate Director for Human Resources Products and 

Services, said that OPM was working to increase its capacity to provide background 

investigations for all federal customers and had streamlined its internal processes to make 

as much use as possible of automated systems. 
Page 10 GAO-04-242 Federal Air Marshal Service 

provided OPM with information for scheduling the investigations more 

efficiently. As candidates applied for positions between October 2001 and 

June 2002 and their preliminary background checks were completed, the 

Service offered conditional employment to some of the candidates and, as 

discussed, placed others on a “pending/ready” list. However, the Service 

did not make this information available to OPM. As a result, some 

potential employees received their top-secret clearances ahead of other 

candidates who were being trained or deployed on flights.12 We brought 

this issue to the attention of the Service in March 2003; and in May, the 

Service sent OPM a list of candidates and asked OPM to give highest 

priority to investigations of those who were already deployed on flights. In 

addition, the Service has asked OPM to schedule the investigations for 

senior managers first and then to schedule investigations for other 

applicants on a first-in, first-out basis. On May 28, 2003, the Service also 

detailed a liaison from its Office of Field Operations to assist TSA’s Office 

of Security in setting priorities for reviewing and adjudicating the backlog 

of background investigations. 

To deploy the requisite number of air marshals by the Deputy Secretary’s 

July 2002 deadline, the Service revised and abbreviated its training 

program. From October 2001 through July 2002, it modified the air marshal 

curriculum incrementally, eventually reducing the original 14-week 

program to about 5 weeks for candidates without prior law enforcement 

experience and about 1 week for candidates with such experience. The 

revised curriculum was designed to provide candidates with the basic law 

enforcement knowledge, skills, and abilities needed to perform their 

duties as air marshals, including knowledge of the Service’s rules and 

regulations, physical skills, and basic and advanced marksmanship. The 

curriculum no longer included certain elements of the original training 

program, such as driving skills and cockpit familiarization, because these 

were not deemed critical for air marshals to perform their duties. The 

curriculum also eliminated a 1-week’s visit to an airline and some 

instruction in the Service’s policies and procedures, which was to be 

provided on the job. Moreover, although the curriculum retained 

instruction in both basic and advanced marksmanship, air marshal 

candidates no longer had to pass an advanced marksmanship test to 

 12OPM told us in March that it had not received a prioritized list of clearances from the 

Service, but noted that it had occasionally received requests to expedite or check the status 

of particular investigations or to discontinue investigations that were no longer needed. 

Changes to the Training 

Curriculum Helped 

Expedite Deployment 
Page 11 GAO-04-242 Federal Air Marshal Service 

qualify for employment. Candidates were still required to pass a basic test13

with a minimum score of 255 out of a possible 300—the highest 

qualification standard for any federal law enforcement agency, according 

to the Service. 

To provide all the newly hired air marshals with needed skills, beyond the 

basic abilities the Service determined were critical for immediate 

deployment, the Service instituted a new 4-week advanced training course 

in October 2002. All air marshals hired from October 2001 through July 

2002, regardless of their previous law enforcement experience, were 

required to complete the course by January 2004. This course includes 

some elements, such as emergency evacuation and flight simulator 

training, that the Service did not include in the 5-week course because, 

although it considered the elements important for air marshals to carry out 

their mission, it did not consider them critical for immediate deployment. 

In addition, the course provides further training in advanced 

marksmanship skills. Air marshals hired after August 2002 attend this 

advanced training course after completing their basic training. The Service 

has developed a centralized tracking system to ensure that all air marshals 

take this course. 

Although the Service is now providing additional marksmanship training, 

its decision not to restore the advanced marksmanship test14 as a 

qualification standard for employment has proved controversial. Passing 

this test would require candidates to demonstrate their speed and 

accuracy in a confined environment similar to the environment on board 

an aircraft. The DOT IG’s report suggested that the Service needed to 

adopt a firearms qualification standard that was more stringent and 

comprehensive than the basic firearms qualifying test. The Service 

disagreed, emphasizing that its minimum score is the most stringent in 

federal law enforcement and adding that its 4-week course provides 

further training in advanced firearms skills. Our review of the Service’s 

documentation confirmed that instruction in advanced marksmanship is a 

critical part of this training, even though passing this element is no longer 

a condition of employment. 

In August 2003, the Service reported that proposed cutbacks in its training 

funds would require it to extend the date for all air marshals hired from 

 13The federal law enforcement Practical Pistol Course (PPC). 

14The Aircraft Tactical Pistol Course (ATPC). 
Page 12 GAO-04-242 Federal Air Marshal Service 

October 2001 through July 2002 to complete the 4-week advanced course 

from January 2004 to mid-2004. According to DHS, the Service’s transfer to 

ICE will not adversely affect either the funding for air marshals’ training or 

the schedule for newly hired air marshals to complete the 4-week training 

course, since a total of $626.4 million is being transferred from TSA to ICE. 

While this funding exceeds the $545 million that the Service received for 

fiscal year 2003, it is not clear how much of the funding will be allocated 

for training. Given the importance of training to ensure that air marshals 

are prepared to carry out their mission, we believe that maintaining 

adequate funding for training should remain a priority. Additionally, 

should reductions in the funding for training be required, our recent work 

on strategic training and development efforts provides alternatives that an 

agency can consider to across-the-board cuts—such as evaluating training 

needs, setting training priorities, developing alternative training 

requirement scenarios, and determining how much funding each of these 

scenarios would require.15 Our work further suggests that it is important 

for agencies to ensure that their training and development efforts are cost 

effective, given the anticipated benefits and to incorporate measures that 

can be used to demonstrate contributions that training and development 

programs make to improve results. These principles are applicable at all 

times, but especially when funds are limited. Determining whether air 

marshals with prior law enforcement experience have the same training 

needs as those without such experience could help set cost-effective 

training priorities. 

We found that a cornerstone of human capital management is the ability to 

successfully acquire, develop, and retain talent. Investing in and enhancing 

the value of employees through training and development is a crucial part 

of addressing this challenge. This investment can include not only formal 

and on-the-job-training but also other opportunities, such as rotational 

assignments. Our work further specifies that agencies should link their 

training curriculum to the competencies needed for them to accomplish 

their mission. The Service has begun developing a formal training 

curriculum beyond the basic and advanced training courses described 

above. This curriculum requires air marshals to participate in 5 days of 

recurrent training each quarter that, in addition to the quarterly weapons 

qualification, includes training in advanced firearms, operational tactics, 

 15U.S. General Accounting Office, Human Capital: A Guide for Assessing Strategic 

Training and Development Efforts in the Federal Government, GAO-03-893G

(Washington, D.C.: July 2003). 
Page 13 GAO-04-242 Federal Air Marshal Service 

defensive tactics, surveillance detection, emergency medicine, physical 

fitness, and legal and administrative elements. Additionally, the Service is 

developing rotational assignments for air marshals that allow them to 

participate in law enforcement task forces, as well as fill a variety of 

operational and training positions in headquarters and the field. The 

Service recognizes that such opportunities can not only enhance 

professional development but also help to prevent problems such as 

boredom and burnout. According to the Secretary of Homeland Security, 

one of the advantages of the Service’s transfer to ICE is that it will 

enhance air marshals’ professional development opportunities. 

As the Service grew from a small, centralized organization to an 

organization with 21 field offices and thousands of employees, its need for 

information, policies, and procedures to manage its expanded workforce 

and operations also grew. The Service collects several types of 

information that it can use to continually improve its operations and 

oversight and, in some instances, it has used the information to do so. In 

other instances, however, the Service lacks sufficiently detailed 

information for effective monitoring and oversight. The new, decentralized 

organization has also required new or written policies and procedures to 

cover new situations and ensure that the same guidance is available to air 

marshals in all locations. According to DHS, it recognized that the Service 

would need to revise its existing policies16 or draft new ones, and it has 

been working to do so since March 2002. Nonetheless, its policydevelopment efforts sometimes responded to problems, rather than 

anticipating and preventing them. DHS told us that it is committed to 

proactively addressing policy issues and developing procedures. 

The Service collects information on air marshals’ work schedules and 

other issues, including potential security incidents documented in reports 

filed by air marshals after completing their missions, allegations of 

misconduct by air marshals, and reasons provided by air marshals for 

leaving the Service. Such information can be useful to managers in 

monitoring mission operations and retention. According to our Standards

for Internal Control in the Federal Government,

17 the information should 

 16Before being transfered to TSA in March 2002, the Service continued to follow standard 

operating procedures designed for a small organization with one facility. 

17U.S. General Accounting Office, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal 

Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: November 1999). 

Management 

Information, Policies, 

and Procedures Have 

Not Kept Pace with 

Expanded Operations 

Management Information 

Is Not Sufficiently Detailed 

or Comprehensive for 

Effective Monitoring and 

Oversight 
Page 14 GAO-04-242 Federal Air Marshal Service 

be recorded and communicated to management and others within the 

agency who need it, and it should be provided in a form and within a time 

frame that enables them to carry out their responsibilities. For example, 

one way to do this would be to ensure that pertinent information is 

captured in sufficient detail to help management identify specific actions 

that need to be taken. Moreover, according to our human capital model, a 

fact-based, performance-oriented approach to human capital management 

is a critical success factor for maximizing the value of human capital. In 

addition, high-performing organizations use data to determine key 

performance objectives and goals, which enable them to evaluate the 

success of their human capital approaches. For example, obtaining 

employee input and suggestions can provide management with firsthand 

knowledge of the organization’s operations, which management can use to 

ensure ongoing effectiveness and continuous improvement. The Service 

has analyzed and made effective use of its mission reports and conduct 

data, but other management information that it currently collects is not 

sufficiently well defined or detailed for monitoring and managing the 

workforce. Although the Service initially had no systematic means of 

obtaining regular input from its employees, it has recently put processes in 

place to solicit air marshals’ opinions and suggestions. In addition, the 

Service is participating in an Office of Management and Budget program 

assessment project. As part of this effort, DHS said it has identified annual 

and long-term performance measures and related performance outcome 

targets to evaluate the Service’s organizational effectiveness along key 

strategic goals and objectives. Through this project and other strategic 

planning initiatives, DHS says it expects to systematically measure and 

analyze the Service’s organizational performance along human capital, 

mission scheduling, professional development, and quality of work-life 

dimensions. 

When the Service was first directed to expand its mission and operations, 

it was using a manual system to schedule air marshals for flight duty. This 

system was quickly overwhelmed as the number of air marshals and flights 

grew, leading to the concern that air marshals were being scheduled 

inconsistently for flight duty. The Service acknowledged that during this 

period, some air marshals were overworked while others were 

underutilized. In June 2002, the Service replaced the manual system with 

an automated system, which, according to Service officials, improved the 

agency’s ability to schedule and deploy its workforce. 

While the automated system expanded the Service’s scheduling capability, 

it did not provide the Service with all of the information it needed for 

effective monitoring. For example, it did not initially break down data on 

Automated System Improved 

Scheduling, but More 

Information Is Needed for 

Monitoring 
Page 15 GAO-04-242 Federal Air Marshal Service 

air marshals’ use of leave into enough categories for the Service to assess 

whether some air marshals were abusing sick leave in order to get a day 

off. Specifically, an article in USA Today reported that about 1,250 air 

marshals called in sick over an 18-day period. Eventually, the Service 

determined that the article was based on a report generated by the 

automated scheduling system that overrepresented the number of air 

marshals who were on sick leave. Although the report was labeled “Sick 

Leave,” it included data on all air marshals who were unavailable for flight 

duty, not only for sickness but also for other reasons such as 

administrative leave, and it listed each day of unavailability for flight duty 

as a separate incident, although the same air marshal might have been 

unavailable for several days in a row for the same reason. 

In analyzing data from the scheduling system, we found that because the 

system reported all leave charges—sick, administrative, military, or 

other—as sick leave, the Service could not distinguish air marshals who 

were unavailable to fly because they were out sick from air marshals who 

were unavailable to fly because of injuries but were available for light field 

office duty. For example, an air marshal with an injured ankle might not be 

able to fly, but could perform administrative work in the field office. The 

Service has since modified the scheduling system to obtain better 

information on the type of leave—sick, military, or administrative—

charged by air marshals who are unavailable to fly. The DOT IG also 

investigated cases concerning sick leave abuse and likewise found that it 

was based on a misunderstanding of the report’s contents stemming from 

the report’s label. 

Although the automated scheduling system provides information for 

managers to monitor how many hours air marshals are scheduled for 

work, automated information is not available for comparing the number of 

hours actually worked with the number of hours initially scheduled. These 

numbers can differ when flights are delayed or cancelled because of bad 

weather or mechanical problems. Information on these differences is 

important for Service managers to consider because of their implications 

for both the Service’s mission and air marshals’ quality of life. For 

example, if air marshals work too many hours, they may become too tired 

to concentrate on their mission, or if they spend too much time away from 

home, they may become dissatisfied with their jobs. 

Information on the number of hours flown will also be important for the 

Service to carry out a new long-term study, initiated by the Director in the 

summer of 2002, on the medical and physiological effects of flying. To 

date, the Service, in collaboration with FAA’s Civil Aviation Medical 
Page 16 GAO-04-242 Federal Air Marshal Service 

Institute and the Air Force, has identified a methodology and objectives 

for the study and completed a literature review to identify trends, possible 

risks, and other pertinent information. As part of the study, the Service 

plans to collect and analyze data from recurrent air marshal physical 

examinations and to compare these data with physiological data from the 

Civil Aviation Medical Institute. Although the Service is still awaiting 

funding approval to conduct the physical examinations and develop the 

database, Service officials plan to begin both efforts in the first quarter of 

fiscal year 2004. The study team has also developed a training course on 

human physiology as it relates to the aviation environment. The Service 

expects this course to be available early in fiscal year 2004. 

On the basis of some early findings from the study team’s literature search, 

the Service set limits in its automated flight-scheduling system to address 

mission, quality-of-life, and health concerns. The system limits scheduled 

“duty time” to 10 hours a day or 50 hours a week.18 Our analysis of 

schedules from the automated system for 37 weeks found that about 92 

percent of the schedules were consistent with these controls.19 The Service 

added that further guidance has been developed that results in scheduling 

air marshals to fly an average of 4.2 hours per day, 18 days per month. 

Thus, air marshals should fly about 75 hours per month, which the Service 

said was within the aviation and military standards for pilots—90 and 100 

hours per month, respectively. As part of implementing this guidance, the 

Service is conducting a detailed analysis of individual flight schedules to 

determine if the goals are being met. The Service reported on the basis of 

this analysis that, as of September 2003, scheduled flight time averaged 

76.5 hours per month. The Service’s analysis, however, focuses on flight 

schedules and not on actual hours worked by the air marshals. 

Information on the hours air marshals actually work is not available for 

automated comparison with the hours they are scheduled to work because 

the actual work hours are recorded manually on time and attendance 

sheets and are not transferred to the automated system. Without an 

automated way to compare actual hours worked with scheduled hours, the 

 18According to an analysis done by the Service, air marshals spend an average of 4 hours 

and 25 minutes per workday in flight and use the remainder of the workday to prepare for 

flights or layovers. Air marshals must be at the airport 1.5 hours before their first flight and 

stay there 15 minutes after arrival. The combination of flight time and the aforementioned 

1.5 hours and 15 minutes is referred to as “duty time.” 

19The remaining 8 percent, Service officials explained, could be due to inconsistencies that 

resulted when the Service overrode the controls to meet mission needs—to, for example, 

provide sufficient coverage for Super Bowl weekend. 
Page 17 GAO-04-242 Federal Air Marshal Service 

Service lacks a tool needed to determine if the automated flight-scheduling 

system is meeting its objectives related to mission, quality-of life, and 

health concerns. DHS agreed that the information on actual hours should 

be automated and said that the Service intended to incorporate this 

capability via personal digital assistants (PDA) issued to all air marshals. 

Between September 2001 and September 2003, air marshals submitted 

reports of almost 2,100 incidents that occurred during their missions. A 

little over 40 percent of these mission reports describe passengers that 

exhibited suspicious behavior to the air marshals. About 18 percent of the 

reports discuss disagreements or conflicts between air marshals and 

airline or airport personnel over airport or airline procedures. The 

remaining mission reports cover a wide variety of incidents that the 

Service grouped into 17 other categories, as shown in appendix V. 

The Service has taken some action to follow up on the air marshals’ 

mission reports, but it has not addressed all of the issues the reports raise. 

For example, the Service established a liaison with the airlines in response 

to reports of disagreements and conflicts with the airlines. According to an 

official with the Air Transport Association,20 this action has improved 

relations between the air marshals and the airlines. Nevertheless, some 

coordination and communication issues remain. In October 2002, for 

instance, the Service purchased PDAs for distribution to all air marshals. 

Service officials told us that before making the purchase, they contacted 

FAA about obtaining approval to use the feature that would allow the air 

marshals to communicate with one another aboard aircraft. In August 

2002, FAA advised the Service that it planned to approve this PDA feature 

for use by air marshals during flight. However, FAA’s approval was never 

finalized, and the airlines have not allowed the air marshals to use the 

PDAs for this purpose because of concerns about interference with flight 

control or navigational signals. According to Service officials, air marshals 

have stopped using their PDAs’ communication feature in flight until FAA 

approves its use, and the Service continues to work with FAA to obtain 

such approval. The Service reports that air marshals continue to use other 

features of the PDAs, such as their cell phone, pager, e-mail, surveillance, 

and photo-display capabilities. 

 20The Air Transport Association is a trade association for 22 major U.S. airlines and five 

foreign carriers. 

The Service Has Used Mission 

Reports to Improve Operations, 

but Some Coordination Issues 

Remain 
Page 18 GAO-04-242 Federal Air Marshal Service 

Between October 2001 and July 2003, the Service collected data on almost 

600 reports of misconduct by air marshals, which it classified into over 40 

categories. Among the categories with large numbers of reported cases 

were “insubordination or failure to follow orders,” “loss of government 

property,” and “abuse of government credit cards.” According to Service 

officials, they have used the misconduct database to identify issues such 

as abuse of government credit cards and cell phones that need to be 

investigated.21 For example, during the Service’s rapid expansion, 

management noted an unacceptable number of unauthorized charges and 

late payments associated with air marshals’ use of the government-issued 

travel card. Further investigation revealed that the process of claiming 

reimbursement for travel was slow and burdensome and there were 

misunderstandings about what charges were proper. After corrective 

action, the delinquency rate dropped dramatically. Similarly, an analysis of 

the misconduct data indicated that a number of air marshals were accused 

of being abusive to airline personnel during the boarding process. A 

detailed review of the data pointed to differences in the Service’s and the 

airlines procedures for boarding aircraft. Subsequently, the Service 

negotiated a mutually agreeable solution with the airlines to resolve these 

differences. In these instances, the Service used misconduct reports to 

effectively refine its management controls. 

The Service maintains data on the number of air marshals who leave the 

Service and categorizes their reason for leaving.22 However, these data are 

not detailed enough for management to identify and follow up on issues 

that could affect retention. Retention is important both to ensure the 

continued deployment of experienced personnel who can carry out the 

Service’s security mission and to avoid the costs to recruit, train, and 

deploy new personnel, which, according to the Service, total about $40,275 

per person. 

Our analysis of the Service’s data on separations indicates that from 

September 2001 through July 2003, about 10 percent of the thousands of 

newly hired air marshals left the Service. However, during August 2002, 

when the media reported a “flood” of resignations from the Service, our 

 21Generally, Service staff members in headquarters investigate reports of misconduct, but 

for more serious cases, the Service has been coordinating its investigations with TSA’s 

Office of Internal Affairs. 

22The Service selects and records one predominant reason for an air marshal’s separation 

from the Service, although the air marshals may have cited more than one reason. 

The Service Has Used Reports 

of Misconduct to Improve 

Management Controls 

Information on Air Marshals’ 

Reasons for Leaving the 

Service Is Not Detailed Enough 

to Target Retention Efforts 
Page 19 GAO-04-242 Federal Air Marshal Service 

analysis indicated that slightly more than 4 percent of the newly hired air 

marshals had left.23 We found that the most frequently recorded reasons 

for air marshals separating from the Service were to take other jobs and 

personal reasons.24 Such reasons are not detailed enough for management 

to identify and target issues that may hinder retention. 

To gain greater insight into the reasons for separation, we examined the 

Service’s documentation for 95 selected cases.25 For 37 of these cases, the 

departing air marshals cited multiple reasons for leaving the Service. For 

example, one departing air marshal cited personal reasons and going back 

to his previous job. Even with this additional information, we could not 

identify management issues that might have led to the separations because 

the reasons documented by the Service were too general and vague. 

The Service’s method of collecting data on air marshals’ reasons for 

separation may be responsible, in part, for the generality and vagueness of 

the information. Specifically, the Service uses either an open-ended exit 

interview with the air marshal’s first-line supervisor, the air marshal’s 

resignation letter, or both to collect the data.26 The supervisor conducts 

and writes up the exit interview and an administrative official in the field 

forwards the interview write-up, resignation letter, or both to human 

resource officials in Service headquarters. A human resource specialist 

then reviews the documentation and determines which of the reasons 

cited is the primary reason for the separation. This method of collecting 

information has several limitations. First, the open-ended exit interview 

may not prompt responses that go beyond generalities, such as taking 

another job or personal reasons, to determine whether management 

issues, such as problems in transferring to a duty station closer to home or 

burdensome work schedules, contributed to the air marshal’s resignation. 

 23Because TSA was a newly created agency without a workforce history (including, for 

example, information on deaths, retirements, transfers, and resignations), we were unable 

to meaningfully compare attrition data for the Service to other federal agencies during this 

period. Therefore we are not making a value judgment on the meaning of the number of 

persons leaving the Service or their rate of departure. However, these data are relevant to 

the resources that have to be expended to maintain a specified number of marshals in the 

Service. 

24A small number of air marshals left because they could not pass training. 

25The details of our selection process are provided in appendix I. 

26This documentation included an exit information form that the Service began using in 

2002 to gather data from separating air marshals. 
Page 20 GAO-04-242 Federal Air Marshal Service 

Second, using the first-line supervisor to conduct the interview may 

discourage detailed responses, either because the air marshal may not 

want to reveal his or her concerns or reasons or because the supervisor 

may not want to report specific issues. Finally, using a human resource 

specialist to determine the primary reason for a separation means that the 

reason is filtered through another party rather than provided directly by 

the air marshal who is resigning. Our work on human capital has 

determined that feedback from exit interviews can guide workplaceplanning efforts. If these exit interviews are constructed to collect valid 

and reliable data, they allow managers to spotlight areas for attention, 

such as employee retention. 

According to the DOT report, air marshals interviewed by the IG’s office 

were concerned about the way the air marshal program was being 

managed, which contributed to low morale in the Service. The air 

marshals the IG interviewed expressed dissatisfaction with the Service’s 

work schedules, aircraft boarding procedures, and dress code policy.27

During the early stages of its expansion, the Service did not have 

processes or mechanisms in place to gather input and suggestions from its 

employees. Such processes and mechanisms would not only allow the 

Service to monitor air marshals’ concerns about management issues, as 

the DOT IG’s report also noted, but it would also provide the Service with 

its employees’ firsthand knowledge and insights that it could use to 

improve operations and policies. According to our work on human capital, 

leaders at agencies with effective human capital management seek out the 

views of employees at all levels and communication flows up, down, and 

across the organization, facilitating continuous improvement. Tools 

commonly used for obtaining employee input include employee 

satisfaction surveys, employee advisory councils, and employee focus 

groups. 

Recently, the Service began putting processes and mechanisms in place to 

gather input from its employees. The Service reports that all field offices 

have methods, such as advisory committees, for air marshals to ask 

questions or express concerns to senior field office management. 

Additionally, question and answer sessions are held when the Director, 

Deputy Director, or Assistant Director visits a field office and during the 

 27As discussed in appendix I, the DOT IG’s sample results cannot be projected to the 

universe of the Service’s air marshal workforce. 

The Service Initially Lacked, 

but Has Recently Begun to 

Implement, Processes for 

Obtaining Employee Input 
Page 21 GAO-04-242 Federal Air Marshal Service 

basic and advanced training classes. To obtain further employee input, the 

Service participated in an ombudsman program that TSA sponsors to 

improve its operations and customer service. According to the Service, it 

is also developing a lessons learned and best practices intranet site that 

will allow substantive communication on issues of interest and concern to 

all air marshals. 

Policies and procedures that were designed to support a small, centralized 

Service were not designed for and could not accommodate the needs of a 

vastly expanded and decentralized workforce. According to our Standards 

for Internal Control in the Federal Government,

28 internal control should 

provide for an assessment of the risks an agency faces from both external 

and internal sources. For example, when an agency expands its operations 

to new geographic areas, it needs to give special attention to the risks that 

the expansion presents. In attempting to hire, train, and deploy its new 

workforce by the Deputy Secretary’s deadline and establish a new field 

organization to support its new domestic mission, the Service had little 

time to systematically assess the risks of expansion and ensure that its 

policies and procedures were appropriate and adequate. Efforts to develop 

new policies or modify existing ones to accommodate new circumstances 

took time, and during the transition, some air marshals voiced concerns to 

the media. Delays in hiring supervisors and the discretion they were given 

in interpreting policies may have contributed to air marshals’ confusion. 

Before its expansion, the Service was a centralized organization with one 

office and fewer than 50 air marshals. Because there were no field offices, 

the Service had no policy on transfers between field locations. The 

vacancy announcement used during the hiring process stated that field 

offices would be located in various major metropolitan areas, and a 

Service official stated that air marshal applicants were allowed to express 

their preferences for particular field locations. According to a media 

report, air marshals alleged that transfers to their preferred locations were 

promised but that those promises were not kept. Our review of a 

recruiting video and other documents related to the hiring process did not 

find any evidence that transfers were promised; however, the recruiting 

video indicated that opportunities for transfer existed. Service officials 

said that no transfers were promised and that as the Service hired air 

marshals and implemented its new field office structure, it assigned the 

 28GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1. 

Developing and 

Implementing Policies and 

Procedures for an 

Expanded Organization 

Took Time and Created 

Some Confusion 

Policy on Transfers Was Not 

Implemented until May 2003 
Page 22 GAO-04-242 Federal Air Marshal Service 

newly hired marshals to the 21 field offices as needed. Service officials 

later added that except in hardship cases, the air marshals were expected 

to remain in the originally assigned field offices for 3 to 5 years. The DOT 

IG also investigated this issue and interviewed air marshals who alleged 

that promises of transfers made during the hiring process were not kept, 

but the IG did not determine whether there was a legitimate basis for the 

air marshals’ concerns. 

By June 2002, the Service had received over 500 applications for transfers. 

Until a policy was issued, the Service tried to respond to the air marshals’ 

requests and to address quality-of-life issues by developing guidance that 

provided for transferring any air marshal (1) who owned a home within 

100 miles of an established field office and (2) whose immediate family 

resided in that location—provided that both of these conditions existed 

before the air marshal’s employment with the Service. While the Service 

communicated this guidance orally to field managers, some air marshals 

were reportedly confused about why their requests for transfers were 

denied. 

In January 2003, the Service postponed further action on transfer requests, 

officials said, until applicable policies—on hardship and transfers—were 

finalized. On May 29, 2003, the Service implemented a hardship transfer 

policy that established processes and criteria for approving transfer 

requests when an air marshal or an immediate family member incurs a 

medical or child-custody hardship. In developing the policy, the Service 

said it looked into other law enforcement agencies’ transfer programs to 

identify best practices. 

During the early months of the Service’s expansion, air marshals 

expressed confusion and dissatisfaction to the media about policies 

covering their attire. At that time, the Service had no written dress code 

policy. Instead, according to Service officials, the agency carried over an 

unwritten FAA policy that air marshals should dress appropriately for 

their missions and the air marshal in charge of a mission should determine 

what attire was appropriate for that mission. According to the Service, 

some airline personnel complained to the Service that marshals were not 

dressed to blend in with other passengers in the location of the air 

marshals’ assigned seats. The Service said that the lack of a written policy 

might have created confusion for some newly hired air marshals whose 

initial training did not cover the Service’s policy on dress and whose field 

office supervisors had discretion in interpreting the policy. In May 2002, 

the Service issued a policy that directed air marshals to dress so as to 

present a professional image and blend into their environment. The 

Unwritten Policy on Dress 

Created Confusion 
Page 23 GAO-04-242 Federal Air Marshal Service 

Service believes that this policy enables air marshals to perform their 

duties without drawing undue attention to themselves. For example, an air 

marshal might wear a business suit on a morning flight to New York and a 

sports shirt on an afternoon flight to Orlando. To explain and ensure 

consistent application of the policy, the Director of the Service discussed 

this policy with supervisors and staff during his visits to many field offices 

and to the Service’s training center. 

Air marshals also discussed concerns about the Service’s workweek policy 

with the media. Some air marshals complained that they had been 

promised 4-day workweeks to compensate for the rigors of travel but were 

being required to work 5-day workweeks. Other air marshals reported 

being confused about the reasons for the change from a 4-day to a 5-day 

workweek and questioned whether this change was necessary. 

According to Service officials, the change in workweek policy occurred on 

July 1, 2002, when the Director of the Service brought the air marshals into 

compliance with the requirements of law enforcement availability pay 

(LEAP), a pay premium for unscheduled duty equaling 25 percent of a law 

enforcement officer’s base salary. Under this pay computation method, air 

marshals are required to average 10 hours of overtime per week. LEAP 

became applicable to the Service with the passage of the Aviation and 

Transportation Security Act on November 19, 2001, but the Service initially 

continued to compute air marshals’ schedules according to the method it 

had previously used, called the “first forty” method. Under this method, 

the first 40 hours worked in a week constituted the basic workweek, and 

4-day and even 3-day workweeks were allowed if air marshals accrued 40 

hours within that time. However, Service officials determined, in 

consultation with TSA’s legal department and human resources office, that 

a change to a 5-day workweek was necessary for the Service to comply 

with LEAP. Accordingly, the Director ordered a 5-day basic workweek, 

effective July 1, 2002. 

The DOT IG reported that over 85 percent of the air marshals its staff 

interviewed expressed concern about working 5 consecutive 10-hour 

mission days (with 2 consecutive off-duty days), saying that it resulted in 

fatigue and illness.29 Service officials acknowledged that working 10-hour 

 29Between November 2002 and February 2003, 112 air marshals were interviewed. 

However, because of the methodology employed, the results are anecdotal and may not 

reflect the views or experiences of all Service employees. 

Air Marshals Expressed 

Concern about Reasons for 

Changes in Workweek Policy 
Page 24 GAO-04-242 Federal Air Marshal Service 

days can create fatigue,30 but said that such days are routine in the law 

enforcement community. Service officials also maintained that fatigue can 

be managed by applying scheduling controls and monitoring air marshals’ 

schedules. However, as noted, the Service lacks the data to ensure that air 

marshals’ actual work hours are consistent with the scheduling controls. 

The Service is likely to face challenges in implementing changes resulting 

from its mergers into DHS in March 2003 and into ICE in November 2003. 

While changes in the size of its workforce could eventually occur in light 

of the many recent improvements to aviation security and federal budget 

constraints, the plans announced to date point to changes in the roles, 

responsibilities, and training of ICE’s workforces; the Service’s 

coordination with TSA and other organizations; and administrative 

matters. DHS reported looking forward to the opportunities accompanying 

the Service’s pending merger into ICE. Our recent work on mergers and 

organizational transformations proposes several key practices and 

implementation steps that could assist the Service and other departmental 

organizations as they face these challenges. 

One challenge for the Service will be to implement any changes in the size 

or in the roles and responsibilities of its workforce that the department 

determines are warranted after the Service is transferred to ICE. The right 

size of a security organization’s workforce appears to depend, among 

other things, on the nature and scope of the terrorist threat and on the 

totality of measures in place to protect against that threat. When the 

Service was first directed to expand, there were fewer protective 

measures in place than there are today. Over the past 2 years, an entire 

“system of systems” has been established for aviation security alone. This 

system includes not only the expanded Federal Air Marshal Service, but 

also about 50,000 federal security screeners in the nation’s airports, 158 

airport security directors, explosives detection equipment for passengers 

and baggage, requirements for performing background checks on about 1 

million airline and airport employees, reinforced cockpit doors on all 

passenger aircraft, and authorization for pilots to carry guns in the 

airplane cockpit. Now, as the department assesses the nation’s homeland 

security risks, considers the constraints on federal resources, and sets 

 30As previously discussed, the 10-hour workday includes the time that air marshals are 

required to be in the airport before and after a flight as well as the time they spend in flight. 

Key Practices and 

Implementation Steps 

Can Help Address 

Merger 

Implementation 

Challenges 

The Service Is Likely to 

Face Challenges in 

Implementing Changes 
Page 25 GAO-04-242 Federal Air Marshal Service 

priorities, it will need to determine its appropriate size. It has already 

begun to make changes in the federal security screener workforce by 

reducing the total number of full-time screeners by 6,000 in fiscal year 

2003 and by planning a further reduction of 3,000 full-time screeners in 

fiscal year 2004 together with the hiring of part-time screeners to meet 

daily and seasonal periods of higher demand. 

In announcing the Service’s merger into ICE, the Secretary of Homeland 

Security did not propose a change in the size of the Service’s or of ICE’s 

other two law enforcement workforces, but his statement pointed to an 

expansion of their roles and responsibilities that would give the 

department greater flexibility to adjust its law enforcement resources 

according to varying threats. Through cross-training, the Secretary said, 

thousands more law enforcement agents would be available for 

deployment on flights, providing a surge capacity during times of 

increased aviation security threats. At the same time, air marshals may be 

assigned to other law enforcement duties, as threat information dictates. 

This planned expansion of the roles and responsibilities of air marshals, 

immigration agents, and customs agents will pose training challenges for 

ICE and its component organizations. According to the Secretary’s 

announcement, the training will be centralized, which could eventually 

produce some cost efficiencies, but initially a needs assessment will have 

to be conducted to identify each law enforcement workforce’s additional 

training requirements. Cross-training requirements and curriculums will 

also have to be established and approved. Finally, each component 

organization will have to coordinate the new training requirements with its 

other mission requirements and schedule its officers for the cross-training. 

The Service is also likely to face coordination challenges following its 

transfer from TSA to ICE. In part, the transfer is designed to improve 

coordination by unifying DHS’s law enforcement functions, but it also 

divides aviation security responsibilities that, for about 2 years, were 

under TSA. According to the Secretary, the transfer will facilitate the 

coordination and sharing of law enforcement information, thereby 

enhancing aviation security. However, TSA has raised questions about 

how air marshals’ flights will be scheduled, and the TSA Administrator has 

expressed a desire to influence the scheduling. Immigration agents have 

reportedly also wondered how ICE would juggle air marshal deployments 

with the bureau’s current investigative work. 

Finally, the Service’s transfer to ICE poses administrative challenges for 

the three component organizations. For example, the planned changes in 
Page 26 GAO-04-242 Federal Air Marshal Service 

the roles and responsibilities of the federal law enforcement officers could 

have implications for their performance evaluations and compensation. 

Currently, the three groups of law enforcement officers are under different 

pay systems and are compensated at different rates. Efforts are under way 

to resolve these challenges. 

On the basis of our work on mergers and organizational transformations, 

we identified nine key practices and 21 implementation steps that could 

assist DHS in successfully merging the roles, responsibilities, and cultures 

of the Service and the department’s other component organizations.31

While these practices will ultimately be important to a successful merger 

and we have previously recommended them for the department,32 there are 

three, we believe, that are particularly applicable to the Service, given the 

concerns about communication and other allegations reported in the 

media. These three practices emphasize communicating with employees 

and obtaining and using their feedback to promote continuous 

improvement. See appendix VI for a complete listing of the practices and 

implementations steps. 

One key practice in a merger or transformation is to set implementation 

goals and a time line to build momentum and show progress from day one. 

These goals and the time line are essential to pinpoint performance 

shortfalls and gaps and suggest midcourse corrections. Research indicates 

that people are at the heart of successful mergers and transformations. 

Thus, seeking and monitoring employee attitudes and taking appropriate 

follow-up actions is an implementation step that supports this practice. 

Our work suggests that obtaining employee input through pulse surveys, 

focus groups, or confidential hotlines can serve as a quick check of how 

employees are feeling about large-scale changes and the new organization. 

As discussed in this report, the Service did not initially have such tools in 

place—in large part because of the enormous demands it faced in 

recruiting, training, and deploying thousands of air marshals by the Deputy 

Secretary’s deadline—and it was not monitoring employee attitudes. 

Furthermore, although monitoring provides good information, it is also 

important for agency management not only to listen to employees’ 

concerns but also to take action. By not taking appropriate follow-up 

 31Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and Organizational 

Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2003). 

32GAO-03-260. 

Key Practices and 

Implementation Steps Can 

Help the Service Address 

Potential Merger 

Challenges 
Page 27 GAO-04-242 Federal Air Marshal Service 

actions, negative attitudes may translate into actions such as employee 

departures—or, as was the case with the Service, complaints to the media. 

Identifying cultural features of merging organizations is another important 

step in setting implementation goals. Cultural similarities between the 

Service and the other organizations within ICE could facilitate the 

Service’s merger into ICE. As the Director of the Service and others have 

noted, air marshals, immigration agents, and customs agents are all law 

enforcement officers and share a common culture. Moreover, as a 

spokesperson for ICE pointed out, many air marshals came to the Service 

from Customs and the Immigration and Naturalization Service; and some 

other agents served as air marshals temporarily after September 11. 

Establishing a communication strategy to create shared expectations and 

report related progress is another key practice in implementing a merger 

or transformation. According to our work on transformations and mergers, 

communication is most effective when it occurs early, clearly, and often 

and when it is downward, upward, and lateral. Organizations have found 

that a key implementation step is to communicate information early and 

often to build trust among employees as well as an understanding of the 

purpose of planned changes. As the Service found when modifying its 

workweek policy to implement LEAP premium pay, the absence of 

ongoing communication can confuse employees. Two-way communication 

is also part of this strategy, facilitating a two-way honest exchange with, 

and allowing for feedback from, employees, customers, and stakeholders. 

Once this solicited employee feedback is received, it is important to 

consider and use it to make appropriate changes when implementing a 

merger or transformation. 

Involving employees to obtain their ideas and gain their ownership is a 

third key practice for a successful transformation or merger. Employee 

involvement strengthens the transformation process by including frontline 

perspectives and experiences. A key implementation step in this practice 

is incorporating employee feedback into new policies and procedures. 

After obtaining sufficient input from key players, the organization needs to 

develop clear, documented, and transparent policies and procedures. Not 

having such policies and procedures was an impediment to the Service as 

it expanded, creating confusion about issues such as transfers and dress 

codes. DHS said that it fully recognizes the value and importance of 

communicating with employees and of obtaining and using their feedback 

to promote continuous improvement. It further noted that as the Service 

merges into ICE, it is committed to involving employees to obtain their 

opinions and gain their ownership. 
Page 28 GAO-04-242 Federal Air Marshal Service 

The rapid expansion of the Service’s mission and workforce posed 

significant challenges, many of which the Service has begun to address. In 

the 2 years that have elapsed since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 

the Service has deployed thousands of new air marshals on thousands of 

domestic and international flights. During this time, the Service has also 

established a decentralized organization and begun to integrate its 

operations with those of a new department. While these accomplishments 

initially came at some cost, as evidenced by air marshals’ concerns with 

the Service’s management, the Service has taken steps to provide 

advanced training, improve scheduling, obtain and use more detailed 

management information, develop and communicate policies and 

procedures, and obtain and respond to employee feedback. 

Continuing these efforts will be important for the Service as it moves 

forward. Developing and analyzing information on the hours air marshals 

actually work is key to ensuring that the Service’s scheduling controls are 

operating as intended. Flying for too many hours can cause fatigue, 

potentially diminishing air marshals’ alertness and reducing their 

effectiveness. Capturing detailed, firsthand information on air marshals’ 

reasons for separation is critical to developing cost-effective strategies for 

promoting retention and would also allow the Service to identify and 

analyze the root causes of issues and to address vulnerabilities through 

changes to its policies, procedures, and training. While retention has not 

been an issue to date, the cost of recruiting, training, and deploying air 

marshals is too high to risk separations that could be avoided through 

better understanding of and attention to air marshals’ concerns. 

We recommend that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland 

Security direct the Under Secretary for Border and Transportation 

Security to support the Service’s continued commitment to developing 

into a high-performing organization by taking the following actions to 

improve management information and to implement key practices that 

contribute to successful mergers and organizational transformations: 

• Develop an automated method to compare actual hours worked with 

scheduled hours so that the Service can monitor the effectiveness of its 

scheduling controls and support its planned long-term study of the effects 

of flying on air marshals and their aviation security mission. 

• Seek and monitor employee attitudes by obtaining detailed, firsthand 

information on air marshals’ reasons for separation, using such means as 

confidential, structured exit surveys, that will allow management to 

Conclusions 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 
Page 29 GAO-04-242 Federal Air Marshal Service 

analyze and address issues that could affect retention and take appropriate 

follow-up actions, such as improving training, career development 

opportunities, and communication. 

We provided a draft of this report to DHS for its review and comment. 

DHS agreed with our report’s information and recommendations and said 

it welcomes our proposals for practices that it believes will ultimately 

maximize its ability to protect the American public, contribute to the 

protection of the nation’s critical infrastructure, and preserve the viability 

of the aviation industry. DHS also expressed a commitment to continuous 

improvement as it moves forward, including actions designed to build on 

the accomplishments the Service has already achieved in expanding its 

mission and workforce since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. 

According to DHS, the Service has ongoing activities in several areas, such 

as continuing to address policy issues and develop procedures and 

establishing field office mechanisms and groups to discuss employee 

issues and concerns. We included this information in the final report. 

Additionally, DHS identified references in the draft report to 

“overscheduling” of air marshals, with an explicit suggestion that such 

“overscheduling” was among air marshals’ reasons for separating from the 

Service. We revised the report to avoid this implication, since we had not 

intended to suggest that air marshals were being overscheduled. Our 

intent was to point out that without an automated method to compare 

actual hours worked with scheduled hours, the Service would not readily 

be able to monitor the effectiveness of its scheduling controls. We also 

agreed with DHS that there were no data in the Service’s separation 

information to suggest that “overscheduling” was among air marshals’ 

reasons for leaving the Service, and we modified the report accordingly. 

DHS agreed with our recommendation to automate air marshals’ time and 

attendance data to facilitate comparisons of actual hours worked with 

scheduled hours and said that the Service was taking steps to implement 

the recommendation. DHS also agreed that there was a need to improve 

the quality of the Service’s separation information. 

In its comments, DHS also emphasized its belief that the Service’s merger 

with ICE would have a number of significant benefits, particularly from 

cross-training personnel. DHS noted that after cross-training, the air 

marshals, as well as personnel in the other ICE components, would have 

far more law enforcement capability and could supplement each other’s 

functions during times of heightened threat. Additionally, DHS said that 

the aviation system would benefit from the concentration and 

Agency Comments 
Page 30 GAO-04-242 Federal Air Marshal Service 

coordination of DHS law enforcement personnel under the direction of a 

single Assistant Secretary. We discuss these changes in our report by 

examining them in the context of issues that may arise as the Service 

merges with other agencies. In addition, we discuss key practices and 

implementation steps that could be useful in dealing with the changes. We 

note, however, that it is too early to assess any possible benefits or 

repercussions of the changes. 

Finally, DHS provided technical clarifications to the report, which we 

incorporated into the report as appropriate. 

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce its contents 

earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 5 days after the 

date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the 

Ranking Member, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, 

and International Relations, House Committee on Government Reform, 

other interested congressional committees, the Secretary of Homeland 

Security, the Undersecretary for Border and Transportation Security, the 

Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration, and the 

Acting Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement. This report is also available on GAO's home page at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

Please contact Carol Anderson-Guthrie or me at (202) 512-2834 if you have 

any questions about the report. Key contributors to this report are listed in 

appendix VII. 

Gerald L. Dillingham 

Director, Civil Aviation Issues 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 31 GAO-04-242 Federal Air Marshal Service 

To address each of our study objectives and research questions, we 

reviewed and analyzed data and documentation provided by the Federal 

Air Marshal Service (The Service) on background checks and training; 

scheduling, mission incidents, employee misconduct, and separation; and 

several workforce policies and procedures. We also interviewed officials 

responsible for implementing and operating the Service. Additionally, we 

used our Standards for Internal Controls in the Federal Government, 

Internal Control Management and Evaluation Tool,

1 Human Capital: A 

Guide for Assessing Strategic Training and Development Efforts in the 

Federal Government,

2 and Model of Strategic Human Capital 

Management,

3

 to help assess the Service’s training, management 

information, and policies and procedures. We also reviewed an audit 

report by the Department of Transportation’s (DOT) Inspector General 

(IG) on the Federal Air Marshal program.4 To guide our examination of the 

Service’s future challenges, we used our Results-Oriented Cultures: 

Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and Organizational 

Transformations.

5

To compare the background check procedures for the newly hired air 

marshals with those used before September 2001, we obtained and 

reviewed Service documents that described the process and procedures 

used to apply for a top-secret clearance, as well as for an interim secret 

clearance waiver. We interviewed officials at the Service’s Human 

Resource Center in New Jersey who were knowledgeable about the 

process and were coordinating the Service’s requirements with the 

responsible Security Management Offices at both the Federal Aviation 

 1

GAO issues standards for internal control in the federal government as required by the 

Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act of 1982. See 31 U.S.C. 3512©. GAO first issued 

the standards in 1983. GAO revised the standards and reissued them as Standards for 

Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1(Washington, D.C.: 

November 1999). These standards provide the overall framework for establishing and 

maintaining internal control and for identifying and addressing major performance 

challenges and areas at greatest risk for fraud, waste, and abuse, and mismanagement. 

GAO issued its Internal Control Management and Evaluation Tool, GAO-01-1008G

(Washington, D.C.: August 2001) to assist agencies in maintaining or implementing effective 

internal control and, when needed, to help determine what, where, and how improvements 

can be implemented. 

2

GAO-03-893G. 

3

GAO-02-373SP. 

4

SC-2003-029. 

5

GAO-03-669. 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 32 GAO-04-242 Federal Air Marshal Service 

Administration (FAA) and the Transportation Security Administration 

(TSA). We also analyzed data provided by the Office of Personnel 

Management’s (OPM) Investigative Service and had discussions with OPM 

personnel on the number of clearances processed and the procedures that 

are used. 

To determine what changes were made in the training curriculum for the 

newly hired air marshals, we analyzed documents related to the air 

marshal training curriculum. In order to identify the curriculum in place 

before the changes were made, we interviewed air marshals who had been 

with the Service before September 2001. To understand the Service’s 

curriculum from September 2001 through July 2003, we evaluated class 

schedules, training materials, and training data that tracked the 

completion of coursework and firearms qualification training. We visited 

the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Artesia, New Mexico and 

the Service’s training center in New Jersey, where we interviewed officials 

responsible for overseeing the air marshal training program. In addition, 

we interviewed representatives of the Air Line Pilots Association, the Air 

Transport Association, and current and former air marshals. 

To determine what management information and policies and procedures 

the Service had developed to support its expanded mission and workforce, 

we examined the Service’s automated scheduling system and management 

information on mission incidents, reported misconduct, and reasons for 

separation. We analyzed the automated scheduling system data to 

determine if the current system controls were operating as expected. 

Additionally, to determine the extent of sick leave use and to address 

allegations of excessive use, we analyzed the “sick calls” generated from 

the scheduling system between July and October 2002. We also reviewed 

and discussed with Service management its policies and procedures for air 

marshals’ transfers between offices, dress code requirements, and work 

schedules. 

To determine how many newly hired air marshals have left the Service and 

why, we used agency data on the number of air marshals on board, hired, 

and separated each month; supervisory memorandums summarizing exit 

interviews; resignation letters; personnel action forms; and the Service’s 

summary database on separations. Using the summary database, we 

determined the number of air marshals who separated, by reason, and 

calculated the percentage of total employees that separated for a specific 

reason. We discussed the process for collecting these data with agency 

officials responsible for maintaining the Service’s personnel data from the 

Service’s Human Resource Center in New Jersey. The Service provided 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 33 GAO-04-242 Federal Air Marshal Service 

information on the processing and maintenance of its data and on the 

relationships among its data systems. When we had concerns about the 

consistency and validity of the data, we asked agency officials to address 

each concern. On the basis of the information provided by the agency and 

our review, we determined that the required data elements were adequate 

for the purpose of this work. 

To gain a basic understanding of the issues surrounding staff decisions to 

leave the Service, we reviewed the agency’s separation data. For each 

departed staff, these data capture only one predominant reason (for 

leaving). To supplement this analysis, we selected 95 cases (36 percent of 

264 separation cases) that had some form of documentation, had occurred 

at various times between January 2002 and March 2003, and had originated 

at various field offices. For each selected case, we reviewed any available 

resignation letters, exit interviews, and forms documenting personnel 

actions. This approach allowed us to conduct a limited quality check of the 

Service’s data and determine whether reasons outside of those reported by 

the Service provided a broader view of air marshals’ reasons for leaving 

the Service. 

To get a better understanding of the types of misconduct that air marshals 

have been charged with, we reviewed the electronic spreadsheets that the 

Service uses to track the status of each case of reported misconduct. The 

spreadsheets included cases reported between October 2001 and July 

2003. We sorted the cases of misconduct by category to determine if a 

particular category was prevalent. We also spoke with Service 

management about the adjudication of alleged misconduct and the issues 

related to the completeness and definition of misconduct measures. 

To determine the types and frequency of the mission reports submitted by 

air marshals, we analyzed the database maintained by the Federal Air 

Marshals’ Mission Operations Control Center. This database contained 

approximately 1,600 incidents that were reported by air marshals between 

September 11, 2001, and September 16, 2003. We then sorted the incidents 

into broad categories, including mission-related incidents and incidents 

that occurred between air marshals and airport or airline personnel. We 

also received information on the Service’s use and dissemination of the 

incident data from the Special Agent in Charge of Field Operations. 

We reviewed the DOT IG’s report on the Federal Air Marshal program as 

an additional source of information about the Service. This report 

evaluated various aspects of the Service, including its selection and hiring 

process and its procedures for properly training and fully qualifying air 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 34 GAO-04-242 Federal Air Marshal Service 

marshals to respond to incidents aboard aircraft. For one aspect of the 

report, the IG interviewed 112 air marshals in a one-on-one format at their 

field office duty stations. The air marshals were not selected for interview 

using structured or random selection methods. Information obtained 

through these interviews highlights employee concerns with the Service 

but is anecdotal and therefore cannot be projected to the universe of the 

Service’s air marshal workforce. 
Appendix II: Demographic Profile of the 

Federal Air Marshal Service 

Page 35 GAO-04-242 Federal Air Marshal Service 

Figure 1: Federal Air Marshal Service Workforce by Gender, by Percentage, as of 

August 2003 

Figure 2: Federal Air Marshal Service Workforce by Age, by Percentage, as of 

August 2003 

Appendix II: Demographic Profile of the 

Federal Air Marshal Service 
Appendix II: Demographic Profile of the 

Federal Air Marshal Service 

Page 36 GAO-04-242 Federal Air Marshal Service 

Figure 3: Federal Air Marshal Service Workforce by Race, by Percentage, as of 

August 2003 
Appendix III: Locations of the Federal Air 

Marshal Service’s 21 Field Offices and 

Training Facility 

Page 37 GAO-04-242 Federal Air Marshal Service 

Appendix III: Locations of the Federal Air 

Marshal Service’s 21 Field Offices and 

Training Facility 
Appendix IV: Events Affecting the Federal Air 

Marshal Service, September 2001 through 

October 2002 

Page 38 GAO-04-242 Federal Air Marshal Service 

a

The exact number of federal air marshals is classified. 

Appendix IV: Events Affecting the Federal Air 

Marshal Service, September 2001 through 

October 2002 
Appendix V: Mission-Related Incidents 

Reported by Federal Air Marshals, by Broad 

Categories, September 15, 2001 — September 

16, 2003 

Page 39 GAO-04-242 Federal Air Marshal Service 

Incident category Number of incidents reported Percentage of total

Suspicious person 444 21.3

Suspicious activities by person 394 18.9

Issues with airport or airline personnel 

• Assigned seating and/or boarding procedures 159 7.6

• Screening and/or escort procedures 106 5.0

• Check-in procedures 59 2.8

• Flight crew briefings 57 2.7

Subtotal: (Issues with airport or airline personnel) 381 18.3

Suspect items or objects 164 7.9

Third-party information reported to air marshal 129 6.2

Undercover status compromised 113 5.4

Disruptive/disorderly person 73 3.5

Security breeches 49 2.3

Medical problems 35 1.7

Arrest/detainment by or at request of air marshal 28 1.3

Interference with flight crew by passenger 20 1

Verbal threats or threatening behavior 19 0.9

Use of nonlethal force by an air marshal 16 0.8

Searches 12 0.5

Equipment retrieval/turn-in 7 0.3

Tampering with aircraft or aircraft equipment 4 0.2

Discharge of an air marshal firearm 3 0.2

To be determined 2 .1

Not applicable 1 0.1

Other 189 9

Total 2,083 100

Source: Federal Air Marshal Incident Reports Database, September 15, 2001, through September 16, 2003. 

Notes: Total includes some incidents counted more than once, because multiple codes for a 

reportable incident might have been reported (e.g., a suspicious person incident might also have 

been reported as a drunk and disorderly incident). The information above represents the major 

categories of information on incidents that air marshals report to the Service’s Operations Center. 

Appendix V: Mission-Related Incidents 

Reported by Federal Air Marshals, by Broad 

Categories, September 15, 2001 — 

September 16, 2003 
Appendix VI: Key Practices and 

Implementation Steps for Mergers and 

Organizational Transformations 

Page 40 GAO-04-242 Federal Air Marshal Service 

Practice Implementation step 

Ensure top leadership drives the 

transformation. 

• Define and articulate a succinct and 

compelling reason for change. 

• Balance continued delivery of services 

with merger and transformation activities. 

Establish a coherent mission and 

integrated strategic goals to guide the 

transformation. 

• Adopt leading practices for resultsoriented strategic planning and reporting. 

Focus on a key set of principles and 

priorities at the outset of the 

transformation. 

• Embed core values in every aspect of the 

organization to reinforce the new culture. 

Set implementation goals and a 

timeline to build momentum and show 

progress from day one. 

• Make public implementation goals and 

timeline. 

• Seek and monitor employee attitudes and 

take appropriate follow-up actions. 

• Identify cultural features of merging 

organizations to increase understanding of 

former work environments. 

• Attract and retain key talent. 

• Establish an organizationwide knowledge 

and skills inventory to allow knowledge 

exchange among merging organizations. 

Dedicate an implementation team to 

manage the transformation process. 

• Establish networks to support 

implementation team. 

• Select high-performing team members. 

Use the performance management 

system to define the responsibility and 

assure accountability for change. 

• Adopt leading practices to implement 

effective performance management 

systems with adequate safeguards. 

Establish a communication strategy to 

create shared expectations and report 

related progress. 

• Communicate early and often to build 

trust. 

• Ensure consistency of message. 

• Encourage two-way communication. 

• Provide information to meet specific needs 

of employees. 

Involve employees to obtain their ideas 

and gain ownership for the 

transformation. 

• Use employee teams. 

• Involve employees in planning and 

sharing performance information. 

• Incorporate employee feedback into new 

policies and procedures. 

• Delegate authority to appropriate 

organizational levels. 

Build a world-class organization. • Adopt leading practices to build a worldclass organization. 

Source: GAO-03-699. 

Appendix VI: Key Practices and 

Implementation Steps for Mergers and 

Organizational Transformations 
Appendix VII: Contacts and Acknowledgments 

Page 41 GAO-04-242 Federal Air Marshal Service 

Gerald Dillingham, (202) 512-2834 

Carol Anderson-Guthrie, (214) 777-5739 

In addition to those named above, Bess Eisenstadt, David Hooper, Kevin 

Jackson, Maren McAvoy, Minette Richardson, Laura Shumway, Rick 

Smith, Gladys Toro, and Alwynne Wilber made key contributions to this 

report. 

Appendix VII: Contacts and 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contacts 

Acknowledgments 

(540078) 
The General Accounting Office, the audit, evaluation and investigative arm of 

Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities 

and to help improve the performance and accountability of the federal 

government for the American people. GAO examines the use of public funds; 

evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides analyses, 

recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make informed 

oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s commitment to good government 

is reflected in its core values of accountability, integrity, and reliability. 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost is 

through the Internet. GAO’s Web site (www.gao.gov) contains abstracts and fulltext files of current reports and testimony and an expanding archive of older 

products. The Web site features a search engine to help you locate documents 

using key words and phrases. You can print these documents in their entirety, 

including charts and other graphics. 

Each day, GAO issues a list of newly released reports, testimony, and 

correspondence. GAO posts this list, known as “Today’s Reports,” on its Web site 

daily. The list contains links to the full-text document files. To have GAO e-mail 

this list to you every afternoon, go to www.gao.gov and select “Subscribe to e-mail 

alerts” under the “Order GAO Products” heading. 

The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 each. A 

check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of Documents. 

GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or more copies mailed to a 

single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders should be sent to: 

U.S. General Accounting Office 

441 G Street NW, Room LM 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 

TDD: (202) 512-2537 

Fax: (202) 512-6061 

Contact: 

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm 

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470 

Jeff Nelligan, Managing Director, NelliganJ@gao.gov (202) 512-4800 

U.S. General Accounting Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

GAO’s Mission 

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony 

Order by Mail or Phone 

To Report Fraud, 

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs 

Public Affairs