for an abuse of discretion). Moreover, even assuming error occurred, 

appellant cannot demonstrate prejudice, as he exercised a peremptory 

strike against the prospective juror and has not shown that any seated 

juror was biased. Id. at 796, 121 P.3d at 578 ("If the jury actually seated 

is impartial, the fact that a defendant had to use a peremptory challenge 

to achieve that result does not mean that the defendant was denied his 

right to an impartial jury."). 

Appellant next contends that the district court abused its 

discretion by rejecting his Batson' challenge to the prosecutor's 

peremptory strike of an African-American juror on the ground that he 

failed to make a prima facie showing of discriminatory intent. 

Determining whether the prosecutor's peremptory challenge against a 

juror was discriminatory involves a three-step analysis—the first step 

being that appellant must make a prima facie showing of discriminatory 

intent. See Diomampo ix State, 124 Nev. 414, 185 P.3d 1031 (2008) 

(identifying the three steps of a Batson analysis). A prima facie showing 

requires the proponent of the challenge to demonstrate "that the totality of 

the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose." 

Batson, 476 -U.S. at 93-94; see Watson v. State, 130 Nev., Adv. Op 76, 335 

P.3d 157, 166 (2014). Here, appellant argued that the prosecutor violated 

Batson because there was "no valid reason other than the fact that [the 

challenged prospective juror] was African-American." Because appellant 

proffered no facts giving rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose, the 

district court did not abuse its discretion by denying his Batson challenge. 

See Watson v. State, Nev., Adv. Op. 76, 335 P.3d 157, 166 (2014) 

'Batson u. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) 

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(observing that "the mere fact that the State used a peremptory challenge 

to exclude a member of a cognizable group is not, standing alone, sufficient 

to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Batson's first 

step"). 

Appellant further argues that the State committed misconduct 

during voir dire by using the word "victim" and asking prospective jurors 

whether crime victims deserve a fair trial. "To determine if prejudicial 

prosecutorial misconduct occurred, the relevant inquiry is whether a 

prosecutor's statements so infected the proceedings with unfairness as to 

result in a denial of due process." Anderson v. State, 121 Nev. 511, 516, 

118 P.3d 184, 187 (2005). "A prosecutor's comments should be viewed in 

context, and 'a criminal conviction is not to be lightly overturned on the 

basis of a prosecutor's comments standing alone." Knight v. State, 116 

Nev. 140, 144-45, 993 P.2d 67, 71 (2000) (quoting United States v. Young, 

470 U.S. 1, 11 (1985)). We conclude that the prosecutor's single reference 

to whether crime victims deserve a fair trial and infrequent use of the 

word "victim" during voir dire did not render the proceedings unfair 

Therefore no relief is warranted on this claim. 

Appellant next argues that the district court abused its 

discretion by rejecting three proffered jury instructions. His first proffered 

instruction concerned witness credibility and was based on a California 

instruction. 2While his instruction was more robust in its description of 

2Appellant proposed the following instruction regarding witness 

credibility: 

The credibility or believability of a witness 

should be determined by anything that reasonably 

tends to prove or disprove the truth or accuracy of 

continued on next page . . 

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what matters jurors should consider in weighing a witness' credibility, the 

district court's instruction included many elements of the proffered 

. . . continued 

that testimony. Among the factors that you may 

consider are the witness's ability to see, hear, or 

otherwise perceive things about which the witness 

testified; the witness's ability to remember and 

describe what happened; the witness's behavior 

while testifying; whether the witness understood 

the questions and answered them directly; 

whether the witness's testimony was influenced by 

a factor such as bias or prejudice, a personal 

relationship with someone involved in the case, or 

a personal interest in how the case is decided; the 

witness's attitude about the case or testifying; 

whether the witness made a statement in the past 

that is consistent or inconsistent with his or her 

testimony; whether the witness's testimony was 

reasonable when considering all the other 

evidence in the case; whether other evidence 

proved or disproved any fact about which the 

witness testified; whether the witness admitted to 

being untruthful; the witness's character for 

truthfulness; whether the witness has been 

convicted of a felony; whether the witness engaged 

in conduct that reflects on his or her believability; 

and was the witness promised immunity or 

leniency in exchange for his or her testimony. 

If you do not believe a witness's testimony 

that he or she no longer remembers something, 

that testimony is inconsistent with the witness's 

earlier statement on that subject. 

If you believe that a witness has lied about 

any material fact in the case, you may disregard 

the entire testimony of that witness or any portion 

of his testimony which is not proved by other 

evidence. 

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instruction and appellant has not identified any prejudice resulting from 

the omission of his instruction. 3Therefore, we conclude that no relief is 

warranted in this regard. Appellant's second and third proffered 

instructions advised the jurors about evidence that is susceptible to two 

interpretations. 4We have considered similar instructions and concluded 

3The district court gave the following instruction regarding witness 

credibility: 

The credibility or believability of a witness 

should be determined by his/her manner upon the 

stand, his/her relationship to the parties, his/her 

fears, motives, interest or feelings, his/her 

opportunity to have observed the matter to which 

he/she testified, the reasonableness of his/her 

statements and the strength or weakness of 

his/her recollections. 

If you believe that a witness has lied about 

any material fact in the case, you may disregard 

the entire testimony of that witness or any portion 

of his testimony which is not proved by other 

evidence. 

4Appellant proposed the following instruction regarding evidence 

susceptible to two interpretations: 

If the evidence in this case is subject to two 

constructions or interpretations, each of which 

appears to you to be reasonable, and one of which 

points to the guilt of the Defendant, and the other 

to the Defendant being not guilty, it is your duty 

to adopt the interpretation which will admit of the 

Defendant's being not guilty, and reject that which 

points to guilt. 

You will notice the rule applies only when 

both of the two possible opposing conclusions 

appear to you to be reasonable. If, on the other 

hand, one of the possible conclusions should 

continued on next page . . . 

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that it is not error to reject such instructions where the jury is properly 

instructed on reasonable doubt. Hooper v. State, 95 Nev. 924, 927, 604 

P.2d 115, 117 (1979); Bails v. State, 92 Nev. 95, 97, 545 P.2d 1155, 1156 

(1976). Because the jury was instructed on reasonable doubt, we conclude 

that the district court did not abuse its discretion in this regard. See 

Crawford v. State, 121 Nev. 744, 748, 121 P.3d 582, 585 (2005). 

Finally, appellant contends that the evidence presented at 

trial was insufficient to support the jury's finding of guilt. In particular, 

he contends that the evidence shows corporal punishment, not child abuse. 

Our review of the record on appeal, however, reveals sufficient evidence to 

establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as determined by a rational trier 

of fact. See Origel-Candido v. State, 114 Nev. 378, 381, 956 P.2d 1378, 

1380 (1998); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). Testimony was 

introduced showing that appellant struck the victim in the face 

repeatedly, causing her head to hit a cabinet and her nose to bleed. The 

jury could reasonably infer from the evidence presented that he was guilty 

of child abuse, despite his claim that he merely disciplined the victim, no 

medical treatment was necessary, and no lasting harm resulted. See NRS 

200.508(1). It is for the jury to determine the weight and credibility to 

give conflicting testimony, and the jury's verdict will not be disturbed on 

appeal where, as here, substantial evidence supports it. See Bolden v. 

. continued 

appear to you to be reasonable and the other to be 

unreasonable, it would be your duty to adhere to 

the reasonable deduction and to reject the 

unreasonable, bearing in mind, however, even if 

the reasonable deduction points to the Defendant's 

guilt, the entire proof must be beyond a reasonable 

doubt to support a verdict of guilty. 

6 
State, 97 Nev. 71, 73, 624 P.2d 20, 20 (1981); see also McNair v. State, 108 

Nev. 53, 56, 825 P.2d 571, 573 (1992). 

Having considered appellant's claims and concluded that they 

lack merit, we 

ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED. 

, C.J. 

Hardesty 

Parraguirre —C2CM6S6er 

saaut-ct. 14-3 

Douglas 

cc: Hon. Kathleen E. Delaney, District Judge 

Clark County Public Defender 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

J. 

J. 

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